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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


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COLONIZATION 


A  STUDY  OF  THE   FOUNDING 
OF  NEW  SOCIETIES 


BY 


ALBERT  GALLOWAY  KELLER,  Ph.D. 

Professor  of  the  Science  of  Society  in  Yale  University 


GINN  &   COMPANY 

BOSTON  .  NEW  YORK  •  CHICAGO  ■  LONDON 


Entered  at  Stationers'  Hall 


Copyright,  1908,  by 
ALBERT   GALLOWAY   KELLER 


ALL    RIGHTS    RESERVED 


78.S 


Clit   Stbtnettim   i)rt<< 

GINN   .V   CDMI'ANY  •   I'RO- 
ruil-TOKS  •  lUlsroN  •  U.S.A. 


TO 

WILLIAM   GRAHAM   SUMNER 


Xelpeaai  dTifiapriai  7ri/Xas  vbov  aliv  6'i.'yvvs' 
^l/evdea  5  ixGaipeii'  Kal  vrjXti  dvp-if  ifpopfxav 
OTrXoTepoi.  irpbs  aov  (Oa.T)p.iv  ■   aol  X'^P's  ecrru. 


CONTENTS 

Pages 

INTRODUCTION ix-xii 

CHAPTER  I.     DEFINITION  AND   CLASSIFICATION      .  1-20 

Emigration  and  Conquest.  Basis  of  Classification.  Vital  Conditions. 
Population.  Industrial  Organization.  Agricultural  Economy.  Types  of 
Society.     Conclusion. 

CHAPTER  11.    COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE       21-78 

The  Colonies  of  the  Chinese.  The  Colonies  of  the  Phoenicians.  Con- 
ditions of  the  Development  of  Trade.  Characteristics  of  Phoenician 
Commerce.  Nature  and  Extent  of  the  "  Empire."  Relations  of  the 
Colony  and  Metropolis.  Carthage  as  a  Phoenician  Colony.  Temper  and 
Influence  of  the  Phoenicians.  The  Colonies  of  the  Greeks.  Motives  of 
Emigration.  Relation  of  the  awoiKla  to  its  Metropolis.  Extent  of  Greek 
Colonization.  Character  of  the  Colonies.  The  Roman  Coloiiiae.  Motives 
for  Founding  the  Coloniac.  Nature  of  the  Coloiiia.  Romanization  :  Case 
of  Gaul.  Mediaeval  Italian  Colonies.  Settlement  in  the  Eevant :  Motives 
and  Extent.  Character  of  the  Foiidachi.  Relation  of  Colony  and  Metrop- 
olis. Monopoly  Policy  and  Trade  Wars.  Decline  before  the  Turks. 
Italian  Influences  upon  Later  Ages.  The  Italians  in  the  Discoveries 
Period. 
Summary  of  the  Conditions  of  Colonization  preceding  the  Discoveries. 

CHAPTER  III.     THE   PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST      .     79-130 

Conditioning  Factors  of  Iberian  Colonization.  Portugal's  Preparation 
for  Colonization.  Henry  the  Navigator.  Effects  of  the  Discovery  of  the 
Cape  Route.  Conditions  in  India.  Conditions  of  Navigation.  The 
Monopoly  and  its  Defense.  The  "  Crusade  in  the  East "  :  Almeida. 
Albuquerque :  his  Administration,  Personality,  and  Policy.  Extent  of 
the  Empire.  The  Army  and  Navy.  'Monopoly  Policy  and  Demoraliza- 
tion. Demoralization  in  the  Metropolis.  Corrupt  Administration  in  India. 
Social  Conditions  in  India.  Relations  with  the  Natives.  Activities  of 
the  Church.  Infringement  and  Collapse  of  the  Monopoly.  Portuguese 
Africa.     Angola.     Mozambique.     Portuguese  Influences  in  Africa. 

CHAPTER  IV.     THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  .     .     .131-167 

Early  Conditions:  the  Captaincies.  Industry  and  Trade.  Social  Con- 
ditions. Relations  with  the  Natives :  the  Labor  Question.  Foreign 
Aggression.  The  Gold  and  Diamond  Discoveries.  The  Expulsion  of 
the  Jesuits.     Conditions  Preceding  Independence.     Factors   Leading  to 


vi  COLONIZATION 

Independence.     Achievements  of  the  Portuguese  in  Brazil.     Conclusion      "ages 

of  Portuguese  Colonization. 

Note    on    Brazilian    Revenue.      Estimates    of    the    Yield    of    ("rold    and 

Diamonds. 


CHAPTER  V.    THE  BEGINNINGS  AND  THE  SETTING 

OF  SPANISH   COLONIZATION 168-206 

Political  and  Religious  Unification.  Economic  Strength.  Comparison 
of  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  Discoveries.  Effects  of  the  Discovery  of 
America.  The  Demarcation.  Early  Policy  of  Spain.  The  Conquests. 
The  Early  Strength  of  Spain.  Spanish  Decadence  and  its  Causes. 
"Accidental"  Causes.  Political  Causes.  Treatment  of  Foreigners. 
Treatment  of  Jews  and  Moriscos.  Legislation  and  Regulation.  At- 
tempted Reform.  Ta.xation.  Economic  and  Social  Causes  for  Decline. 
Religious  Causes  for  Decline.  The  Colonial  Career  as  a  Cause  for 
Decline.     The  Mercantile  System.     The  Inflow  of  Bullion. 

CHAPTER  VI.  SPANISH  AMERICA:  POPULATION, 
INDUSTRY,  AND  TRADE 207-241 

Mine-Production  and  Revenue.  Emigration  to  America.  Restriction  of 
Emigration.  Constituents  of  Population.  Race-Mixture.  Interrelation 
of  Classes.  Industrial  Organization.  Trade-Restriction.  Monopoly 
Policy.  The  Seville  Monopoly.  The  Casa  de  Contratacioii.  The  Fleets 
and  Galleons;  the  Fairs.  Further  Restriction  :  the  Privileged  Companies. 
Results  of  Restriction.     Disintegration  of  the  Restrictive  System. 

CHAPTER    VII.      SPANISH     AMERICA:       RELATIONS 

WITH    FOREIGNERS   AND   NATIVES    ....'...  242-282 

The  Exclusion  Policy.  The  Safeguarding  of  the  Monopoly.  The  In- 
fringement of  the  Monopoly.  The  Asieiitos:  Illicit  Traffic.  Territorial 
Aggressions.  Decline  of  the  Spanish  Sea-Power.  The  Contact  of  Races. 
The  Conflict  of  the  Economic  Need  and  the  Religious  Motive.  Subjuga- 
tion. Enslavement.  The  Kcpartiinieutos  and  IC>icomiendas.  Decline  of 
the  Native  Population.  Causes  of  Dejiopulation.  Protective  Legislation. 
Las  Casas:  the  New  Laws.  Effectiveness  of  Governmental  Control. 
Negro  Slavery. 

CHAPTER  VIII.  SPANISH  AMERICA:  MISSIONS, 
CLERGY,  GOVERNMENT 283-315 

Indian  Village  I>ife.  Extension  of  Religious  Influence.  The  Missions. 
Seclusion  of  the  Natives.  The  Jesuit  Reductions  in  Paraguay.  Expul- 
sion of  the  Jesuits.  Conclusion  of  the  Spanish  Native  Policy.  Clerical 
Organization.  Policy  and  Influence  of  the  Clergy.  Colonial  Administra- 
tion. The  Coiiqiiistadores.  Transfer  of  the  Metropolitan  system :  the 
King.  The  Council  of  the  Indies.  The  Viceroy  and  Aitdioicia.  Char- 
acter and  Results  of  the  System.  Class  Discriminations.  Colonial 
Revenue. 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTER  IX.    SPANISH  AMERICA:   15UEN()S  AYRES ;     p^'^-^^ 
CUBA.    THE  PHILIPPINES.     AFRICA 316-365 

Early  Conditions  in  the  Southern  Colonies.  Contrasts  with  the  Northern 
Colonies.  Movements  toward  Independence.  Grievances  of  the  Colo- 
nists: the  Revolution.  Summary  of  Spanish  Influence.  Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico.  Cuba  after  1800.  The  Supply  of  Labor.  Spanish  Policy 
in  Cuba.  Insurrection.  Cuba's  Relations  with  the  United  States. 
Puerto  Rico.  The  Philippines.  The  Moros.  Constituents  of  Popula- 
tion. Industrial  Organization.  Clerical  Predominance.  Power  of  the 
Church.  Results  of  Clerical  Rule.  Administration.  Foreign  Aggression 
and  Popular  Discontent.     Anti-Clericalism  :    Revolt.     Spanish  Africa. 

CHAPTER  X.  COLONIZATION  OF  THE  NETHER- 
LANDERS:   SETTING;   THE    INDIA  COMPANIES     .     .  366-415 

Unification.  The  Struggle  for  Freedom  of  Faith.  Economic  Strength. 
Growth  of  Trade.  Commercial  Predominance  of  the  North.  Resistance 
to  Spanish  Policy.  Movements  toward  Independence.  The  Revolt. 
Development  of  Trade  :  Earlier  Voyages.  The  Voyage  to  India.  Foun- 
dation of  the  East  India  Company.  The  Charter.  The  Monopoly. 
Relations  of  Company  and  State.  Interrelation  of  the  Chambers. 
Internal  Organization.  Rights  of  Shareholders.  Participation.  Conflicts 
between  Directors  and  Shareholders.  Hostility  to  the  Company.  Re- 
newals of  the  Charter;  Decline.  Foundation  of  the  West  India  Com- 
pany. Willem  Usselincx.  Organization  of  the  West  India  Company. 
Maladministration  and  Decline. 

CHAPTER  XL    THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS     416-462 

Centralization  of  Administration.  The  Crushing  of  Competition.  Monop- 
oly Policy ;  Oppression  of  the  Natives.  Policy  toward  Private  Trade. 
Limitation  of  Production.  Corruption  of  the  Service.  Native  Policy. 
Conquests;  Native  Services.  Policy  toward  Colonization.  The  Chinese. 
Foreign  Aggressions.  Bankruptcy  and  Ruin.  The  Cape  Settlements. 
The  Boers  as  a  Product  of  Company  Rule.  Policy  of  the  West  India 
Company  in  New  Netherlands.  Administration  :  the  Patrooiis.  Belated 
Reform.  The  Company  in  Brazil  and  Surinam.  Aspects  of  the  Chartered 
Company.  Influence  of  Dutch  Colonization.  Influence  of  the  Com- 
panies upon  the  Metropolis.     Collapse  of  the  Monopoly. 

CHAPTER  XII.  DUTCH  COLONIZATION  IN  THE 
NINETEENTH   CENTURY 463-495 

Reorganization:  Daendels.  British  Dominance:  Raffles.  His  Revenue 
and  Administrative  Systems.  The  Commission  of  1816.  Reversion  to 
Company  Policy.  The  Culture  System.  Plan  of  the  Culture  System. 
Real  Character  of  the  System.  Oppression  and  Corruption.  Condition 
of  the  Native.  Reputation  of  the  Culture  System.  Reform  :  Methods  of 
Indirection.  "  Max  Havelaar"  :  Decline  of  the  System.  "  Free  Labor." 
The  Chinese.  Recent  Fiscal  and  Other  Conditions.  The  Dutch  East 
Indies  other  than  Java;  the  Atjeh  War. 


viii  COLONIZATION 

CHAPTER  XIII.    THE    COLONIES   OF   THE   SCANDI-  p^<« 

NAVIANS 496-516 

The  Danish  East  India  Company.  The  Danish  West  Indies.  Early 
Conditions :  the  West  India  Company.  Purchase  by  the  King.  Admin- 
istration ;  Social  Conditions.  Trade-Conditions.  Decline  of  the  Islands. 
Polar  Colonies  of  the  Scandinavians.  Population  and  Life-Conditions 
of  Iceland.  Government.  Colonization  and  Life-Conditions  of  Greenland. 
Race-Contact.  | 

« 
CHAPTER    XIV.      MODERN    ITALIAN   AND    GERMAN 
COLONIZATION 517-596 

Italian  Colonization.  Disqualifications  of  Italy.  Motives  of  Expansion. 
The  African  Acquisitions.  Policy  and  Administration.  Creditable  Suc- 
cess.    Italy's  "Natural"  Colonies. 

German  Colonization.  Earlier  Colonial  Projects.  Unification  of  Ger- 
many. Agitation  for  Colonies.  Policy  of  Bismarck.  Colonial  Acquisi- 
tions. The  Chartered  Companies.  Character  of  the  Colonies.  Summary 
of  the  Beginnings.  General  Character  of  the  Colonial  Policy.  The 
Modern  Chartered  Company.  The  German  Companies :  Function  and 
Administration.  Imperial  Administration.  Population.  Colonial  Trade. 
Internal  Improvements;  liudget.  The  "  Native  Question."  Severity  and 
Cruelty :  Maladaptability.  Sirc-tige  mit  Gerec/iiigkeit.  The  Tropical  Labor 
Issue.  Compulsory  Labor.  Missions  and  Education.  The  Colonial  Service. 
Minor  Colonial  Possessions.     Colonial  Prospects. 

MONEY-EQUIVALENTS 597 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  AND  BIBLIOGRAPHY     .     .  599-611 

INDEX 613-630 

MAPS 631 


INTRODUCTION 

The  main  motive  in  writing  this  volume  has  been  to  provide  a 
text-book  for  the  study  of  colonization.  It  does  not  take  one  who 
essays  to  teach  the  subject  long  to  see  the  futility  of  dilating  upon 
this  or  that  aspect  of  colonization  when  his  students  are  not  yet 
in  possession  of  an  adequate  historical  background  ;  but  this  they 
seldom  have.  Their  historical  studies  have  generally  been  circum- 
scribed, and  envisaged  from  different  standpoints  ;  while  coloniza- 
tion, if  approached  by  the  comparative  method,  must  call  for  a 
wealth  of  historical  allusion,  widespread  both  as  to  place  and  time. 
In  the  absence  of  text-books,  at  least  in  English,  of  any  adequate 
character,  the  instructor  in  colonization  is  therefore  confronted  by 
an  ever-present  dilemma :  the  assignment  of  widely  scattered  and 
disconnected  collateral  readings,  or  the  devotion  of  a  large  part  of 
his  lectures  to  historical  detail.  The  former  alternative  is,  for 
practical  reasons,  next  to  impossible  for  classes  of  any  size  ;  and 
it  is  rendered  in  a  higher  degree  impracticable,  so  far  as  compre- 
hensiveness goes,  by  reason  of  the  linguistic  training  which  it  must 
involve.  In  the  field  of  colonial  history,  translations,  especially 
from  the  less  well-known  foreign  languages,  are  but  few  ;  and  it 
is  only  by  the  rarest  exception  that  even  a  German  or  French 
treatise  can  be  utilized  ;  for  the  undergraduate  who  ventures  upon 
the  actual  use  of  even  those  languages  upon  which  he  has  spent  a 
good  deal  of  time  is  commonly  a  prey  to  faint-heartedness  and 
sore  misgiving.  Thus,  at  best,  assigned  readings  must  be  of 
narrow  scope.  And  as  for  the  other  alternative,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
obliged  to  introduce  into  lectures  that  from  which  a  text-book 
ought  to  secure  freedom,  the  instructor  is  compelled  to  exclude 
what  he  regards  as  more  worth  while  and  to  sacrifice  the  continuity 
and  logic  of  his  exposition. 

To  meet  such  a  need,  felt  personally,  the  following  sketches  of 
colonial  history  have  been  written.  They  have  been  condensed  so 
far  as  their  purpose  seemed  to  allow,  and  include  very  little  that 
appeared  at  the  time  of  writing  reasonably  easy  of  access  to  serious 


X  COLONIZATION 

students.  Thus  the  whole  of  British  and  French  colonization  has 
been  passed  over,  although  there  existed  here  an  added  deterrent 
in  the  intolerable  lengthening  of  a  task  somewhat  outside  of  the 
author's  field,  if  such  a  pair  of  topics  were  to  be  included.  It 
seemed  likewise  that  the  author  would  be  able  to  add  little  to 
what  is  accessible  to  any  one  concerning  the  colonial  activities  of 
the  Russians,  Belgians,  Americans,  and  Japanese.  Consequently, 
of  the  moderns,  only  the  Germans  and  the  Italians  are  treated, 
and  they  in  something  of  the  appendix  style  ;  for  until  they  are 
taken  up  the  continuity  of  the  narrative  need  show  no  essential 
breaks.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to  treat  the  several  colonizing 
states  in  slightly  differing  ways,  while  adhering,  in  the  main,  to  one 
general  plan ;  indeed,  such  shifting  of  emphasis  has  been  almost 
unconscious  in  view  of  the  fact  that  accessible  material  tended  to 
show  strength  now  in  one  direction  and  again  in  another.  The 
treatment  is  not  designed  to  be  encyclopaedic.  Nor,  finally,  is  any 
consistent  endeavor  made  to  bring  everything  up  to  date ;  for  the 
present-day  political,  fiscal,  and  other  details,  publications  on  the 
order  of  the  Statesman's  Year-Book,  with  its  references,  can  easily 
be  consulted.  What  have  seemed  to  the  author  from  his  point  of 
approach  to  be  the  signal  and  salient  facts  and  relations  in  the 
colonial  history  of  the  ancient,  mediaeval,  and  modern  peoples  have 
been  set  forth,  with  some  pedagogic  devices  of  partial  repetition 
and  the  like,  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  college  student  as  these 
have  been  brought  home  by  the  experience  of  several  years.  The 
hope  is  not  renounced,  however,  that  this  book  may  be  useful  to 
others  than  college  students.  The  American  collegian  is,  after  all, 
simply  a  member  of  society  in  posse  who  is  being  put  through  a 
course  of  learning  designed  to  fit  him  to  become  one  in  esse.  In 
general,  the  kind  of  book  upon  any  particular  subject  that  may 
meet  his  needs  ought  to  meet  those  of  one  who,  in  later  life,  it  may 
be,  is  directing  his  own  education  along  the  same  line.  It  is  hoped 
that  the  information  here  assembled,  and  its  arrangement,  may 
prove  of  some  utility  to  any  one  interested  in  colonization. 

Naturally,  however,  any  such  fact-assembling  must  be  referred 
to  some  set  of  guiding  elective  and  systematizing  principles ;  and 
these,  in  the  present  case,  are  such  as  appeal  to  the  student  of 
human  societies.  The  study  is  one  of  that  societal  movement 
which  commonly  results  in  the  formation  of  new  societies  in  new 
environments,  and  so  seems  to  the  writer  —  though  the  question  of 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

nomenclature  is  naturally  a  matter  of  indifference  —  to  be  ranged 
rather  under  the  social  sciences  than  under  history  in  any  moderate 
and  reasonable  understanding  of  the  term.  There  has  been  no 
attempt  to  get  at  new  historical  data,  but  rather  to  assemble  what 
is  known  and  arrange  it  under  somewhat  different  categories,  with 
an  eye  to  any  important  relationships,  newly  or  long  recognized, 
that  may  emerge.^    Hence  the  sub-title  of  this  book. 

And  it  may  be  worth  while,  perhaps,  to  go  a  little  farther  and 
indicate  the  place  in  a  series  of  studies  of  man  and  human  society 
which  colonization  as  here  treated  is  designed  to  occupy.  It  pre- 
supposes some  such  study  as  geography  in  its  broader  sense, 
including  physical  geography,  the  geography  of  man  (anthropo- 
geography),  and  the  geography  of  trade;  or,  put  more  generally, 
since  man  is  the  center  of  interest,  a  study  of  environmental 
influences  on  man  and  human  groups,  and  of  the  various  topics  of 
general  anthropology.  A  geography  of  trade  or  of  man  comes 
inevitably  to  touch  upon  the  trading  settlement,  which  is  in  turn 
the  commonest  forerunner  of  the  colony ;  and  the  science  of 
society  then  reaches  out  to  these  frontier  societies  as  in  many 
respects  peculiarly  significant.  The  subject  of  colonization  opens 
out,  therefore,  as  a  sort  of  special  topic  of  the  science  of  society 
(sociology),  following,  in  so  far  as  the  exigencies  of  a  curriculum 
will  allow,  upon  the  more  general  study  of  man  and  human  groups. 
It  is  possible  that  the  concreteness  of  these  statements  may  serve 
to  define  the  scope  and  method  of  attack  of  the  present  volume,  as 
the  more  general  considerations  which  precede  may  not. 

Finally,  although  some  attempt  has  been  made  to  define  a  colony, 
there  has  been  no  systematic  effort  put  forth  to  exclude  from 
treatment  everything  that  does  not  square  with  that  definition, 
loose  though  it  may  be  ;  this  book  deals  with  colonies  and  colonial 
empires  in  the  common  acceptance  of  these  terms. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  following  essays  I  have  received  aid 
from  many  colleagues  and  friends  ;  the  faithfulness  of  their  wounds 
accounts  for  a  large  part  of  any  value  which  these  labors  may 
have.  The  influence  of  Professor  Sumner  is  ever  present  with  his 
former  disciples  wherever  their  subsequent  interests  may  lie  ;  and 
I  am  conscious  in  particular  that  my  first  interest  in  colonies  as 
frontier  societies  was  awakened  by  his  illuminating  suggestions. 

^  See  the  Bibliographical  Note,  p.  599. 


xii  COLONIZATION 

It  is  but  fair,  though  I  esteem  it  a  great  privilege,  to  dedicate 
this  volume — and  I  wish  it  were  a  more  mature  and  worthier 
offering  —  to  him.  Among  younger  men  I  hasten  to  mention 
Professor  Edward  G.  Bourne,^  to  whose  stimulating  criticism  and 
helpfulness  and  never-failing  kindness  I  wish  here  to  bear  witness. 
I  have  also  been  privileged  to  profit  by  the  advice  and  criticism 
of  several  other  colleagues  in  the  matter  of  details  which  fell 
within  their  fields  ;  such  assistance  I  have  derived  from  Professors 
Gregory,  Emery,  Day,  Schevill,  and  many  others.  Formal  acknowl; 
edgments  are  due  to  my  colleagues  on  the  editorial  board  of  the 
Yale  Revieiv,  and  to  the  editors  of  the  Annals  of  the  American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  for  permission  to  use 
material  originally  published  in  those  journals. 

A.  G.  K. 
New  Haven,  Connecticut 

1  Now  that  this  gifted  and  intrepid  spirit  is  gone  from  among  us,  it  is  perhaps  of 
interest,  as  bearing  upon  his  many  side-activities,  to  record  the  fact  that  all  of  the 
following  chapters  except  X-XII  and  the  first  part  of  Xlll  were  read  in  manuscript 
and  criticised  by  him  —  Chapters  II-IX  during  the  early  weeks  of  his  last  illness. 


COLONIZATION 

CHAPTER   I 

DEFINITION  AND  CLASSIFICATION 

The  word  "colony  "  is  like  all  other  current  terms  of  language  in 
that  it  covers,  as  Whitney  puts  it,  "  not  a  point,  but  a  territory." 
For  the  purpose  of  this  book  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  the 
term  more  precise  ;  there  seems  to  be  no  urgent  need  for  restrict- 
ing it  artificially  to  cover  a  point,  but  it  must  be  defined  with 
reasonable  sharpness  within  a  portion  of  the  field  to  which  it  has 
come  to  be  applied. 

Emigration  and  Conquest 

The  fundamental  ideas  of  colonization  are  a  movement  of  popu- 
lation and  an  extension  of  political  power ;  because  it  is  allied  to 
them  both,  colonization  is  therefore  to  be  distinguished  on  the  one 
hand  from  migration,  and  on  the  other  from  conquest  in  the  broad 
sense.  The  former  distinction  is  not  so  difficult,  for  it  is  generally 
admitted  that  one  area  and  society  cannot  rightly  be  called  a  col- 
ony of  another  when  the  sum  of  mutual  relations  does  not  include 
political  dependence  of  the  former  upon  the  latter.  No  one  thinks 
of  regarding  the  Vandal  groups  in  Africa  as  having  been  colonies; 
and  if  the  Italian  settlements  in  Argentina  are  so  denominated,  it 
is  usually  with  the  added  qualification,  "  natural  "  (colonies),  or  the 
like.  The  other  distinction  is  more  troublesome  ;  yet  it  may  be 
said  that  in  common  understanding  of  the  terms  a  dependency  is 
scarcely  a  colony  until  it  contains  actual  emigrants  from  the  colo- 
nizing state  ;  or,  at  least,  until  it  looks  to  such  settlement,  or 
counts  upon  potential  emigration.  As  long  as  the  activity  of  the 
colonizing  state  is  purely  governmental,  —  as  long  as  the  immi- 
grants are  simply  officials, —  there  is  a  province,  perhaps,  but  no 


2  COLONIZATION 

colony.  However,  by  adding  either  of  these  fundamentals,  emigra- 
tion and  conquest,  to  the  other,  the  essence  of  colony  is  brought 
out.  A  group  of  emigrants  in  a  foreign  land  may  become  a  colony 
by  the  extension  of  political  control  over  them,  their  possessions, 
and  interests,  on  the  part  of  the  state  of  which  they  are  citizens; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  state-acquired  domain  or  mere  sphere  of 
influence  may  become  a  colony  through  settlement  by  non-official 
members  of  the  state's  population.  Both  individual  and  govern- 
mental initiative  and  subsequent  support  are  needful  in  the  crea- 
tion of  a  colony. 

Formulating  a  working  definition  upon  these  terms,  a  colony  is 
here  understood  to  be  a  political  dependency,  settled  or  prospec- 
tively to  be  settled,  to  some  degree,  by  the  citizens  of  its  dominant 
state.  This,  it  will  be  noted,  is  a  definition  of  a  type;  the  following 
treatment  may  exhibit  variations  about  the  type,  but  to  it  return  will 
constantly  be  made,  in  the  belief  that  it  represents  a  popular  and 
at  the  same  time  sufficiently  precise  conception.^  Cases  where 
either  of  the  two  prime  conditions  is  represented  rudimentarily 
will  be  treated  simply  for  the  light  which  such  immature,  simpli 
fied,  or  abnormal  forms  may  cast  upon  the  typical  or  normal  ones. 
More  specifically,  the  definition  would  exclude  as  a  whole  from 
direct  treatment  such  dependencies  as  the  Roman  provinces,  the 
Arabian  conquests  in  Africa,  the  Turkish  vilayets,  and  the  Chinese 
republican  communities  in  the  Malay  Archipelago,  although  any 
and  all  of  them  might  be  drawn  upon  for  side-lights  and  in  loco 
cxpcrimcnti,  while  it  would  include  the  territories  of  the  United 
States,  Russian  possessions  in  Asia,  and  the  like.  The  so-called 
"  interior  colonization  "  of  the  Germans  would  naturally  be  a  mis- 
nomer on  the  basis  of  the  definition  suggested. 

The  portion  of  the  "  territory"  connoted  by  colony  and  coloniza- 
tion being  thus  roughly  defined,  its  limits  can  be  sharpened  in 
some  degree  by  proceeding  to  a  classification  of  colonies  ;  for 
although  this  classification,  being  one  of  societies,  might  apply  to 
groups  which  do  not  form  colonies,  yet,  as  a  cross-classification,  it 
should  not  be  without  its  value  in  filling  out  the  conception  of  the 
term  "  colony  "  itself. 

1  The  etymological  demonstrations  in  which  some  writers  on  colonies  deal  are  of 
little  or  no  value  in  framing  a  working  definition.  They  are  rather  of  historic  interest. 
The  etymology  of  colo)iia  is  of  great  value  in  forming  a  conception  of  the  character 
of  the  Roman  colonies;  but  the  modern  term  "colony"  conveys  a  dissimilar  and 
modern  conception,  suited  to  the  modern  world  and  its  organization, 


DEFINITION   AND  CLASSIFICATION  3 

Basis  of  Classification 

It  is  a  common  conviction  among  students  of  the  less  complex 
forms  of  human  society  that  the  character  of  the  latter  is  ulti- 
mately, if  not  immediately,  determined  by  the  conditions  of  natural 
environment.^  For  these  conditions  at  once  evoke  the  local  form 
of  the  struggle  for  existence,  that  is,  the  industrial  organization  ; 
and  upon  the  latter  rests  a  series  of  secondary  social  forms,  such 
as  systems  of  property-holding,  marriage,  and  government.  And  it 
is  further  believed  by  those  who  hold  this  view  that  the  influences 
of  natural  environment  enter  far  deeper  into  the  life  of  even  the 
more  evolved  societies  than  is  generally  recognized.  If  now  such 
a  standpoint  were  taken,  and  natural  environment  were  conceded, 
if  only  for  the  sake  of  argument,  to  be  a  sort  of  elemental  deter- 
minant in  the  destiny  of  societies  in  general,  it  would  be  so  a 

fortiori  in  respect  to  such  special  and  peculiar  forms  of  societies 
as  colonies.  For  colonial  societies  are,  by  their  wide  diffusion  over 
the  earth,  exposed  to  a  great  variety  of  environmental  influences, 
under  conditions  where  these  can  be  the  more  freely  gauged  and 
estimated,  owing  to  the  essential  constancy  of  other  factors  (e.g.  race- 
character  of  the  colonizers)  whose  diversity  commonly  obscures 
every  such  valuation.  Here  should  be  a  chance  for  a  striking 
refutation  or  vindication  of  more  general  views. 

But  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  present  purpose  to  embark 
upon  any  such  troubled  waters  in  attempting  to  demonstrate 
wide  generalities.  Naturally,  as  has  been  hinted,  the  relationship 
between  a  society  and  its  environment  comes  out  most  clearly  in 

.  the  case  of  the  simpler  human  groups  which  are,  as  we  say, 
"nearer  to  Nature";  but  colonies  are,  at  least  in  their  begin- 
nings, societies  of  relative  simplicity,  as  yet  unendowed  with  that 
accumulation  of  relationships,  institutions,  and  so  on,  through 
which  older  human  groups  appear  to  have  rendered  themselves, 
to  some  extent,  independent  of  natural  conditions.  If  this  is 
admitted,  either  through  conviction  or  as  a  working  hypothesis, 
then  it  should  be  possible  to  construct  a  useful  classification  of 

1  The  views  set  forth  in  this  classification  represent  a  sort  of  composite  impression 
derived  from  the  reading  of  some  years  in  anthropology,  sociology,  and  colonial 
history.  Hence  it  is  impracticable,  if  not  impossible,  to  fix  the  exact  provenance  of 
derived  ideas.  That  which  is  owed  to  Darwin,  Ilu.xley,  Spencer,  Sumner,  and  other 
stock  authorities  will  be  easily  recognized. 


4  COLONIZATION 

colonial  societies  upon  the  broader  variations  of  the  natural  con- 
ditions to  which  they  are  or  have  been  exposed. 

Of  these  conditions  climate  is,  in  the  present  case  at  least,  the 
vital  and  determining  one.  It  is  usually  so,  carrying  with  it,  as  it 
does,  so  many  other  factors  whose  variations  are  correlated  with 
its  own ;  for  instance,  flora  and  fauna,  including  among  the  latter 
the  microscopic  fauna  of  disease.  Climate,  though  itself  varying 
in  accordance  with  several  factors,  and  though  it  evades  classifica- 
tion except  by  type,  may  still,  for  the  purpose  in  hand,  be  broadly 
divided  into  tropical  and  temperate.  But  this  distinction  would  be 
of  no  utility  in  classifying  colonics,  because  too  general,  if  these 
distinct  types  of  climate  did  not  condition  the  human  struggle  for 
existence  in  a  manner  so  vital  as  to  determine  two  distinct  types 
of  industrial  organization,  upon  which  in  turn,  as  what  follows  is 
designed  to  show,  there  would  regularly  be  developed  two  dis- 
tinctly variant  types  of  human  society.  Thus  the  classification 
based  upon  climate  and  attendant  influences  may  be  shifted  over 
into  a  classification  based  upon  the  type  of  the  industrial  organiza- 
tion. Anticipating  what  is  to  follow,  we  should  then  distinguish 
the  tropical  and  the  temperate  colony  upon  the  ground  of  their 
common  and  basic  occupation,  agriculture,  and  might  name  them 
respectively  \hQ  plantation  colony  and  \hQ.farm  colony} 

Vital  Conditions 

But  there  are  not  a  few  considerations  and  reflections  of  a  more 
concrete  nature  that  underlie  the  assertions  ventured  in  the  last 
paragraph  ;  we  turn  now  to  what  must  be  a  rather  rapid  survey  of 
the  same.  The  new  environmental  influences  felt  by  colonists 
most  obviously  condition  the  struggle  for  existence,  perhaps, 
through  their  direct  action  upon  the  struggling  individual  or  group; 
they  create  new  vital  conditions,  conformity  to  which  means  life, 
health,  fecundity,  working  power  of  body  and  mind,  while  inability 
to  conform  entails  an  absence  of  these  same  advantages.  The 
issue  is  one  which  popular  parlance  rightly  denominates  one  of 
acclimatization.  The  question  of  acclimatization  is  simplified  in 
the  colonial  field  because  the  important  colonizing  nations  of  the 

1  As  this  classification  is  based  in  large  part  upon  data  to  be  found  in  the  succeed- 
ing chapters,  it  is  suggested  to  the  teacher  that  the  first  chapter  might  profitably  be 
re-read  by  the  student  after  completing  the  book. 


DEFINITION   AND  CLASSIFICATION  5 

world  have  been  without  exception  nations  of  the  temperate  zone 
and  mainly  Europeans  ;  hence  the  racial  element  is  all  but  elimi- 
nated, and  the  colonists  may  be  conceived  as  moving  either  into 
regions  of  a  temperate  climate  similar  to  their  own  at  home,  or 
into  the  tropics.  Climate  transitional  between  these  two  types, 
and  polar  climates,^  must  be  understood  to  exist,  but  need  not 
confuse  or  add  to  the  main  and  clearly  marked  types. 

Let  us  first  consider  the  vital  conditions  of  the  European  colo- 
nist in  another  part  of  the  temperate  zone.  From  such  a  change  he 
is  likely  to  experience  physical  profit  rather  than  detriment.  What 
variations  he  encounters  in  physical  conditions  are  seldom  so  great 
as  to  call  for  vital  modifications  in  his  constitution  or  mode  of 
living,  while  on  the  other  hand  there  exist  the  positive  advantages 
of  a  life  free  from  the  crowding  and  over-competition  of  his  fellows.^ 
Conflicts  with  the  native  races  have  been,  in  the  temperate  colonies, 
short,  though  sharp,  and  the  outcome  never  seriously  in  doubt ; 
indeed,  the  aborigines  have  been  but  sparsely  represented  in 
temperate  regions  at  all  open  to  colonization.^  The  momentum 
of  the  inter-racial  struggle  and  the  elation  of  relatively  easy  and 
sweeping  victories  have  often  lent  to  the  colonists  a  vigor  that 
lasted  on.  That  such  change  of  environment  is  generally  bene- 
ficial is  indicated  by  the  more  rapid  growth  of  population  in  the 
new  country  as  compared  with  that  at  home,  despite  the  ruder 
conditions  met.  It  is  also  likely  that  the  physical  and  mental 
quality  of  the  population  is  bettered,  partly  no  doubt  because 
of  the  more  unrestricted  activity  of  natural,  and  perhaps  of  sexual, 
selection  as  compared  with  their  impeded  action  under  the  regime 
of  a  higher  development  of  the  arts.  There  are  fewer  of  those 
agencies,  such  as  surgery,  medicine,  humanitarian  institutions, 
and  the  like,  by  which  man  seeks  to  lessen  the  mortality  of  the 
less  fit,  and  the  selection  of  mates  must  rest  more  largely  upon 


^  The  really  polar  possessions  of  the  Danes,  Russians,  Americans,  and  British 
have  never  assumed  the  real  forms  of  self-supporting  colonies.  They  are  temporary 
camps  of  hunters,  traders,  miners,  or  missionaries,  and  if  they  deserve  the  name  of 
colony  at  all,  they  represent  aberrant  and  e.xtreme  forms. 

2  The  many  analogies  between  man's  occupation  of  a  new  habitat  and  what  is  well 
known  to  naturalists  concerning  the  migrations  and  struggles  of  plants  and  animals 
scarcely  need  to  be  pointed  out. 

^  In  Australia  and  America,  for  example.  Such  a  country  as  China  is  taken  to  be 
not  open  to  colonization.  For  the  effects  of  contact  upon  the  native  stocks,  see  p.  269 
below. 


6  COLONIZATION 

physical  adequacy.  Again,  although  nature  yields  a  liberal  return 
to  sturdy  effort,  no  bounty  is  offered  regardless  of  industry  and 
foresight.  The  temperate  colony  is  one  which  invigorates  the 
constitution  of  the  immigrant  race  and  at  the  same  time  coerces 
it  into  an  incessant  and  wholesome  activity  in  meeting  and  coping 
with  difficult  but  not  insuperable  obstacles. 

In  a  tropical  country,  on  the  other  hand,  there  occurs  a  \it)lent 
change  in  the  life  of  the  emigrant  from  temperate  regions.  The  man 
animal  is  out  of  his  habitat.  A  few  years  of  unvaried  tropical  heat 
undermine  the  most  vigorous  constitutions,  and  acclimatization  in 
the  case  of  individuals  is  practically  impossible.  Even  when  the 
vicissitudes  of  the  climate,  including  its  diseases,  are  minimized  by 
an  artificial  mode  of  life  or  by  other  means, ^  profound  changes  in 
the  physical  organism  still  appear.  Of  these  the  most  important 
from  a  sociological  standpoint  is  the  general  disturbance  of  the 
reproductive  system,  both  in  the  direction  of  morbid  stimulus  and 
of  decreased  vitality.  In  the  case  of  animals  this  perturbation,  in 
consec}uence  of  what  is  often  a  very  slight  change  of  habitat,  is 
fully  recognized  ;  it  was  used  by  Darwin  as  one  of  his  causes  for 
otherwise  unexplained  variation.  This  disturbance  is  often  fatal  to 
mother  and  child,  owing  to  the  decrease  in  vitality  of  both ;  preg- 
nancy and  parturition  constitute  a  grave  danger  to  European  women, 
and,  as  is  natural,  the  infant  death-rate  is  high  where  the  more 
stable  constitutions  of  adults  are  wont  to  disintegrate.  Population 
suffers  quantitatively  owing  to  the  above  causes,  and  to  their 
deterrent  action  on  immigration,  especially  of  females  ;  it  also 
tends  almost  inevitably  to  take  on  a  temporary  and  changing  char- 
acter as  accession  after  accession  dies  off  or  is  forced  to  withdraw. 
The  quality  of  ptjpulation  also  tends  to  retrograde,  for  lethargy 
replaces  energy  where  life  is  both  easy  and  hopeless  ;  and  before 
such  a  small  and  enfeebled  society  there  stands  always  the  menace 
of  a  numerical  preponderance  of  native  population  incapable  of 
being  restrained  by  the  unaided  force  of  the  immigrant  merchants 
or  planters.  The  conditions  of  the  tropical  colony  are  thus  ex- 
tremely unfavorable  to  both  individual  and  society. 

1  I.e.  by  not  living  as  the  natives  do. 


DEFINITION   AND  CLASSIFICA'llON  7 

Population 

A  comparison  of  colonial  population  in  one  and  the  o'thcr  type 
of  colony,  as  determined  by  the  vital  conditions  thus  briefly  indi- 
cated, reveals  the  following  results.  Emigration  to  the  plantation 
colony  is  slight,  and  natural  increase  thereafter  is  inconsiderable. 
The  colonists  are  few  in  number,  do  not  contemplate  an  extended 
stay,  and  are  represented  preponderatingly  by  males  ;  the  racial 
unit  is  thus  the  individual,  not  the  family.^  The  population  is 
rendered  by  the  climate  and  attendant  influences  unfit  for  strenu- 
ous Labor,  and  is  practically  excluded  from  the  direct  working  of 
the  soil.  Excesses  are  not  infrequent,  and  the  attempt  to  stimu- 
late a  languid  physical  organization  by  the  use  of  alcohol  is  common 
and  disastrous ;  incredible  deeds  of  criminality  that  must  have 
their  origin  in  an  unsettled  nervous  system  are  from  time  to  time 
reported  to  an  offended  world.  Relations,  often  irregular,  with 
native  women,  especially  on  the  part  of  the  Latin  nations,  have 
produced  a  multitude  of  half-breeds,  whose  general  character  is 
but  rarely  an  improvement  upon  that  of  either  of  the  uniting  races  ; 
for  its  objectionable  qualities  are  likely  to  increase  proportionately 
to  the  degree  of  contrast  exhibited  by  the  uniting  hereditary  ele- 
ments. In  general,  the  colonial  population  exhibits  the  character- 
istic symptoms  of  a  group  of  animals  transported  into  a  habitat  to 
whose  strange  conditions  it  is  unable  to  adapt  itself  within  a  reason- 
able time  ;  but  because  these  animals  are  Jioniincs  sapientcs,  they 
are  enabled  to  adopt  rational  methods  which  limit  the  immediate 
and  fatal  action  of  natural  selection. 

The  state  of  affairs  in  a  temperate  colony  presents  a  marked 
contrast  in  almost  all  these  particulars.  Immigration  is  relatively 
strong  at  the  outset ;  later,  in  consequence  of  the  accelerated  rate 
of  natural  increase  the  accession  of  periodic  relays  of  population 
from  without  is  not  a  matter  of  vital  importance.  The  colonists 
are  numerous  and  intend  to  stay  ;  and  since  they  include  a  con- 
siderable number  of  females,  the  unit  is  the  family  ^  rather  than 
the  individual.  The  climate  invigorates  the  population,  which  is 
energetic,  self-reliant,  early  of  marriage,  and  fecund,  and  displays 
these  qualities  in  its  vigorous  and  healthy  activity.    The  native 

1  The  Portuguese  in  India,  Dutch  in  Java,  etc.,  compared  with  the  EngHtih  in 
North  America. 


8  COLONIZATION 

population  of  the  temperate  regions  is  unable  long  to  withstand 
the  new  and  generally  ruthless  competitor.  Mongrel  races  are  ex- 
tremely r$Lre,  for  the  settlers  marry  within  their  own  ranks,  either 
before  or  after  migration,  and  are  not  led  by  strange  and  unnat- 
ural conditions  of  life  to  associate  irregularly  with  the  natives. 
Hence  the  whole  stock  of  the  society  is  homogeneous  and  of 
high  physical  and  racial  quality. 

Industrial  Organization 

The  total  diversity  of  vital  conditions  here  indicated  is  also 
sufficient  to  effect  the  wide  divergence  between  the  temperate 
and  tropical  forms  of  the  organization  of  industry  to  which  allusion 
has  been  made.  Here,  however,  dealing  as  we  are  in  types,  some 
narrowing  of  the  field  is  possible.  On  looking  over  the  colonies  of 
the  world,  it  becomes  perfectly  clear  that  of  the  industrial  opera- 
tions which  secure  their  existence,  agriculture  stands  foremost. 
Only  when  the  environment  approaches  the  desert  type  does 
agriculture  yield  to  cattle-raising ;  and  since  the  savannas  or 
steppes  suited  to  the  latter  occupation  are  practically  all  of  a 
temperate  or  sub-tropical  climate,'^  agriculture  is  the  only  important 
primary  form  of  the  industrial  organization  common  to  colonies  of 
all  latitudes  and  altitudes,  and  so  the  only  criterion  of  classification 
of  adequate  generality,  not  to  mention  importance.  It  is  also  the 
ultimate  form  to  which  any  preliminary  occupations  may  lead. 
Practically  all  colonies  have  their  origin  in  trade,  as  Roschcr^  says  ; 
but  exchange  of  life-supporting  prodjuts  is  the  form  toward  which 
it  tends.  There  must  be  that  wherewith  to  trade,  and,  if  the 
colony  is  to  be  economically  self-sufficient,  there  must  exist  first 
and  foremost  that  wherewith  to  support  life.  Mining  may  last  on 
for  a  long  period,  but  it  is  not  a  basis  upon  which  a  normal  society 
may  continue  to  rest.  The  only  self-sufficient  vocation  of  man  is 
that  of  working  the  earth  and  utilizing  its  i)rimary  or  derived 
nutritious  products.  It  is  a  significant  fact  that,  as  time  goes  on, 
all  colonies  where  the  soil  will  permit  are  forced  into  agriculture 
on  their  own  account.  Classifying  by  the  forms  of  agriculture 
characteristic  respectively  of  the  temperate  and  of  the  tropical 
climate,  therefore,  one  discriminates  upon  a  character  that  is  not 

1  Those  nearest  the  tropics  are,  for  example,  the  savannas  of  the  Sudan,  the  llanos 
of  South  America,  the  interior  semi-deserts  of  Australia,  etc.  ^  I'age  i6. 


DEFINITION   AND  CLASSIFICATION  9 

transitory  but  ultimate.  Hunting,  fishing,  and  mining  last  but  for 
a  time  ;  even  cattle-raising  tends  relatively  to  decline  as  unoccu- 
pied or  arid  land  is  redeemed  ;  whether  the  masters  of  the  colony 
labor,  or  steal  the  results  of  others'  labor,  the  occupation  which 
assures  combined  societal  existence,  either  directly  or  through 
exchange,  is  the  vital  one. 

This  fact  has  been  recognized  by  the  two  most  eminent  writers 
on  colonies,  Roschcr  and  Leroy-Beaulieu.^  The  former's  classifi-. 
cation  (A,  conquest  colonies;  B,  trading  colonies;  C,  agricultural 
colonies  ;  D,  plantation  colonies)  is  faulty  from  the  simultaneous 
employment  of  several  criteria  of  discrimination  :  for  example,  in  A 
the  criterion  is  mode  of  acquisition  or  administration  ;  in  B,  motive 
of  settlement  or  acquisition.  But  C  and  D,  to  which  in  his  discus- 
sion Roscher  assigns  a  special  importance,  correspond  to  the  dis- 
tinctions contended  for  in  this  essay.  Leroy-Beaulieu  distinguishes 
colonies  of  (i)  exploitation  or  plantation,  (2)  settlement  or  agricul- 
ture, and  (3)  mixed  colonies.  The  first  two  categories  correspond 
with  Roscher's  C  and  D  above,  and  are  in  reality  tropical  and  tem- 
perate agricultural  colonies,  although  the  alternative  terms  suggest 
also  the  predatory  or  sedentary  tendencies  of  the  population.  No 
subordination  of  these  alternative  terms  one  to  the  other  is  indi- 
cated. The  term  "  mixed  colonies "  represents  an  unnecessary 
effort  to  cover  inevitable  transitional  forms,  and  does  not  aid  in  a 
classification  which  seeks  well-marked  types  for  purposes  of  expo- 
sition and  clarification  of  thought. 

Both  authors,  then,  recognize  the  two  types  of  colony  mentioned 
above,  —  the  tropical  agricultural  and  the  temperate  agricultural  ; 
for  this  is  what  the  terms  "plantation  colony"  and  "agricultural 
colony"  really  mean.  These  forms  of  colony  might  be  denomi- 
nated, to  avoid  confusion,  plantation  colony  (tropical)  and  farm 
colony  (temperate). 

Agricultural  Economy 

It  requires  something  more  than  the  assertion,  however,  to 
prove  that  these  two  forms  are  marked  enough  to  constitute  the 
basis  of  a  classification  ;  that  is,  that  they  really  possess  a  sort  of 
generic  value.    Besides  their  direct  action  on  man,  as  sketched 

^  Roscher,  chap,  i;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  II,  part  ii,  book  ii,  chap.  i.  For  a  minute  and 
involved  classification,  see  Schaffle's,  in  Reinsch,  pp.  19-20. 


lO  COLONIZATION 

above,  the  natural  conditions  which  center  about  cHmate  exert 
other  strong  though  less  direct  influences.  First  of  all,  they  pro- 
foundly affect  the  rnedium  upon  which  man  works.  For  example, 
the  tropical  soil,  flora,  fauna,  etc.,  are  of  types  entirely  distinct 
from  those  of  temperate  regions.  This  fact  may  be  brought  out 
clearly  enough  by  proceeding  at  once  to  a  general  comparison  of 
the  industrial  organization  of  tropical  and  temperate  colonies, 
which  will  incidentally  explain  the  coordinate  terms  "  farm  colony  " 
and  "  plantation  colony  "  already  employed. 

Owing  to  the  diversity  of  natural  conditions  in  the  two  regions, 
the  tropical  lands  are  fitted  to  produce  with  ease  certain  goods 
which  either  cannot  be  produced  at  all,  or  not  without  great  diffi- 
culty and  cost,  in  the  temperate  regions.  To  the  northerners  who 
were  reaching  out  beyond  the  confines  of  their  native  habitat  for 
the  fuller  satisfaction  of  their  wants  these  tropical  products  (spices, 
sugar,  coffee,  etc.)  were  purely  luxuries,  but  of  a  desirability 
measured  by  history-making  efforts  to  attain  them.  Even  now 
they  remain  largely  luxuries,  though  their  extended  use  has  made 
them  seem  indispensable  ;  they  are  not  really  so  in  the  sense  that 
life  would  be  for  many  people  impossible  without  them ;  they  are 
not  like  wheat  or  corn.  Another  cardinal  fact  respecting  tropical 
products  is  that  those  which  pay  are  relatively  few  in  number.  Of 
a  consequence,  production  is  specialized,  and,  as  a  rule,  must  be 
carried  out  on  the  larger  scale,  extensively  and  with  a  strong  labor 
force.  Thus  the  characteristic  tropical  "  plant "  has  been  the 
plantation  rather  than  \hQ.farm. 

But  this  very  form,  of  necessity  taken  by  tropical  production, 
implies  a  number  of  definite  results  which  in  turn  enter  as  condi- 
tioning factors  of  production.  First  of  all  there  arises  the  troubled 
question  of  tropical  labor ;  tropical  colonies  are  the  home  of  the 
"native  question."  Vital  conditions  do  not  permit  of  the  accom- 
plishment of  plantation  labors  at  the  hands  of  an  unacclimatized 
race.  But  the  disposition  of  the  inhabitant  of  tropical  regions  is 
not  industrious,  and  he  has  never  been  induced  to  alter  his  ways 
by  the  application  of  economic  stimuli.  However,  the  logic  of 
what  was  conceived  to  be  necessity  would  not  be  denied.  The 
formula  ran  :  The  tropics  must  be  developed  ;  the  native  of  the 
tropics  is  the  only  available  agency  for  such  development ;  there- 
fore, whatever  his  will  in  the  matter,  he  must  work.  The  earliest 
form    of   compulsion   was   slavery    of    the   local    native ;    then,   in 


DEFINITION  AND  CLASSIFICATION  n 

certain  regions  where  this  native  remained  intractable,  slavery  of 
an  imported  native.  Plantation  colonies  have  regularly  been  the 
seats  of  wholesale  enslavement,  and  planters  have  championed 
such  theory  as  was  needful  to  support  what  was  to  them  an 
indispensable  actuality.  But  those  who  did  not  feel  the  neces- 
sity of  the  system  were  able  to  coerce  those  who  did.  The  aboli- 
tion of  slavery  then  led  to  the  development,  where  the  former 
system  did  not  persist,  of  various  substitutes  and  subterfuges  : 
contract-labor,  debt-slavery,  "compulsory  labor,"  and  the  like,^  all 
in  greater  or  less  degree  disguised  forms  of  coercion.  Such  com- 
pulsory production,  however,  under  whatever  form,  was  bound  to 
suffer  from  the  stock  weaknesses  of  slave-labor,  —  lack  of  energy, 
purpose,  and  initiative.  Thus  tropical  production  has  never  lived 
up  to  such  possibilities  as  it  might  have  realized  with  an  adequate 
labor  supply. 

But  it  has  not  been  the  native  situation  alone  which  has  crip- 
pled the  industrial  organization  of  the  hot  countries.  The  Euro- 
peans had  a  well-founded  distaste  and  fear,  rather  than  love,  of 
the  new  environment ;  and  their  presence  in  it  has  been  prevail- 
ingly motived  by  a  desire  for  wealth  speedily  gained. ^  They  have 
exhibited,  as  a  rule,  no  real  interest  in  the  region  of  their  tempo- 
rary sojourn.  Taking  into  account  the  tendency  of  mankind  to 
strike  into  courses  offering  least  resistance,  it  is  not  surprising  to 
find  the  system  of  plantation-culture  to  have  been  a  ruthless  and 
wasteful  one,  not  only  of  soil  but  of  men.  It  is  what  the  Germans 
graphically  denominate  Raubbau.  Agriculture  presents  the  exten- 
sive rather  than  the  intensive  form,  with  all  which  that  implies  of 
non-restoration  of  soil,  even  non-rotation  of  crops,  etc.  Frequent 
and  protracted  absenteeism  of  sick  or  indifferent  owners  —  who 
are  often,  indeed,  mere  shareholders  in  a  company  —  has  played 
its  part  in  mismanagement  and  waste.  A  widespread  indifference 
or  cynicism  respecting  the  fate  of  the  human  working-animal  has 
prevailed  ;  he  has  been  regarded  in  general  as  an  insentient  factor 
in  the  accumulation  of  wealth.  There  has  been  but  little  concern 
for  the  future  well-being  of  the  land  or  people  ;  the  unexpressed, 
if  not  openly  av^owed,  sentiment  has  been,  "  After  us,  the  deluge  !  " 
This  attitude  is  so  characteristic  of  the  plantation  colony  as  to 
have  led  Leroy-Beaulieu  and  others  to  employ  tRe  alternative  title 
of  "colony  of  exploitation."    It  was  natural  enough  for  European 

1  Cf.  pp.  580  ff.,  below.  2  cf  pp  238  ff.,  below. 


12  COLONIZATION 

peoples  who  invaded  the  tropics  in  quest  of  what  they  did  not 
have  at  home  to  seize  by  any  methods  the  spices,  or  the  ivory, 
and  depart.^  They  were  not  figuring  on  the  long  run,  but  the 
short ;  this  is  the  main  reason  why  they  pursued  their  character- 
istic methods  in  the  tropics  alone,  —  there  was  comparatively 
nothing  in  the  other  type  of  environment  to  allure  them.  It  took 
a  different  theory  of  life  to  render  the  cooler  regions  attractive. 

The  tendency  in  the  tropics  toward  the  specialized  production 
of  a  few  staples,  and  those  usually  incapable  of  being  transformed 
into  a  local  food-supply,  has  had,  finally,  for  one  of  its  results,  a 
thorough-going  economic  dependence  upon  the  dominant  state, 
the  importance  of  which  in  a  political  direction  will  presently  be 
seen.  This  dependence  is  most  clearly  shown  by  the  distress 
attendant  upon  either  failure  of  the  staple  crop  or  interruption  of 
communication  with  the  mother-country  or  outside  world.  A  lack 
of  self-sufficiency  is  further  shown  in  the  failure  of  the  population 
to  provide  for  its  own  immediate  and  simple  needs  along  the  line 
of  manufacture  or  small  jobbing;  or,  in  general,  to  develop  any 
natural  resources  beyond  those  few  that  are  immediately  and 
highly  profitable.^  This  species  of  economic  dependence  is  of 
course  quite  different  from  that  of  a  frontier  society  in  the  tem- 
perate zone  which  specializes  in  a  certain  kind  of  production,  — 
for  example,  in  that  of  corn,  - —  to  the  temporary  exclusion  of  such 
products  of  the  mechanic  arts  as  can  be  easily  obtained  by  ex- 
change with  more  settled  sections. 

A  parenthetic  word  may  here  be  introduced  relative  to  the 
other  extractive  industry,  mining.  This  is  generally  pure  exploita- 
tion, at  least  for  a  time,  wherever  practiced  ;  but  it  yet  differs  in 
form  as  between  the  regions  where  natives  are  numerous  and  where 
they  are  few.^  Precious  stones  and  metals  were  costly  luxuries 
which  attracted  the  adventurous  exploiter,  and  in  the  tropical 
regions  called  for  native  labor  and  made  for  economic  dependence. 
Hut  this  industry,  because  in  itself  it  implies  no  definite  and  pro- 
tracted settlement,  is  here  passed  over  in  favor  of  the  more  basic 
occupation. 

Carrying  out,  now,  the  comparison  with  the  farm  colony,  it  is 
found,  first  of  all,  that  the  products  of  the  new  country  do  not 
materially   differ    from    those    of    the    home-land.     Because    they 

1  Cf.  pp.  91  ff.,  below.  '^  Cf.  pp.  221  ff.,  below. 

^  For  instance,  compare  Peru  and  Australia. 


DEFINITION  AND  CLASSIFICATION  13 

represent  more  fully  the  extractive  industries,  the  colonies  with 
their  raw  products  may  be  able  so  to  supplement  the  mother- 
country  as  to  encourage  a  progressive  mutual  diversification  of 
industry  on  a  grand  scale  ;  but  the  colonial  society,  under  normal 
conditions,  produces  a  variety  of  products,  most  of  which  are 
necessities  of  life  designed  for  local  consumption.  Because  these 
products  do  not  afford  immense  profits  by  reason  of  their  absence 
or  rarity  in  the  older  lands,  —  because  there  is  no  great  diversity 
of  the  conjuncture,  —  specialization  and  exploitation  on  the  grand 
scale  are  seldom  seen.  The  characteristic  "plant"  is  \.h.Q  farm 
rather  than  t\\Q  plantatio7i. 

Contrasts  between  the  labor-situation  and  other  important 
phases  of  the  industrial  organization  may  be  signalized  in  a  few 
words.  The  colonists  themselves  furnish  labor  of  a  high  order, 
for  they  are  healthy  and  sturdy,  and  efficient  as  few  natives  can 
be.  Wholesale  slavery,  therefore,  has  been  found  unprofitable  in 
temperate  colonies,  and  has  yielded,  even  though  tried  in  a  number 
of  cases,  as  in  New  England,  to  a  more  effective  system  impossible 
in  the  torrid  regions.  The  native-labor  question  does  not  exist ; 
even  in  the  mines  the  bulk  of  labor  falls  upon  the  immigrant  race. 
Nor  does  the  custom  of  improvident  exploitation  develop  with 
any  such  generality  as  in  the  tropics  ;  except  in  the  short-lived 
fur-trade  and  in  mining,  motives  of  a  different  stamp  ^  —  economic, 
political,  and  religious  —  have  led  to  establishments  of  a  permanent 
nature.  Foresight  and  economy  in  the  use  of  natural  advantages 
result,  and  agriculture  is  intensive  rather  than  extensive.  Absen- 
teeism is  almost  unknown ;  the  owners  cannot  afford  to  be  absent 
if  they  would.  The  future  well-being  of  the  land  is  to  the  interest 
of  all,  especially  as  parents  expect  their  descendants  to  succeed 
them,  perhaps  for  centuries,  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  possessions. 

And  economic  independence  and  self-sufficiency  are,  with  few 
exceptions,  marked.  There  is  no  .great  staple  crop,  relatively  use- 
less as  a  food-supply,  upon  the  hazard  of  whose  success  or  failure 
well-being  or  misery  wait.  Industry  is  diversified  ;  the  people  are 
resourceful  and  inventive,  practice  simple  manufactures  as  the 
forerunners  of  greater  yet  to  come,  and  develop  natural  resources 
of  all  kinds  that  may  make  for  their  own  success  in  the  struggle 
for  existence  and  comfort. 

1  As  bearing  upon  the  character  of  these  immigrants,  the  relative  loftiness  of  their 
motives  should  receive  attention. 


14  COLONIZATION 

Types  of  Society 

The  colonial  societies  and  social  life  built  upon  these  contrasting 
forms  of  the  industrial  organization  could  not  but  reflect  in  the 
superstructure  the  lines  of  the  foundation.  The  system  of  property- 
holding  in  land  characteristic  of  the  temperate  colony  is  the  small, 
inherited  freehold  ;  at  first,  the  farm  or  clearing.  This  system, 
being  the  one  upon  which  forms  familiar  to  us  all  are  built,  needs 
little  characterization  beyond  that  afforded  by  its  contrast  with 
the  system  as  developed  in  the  ti"opics.  The  latter  started  with  a 
larger  unit  and  developed  the  estate-form  and  the  domain  of  the 
chartered  company.  The  tropical  plantation  was  an  undertaking 
beyond  the  power  of  the  individual,  and  ownership  thus  became 
shareholding  rather  than  individual  possession  or  active  partner- 
ship. The  immediate  concern  of  the  owners  was  thus  replaced  by 
a  remoter  interest  through  functionaries  of  various  kinds,  absen- 
teeism was  thus  encouraged,  and  such  undertakings  have  taken  on 
a  marked  speculative  character.  Brief  reflection  will  show  that 
these  diverse  forms  were  not  the  product  of  traditional  legal 
prepossessions,  except  as  these  fell  in  with  the  demands  of  the 
new  environment.  Peoples  as  prejudiced  against  monopolies  as 
were  the  Dutch  promptly  developed  chartered  companies ;  and 
the  failure  of  the  proprietary  system  in  the  English  colonies  is 
notorious. 

Comparison  is  likewise  challenged  in  respect  of  marriage  and 
the  family.  The  fundamental  factors  which  rendered  the  conditions 
in  the  tropical  colonies  so  different  from  those,  say,  of  the  New 
England  settlements,  were  the  great  preponderance  of  males,  and 
the  feeble  economic  efficiency  of  such  females  as  were  present. 
The  former  factor  led  to  formal  celibacy,  intermixture  of  races, 
and  aberrations  all  but  unknown  in  societies  of  the  other  type,  — 
all  this  amounting  to  a  negation  of  matrimony  in  the  sense  char- 
acteristic of  the  temperate  colony.  The  other  factor,  economic 
inefficiency,  minimized  the  importance  of  woman's  status ;  the 
materfamilias  had  no  such  independent  and  influential  position  in 
the  tropics  as  in  the  cooler  regions.  And  where  woman  was  absent 
or  of  little  significance,  there  could  be  little  of  the  family  life  and 
solidarity  characteristic  of  many  settlement  colonies.  Thus,  as 
has  been  said,  the  individual  was  in  one  case  the  unit  of  population, 
in  the  other  the  family. 


DEFINITION  AND  CLASSIFICATION  1 5 

It  is  probably  impossible  to  show  any  consistent  contrasts  between 
the  religious  ideas  of  one  region  and  the  other ;  but  in  the  matter 
of  missionary  activities  a  distinction  follows  partly  from  the  condi- 
tions already  described.^  In  the  temperate  regions  the  native  people 
were  decimated  or  driven  back  in  a  fierce  race-conflict,  inconsider- 
ate of  their  material  or  spiritual  interests,  almost  before  there  had 
been  time  to  institute  propaganda ;  but  in  the  tropical  countries  a 
distinct  proselytizing  type  of  religion  has  often  appeared,  stimulated 
as  it  was  by  the  abundant  and  persistent  native  population.  The 
necessity  of  adaptation  to  the  needs  and  understanding  of  the  latter 
has  often  induced,  likewise,  a  modification  of  the  alien  toward  the 
native  type  of  religion.  Actual  or  pretended  solicitude  regarding 
the  spiritual  weal  of  the  native  has  disguised  the  selfish  and  eco- 
nomic motive  rather  more  in  the  warmer  zones  than  elsewhere. 
And,  in  general,  in  the  tropics,  the  invading  religion  of  the  higher 
race  has  usurped  and  discharged,  for  good  or  ill,  an  important 
economic  and  political  function  but  rarely  approached  in  the 
colony  of  settlement. 

Political  dissimilarities  between  the  plantation  and  the  farm 
colony  afford,  perhaps,  the  most  striking  and  evident  basis  of  dif- 
ferentiation ;  and  with  these  differences  is  closely  identified  the 
political  destiny  of  the  societies  in  question.  For  these  reasons  not 
a  few  classifications  have  been  based  upon  such  criteria  of  distinc- 
tion ;  the  latter  are  deducible,  however,  from  the  more  fundamental 
basis  here  adopted.  The  economic  dependence  of  the  plantation 
colony  has  been  explained  already ;  its  very  Hfe  lies  in  exchange 
with  the  cooler  regions  —  exchange  not  only  of  products  but  of 
men  ;  and  it  is  not  infrequently  dependent  regularly  or  for  varying 
periods  upon  the  bounty  of  the  mother-country.  In  the  presence 
of  a  native  population  which  far  outnumbers  its  own,  the  colony  is 
likewise  dependent  upon  the  support  of  the  sponsor  state ;  and  its 
very  riches  under  the  typical  policy  of  exclusion  tempt  foreign 
aggression.  The  colonizing  power  is  often  forced  to  take  upon  its 
shoulders  enterprises  which  have  proved  too  arduous  not  only  for 
the  individual  but  for  large  corporate  bodies  with  practically  un- 
limited power.  These  conditions  promote  constant  outside  inter- 
ference and  molestation,  and  keep  the  colony  and  its  doings  from 

1  Compare  the  missions  in  Spanish  America  and  Central  Africa  with  those  in 
French  and  British  North  America. 


l6  COLONIZATION 

lapsing  into  that  happy  state  of  obscurity  where  it  may  direct  its 
own  destiny.  The  peoples  of  such  colonies  gain  no  experience 
in  managing  their  own  affairs,  and,  if  left  to  themselves,  possess 
no  body  of  norms  or  local  precedents  by  which  to  gain  an  orien- 
tation. If  they  have  become,  by  some  contingency,  nominally  in- 
dependent, their  ensuing  political  form  has  been  unstable  and  they 
have  offered  a  standing  temj^tation  to  aggression  on  the  part  of 
stronger  nations.^  This  instability  both  before  and  after  inde- 
])cndence  is  the  more  marked  if  the  presence  of  a  mongrel  pop- 
ulation has  already  provided  the  unfortunate  element  of  what 
might  be  called  biological  instability  and  incongruity.  No  tropical 
colony  has  ever  yet  proved  itself  capable  of  living  up  to  a  regime 
of  representative  institutions  (self-government)  or  of  independence, 
apart  from  the  sponsorship  of  some  state  of  the  temperate  re- 
gions. The  terms  "  protectorate,"  "  crown  colony,"  ^  etc.,  express- 
ing a  distinctly  subordinate  relation,  are  all  but  peculiar  to  the 
tropical  lands. 

The  contrast  with  the  other  type  of  colony  is  pointed.  The  latter 
is  economically  independent ;  it  is  able  early  in  its  career  to  settle 
its  own  disputes  with  its  native  neighbors ;  it  is  not  unwilling  at 
times  to  challenge  an  older  society  to  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword. 
But  because  it  presents  few  immediate  rewards  to  the  conqueror, 
it  generally  escapes  the  latter  struggle.  It  is  not  rich  enough  to 
evoke,  and  suffer  under,  so  rigid  a  policy  of  exclusion  and  monop- 
oly as  has  been  so  regularly  applied  to  tropical  colonies.  In  short, 
it  can  live  its  own  life,  without  much  aid,  even  though  it  demands 
help  as  of  right  when  its  advantage  seems  to  lie  in  so  doing.  At 
other  times  outside  interference  is  bitterly  resented.  The  society 
not  infrequently  lives  under  a  beneficial  regime  of  neglect  and  even 

'  E.g.  the  Spanish  American  republics. 

2  As  an  example  of  a  popular  classification,  which  is  practical,  but  of  administra- 
tive rather  than  of  scientific  value,  the  following,  based  upon  the  degree  of  exten- 
sion of  control  of  the  mother-country,  may  be  cited  :  (i)  colony  proper,  which  may 
have  representative  or  semi-representative  institutions,  or  nothing  of  the  kind 
(crown  colony)  ;  (2)  protectorate  ;  (3)  sphere  of  influence.  Classifications  of  this 
kind  simply  darken  counsel  in  the  popular  mind,  for  they  envisage  the  colony  from 
the  administrative  standpoint  of  the  home  government,  and  afford  to  the  expert 
alone  a  clue  as  to  the  real  nature  of  country  and  people.  It  depends  largely  upon 
the  identity  of  the  colonizing  power,  and  to  a  certain  degree  upon  chance,  whether 
the  form  of  administration  is,  within  a  reasonable  period,  adapted  to  the  vital 
peculiarities  of  the  dependency  in  question;  i.e.  whether  this  form  is  an  index  of 
the  character  of  the  colony  or  not. 


DEFINITION  AND  CLASSIFICATION  17 

contempt  on  the  part  of  the  native  country,  and  is  thus  able  to 
work  out  its  own  salvation.  Not  being  hermetically  sealed  from 
the  world,  it  learns  from  others,  friends  or  rivals.  The  experience 
and  suggestions  thus  gained  are  invaluable,  and  create  a  sense  of 
self-sufficiency  and  power  which  in  the  course  of  time  asserts  itself 
in  the  forcible  or  peaceable  acquisition  of  virtual  or  real  independ- 
ence. And  since  the  population  is  homogeneous  and  politically 
experienced,  the  resulting  state  is  fitted  to  take  its  place  alongside 
the  older  states  as  a  stable  and  safe  government,  not  essentially 
different  from  its  elders  except  in  the  qualities  of  vigor,  however 
crude  these  may  be,  and  possibilities  of  growth  characteristic  of  a 
healthy  society  in  a  roomy  and  wholesome  environment. 

This  political  comparison  is  not  complete  unless  supplemented 
by  an  alignment  of  the  divergent  social  structures  which  grow  out 
of  the  other  conditions,  mainly  economic,  already  described.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  the  population  of  the  tropical  colony,  taken  as 
a  whole,  is  unhomogeneous.  The  presence  of  native  and  mongrel 
races,  the  latter  usually  of  all  degrees  of  mixture,  causes  the  popu- 
lation to  cleave  along  various  lines  so  as  to  create  castes  or  classes 
of  a  marked  order.  This  is  the  kind  of  growth  upon  which  a  rigid 
aristocracy  is  wont  to  develop.  The  large-scale  production  and 
system  of  latiftindia,  or  extended  estates,  implying  as  they  do  an 
original  aristocracy  of  wealth,  contribute  to  the  speedy  appearance 
of  social  strata ;  and  the  system  of  slavery  on  the  large  scale 
causes  the  lines  of  cleavage  of  the  society  to  widen  into  unmistak- 
able chasms  between  "higher"  and  "lower."  The  adventurer 
class  often  finds  its  level  in  a  sort  of  retainer  relation  ;  priests  and 
missionaries  form  at  times  a  sort  of  sacerdotal  caste.  And  the 
scattering  of  population-groups  in  what  might  well  be  termed 
manors  —  a  phenomenon  due  again  mainly  to  the  mode  of  produc- 
tion and  the  relations  with  subject  races  —  lends  still  another 
characteristic  feature  of  the  aristocratic  regime. 

These  conditions  are  all  but  reversed  in  the  farm  colony.  The 
population  is  homogeneous  from  the  outset,  for  the  mediocre 
gains  of  the  farm  colony  attract  neither  the  very  wealthy  nor  the 
helpless  pauper  ;  while  for  the  former  a  large  aggregation  of  capital 
will  not  pay,  the  man  who  has  no  capital  and  feeble  instincts  of 
industry  has  few  prospects  before  him.  Hence  the  original  immi- 
gration is  largely  from  the  middle  class,  or  what  is  likely  soon  to 
attain  that  station  (e.g.  indented  servants),  and  a  certain  feeling  of 


l8  COLONIZATION 

equality  exists  at  the  outset.^  This  is  speedily  augmented  by  the 
action  of  the  characteristic  economic  conditions.  Abundance  of 
available  land  and  the  prevalence  of  the  small  holding  render  men 
independent  of  birth,  landlord,  and  employer.  Rents  are  low  and 
wages  must  be  high  enough  to  tempt  the  laborer  to  remain  in  a 
position  where  he  is  not  his  own  master.  Efforts  to  transplant  the 
retainer  relation  from  the  older  lands  have  resulted  in  utter  and 
ridiculous  failure.  Evasion  was  too  easy,  and  livelihood,  in  conse- 
quence of  individual  effort,  too  well  assured.  Thus  no  social 
cleavage  of  moment  occurred  among  the  immigrants  themselves, 
and  in  the  absence  of  slavery  or  miscegenation  on  the  large  scale, 
an  incalculably  strong  factor  working  against  a  democratic  regime 
was  excluded.  The  adventurer  class  clung  to  the  outposts  of  civili- 
zation and  actually  discharged  a  service  to  the  society  comparable 
to  that  of  the  sappers  and  miners  to  an  army.  And,  finally,  the 
population  was  not  indefinitely  scattered,  owing  to  a  large-scale 
division  of  the  land,  but  congregated  in  groups  of  farms,  or  towns. 
This  is  a  ground  on  which  ideas  of  equality  and  democracy 
throve,  as  the  wheat  and  maize  throve  in  the  soil ;  and  to  carry  out 
the  comparison  in  this  detail,  it  was  a  ground  as  little  fitted  for 
aristocracy  as  was  the  soil  for  sugar,  coffee,  and  spices.  Such  a 
society  was  enabled  to  receive  elements  of  the  most  diverse  and 
often  objectionable  kinds,  and  transform  them  to  its  type.    And  its 

1  It  ha.s  not  seemed  necessary  to  go  into  a  number  of  subsidiary  points  bearing 
upon  tliis  classification,  —  for  instance,  into  the  motives  for  emigration.  Strictly 
speaking,  there  is  no  real  emigration  to  most  plantation  colonies.  It  may  be  noted, 
however,  that  the  very  motives  that  lead  to  real  emigration  reveal  in  those  who 
found  the  farm  colony  a  very  different  temper  from  that  displayed  by  those  who  go 
to  the  tropics.  The  latter  are  generally  mere  sojourners ;  they  go  out  for  wealth  and 
wish  no  break  with  the  metropolis,  guaranteed  as  they  are  by  its  support.  Genuine 
emigration,  on  the  other  hand,  is  motived  by  discontent  with  the  old  environment, 
—  and  such  a  sentiment  must  be  strong  to  overcome  the  human  tendency  toward 
inertia  or  love  of  accustomed  environment  (home).  Roscher  (32  ff.)  and  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  (II,  471  ff.)  catalogue  these  motives.  Taken  in  broad  lines,  the  discontent 
with  the  old  may  be  directed  toward  the  economic  conditions  prevalent  (over-popula- 
tion, and  its  attendant  ills)  or  toward  the  political  and  social  (dominance  of  a  hostile 
political  or  religious  faction,  etc.).  In  any  case  there  is  a  disposition  to  break  with 
the  old,  ignoring  the  bonds  once  recognized.  Home  is  not  alone  a  certain  congenial 
fraction  of  the  physical  environment ;  it  is  not  alone  a  matter  of  latitude  and  longi- 
tude. Congeniality  must  extend  to  that  which  is  less  tangilile,  in  group-life. 
Hence  if  the  conditions  of  the  colony  are,  or  are  made,  different  and  more  accept- 
able, the  home  feeling  grows  and  the  former  sentiments  of  attachment  and  loyalty 
are  displaced.  This  is  another  aspect  of  the  "  independence  "  of  the  settlers  in  the 
farm  colony. 


DEFINITION  AND  CLASSIFICATION  19 

local  and  detached  governments  were  able,  even  though  with  throes, 
to  coalesce  into  a  centralized  and  powerful  state.  The  only  strong 
and  stable  European  offshoot  societies  are  located  in  temperate 
regions  and  are  developed  farm  colonies. 

And  these  were  evolved  into  their  stable  form,  without  as  yet 
important  exception,  beneath  the  British  flag  :  Canada,  the  United 
States  of  America,  South  Africa,  Australia,  New  Zealand.  This 
consideration  would  seem  to  cross  a  classification  based  upon 
environment  by  introducing  the  element  of  race-character,  and 
perhaps  national  policy.  These  factors  have  been  reflected  upon, 
and,  while  their  importance  has  been  realized,  they  have  been  re- 
garded as,  in  the  large,  distinctly  ancillary  to  the  criteria  of  classi- 
fication adopted.  Where  have  even  the  British  developed  a  stable 
state  in  the  tropical  regions  }  And  have  not  the  Germans  and 
Italians  in  Argentina,  or  the  Spanish-Americans  in  Mexico,  made 
notable  progress  —  even  if  aided  somewhat  in  indirect  ways  by 
British  and  Americans  —  toward  evolving  (but  only  in  a  temperate 
region)  a  promising  state  ?  It  is  no  place  here  to  argue  upon  the 
reasons  why  nearly  all  the  eminent  young  states  of  the  modern 
world  have  developed  out  of  British  colonies  :  opportunity  seized, 
the  capability  of  learning  from  the  experience  even  of  others, 
adaptability,  indifference,  —  these  and  other  less  general  elements 
have  contributed  to  the  astonishing  results  chronicled  in  British 
colonial  history.  The  British,  because  of  their  race-character,  con- 
formed themselves  and  their  methods  more  aptly  to  the  conditions 
amidst  which  their  colonial  destiny  launched  them  than  did  other 
colonizing  peoples.  But  they  performed  no  miracles  in  the  setting 
aside  of  elemental  forces  of  nature. 

Conclusion 

Returning  from  this  digression,  the  discussion  of  classification, 
which  has  been  developed  chiefly  with  the  purpose  of  getting  the 
essentials  of  a  colony  before  the  mind,  may  be  concluded  in  a  word. 
The  sharp  and  vital  contrasts  in  primary  and  secondary  societal 
forms,  which  have  here  been  detailed,  seem  to  afford  a  sufficient 
ground  for  assigning  to  the  two  types  of  colony  distinguished  by 
climate  a  separate  and,  as  it  were,  varietal  value.  As  colonies,  or 
better,  perhaps,  as  frontier  societies,  the  plantation  and  the  farm 
colony  possess  many  characteristics  in  common.    So  closely  allied 


20  COLONIZATION 

varieties  possess  specific  characters  in  common,  although  they  may 
be,  as  varieties,  sharply  differentiated  in  a  number  of  respects  one 
from  another.  But  the  characters  here  selected  havS,  to  all  appear- 
ance, such  a  determinative  influence  upon  the  characters  by  which 
colonies  are  more  obviously  or  superficially  distinguished,  as  to 
deserve  precedence,  from  the  genetic  point  of  view,  over  the  latter. 
From  the  practical  standpoint,  also,  it  could  not  be  a  misfortune  to 
a  statesman  of  a  colonizing  state  to  get  clearly  before  his  mind  the 
essential  diversity,  in  constitution  and  destiny,  of  colonies  exposed 
to  such  diverse  types  of  natural  environment. 


CHAPTER    II 
COLONIZATION   OF   A   SIMPLER  TYPE 

The  colonics  and  colonization  of  the  ancients  have  this  value  for 
the  social  scientist,  —  they  exhibit  in  their  simpler  form  the  ground- 
work of  the  complex  structures  and  processes  of  a  later  day.  In 
the  social  sciences,  owing  to  the  impossibility  or  impracticability 
of  experimentation,  such  less  complex  instances,  fairly  representing 
an  isolation  of  one  or  more  factors,  attain  a  special  importance. 
The  same  might  be  said  with  perhaps  even  greater  pertinence  of 
the  colonial  operations  of  races  widely  alien  to  our  own. 

The  chief  writers  on  colonies  have  been  criticised  for  not  includ- 
ing in  their  treatises  the  colonial  activities  of  primitive  peoples, 
and  the  critic  cites  a  brief  list  of  facts  calculated  to  illustrate  these 
activities  among  certain  African,  Malay,  and  other  tribes. ^  They 
are  good  enough  so  far  as  they  go.  The  reader  of  ethnography 
often  meets  with  cases  of  emigration  and  settlement  consequent 
to  pressure  of  population  in  certain  tribal  areas,  or  to  the  stimuli 
of  economic  gain ;  and  occasionally  observes  an  instance  of  what 
might  well  be  called  c5lonization,  in  a  sense  approaching  that  of 
our  definition.  The  new  society  is  not  infrequently  a  strict  repro- 
duction of  the  old,  and  is  sometimes  temporarily  united  to  the  latter 
by  a  loose  sort  of  political  cohesion  ;  or,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
ancient  Peruvians,  a  deliberate  governmental  colonization  may  be 
observed.  But  all  these  instances  tell  us  scarcely  more  than  that 
men  of  lower  races  flee  from  an  actual  or  impending  catastrophe 
in  the  struggle  for  existence  ;  or  that  they  seek  to  raise  their 
standard  of  living  by  temporary  or  permanent  change  of  environ- 
ment ;  or  that  they  find  the  artificial  shifting  of  population  an 
effective  means  for  consolidating  the  power  of  the  state  or  com- 
munity. Men  of  higher  races,  however,  do  all  these  things,  and 
leave  completer  and  more  definite  records  of  their  activities.    So 

^  Ratzel,  Politische  Geographic,  pp.  143-145;  cf.  Wilken,  p.  63;  Van  der  Aa, 
"Koloniale  Politick"  {^De  Gids,  i860);  Lctourneau,  La  Guerre,  pp.  i84ff.;  G.  C. 
Lewis,  pp.  96  ff . 


2  2  COLONIZATION 

that  while  no  evidence  germane  to  the  subject  —  especially  if  it  is 
calculated  to  simplify  it  —  should  be  neglected,  it  is  scarcely  possi- 
ble to  make  practical  use  of  the  scattered,  fragmentary,  and  often 
largely  inferential  ethnographical  data  which  are  as  yet  available. 

THE   COLONIES   OF  THE  CHINESE 

These  considerations,  however,  do  not  apply  so  well  to  the 
case  of  the  Chinese.  With  them  we  are  already  within  the  field 
of  history.  Their  activities,  while  they  stand  in  no  genetic  con- 
nection with  the  evolution  of  what  are  called  the  modern  or  occi- 
dental .systems  of  colonization,  merit,  from  their  very  isolation  and 
exceptionality,  a  brief  mention. 

That  which  would,  in  strictness,  remove  the  case  of  the  Chinese 
from  our  field  is  that,  where  popular  initiative  has  been  most  strik- 
ingly exhibited,  there  extension  of  governmental  control  has  been 
least ;  and  conversely,  where  the  authority  of  the  government  has 
been  extended,  there  the  whole  movement  has  resembled  the  mere 
widening  of  political  boundaries  rather  than  colonization  in  any 
strict  understanding  of  the  term.  The  former  of  these  alternatives 
is  what  has  led  Ratzel  ^  to  remark  that  "  Chinese  colonization  is 
an  exclusively  economic  and  ethnographic  affair.  Nothing  is  more 
manifest  than  the  incapacity  of  the  Chinese  to  effect  a  military 
conquest  and  then  to  rule."  This  refers  mainly  to  the  extension 
of  political  control  over  districts  already  economically  and  ethno- 
graphically  Chinese.    The  other  alternative  —  boundary  extension 

—  is  represented  by  the  cases  where  conquest  of  territories  adjoin- 
ing the  empire  was  followed  by  the  attempt  to  further  an  economic 
and  ethnographic  assimilation. 

The  latter  alternative  may  be  considered  first.  Precaution  in 
self-defense  early  prompted  China  to  secure  her  boundaries  by 
extending  political  control  over  neighbors  who  threatened  them, 

—  chiefly  the  unruly  and  restless  nomad  tribes  of  the  northern  and 
western  steppes.  At  the  outset  the  half-unconscious  policy  was 
one  of  conquest  through  civilization  rather  than  by  force  of  arms, 
a  movement  due  less  to  pressure  of  population  on  land,  and  more 
to  the  desire  for  political  influence  in  the  steppe  region.  But 
although  settlers  and  merchants  came  thus  to  form  nuclei  of 
culture  in  wilder  lands,  the  necessity  of  more  compelling  agencies 

^  Chin.  Ausw.,  p.  252. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  23 

soon  became  manifest ;  "  in  the  steppes,  in  view  of  the  pccuhar 
character  of  their  inhabitants,  one  must  follow  the  rule  :  nothing 
or  everything."  Districts  occupied  in  consequence  of  such  necessity 
were  secured  by  the  founding  of  military  colonics  and  by  govern- 
mental measures  such  as  the  wholesale  transfer  of  population 
between  unruly  districts  and  loyal  sections  of  the  empire.  These 
colonies  were  generally  prosperous  and  soon  became  agricultural 
or  industrial  in  type  ;  but  of  voluntary  emigration  there  was  little. ^ 
Individual  enterprise  played  but  a  small  part  in  operations  of  this 
nature. 

Manchuria,  Mongolia,  Tibet,  and  Tonkin  represent  governmental 
activity  of  the  order  described.  The  policy  followed  was  to  assure 
the  nomads  or  other  natives  of  a  semblance  of  freedom,  which 
stood  to  them  for  its  reality.  Their  leaders  were  sometimes  placed 
in  a  position  corresponding  to  that  of  Chinese  mandarins  ;  they 
not  infrec[uently  received  their  lands  back  in  fief,  tribute  being 
exacted  where  practicable.  The  Chinese  settlers  promptly  inter- 
married with  the  natives  and  gradually  acquired  possession  of  the 
best  lands.  They  were  favored  in  important  ways  by  the  govern- 
ment, which  sought  likewise  to  attract  to  permanent  settlement 
both  such  laborers  as  had  emigrated  across  the  boundaries  in  search 
of  employment,  and  criminals,  chiefly  political,  who  had  been 
banished  from  the  older  society.^ 

In  sharp  contrast  with  the  favoring  policy  of  the  government  as 
here  exhibited  stand  the  restrictions  imposed  upon  Chinese  emi- 
gration which  took  its  origin  in  individual  initiative.  To  envisage 
these  private  motives  it  is  necessary  to  realize,  first  of  all,  that 
the  Chinese  have  been  too  firmly  rooted  in  ancestral  soil,  and  too 
little  actuated  by  ideal  considerations,  to  emigrate  for  any  reasons 
short  of  the  most  obvious  and  vital,  i.e.  material  ones.  One  of 
these  was  the  discomfort  and  danger  arising  from  the  pressure  of 
population  on  land,  already  alluded  to  ;  ^  and  it  must  be  realized,  in 
order  to  gain  a  conception  of  the  pressure,  that  what  we  call  pru- 
dential checks  to  the  growth  of  numbers  have  played  but  a  van- 
ishing role  among  a  people  the  whole  weight  of  whose  superstition 

1  Ratzel,  Chin.  Ausw.,  pp.  56-59;  Von  Brandt,  pp.  126-127,  137,  140  ff.,  151  ff., 
161  ff.,  191-192.    The  Chinese  influence  advanced  as  far  west  as  the  Caspian  (p.  138). 

2  Ratzel,  Chin.  Ausw.,  pp.  75-81  ;  Von  Brandt,  pp.  136-139,  190-191,  521. 

3  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  emigration  did  not,  as  a  rule,  take  place  from 
the  most  thickly  settled  districts ;  contiguity  to  the  territory  to  be  settled  played  a 
considerable  part  in  those  days. 


24 


COLONIZATION 


and  tradition  is  thrown  against  celibacy  and  the  restriction  of  off- 
spring.^ Cooperating  with  this  motive  to  emigration,  and  often 
directly  derivable  from  it,  were  others  arising  from  political  dis- 
content or  friction ;  -  but  only  when  the  latter  reflected  economic 
dissatisfaction  did  they  rise  into  the  importance  of  true  motive 
forces.  Religious  motives  were  practically  non-existent.  For  the 
consideration  which,  above  all  others,  impelled  the  Celestial  to  pass 
the  boundaries  of  his  country  was  commercial  gain.  No  govern- 
mental aid  was  here  needed  ;  such  emigration  pursued  its  course 
not  only  without  state  aid  but  despite  state  opposition.  The 
Chinese  government  decreed  from  time  to  time  against  the  depar- 
ture of  its  subjects  at  the  promptings  of  individual  enterprise.  It 
could  not,  however,  prevent  the  gradual  growth  of  a  shipping- 
trade^  for  which  environing  geographical  and  other  conditions  pro- 
vided so  irresistible  an  incentive,  nor  that  of  a  land-trade  which 
was  tempted  ever  farther  by  opening  vistas  of  commercial  profit. 
In  spite  of  all  restrictions  the  Chinese  early  made  their  way  by  sea 
not  only  to  Japan  and  the  Philippines,  but  throughout  the  Malay 
Archipelago  and  far  into  the  Indian  Ocean ;  and  by  land  they 
penetrated  at  such  a  remote  period  and  in  such  great  numbers 
into  the  southern  peninsulas  that  Siam  and  Cambodia  are  half- 
Sinicized,  and  India  came  to  exhibit  a  strong  ethnological  and 
cultural  strain  of  the  same  character.^ 

Something  of  the  importance  of  the  Chinese  element  in  the 
colonies  of  modern  nations  will  be  seen  in  later  chapters.  Their 
movement  to  the  adjacent  islands  and  countries  has  been  almost 
irresistible.  Adherents  of  the  Ming  dynasty,  settling  in  Formosa 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  (a.d.),  led  a  colonial 
movement  which  practically  conquered  the  rather  strong  Malay 
population  of  that  island.  In  the  rhilipi)incs  and  in  Java  the  Chinese 
element  has  for  centuries  been  of  an  importance  quite  dispropor- 
tionate to  its  size ;  heavy  taxation  and  extreme  cruelty  at  the 
hands  of  Spaniards  and  Dutch  were  inadequate  to  secure  relief 
from  its  hateil  though  indispensable  presence.  In  general  the 
Chinese   have  functioned   as  itinerant  frontier-traders,    plantation 

1  Schallmayer  (pp.  193  ff.)  works  these  conditions  with  a  somewhat  precarious 
argument  for  "  the  biological  value  of  Chinese  civilization." 

2  Chiefly  in  the  case  of  Formosa  and  the  frontier  provinces  of  Korea. 

8  Cf.  Lindsay,  I,  T28ff.    This  was  after  the  conquest  of  southern  China  (220  n.c). 
*  Cf.  Von  Brandt,  pp.  544-545,  569  ff.,  592  ff. ;  Ratzel,  Hist.,  Ill,  171 ;  Chin.  Ausw., 
pp.  121  ff. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  25 

and  mine  workers  and  directors  ;  not  infrequently  as  large  mer- 
chants and  money-lenders ;  and  as  a  successful,  frugal,  and  clan- 
nish group  ^  they  have  been,  as  a  rule,  cordially  hated  both  by 
natives  and  by  later  European  conquerors.  Nevertheless,  when 
reasonably  and  intelligently  dealt  with,  they  have  proved  to  be 
industrious,  law-abiding,  and  valued  subjects.  The  Chinese  immi- 
grants were  mostly  males  {except  to  some  extent  in  Formosa, 
which  by  reason  of  the  exception  more  nearly  resembled  a  colony 
in  the  stricter  sense  of  the  term),  and  commonly  consorted  with 
native  women,  producing  mongrel  races  which  are,  at  least  in  the 
Philippines,  of  a  relatively  high  quality.  Native  wives  and  their 
children  were  generally  deserted  when  the  adventurer  had  accumu- 
lated enough  property  to  return  to  China  and  live  at  ease  ;  yet 
from  time  to  time  the  Chinese  chose  to  remain  permanently  in 
foreign  parts,  and  even  constituted  settlements  modeled  after  the 
local  political  form  of  the  fatherland. ^ 

It  is  plain  that  the  Chinese  have  displayed  in  vigorous  form 
certain  activities  characteristic  of  so-called  colonizing  peoples ; 
that  they  have  formed  what  might  be  termed  a  potential  colonial 
empire.  Had  the  capacities  and  disposition  of  the  home  govern- 
ment admitted  of  an  extension  of  control  analogous  to  that  exer- 
cised by  much  weaker  European  nations  over  more  ephemeral 
European  settlements  in  lands  far  less. accessible,  we  might  here 
be  studying  the  Chinese  settlements  as  full-fledged  Chinese  colo- 
nies. However,  governmental  activity  of  this  kind  is  an  evolved 
product,  and  China  had  not  developed  it. 

One  consideration  connected  with  this  potential  colonial  empire 
is  of  curious  interest.  Owing  to  the  apparent  power  of  the  Chinese 
to  live,  labor,  and  procreate  in  any  climate,^  the  so-called  planta- 
tion colony  in  a  hypothetical  Chinese  colonial  empire  would  lose 
many  of  its  distinctive  features,  as  sketched  in  Chapter  L  And  it 
will  be  seen,  at  the  close  of  this  chapter,  that  the  Chinese  settle- 
ments fall  in  with  those  of  the  ancients  in  illustrating  the  effect 
upon  the  nature  and  results  of  colonization  produced  by  the  elimi- 
nation of  several  factors  often  assumed  to  be  of  great  moment  in 
the  modern  and  irresolvable  product. 

1  The  Chinaman  does  not  easily  assimilate  to  the  environing  type.  He  adapts 
himself  with  little  difficulty  to  all  climates,  but  retains  his  peculiar  characteristics  — 
language,  customs,  industry,  commercial  ability  —  under  all  governments  and  in  all 
natural  environments  with  only  general  modification.         ^  Cf.  l?ordier,  Col.,  p.  59. 

2  De  Groot, Het  Kongsiwezen, etc.;  cf .  Knoop, " Krijgsgeschiedenis "  {^De  Gids,  i860). 


26  COLONIZATION 

THE  COLONIES   OF  THE  PHCENICIANS 

The  forms  of  migration  and  colonization  thus  far  considered  are 
not  genetically  connected  with  colonial  systems  familiar  to  us  at 
the  present  day.  They  have  been  cited  because  they  throw  a 
side-light  upon  the  latter,  through  their  exhibition  of  the  similari- 
ties and  diversities  of  human  motives  and  actions  as  displayed  in 
similar  social  movements  under  widely  diverging  conditions.  At- 
tention now  turns  to  the  colonizing  peoples  whose  activities  lay  in 
the  Occident,  and  whose  influence,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
has  extended  down  to  the  present  day  and  its  modern  systems. 

Conditions  of  the  Development  of  Trade 

Of  these  peoples  the  first  to  found  what  may  be  called  a  colo- 
nial system  were  the  Semites  of  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  Phoenicians.^  If  now  we  seek  for  the  causes  of  that 
movement  of  trade,  and  finally  of  population,  to  which  the  Phoeni- 
cian colonies  owed  their  being,  we  find  them  rooted  in  conditions 
of  actual  or  relative  discomfort  in  the  home-land.  Phoenicia,  with 
a  coast-line  of  about  two  hundred  miles  (far  shorter  than  that  of 
Portugal),  a  maximum  extension  from  the  coast-line  of  some  thirty 
odd  miles,  and  with  considerable  unproductive  soil,  was  not  well 
fitted  to  support  a  growing  population.  And,  in  addition  to  this, 
there  existed  constant  pressure  from  the  directions  of  the  neigh- 
boring empires,  and  not  a  few  incursions ;  Phoenicia  was  not  infre- 
quently the  unfortunate  witness  of  Egypto-Assyrian  collisions  on 
her  own  ground.  This  meant  not  alone  pressure  of  population  but 
also  political  discontent ;  and  all  these  factors  contributed  to  ren- 
der the  native  environment  unsatisfactory  and  to  motive  an  ever- 
augmenting  attention  to  the  lands  which  lay  in  sight  across  the 
sea.  The  Phoenicians  became  the  first  people  of  the  West  who  were 
able  freely  to  sunder  their  relations  with  the  native  soil  and  to 

1  Much  of  the  following  is  condensed  or  adapted  from  the  first  chapter  of  the 
author's  Homeric  Society,  and  rests  largely  upon  the  authorities  there  used.  Refer- 
ence is  also  made  to  the  Homeric  Society  as  a  study  of  one  of  the  undeveloped 
societies  of  the  Phanician  period,  envisaged  in  good  part  from  the  standpoint  of  its 
relations  with  the  Phoenicians.  On  PhcEnician  trade,  Speck's  Ilandelsgeschichte  has 
been  the  general  source  and  check.  Busolt  (I,  263  ff.)  gives  some  attention  to  the 
Phccnicians  in  their  influence  upon  Greek  history.  Professor  Seymour's  authoritative 
handbook  of  Homeric  antiquities  has  appeared  during  the  progress  of  the  present 
volume  thrcjugh  the  press. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  27 

adapt  themselves  readily  to  the  varying  conditions  of  the  outside 
world,  without  at  once  losing  their  national  individuality.  To  these 
motives  for  emigration  was  added  the  positive  incentive  of  com- 
mercial gain.  Overland  trade  between  the  two  great  empires  of 
the  time  had  long  been  in  progress,  and  had  been,  at  least  in  part, 
in  the  hands  of  the  Phoenicians.  But  when  once  the  latter  had 
overcome  the  initial  difficulties  of  the  sea-route  to  Egypt,  they 
were  increasingly  disposed  to  sacrifice  the  land-traffic  to  the  even 
greater  profits  of  a  maritime  frontier-trade.  It  is  to  be  noted  here 
that  Phoenicia  was  favored  for  the  development  of  commerce 
above  either  of  the  empires,  both  in  geographical  position  and  in 
the  possession  of  materials  (cedar,  etc.)  for  the  construction  of 
ships.  Moreover,  in  the  very  dawn  of  their  history  the  Phoeni- 
cians appear  already  to  be  characterized  by  that  restless  energy, 
persistence,  audacity  in  enterprise,  acuteness  of  intellect,  commer- 
cial genius,  adaptability,  and  general  unscrupulousness  which  were 
their  distinguishing  qualities  in  later  time.  Hence,  with  the  inev- 
itable advance  of  civilization  toward  the  west,  their  country  be- 
came the  staple  and  they  the  middlemen  and  carriers  for  the  whole 
occidental  world ;  and  they  were  thus  enabled  to  seize  at  the 
outset  and  to  maintain  for  ages  the  predominant  position  in  a 
rapidly  extending  frontier-trade.^  The  lucrativeness  of  such  a 
trade  is  proverbial.  It  matters  not  that  they  were  adapters  rather 
than  inventors  ;  they  reaped  for  centuries  enormous  gains  from  a 
double  exchange  of  commodities  between  markets  of  widely  di- 
verse conjunctures,^  and  speedily  advanced  their  sphere  of  opera- 
tions to  include  the  limits  of  the  then-known  world.  But  a  widely 
developed  trade  implies  trading-posts,  and  successful  trading- 
stations  have  ever  formed  favorable  ground  for  the  erection  of 
colonies.^  This  latter  result  was  the  more  likely  to  take  place,  if, 
as  was  not  uncommon  in  the  case  of  the  Phoenicians,  delays  in 
procuring  a  return-cargo  led  to  temporary   settlement,  including 

1  Rawlinson,  pp.  i  ff.,  50  ff.,  89,  129;  Duncker,  II,  70;  Movers,  II,  part  ii,  6  ff . ; 
part  iii,  127  ff. ;   Pietschmann,  pp.  7  ff.,  252  ff. 

2  Cf.  Lindsay,  I,  22-23;  Pietschmann,  p.  291  ;  Movers,  II,  part  iii,  87  ff. 

3  Winckler  does  not  believe  that  there  was  much  emigration  from  Phoenicia 
proper;  he  thinks  that  the  settlers,  in  North  Africa  for  instance,  were  peoples 
racially  related  to  the  Phoenicians,  who  came  to  be  thought  Phoenicians  because  of 
their  connections  with  Tyre.  The  trading-colony,  or  fondaco  (cf.  p.  64,  below),  was 
the  typical  form  of  Phoenician  colony.  See  pp.  341  and  349-357  of  Winckler's  first 
article. 


28  COLONIZATION 

tillage  and  the  like.  Starting  out  in  search  of  the  nmrcx,  from  which 
the  popular  purple  dye  of  the  time  was  expressed,  they  were  led  by 
this  motive,  and  in  quest  of  metallic  treasure,  step  by  step  across 
an  island-dotted  sea,  until,  with  the  lengthening  of  such  easy 
stages,  their  nautical  art  and  their  confidence  had  grown  able  to 
cope  with  the  more  formidable  distances  and  exigencies  that  lay 
beyond.  In  one's  astonishment  at  the  extent  and  daring  of  Phoe- 
nician enterprise  he  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  these 
mariners  were  "  children  of  destiny,"  and,  even  though  apt 
scholars,  were  taught  by  Nature  in  one  of  her  exceptional  moods 
of  suggestiveness,  sequence,  and  complacency.  These  progressively 
established  trading-stations,  extending  from  the  eastern  to  the 
western  end  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  beyond,  were  subjected,  in 
the  course  of  time,  to  a  sort  of  unconscious  selection  whereby  the 
most  favorably  located  and  circumstanced  became  actual  settle- 
ments and  colonies.  Located  on  the  coasts,  at  the  mouths  of  rivers 
and  in  other  eligible  spots,  these  colonies  became  centers  for  the 
dissemination  of  culture  in  all  its  existing  forms. 

Characteristics  of  Phcenician  Commerce 

But  no  sufficient  conception  can  be  gained  either  of  the  colonies 
themselves,  or  of  their  influence  upon  the  West  and  upon  civiliza- 
tion, without  at  least  a  sketch  of  that  stream  of  trade  to  which  they 
owed  their  origin  and  of  which  they  marked  the  successive  courses 
and  branchings.  This  commerce  found  its  strongest  incentive  and 
richest  rewards  in  the  exchange  of  the  characteristic  commodities, 
crude  and  elaborated  respectively,  of  West  and  East.  It  cannot  be 
said  that  the  eastern-bound  traffic  compared  in  any  degree  with  the 
western-bound  in  the  momentousness  of  its  effects  upon  contem- 
porary culture  and  subsequent  history  ;  but  it  was  the  desire  for 
the  raw  materials  of  the  West  which  constituted  the  predominant 
motive  for  the  early  extension  of  Phoenician  trade.  These  unelabo- 
rated  products  were,  in  large  part,  metals  or  ores,  and  later,  wool 
and  grains.  Copper  was  gotten  from  Cyprus  in  early  times,  and 
tin,  —  of  such  importance  in  a  "bronze  age," — from  Spain,  and, 
through  direct  or  intermediary  trade,  from  the  Scilly  Islands 
and  southern  Britain.  Silver  was  derived  largely  from  the  fabulously 
wealthy  deposits  of  Spain  ;  and  gold,  lead,  and  iron,  from  points 
near  and  remote.    Mining  was  a  colonial  occupation  of  the  highest 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  29 

importance,  and  many  of  the  settlements  were  as  truly  mining 
colonics  as  were  those  of  the  Spanish  in  America.  Rare  and  curi 
ous  products,  such  as  ivory,  amber,  precious  stones,  feathers,  and 
even  apes  and  peacocks,  made  their  way  to  Tyre  and  Sidon  from 
such  remote  points  as  the  Senegal  and  Gambia  regions.  The  impres- 
sion created  in  the  East  by  this  influx  of  commodities  is  vividly 
expressed  in  the  Book  of  Ezekiel  (chap,  xxvii). 

It  is,  however,  to  the  stream  of  commodities  which  flowed  from, 
rather  than  toward,  the  centers  of  civilization  that  the  attention  of 
the  student  of  colonization  is  directed.  The  latter  stream  served 
to  provide  an  already  refined  civilization  with  additional  necessities 
and  luxuries,  but  the  former  carried  civilization  where  before  it  was 
not,  and  in  its  train  came  those  results  of  commercial  and  colonial 
activity  which  have  contributed  so  effectively  to  make  the  later 
world  what  it  is.  The  western-bound  ^  traffic  consisted  roughly  of 
products  of  the  arts,  and,  of  these,  manufactures  formed  the  chief 
component :  the  various  creations  of  metal  work,  textiles,  wines, 
oils  and  ointments,  spices,  perfumes,  dyes,  drugs,  and  the  like,  — 
in  brief,  those  products  of  the  high  civilization  of  the  East  which 
would  progressively  appeal  to  the  evolving  taste  of  the  western 
peoples,  starting  with  trinkets  and  baubles  and  leading  up  to  the 
most  refined  of  artistic  creations.  And  to  these  products  of  the 
mechanic  arts  are  to  be  added  others  of  scarcely  less  significance, 
—  those  of  domestication  and  breeding,  i.e.  plants  and  animals 
within  whose  organisms  there  had  been  accumulated,  by  the  select- 
ive activity  of  man,  elements  of  refinement  and  superiority.  That 
the  Phoenicians  were  the  main  agents  in  the  spread  of  the  noble 
grains,  vines,  and  trees,  and  of  some,  at  least,  of  the  most  useful 
domestic  animals,  admits  of  little  doubt.^  In  the  course  of  time 
the  processes  also  of  the  arts  of  agriculture,  domestication,  manu- 
facture, etc.,  followed  in  the  wake  of  the  products,  if,  indeed,  they 
did  not  often  come  with  them.  And  there  can  be  no  question  but 
that  the  slave-trade  and  indiscriminate  kidnapping  practiced  by 
the  Phoenicians  considerably  aided  in  the  latter  result.^    For  one 

1  Phoenician  traffic  with  the  farther  East  does  not  concern  the  present  argument, 
as  it  affected  only  indirectly  the  origin  and  life  of  the  colonies. 

2  Lippert,  I,  584  ff. ;  Rawlinson,  pp.  38  ff.,  243  ff. ;  Duncker,  II,  287-300; 
Movers,  I,  524-525  ;  II,  part  i,  250 ;  part  iii,  83  ff.,  316  ff.  ;  Maspero,  pp.  234  ff. ; 
McCurdy,  I,  §66  ;   Pietschmann,  pp.  245  ff.,  287  ff. ;   Meyer,  I,  226. 

3  Movers,  II,  part  iii,  71  ff.;  Maspero,  pp.  248  ff . ;  Pietschmann,  pp.  28  ff.  ;  cf. 
Odyssey,  xiv,  200  ff. 


30  COLONIZATION 

must  realize  that  the  slaves  of  this  time,  and  indeed  of  all  antiquity, 
were  not  necessarily  racial,  cultural,  or  social  inferiors.  Quite  the 
reverse  would  be  true  if  Egyptians,  Hebrews,  or  Assyrians,  kid- 
napped in  the  East,  were  sold  in  the  West.  Western  masters 
learned  much  from  such  slaves  ;  and  if  a  westerner  happened  to 
undergo  the  same  ordeal  of  loss  of  liberty  in  an  eastern  land,  it 
would  occasionally  be  possible,  no  doubt,  for  him  to  escape  with  a 
wealth  of  ideas  and  accomplishments  acquired  in  his  enforced  con- 
tact with  a  higher  culture.  And  thus,  to  some  degree,  would  the 
dissemination  of  civilization  be  attained. 


Nature  and  Extent  of  the  "  Empire  " 

This  surv^ey  of  the  main  lines  of  Phoenician  commercial  activity 
is  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  general  groundwork  out  of  which 
grew  their  colonial  system,  if  it  should  be  dignified  by  such  a  name. 
It  cannot,  in  justice,  be  maintained  that  the  Phoenician  settlements 
and  dependencies  fully  satisfy  our  definition  of  colony.  Emigration, 
especially  during  the  periods  of  Assyrian  and  Persian  aggression 
in  Phoenicia,  was  strong  enough  seriously  to  undermine  the  pros- 
perity of  the  colonizing  cities ;  but  the  extension  of  governmental 
control  over  the  colonies  was  of  a  sort  which  would  to-day  be 
deemed  shadowy,  to  say  the  least.  One  must  reflect,  however, 
that  such  extension  of  state  control  as  that  upon  which  as  a 
criterion  we  form  our  judgments,  is  rendered  possible  only  by  the 
advance  in  power  over  nature,  and  especially  by  the  development 
of  speedy  means  of  communication.  By  ship,  Carthage  was  in 
early  times  as  far  from  Tyre  as  is  Australia  from  England,  and 
Cyprus  itself  was  at  an  equally  great  distance  as  far  as  administra- 
tive control  through  direct  communication  is  concerned.  Assuming, 
however,  the  sufficiency  of  means  of  communication  in  the  setting 
of  the  age,  there  remains  the  significant  and  vital  fact  that  Phoenicia 
was  not  a  unified  state  with  a  central  government.  There  was  not 
so  much  as  a  capital.  Authors  tell  us  of  the  "  hegemony  "  of  Sidon, 
and  then  of  Tyre  ;  ^  and  this  word,  as  in  later  Greek  times,  ])re- 
cisely  expresses  the  degree  of  governmental  centralization  to  which 

^  Meyer,  art.  "  Phoenicia,"  says  that  it  cannot  be  shown  that  any  other  Phoeni- 
cian towns,  except  Tyre,  founded  colonies.  Cf.  McCurdy,  I,  §§  42-44;  Movers,  II, 
part  i,  318  ff.  The  hegemony  of  Tyre  covered  the  period  of  great  Phoenician  pros- 
perity (ninth  and  eighth  centuries  B.C.).     Winckler,  I,  344  ff.,  357  ;   II,  439  ff. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  31 

the  Phoenicians,  and  later  the  Greeks,  attained.  Not  even  inside 
the  single  cities,  which  formed  the  largest  political  and  colonizing 
units,  was  centralization  secured.  This  absence  of  national  or  even 
local  coherence  and  cooperation,  and  of  centralized  direction,  is 
heavy  with  fate  for  the  "  colonial  empire  "  when  there  are  enemies 
in  the  field  ;  but  it  does  not  necessarily  prevent  the  growth  of 
such  an  empire  under  favorable  conditions.  In  the  early  days  of  a 
Phoenician  settlement  there  existed  a  distinct  relation  of  depend- 
ence —  even  unwilling  and  coerced  dependence  —  of  the  new 
settlement  upon  the  mother-city ;  and  there  even  arose  a  certain 
recognizable  solidarity  between  the  complex  of  colonies  and  metrop- 
olises, worthy  of  the  name  of  empire.  This  preliminary  statement 
of  the  reasons  for  employing  "  colony  "  and  "  colonization  "  in  refer- 
ence to  the  Phoenicians  should  receive  justification  in  the  more 
specific  account  which  follows. 

"  In  the  tenth  century  e.g.  the  navigation  and  trade  of  the 
Phoenicians  extended  from  the  coasts  of  the  Arabian  Sea,  from  the 
Somali  coast,  and  perhaps  from  the  mouths  of  the  Indus  as  far  as 
the  coast  of  Britain."  ^  This  extension  of  activity,  immense,  even 
though  it  be  cautiously  discounted,  implies  a  long  past  of  com- 
mercial enterprise  and  attendant  colonization.  It  is  therefore  with 
less  astonishment  that  we  are  able  to  accept  the  truth  of  the  state- 
ment that  Phoenician  colonial  activity  began,  with  the  settlement  of 
parts  of  Cyprus,  as  early  as  the  thirteenth  or  fourteenth  century  b.c. 
The  movement  was  continued  along  lines  of  least  resistance  to  the 
then  navigation  (island-chains,  etc.)  toward  the  north-west,  and  the 
islands  of  the  yEgean  and  the  coasts  of  Greece  (Thrace,  Euboea, 
Cythera)  were  visited  and  partially  settled  within  a  relatively  brief 
period.  The  Black  and  Adriatic  seas,  offering  as  they  did  compara- 
tively unfavorable  opportunities  for  lucrative  commerce,  were,  for 
the  most  part,  neglected.  However,  by  the  time  they  had  advanced 
to  the  Adriatic  the  Phoenicians  were  able  to  leap  the  barriers  of  a 

1  Duncker,  II,  302  ;  cf.  McCurdy,  I,  App.  3.  It  is  of  course  impossible  to  assign 
dates  except  with  vague  approximation.  The  chronology  of  the  ancients  was,  as  was 
inevitable  at  their  stage  of  civilization,  legendaiy,  conventional,  and  uncritical.  See 
Pietschmann,  p.  287,  note.  The  tendency  of  the  older  writers  on  ancient  history 
was  undoubtedly  toward  the  assignment  of  a  too  high  antiquity,  especially  as  regards 
the  activity  of  the  Phoenicians.  Movers  (II,  part  ii,  passim  ;  part  iii,  21  ff.),  Duncker 
(II,  54  ff.),  Rawlinson  (pp.  96  ff.),  have  been  corrected  by  Pietschmann  (pp.  27, 
240  ff.),  Meyer  (I,  230  ff.),  Maspero  (pp.  244-246),  and  other  authorities  of  a  later 
date.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  present  volume  the  precise  dating  of  these  early 
colonial  movements,  even  if  possible,  is  not  a  matter  of  essential  moment. 


32  COLONIZATION 

narrow  sea  and  to  pass  on  to  Sicily,  Sardinia,  the  Balearic  Islands, 
and  Spain.  They  likewise  visited  the  northern  coast  of  Africa, 
opposite  Sicily,  and  founded  colonies,  one  of  the  earliest  of  which 
was  Ityke,  the  later  Utica.  From  these  stations  they  pushed  on 
through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  and  founded  Gades  (Cadiz),  the 
extreme  of  their  colonies  {ca.  looo  B.C.);  for,  although  they 
advanced  beyond  the  straits  both  northward  and  southward,  and 
even  westward,  there  is  no  reliable  record  of  further  settlement  in 
these  outlying  parts.  The  Mediterranean  thus  became  a  Phoenician 
sea,  fringed  with  Phoenician  settlements,  and  crossed  by  a  network 
of  Phoenician  trade-routes.^  Although  our  information  concerning 
the  actual  life  in  these  settlements  and  colonies  is  very  defective, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  they  were  typical  trading  and  some- 
times mining  colonies,  and  came  in  the  course  of  time  to  engage  in 
agriculture  for  the  support  of  life.  Population  was  shifting  during 
the  "  factory"  period,  and  it  was  only  during  later  and  more  settled 
times  that  Phoenician  wives  and  families  emigrated,  and  then  in  no 
considerable  numbers.  Free  miscegenation  with  the  natives  must 
have  been  the  rule,  as  will  appear  later.  The  local  governmental 
form  was  probably  that  which  regularly  obtains  in  a  group  of  mer- 
chants far  from  home,  — an  oligarchy  of  the  older  and  more  experi- 
enced. These  general  inferences  are  supported  by  the  better-known 
case  of  Carthage,  later  to  be  cited. 

Relations  of  the  Colony  and  Metropolis 

It  is  fitting  now  to  examine  the  relations  subsisting  between  the 
colony  and  its  metropolis.  The  bearing  of  the  means  of  communi- 
cation upon  this  matter  has  already  been  noted,  but  definiteness 
may  be  given  to  that  factor  by  a  word  upon  Phoenician  navigation. 
In  the  early  periods  the  ships  were  very  small  and  slow,  and  their 
effectiveness  as  vehicles  of  communication  was  halved  by  the 
impossibility  of  night-sailing.  But  this  was  soon  remedied,  and  the 
Phoenicians  also  learned  to  sail  into  the  wind, — a  feat  regarded 
as  no  less  than  marvelous  in  those  days,  —  to  steer  by  the  north 
(or  Phoenician)  star,  and  to  venture  over  untried  seas.  As  early 
as  the   Homeric  times  Phoenician  ships  had  taken  on  a  magical 

1  On  the  tradition  of  the  circumnavigation  of  Africa  by  Phoenician  sailors  dis- 
patched by  King  Necho  of  Egypt,  see  Merodotu.s,  IV,  42.  Saco  (App.  I,  362  ff.) 
collects  the  o])inions  of  scholars  ui)on  the  reliability  of  this  account. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  33 

character  because  of  their  relatively  high  speed  and  extensive 
voyages.  Their  advance  in  nautical  technique  was,  relatively  to 
that  of  their  c(}ntemporaries,  very  great,  but  it  did  not  suffice  to 
draw  the  bonds  of  empire  close,  even  in  the  latter  days.^  Thus  it 
is  clear  that  the  very  apparatus  for  the  extension  of  metropolitan 
control,  had  this  existed  in  the  spirit  of  the  age,^  was  yet  inade- 
quate. On  the  whole,  however,  the  political  bond  seems  not  to 
have  been  much  in  evidence  or  attention  ;  the  ties  between  colonies 
and  parent-cities  were  rather  commercial  and  religious  than  polit- 
ical. "  Most  of  the  colonies  of  importance  were  held  under  a  very 
mild  form  of  the  general  system  of  vassalage.  The  tribute  expected 
was  light,  and  ships  and  sailors  were  more  in  demand  than  money 
for  the  fulfillment  of  the  obhgations  to  the  mother-state."'^  Any 
relations  in  which  Phoenicians  figured  are  better  understood  if  the 
fact  be  kept  before  the  mind  that  the  desire  for  actual,  material 
gain  overweighed,  in  the  Phoenician  temperament,  all  other  con- 
siderations, especially  those  of  large  and  unsubstantial  ideals  of 
"empire"  and  the  like.  When  the  sometimes  sorely  oppressed 
metropolis  was  dependent  upon  one  of  its  colonies  for  contributions 
or  trade  in  raw  materials  and  foods,  any  defection  would  naturally 
be  resisted  with  energy.  Thus  Utica  was  forced  to  resume  pay- 
ment of  tribute,  and  the  policy  of  monopoly  and  exclusion  of  alien 
rivals  led  to  the  employment  of  mercenaries  in  considerable  num- 
bers. In  general  the  government  of  the  metropolis  was  not  so 
much  averse  to  the  exercise  of  coercion,  as  incapable  of  enforcing  it. 
If,  however,  the  purely  political  bonds  were  thus  weak,  there 
certainly  existed  other  ties  of  a  rather  intimate  variety  ;  quarrels 
between  colonies,  for  example,  were  referred  to  the  authorities  of 
the  metropolis  for  settlement.  And  if  the  purely  political  bonds 
were  weak,  it  must  be  realized  that  the  religious  bonds  of  the 
period  were  of  a  far  more  vital  and  material  character  than  those 
of  modern  times.    The  colonies  made  yearly  presents,  which  were  a 

1  Herodotus  (IV^  86)  reckons  700  stadia  for  a  day-voyage  and  600  for  a  night- 
voyage,  aggregating  1300  stadia,  or  150  miles,  for  twenty-four  hours.  Cf.  Lindsay,  I, 
3  ff.  The  voyage  from  the  Syrian  coast  to  Gades  occupied  eighty  days,  even  in 
Greek  times.  Pietschmann,  p.  307;  cf.  Maspero,  pp.  246 ff.;  Rawlinson,  pp.  57, 
411-412,  467  ;  Movers,  II,  part  iii,  157  ff. ;  Pietschmann,  pp.  27  ff.,  283. 

2  Cf.  p.  43,  below. 

3  McCurdy,  I,  §  42  ;  Meltzer,  I,  144  ;  Meyer,  art.  "  Phoenicia"  ;  Movers,  II,  part  ii, 
34 ff.;  Lewis,  pp.  108-109T  Speck,  III,  part  i,  I73ff.  (on  Carthaginian  relations  to 
Tyre). 


34  COLONIZATION 

sort  of  tribute  to  the  state,  to  the  temples  of  the  metropoHs  ;  even 
Carthage  thus  supported  the  worship  of  Melkarth  in  Tyre.^  And 
the  commercial  bonds  were  at  first  the  more  closely  drawn,  inasmuch 
as  the  ways  of  trade  converged  in  the  parent-cities  and  commerce 
thereby  attained  its  exclusive  and  monopolistic  stamp.  The  soli- 
darity engendered  by  all  these  alliances,  when  practically  all  mer- 
chants were  natives  of  one  small  country,  took  the  place,  to  some 
extent,  of  the  political  union  now  deemed,  in  the  wide  and  cosmo- 
politan extension  of  trade,  to  be  the  sine  qua  Jion  of  colonial  empire. 

This  semi-coherence  tended  to  pass  away  with  time,  but  was 
confirmed  for  a  considerable  period  during  the  rise  of  the  early 
competitors  for  that  alluring  traf^c  which  had  once  been  all  but 
exclusively  Phoenician.  If  the  mother-country  could  have  preserved 
and  extended  its  independence  and  effected  some  adequate  unifica- 
tion, and  if  the  colonists  had  safeguarded  the  integrity  of  their 
blood,  this  clannish  feeling  of  a  monopolistic  nation  might  have 
continued.  That  friendly  feelings  toward  the  country  of  origin 
were  preserved  for  long  periods  is  indicated  by  the  continued 
migrations  to  the  colonies,  and  by  the  welcome  there  extended  to 
Phoenician  fugitives  during  the  encroachments  upon  Phoenicia  of 
Sargon,  Sennacherib,  Nebuchadnezzar,  Alexander,  and  others. 
But  it  was  evident  from  the  disposition  and  ideals  of  the  Phoeni- 
cians that  the  formation  of  a  colonial  empire,  in  the  modern  sense, 
was  outside  of  their  purposes  and  endeavors.  Temporary  union 
for  self-defense,  to  say  nothing  of  the  formation  of  any  political 
aggregation,  had  to  be  forced  upon  them  —  as  is  evidenced  by  the 
case  of  the  Carthaginian  empire  —  by  the  exigencies  of  the  struggle 
for  existence.  All  the  Phoenicians  cared  for  was  commercial  gain  :» 
if  in  force,  they  had  always  pillaged,  robbed,  and  practiced  piracy; 
if  inferior  in  strength,  they  fell  back  upon  pilfering,  cheating,  and 
kidnapping.  They  were  known  even  to  Homer  as  rogues  and ' 
deceivers,^  but  were  endured  throughout  antiquity  for  the  sake  of 
that  which  they  brought  within  the  reach  of  active  and  progressive, 
if  rude,  races. 

One  of  the  cardinal  points  of  Phoenician  policy  was  the  preser- 
vation of  their  monopoly  through  the  exclusion  of  rivals  ;  to  this 
end  they  were  ready  to  expose  themselves  to  serious  loss  and  danger. 

1  Meltzer,  II,  149,  151  ;  cf.  Winckler,  I,  342  ff. 

2  Cf.  the  piotica  fides  of  the  Carthaginians,  of  which  *the  Romans  Hked  to  tell. 
Speck,  III,  part  i,  63. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  35 

This  attitude  came  out  more  clearly  when  their  monopoly,  in  its 
origin  almost  a  natural  one,  beg'an  to  suffer  from  the  encroach- 
ment of  much-tempted  comj)etitors.  When  at  last  the  sources  of 
their  material  prosperity  were  threatened  they  were  eager  to  resist. 
However,  in  the  palmy  days  of  greater  security  they  were  willing 
to  sacrifice  all  to  economic  profit;  language,  religion,  customs, 
even  integrity  of  blood  — all  the  characteristics  which  distinguish 
a  race  or  a  people  —  were  readily  renounced  for  the  gratification 
of  an  all-pervading  passion  for  the  accumulation  of  material  wealth. 
It  could  not  be  otherwise  but  that  the  Phoenician  colonies  should 
thus  lose  their  national  character.  And  more :  even  the  racial 
character  of  the  settlements  gradually  merged  with  its  environment, 
so  that  while  the  Hebrews,  who  pursued  a  policy  almost  diamet- 
rically opposed  to  the  easy  adaptability  of  the  Phoenicians,  have 
maintained  their  racial  stamp  into  modern  times,  the  Phoenicians 
as  a  people  have  long  ceased  to  exist.^  If,  then,  the  specialized 
commercial  spirit  has  been  able  to  effect  a  result  of  this  generality, 
it  is  no  wonder  that  the  inceptive  or  potential  colonial  empire 
disintegrated  and  melted  away.  But  it  was  not  left  entirely  to 
these  broadly  acting  forces  of  nature  to  begin  and  conclude  the 
process  of  decay.  As  in  most  such  cases,  the  fatal  sweep  of  the 
storm  did  not  occur  without  an  antecedent  brewing,  nor  apart  from 
ominous  indications  in  previous  periods.  Even  during  the  Sidonian 
hegemony  (roughly  estimated  as  extending  to  about  the  tenth 
century  b.c),  the  period  of  early  expansion,  the  people  first  to 
profit  by  and  imitate  the  activities  of  the  Phoenicians  had  already 
replaced  their  masters  in  the  eastern  regions  of  the  Mediterranean. 
By  the  thirteenth  century  the  Greeks  had  driven  the  Phoenicians 
from  the  yEgean  Sea.  And  during  the  glory-period  of  Tyrian 
supremacy  which  succeeded  that  of  Sidon,  the  end  was  already 
foreshadowed.  With  a  vigor  to  which  they  could  offer  but  insuffi- 
cient resistance,  the  Phoenicians  were  forced  from  the  hitherto  undis- 
puted advantages  of  their  position,  and  were  encroached  upon  until 

1  Cf.  Gumplowicz,  Rassenkampf,  pp.  332-333;  McCurdy,  I,  §§  39,  683;  Duncker, 
11,263;  Rawlinson,  p.  28  ;  Maspero,  pp.  214  ff.;  Movers,  I,  6i ;  II,  part  i,  559-561.  The 
Phoenicians  did  not  resist  the  payment  of  tribute,  provided  there  was  a  net  commercial 
gain.  "  The  Tyrians,  like  the  other  Phoenicians,  were  at  all  times  ready  to  pay  tribute 
to  the  Great  King,  whether  he  was  Assyrian,  Babylonian,  or  Persian.  But  in  the 
present  case  [that  of  Sennacherib]  it  was  not  a  question  of  allegiance,  but  of  the 
abdication  of  maritime  supremacy,  and  such  preeminence  Tyre  was  as  little  willing  to 
forego  as  was  afterwards  her  greatest  colony,  Carthage."    McCurdy,  II,  283-284. 


36  COLONIZATION 

there  existed  in  the   Mediterranean  Sea  another  colonial  empire 
conterminous  with  their  own. 

To  the  activities  of  these  new  colonizers  the  account  will  presently 
come  ;  it  is  enough  here  to  say  that  they  overcame  and  forced  back 
the  Phoenicians  through  the  same  methods  of  aggression  practiced 
by  the  latter  throughout  their  history.  But  when  the  Phoenicians 
had  retired  to  a  point  where  further  withdrawal  meant  a  complete 
surrender  of  their  share  in  the  world-trade,  they  began  to  evince  a 
characteristically  tardy  willingness  to  unite  and  to  fight  for  com- 
mercial existence.  And,  since  the  decline  of  the  Phoenician  cities 
left  the  headship  of  this  enforced  ccjnfederation  to  the  greatest 
colony  of  the  west,  —  Carthage,  —  the  center  of  historical  interest 
moves,  naturally  enough,  to  that  city  and  its  destiny.  Here,  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  leave  is  taken  of  Phoenician  colonization. 
But  since  the  subsequent  history  of  the  quondam  colonies  is  well 
fitted  to  bring  out  several  important  considerations  respecting 
Phoenician  capabilities  and  colonial  policy,  a  sketch  of  this  history 
as  it  centered  about  the  figure  of  Carthage  is  yet  in  place. ^ 

Carthage  as  a  Phcenician  Colony 

Carthage,  the  "new  city,"  founded  about  800  B.C.,  was  already 
beyond  the  early  stages  of  a  trading-colony  —  was,  indeed,  a  large 
and  powerful  city  —  before  the  Greeks  thought  of  moving  westward. 
During  the  three  centuries  of  upheaval  and  general  insecurity  which 
followed  the  second  elevation  of  the  Assyrian  kingdom  in  the  first 
half  of  the  ninth  century  b.c,  many  a  noble  family  and  its  retainers  j 
and  many  a  prominent  business  firm  was  transferred  from  Tyre, 
the  mother-city,  to  Carthage.  The  position  of  affluence  and  inde- 
pendence thus  attained  was  increased  by  the  results  of  Greek 
aggression  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  which  interposed  a  foreign 
and  hostile  element  between  the  metropolis  and  its  colony.  And 
so,  because  of  its  prosperity  and  power,  Carthage  came  to  usurp 
the  position  of  a  common  metropolis,  as  it  were,  for  the  colonies  of 
the  west. 2  With  the  tardy  recognition  on  the  part  of  these  colonies 
of  the  true  significance  of  the  advance  of  the  Greeks,  at  first  under- 
estimated, Carthage  was  led  to  assume  a  theoretical,  if  not  actual, 

1  See  especially  Meltzer,  1, 144  ff.    Speck  (III,  part  i)  gives  a  very  valuable  general 
account  of  Carthage  and  its  dependencies. 

2  As  Winckler  {II,  449)  puts  it,  Carthage  gathered  together  "  PhcL-niciandoin  "  as 
Tyre  had  done  before. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  37 

protectorate  over  Phoenician  interests ;  to  direct  united  efforts 
where  the  spur  of  necessity  had  clearly  demonstrated  the  need  of 
concerted  action,  and  to  enforce  cooperation  on  the  part  of  recalci- 
trants. A  quasi-imperial  station  was  thus,  as  it  were,  forced  upon 
her.  She  aided  other  colonies  in  their  wars  with  native  peoples, 
and  in  return  possessed  herself  of  part  of  their  lands  ;  she  was  even 
led  to  a  certain  amount  of  true  colonization  on  her  own  account.^ 
But  it  was  as  a  willingly  or  unwillingly  acknowledged  head  of  a 
defensive  coalition  that  she,  like  Athens  in  the  Delian  League, 
administered  her  empire.^  The  progressive  advance  of  the  Greeks 
to  the  shores  of  Sicily  seems  not  to  have  aroused  the  Phoenician 
colonies  to  a  sense  of  danger,  but  their  abrupt  appearance  in  the 
western  end  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  even  in  the  Gades-region, 
awakened  the  Semites  to  the  fact  that  their  last  and  most  treasured 
possessions  were  threatened  ;  and  before  the  Greeks  could  advance 
across  Sicily,  a  line  of  defense  had  already  been  formed,  facing  the 
south  and  east,  by  cities  under  the  protection  of  Carthage,  and  by 
allied  native  peoples.  The  Greeks  were  at  first  repulsed,  and  in 
succeeding  times  were  held  back  from  political  advance  both  in 
the  islands  and  on  the  coasts.  To  this  end  a  system  of  alliances 
with  Etruscans,  Romans,  and  others  was  skillfully  employed. 
Treaties  went  even  to  the  modern  extent  of  delimitation  of  spheres 
of  influence,  for  instance  in  the  relations  of  the  Carthaginians  with 
Massilia.  The  Carthaginian  hegemony  took  on  a  more  and  more 
imperial  aspect,  and  the  administration  a  progressively  centralized 
form.^    From  this  time  on  the  colonial  quality  of  the  settlements 

1  The  Carthaginians  had  much  difficulty  with  the  nomad  peoples  of  Africa,  over 
whom  they  were  unable  to  extend  an  unquestioned  supremacy.  They  had,  indeed, 
bought  or  rented  their  own  ground  from  the  natives  and  paid  them  an  annual  stipend 
up  to  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century.  They  attempted  to  enlist  native  races  in  their 
armies  from  time  to  time,  but  above  all  tried  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  them. 
Meltzer,  II,  74/f.,  93,  104;  Speck,  III,  parti,  37-50,  407  ;  cf.  Smith,  pp.  13-21,  43  ff.; 
Lewis,  pp.  110-112  ;  Ratzel,  III,  183-184.  On  the  Phoenicians  and  Carthaginians  in 
Spain,  cf.  Colmeiro,  I,  29-43.  On  the  rather  close  mutual  relations  of  Tyre  and 
Carthage,  see  Meltzer,  II,  149-152. 

2  On  the  Carthaginian  league  or  empire,  see  Speck, III,  part  i,  2  5-28, 33-36,50  ff .,  1 44ff. 

3  Cf.  Ihne,  II,  5  ff.  This  author  naturally  envisages  Carthage  from  the  standpoint 
of  its  relations  and  conflict  with  Rome,  summing  up  the  comparison  as  follows  (II, 
461) :  "The  main  cause  of  the  superiority  of  Rome  over  Carthage  we  have  found  in 
the  firm  geographical  and  ethnographical  unity  of  the  Roman  state  as  compared  with 
the  chequered  career  of  the  nationalities  ruled  over  by  Carthage,  and  in  the  disjointed 
configuration  of  its  territory,  scattered  over  long  lines  of  coast  islands."  This  contrast 
serves  to  bring  out  from  a  somewhat  different  angle  of  vision  several  considerations 
upon  which  the  present  treatment  lays  stress.    Cf.  Speck,  III,  part  i,  6^  ff. 


38  COLONIZATION 

drops  away,  and  states  are  pitted  against  states.  The  rise  of 
Carthage  demonstrates,  however,  that  there  was  in  the  trading- 
settlements  of  the  Phoenicians  the  possibility  of  the  construction 
of  a  closely  knit  colonial  empire.  The  elements  lacking  to  this 
end,  and  cited  above,  are  easily  recognizable  as  functions  of  the 
Phoenician  character  and  of  the  contemporary  stage  of  civilization. ^ 


Temper  and  Influence  of  the  Phcenicians 

But,  before  leaving  the  Phoenicians  and  their  activities,  recogni- 
tion must  be  accorded  to  the  services  rendered  by  them  to  civiliza- 
tion. Working  from  the  sole  standpoint  of  self-interest,  they 
neither  harbored  humanitarian  and  missionary  aims  nor  felt  the 
necessity  of  utilizing  them  as  cloaks  to  conceal  their  real  motives. 
Hence  any  "  culture-mission  "  performed  by  them  was  discharged 
with  indifference,  if  not  unconsciously.  If  their  influence  upon 
later  times  was  a  powerful  one,  it  represents  the  effectiveness  of 
the  virtually  isolated  factor  of  trade,  —  a  factor  which,  in  later 
times,  it  has  been  all  but  impossible  convincingly  to  isolate.  It 
must  be  realized  that  the  Phoenicians  had  largely  to  do  with  active, 
receptive  races,  and  no  doubt  effected  changes  in  their  culture  with 
the  minimum  of  resistance.  But  it  is  likewise  true  that  they  had 
no  notions  of  what  "ought  to  be,"  but  contented  themselves  with 
a  tactful  display  of  temptations  to  the  acquisition  of  a  higher 
material  civilization,  this  being  a  commercial  activity  which  brings 
its  own  rewards.  It  would  be  hard  to  do  justice  to  the  unconscious 
culture-dissemination  of  the  Phoenician  settlements  and  colonies. 
Most  authorities  would  doubtless  agree  upon  the  general  statement 
that  but  for  the  Phoenicians  Europe,  and  so  the  farther  West,  could 
scarcely  have  become  what  they  now  are.  From  the  trade-routes 
of  this  people,  both  to  the  north  and  to  the  south,  there  radiated  a 
glow  of  enlightenment  and  civilization  ;  and  in  their  wake  came 
worthy  successors  in  the  task  of  race-education,  whose  arts  and 

1  Speck  (III,  part  i,  147),  envisaging  terms  in  a  sense  somewhat  different  from 
that  here  employed,  can  write  :  "  Kein  anderer  Staat  der  alten  Welt  hat  das  Kolonial- 
system  in  solchem  Umfange  geiibt  wie  Karthago,  und  fiir  keinen  zweiten  sind  die 
Kolonien  andauemd  von  gleicher  Bedeutung  geblieben.  Der  Staat  bestand  beinahe 
nur  aus  Kolonien,  war  in  solchem  Masse  auf  sie  begriindet,  das  seine  Existenz  davon 
abhing."  This  author  calls  attention  to  the  wide  extent  of  Carthaginian  trade  (III, 
part  i,  182  ff.),  asserting  (p.  182):  "Kein  anderes  Volk  brachte  gleichzeitig  so 
zahlreiche  und  mannigfaltige  Waren  in  den  Ilandelsverkehr  wie  die  Karthager." 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  'lA'PE  39 

methods  were  based  upon  those  of  the  path-breakers  themselves.' 
The  same  trade-routes  continued  to  mark  the  widenin<;  highroads 
of  culture  until  the  way  was  prepared  for  the  great  civilizing 
agencies  which  proceeded  westward  with  the  extension  of  the 
Christian  religion.  Owing  to  physiographical  and  ethnological  con- 
ditions, this  progress  of  culture  turned  to  the  north  rather  than  to 
the  south.  Possibly  some  indirect  influences  penetrated  in  the  latter 
direction  ;  in  any  case  it  is  certain  that  the  African  coast  would 
have  exerted  less  attraction  upon  the  later  Moslem  conquerors  had 
it  not  been  brought  within  the  civilized  world,  and  made  worth  the 
effort  of  conquest,  by  the  initial  activity  of  the  Phoenicians.''^ 

"  Not  only  were  the  Phoenicians  the  originators  of  a  worldwide 
trade  and  of  a  farsighted  commercial  policy  unrivalled  in  ancient 
times,  but  their  maritime  supremacy  has  been  the  most  enduring 
known  to  men.  Even  that  of  Britain  has  not  yet  lasted  one-fourth 
as  long."  ^ 

THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  GREEKS 

After  the  Phoenicians,  the  next  people  to  found  colonial  societies 
on  a  large  scale  were  the  Greeks.^  Their  activities  have  been 
touched  upon  in  so  far  as  was  necessary  to  the  preceding  argument, 
and  may  be  reviewed  the  more  rapidly  for  the  reason  that  they 
were  so  largely  inspired  by  and  patterned  after  those  of  the  Phoeni- 
cians. The  genesis  of  Greek  maritime  enterprise  can  be  made  out 
in  the  Homeric  poems,  which,  in  addition,  cast  considerable  light 
upon  early  relations  between  Greeks  and  Phoenicians.  The  Homeric 
Greeks  are  about  as  proficient  on  the  sea  as  the  earlier  Phoenician 

1  Winckler  (I,  340;  II,  450)  lays  particular  stress  upon  the  fact  that  the  Phoeni- 
cians were  only  intermediaries  ;  he  says  that  they  had  no  more  of  independent 
culture  than  does  a  harbor-town  in  comparison  with  the  interior  district  to  which  it 
affords  an  outlet.  He  likewise  insists  that  the  Phoenicians  have  been  given  too 
much  credit,  because  everything  that  came  to  the  less-cultured  nations  from  the  East, 
i.e.  through  trade,  was  referred  Ijy  the  recipients,  who  knew  of  no  other,  to  a  Phoeni- 
cian source.  Cf.  Keller,  Horn.  Soc,  pp.  10,  24,  89-90.  The  Phoenicians  thus  came 
to  be  trade  personified. 

2  Meltzer,  I,  63  ff. ;  Pietschmann,  p.  2S5  ;  Duncker,  II,  287  ff. ;  Movers,  II,  part  ii, 
4ff. ;  part  iii,  2  ff. ;  Meyer,  art.  "  Phrenicia."  "Wherever  the  Phoenicians  had  been, 
the  grandeur  and  audacity  of  their  enterprises  had  left  ineffaceable  traces  in  the 
imagination  of  the  people."    Maspero,  p.  234. 

3  McCurdy,  I,  §66. 

*  The  greater  part  of  what  follows  on  the  Greek  colonies  has  been  taken  from 
Beloch  (Vol.  I),  Busolt  (Vol.  I),  and  Speck  (Vol.  II);  where  there  is  substantial 
agreement  between  these  authorities  specific  references  to  them  are  omitted. 


40  COLONIZATION 

mariners  ;  they  are  just  learning  from  the  latter,  who  display  the 
products  and  processes  of  culture  to  their  eager  eyes,  and  pour 
wild  and  competition-discouraging  "  commercial  myths"  ^  into  their 
astonished  ears.  The  Greeks  venture  on  the  sea,  it  is  true,  but 
their  voyages  are  short  and  slow,  and  but  rarely  for  trading-pur- 
poses ;  they  are  still  the  sought  and  not  the  seekers.  From  the 
Homeric  narrative  we  are  therefore  able  to  apprehend  the  point  of 
view  of  the  lower  and  rising  race  in  its  contact  with  a  superior 
civilization.  This  picture  is  but  the  reverse  of  the  process  as  it 
has  been  viewed  from  the  Phoenician  side ;  the  early  colonial 
activities  of  the  Greeks  are  the  more  readily  understandable  if  the 
scope  and  nature  of  Phoenician  commercial  enterprise  be  kept  in 
mind.2 

Motives  of  Emigration 

At  the  outset,  however,  it  would  appear  that  the  main  motive 
for  Greek  emigration  to  and  settlement  in  adjacent  islands  was  less 
a  desire  for  commercial  gain  than  an  impulse  to  escape  the  evils 
attendant  upon  pressure  of  population  on  land.  Emigration  because 
of  political  discontent  played  but  a  small  role  in  these  early  ages, 
and  trade-interests  of  an  aggressive  sort  did  not  exist  in  the  absence 
of  industries  sufficient  to  provide  products  for  exportation.  It  was 
under  such  a  system  of  folk-movements  that  the  neighboring 
.^gean  and  other  islands  and  the  western  coast  of  Asia  Minor 
were  settled,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  second  millennium  B.C.  The 
native  peoples  were  absorbed  or  reduced  to  a  subject  class,  and  the 
various  cities  united  their  interests  in  a  sort  of  religious  league 
with  its  center  at  Mykale.  By  the  eighth  century,  therefore,  when 
the  stream  of  emigration  began  to  flow  with  stronger  sweep  over 
greater  distances,  the  Greek  race  already  occupied  an  area  far 
larger  than  Greece  itself,  and  some  of  the  earliest  settlements  of 
the  yEgean  were  ready  to  send  out  colonies  in  competition  with 
those  of  the  parent-land.^ 

1  It  seems  probable  that  the  tales  of  strange  and  vaguely  localized  tribes  and 
monsters  in  the  Odyssey  may  be  in  large  part  referred  to  the  only  mariners  of  the 
time  well  known  to  the  peoples  of  Greece.  These  tales  were  certainly  calculated  to 
discourage  travel  upon  the  sea.  It  will  be  seen  in  later  chapters  of  this  book  that 
other  peoples  who  have  held  valued  monopolies  have  utilized  such  means  to  hold  off 
encroachment. 

2  Cf.  Keller,  Horn.  Soc,  chap,  i,  et  passim  ;   Letourneau,  Commerce,  pp.  426  ff. 

3  Hertzlierg,  pp.  3  ff.  Speck  (II,  166)  says  that  "the  external  history  of  the  Greek 
people  consists  essentially  in  an  unbroken  transmarine  migration." 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPF:  41 

Meanwhile  the  simple  motive  for  emigration  in  the  sense  of  folk- 
movement  had  been  superseded  by  a  complex  of  incentives,  of 
which  the  desire  to  escape  the  direct  ills  of  over-population  was 
but  one.  Commercial  interests  had  sprung  up  with  the  advance  in 
culture  gained  by  contact  with  the  East.  These  took  form,  first  of 
all,  in  piracy,  wherein  the  Greeks  speedily  came  to  surpass  their 
old  masters,  the  Phoenicians.  Thucydides  ^  notes  that  the  older 
Greek  settlements  were  established  inland  rather  than  directly  upon 
the  shores,  in  order  to  expose  them  less  to  piratical  raids  ;  and  even 
in  his  own  time  this  historian  had  not  seen  the  suppression  of  the 
freebooters.  Another  motive  was  the  adventurous  and  wandering 
spirit  which  characterized  the  Greeks  in  their  newly  gained  power 
of  sailing  the  sea,  and  which,  indeed,  promoted  settlement  less  in 
a  direct  way  than  indirectly  through  piracy.  Motives  of  conquest 
were  also  involved  in  the  complex  of  Greek  incentives.  And, 
finally,  the  development  of  factions  in  the  home-cities  had  led, 
through  consequent  political  dissatisfaction,  to  the  voluntary  or 
coerced  withdrawal  of  considerable  bodies  of  citizens.^  But  the 
primary  motives  remained  rooted  in  the  conditions  of  pressure  of 
numbers  and  in  the  opening  prospects  of  commercial  gain  through 
imitation  of  Phoenicians  and  their  methods.  It  has  been  stated  by 
some  that  the  typical  colony  was  of  the  agricultural  type ;  and  it 
is  no  doubt  true  that  Greece  was,  by  its  physiographical  nature,  a 
land  sure  to  suffer  from  limitations  of  agricultural  and  pasture  areas. 
These  limitations  were  felt  the  more  because  of  the  strength  of  the 
growth  of  population.  There  were  many  purely  agricultural  colonies 
and  not  a  few  fishing-stations,  but  a  survey  of  the  facts  leaves  no 
room  for  doubt  that  a  large  number  of  the  inceptive  undertakings 
were  essentially  commercial  in  nature  and  represented  an  effort  to 
win  a  share  in  the  lucrative  operations  hitherto  monopolized  by 
the  Phoenicians.  In  the  course  of  time  the  trading-stations  acquired 
adjacent  areas  and  took  on  a  distinctly  agricultural  type,  for  the 
Greeks  exhibited  a  tendency  thus  to  identify  themselves  with  land, 
which  was  almost  as  marked  as  the  indifference  of  the  Phoenicians 
to  all  else  than  exchange.    The  progress  of  the  Greek  colonies  was 

1 1, 7  ;  cf.  8. 

2  Speck,  pp.  180-182.  A  writer  on  the  term  diroiKla  in  Pauly-Wissowa  distinguishes 
a  third  period  of  emigration  and  colonization,  subsequent  to  the  year  580  l?.c.  and 
lasting  till  the  time  of  Alexander,  where  the  predominant  motive  for  movement  lay  in 
the  stre.sses  and  calamities  of  war.  This  period,  however,  falls  rather  outside  the  scope 
of  this  discussion. 


42  COLONIZATION 

from  trade  to  agriculture  and  cattle-raising  rather  than  the  reverse  ; 
and  this,  their  ultimate  form,  in  accordance  with  general  principles 
explained  above,  rendered  them  of  a  type  less  dependent  and 
ephemeral  than  that  of  the  Phoenician  colonies,  and  so  differenti- 
ated them  from  the  latter  in  an  important  respect.^ 


Relation  of  the  uTroiKia  to  its  Metropolis 

In  fact,  the  drrotKia  is  not  infrequently  used  as  a  type  of  the 
so-called  "natural  colony,"  ^  —  an  emigrant  group  connected  with 
the  country  of  origin  by  no  more  definite  bonds  than  those  of  a 
common  nationality  and  culture.  If  this  were  strictly  true,  the 
diroLKia  could  have  small  place  in  our  present  discussion.  In  their 
early  history,  however,  and  sometimes  in  their  subsequent  periods, 
the  Greek  colonies  seem  to  have  recognized  bonds  of  a  much  closer 
character.  In  founding  the  colony,  the  activity  of  the  metropolis 
was  generally  the  determining  factor.  For,  in  addition  to  service 
in  forwarding  the  emigrants  to  their  destination,  the  parent-city 
appointed  a  director  (ot/cio-TT;?)  for  the  colony,  who  supervised  the 
settlement  and  established  institutions  for  the  settlers  modeled 
directly  upon  those  of  the  metropolis.^  This  bound  the  colony  to 
the  mother-community  by  ties  of  an  intimate  nature ;  and  to  these 
were  added  those  of  a  common  dialect,  religion,  body  of  customs, 
etc.  Even  the  rivers,  mountains,  and  other  natural  features  of  the 
new  habitat  were  named  after  those  of  the  home-land.'*  War  of  a 
colony  upon  its  metropolis  was  regarded  as  a  crime  analogous  to 
an  assault  of  a  son  upon  a  father,^  and  the  metropolis  was,  on  its 
part,  supposed  to  aid  the  colony  in  time  of  danger.  Corinth,  for 
example,  afforded  aid  to  the  adult  Syracuse  through  four  centuries. 
The  colony  was  represented  at  festivals  in  the  mother-city  by 
solemn  embassies,  and  common  intellectual  interests  —  in  poetry, 
art,  and  ideas  in  general — added  to  the  more  material  solidarity. 

The  political  dependence  characteristic  of  trading-stations,  with 
their    sparse    population    and    dangerous   environment,   gave    the 

1  Speck,  II,  i8o  ff. ;  cf.  Ihne,  II,  4-5.       2  Roscher,  pp.  44  ff. ;  Ireland,  p.  3;  etc. 

^  For  the  details  of  colony-founding,  see  Caillemer;  Speck,  II,  167  ff.  The  colo- 
nists generally  emigrated  willingly,  but  sometimes  under  constraint.  Surveys  implying 
the  definition  of  titles  to  land  were  undertaken. 

*  The  airoiKla  was  really  a  "  home  away  from  home." 

''  Cf.  Raoul-Rochette,  I,  33-34,  44-45 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  43 

metropolis  an  especial  influence  in  the  earliest  times.  Not  infre- 
quently the  colonies  paid  tribute  in  return  for  protection,  and  were 
forced  to  submit  to  a  certain  amount  of  coercion,  especially  in 
times  of  danger.  But  with  the  divergence  of  interests  the  power 
of  the  metropolis  declined,  and  became  rather  a  respected  and 
honored  general  influence  upon  trade  and  politics  than  a  real  rule. 
The  mother-city  sometimes  rebelled  against  this  consummation, 
and,  in  the  case  of  Corinth,  resisted  it  and  formed  what  might  be 
called  a  true,  if  miniature,  colonial  empire ;  but  the  non-centraliza- 
tion at  home,  and  the  inadequacy  of  means  of  transportation  and 
communication,  rendered  an  extensive  empire  almost  as  impossible 
for  the  Greeks  as  it  had  been  for  the  Phoenicians. ^ 

The  loose  relationship  between  metropolis  and  colony  —  so 
striking  to  one  who  has  in  mind  the  extent  of  metropolitan  pre- 
tensions at  the  present  day  —  was  largely  a  function  of  the  com- 
paratively diminutive  scale  of  areas  and  activities  of  the  ancient 
times.  Both  Greek  and  Phoenician  colonies  were  settlements  of 
cities,  "  not  of  nations,  not  of  kingdoms,  nor  of  commonwealths  on 
the  scale  of  kingdoms."  The  emigrants  were  citizens  isolated  from 
their  spheres  of  civic  activity,  not  subjects  who  owed  loyalty  to  a 
sovereign  man  or  government  in  all  places  and  at  all  times  ;  the 
latter  is  an  idea  which  demanded  the  mediaeval  environment  to  call 
it  into  being.  The  metropolis  continued  to  lead  its  life  as  before ; 
the  colony  began  one  of  its  own.  Claims  of  actual  dominance  on 
the  part  of  the  older  society  did  not  enter  into  the  category  of  pos- 
sibilities harbored  by  the  minds  of  the  time.  There  was  no  need 
of  a  declaration  of  independence,  still  less  of  the  severance  of  an 
irritating  relation  in  wrath  and  by  the  sword  ;  the  falling-out  of 
Corcyra  and  Corinth,  by  its  very  exceptionality  and  the  popular 
feelings  it  engendered,  contributes  to  the  strengthening  of  the 
general  case.^  There  was  no  necessary  economic,  political,  or 
financial  dependency,  such  as  characterizes,  as  has  been  seen,  the 
distant  or  tropical  colony.  No  allegiance  was  implied  ;  hence  no 
constraint  was  felt  in  the  acknowledgment  of  what  would  seem 
in  a  later  age  to  indicate  dependence, — of  such  names,  bonds, 
and  the  like,  as  are  not  infrequently  suppressed,  ignored,  or  chafed 

^  In  collateral  confirmation  of  this  principle  it  may  be  noted  that  the  centralized 
monarchies  of  some  of  the  colonies  were  able  to  hold  in  subjection  their  own  sub- 
colonies  if  the  latter  were  not  too  remote. 

2  Busolt,  I,  305-307  ;  Raoul-Rochette,  I,  33,  48. 


44  COLONIZATION 

under  in  modern  times. ^  The  lasting  tie  between  colony  and 
metropolis,  and  the  one  which  constantly  recalled  community  of 
nationality  and  interests,  was  that  of  trade.  And  here  we  have 
the  familiar  relation  of  the  supplementary  markets  of  communities 
producing  respectively  elaborated  and  raw  products.  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  rehearse  the  details  of  Mediterranean  trade,  which 
have  been  indicated  already  in  treating  of  the  Phoenicians  ;  for 
the  Greeks  virtually  imitated  the  Phoenicians,  then  expelled  them 
and  took  their  places,  at  least  in  the  eastern  sections  of  the  Medi- 
terranean.^ 

Extent  of  Greek  Colonization 

The  spread  of  Greek  colonization  might  roughly  be  indicated 
by  saying  that  it  was  practically  conterminous  with  that  of  the 
Phoenicians,  but  also  included  certain  districts  to  which  the  latter, 
with  their  exclusively  commercial  interests,  gave  less  attention. 
P'rom  the  eastern  end  of  the  Mediterranean  to  Sicily  the  Phoeni- 
cian colonies  were  largely  suppressed  and  replaced  ;  beyond  that 
point,  toward  the  west,  the  settlements  of  both  nations  existed, 
occasionally  in  close  proximity.  The  first  Greek  colonies,  the 
results  of  irregular  movements  of  population,  had  been  located  in 
Crete,  the  ^gean  Islands,  and  on  the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor ;  they 
were  composed  largely  of  emigrants  from  Attica,  Boeotia,  and 
other  agricultural  centers.  But  with  the  lengthening  of  distances 
and  the  development  of  shipping,  the  centers  of  dispersion  had 
changed  to  such  maritime  districts  as  Chalkis  and  Eretria ;  and 
later  to  Megara,  Corinth,  Rhodes,  Lesbos,  and  the  Ionian  coast- 
cities,  among  which  Miletos  was  the  most  eminent.  Owing  to  the 
resistance  met  with  toward  the  south  and  east,  the  course  of  emi- 
gration had  been  directed  predominantly  toward  the  west,  where 
its  energetic  currents  rapidly  drove  before  them  the  almost  non- 
resisting  Phoenicians.  In  this  western  movement  the  first  great 
stage  was  Sicily,  a  fertile  island,  rich  in  hides,  wool,  salt,  clay, 
asphalt,  valuable  stones,  and  other  desirable  pro.ducts.    Roughly 

1  Freeman,  pp.  d-^d  passim. 

2  Speck,  II,  187-190.  "Den  Kem  einer  Kolonie  bildete  eine  Schar  von  Auswan- 
derern,  die  eine  neue  Heimat  suchte  und  eine  neue  I'olis  l:)egiiindete,  welche  zwar 
in  einem  Pietatsverhriltnisse  zur  Mutterstadt  blieb,  sicli  jedoch  als  selhstandiges 
Staatswesen  entwickelte."  Busolt,  I,  281  ;  cf.  Raoul-Rochette,  I,  36-42,  56-58; 
Lewis,  pp.  107-108. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  45 

speaking,  the  Greek  voyages  to  the  west  began  with  the  eighth 
century,  and  by  700  B.C.  Naxos  and  Syracu.se  had  been  founded. 
Corinth  was  especially  prominent  in  these  early  western  enter- 
prises. The  emigration  to  Sicily  was  large,  and  the  early  colonies 
were  soon  able  to  send  out  sub-colonies.  New  settlements  were 
made  in  what  was  later  known  as  Magna  Graecia,  the  most  impor- 
tant of  them  being  Cumae,  Sybaris,  Croton,  Tarentum,  and 
Neapolis.i  By  the  middle  of  the  seventh  century  the  growth,  pros- 
perity, and  aggressiveness  of  the  Greek  colonies,  particularly  of 
Syracuse,  aroused  the  Phoenicians  to  their  peril,  and  the  struggle 
between  the  rivals  began.  However,  the  Greeks  were  not  deterred 
by  opposition  from  passing  beyond  the  chief  scene  of  conflict  and 
founding  settlements  in  the  farther  West.  The  most  important  of 
these  was  Phocaean  Massilia  (about  600  B.C.),  which,  with  the  aid 
of  the  metropolis,  proceeded  to  surround  itself  with  a  series  of 
daughter-settlements  located  especially  on  the  south-eastern  coast 
of  Spain. 2  The  Greeks  thus  secured  the  trade  of  the  Gulf  of 
Lyons  and  of  the  Spanish  eastern  coast,  and  even  opened  up 
routes  for  the  overland  transportation  of  Gallic  and  British  prod- 
ucts. Upon  the  southern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean  they  like- 
wise established  themselves  in  Cyrenaica  and  Barca,  between  the 
Egyptians  and  the  Carthaginians. 

It  has  been  shown  how  the  Carthaginians,  called  to  assume  the 
headship  of  a  defensive  Phoenician  league,  succeeded  in  blocking 
the  hitherto  irresistible  advance  of  the  Greeks.  The  details  of 
this  action  need  scarcely  be  given,  for  neither  Carthage  on  the 
one  hand,  nor  Syracuse  on  the  other,  after  this  time  deserve  the 
name  of  colony.  No  doubt  the  indefatigable  activity  of  Dionysios  I, 
had  it  met  with  success,  would  have  opened  up  a  broad  field  for 
further  Hellenic  expansion.  And  it  is  not  without  its  significance 
that  under  pressure  both  Phoenicians  and  Greeks  could  cooperate 
among  themselves  for  a  common  end ;  Dionysios  received  aid 
from  even  the  old  Greek  metropolis  in  his  struggles,  which  shows 
that  the  original  bonds  had  not  yet  dropped  away.'"^  Nevertheless, 
interest  in  the  western  colonies  as  colonies  can  hardly  be  extended 
farther. 

^  Cf.  Ihne,  I,  376  ff. ;  Pauly-Wissowa,  sttb  d-rroiKla ;  Hertzberg,  pp.  20-80 ;  Speck, 
II,  168  ff. ;  Lindsay,  II,  68  ff. 

2  For  the  commercial  importance  of  Marseilles,  see  Pigeonneau,  I,  18  ;  Speck,  III, 
part  i,  55  ff.  3  Qn  the  career  of  Dionysios,  see  especially  Beloch,  II,  155  ff. 


46  COLONIZATION 

Toward  the  south  and  east  the  Greeks  found  insuperable  obsta- 
cles to  settlement  in  the  presence  of  the  older  empires  and  their 
influence.  Even  Cyprus  was  never  fully  cleared  of  Phoenicians. 
Before  Egypt  the  Greeks  first  appeared  as  pirates,  later  as  mer- 
cenaries ;  and  in  subsequent  times  they  had  factories,  with  rights 
of  corporations,  at  the  mouths  of  the  Nile.  This  acquaintance 
with  Africa  probably  suggested  the  settlement  of  Cyrenaica,  but 
has  little  importance  for  our  subject.  Toward  the  north-east,  like- 
wise, attention  was  directed.  Greek  cities,  especially  Miletos,  early 
conceived  an  interest  in  the  Black  and  Marmora  seas ;  of  the 
former  they  made,  with  their  many  trading-settlements,  an  "  hos- 
pitable sea."  ^  There  was,  however,  but  little  colonization  in  this 
region.  The  configuration  of  the  coast  enforced  settlement  in 
localities  unprotected  by  nature  from  the  inroads  of  barbarian 
tribes ;  and  the  Greeks,  besides,  never  cared  to  dwell  permanently 
outside  of  their  native  vine-and-olive  type  of  physical  environment. 
The  Black  Sea  stations  were  not  populous,  and,  for  the  most  part, 
discharged  the  function  of  supply  depots  for  grain,  salt  fish,  and 
other  raw  products  in  demand  at  home.  Somewhat  the  same  may 
be  said  of  the  colonies  in  the  northern  /Egean. 

If,  now,  the  data  of  Greek  expansion  be  summed  up,  "  In  a 
period  of  two  centuries  {circa  800-600  B.C.)  the  Greeks  turned 
the  Ionian  Sea,  the  Propontis,  and  the  Pontus  into  Greek  seas,  and 
founded  settlements  in  the  lands  of  the  Scythians,  Thracians, 
Italians,  Kelts,  Iberians,  Libyans,  and  Egyptians.  Greek  mer- 
chants visited  the  courts  of  inland  kings  as  far  as  the  great  moun- 
tain chains  of  Central  Asia,  in  the  Libyan  oases  of  Egypt,  the  Po 
region,  and  that  of  Tartessus  ^  on  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  The  nation 
outgrew  former  narrow  boundaries  ;  Greek  influence  made  itself 
effective  in  the  whole  Mediterranean  region ;  the  Hellenes  took 
their  share  in  the  evolution  of  the  world's  history."  ^  The  process 
by  which  the  Greeks  spread  civilization  has  already  been  indicated 
in  speaking  of  the  Phoenicians  and  their  methods  ;  but  some  differ- 
ences in  results  may  be  seen  by  noting  several  characteristic 
features  in  the  growth  and  life  of  the  colonies. 


^  n6vTos  ED^eiws.  It  was  once  called  dff  os  because  of  the  rude  tribes  which  sur- 
rounded it;  Ei/^eifos  may  be  a  euphemism  (Liddell  &  Scott,  sub  cvfecos). 

2  The  Phoenician  Tarshish,  the  region  about  Gades. 

'' Speck,  11,  7^-71  ;  cf.  lUisolt,  I,  293  ;  Beloch,  I,  198.  A  full  list  of  Creek  dn-ot/c/ai 
is  given  under  dTrotxta  in  Tauly-Wissowa.    See  for  exhaustive  details  Raoul-Rochette. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  47 

Character  of  the  Colonies 

When  Cicero  speaks  of  the  Greek  colonies  forming  a  "border" 
about  the  seas,^  his  expression  is  descriptive  rather  than  metaphor- 
ical ;  for  the  inland  penetration  of  the  colonies  was  very  slight. 
This  was  natural  enough  in  the  trading-colonies,  for  commerce,  as 
well  as  fishing  and  mining,  affords  gains  to  a  limited  number 
only ;  but  even  the  agricultural  colonies,  or  those  which  later 
took  on  the  agricultural  type,  although  they  received  a  large 
immigration,  remained  essentially  coast-settlements.  The  Greeks 
never  cared  to  leave  the  sea  and  found  an  inland  empire ;  perhaps 
their  greatest  inland  expansion,  if  it  may  be  so  called,  before  the 
time  of  Alexander,  occurred  in  Magna  Graecia,  across  the  penin- 
sula of  Italy.  The  colonial  areas  varied  from  four  to  twenty-four 
square  miles  ;  in  North  Africa  they  got  no  farther  than  eleven  or 
twelve  miles  from  the  sea.  It  may  be  judged,  therefore,  that 
Greek  influence  proceeded  but  little  farther  through  direct  contact 
than  Phoenician.  And  in  the  Greeks'  relations  to  natives,  since 
they  had  no  "colonial  system,"  variation  was  the  rule  —  variation 
according  to  the  strength  and  needs  of  the  colonists  and  the  state 
of  settlement,  on  the  one  side,  and  in  view  of  the  military  strength 
and  disposition  of  the  natives  on  the  other.  Friction  was  gener- 
ally avoided,  and  simple  relations  of  trade  maintained  ;  if,  however, 
the  colony  received  numerous  accessions,  it  made  itself  mistress, 
through  force  or  treachery,  of  the  native  peoples.^  These  were 
destroyed  only  in  desperate  cases  ;  the  Greeks  preferred  to  keep 
them  as  slaves,  or  subjects  without  rights.  Thus  the  significant 
influence  of  the  Greeks  upon  later  civilization  was  not  exercised 
through  conquest,  political  or  religious,  but  primarily  through  the 
adaptable  instrumentality  of  exchange.  Thus  far  the  cases  of 
Greek  and  Phoenician  are  parallel. 

It  is  noteworthy,  however,  that  the  Greeks  maintained  their 
national  identity  more  successfully  than  did  the  Phoenicians,  and 
that  they  impressed  the  type  of  specifically  Hellenic  civilization 
where  the  Phoenicians  spread  a  less  specialized  form.  This  result 
is  referable  partially  to  the  Greek  character  and  partially  to  the 
condition  under  which  colonization  took  place.  For  while  the 
Greeks  lusted  for  gain  quite  as  much  as  did  the  Phoenicians,  they 

1  De  Republica,  II,  chap.  iv. 

2  Speck,  II,  185-186;  Busolt,  I,  271-272. 


48  COLONIZATION 

substituted  in  place  of  Phoenician  adaptability  a  positive  element 
of  aggressiveness  in  the  retention  of  their  national  characteristics. 
With  all  its  city-economy, ^  Greece  was  more  of  a  nation  than  was 
Phoenicia.  There  was  a  general  loyalt}^  to  the  Delphic  god,  who, 
it  should  be  noted,  relying  as  he  did  upon  rather  full  information,^ 
actively  furthered  and  directed  colonization ;  and  the  national 
games  long  formed  a  tie  of  an  intimate  nature.  The  distinction 
between  Greek  and  barbarian  was  too  strongly  felt  to  admit  of 
systematic  neglect,  for  example,  in  miscegenation.  The  barbarians 
became  Greek  less  through  contact  with  Greek  settlements  than 
through  the  dissemination  of  the  Greek  tongue  and  culture  —  they 
became  Greek  by  adoption,  not  by  the  infusion  of  Greek  blood  .^ 
And  the  spirit  of  Greek  institutions  and  customs  was  not  allowed 
to  lapse.  It  has  been  shown  how  a  colony  was  modeled  through- 
out upon  its  metropolis,  and  this  went  so  far  as  to  render  an  oUi- 
aT7]<i  from  the  original  city  all  but  indispensable  in  the  founding 
of  even  a  colony's  colony.  Strong  instances  of  attachment  between 
a  colony  and  its  metropolis  are  not  infrequent ;  according  to  Plato, 
the  two  should  form  one  entity,  alike  in  language  and  laws.^  This 
extended  community  of  interests  and  life  was  broken  in  upon  by 
no  such  catastrophes  as  separated  the  Phoenician  cities  from  their 
colonies  ;  in  fact,  constant  and  copious  emigration  to  the  colonies 
was  a  distinctively  Greek  characteristic.  And  since  these  colonies 
were  real  colonies  of  settlement,  the  general  principles  given 
above  ^  apply  to  them,  and  show,  on  general  lines,  why  they  grew 
to  states,  while  maintaining  their  individuality  and  leaving  its 
strong  impress  upon  the  world. 

Action  and  reaction  are  interwoven ;  for  the  economic  and 
other  effects  of  the  opening  of  extended  markets  and  the  spread 
of  nationality  could  not  but  affect  strongly  the  land  of  origin.^ 
Greece  was  better  fitted  for  manufacture,  mining,  and  trade  than 
for  agriculture  ;  and  her  technical  inferiority  to  the  East  gradually 

1  How  all-absorbing  in  group-relations  the  conception  of  the  7r6Xts  was,  can  best 
be  judged  by  one  who  has  searc!  ed  the  Greek  language  for  a  term  corresponding  to 
"society"  or  "  nation."  It  is  only  in  the  absence  of  an  adequate  Oreek  term  that  a 
linguistic  hybrid  such  as  "sociology"  has  become  current.  But  "political"  is  a 
heritage  which  is  retained,  although  with  etymological  inconsistency. 

^  Caillemer. 

"  Freeman  (p.  ii)  draws  a  contrast  with  America,  where  the  population  of  the 
United  States  has  become  European  not  by  adoption  but  through  a  process  of 
replacement.  *  y^vos  ofidcfiojvov  Kal  Ofidvo/jLov.   N6/iot,  IV,  708.  ^  Pp.  17  ff. 

0  Beloch,  I,  198  ff. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE 


49 


disappeared  as  this  broad  division  of  labor  between  metropolis  and 
colony  rendered  possible  an  ever-sharpening  specialization.  She 
was  enabled  progressively  to  shift  the  center  of  gravity  of  her 
industrial  organization  away  from  the  production  of  a  food-sui)ply 
and  of  raw  materials  of  the  arts.  And  the  development  of  crowded 
centers  of  population,  and  of  complex  relations  between  men, 
forced  changes  of  great  moment  in  customs,  laws,  and  govern- 
ment. Not  only  that,  —  which  is  a  matter  of  Greek  culture-his- 
tory,—  but  the  important  colonial  interests  formed  a  new  basis  for 
Hellenic  strifes,  catastrophes,  and  combinations,  and  so  of  larger, 
if  not  more  stable,  political  units. 

The  history  of  the  colonies,  so  far  as  it  is  known,  shows  them 
prosperous.  They  were  sufficiently  adaptable  to  change  unessen- 
tial elements  in  their  own  constitutions,  and  not  infrequently  sur- 
passed the  home-land  in  the  wealth  and  variety  of  their  products, 
material  and  intellectual.  Their  original  social  forms,  modeled 
upon  those  of  the  parent-cities,  and  consequently  aristocratic  in 
general  nature,  were  not  infrequently  altered  in  the  direction  of 
adaptation  to  a  rougher  environment.  Thus,  especially  in  Sicily, 
and  under  pressure  of  hostile  neighbors,  a  well-developed  monarchy 
was  established  and  long  maintained.  The  more  intimate  details 
of  colonial  life  are  not  well  made  out ;  this  life  was  undoubtedly  a 
rougher  type  of  that  exhibited  by  the  metropolis,  but  identical 
with  the  latter  in  essential  details.  The  great  influence  of  mate- 
rial wealth  should  be  especially  noted  ;  the  colonies  were  often 
"  timocratic."^  The  trading  or  agricultural  colony,  by  whomsoever 
founded,  represents  a  fairly  consistent  type. 

It  is  because  there  existed  between  the  colonies  and  metropo- 
lises a  complex  of  ties  vital  enough  to  be  transformed,  in  case  of 
need,  into  actual  bonds  of  political  dependency,  that  the  Greek 
settlements,  like  the  Phoenician,  give  the  impression  of  a  colonial 
empire.  But  it  appears  that  the  characteristic  factional  spirit  of 
the  Greeks  followed  them  directly  into  the  newer  settlements  ; 
and  this  internal  dissension,  even  though  suspended  on  occasion, 
was  a  quality  fatal  to  the  construction  of  a  real  empire.^    The 

1  Caillemer;  cf.  Busolt,  I,  271  ff. 

2  It  would  be  unjust  to  pass  over  the -two  Greek  "empires"  that  deserve  the 
name,  —  the  Athenian  and  the  Macedonian.  During  their  period  of  predominance 
the  Athenians  developed  a  form  of  offshoot  society,  the  KXripovxl-a-,  very  similar 
to  the  Roman  colonia,  presently  to  be  mentioned  in  more  detail  as  being  a  better 
represented   type.    This  was   an   imperial  dependency  created  for   imperial   ends, 


50  COLONIZATION 

rising  Roman  power  reduced  the  several  Greek  states  and  colonies, 
as  it  were,  one  by  one  ;  and  the  arduousness  and  cost  of  this  re- 
duction did  not  approach  those  incurred  in  coaquering  the  en- 
forced but  persistent  and  desperate  league  of  Semites,  which 
constituted  the  last  hope  of  the  Phoenicians  in  the  West.  So  far 
as  these  cases  in  extremis  go,  they  indicate  less  capacity  in  the 
Greek  than  in  the  Semite  for  the  unification  and  extension  of 
political  power.^ 


THE   ROMAN   COLONIAE 

In  treating  of  the  Phoenician  and  Greek  colonies  it  has  been 
possible  practically  to  eliminate  the  element  of  metropolitan  con- 
trol over  the  new  societies,  for  it  existed  only  at  the  outset,  by 
exception,  or  in  vague  and  shadowy  form.  Nice  discrimination 
might  with  some  reason  refuse  to  recognize  in  these  peoples' 
enterprises  a  genuine  colonial  activity  ;  and  the  same  might  be 
asserted  with  even  greater  reason  regarding  those  of  the  Romans. 
The  latter  afford  us,  however,  another  experiment  in  the  elimina- 
tion of  factors,  and  that  in  a  sense  converse  with  respect  to  the 
one  just  cited  ;  for  with  the  Romans  emigration  and  trade  were 
negligible  and  metropolitan  control  was  a  universal  principle.^ 

whose  settlers  expropriated  the  natives  of  its  regions,  or  functioned  as  a  garrison 
among  disaffected  allies,  while  retaining  most  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  Athenian 
citizenship.  The  cleruchies  were  located  chiefly  in  Euboea,  the  Cyclades,  the  islands 
off  the  southern  coast  of  Thrace,  and  the  Chersonese;  the  number  of  families  lo- 
cated in  cleruchies  just  before  the  Peloponnesian  War  is  estimated  at  15,000.  Hertz- 
berg,  p.  80;  Caillemer;  Beloch,  I,  493  ff. ;  II,  274  ff.,  279,  304;  Lewis,  p.  104. 

The  Macedonian  settlements  in  the  East  were  mostly  garrisons,  whose  mem- 
bers generally  intermarried  or  consorted  with  the  natives.  They  can  scarcely  be 
denominated  colonies  in  our  sense,  although  their  constituents  of  po])ulali()n,  their 
later  industrial  and  commercial  activity,  and  finally  their  widely  extending  Ilelleniz- 
ing  function  give  them  a  kind  of  colonial  stamp.  Perhajjs  they  were  as  much 
colonies  for  a  time  as  the  Roman  coloitiae\  their  general  type  departs  in  only  unim- 
portant respects  from  that  of  the  latter,  as  described  below.  But  their  ejihemeral 
character  makes  them  of  less  value  to  the  study  of  colonization  than  their  more 
developed  aftertypes.    See  Hertzberg,  pp.  81  ff . ;  Beloch,  III,  part  i,  10  ff.,  261  ff. 

1  Cf.  Ihne,  I,  377-378;  Hertzberg,  pp.  11-16. 

2  The  bulk  of  the  data  here  given  on  the  colonies  is  derived  from  Brodrick,  Ihne, 
Lewis,  De  Coulanges,  Arnold,  and  the  article  "  Coloniae  "  in  the  I'auly-Wissowa 
Encyclopjidie.  Cf.  also  Humbert,  in  Daremberg  et  Saglio,  sub  "  Colonia."  These 
encyclopa;dia  articles  furnish  details  and  necessary  references  ;  the  present  treatment 
takes  up  the  colonia  mainly  as  a  variant  form.  For  a  brief  general  treatment,  see 
BruniaUi,  pp.  19  ff. 


COLONIZATION   OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  51 

Motives  for  Founding  the  Coloniae 

The  stock  motives  for  colonization  were  with  the  Romans  rela- 
tively non-existent.  Italy  was  never  to  such  a  degree  over-popu- 
lated during  the  Roman  predominance  that  the  rational  utilization 
of  the  existing  arts  would  not  have  afforded  almost  immediate 
relief.  The  commercial  spirit  entered  but  feebly  into  the  situation, 
for  mercantile  activity  scarcely  existed  in  earlier  times,  and  then 
and  later,  as  is  natural  in  a  military  state,  was  held  in  more  or  less 
of  disesteem.i  There  were  no  religious  or  political  reasons  to  impel 
emigration.  The  incentives,  in  short,  which  have  most  generally 
led  men  to  a  change  of  environment  were  but  a  vanishing  c[uantity. 
All  other  motives  were  merged  in  the  political  and  imperial  one  of 
group-aggrandizement,  —  the  extension  and  confirmation  of  the 
authority  of  the  Roman  rule  ;  "  the  history  of  Roman  colonization 
is  the  history  of  the  Roman  state.^  Roman  colonization  was  thus 
one  of  many  governmental  expedients  in  the  struggle  for  empire  ; 
the  colonies  were  part  of  the  machinery  of  conquest  and  subjuga- 
tion. They  did  not  precede  the  state  and  impel  its  extension  to 
cover  already  existing  national  interests,  but  followed  it,  and,  as 
outposts,  secured  its  successive  advances.  Thus  they  formed, 
from  one  aspect,  part  of  the  machinery  of  provincial  administra- 
tion ;  they  were,  in  short,  a  series  of  garrisons,  and  in  both  the 
earlier  and  later  periods  were  intended  to  be  "  non  oppida  Italiae, 
sed  propugnacula  imperii."^  They  "marked  the  growth  of  Ro- 
man dominion  as  the  rings  mark  the  annual  growth  of  a  tree."  * 

1  "  Despising  commercial  pursuits,  they  [the  Romans]  looked  to  Greece  and  other 
nations  to  regulate  their  over-sea  trade  and  to  supply  their  wants;  and  when  their 
fleets  obtained  the  dominion  of  the  sea,  their  object  was  less  to  protect  their  rapidly 
extending  maritime  commerce  than  to  consolidate  and  preserve  their  power  and 
dominion  upon  the  land.  ...  As  far  as  can  now  be  ascertained,  the  supply  of  corn 
for  the  capital  formed  the  chief  and  for  ages  almost  the  only  article  of  commerce 
worthy  of  senatorial  notice,  as  any  scarcity  in  the  supply  of  that  necessary  article 
invariably  produced  tumults  among  the  people."  Lindsay,  I,  1 63,  1 70 ;  cf .  also  pp.  1 09, 
157,  177-179,  187-188.  It  was  mainly  the  efforts  of  other  peoples  that  made  Rome 
a  commercial  center.  One  is  inclined  sometimes  to  suspect  that  the  body  of  Roman 
commercial  law  subsequently  developed  was  aimed  in  its  application  mainly  at  non- 
Roman  merchants,  etc.    Cf.  Speck,  III,  part  i,  427  ff.,  493,  etc. ;  Lindsay,  I,  162  ff. 

2  Fauly-Wissowa,  sub  "  Coloniae." 

3  Cicero,  De  leg.  agr.,  II,  27,  §  73.  The  colonists  regularly  went  out  "  sub  vexillo." 
Practically  all  the  colonies  founded  under  the  Empire  were  strictly  militaiy.  Krod 
rick,  pp.  53,  54,  56. 

*  Ihne,  I,  413. 


52  COLONIZATION 

Conformably  with  this  their  object,  the  colonies  owed  their  origin 
not  to  individual  initiative,  but  to  deliberate  official  action ;  the 
right  of  creating  colonies  lay  successively  with  the  kings,  the  offi- 
cial representatives  of  the  people,  and  the  emperors.  Even  emigra- 
tion to  already  formed  colonies  was  excluded  from  the  sphere  of 
individual  initiative.  It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the  colonies  were 
not  established  in  unsettled  districts,  but  were  generally  located  in 
the  heart  of  towns,  in  newly  conquered  regions,  where  their  pres- 
ence provided  a  constant  suggestion  and  example  of  subordina- 
tion, as  well  as  an  intimate  and  uninterrupted  exhibition  of  the 
advantages  of  Roman  rule  and  civilization.  Thus  they  were  far 
from  representing  the  tentative  efforts  of  a  growing  people  to 
expand  into  new  habitats,  or  to  "tap"  a  virgin  region  of  trade; 
they  were  the  guardians,  and  at  times  the  buffers,  of  the  empire, 
the  last  links  between  Rome  and  her  dependencies,  the  objects  of 
gradual  incorporation.  It  is  clear  that  we  have  here  a  form  of 
colonization  exhibiting  a  thorough-going  contrast  with  those  of  the 
other  Mediterranean  nations  hitherto  considered.  The  principle  of 
the  Roman  colony  has  been  compared  with  that  followed  by  the 
French  in  Algeria  and  the  British  in  India,^ 

Nature  of  the   Colon/a 

If  the  colfljiiae  had  been  merely  garrisons,  they  would  have 
entered  as  little  into  the  range  of  our  subject  as  do  Xhc  frovinciae. 
Etymologically  the  word  co Ionia  designates  an  important,  if  sec- 
ondary, character  of  the  Roman  offshoot  societies ;  they  were 
groups  of  cultivators.^  When,  during  the  earlier  Italian  conquests, 
the  citizens  of  a  town  were  dispossessed  in  favor  of  a  Roman 
garrison,  a  part  of  their  lands  (often  one-third)  was  given  over  to 
the  farmer-soldiers  as  a  sort  of  substitute  for  other  remuneration. 
The  coloniae  likewise  came  to  discharge  the  political  and  social 

1  Algeria :  Lewis,  p.  117.  India:  15rodrick,  p.  64;  De  Saussuie,  pp.  26S-269. 
Lewis,  in  the  same  place,  says  that  the  Greek  colonies  were  somewhat  similar  to  the 
English  colonies  in  America,  especially  after  the  latter's  independence. 

'■^  It  is  clear,  of  course,  that  the  connection  of  this  term  with  our  own  "  colony  " 
is  etymological  merely ;  it  explains  little  or  nothing  in  the  modern  term.  See  note, 
p.  2.  For  the  previous  history  of  the  term,  see  Pauly-Wissowa,  siih  "  Colonatus," 
"  Coloniae  "  ;  cf.  Lewis,  p.  115,  note  2.  On  X.\\q />ro7ii/ici(ie,  see  Arnold  ;  Lewis,  pp.  1 1 7  ff . 
The  provinces  form  a  very  suggestive  side-study  for  one  interested  in  the  general 
question  of  colonization.  As  for  the  cohuiiae,  they  were,  in  strictness,  only  special 
parts  of  \\y&\x  provinciae. 


COLONIZATION   OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  53 

function,  subordinate  up  to  the  time  of  the  Gracchi,  of  providing 
for  poorer  citizens  from  whose  presence  the  state  desired  rehef ; 
this  function  was  strongly  emphasized  by  the  younger  Gracchus, 
who  wished  to  reestablish  an  independent,  land-owning  peasantry.^ 
It  is  clear  that  such  colonization  rested  upon  the  family  as  its 
unit,  especially  as  preference  is  regularly  given  to  prospective 
emigrants  with  families.^  After  the  Civil  Wars  the  coloniae  were 
further  employed  to  afford  a  place  of  retirement,  together  with  a 
sort  of  pension  in  land,  for  the  veterans.  Not  infrequently,  in 
later  times  particularly,  the  distinction  between  colonia  and,  for 
example,  iminicipiuin,  became  legal  or  fictitious  merely,  implying 
no  vital  differences  of  any  kind.^  Thus  the  term  changed  during 
the  life  of  the  Republic  and  Empire,  with  the  extension  of  security 
of  rule  in  the  wake  of  conquest.  But  the  essential  of  colonia  for 
the  present  purpose  is  the  conception  of  a  garrison-society  main- 
taining itself  by  industry,  and  to  a  certain  extent  producing  its 
kind,  on  the  borders  of  the  empire,  and  exercising  a  moral  re- 
straint rather  than  an  actual  coercion  upon  the  surrounding  popu- 
lation. Of  the  colonial  types  hitherto  cited  it  resembles  most 
closely  the  Greek  cleruchy.^ 

The  foregoing  considerations  form  the  justification  of  the  state- 
ment that  "  the  area  embraced  by  Roman  colonization  was  co- 
extensive with  the  whole  Empire."  The  first  local  conquests  did 
not  need  colonies  to  secure  them,  but  a  large  number  were  formed 
in  more  distant  parts  of  Italy.  A  strong  indisposition  to  extend 
the  system  outside  of  the  peninsula  was  made  manifest  at  the 
time  of  Caius  Gracchus ;  indeed,  the  senate  was  committed  to 
many  steps  in  the  direction  of  world-dominion  before  it  was  well 
aware  of  the  fact.  But  this  reluctance  was  made  short  work  of  by 
the  emperors,  who  regularly  followed  up  their  conquests  with  the 

1  Ihne,  IV,  455;  V,  394. 

"^  Brunialti,  p.  26,  note.  Livy  gives  the  numbers  sent  to  several  colonies  as  300, 
1500,  3000,  and  even  6000  (IV,  47;  VIII,  21;  X,  i;  XXXVII,  57;  XL,  26,  34). 
The  assignments  of  land  ranged  from  2  jugera  (a  superficial  measure  equivalent  to 
about  one  acre  and  one-quarter)  to  140  a  head  (Id.,  IV,  47;  VIII,  21  ;  XL,  26,  34  ; 
Brunialti,  p.  27). 

^  Such  were  all  post-Hadrian  colonies,  "  purely  fictitious."  Pauly-Wissowa, 
"Coloniae";  Lewis,  p.  115. 

*  "  The  Coloniae  were  settlements  of  Roman  citizens  in  Italy,  who  occupied  a  con- 
quered town,  divided  the  whole  or  a  large  part  of  the  lands  belonging  to  its  citizens 
among  themselves,  and  became  the  coloni,  or  cultivators  of  the  lands  thus  appropri- 
ated."   Lewis,  p.  114.    This  definition  covers  mainly  the  ^^^xXx^x  colotiiae. 


54  COLONIZATION 

founding  of  colonies.^  The  latter  varied  in  number  with  the  tur- 
bulence of  the  locality,  were  sometimes  very  prosperous,  as  in 
Africa,  and  at  other  times  short-lived  and  unsuccessful,  as  in 
Spain. ^  In  the  latter  country  troops  had  to  be  assigned  for  garri- 
son-duty year  by  year.*^  All  these  colonies,  with  the  provinces 
they  guarded,  were  bound  closely  to  Rome  both  by  their  interests 
and  by  the  presence  of  relatively  complete  means  of  communica- 
tion.'* For  Rome  instinctively  created  for  herself  those  bonds  of 
empire  for  which  the  less  imperial  genius  of  Phoenicia  and  Greece 
had  not  clearly  conceived  the  necessity  ;  by  her  roads  Rome  held 
to  herself  not  only  her  provinces  but  her  colonies.-'' 

Under  this  ever-present  domination  of  the  capital,  however,  the 
coloniac  remained  as  they  had  begun,  comparatively  devoid  of  indi- 
vidual enterprise,  initiative,  and  character.  They  had  no  life  of 
their  own,  never  conspired  against  Rome  nor  asserted  independ- 
ence. They  clung  to  Rome  with  a  "  sort  of  passive,  mechanical 
cohesion,"  ^  even  after  the  imperial  government  had  become  weak 
and  old  ;  from  having  been  self-governing  above  other  sections  of 
the  empire,  they  suffered  their  privileges  to  lapse  in  the  general 
gravitation  of  power  into  the  hands  of  a  single  despot. 

But  little  is  known  of  the  internal  life  of  these  garrison-colonies, 
and  that  may  be  summed  up  by  saying  that  they  constituted  small 
replicas  of  Rome.  Agriculture  was  practically  the  only  industry. 
Miscegenation  with  natives  doubtless  occurred,  but  did  not  elim- 
inate the  need  of  fresh  relays  of  emigrants  to  keep  up  the  popula- 
tion. Theoretically  these  emigrants  did  not  lose  their  Roman 
civic  rights,  but  in  practice  such  rights,  culminating  in  the  fran- 
chise, lay  dormant.  It  is  certain  that  as  a  whole  the  colonies 
possessed  no  capacities  for  self-transformation  or  development  into 

1  Brodrick,  p.  52  ;  Arnold,  pp.  2-3,  9.  For  the  number  of  colonies  founded  at 
various  periods  and  by  different  rulers,  see  Pauly-Wissowa,  sub  "  Coloniae  "  ;  Brod- 
rick, p.  50;  Ihne,  I,  455,  473,  543,  etc. 

2  Cf.  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  14  ff . ;  Colmeiro,  I,  57  ff. 

3  Ihne,  III,  373-374- 

*  The  care  taken  by  the  Romans  to  afford  material  benefits  to  their  colonies  is 
evidenced,  among  other  things,  by  ruins  of  aqueducts,  cisterns,  etc.,  in  such  dry 
regions  as  North  Africa.  See  Brunialti,  p.  31,  note;  p.  32,  note.  The  careful  enu- 
merations and  surveys  which  formed  a  part  of  the  founding  of  the  colonii)  defined 
the  holdings  of  land  and  titles  to  it  in  a  most  satisfactory  manner.  It  would  be 
hard  to  discover  another  such  matured  and  scientific  system  until  the  nineteenth 
century. 

5  Cf.  Arnold,  pp.  7,  14  ff. ;  Lewis,  p.  127  ;  Brunialti,  p.  31. 

•'  Brodrick,  p.  77. 


.      COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  55 

new  states;  ^  nor  were  they  able,  in  the  final  time  of  trial,  to  aid 
themselves  or  Rome  in  any  considerable  degree.  They  were  con- 
nected with  Rome  alone,  and  in  a  quasi-parasitic  relation ;  they 
existed  for  her  and  fell  with  her ;  among  themselves  they  had  no 
common  interests  and  no  fellowship  except  in  their  common  de- 
struction at  the  hands  of  the  invading  races.^  Hence  Roman 
colonization  represents  no  such  grandiose  and  startling  movement 
of  population  and  no  such  generation  of  new  societies  as  do  the 
antecedent  activities  of  the  Phoenicians  and  Greeks. 

ROMANIZATION  :    CaSE    OF    GaUL 

In  their  influence,  however,  upon  the  world-to-come  the  Roman 
colonies  were  far  from  insignificant.  This  their  effect  upon  sub- 
sequent history  was  exercised  by  them  rather  as  expedients  in 
imperial  administration  than  as  colonies  pure  and  simple  ;  never- 
theless it  seems  desirable  briefly  to  consider  this  influence,  even 
though  it  leads  to  a  certain  amount  of  digression  from  the  subject 
in  hand.  In  much  later  days  colonial  administration  is  occasionally 
hard  to  distinguish  from  imperial  administration  ;  but  a  suggestion 
of  the  system  of  which  the  coloniac  formed  part  cannot  fail  to  cast 
light  upon  their  origin  and  their  destiny  as  instruments  in  the 
spread  of  culture.  It  is  in  order,  then,  to  show  the  methods  of 
the  Romans  in  dealing  with  and  modifying  subject  peoples  ;  and 
for  this  purpose  it  has  seemed  best  to  single  out  a  particular 
people,  the  Gauls. ^  For  while  the  activity  of  the  Romans  in  Gaul 
may  not  be  absolutely  typical  of  them  in  the  capacity  now  under 
consideration,  it  is  sufficiently  so  for  the  present  purpose  ;  and  it 
is  the  more  in  point  because  of  its  pervasive  and  enduring  influ- 
ence upon  the  disposition  and  tendencies  of  several  peoples  with 
whom  any  complete  study  of  colonization  must  deal.    Like  the 

^  The  coloniae  conserved  the  form  into  which  they  were  originally  molded ;  they 
preserved  what  was  distinctively  Roman  when  Rome  itself  was  "  Roman  "  no  longer. 
Pauly-Wissowa,  sub  "  Coloniae."  By  way  of  comparison  with  the  relations  of  Greek 
colonies  to  the  metropolis,  Brodrick's  remark  (p.  68)  is  apt :  "  The  despotic  character 
of  the  relation  between  father  and  son,  as  defined  by  the  Roman  jurisprudence,  was 
amply  realized  in  that  between  Rome  and  her  colonies."  Cf.  Ihne,  I,  413-414  ; 
Lewis,  pp.  1 1 6-1 17.  -  Brodrick,  pp.  77-82. 

3  Most  of  what  follows  on  Gaul  is  derived  from  Fustel  de  Coulanges.  The  atti- 
tude of  this  author  is  pro-Roman,  but  his  conclusions  as  here  cited  seem  amply  sup- 
ported over  a  wide  range  of  scholarship.  His  views  find  a  rather  more  popular 
presentation  in  De  Saussure's  chapter  on  Roman  Gaul.    Cf,  Brodrick,  pp.  51-52. 


56  COLONIZATION 

Phoenician  and  the  Greek,  the  Roman  left  his  stamp  unmistakable 
upon  the  rising  races  of  his  time  ;  but  it  was  impressed  through 
agencies  widely  diverging  from  those  of  his  predecessors. 

It  was  a  primary  and  vital  condition  of  the  Gallic  conquest  and 
subsequent  history  that  the  Gauls  did  not  conceive  the  Romans  to 
be  enemies  of  their  race.  The  sentiment  of  race-diversity  was 
vague  in  those  days,  and  what  little  there  was  in  evidence  was  not 
accentuated  and  perpetuated  by  any  marked  external  distinctions, 
such  as  were  familiar  in  the  ages  succeeding  the  discovery  of  new 
worlds  and  races.  Nor  did  the  Gauls  regard  the  Romans  as  ene- 
mies of  their  country,  in  the  modern  sense.  There  was  no  Gallic 
state,  no  national  feeling ;  all  was  turmoil  and  encroachment  of 
neighbor  on  neighbor,  to  say  nothing  of  threatened  irruption  from 
the  north.  Hence  the  dominion  of  those  who  could  guarantee 
security  and  peace,  as  it  became  better  known,  was  accepted  rather 
than  repelled  ;  subjugated  on  one  side,  the  Gauls  were  freed  on 
the  other.  The  conquest,  so  far  as  fighting  went,  occupied  but 
a  few  years,  and  did  not  degenerate  into  the  petty  but  endless 
guerrilla  warfare  to  which  an  irreconcilable  people  takes  recourse. 
There  were  therefore  no  vital  difficulties  in  the  way  of  extension 
of  Roman  rule.  Not  only  this,  but,  because  they  wished  simply 
to  govern,  the  Romans  systematically  escaped  the  consequences 
of  an  interfering  and  meddlesome  policy.^  "Assimilation"  of  the 
conquered  district  to  the  metropolitan  model  was  an  idea  foreign 
to  the  ancients.  Hence  Gaul  was  not  crushed  by  the  conquest 
and  its  sequel,  nor  were  the  Gauls  reduced  to  servitude ;  they 
retained,  with  few  exceptions,  their  civil  liberty,  internal  organ- 
ization, traditions,  and  habitudes.  Most  men  of  narrow  horizon 
perceived  no  great  change  in  their  existence  as  a  consequence  of 
the  conquest.  If  the  Gauls  had  to  pay  taxes  and  furnish  soldiers, 
that  was  nothing  new  to  them  ;  and  discharging  these  obligations  to 
the  Romans,  they  were  sure  of  the  return  they  desired,  —  security 

1  The  actuality  of  rule  was  preferred  to  its  name,  and  consequent  ostentation. 
Bordier  (p.  165)  quotes  the  Roman  maxim  in  reference  to  colonies,  "  Non  tarn 
regendae  sunt  quam  colendae  " ;  adding,  "  Ce  ne  sont  pas  les  lois  qu'il  nous  faut, 
disent  les  colonies,  ce  sont  les  bras ! "  It  must  be  understood,  however,  that  the 
Roman  citizens  were  those  who  profited  most  largely  in  a  material  way  from  the 
development  of  Gaul,  receiving  almost  all  the  concessions,  commercial  privileges, 
etc.  The  great  and  rapid  development  of  the  country  proves  conclusively  that  the 
activity  of  the  latter,  even  though  often  oppressive,  was,  conjoined  with  the  advan- 
tages of  Roman  rule,  a  favorable  factor.    Pigeonneau,  I,  22  ff.,  29  ff. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  57 

and  peace.  The  "Pax  Romana "  was  something  for  which  the 
provinces  could  afford  to  pay  dearly,  as  is  proved  by  their  pros- 
perity, even  under  the  exactions  of  Roman  rule  in  the  hands  of 
certain  unscrupulous  functionaries. 

The  Roman  system  of  dealing  with  subject  races  was  one  of 
non-disturbance ;  such  changes  only  were  made  in  local  forms  as 
were  necessary  to  complete  subordination.^  Even  the  exercise  of 
sovereignty  was  mild,  and  it  impinged  upon  the  common  people 
through  old  and  familiar  channels.  In  the  case  of  Gaul,  the  country 
was,  if  not  subjected,  certainly  administered  and  developed  through 
the  Gauls,  somewhat  as  India  has  been  through  the  Hindus  ;  for 
with  few  exceptions  the  Gauls  were  left  to  themselves,  and  it  is  an 
evidence  of  their  satisfaction  with  their  destiny  that  they  did  not 
care  to  be  free.  Indeed,  the  "assimilation"  policy  originated  in 
the  subject  people  itself,  starting  with  the  richest  and  noblest 
families  and  working  on  through  the  population.  The  people  passed 
with  no  great  difficulties  or  throes  from  the  state  of  subjection  to 
that  of  citizenship.  They  became  attached  to  Rome  as  to  a  native 
land  ;  and  their  union  with  her  was  broken  not  by  themselves  but 
by  another  race.  If  Gaul  was  transformed  from  her  former  state, 
it  was  the  will  of  the  Gauls  rather  than  of  the  Romans  that  this  came 
to  pass.  Here  again,  then,  as  in  the  cases  of  the  Phoenician  and 
Greek  colonization,  we  are  drawn  to  note  the  absence  of  any  pre- 
conceived ideal  or  "  mission";  differing  from  their  predecessors  in 
many  and  characteristic  respects,  the  Romans  were  one  with  them 
in  the  practicality  of  the  ends  which  they  set  before  themselves. 
The  results  were  of  far-reaching  and  wholesome  effect  in  the  one 
case  as  in  the  other. ^  For,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  as  members  of  the 
Empire  the  Gauls  renounced  in  favor  of  Roman  characters  most  of 

1  Lewis,  p.  119.  Judjea,  says  this  autlior  (p.  120),  presents  a  "lively  image  of  the 
continuance  of  the  peculiar  laws  and  religious  usages  of  a  Roman  dependency  outside 
of  Italy." 

2  Language  and  religion  were  respected,  but  the  needs  of  trade,  etc.,  brought  about 
a  use  of  Latin  even  among  the  higher  classes  of  Carthage,  however  much  the  lower 
classes  clung  to  their  gods  and  native  tongue.  Rome  did  not  try  to  modify  everything 
by  a  sweeping  tabula  rasa,  but  altered  the  present  and  prepared  for  the  future. 
Brunialti,  p.  31,  note,  quoting  from  J.  Toutain,  Le  citta  romane  della  Tunisia  (French), 
Paris,  1896.  Pliny  (Hist.  Nat.,  Ill,  v)  says  of  Rome:  "...  terra  omnium  terrarum 
alumna  eadem  et  parens  numine  deum  electa  quae  caelum  ipsum  clarius  faceret,  sparsa 
congregaret  inperia,  ritusque  molliret,  et  tot  populorum  discordes  ferasque  linguas, 
sermonis  commercio  contraheret,  coUoquia  et  humanitatem  homini  daret,  breviterque, 
una  cunctorum  gentium  in  toto  orbe  patria  fieret."  Cf.  De  Saussure,  pp.  268-269; 
Van  der  Aa,  De  GiJs,  i860,  I,  833-834. 


^8  COLONIZATION 

those  national  characteristics  which  race-educators  have  desired  to 
remove  or  change  ;  rehgion,  language,  law,  customs,  even  names, 
were  remodeled  after  or  directly  replaced  by  the  Roman  forms. 
The  popular  religion  w^as  not  essentially  different  from  that  of 
Rome;  Gaul  not  only  adopted  Roman  gods,  rituals,  etc.,  but, 
following  Rome's  example,  those  of  other  Mediterranean  nations 
as  well.  Druidism  was,  indeed,  uprooted  and  proscribed,  but  it 
was  hardly  a  genuine  Gallic  form.  As  for  the  Gallic  language,  it 
scarcely  appears  after  the  first  century  a.d.  Rome  never  fought 
the  Gallic  tongue ;  in  fact,  the  change  in  language  was  less  a 
consequence  of  conquest  than  of  an  altered  social  status.  The 
Gauls  took  up  Latin  "  because  they  found  interest,  profit,  and  pleas- 
ure in  its  adoption."  For  their  new  and  advanced  status  of  culture 
Gallic  was  insufficient ;  it  lacked  terms  corresponding  to  the  things 
and  ideas  of  a  changed  order.  Latin  was  from  the  first,  of  course, 
the  official  tongue,  and  as  the  Gauls  gradually  entered  into  the 
empire  as  an  integral  and  patriotic  constituency,  they  naturally 
adopted  the  traditional  speech  of  the  Roman  citizen.  There  is  here 
afforded  a  case  of  the  prevalence  of  that  language  which  suits  the 
situation  over  one  which  is  spoken  by  the  majority  of  the  group. 

In  the  matter  of  law  the  same  gradual  but  sweeping  change  took 
place.  After  the  conquest  the  Gauls  retained  their  own  law ; 
the  Romans,  through  the  suppression  of  the  Druids,  simply  replaced 
a  sacerdotal  with  a  lay  justice,  and  a  rigid  and  unmodifiable  system, 
rooted  in  religion  and  ancestral  custom,  with  one  capable  of  con- 
sistent adaptation  in  the  interests  of  the  community.  The  Gauls 
were  quick  to  perceive  the  advantages  of  security  of  individual 
property,  freedom  of  contract,  and,  above  all,  of  the  impartial  pro- 
tection of  all  classes,  which,  under  the  Roman  law,  succeeded  their 
own  system  of  clientage,  debt-slavery,  etc.  The  capricious  Druid 
justice  was  gone,  and  in  its  place  was  the  responsible,  reasonable, 
and  accessible  system  of  Rome,  with  its  unheard-of  right  of  appeal 
to  governor,  senate,  and  emperor.  And  when,  by  a  natural  process, 
the  Gauls  had  entered  the  ranks  of  the  Roman  citizens,  their  own 
legal  forms  were  already  things  of  the  past.  But  it  should  be  noted 
that  for  two  centuries  and  a  half  no  constraint  was  laid  upon  them 
to  become  citizens  ;  here  again  they  were  the  seekers  and  not  the 
sought.  And  the  like  is  true  when  we  consider  the  alterations 
which  took  place  in  the  more  general  customs  and  habitudes  of  the 
subject  people.    They  speedily  renounced  their  hitherto  proverbial 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  59 

warlike  habits  and  disposition,  and  adopted  the  usages,  mode  of 
existence,  and  even  the  tastes  of  the  Romans.  They  imitated  them 
in  such  important  activities  as  road  construction,  and  freely  built 
schools  where  Latin  and  Greek  should  be  taught.  The  whole 
political  education  of  the  land  was  derived  from  Roman  sources  : 
a  national  political  and  religious  unity  was  formed,  and  a  compact 
and  centralized  government  became  traditional.  This  centralization 
was  not  attained,  however,  at  the  expense  of  local  freedom  ;  for 
the  cities  administered  themselves,  and  their  councils  were  even 
able  to  exert  a  certain  controlling  influence  over  the  proconsuls 
and  governors. 

The  function  of  the  colonies  in  the  dissemination  of  Roman 
ideas  and  customs  has  already  been  noticed  ;  they  were  responsible 
in  no  slight  degree  for  the  transformations  just  described.^  But 
these  transformations,  it  should  be  clearly  apprehended,  were  not 
a  matter  of  racial  mixture.  From  Gaul,  for  example,  there  was 
practically  no  emigration,  permanent  or  temporary,  to  Italy,  and 
but  few  Italians  were  introduced  into  this  country  through  the 
colonies.  If  these  intermarried,  the  Roman  strain  and  traditions, 
passed  on  thus  family-wise,  could  not  have  left  much  trace  upon 
the  population.  The  colonists,  here,  as  elsewhere,  were  often  of 
races  other  than  the  Roman ;  and  the  functionaries  did  not  care 
to  establish  themselves  away  from  Rome,  the  great  center  of 
interests  and  careers.  It  was,  therefore,  neither  the  blood  of  the 
Romans  nor  their  will  and  policy  which  produced  the  far-reaching 
changes  whose  result  was  the  impressing  on  the  western  world, 
through  the  elevation  of  the  backward  peoples,  of  a  sort  of  homo- 
geneous stamp.  It  was  the  attraction  of  superiorities  in  the  prac- 
tical ordering  of  individual  and  communal  life,  —  superiorities  that 
were  not  heralded  to  others  nor  forced  upon  their  attention,  but 
which  were  self-evident.  And  here  reflection  returns  to  that  vital 
condition  of  Roman  influence  upon  subject  peoples,  —  the  absence 
of  wide  racial  diversity  in  these  ancient  times.  The  superiorities  of 
Roman  ideas  and  systems  were  self-evident  because  the  grades 
of  civilization  were  not  so  distant  one  from  another  as  to  prevent 
easy  passage  from  the  lower  to  the  higher.  This  was  particularly 
noteworthy  in  respect  to  Gaul,  but  not  untrue  in  the  case  of  other 

1  "  All  that  was  valuable  in  the  Roman  Empire,  transmitted  through  the  colonies 
whole  and  entire,  has  long  since  been  encorporated  into  the  social  life  of  modern 
Europe."    Brodrick,  p.  85  ;  cf.  Arnold,  pp.  21,  45  ff. 


6o  COLONIZATION 

lands.  It  is  said  that  Rome  succeeded  better  with  races  inferior  in 
civiHzation  to  herself  than  with  her  equals  or  superiors. ^  What  she 
would  have  done  with  a  complex  of  races  such  as  are  represented 
within  the  British  Empire  we  cannot  know  ;  her  experiences  in 
Africa  held  no  great  promise.  But  the  essential  factor  in  her 
influence  on  the  world,  as  in  that  of  the  Phoenicians  and  Greeks, 
was  the  relatively  high  quality  and  remarkable  potentiality  of  the 
civilizations  with  which  she  came  into  effective  contact.  And  into 
this  momentous  work  the  coloniae  entered  as  examples  and  nuclei 
of  Roman  civilization  among  ruder  peoples ;  their  importance  is 
correspondingly  great  in  the  history  of  the  contact  of  races 
through  colonization. 

MEDIEVAL   ITALIAN   COLONIES 

The  troubled  course  of  events  which  preceded  and  accompanied 
the  dissolution  of  the  Roman  Empire  was  such  as  to  preclude 
both  state-directed  colonization  and  that  which  takes  its  origin  in 
individual  initiative.  Imperial  colonization  had,  of  course,  reached 
its  end  together  with  the  expansive  power  of  the  Empire,  and 
could  not  reappear.  The  next  series  of  social  phenomena  to  which 
the  name  colonization  may  apply  was  almost  purely  commercial, 
and  was  connected  in  no  slight  degree  with  the  great  reactionary 
movement  from  west  to  east  represented,  among  other  results,  by 
the  Crusades.2  Hitherto  the  general  rule  had  been  that  the  East 
should  seek  the  West,  resorting  thither  as  the  carrier  of  its  own 
civilization ;  but  when,  in  consequence  of  the  great  changes  of  the 
early  Middle  Ages,  the  East  retired  into  itself  and  ceased  to  mani- 
fest the  active  initiative  of  former  times,  the  hitherto  relatively  pas- 
sive West  began  to  reach  out  on  its  own  account  for  that  of  which 
it  now  felt  the  lack.^  Naturally  enough  this  effort  was  directed  at 
first  along  commercial  lines  ;  from  the  tenth  century  on  through 
the  Discoveries  period  the  attention  of  the  West  was  regularly 
and  continuously  directed  toward  the  East,  and  finally  toward 
that  vicarious  and,  a*s  it  were,  accidentally  substituted  East 
represented  by  America. 

1  Arnold,  Introduction. 

2  The  following  is  written  mainly  from  Cibrario,  Heyd,  Prutz,  Pigeonneau,  and 
Sumner.  Brunialti  covers  the  period  in  an  interesting  chapter  leased  largely  upon 
Heyd. 

2  For  the  articles  of  mediaeval  commerce,  see,  besides  Heyd,  Pigeonneau,  I,  chap, 
iv  ;  Cibrario,  III,  chap.  ix. 


COLONIZATION   OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  6 1. 

The  Mediterranean  was,  naturally  enough,  the  theater  of  action 
for  many  decades  ;  and  in  view  of  Italy's  central  and  commanding 
position,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  the  eastern  movement  most 
strikingly  developed  in  that  country.  The  desire  for  the  charac- 
teristic products  of  the  East,  stimulated  under  the  Empire,  mani- 
fested itself  anew  with  the  relative  emergence  of  the  West  from  a 
period  of  turmoil  and  confusion ;  but  the  agency  through  which 
these  products  were  transported,  changed.  During  the  early  Middle 
Ages  the  trade-routes  toward  the  East  remained  practically  the 
same  as  those  in  use  under  the  Empire  ;  but  it  suited  the  policy 
and  pride  of  Byzantium  to  renounce  the  intermediary  function  and 
to  force  the  westerners  to  acknowledge  her  commercial  predomi- 
nance by  personal  suit  for  the  commercial  favors  which  they 
desired.^  This  policy,  like  that  later  developed  at  Lisbon,  was 
well  calculated  to  raise  up  strong  rivals,  and  amounted  in  the  end 
to  an  abdication  of  the  leading  position  which  it  was  desired  to 
hold.  Of  the  diminutive  city-republics  which  at  this  time  flourished 
in  Italy,  Amalfi  was  the  first  to  bridge  over  a  gap  thus  widening 
between  West  and  East ;  the  trade  of  the  Amalfitans  with  the 
Levant  began  in  the  tenth  century,  or  earlier ;  and  they  were 
followed  by  the  Venetians,  and  somewhat  later  by  the  Genoese, 
Pisans,  and  others.  The  activities  of  these  four  cities  in  the  Levant 
were  practically  identical,  but  the  historical  importance  of  the 
Venetian  and  Genoese  factories  and  colonies  so  far  outweighs  that 
of  the  Amalfitan  and  Pisan  settlements  that  the  latter  may  be  ex- 
cluded from  more  than  casual  mention,  as  may  also,  for  the  same 
reason,  those  of  the  Florentines,  Sienese,  Provencals,  and  Spanish.^ 

Settlement  in  the  Levant  :  Motives  and  Extent 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  activities  of  the  westerners  were 
motived  almost  wholly  by  the  prospect  of  commercial  gain.  The 
Italian  settlements  were  at  the  outset  trading-posts  or  factories  of 
an  almost  pure  type.  In  those  days  of  undeveloped  means  of 
communication  it  was  necessary  for  a  merchant  to  go  in  person  to 
the  scene  of  his  operations,  and  generally  to  remain  there  for  a 
protracted    period.    Although    protected    by  treaties  with  native 

1  Heyd,  I,  64-65. 

2  Details  in  Heyd,  I,  105  ff.  et passim ;  Lindsay,  I,  232  £f.,  473  ff.,  522  ff. ;  Wappaus, 
I,  118  ff. ;  on  tlae  mercantile  activities  of  the  mediaeval  Jews,  see  Heyd,  I,  pp.  139  ff- 
For  the  French  merchants  of  the  Middle  Ages,  see  Pigeonneau,  I,  chap.  iv. 


62  COLONIZATION 

rulers,  considerations  of  safety  led  such  traders  to  cleave  together ; 
they  even  went  so  far  as  to  have  a  military  organization  and  de- 
fensive structures  in  those  city-quarters  in  which  their  commer- 
cial purposes  favored  settlement.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
trading-colony  was  not  infrequently  tempted  to  a  display  of  force 
in  conquest.  These  two  motives,  the  predominant  one  of  trade 
and  the  derived  one  of  conquest,  lay  at  the  bottom  of  Italian 
colonization  in  the  Levant ;  other  stock  motives  play  but  a  small 
part  in  its  inception  and  history. 

The  internal  development  of  the  Italian  city-states  brought  it 
about  that  Venice  should  earliest  attain  a  degree  of  political  coher- 
ence which  justified  and  rendered  possible  the  turning  of  attention 
without.  This  advantage  in  time  was  augmented  by  the  favorable 
geographical  and  topographical  conditions  which  early  assured  her 
of  safety  from  aggression  and  of  a  picked  population  of  desirable 
refugees,  together  with  the  further  advantage  of  relative  nearness 
to  the  East.  Some  time  before  the  Crusades  the  Venetians  had 
already  attained  many  grants  in  reward  of  aid  lent  to  the  Emperor 
of  the  East  against  the  Saracens  ;  their  settlements  came  early  to 
be  regarded  by  him  as  those  of  allies  rather  than  subjects.  Ofie 
of  the  earliest  of  these  was  in  Byzantium,  but  from  this  central 
point  they  were  scattered  throughout  the  country,  forming  the 
outlines  of  a  real  "  maritime  empire."  ^  Their  influence  was  so 
strong  that  the  emperor  excluded  from  his  domains  any  nation 
with  which  they  were  at  war,  thus  considerably  hampering  the 
early  operations  of  the  Genoese  and  Pisans. 

The  latter  competitors  were  later  in  the  field,  for  they  attained 
the  requisite  internal  unity  and  organization  only  shortly  before  the 
Crusades.  But  such  was  the  energy  of  the  Genoese  that  they  were 
not  far  behind  their  older  rivals  in  sharing  the  gains  of  this  great 
movement  of  peoples.''^  It  was  only  with  the  Crusades,  indeed,  that 
the  opportunity  came  to  them  both  to  found  the  characteristic 
Italian  colony  in  the  Levant ;  their  timely  and  indispensable,  if 
not  disinterested,^  services  during  the  early  Crusades  enabled  them 

1  Ileyd,  I,  i2off.;  Brunialti,  p.  41;  Cibrario,  III,  275;  Wappiius,  I,  iiSff.; 
Sumner,  Lectures. 

2  Cibrario,  III,  278  ff. ;   Prutz,  p.  377. 

3  The  Crusaders  and  their  trappings  were  the  Italians'  '•  back -freight."  Sumner ;  cf. 
Ileyd,  I,  145  ff.  "  Pardessus  observes  that  in  reading  the  history  of  the  period  of  the 
Crusades,  any  one  would  suppose  that  these  expeditions  were  made  merely  to  promote 
and  extend  their  [tlie  Italians']  commerce."    Lindsay,  I,  473. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  63 

to  acquire  wide  and  practically  sovereign  areas  and  rights  in  the 
most  important  trading-centers  of  the  land  of  commercial,  as  well 
as  of  other,  promise.  To  Venice,  for  instance,  was  granted  as 
much  as  a  third  of  such  important  cities  as  Tyre  (capitulated  1 124) 
and  Sidon,  to  say  nothing  of  extensive  rights  in  Jerusalem,  where, 
in  consequence  of  many  pilgrimages,  business  was  very  profitable. 
Even  greater  concessions  were  gained  by  the  Venetians  after 
the  capture  of  Constantinople  (1204),  undertaken  largely  at  their 
own  instance  as  creditors  for  transportation  services,  and  at  which 
they  assisted  ;  the  removal  of  the  Doge  to  this  station  as  a  center 
of  empire  was  at  one  time  considered.  Their  ambition  extended  to 
the  exploitation  of  the  ^gean  Islands  and,  in  1395,  even  to  the 
seizure  of  Athens  and  Thessalonica  ;  and  their  trading-settlements 
were  gradually  extended  along  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea.^  They 
were  well  received  in  Egypt,  Tunis,  and  Tripoli,  and  established 
regular  lines  of  navigation  to  these  coasts  ;  through  the  Barbary 
settlements  they  were  enabled  also  to  share  to  some  extent  in  the 
commerce  of  interior  Africa.  The  Genoese  and  Pisans  were  at 
first  mere  novices,  where  the  Venetians  were  masters  ;  but  the 
Genoese  were  not  contented  to  follow  afar  off,  and,  after  acquiring 
a  commercial  colony  in  Constantinople  (11 55),  had  speedily  risen 
to  be  deadly  and  dangerous  rivals  for  the  monopoly  hitherto  enjoyed 
by  their  predecessors.  For  the  strains  of  this  great  conflict  the 
forces  of  the  Amalfitans  and  Pisans  were  insufificient. 


Character  of  the  Fondachi 

Such  was  the  general  field  covered  by  the  Italian  factories.  Had 
they  remained  factories  merely,  they  could  have  but  little  im- 
portance for  the  subject  in  hand  ;  and  they  might  have  retained 
a  more  rudimentary  form  had  it  not  been  for  the  Crusades.  The 
results  of  these  quasi-migrations  which  concern  this  immediate 
contention  were  the  presence  of  a  large,  if  unstable,  European 
population  in  the  East,  and,  especially  in  the  Holy  Land,  the  sub- 
stitution of  political,  legal,  and  other  conditions  modeled  upon 
familiar  European  patterns  for  the  more  unfamiliar  and  difficult 

1  Canestrini,  II  Mar  Nero,  etc.,  covers  mainly  the  local  Genoese  colonies,  —  their 
government  and  legislation,  products  and  commercial  policy,  decadence  and  fall. 
Cf.  Wappaus,  I,  183  ff. 


64  COLONIZATION 

Mohammedan  systems.  The  East  was  no  longer  a  foreign  country  ; 
it  was  a  complex  of  European  nationalities,  and  a  favorable  ground 
for  the  development  of  security-loving  trade. ^  Hence  the  Italian 
factories,  through  the  presence  of  a  considerable  population,  includ- 
ing whole  families,  became  real  Italian  settlements  ;  and  the  per- 
sistence of  close,  strong,  and  partisan  relations  between  the  several 
Venetian,  Genoese,  and  other  settlements  and  their  respective 
cities  of  origin,  formed  the  ties  which  bound  together  two  real, 
even  though  diminutive,  colonial  empires. 

In  accordance  with  the  terms  of  their  treaties  with  eastern 
rulers,  and  grants  from  them,  the  citizens  of  the  several  Italian 
republics  were  assigned  to  different  quarters  in  the  cities  of  the 
Levant.  Here  was  erected  a  warehouse,  or  fo}idaco,'^\\\nQ\\,  in  the 
smaller  settlements,  was  likewise  the  courthouse,  dwelling-house, 
and  inn.  The  quarters  were  sometimes  much  more  extensive, 
including  a  whole  street  or  several  streets,  with  official  and 
private  buildings,  warehouses  and  salesrooms,  churches,  mills, 
slaughter-houses,  baths,  etc.^  Venice  is  said  at  one  time  to  have 
had  fondachi  in  all  the  cities  of  importance  in  the  Eastern  Empire. 
But  the  life  of  the  colonies  was  not  always  strictly  confined  to  the 
cities  ;  when  they  received,  for  instance  from  the  Crusaders,  a 
concession  of  one-third  of  a  city,  they  likewise  acquired  claims  on 
one-third  of  the  surrounding  land  for  a  mile  out.  The  larger  of 
these  domains  were  under  the  charge  of  overseers  ;  in  Syria  the 
peasants  did  most  of  the  cultivating,  on  shares,  where  their  remu- 
neration appears  to  have  been  a  generous  one  (two-thirds  to  three- 
quarters  of  the  product).^ 

The  relation  of  the  Italian  communes,  as  they  were  called,  to  the 
dominant  power  of  the  region  in  which  they  were  established,  was 
an  extremely  independent  one.  They  were  states  within  states ; 
v/ere  regularly  exempt  from  the  payment  of  full  taxes,  and  often 
made  no  contribution  whatsoever.  Indeed,  it  was  not  uncommonly 
the  case  that  they  received  a  considerable  share  in  the  revenue  of 
their  cities,  so  that  in  the  event  of  the  local  preponderance  of  one 
Italian  city,  another  might  be  paying  tribute  to  it.    In  the  Holy 

1  Heyd,  I,  i8o. 

2  From  the  hx2M\cfunduk  =  Greek  tra-vhoKitov  (or  Trdi/So/cos).  See  especially  Simons- 
feld,  II,  3  ff. 

*  See  Heyd,  I,  167  ff.,  445  ff. ;  II,  430  ff.  A  community  of  such  relative  magnitude 
was  called  a  ruga  or  viciis. 

•»  Heyd,  I,  lyoff. ;  Prutz,  pp.  377  ff. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  65 

Land  during  the  domination  of  the  Crusaders  ^  the  communes  owed 
no  feudal  obligations  and  existed  as  equal  and  generally  self-suffi- 
cient powers.  During  the  period  of  their  prosperity  the  colonies 
were  relatively  uncontrolled  by  the  local  governments,  a  fact  which 
will  emerge  the  more  clearly  from  a  consideration  of  their  internal 
administration  and  relations  to  their  cities  of  origin. 

Relation  of  Colony  and  Metropolis 

The  influence  of  the  metropolis  was  from  the  first  supreme. 
The  original  grants  and  privileges  were  obtained  by  the  mother- 
city,  often  as  the  rewards  of  considerable  military  and  naval 
activity  and  expense  ;  the  buildings  were  erected  at  public  and 
not  private  cost ;  the  trade  of  the  colonies  was  manipulated  for 
the  advantage  of  the  metropolis.  The  colonies  were  treated  as  a 
piece  of  external  domain  ;  it  was  only  at  first  that  they  elected 
their  own  head-men  ;  as  the  factory  grew  into  a  colony,  the  magis- 
trates were  regularly  appointed  by  the  home-authorities.  These 
officials  were  called  at  first  vice-cotnites,  later  consoli  {Genoese  and 
Pisans)  and  baili  (Venetians).  In  earlier  times  each  colony  had  its 
supervisor ;  later  a  consul,  or  bailo^  residing  in  the  chief  center 
of  trade,  was  appointed  for  an  entire  region  or  country.  After 
the  capture  of  Constantinople,  in  which  the  Venetians  afforded  the 
Crusaders  indispensable  aid,  the  chief  Venetian  official  of  the 
region  became  tho,  podestd,  with  the  rank  of  despot  or  prince,  and 
with  a  very  high  power  delegated  in  the  name  and  commission  of 
the  Doge.  These  vicegerents  were  chosen  for  a  specified  time  and 
given  complete  instructions,  the  central  power  to  which  they  were 
responsible,  in  the  case  of  the  Venetians,  being  the  three  consoli 

1  De  Lanessan  (p.  13)  says  that  the  Crusades  were  nothing  but  tentatives  at  the 
colonization  of  Syria,  rendered  unfruitful  by  climate,  difficulties  of  communication, 
etc.  Prutz  (pp.  1-5)  compares  them  with  the  operations  of  Alexander  the  Great. 
The  religious  and  mystic  elements  which  surround  these  enterprises  should  not  blind 
us  to  their  essentially  worldly  and  economic  character ;  nor  is  the  comparison  of  the 
Crusader-states  and  the  Italian  communes  without  great  value  for  the  understanding 
of  the  latter.  Nevertheless,  there  appears  to  be  good  reason  for  regarding  these 
adventures  as  constituting  a  case  of  conquest  rather  than  colonization ;  the  relation 
of  the  Syrian  governments  to  any  possible  metropolis  or  metropolitan  complex  (i.e. 
Christian  Europe)  is  too  vague  to  justify  the  use  of  the  term  "colony,"  even  in  a 
loose  sense.  Certain  phenomena  aptly  bearing  on  the  effects  of  a  changed  environment 
and  the  contact  of  races  tempt  one  to  include  these  curious  settlements  and  govern- 
ments; but  for  the  same  reason  one  might  well  include  migration  or  conquest  in 
general.    See,  for  details,  Prutz,  especially  pp.  1-32,  89-181,  314-354,  396-415. 


66  COLONIZATION 

dei  incrcanti,  by  whose  general  supervision  a  marked  unity  of  policy 
was  effected.  This  body  was  a  sort  of  prototype  of  later  Boards 
of  Trade. ^  The  post  of  consul,  or  bailo,  was  one  of  great  honor  and 
responsibility;  in  the  lists  of  the  baili oi  Syria  occur  many  famous 
Venetian  names.^ 

A  large  part  of  the  official  responsibility  granted  to  local  direc- 
tors was  due  to  the  impossibility  of  receiving  instructions  from  the 
metropolis  at  all  times.  To  somewhat  neutralize  the  personal 
power  which  attended  such  independence  of  function  the  governors 
were  provided  with  counselors  or  councils  without  whose  knowledge 
they  should  not  act.  Thus  the  superior  officers,  whatever  their 
title,  remained  at  least  nominally  subordinated  to  and  controlled 
by  the  metropolitan  government.  The  laws  of  the  metropolis 
were,  in  addition,  carried  over  with  little  alteration  to  the  colonics. 
The  communes  administered  their  own  justice,  and  their  exterri- 
toriality sometimes  went  so  far  as  practically  to  disallow  the  author- 
ity of  the  former  ruler  of  the  district.  Appeal  could  be  made  from 
an  inferior  officer  to  the  bailo,  and  through  him  to  the  highest  author- 
ities at  home.  They  were  able  to  lay  taxes,  e.g.  on  industries,  and 
sometimes,  as  has  been  mentioned,  enjoyed  large  revenues  from 
their  share  in  public  income.  Because  of  this,  and  the  fact  that 
they  were  enabled  to  raise  most  of  their  own  food,  they  were  much 
less  dependent  upon  European  importation  than,  for  instance,  the 
Crusader-states. 


Monopoly  Policy  and  Trade  Wars 

The  temper  of  the  communes  was  in  consequence  extremely 
free  and  independent  respecting  local  control ;  they  even  insisted 
upon  having  their  own  clergy,  from  their  own  cities  of  origin. 
Their  sense  of  nationality  was  very  pronounced,  not  to  say  assertive ; 
they   stubbornly  and    successfully   resisted   the    attempts   of    the 

1  Casa  da  India,  Casa  de  Contrataciim,  etc.  Cf.  p.  228,  below.  As  this  volume 
does  not  pretend  to  follow  the  derivation  of  institutions,  it  is  possible  on  occasion 
simply  to  hint  at  or  suggest  accepted  or  probable  prototypes  or  aftertypes. 

2  Heyd,  pp.  176  ff.,  282  ff.,  317  ff.;  Brunialti,  pp.44,  59  ff- ;  Prutz,  pp.  384  ff.  The 
Officium  Gazariae  discharged  the  regulating  fun'-tion  from  Genoa  to  her  colonies. 
Cibrario,  pp.  292  ff.  Many  of  the  governmental  measures  regarding  trade,  such  as 
the  detailed  directions  given  to  ship  captains  (the  keeping  of  the  fleets  together, 
etc.),  foreshadow  the  policy  of  the  later  commercial  and  colonial  powers.  Cf.  Brown, 
pp.  277-278;  note,  p.  71,  below. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  67 

Crusader-rulers  to  lay  hands  upon  the  administration  of  justice,  or, 
indeed,  to  direct  the  least  important  parts  of  their  lives.  They 
formed  an  element  totally  incongruous  amidst  the  feudal  regime 
of  the  knights  and  orders.  They  were  in,  but  not  of,  the  Crusades  ; 
after  the  acquisition  of  their  privileges  they  took  little  part  in 
succeeding  wars  against  the  Mohammedans.  They  exhibited  no 
religious  enthusiasm  and  but  little  of  the  intolerance  and  narrow- 
ness of  the  Crusaders ;  for  their  commercial  motive  was  their 
strength.  They  were  prudent  and  farsighted  in  trade,  zealous  for 
the  interest  of  their  several  states,  steadfast  for  their  rights,  and 
moderate  in  their  living,  —  all  of  which  made  life  in  the  East 
easier  for  them,  as  compared,  for  instance,  with  the  ill-living 
Crusaders.  They  utilized  their  exceptional  advantages  to  the 
utmost  and  profited  accordingly.  The  exclusively  commercial  pre- 
occupation was  likewise,  however,  their  weakness.  Their  policy 
was  one  of  closed  monopoly  and  "  secret  commerce  "  ;  all  com- 
mercial operations  were  veiled  in  the  deepest  mystery,  and  the 
exposure  of  trade-secrets  was  severely  punished.^  Their  trade- 
envy  and  insatiable  greed  led  to  recurrent,  if  not  constant,  and 
always  savage,  feuds  with  the  Crusaders  and  with  each  other,  by 
which  the  enemies  of  Christendom  profited.  The  victories  of  these 
enemies  caused  a  shifting  of  the  trading-centers  toward  the  end  of 
the  tljirteenth  century  from  Syria  to  Cyprus  and  Lesser  Armenia.^ 
One  great  object  and  ideal,  above  all,  lay  before  the  Venetians 
and  Genoese,  —  that  of  trade-monopoly,  implying  the  ruthless 
exclusion  or  destruction  of  all  competition.  The  pursuit  of  this 
policy  naturally  brought  the  Italians  into  conflict  with  the  authori- 
ties in  the  Levant  and  with  each  other  ;  the  history  of  the  colonies 
in  Constantinople  and  elsewhere,  to  the  very  end  of  their  existence, 
is  one  of  intrigues,  expulsions  or  massacres,  and  restorations,  to 
say  nothing  of  mutual  friction  and  bloody  wars.  In  the  desperate 
struggles  for  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  monopoly,  Amalfitan 
hopes  were  early  crushed,  and  the  role  of  Pisa  was  cut  short.  The 
details  of  the  fierce  colonial  wars  of  Genoa  and  Venice  do  not 
especially  concern  us  ;  on  the  whole,  Venice  seems  to  have  emerged 
with  a  residuum  of  advantage  over  her  great  rival,  but  not  with 

1  Cf.  Hunter,  I,  218,  220;  Sumner,  Lectures. 

2  Heyd,  I,  2i6ff. ;  II,  3.  For  the  relations  with  the  Crusader-states,  see  especially 
Prutz,  p]).  377  ff.  An  interesting  account  of  "  Christian  and  Infidel  in  the  Holy  Land" 
is  given  by  Munro. 


68  COLONIZATION 

the  power  to  crush  her.  But  the  essential  bearing  of  this  condition 
of  affairs  lies  in  its  fatal  effect  upon  the  colonies  themselve  s ;  for 
not  only  were  they  crippled  and  sometimes  prostrated  durimg  the 
periods  when  conditions  promised  rich  rewards  to  cominercial 
activity,  but  they  could  in  the  end  offer  no  unified  resistance  to 
the  advancing  Turks.  Behind  the  trade-hostility  there  lay  alsc?  fj 
political  hostility  of  city  against  city  in  Italy  itself.  Here  agai-n, 
as  amongst  the  Phoenicians  and  Greeks,  we  have  a  city-economy,  — 
a  too  small  and  restricted  metropolitan  unit.  Political  control  was 
indeed  extended  over  the  persons  and  interests  of  subjects  in 
foreign  parts,  such  as  neither  Phoenician  nor  Greek  had  been  able 
to  encompass,  but  upon  a  scale  insufficient  for  the  erection  of  any 
considerable  empire.  The  parent  society,  taken  as  a  city-republic, 
was  too  small,  and  the  complex  of  city-republics  was  so  unhomo- 
geneous  as  to  refuse  to  cohere  even  in  the  face  of  destruction. 
The  Venetians  and  Genoese  allied  themselves  even  with  Spaniard 
and  Ottoman  ^  in  order  to  prevail  one  over  the  other.  When,  now, 
the  Turks  took  Constantinople  (1453),  and  began  to  extend  their 
conquests  toward  Egypt,  the  several  Italian  colonies  were  unable 
to  make  an  effective  resistance.  Payment  of  tribute  was  their 
only  safety ;  all  their  old  preferential  treatment  was  reversed  in 
favor  of  taxation  to  the  limit  of  endurance.  Certain  ostensibly 
favorable  agreements  were  drawn  up,  but  the  rude  and  brutal 
invaders  paid  but  little  heed  to  them  ;  the  usual  contempt  of  a 
warlike  people  for  an  industrial  and  commercial  one  was  exhibited 
in  an  extreme  form.  The  duties  of  consul  became  difficult  and 
even  dangerous  ;  the  Italians  fervently  wished  the  Greeks  back 
in  power. 


Decline  before  the  Turks 

The  gradual  extension  of  Turkish  conquests  brought  on  actual 
war  with  Venice,  which  led  (1479)  to  considerable  losses  of  terri- 
tory on  the  part  of  the  latter.  Individual  traders  suffered  severely  ; 
many  Venetians  had  been  seized  and  imprisoned  and  much  property 
arbitrarily  confiscated.  The  Constantinople  colony  dwindled  under 
such  adverse  circumstances  and  presently  disappeared  in  conse- 
quence of  another  war.    By  1 500  but  few  of  the  eastern  possessions 

1  Hrunialti,  p.  46. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  69 

of  Venice  and  Genoa  remained  ;  the  Black  Sea  colonies  also  dis- 
appeared under  incursions  of  the  Tatars  and  in  consequence  of 
the  fall  of  Constantinople.  The  last  great  blow  in  the  East  was 
the  Turkish  conquest  of  Egypt  (15  17),  followed  by  the  disappear- 
ance of  the  fondachi  and  colonies  in  that  country,  upon  which  the 
last  hope  depended.  Cyprus  held  out  till  1570,  and  then  it,  too, 
was  swept  under  by  the  wave  of  barbarism.  In  none  of  these 
cases  were  the  Italian  cities  or  colonies  of  material  aid  one  to 
another.^ 

The  colonies  were  gone,  but  not  even  ut  extremis  was  the  trade- 
monopoly  given  up  or  modified.  The  Venetians  struggled  tena- 
ciously for  many  decades  against  the  inevitable.  But  by  their  very 
policy  and  its  accentuation  they  had  invited  rivals  into  the  field  ; 
the  artificially  elevated  prices,  in  Europe,  of  the  products  of  the 
East  stimulated  the  western  nations  to  repeated  attacks  upon 
the  monopoly  system.  As  long  as  the  Mediterranean  remained  the 
center  of  activities,  such  efforts  were  of  little  avail  against  the 
preponderant  maritime  power  of  the  Venetians.^  But  the  center 
of  trade  was  moving  inevitably  westward,  and  deserting  a  "  thalas- 
sic  "  for  an  "  oceanic  "  field.  When,  therefore,  at  the  end  of  the 
fifteenth  century  both  Portuguese  and  Spaniards  broke  through 
the  cordon  of  restrictions  by  their  discovery  of  independent  and 
uncontrollable  routes  to  new  regions  of  supply,  the  supremacy  of 
the  Venetians  was  already  obsolescent  and  doomed.  In  spite  of  the 
utmost  efforts  of  the  Venetians  to  demonstrate  to  the  Turks 
the  advantage  and  necessity  of  reasonably  low  transit  dues  and 
taxes,  the  latter,  taking  counsel  of  greed  and  ignorant  lack  of 
foresight,  refused  to  be  persuaded.  The  situation  from  the  com- 
mercial standpoint  became  desperate,  and  in  i  504  the  Italians  con- 
templated even  the  project  of  piercing  the  Isthmus  of  Suez,  an 
undertaking  beyond  the  possibilities  of  the  age.  The  attempt  to 
utilize  more  tortuous  land-and-river  routes  to  the  Indies  also  proved 

1  Details  in  Ileyd,  I,  383  «-,  445  «•  ;  H,  i58ff.,  257  ff.,  313  ff.,  381  ff.,  427  ff.,  505  ff. 
This  book  is  by  far  the  best  authority  for  the  period  it  covers ;  especial  attention  is 
here  drawn  to  Anhange  I  and  II  of  Vol.  II,  which  deal  with  the  various  products 
derived  from  the  East,  and  their  destinations. 

2  For  some  data  on  the  maritime  power  of  Venice,  see  Cibrario,  III,  277  ff.  He 
quotes  (p.  277)  Marin  Sanuto,  who  assigns  to  Venice  in  the  fifteenth  century  36,000 
sailors,  16,000  workers  in  the  arsenals,  and  3300  ships  in  commission  (jiiro).  For  the 
commercial  wealth  of  Venice,  see  Lindsay's  figures  (I,  4S0-481).  Brown  (p.  278) 
quotes  an  estimate  of  the  annual  revenue  of  Venice  in  1500  as  amounting  to  1,145,580 
ducats.    Cf.  Wappaus,  I,  240,  262  ff.,  317  ff. 


70  COLONIZATION 

impracticable,^  and  it  was  only  through  the  inertia  of  custom  and 
habit  that  a  temporary  respite  from  the  inevitable  was  rendered 
possible.  By  a  timely  realization  of  changed  conditions  and  by 
submission  to  them,  Venice  might  have  long  retained  a  secondary 
importance  in  the  commerce  of  the  new  period  ;  but  the  old  spirit 
of  haughtiness  and  selfishness  had  persisted,  and  brought  on  the 
end  the  more  speedily. 

Italian  Influences  upon  Later  Ages 

The  significance  of  the  Italians  and  their  colonies  during  the 
Middle  Ages  was  in  many  respects  analogous  to  that  of  the  Phoeni- 
cians and  Greeks  in  ancient  times.  They  transported  the  products 
and  ideas  of  civilization  from  East  to  West,  and  thereby  uncon- 
sciously educated  the  westerners  to  a  civilization  which  they  could 
have  evolved  independently  only  through  the  lapse  of  ages.  They 
likewise  engaged  to  no  small  extent  in  the  slave-trade,  an  activity 
whose  results  for  the  spread  of  civilization  have  already  been  pointed 
out  in  the  case  of  the  Phoenicians.  Their  function  was  not  so  vital 
as  that  of  their  early  predecessors,  for  the  seed  had  been  long  sown, 
and  in  addition  the  crusading  movements  had  effected  a  certain 
contact  of  West  with  East ;  ^  but  they  nevertheless  bridged  over 
the  chasm  between  the  Occident  and  the  Levant  long  before  the 
Crusades,  and  they  maintained  such  connection  when  protracted 
estrangement  was  threatened,  and  when  degeneration  might  easily 
have  taken  place.  But  when  the  Italians'  activity  was  waning,  the 
West  was  ready  to  take  its  fate  in  its  own  hands,  since  it  had 
acquired  confidence  in  the  effectiveness  of  its  own  initiative.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  rehearse  the  details  of  this  educative  process,  for 
they  were  analogous  to  those  of  preceding  ages  ;  but  a  word  may 
be  given  to  the  commercial  example  of  the  Italians,  so  faithfully 
copied  and  maintained  by  the  nations  of  the  West.^ 

^  The  final  struggles  of  the  Venetians  are  treated  briefly  in  Erunialti,  capo  iv, 
pp.  84  ff.  The  Venetians  had  an  idea  that  the  Cape-route  trade  would  not  last ;  that 
the  Sultan  would  be  obliged  to  lower  duties  and  then  their  old  trade  would  return. 
Sumner,  Lectures. 

^  This  contact  was  not  exclusively  beneficial,  of  course.  Among  other  eastern 
products  the  plague  is  thought  by  some  to  have  been  transferred  directly  through  the 
agency  of  the  Crusades.    Bordier,  Geographie  medicale,  p.  256. 

8  The  best  presentation  of  this  phase  of  the  subject  known  to  the  autlior  is  that 
formerly  given  by  Professor  Sumner  in  unpublished  lectures  on  "The  Industrial 
Revolution  of  the  Renaissance  Period." 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  71 

During  and  after  the  Crusades,  in  operations  which  demanded 
the  movement  of  much  capital,  the  Italians  were  led  to  the  inven- 
tion or  practical  application  of  many  new  and  economical  com- 
mercial devices,  among  them  the  bill  of  exchange,  letter  of  credit, 
and  other  banking  and  credit  devices.^  Money,  interest,  specula- 
tion, and  like  topics  occupied  much  of  their  attention,  and  practi- 
cal api^lications  along  these  lines  did  a  good  deal  to  break  down 
bigoted  mediaeval  notions  derived  from  the  intuitions  and  deduc- 
tions of  ecclesiastical  visionaries.  But  the  characteristically  short- 
sighted ideas  and  practices  connected  with  the  maintenance  of 
monopoly  constituted,  to  its  misfortune,  a  large  part  of  the  herit- 
age from  these  talented  peoples  to  the  modern  world.  Many  of 
the  dog-mas  and  doctrines  later  known  under  the  collective  name 
of  the  Mercantile  System  were  original,  as  far  as  effective  applica- 
tion goes,  with  Venice  and  Genoa.  Because  of  admiration  and 
emulation  of  Italian  successes,  these  were  eagerly  adopted,  and 
have  persisted  in  force  or  as  survivals  down  to  the  present  day. 
It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  the  colony  was  utilized  strictly 
for  the  benefit  of  the  metropolis,  and  to  provide  her  not  only  with 
regions  of  active  demand  and  supply,  but  with  a  profitable  carry- 
ing and  transfer  trade.  This  trade  was  regulated  in  the  most 
minute  and  arbitrary  fashion  ;  ^  for  Venice  insisted  upon  retaining 
for  herself  the  so-called  "  active  "  as  distinguished  from  "  passive  " 
commerce.  The  regulations,  for  example,  to  which  traders  of  other 
nations  living  in  Venice  were  obliged  to  conform,  were  no  less  than 
tyrannical  as  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  the  present  day.^  In 
short,  an  unremitting  and  tireless  effort  was  put  forth  to  limit  the 
movements  of  commerce  and  to  confine  the  action  of  the  great 
forces  of  exchange  within  local  and  selected  channels. 

One  of  the  commercial  expedients  of  the  period  under  examina- 
tion deserves  special  notice  as  the  forerunner  of  many  a  grandiose 
enterprise  of  later  times, — the  joint-stock  company  with  rights 
of  sovereignty,  that  is,  the  prototype  of  the  later  chartered 
companies.*    Amidst  the  strife  of  parties  in  Genoa,  in  the  middle 

1  See  Pigeonneau,  I,  253  ff,  278  ff;  Cibrario,  III,  306  ff ;  Prutz,  pp.  362  ff. 

2  Officers  were  required  to  take  oath  to  obey  instructions.  Their  routes  were 
minutely  prescribed,  size  of  anchors  and  quaUty  of  rope  scrutinized,  etc.  The  ships 
were  to  stick  together,  refit  at  prescribed  ports,  etc.  These  vessels  were,  of  course, 
convertible  into  men-of-war.    Brown,  pp.  277-278.  ^  See  Simonsfeld, /^j-j/'/w. 

*  Hopf,  in  Ersch  und  Gruber's  Encyclopadie,  Part  LXVIII,  308  ff.,  stib  "  Giusti- 
niani";  see  also  Heyd,  I,  509,  542  ff. 


72  COLONIZATION 

of  the  fourteenth  century,  it  became  necessary  for  the  city  to 
depend  for  its  defense  upon  the  efforts  and  capital  of  private 
persons.  The  latter  were  then  allowed  to  farm  certain  revenues 
and  to  make  any  conquests  they  pleased  until  fully  indemnified. 
The  body  of  citizens  who  stopped  the  breach  for  the  city  were 
called  Mahonenses,  and  the  body  into  which  they  organized  them- 
selves Mahona,  or  Maona.  The  fleet  raised  by  the  Mahonenses 
sailed  off  to  the  east  to  protect  the  Genoese  colonies  in  1346,  and 
in  pursuance  of  their  purposes  of  self-indemnification  seized  Chios 
from  the  Greeks  and  Phocsea  from  the  Turks.  Complaints  to  the 
Genoese  government  were  met  by  a  disclaimer  of  responsibility. 
And  yet  Genoa  was  to  have  complete  jurisdiction  over  these 
acquisitions ;  though  the  profits  were  to  go  to  the  29  Mahonenses 
for  20  years,  the  city  could  obtain  full  sovereignty  by  completing 
the  indemnification  within  that  period.  By  a  treaty  of  1363  with 
John  Palaeologus  the  Greek  claims  to  Chios  were  renounced  in  re- 
turn for  tribute.  The  Maona  was  a  real  joint-stock  company,  and 
the  shares  were  salable;  by  1358  Chios  belonged  to  eight  men, 
only  one  of  whom  had  been  a  member  of  the  first  company.  When 
in  15  10  the  republic  proposed  to  pay  off  its  indebtedness,  the  com- 
pany protested,  and  was  finally  for  a  consideration  left  in  possession. 
They  retained  the  island  of  Chios  (chiefly  valuable  for  its  mastic) 
until,  falling  into  arrears  in  their  tribute,  they  lost  it  to  the  Turks  ; 
in  1588  the  republic  disclaimed  to  the  Sultan  all  responsibility  for 
the  Maona.  Claims  for  compensation  were  lodged  against  Genoa 
by  the  representatives  of  the  Maona  as  late  as  1805. 

This  instance  is  noteworthy  in  that  it  exhibits  with  especial 
clearness  the  function  of  the  chartered  company  as  a  substitute 
for  or  a  concealing  medium  of  state  action.  It  thus  offers  an 
anticipation  of  a  phase  of  the  chartered  company  most  clearly 
exhibited  in  the  resurrected  type  of  recent  decades,  —  a  prototype 
in  a  sufficiently  elaborated  state  to  challenge  comparison  and 
suggest  principles. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  influence  of  the  Italians  on  the 
later  world,  it  should  be  noted  yet  again  that  it  was  exercised  with- 
out direct  policy  or  intent.  Although  nominally  participators  in  a 
great  religious  movement,  the  Italian  cities  had  but  one  real  motive 
for  their  activities,  —  that  is,  material  self-interest.^    In  pursuance 

1  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  what  was  likely  to  have  vitally  differentiated  the 
activity  of  the  Venetians  and  Genoese  from  that  of  their  predecessors  was  the  fact 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  73 

of  this  worldly  end  they  effected  significant  political  and  social 
changes  which  followed  upon  the  economic  ones  to  which  allusion 
has  already  been  made.  Their  influence  was  far  more  lasting  in 
the  diffusion  of  culture  than  was  that  of  the  Crusades,  h(nvever 
important  the  latter  may  have  been  ;  for  when,  with  the  loss  of 
their  cause  in  the  ruin  of  their  Syrian  empire,  the  Crusader-states 
disappeared,  the  Italian  colonies  stayed  on,  resolutely  holding  to- 
gether their  mother-cities  and  their  trading-areas,  and  thus  prevent- 
ing the  deadly  hatred  incident  to  a  religious  war  from  "  effecting  a 
cessation  of  the  most  important  culture-relations."  ^  In  Europe 
this  commerce  and  its  consequences  helped  to  disintegrate  the 
manor-economy  by  widening  the  horizon  of  individuals  and  of  socie- 
ties ;  it  likewise  aided  in  the  shattering  of  the  whole  feudal  system. 
The  Italian  monopoly  unwittingly  and  unwillingly  forced  potential 
but  diffident  rivals  into  an  activity  which  resulted  in  the  ensuing 
great  discoveries  with  their  far-reaching  effects  upon  subsequent 
history .2  Italian  activity,  in  short,  ushers  in  what  are  known  as 
modern  times  ;  and  this  momentous  function  was  furthered  not  a 
little  by  the  possibility  of  prolonged  sojourn  in  eastern  countries, 
with  a  consequent  better  knowledge  of  eastern  civilization  ;  that 
is,  by  the  existence  of  the  colonies  whose  origin  and  course  has 
now  been  traced. 

The  Italians  in  the  Discoveries  Period 

Nor  must  it  be  thought  that,  with  the  decline  of  the  Italian 
supremacy,  the  influence  of  Italy  upon  the  world's  history  abruptly 
ceases.    This  is  not  in  the  order  of  nature.    Experience  such  as  the 

that  they  and  their  Saracen  clients  in  trade  professed  two  separate  and  irreconcilable 
religions.  Former  conditions  about  the  Mediterranean  of  essential  religious  similarity 
and  consequent  tolerance  had  suffered  a  metamorphosis  since  the  spread  of  Christianity 
and  Islam.  But  because  the  Italians  were  led  frankly  to  recognize  the  preponderant 
importance  of  trade  over  creed,  whatever  the  danger  to  their  souls  of  such  a  com- 
plaisant or  mercenary  attitude,  they  so  subordinated  the  newly  introduced  element  of 
hostility  as  practically  to  pursue  their  projects  with  the  tolerance  of  Phoenicians  and 
Greeks.  Hence  the  essential  similarity,  as  respects  methods  and  results,  of  their 
activity  and  that  of  their  pagan  prototypes. 

^  Prutz,  p.  393.  For  a  comparison  of  the  civilization  of  the  Saracens  and  Crusaders, 
cf.  Munro,  Christian  and  Infidel  in  the  Holy  Land. 

2  If  the  Syrian  tolls  raised  prices,  including  the  large  margin  of  profit,  from  one 
ducat  in  Calicut  to  from  60  to  100  in  Venice,  then,  taking  the  average  as  80,  the  Portu- 
guese could  get  a  market  for  whatever  they  could  import  at  a  profit  just  short  of  equal 
to  that  of  the  Venetians  plus  the  tolls,  say  79.  This  was  a  powerful  incentive.  Sumner, 
Lectures. 


74  COLONIZATION 

Italians  possessed  was  not  built  up  in  a  day ;  and  under  the  medi- 
aeval system  of  mystery  and  secrecy  respecting  trade  but  little  of 
it  had  been  transmitted.  Of  a  consequence  we  find  that  Italy,  as 
represented  by  individuals,  in  a  sense  directed  the  progress  of  the 
Discoveries.  The  detailed  demonstration  of  this  statement  would 
make  a  long  story ;  but  a  few  of  the  best-known  cases,  several  of 
which  will  appear  in  later  chapters,  may  be  cited  by  way  of  illus- 
tration. Prince  Henry  of  Portugal  is  supposed  to  have  derived, 
through  his  brother,  considerable  information  from  Italian  sources  ; 
and,  farther  back,  a  Genoese,  Pezagno,  became  admiral  of  Portugal. 
The  brothers  Vivaldi  discovered  the  Azores  and  Madeiras  ;  Cada- 
mosto  operated  under  Prince  Henry ;  the  thirteenth-century  jour- 
neys of  the  Poli  took  them  to  China.  Two  of  the  greatest  discoverers 
were  a  Genoese  and  a  Venetian,  —  Columbus  and  John  Cabot. 
Men  of  lesser  fame  were  Verrazano,  Sebastian  Cabot,  Amerigo 
Vespucci,  Pigafetta,  Toscanelli ;  not  to  mention  many  others,  pilots, 
map-makers,  travelers,  and  the  like.^  If,  now,  some  such  list  be 
compared  with  one  made  up  from  names  of  any  other  single  nation- 
ality, however  actively  the  latter  may  have  been  engaged  in  the 
operations  of  the  early  period,  it  will  not  suffer  in  comparison. 
This  is  perfectly  natural,  and  in  the  order  of  events  ;  for  human 
progress  depends  always  upon  the  accumulation  of  knowledge, 
experiences,  and  dexterities.  The  Italians  knew,  and  the  west- 
erners were  ignorant ;  the  latter  had  to  secure  their  footing  under 
the  guidance  of  the  former  before  they  were  able  to  work  out  their 
destiny  upon  the  different  lines  determined  by  newly  invaded  areas 
and  newly  experienced  conditions  of  nature. 


Summary  of  the  Conditions  of  Colonization  preceding 
THE  Discoveries 

Before  proceeding  to  the  colonization  of  the  modern  times,  it 
seems  useful  to  survey  some  general  aspects  of  the  subject  as  they 
emerge  from  the  study  of  the  foregoing  simpler  cases, — cases  in 
whose  evaluation,  moreover,  since  sentiment  cannot  enter  as  in 

^  A  brief  chapter  on  the  Italians  during  the  Discovery  period  is  given  by 
Bruniaiti  (capo  iv,  68  ff.),  who  quotes  the  old  formula  Sic  vos,  non  vobis  to  charac- 
terize their  activities  in  the  service  of  others.  See  also  Major,  p.  309;  Bourne, 
Spain  in  America,  pp.  i  ff. ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  i  ff. ;  and  any  work  on  the 
Discoveries  period  (e.g.  Peschel,  Huge,  Fiske), /ajj»>« ;  cf.  Cheyney,  pp.  41  ff. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  75 

more  modern  phases,  any  other  consideration  than  that  of  historical 
impartiaUty  can  scarcely  find  place.  It  has  been  possible  here  to 
study  the  course  of  colonization  in  the  absence  of  several  factors 
which  have  attained  considerable  importance  in  later  times,  and  to 
which  great  significance  has  been  uncritically  assigned.  In  a  whole 
series  of  phenomena  it  has  been  found  that  strict  control  on  the 
part  of  the  metropolis  was  unessential  for  the  economic  and  other 
development  of  offshoot  societies  ;  indeed,  so  far  as  the  converse 
case  of  the  Roman  coloniae  goes,  rigorous  governmental  supervision 
has  tended  to  undermine  the  independent  life  and  development  of 
the  new  community.  It  has  been  seen,  however,  that  the  weakness 
of  control,  practically  unavoidable  under  the  conditions  of  the 
times,  —  in  the  absence  of  swift  communication,  in  the  relative 
feebleness  of  political  units,  etc.,  —  has  precluded,  the  case  of 
Rome  excepted,  the  existence  of  a  real  and  persisting  empire.  In 
most  of  the  cases  considered,  centralization  of  authority  in  a  more 
than  local  metropolis  has  been  consistently  absent.  Relations  of 
colonies  to  parent-cities  have  been  those  of  material  interest  rather 
than  of  political  integration,  and  of  a  common  civilization  rather 
than  of  actual  dependency.  The  argument  of  Freeman,  above 
cited, ^  is  susceptible  of  an  application  wider  than  that  given  by  the 
author,  whose  specific  comparison  is  that  of  Greece  and  Britain. 

The  motives  for  colonization  reviewed  have  been  preponderantly 
commercial,  and  as  a  consequence  the  colonies  have  regularly 
originated  in  trading-stations  ;  important  exceptions  must  naturally 
be  made  of  the  state-initiated  enterprises  of  the  Chinese  and  the 
Romans.  Incidentally  it  should  be  noted  that  trade  has  not 
"followed  the  flag"  to  any  convincing  degree,^  although  military 
operations  have  at  times  removed  obstacles  against  which  a  healthy 
trade  has  employed  its  own  expedients  in  vain.  Economic  and 
political  discomfort,  as  an  incentive  to  emigration,  has  played  a 
relatively  unimportant  role  ;  it  was  rather  to  gain  more  abundantly 
than  to  avoid  loss  and  misery  that  change  of  station  has  taken 
place.  Among  the  stock  motives  the  absence  of  religious  discontent 
is  noteworthy  :  there  were  no  irreconcilable  religious  (or,  indeed, 
political)  dogmas  in  those  days.^ 

^  P-  43- 

*  That  "  trade  and  the  flag  "  were  not  inseparable  ideas  to  these  non-conquering 
commercial  experts  lends  color  to  the  contention  that  their  close  association  has 
something  of  affinity  with  the  imperial  disposition  that  does  not  care  openly  to  pro- 
claim its  purposes.  8  Cf.  Keller,  Horn.  See,  p.  17. 


76  COLONIZATION 

For  similar  reasons  the  "native  policy"  of  ancient  times  was 
constructed  to  subserve  the  purposes  of  exchange,  or  was  directed 
simply  toward  the  maintenance  of  such  subordination  and  order  as 
a  wider  administrative  experience  had  proved  to  be  socially  bene- 
ficial, if  not  indispensable.  There  was  no  idea  of  "  culture-mission  " 
or  the  like,  and  consequently  no  dogma,  rooting  in  national  egotism, 
of  "assimilation."  No  moral  or  religious  crusades  were  carried  on 
through  the  colonies  ;  diversity  of  customs  and  morals  was  regarded 
as  natural  and  a  matter  of  course,  —  though  both  customs  and 
religions  were  nationally  less  differentiated  than  they  have  come  to 
be  in  the  eyes  of  later  ages.  The  predominant  commercial  motive, 
and  the  imperial  policy  as  well,  counseled  respect  for  the  social 
forms  of  an  alien  people  ;  hence  the  influence  of  the  higher  civiliza- 
tion upon  the  lower  proceeded  through  example  and  suggestion 
rather  than  coercion.  Participation  in  exchange  between  the  com- 
plementary trade-areas  of  East  and  West  was  indeed  enforced,  as 
was  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  order  (e.g.  by  Rome)  ;  but  these 
were  benefits,  self-evident  or  speedily  demonstrated,  thus  needing 
but  little  insistence.  In  short,  influence  was  brought  to  bear  pri- 
marily upon  the  economic  life  and  industrial  organization  of  back- 
ward peoples,  while  their  secondary  and  derived  social  forms 
(marriage-system,  property-tenure,  etc.)  were  for  the  most  part 
let  alone.  This  is  the  secret  of  much  of  the  success  in  the  spread 
of  civilization  which  has  been  noticed  ;  ^  but  such  influence  was,  of 
course,  of  almost  totally  unconscious  application.  It  was  effective, 
because,  falling  in  with  the  order  of  nature  and  evolution,  it  moved 
along  lines  of  least  resistance. 

One  makes  haste  to  add  that  if  the  elder  colonizing  peoples 
appear  to  have  attacked  the  question  of  elevating  the  less  ad- 
vanced races  with  better  effect  than  have  their  successors,  it  is 
largely  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  problem  was  presented  to  them 
in  a  form  more  easily  soluble  ;  for  between  the  races  that  were 
brought  into  contact,  especially  around  the  border  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, there  existed  few  contrasts  of  any  significance.  The  like 
was  true  in  the  case  of  the  Chinese  and  their  ethnic  environment. 
There  were  no  obvious  ethnological  differences  such  as  distinguish 
one  race  sharply  from  another,  and  the  various  stages  of  culture 
were  separated  by  no  impassable  or  discouraging  chasms.  If  the 
eastern  races  had  lifted  themselves  to  a  higher  plane  of  material 

1  Cf.  Keller,  Soc.  View,  etc. 


COLONIZATION  OF  A  SIMPLER  TYPE  77 

civilization,  they  yet  retained  in  their  religious  forms  and  in  their 
body  of  customs  and  snores  an  essential  likeness  to  those  of  racially 
allied  peoples.  Even  slavery  was  an  institution  totally  different 
from  that  with  which  later  ages  have  made  us  familiar  :  there  was 
no  "color-line";  the  system  was  one  of  "domestic  slavery"  in 
the  main ;  and  the  passage  from  freedom  to  servitude  was  easy, 
often  turning  purely  upon  chance.  Hence  that  eternally  vexatious 
and  unsolved  question  of  the  treatment  of  a  "lower  race"  was 
but  faintly  represented  ;  except  in  mining,  we  hear  little  of  the 
labor  supply  or  "native-labor  question."  If  other  than  economic 
stimuli  had  to  be  applied,  it  was  not  the  colonizing  state  that  had 
to  apply  them,  for  the  forces  of  trade  impinging  upon  local  con- 
trollers of  labor  were  sufficient. 

Another  point  well  worthy  of  notice,  and  which  really  lies 
beneath  the  one  just  mentioned,  as  Chapter  I  is  designed  to  sug- 
gest, is  that  the  colonists  before  the  Portuguese  but  rarely  settled 
outside  of  their  native  climatic  zone.^  The  Semites  and  Aryans 
colonized  the  shores  of  their  own  Mediterranean  ;  and  as  for  the 
Chinese,  no  climate  appears  to  affect  them  adversely  to  any  great 
degree.  Hence  there  have  been  brought  into  the  discussion  thus 
far  none  of  the  physical  and  social  disturbances  incident  to  a 
sudden  and  violent  change  in  vital  conditions.  In  other  words, 
any  of  the  colonies  hitherto  mentioned  might  have  developed  into 
what  has  been  called  the  farm  colony.  One  of  the  consequences 
of  this  condition  has  been  already  mentioned, —  the  absence  of  a 
"lower"  race,  or,  as  it  might  be  stated  from  another  point  of 
view,  the  absence  of  the  need  itself  for  an  acclimatized  labor 
force.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  if  the  foregoing  types  of 
colonies  fall  in  rather  strikingly  with  the  temperate  or  farm  colony 
in  the  matter  of  life,  social  forms,  etc.  ;  but  they  differ  from  it 
markedly  in  one  respect :  instead  of  native  wars  and  annihilation, 
an  auspicious  large-scale  miscegenation,  mainly  of  closely  allied 
races,  took  place,  this  being  due  to  the  several  facts  that  the  seats 
of  the  colonies,  conformably  with  their  commercial  purpose,  were 
but  rarely  in  relatively  unoccupied  country  ;  that  the  colonists 
were  regularly  too  weak  to  indulge  in  extended  conquests  ;  and 
that  no  such  barriers  to  intermarriage  existed  as  appeared  in  later 
times,  when  racial  distinctions  were  more  marked.    Under  these 

1  Hertzberg  (pp.  86  ff.)  develops  this  aspect  of  the  Greek  colonization  to  some 
extent. 


jS  COLONIZATION 

conditions  a  greater  modicum  of  success  in  the  spread  of  a  fructi- 
fying civilization  is  the  less  to  be  wondered  at.  It  was  the  Dis- 
coveries which,  by  opening  up  new  parts  of  the  world  where 
Europeans  were  subjected  to  new  and  strange  conditions,  im- 
mensely complicated  the  matter  of  colonization.  In  so  far  as  these 
conditions  were  new  and  strange,  they  drew  in  their  wake  new 
necessities  of  adaptation  ;  but  it  is  hoped  that  the  rehearsal  of  the 
foregoing  simpler  phases  of  a  now  complicated  and  tortured  social 
movement  cannot  be  without  its  utility  for  the  better  understand- 
ing of  the  modern  forms,  and  the  factors  which  condition  them. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE    PORTUGUESE    IN    THE    EAST 

It  has  been  shown  how  the  monopolistic  pohcy  of  the  ItaHans 
was  calculated  to  raise  up  rivals  whose  energy  and  eagerness 
would  vary  directly  with  the  rigor  with  which  monopoly  was 
maintained  ;  for  it  is  when  monopoly  is  at  its  climax  of  efficiency 
and  tyranny  that  it  offers  the  richest  rewards  to  him  who  shall 
evade  or  break  it.  The  strength  and  prestige  of  Venetian  mari- 
time power  was  great  enough,  indeed,  to  deter  all  rivals  from  the 
serious  attempt  to  dispute  Venetian  monopoly  within  the  Mediter- 
ranean,^ but  the  extraordinary  prizes  of  this  monopoly  were  suffi- 
ciently alluring  to  other  nations  to  overcome  the  inertia  of  things, 
and  to  motive  those  efforts  along  untried  ways  which  were  des- 
tined to  set  upon  commerce  an  oceanic  and  cosmopolitan  stamp, 
where  before  it  had  been  mediterranean  and  relatively  local.  The 
successors  of  the  Venetians  would  come  into  no  less  a  heritage 
than  the  intermediary  function  between  the  two  complementary 
trade-areas  of  East  and  West,  —  India  and  Europe,  —  a  func- 
tion which  had  been  historically  the  making  of  the  wealthiest 
and  most  powerful  commercial  nations.  The  incentive  was  suffi- 
cient to  force  a  display  of  activity  along  indirect  and  unpromising 
lines,  when  the  old  direction  of  least  resistance  had  been,  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  blocked. 

In  preceding  pages  it  has  been  noted  that  merchants  of  coun- 
tries west  of  the  Italian  peninsula  had  been  drawn  into  commer- 
cial activity  during  the  period  of  the  Crusades  and  later,  and  that 
the  inhabitants  of  western  Europe  in  general  had  during  this 
period  experienced  considerable  enlightenment  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  Orient  and  its  commerce.  Some  of  these  peoples,  like  the 
Germans,  long  received  their  dole  of  luxuries  through  the  hands 
of  the  Venetians ;   others,  Provencals  and  Iberians,  made  a  more 

1  One  might  query  why  the  Venetians  did  not  fight  the  Portuguese  for  the  posses- 
sion of  the  ocean-route.  But  it  must  be  reaUzed  that  they  were  led  by  the  inertia 
of  things  to  cling  to  the  old  and  familiar  ways,  especially  since  the  new  were  so 
formidable  and  were  for  many  decades  of  so  little  promise. 

79 


So  COLONIZATION 

or  less  vigorous  attempt  to  supply  themselves  at  the  source.^  But 
it  was  the  historical  destiny  of  the  Iberians  to  break  the  Italian 
monopoly  and  to  found  it's  aftertype  on  a  grander  scale. 


Conditioning  Factors  of  Iberian  Colonization 

The  two  streams  of  colonial  enterprise  which  thus  arose  in 
Portugal  and  Spain  can  hardly  be  treated  in  isolation  one  from 
the  other.  They  flow  in  parallel  channels,  and  recurrent  reference 
from  one  to  the  other  is  inevitable  ;  and  when  one  looks  to  their 
historical  antecedents,  he  finds  a  number  of  determining  and  con- 
ditioning elements  common  to  both.  These  may  be  briefly  indi- 
cated before  embarking  upon  an  account  of  more  detailed  and 
local  matters. 

The  status  of  the  Peninsular  peoples  toward  the  end  of  the 
fifteenth  century  was  in  large  part  the  outcome  of  centuries  of 
war,  on  native  soil,  with  an  alien  race  ;  of  conflicts  culminating  in 
1492  with  the  reduction  of  Granada.  These  wars  had  effected  a 
racial  and  national  cohesion  exceptional  in  its  time,  and  visibly 
represented  by  the  strengthening  of  monarchy ,2  and,  later,  by  the 
formation  of  larger  political  units.  They  had  likewise  engendered 
a  military  spirit  attended  by  the  usual  qualities  of  endurance, 
courage,  skill  in  the  use  of  arms,  love  of  an  irregular  and  venture- 
some life,  and,  too  often,  contempt  for  the  arts  of  peace.  And 
because  these  racial  struggles  were  likewise  religious  wars,  there 
had  grown  upon  the  people  an  ideal  of  religious  solidarity  which 
had  within  it  the  germs  of  intolerance  and  fanaticism.  The  spirit 
of  conquest  was  commingled  with  that  of  crusade  ;  the  Iberian 
soldiers  went  out  to  win  the  temporal  empire  for  the  sovereign 
and  the  spiritual  dominance  for  the  faith.  It  is  probable  that  the 
exaltation  of  mind  under  which  they  strove  lent  them  a  motive 
force  with  which  their  opponents  found  it  difficult  to  reckon,  and 
which  the  historian  cannot  well  measure  or  define.^ 

In  addition  to  these  elements  of  strength,  Spain  and  Portugal 
possessed  undoubted  economic  vigor  at  the  outset  of  their  colonial 

i  Wappaus,  I,  191-210,  277-309. 

2  "The  Ilanseatic  confederacy,  powerful  as  it  might  be,  was  but  a  confederacy; 
and  Venice,  however  magnificent,  was  but  a  city.  The  really  modern  states  of  Western 
Europe  had  the  germs  of  quite  another  force  and  power  within  them."  Major, 
pp.  308.  ^  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  p.  205  et  passim  \   Major,  p.  300. 


THK   PORTUGUESE   IN  THE  EAST  8 1 

careers.  The  Peninsula  as  a  whole  had  benefited  by  the  intelli- 
gent industrial  example  and  legislation  of  its  Moorish  conquerors  ; 
for  the  latter,  despite  their  military  prowess  and  successes,  were 
endowed  with  the  habits  and  sentiments  characteristic  of  an  indus- 
trial society.  The  Moors,  for  example,  were  experts  in  the  manip- 
ulation of  arid  soils,  and  were  the  repositories  of  both  agricultural 
and  other  sciences  during  the  Dark  Ages.  Under  the  protection 
of  their  Semitic  brethren,  likewise,  the  Jewsfor  long  years  advan- 
taged the  economic  life  of  the  Peninsula  by  developing  their  char- 
acteristic financial  functions.  And  even  after  the  fall  of  Granada, 
the  Moriscos,  or  conquered  Moors,  continued  to  confer  benefits 
upon  the  Peninsula  by  their  presence  and  activities.  The  very  fact  r 
that  they  attained,  under  hard  conditions,  an  industrial  prosperity  «, 
which  in  later  times  drew  upon  them  the  envy  and  greed  of 
the  Christians,  witnesses  to  their  economic  efificiency.^  Moreover,  ^' 
apart  from  the  Moors,  the  Peninsula  had  by  1500  developed 
industries  already  of  long  standing,  and  of  vitality  rugged  enough 
to  have  weathered  the  fantastic  regulation  of  the  Middle  Ages.^ 
A  high  quality  of  wool  was  produced  in  relatively  enormous  quan- 
tities ;  the  ^live  was  a  prolific  source  of  national  wealth  ;  silk  was 
a  prime  asset  of  the  Peninsula,  and  the  manufacture  of  siTken  and 
woolen  fabrics  formed  before  1500  a  point  of  distinct  industrial 
superiority.  In  short,  the. industrial  population  of  the  period  formed 
a  middle  class  capable  of  developing  into  a  lasting  resource  and 
stay  of  any  government.  And  to  these  several  advantages  was 
added  a  prosperous  maritime  commercial  element  susceptible  of 
a  high  development  under  reasonably  favoring  conditions.  When 
a  series  of  momentous  possibilities  along  many  lines  of  activity 
was  about  to  be  opened  by  Da  Gama  and  Columbus,  the  Peninsular 
nations  were  ready  to  play  a  considerable  part  in  their  realization. 
No  European  peoples  were  more  closely  unified  and  nationalized, 
and  few  save  the  Venetians  and  Genoese  economically  stronger.^ 

Although  now  the  calamities  and  decline  of  Spain  and  Portugal 
cannot  be  treated  conjointly,  still,  at  the  risk  of  anticipation,  a  few 

^  Colmeiro,  I,  159-198;  Lea,  Moriscos,  pp.  5  ff. 

2  Colmeiro,  I,  233  ff. ;  cf.  349  ff. 

8  This  is  not  believed  by   Leroy-Beaulieu   (1,3),  who   thinks   that    "no  people     [ 
were  less  fitted  to  colonize  than  the  Spaniards."     But  he  adds  the  limiting  clause, 
"  a  juger  les  choses  de  notre  point  de  vue  actuel."    The  reader  will  be  furnished  in 
later  pages  with  information  and  considerations  upon  which  to  base  a  judgment  as     [ 
to  this  contention. 


82  COLONIZATION 

general  considerations  growing  out  of  the  projection  of  the  above 
factors  upon  the  hfe  of  the  sixteenth  century  may  be  noted.  Both 
of  the  Iberian  states  were  enticed  or  forced  into  efforts  dispropor- 
tionate to  their  population  and  economic  strength,  this  being  due 
in  large  part  to  royal  and  clerical  incitement,  to  the  inebriating 
and  demoralizing  effects  following  upon  the  Discoveries,  and  to 
miscellaneous  unhappy  combinations  of  circumstances  of  a  less 
general  nature.  The  destructive  forces  were  at  work  before  the 
sixteenth  century  began,  but  displayed  themselves  in  aggravated 
and  menacing  form  only  toward  its  close.  Then  both  states  suffered 
from  the  incapacity  and  maladministration  of  kings  who  were  always 
short  of  funds  ;  from  decline  in  quantity  and  quality  of  population 
and  of  industry,  —  in  short,  from  the  effects  of  the  diversion  of 
national  life  into  uncharted  ways.  Under  the  influence  of  racial 
and  religious  hatred,  and  economic  greed  and  envy,  both  nations 
drove  from  them  economic  assets  of  a  high  order :  the  Jews, 
expelled  from  Spain  and  Portugal  in  1492  and  1496  respectively, 
and  the  Moriscos,  banished  in  cruel  fashion  in  1609.^  Both  nations 
came  to  support  a  large  parasitic  element  in  the  population  in  the 
persons  of  the  clergy,  and  of  the  vagrants  and  mendicants  attracted 
by  a  profuse  and  indiscriminate  charity  for  which  the  Church  stood 
as  champion.  The  encouragement  of  such  classes  amounted  to 
contraselection  in  the  evolution  of  the  national  type,  and  aided  the 
government  in  blocking  industrial  development.  Idleness,  venality, 
cheap  ostentation,  and  superstition  infected  rulers  and  ruled.^ 

Each  state  collapsed  in  its  own  special  way  from  the  lofty  posi- 
tion to  which  its  earlier  energy  had  elevated  it ;  and  that  this 
decadence  was  decisive  and  irrevocable  finds  evidence  in  the  sub- 
sequent history  of  the  Peninsular  peoples  and  their  colonial  empires. 

1  Martins,  Os  Filhos,  etc.,  chap,  vii;  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  13  ff. ;  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  266- 
271;  Colmeiro,  I,  250  ff. ;  cf.  pp.  335  ff. ;  Varnhagen,  I,  87-88.  Upon  the  Moriscos,  Lea 
is  the  special  authority.  The  story  of  the  oppression  and  expulsion  of  these  valuable 
people  and  of  the  Jews  cannot  be  gone  into  in  this  place,  but  will  be  found  in  all 
needed  detail  in  Lea's  Moriscos,  especially  chaps,  i,  iv,  vi,  vii,  viii,  x,  and  xi;  and  in 
his  Inquisition,  especially  I,  chap,  ii,  84  ff. ;  II,  315  ff.,  485  ff. ;  III,  i  ff.  It  will  be 
noted  that  almost  the  chief  activity  of  the  Inquisition  was  the  harassing  of  Jews  and 
Moriscos.  Even  if  the  number  of  actual  autos-da-fe  was  less  than  was  once  supposed, 
not  running  into  the  tens  of  thousands  (cf.  Inquisition,  III,  551  ff.),  yet  the  other 
penalties  of  torture,  imprisonment,  confiscation,  etc.,  constantly  overhung  the  pre- 
destined victims,  rendering  life  and  property  insecure  and  so  crippling  all  economic 
activity.  In  fact,  "practically  acciuittal  amounted  to  a  sentence  of  not  proven" 
j(Inciuisition,  III,  107). 

2  Marlins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  32,  1 13-116,  192-193  ;  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  271-273,  2S3-286. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  83 

The  general  impression  of  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  activities 
under  consideration  is  that  of  an  excessive  and  feverish  energy,  a 
prodigal^ver-expenditure  of  vitality,  followed  by  an  equally  accentu- 
ated reaction  and  exhaustion.  As  one  follows  more  specially  tTie 
course  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese  colonial  enterprise,  these  general 
considerations  are  found  to  underlie  not  a  few  of  the  sets  of  con- 
ditions encountered. 


Portugal's  Preparation  for  Colonization 

If  in  the  period  immediately  preceding  the  Discoveries  the 
Peninsula  as  a  whole  had  been  gathering  its  forces,  the  same  was 
true  of  its  constituent  political  units,  —  Spain  and  Portugal.  Each 
of  these  nations  exhibited,  moreover,  the  action  of  local  forces 
making  for  internal  coherence  and  the  storage  of  energy. 

Portugal  had  won  its  independence,  after  a  series  of  wars,  toward 
the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century,^  and  had  developed  a  centralized 
government  of  some  strength  Conflicts  with  an  alien  race  had 
accentuated  racial  and  religious  homogeneity,  and  the  genius  of 
the  King  Affonso  Henriques  (1143-1183)  was  enabled  politically 
to  consolidate  a  land  and  people  neither  geographically  nor  ethno- 
logically  distinct  from  their  neighbors.  At  the  end  of  the  four- 
teenth century,  according  to  Stephens,  Portugal  formed  a  political 
and  social  entity  more  conscious  of  nationahty  than  almost  any 
other  people  of  Europe.^  This  unity  of  purpose,  conformably  with 
the  laws  of  state-development,  proceeded  to  display  itself  outside 
the  boundaries  of  the  state,  and  at  first  along  lines  already  familiar. 
Expeditions  were  led  against  the  Moors  of  North  Africa,  and  the 
idea  of  external  dominion  was,  in  true  crusading  fashion,  com- 
mingled with  the  desire  to  extend  the  outposts  of  Christendom. 
The  strength  of  the  rising  state  was  augmented  also  by  the  skill- 
ful use  of  foreign  relations.  A  striking  illustration  of  the  essential 
analogy  between  the  Crusades  and  the  Moorish  wars  of  the  Penin- 
sula lay  in  the  fact  that  Portuguese  kings  were  able  to  divert  large 
bodies  of  itinerant  Crusaders  to  their  own  local  purposes.    Even 

1  The  battle  of  Aljubarrota,  13S5,  practically  ended  the  aggression  of  Castile. 
Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  15,  158  ff. 

2  Stephens,  p.  100 ;  Hunter.  I,  57  ff. ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  67  ff  "  The  grand 
movement,  popular  in  its  essence,  of  the  fourteenth  century,  invigorated  the  nation 
and  prepared  it  for  the  great  period  of  daring  navigation  and  grand  discoveries." 
Corvo,  I,  6. 


84  COLONIZATION 

the  Pope  declared  that  crusading  in  the  Peninsula  was  as  meritori- 
ous as  in  the  Holy  Land.^  Of  still  greater  and  more  lasting  import 
were  the  relations  between  Portugal  and  England.  Himself  the 
founder  of  the  house  of  Aviz  and  the  consolidator  of  the  realm, 
John  I,  by  his  union  with  Philippa  of  Lancaster  ^  (1387),  laid  the 
foundation  of  an  international  relationship  and  sympathy  which 
have  often  redounded  to  the  advantage  of  the  less  powerful  nation. 
Already  in  1385  English  archers  had  rendered  matcFial  assistance 
in  the  attainment  of  Portuguese  independence ;  and  after  the  recog- 
nition of  John  as  king  (141 1)  and  the  completion  of  the  era  of  consoli- 
dation, the  cementation  of  this  alliance  through  the  more  palpable 
and  enduring  bonds  of  trade  went  on  with  few  interruptions. 

The  position  of  Portugal  was  scarcely  favorable,  under  the  con- 
ditions of  the  age,  for  the  development  of  trade  and  shipping.  Cut 
off  from  the  Mediterranean,  the  scene  of  action  of  the  time,  the 
Portuguese  felt  the  influence  of  the  trade-movements  already 
described  only  after  the  Italians  had  extended  their  voyages  to 
Flanders  and  the  North ;  and  even  then  the  Italian  exclusion-policy 
allowed  them  but  small  share  in  the  new  operations.  Portuguese 
sea-battles  of  the  twelfth  century  showed  courage  rather  than  skill ; 
it  was  not  until  the  early  fourteenth  century  that  a  real  beginning 
of  maritime  activity  was  made.^  From  this  time  on  the  Portuguese, 
together  with  the  Spanish,  became  more  alive  to  the  economic 
advantages  enjoyed  by  the  Italians  in  the  trade  with  the  East  and 
with  North  Africa.  On  the  part  of  both  nations  there  emerged 
more  and  more  plainly  the  tendency  to  outgrow  the  status  of  the 
passive  recipient  and  to  enter  upon  the  lucrative  function  of  the 
distributor.  King  Diniz  (i 279-1 325)  of  Portugal,  in  addition  to 
his  unremitting  efforts  to  repair  the  damage  of  the  Moorish  wars, 
through  the  development  of  economic  resources,  managed  to  check 
the  overgrown  power  of  the  Church,  and  thus  to  lay  the  founda- 
tion of  a  strong  and  undisputed  monarchy.*  He  also  attracted 
Genoese  shipbuilders  to  Portugal  and  employed  an  Italian  as  ad- 
miral of  his  fleets,  thus  making  the  first  definite  advance  toward 

1  Stephens,  pp.  48,  52-53,  61,  72;   Martins,  Ilist.  de  Port.,  I,  84,  181. 

2  Daughter  of  John  of  Gaunt  and  granddaughter  of  Edward  III.  Hunter,  I,  58  ff. ; 
Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  130-131. 

'^  Wappaus,  I,  209-210;  but  cf.  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  26. 

*  The  strife  between  the  kings  and  the  clergy  was  practically  ended  by  1360. 
Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  III,  478-481;  IV,  872-874;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  118; 
II,  II,  note.    The  popular  title  of  Diniz  was  Lavrador. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  85 

maritime  power;  and  in  succeeding  reigns,  notably  that  of  Ferdi- 
nand IV  ( 1 367-1 383),  numerous  privileges  and  exemptions  were 
granted  to  shipbuilders  and  sailors.  This  attention  to  sea-borne 
commerce  went  even  to  the  extent  of  founding  a  marine  insurance 
society.  Merchants  of  all  lands  were  attracted  to  Lisbon  under 
this  fostering  policy,  and  John  I,  on  attaining  power,  found  the 
ground  prepared  for  a  solid  advance  in  commercial  development. 
This  opportunity  was  not  suffered  to  slip  away.^ 

That  the  subsequent  generations  of  astonishing  activity  on  the 
part  of  Portugal,  and  her  final  degeneration  as  well,  were  the  work 
of  no  single  man,  or  group  of  men,  the  preceding  argument  is 
designed  to  indicate.  It  is  in  all  ways  probable,  however,  that  the 
very  strength  of  the  monarchy  as  it  existed  in  Portugal  was  at  the 
bottom  of  a  premature  or  exaggerated  display  of  enterprise  and 
aggression. 2  Fitted  to  play  a  part  proportionate  to  her  resources, 
Portugal  was  constantly  forced  into  situations  with  which  she  was 
normally  unfit  to  cope.  And  yet  her  royal  directors  were  far  from 
being  unpopular  ;  the  sound  or  senseless  ideals  at  which  they  aimed 
in  their  early  contact  with  Africa  and  the  East  appealed  to  the 
spirit,  or  at  least  encountered  no  resistance  on  the  part  of  their 
subjects  ;  it  was  weakness  of  the  flesh  rather  than  unwillingness 
of  the  spirit  that  caused  a  falling-short. 

Henry  the  Navigator 

In  some  such  way  as  this  the  spirit  of  the  Discoveries  period  was 
epitomized  in  an  influential  member  of  the  ruling  house.  This  was 
Dom  Henriques,  son  of  John  the  Great  and  his  English  queen,  a 
character  more  familiarly  known  in  history  as  Henry  the  Navigator, 
—  a  prince  who  was  enabled  in  an  exceptional  degree  to  direct  the 
fortunes  not  only  of  his  own  country,  but  of  the  civilized  world,  with 
his  own  hand.3    Raised  in  an  environment  of  religious  militancy, 

1  Wappiius,  I,  351-364;  Schafer,  I,  112  ff. ;  Danvers,  I,  16  ff.;  Hunter,  I,  16-1S. 
Major  (p.  46)  thinlcs  that  the  expulsion  of  the  Moors  from  the  Peninsula,  entailing 
as  it  did  a  dearth  of  objects  of  Oriental  luxury  to  which  the  westerners  had  become 
used,  "  was  one  of  the  great  stimulants  to  the  search  for  a  passage  to  India  by  the 
sea."  He  adds :  "  In  this  expulsion  the  Portuguese  took  the  lead,  and  were  con- 
sequently the  first  to  feel  the  effect  of  the  incentive."  Cf.  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port., 
I,  165.  2  Cf.  Hunter,  I,  89  ff. 

8  The  best  accounts  of  Prince  Henry's  life  and  work  will  be  cited  below.  Briefer 
estimates  are  Stephens,  Story  of  Portugal,  pp.  141  ff.;  Bourne,  Kssays,  etc., 
pp.  173-189;  Zimmermann,  I,  4-10.  Martins  (Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  166  ff.,  183  ff.) 
gives  Henry  rather  the  character  of  a  ruthless  enthusiast. 


86  COLONIZATION 

its  spirit  was  his,  and  his  eadiest  independent  efforts  were  spent 
in  the  endeavor  to  gather  such  information  concerning  the  Moors 
of  North  Africa  as  would  enable  him  the  more  crushingly  to  defeat 
them  and  to  reduce  the  power  of  Islam.  The  sah^ation  of  souls 
was  an  object  very  near  to  his  heart  in  his  character  of  medi- 
aeval knight  and  crusader ;  his  earliest  ships  were  fitted  out  to 
injure  the  enemies  of  Christendom  rather  than  to  advance  the 
worldly  interests  of  Portugal  or  the  king.  Yet  Henry  was  more 
than  mediaeval  and  unworldly  ;  he  was  a  man  of  scientific  curiosity 
and  of  practical  astuteness.  He  was  versed  in  the  geographical 
and  other  lore  of  his  time  and  imbued  with  respect  for  that  reason- 
ing which  proceeds  from  fact  to  theory,  and  which  has  become  the 
special  heritage  of  modern  science.  His  knowledge,  as  a  child  of  a 
new  age,  was  the  fruit  of  an  accumulation  of  what  had  gone  before  ;  ^ 
like  Columbus,  he  represented  one  of  the  results  of  the  invention 
of  printing.  He  was  able  to  apprehend  the  import  for  the  general 
advancement  of  culture  of  the  extension  of  the  geographical  horizon 
and  of  nautical  education,  attained  through  the  development  of 
shipping.  He  saw  at  least  some  of  the  results  to  be  expected  from 
the  establishment  of  easier  and  cheaper  communication  with  the 
East.^  He  was  aware  of  the  seemingly  secure  but  really  precarious 
tenure  of  Venetian  monopoly,  and  coveted  for  Portugal  not  only 
the  souls  but  also  the  lucrative  trade  of  the  easterners.^  He  may 
not  have  seen  that  the  discovery  of  a  direct  route  to  the  Indies 
would  "  turn  the  flank  of  Islam,"  but  he  was  convinced  that  it 
would  neutralize  the  excessive  advantages  held  by  Italian  cities, 
and,  above  all,  by  Venice.  He  stood,  as  it  were,  the  inspired  and 
clarified  exposition  of  the  time's  awakening  spirit,'^  and  was  for 
this  reason  enabled  to  wield  the  influence  he  did.  As  commander 
of  the  wealthy  Order  of  Christ  he  controlled  ample  funds  for  his 
purposes,  and,  renouncing  all  else  in  the  pursuit  of  his  life-idea, 
retired  to  the  rocky  promontory  of  Sagres,  there  to  pass  his  days.^ 

i-The  Arabs  were  "the  most  important  helpers  and  informants  of  Prince 
Henry."    Beazley,  in  Azurara,  II,  xlv ;   cf.  pp.  xliii   ff. 

2  Wappaus,  p.  145;  Beazley,  in  Azurara,  II,  Ivi  ff.,  cxvii  ff. ;  Major,  pp.  47  ff. ; 
Ruge,  pp.  81  ff. ;   Martins,  Os  Filhos,  etc.,  chap,  iv ;    Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  167  ff. 

^  There  also  existed  at  this  time  a  legend  derived  from  the  classics  concerning 
certain  Gold  and  Silver  Islands  in  the  Far  East.  The  Portuguese  later  made  several 
ineffectual  attempts  to  find  them.    Huge,  pp.  207  ff. 

*  Cf.  Leroy-Peaulieu,  I,  41-42  ;   Cheyney,  pp.  43  ff.,  76. 

''That  he  took  up  his  abode  in  .Sagres  in  1419  is  doubtful,  but  he  certainly 
remained  there  most  of  his  life  after  1437.    Beazley,  in  Azurara,  II,  viii,  xii ;  Martins, 


'rm-:  pori'UGUesp:  in  the  east  87 

In  spite  of  considerable  opposition  accompany ini;  and  following  his 
many  reverses,  he  did  not  fail,  such  was  his  consistency  of  purpose 
and  great  force  of  character,  throughout  his  life  to  inspire  his  fol- 
lowers with  a  spirit  similar  to  his  own.  There  is,  in  his  case,  more 
reason  than  usual  for  asserting  the  effect  upon  history  of  the  work 
of  a  single  man. 

His  activities  came  to  be  directed  almost  wholly  to  the  attempt 
to  circumnavigate  Africa, — a  feat  reputed  to  have  been  accom- 
plished in  the  remote  past.^  To  this  end  he  not  only  gathered 
about  him  the  leading  scientists  of  his  time,  but  also  secured  the 
services  of  daring  sea-captains  and  sailors.^  In  their  wretched, 
insufficient  saihng  craft  these  mariners  made  their  way,  little  by 
little,  down  the  coast  of  Africa,  were  long  daunted  before  the 
terrors  of  Cape  Bojador,  but  finally  doubled  it  (1434)  and  passed 
on  toward  the  south.  The  long  trend  to  the  eastward  represented 
by  the  Gulf  of  Guinea  no  doubt  raised  false  hopes  ;  it  took  until 
147 1,  eleven  years  after  Henry's  death,  to  cross  the  equator.  Yet 
he  lived  to  see  some  of  the  wealth  of  Africa,  if  not  of  India,  return 
to  Portugal,  and  to  experience,  though  it  probably  affected  him  but 
slightly,  the  sudden  veering  of  a  public  opinion  hitherto  adverse  to 
him  (about  1442).  The  Madeira  Islands  had  been  occupied  (after 
141 8),  and  endowed  with  the  beginnings  of  their  future  resources  ; 
to  these  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  were  added  (1446)  and  the  Azores 
(1449).^  Slaves  had  been  introduced  (1441)  into  the  great  estates 
of  the  south  of  Portugal  where  the  labor  supply  was  depleted  ;  this 
set  free  large  numbers  of  men  for  the  royal  policy  of  adventure, 
but  the  cruelties  attending  the  seizures  had  already  embittered  the 
natives  of  the  African  coast. "^    Whatever  its  immediate  effects  for 

Os  Filhos,  etc.,  chap.  iii.  What  he  did  was,  in  one  of  its  most  important  aspects,  to 
found  a  "  .school  of  sea-training."  Cheyney,  p.  76.  These  expeditions,  owing  to  laclc 
of  private  capital  and  enterprise,  could  not  have  been  sent  out  without  drawing  upon 
some  such  funds  as  a  prince  might  be  able  to  control.   Cf.  Van  der  Chys,  p.  1 17,  note. 

1  See  p.  32,  note.  Payne  (Age  of  Disc,  p.  12)  doubts  this,  regarding  Henry  as 
little  more  than  a  crusader.     But  cf.  Beazley,  in  Azurara,  II,  v. 

2  Seamen  of  Italy,  Germany,  and  the  Netherlands  entered  Henry's  service  in 
relatively  considerable  numbers.    Major,  pp.  308-309. 

3  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  take  up  in  detail  the  history  of  these  island  groups. 
Being  unoccupied,  they  were  divided  in  feudal  fashion  into  captaincies,  and  gradu- 
ally settled  by  Portuguese,  as  a  vacant  portion  of  Portugal  might  have  been  settled. 
They  soon  became  portions  of  Portugal  and  were  administratively  so  considered. 
See  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  3  ff.,  194 ;   Corvo,  I,  43  ff. ;   Saco,  pp.  20  ff. 

*  Hunter,  I,  61  ff . ;  Beazley,  in  Azurara,  II,  cix  ;  Bourne,  Essays,  etc.,  pp.  173-189; 
Payne,  Age  of  Disc,  pp.  13  ff. 


88  COLONIZATION 

good  or  ill,  the  life  of  this  determined  and  undaunted  prince  had 
seen  a  grand  undertaking  so  far  upon  its  way  that  non-cessation  of 
effort  was  assured.  Without  his  activities  "  the  results  of  the  great 
forty  years  (1480- 15  20)  of  Diaz,  Columbus,  Da  Gama,  and  Magel- 
lan must  have  been  long,  might  have  been  indefinitely,  postponed."  ^ 

After  the  death  of  Henry  the  voyages  to  the  south  continued, 
with  few  interruptions,  to  extend  their  range,  until  the  Cape  was 
doubled  by  Diaz  (i486),  and  until  finally  Da  Gama  swung  clear 
around  the  southern  tip  of  the  continent  and  made  his  way  to 
India  (1497- 1498).  The  details  of  these  voyages  are  important 
to  our  purpose  simply  as  they  display  from  the  outset  the  daring 
and  reckless  spirit  of  the  Portuguese  of  the  time.  Shipping  had 
been  much  improved  in  the  hard  school,  and  was  now  better 
adapted  to  the  ocean  and  the  exigencies  of  oceanic  commerce. 
The  sea  had  lost  its  imaginary  terrors  ;  navigation  under  strange 
skies  had  been  learned.  In  short,  a  beginning  had  been  made  in 
the  creation  of  a  vehicle  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  world-wide  com- 
merce.^ The  timely  impulse  of  the  single  farsighted  man  had  prob- 
ably hurried  on  the  evolution  of  the  period  at  a  greatly  accelerated 
pace.  When  it  was  removed,  exploration  was  indeed  largely  sus- 
pended for  about  twenty  years  ;  but  it  needed  only  a  resumption 
of  royal  encouragement  to  stimulate  it  to  the  accomplishment  of 
its  ultimate  object.^ 

It  is  noteworthy  as  illustrating  the  knowledge  and  purposes  of 
the  Portuguese  that  in  1487  two  envoys  were  dispatched  to  pursue 
the  overland  route  to  India,  and  to  search  for  the  mysterious  Chris- 
tian potentate,  Prester  John.  The  latter,  it  was  hoped,  would 
prove  an  efficient  ally  against  the  Moors.  It  fell  to  one  of  these 
envoys,  Covilhao,  not  only  to  reach  India  and  to  become  the  "  theo- 
retical discoverer"'*  of  the  Cape  route  —  he  sent  back  assurances 

^  Beazley,  in  A/uraru,  II,  vii.  Yet  .such  was  the  .slowness  of  progress  in  these 
early  years  that  the  forty-two  years  from  1418  to  1460  had  added  only  18  degrees  of 
latitude  to  verified  geography.    Hunter,  I,  69;   cf.  Roscher,  p.  258,  and  note. 

'^  Henry  really  founded,  with  the  funds  of  his  Order,  the  first  real  commercial 
and  discovery  company  of  modern  times.    Bourne,  Essays,  etc.,  pp.  173-179. 

8  The  details  of  the  voyages  under  Prince  Henry's  direction  are  to  be  found  in 
Azurara,  Discovery  and  Conquest  of  Guinea.  In  the  second  volume  of  this  publi- 
cation is  included  an  excellent  introductory  essay  by  C.  R.  Beazley,  who  gives  some 
space  to  the  voyages  suljsequent  to  Henry's  death,  in  completion  of  his  work 
(pp.  xxviii  ff.).  See  also  Major,  pp.  317  ff.;  Martins,  Os  Filhos,  etc.,  chap,  ix; 
Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  IV,  800  ff. ;    Heyd,  II,  506  ff. 

*  Hunter,  I,  78-79;  Whiteway,  p.  16;  Major,  pp.  339-340;  Martins,  Hist,  de 
Port.,  pp.  163  ff.    For  a  resume  of  the  legends,  etc.,  about  Prester  John,  see  Huge, 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  89 

to  Portugal  that  ships  would  of  a  certainty  attain  the  termination 
of  the  continent,  and  he  directed  them  to  Sofala  —  but  to  discover 
Prester  John  in  the  king  of  Abyssinia,  and  to  be  retained  by  him 
under  kindly  restraint  for  the  rest  of  his  life. 

Effects  of  the  Discovery  of  the  Cape  Route 

With  the  discovery  of  the  Cape  route,  Portugal  takes  her  place 
as  the  successor  of  Venice  in  the  empire  of  commerce ;  ^  for, 
despite  the  efforts  of  the  latter,  her  monopoly  was  already  doomed 
when  the  ships  of  Da  Gama  had  once  anchored  at  Calicut.  The 
center  of  the  world's  commercial  activity  again  shifted  toward  the 
west,  and  its  medium  became  the  ocean  which  connects,  not  adja- 
cent areas,  but  all  lands  of  the  earth.  Local  trade,  with  its  rela- 
tively restricted  interests,  was  a  thing  of  the  past,  for  in  the 
distance  lay  the  world-market  and  its  limitless  possibilities  for  the 
meeting  of  all  nations  and  peoples.^  The  policy  of  Portugal,  how- 
ever, contemplated  no  such  cosmopolitan  aims.  It  has  been  shown 
how  the  ancient  nations  strove  to  maintain,  through  any  and  all 
means,  the  monopoly  of  trade,  each  for  itself  ;  and  how  the  Italians 
invented  expedients  and  fought  for  their  realization,  in  the  effort 
to  exclude  rivals.  As  was  inevitable,  the  policy  was  adhered  to  by 
the  new  mistress  of  the  seas.  Prince  Henry  had  no  sooner  realized 
the  likelihood  of  success  in  his  prime  endeavor  than  he  secured, 
from  the  only  arbiter  of  the  time,  a  clear  title  to  all  lands  to  be 
discovered  from  Cape  Bojador  "ad  Indos."  The  Pope  "repre- 
sented after  the  fashion  of  that  age  what  we  now  call  the  concert 
of  Europe";  he  exercised  an  authority  which  was  "regarded  as 
essential  to  the  peace  of  Christendom,"  for  Papal  arbitration  was 
the  only  course  short  of  war.  Even  recalcitrant  nations  like  Eng- 
land, under  aggressive  sovereigns  like  the  Tudors,  hesitated  openly 
to  assail  a  "  settlement  which  had  become  part  of  the  public  law 
of  Europe."^    Hence  India  became  Portuguese  by  fiat,  and  the 

pp.  37  ff.  Payne  (Age  of  Disc,  p.  11)  says  Henry  hoped  to  unite  forces  witli  Prester 
John  through  the  "  Western  Nile,"  —  a  geographic  illusion,  —  and  so  turn  the 
flank  of  Islam.  ^  See  p.  69,  above. 

2  "  Of  all  the  changes  which  mark  the  transition  from  ancient  and  medi.xval  to 
modern  history,  none  is  so  profound  as  that  which  has  regrouped  human  life  about 
the  Atlantic  as  a  new  and  grander  central  sea."    Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  3. 

8  Hunter,  I,  83,  84,  85.  Under  the  conditions  of  the  time,  then,  the  Portuguese 
had  a  right  to  call  intruders  upon  their  dominions  "pirates"  {ireiparaL),  i.e.  those 
who  make  (wrongful)  attempts.     Hunter,  I,  86,  note;   Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  43-44. 


90  COLONIZATION 

Portuguese  habitually  spoke  of  it  as  theirs,  despite  their  scanty 
occupation. 

It  is  necessary  here  to  anticipate  slightly.  When,  in  consequence 
of  the  discoveries  of  Columbus,  Spain  entered  the  lists  with  Por- 
tugal, it  became  imperative  for  the  Holy  See  to  construct  some 
working  agreement  between  these,  its  favorite  children.  This 
arrangement  worked  out  ev^entually  into  the  Treaty  of  Tordcsillas 
(1494),  whereby  the  non-European  world  was  divided  along  a 
meridian  100,  later  370,  leagues  west  and  south  of  any  one  of  the 
islands  known  as  the  Azores  or  the  Cape  Verde  Islands.^  The 
Portuguese  were  excluded  from  areas  west  of  this  line,  the  Spanish 
from  those  east.  In  conformity  with  the  spirit  of  the  time,  as  will 
be  seen,  this  to  us  stupendous  presumption  was  regarded  as  a 
matter  of  course,  and  as  indisputable.  Its  bearing  upon  the  sub- 
ject directly  in  hand  is  this  :  it  justified  the  destruction  of  inter- 
lopers, and  enlisted  the  superstitious  and  religious  tendencies  of 
the  time  in  the  maintenance  of  commercial  and  colonial  monopoly. 
Its  incompleteness  may  be  passed  over  for  the  present ;  the  Por- 
tuguese had  the  East  as  a  sphere  of  activity,  the  Spanish  the  West. 
It  was  time  enough  to  consider  and  discover  where  the  East  and 
West  must  meet,  when  that  question  became  a  practical  issue. ^ 

Conditions  in  India 

The  marvelous  good  fortune  of  the  Portuguese — for  thus  one 
must  denominate  the  happy  outcome  in  their  colonial  history  of 
many  an  unplanned  or  ill-planned  venture  —  attended  them  from 
their  arrival  on  the  scene  of  action.  They  landed  i)ropitiously  both 
as  to  place  and  time.    Calicut  was  part  of  a  narrow  strip  of  shore 

1  See  especially  Bourne,  P2ssays,  etc.,  pp.  193-217;  Sp.  in  Anier.,  pp.  29-32, 
71-73;    Hunter,  I,  83  ff. 

2  "  Neither  in  the  Papal  Rull.s  nor  in  the  Treaty  of  Tordesillas  was  there  any 
specific  reference  to  an  extension  of  the  Line  around  the  globe  or  to  a  division  of 
the  world.  The  arrangement  seems  to  have  contemplated  a  free  field  for  the  e.xplora- 
tion  and  conquest  of  the  unknown  parts  of  the  world,  to  the  eastward  for  Portugal 
and  to  the  westward  for  Spain.  If  they  should  cross  each  other's  tracks,  priority  of 
discovery  would  determine  the  ownership. 

"  The  suggestion  of  the  extension  of  the  line  around  the  globe  and  of  the  idea  that 
Spain  was  entitled  to  what  might  be  within  the  hemisphere  set  off  by  the  Demarca- 
tion Line  and  its  extension  to  the  antipodes  does  not  a])pear  until  the  time  of  Magel- 
lan, and  it  is  then  that  we  first  meet  the  notion  that  the  Pojie  had  divided  the  world 
between  Spain  and  Portugal  like  an  orange."  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p]).  2.^-25;  cf. 
Payne,  Age  of  Disc,  p.  23. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  9 1 

belonging  to  petty  rajahs  of  whom  its  ruler,  the  Zamorin,  was  a 
sort  of  chief.  Too  feeble  to  offer  a  serious  resistance,  and  with  an 
eye  to  an  increase  of  revenue,  the  kinglets  welcomed  foreign  mer- 
chants ;  and  having  long  been  accustomed  to  differences  of  faith, 
they  conceded  freedom  of  religious  belief  and  practice.  And  at 
the  time  of  the  Portuguese  arrival  united  resistance  was  further 
weakened  because  of  the  encroachments  of  Mohammedan  invaders 
upon  the  Hindu  overlordship  of  the  interior.  The  Mogul  Empire 
was  not  yet  firm ;  petty  states  were  isolated  and  the  Portuguese 
could  deal  with  them  with  a  free  hand,  and  one  by  one.  And  the 
people,  though  in  important  respects  more  highly  civilized  than  the 
Portuguese,  were  not  only  insufficiently  advanced  in  the  arts  and 
almost  unprovided  with  the  modern  weapons  of  war,  but  also 
exhibited  in  their  military  system  certain  customs  of  a  chivalrous 
nature,  e.g.  antecedent  declaration  of  hostile  intent,  of  which  the 
Portuguese  were  able  to  make  consistent  and  unscrupulous  use. 
These  considerations,  while  in  no  way  detracting  from  the  courage 
of  the  Portuguese  adventurers,  rendered  their  task  an  easier  one 
than  had  at  first  appeared.^ 

The  mood  in  which  the  Europeans  approached  the  East  is  well 
exemplified  in  the  character  of  the  first  great  leader,  Vasco  da 
Gama.  A  man  of  great  energy  and  indomitable  firmness,  incorrupt- 
ible in  dealing  justice,  and  of  strong  religious  purpose,  he  added 
to  his  inflexibility  a  harsh  manner  and  a  cruel,  violent,  and  revenge- 
ful character. 2  He  dealt  out  justice  untempered  with  mercy,  and 
was  utterly  lacking  in  tolerance,  and  even  in  a  formal  and  diplo- 
matic courtesy.  The  striking  success  of  his  summary  methods 
scarcely  atoned  for  the  friction  and  ill-feeling  which  they  engen- 
dered. In  conformity  with  the  purpose  of  his  voyage,  however, 
•Da  Gama's  immediate  duty  was  the  collection  of  such  a  cargo  of 
spices  as  would  verify  the  high  expectations  of  his  royal  patron  in 
Lisbon.  Trade  agreements  were  therefore  made  with  the  rulers 
of  Calicut  and  Cochin  ;  an  attempt  was  made  to  fix  prices  once  for 
all ;  and  in  the  face  of  Arabic  misrepresentation,  and  in  spite  of 
high-handed  and  hot-headed  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  Portuguese, 

1  Whiteway,  pp.  27-28 ;  Lindsay,  I,  152. 

2  "...  so  liegen  auch  bei  Vasco  da  Gama  als  die  treibenden  Krafte :  ritterlicher 
Waffenruhm  und  die  Verbreitung  des  heiligen  Glaubens  offen  vor  Augen  ;  denn 
vielen,  und  darunter  den  Edleren,  erschienen  die  indischen  Kampfe  als  heilige  Kriege, 
als  Kreuzziige  gegen  den  Erbfeind  des  Christenthums."  Ruge,  p.  190.  The  spirit  of 
exploration  had  succeeded  and  absorbed  that  of  the  Crusades.    Hunter,  I,  58. 


92  COLONIZATION 

the  ships  were  well  loaded  with  pepper,  cinnamon,  and  other  local 
products.  In  exchange  for  his  spices  the  Zamorin  wished  chiefly 
gold,  silver,  coral,  and  scarlet.  In  accordance  with  instructions, 
Da  Gama  likewise  visited  Cannanore  and  established  a  factory  at 
Cochin,  making  arrangements  for  its  protection  during  his  absence, 
and  for  the  purchase  and  storage  of  goods  destined  for  the  lading 
of  the  yearly  fleets  which  it  was  planned  to  send.  By  reason  of 
ignorance  of  local  conditions  and  a  tendency  easily  to  take  offense 
with  a  people  whom  he  despised  without  in  any  degree  striving  to 
understand  them.  Da  Gama  managed  also,  at  the  end  of  his  brief 
sojourn,  to  leave  the  Zamorin  of  Calicut  his  bitter  enemy. ^  Beyond 
imposing  the  natives  with  brute  force,  his  activity  had  been  sterile 
of  real  results.  The  breach  which  he  had  made  with  the  Zamorin 
was  widened  by  the  blundering  incapacity  of  his  successor,  Cabral.^ 

Conditions  of  Navigation 

Some  more  definite  information  concerning  the  nature  of  ships 
and  navigation  at  the  date  in  question  will  help  to  form  a  concep- 
tion of  both  the  advantages  and  the  difficulties  of  the  discoverers 
and  their  successors.  Since  the  time  of  Prince  Henry  considerable 
advance  had  been  made  in  the  size  and  power  of  the  vessels  and  in 
the  outfit  of  the  navigator.  The  fleet  of  Da  Gama  consisted  of  a 
flagship  of  1 20  tons  and  about  80  feet  long,  two  other  vessels  of 
100  and  50  tons  respectively,  and  smaller  craft  with  munitions. 
The  flagship  had  a  very  high  bow  and  stern  and  possessed  great 
floating  power  and  strength,  but  was  nautically  deficient ;  it  carried 
twenty  guns.-^  The  combined  crews  of  the  vessels  came  to  about 
150  men.  Cadamosto  says  the  Portuguese  caravels  of  his  time'* 
were  the  best  sailing  ships  afloat ;  there  had  certainly  been  much 
improvement  since  Prince  Henry's  early  life,  but  when  we  read  of 

1  The  exclusion  of  Da  Gama  from  the  Indian  enterprises  from  1502  to  1524  is 
thought  by  some  to  have  been  a  consequence  of  his  rude  and  exasperating  methods. 
Ruge,  p.  188;  cf.  Whiteway,  pp.  77-81  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  212  ff.;  Lindsay, 
II,  41  ff.;  Danvers,  I,  85  ff. ;   Hunter,  I,  109. 

2  Whiteway,  pp.  88  ff.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Cabral  sailed  for  India  not  as  a  dis- 
coverer and  adventurer  but  as  an  ambassador,  fitted  to  appear  in  state.  Martins, 
Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  223. 

8  For  further  details  of  construction,  see  Danvers,  I,  43-44.  Here  also  (pp.  33  ff.) 
and  in  Azurara  (/xisstm  ;  and  Beazley's  Introduction  to  II,  viii  ff.)  are  to  be  found  the 
details  of  the  voyages  down  the  west  coast  of  Africa,  including  the  noteworthy  one 
of  Diaz.  See  also  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  209-210,  and  especially  Lindsay,  I,  547  ff. ; 
II,  I  ff.  *  He  was  in  the  service  of  Henry  after  1455  and  died  in  1480. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  93 

"lateen  sails  on  long  poles  suspended  from  the  masthead,"  we  are 
led  to  realize  the  essential  backwardness  of  the  arts  of  construction, 
and  the  corresponding  hardihood  of  the  navigators.  Yet  these 
constituted  the  new  "ocean-going"  type  of  vessel  and  were  un- 
doubtedly a  great  improvement  on  the  galleys  that  went  before. 
The  navigation  of  the  time  was  also  much  advanced  ;  this  is 
proved  partly  by  the  fact  that  sailors  dared  to  let  land  out  of  their 
sight.  After  the  equator  was  crossed,  also,  it  had  been  necessary 
considerably  to  modify  the  means  of  determining  directions  and 
bearings.  The  rude  astrolabe  had  been  improved  and  the  constel- 
lations of  a  new  hemisphere  learned.  Nevertheless,  in  the  time  of 
Da  Gama  and  his  successors  navigation  was  a  haphazard  affair. 
To  take  an  observation  with  an  approach  to  accuracy  it  was  neces- 
sary to  land  ;  this  was  done  repeatedly  by  Da  Gama  on  his  first 
voyage.  The  compass  was  known,  but  its  use  was  checked  by  the 
superstition  of  the  sailors. ^  Without  satisfactory  charts  and  pilots 
dangers  abounded,  and  although  the  efforts  of  Prince  Henry  had 
exorcised  most  of  the  ridiculous  superstitions  of  preceding  centuries, 
yet  in  their  frequent  calamities,  due  to  storms  and  unseaworthy 
craft,  the  sailors,  as  Albuquerque  remarked,  "  always  had  the 
pumps  in  their  hands  and  the  Virgin  Mary  in  their  mouths."  ^ 
Voyages  were  lengthened  out  into  years.  Da  Gama,  it  is  true, 
covered  the  distance  from  Lisbon  to  Calicut  between  July  8,  1497, 
and  May  20,  1498  ;  but  it  took  one  unfortunate  captain  consider- 
ably more  than  two  years,  and  several  trials,  to  make  the  return- 
voyage.^  And  if  the  perils  of  the  sea  and  of  indifferent  quality  of 
ships  and  seamanship  were  overcome,  there  still  remained  the 
danger  of  encountering  one's  fellow-men.  Every  strange  vessel 
was  a  possible  enemy,  and  even  friends,  in  the  panic  of  ignorance 
and  inexperience,  could  not  be  relied  upon.  On  the  Indian  coast, 
ships  blown  into  a  wrong  port  became  lawful  prize  ;  and  during  the 
wars  succeeding  the  Portuguese  entrance  into  the  eastern  seas,  a 
rank  growth  of  piracy  was  fostered.*  The  conditions  of  navigation, 
of  which  such  instances  as  the  above  are  typical,  must  be  con- 
stantly kept  in  mind  in  order  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  the 
Portuguese  exploits  and  failures  in  the  East. 

1  Hunter,  I,  71  ;  Major,  pp.  58,  59. 

2  Whiteway,  p.  46,  note ;  a  short  description  of  the  voyage  to  India  is  found  in 
Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  306  ff. 

3  Beazley,  in  Azurara,  II,  cxi-cxii,  cxliv  ;  Whiteway,  pp.  45  ff. ;  Lindsay,  I,  547  ff. 
*  Whiteway,  pp.  44-45,  47,  175-176;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  282-283. 


94 


COLONIZATION 


The  Monopoly  and  its  Defense 


If  the  risks  were  great,  the  rewards  could  scarcely  be  regarded 
as  disproportionate.  The  freight  of  Da  Gama's  ships  covered  the 
expenses  of  his  voyage  sixty  times  over.^  Of  Cabral's  fleet  only 
five  vessels  out  of  thirteen  returned  laden,  but  the  cargo  more 
than  repaid  the  cost  of  the  whole  fleet.  The  elation  and  excitement 
in  Lisbon  may  be  imagined,  for  these  were  the  first  rich  rewards 
of  monopoly.  At  this  time  the  Portuguese  merchant-in-chicf,  that 
is,  the  king,  assumed  with  Papal  sanction  the  resonant  title  of 
Lord  of  the  Navigation,  Conquest,  and  Commerce  of  Ethiopia, 
Arabia,  Persia,  and  India. '-^  The  very  exuberance  of  self-confidence 
indicated  by  this  rather  premature  assumption  witnesses  to  the 
exceptional  and  exalted  frame  of  mind  in  which  the  foremost 
people  to  grasp  opportunities  unparalleled  in  history  approached 
their  destiny. 

It  was  the  voyage  of  Da  Gama,  then,  which  brought  to  its  defi- 
nite fruition  the  work  of  Prince  Henry.  The  first  striking  evidence 
of  its  importance  was  the  readjustment  of  the  markets  and  routes 
of  the  eastern  products,  which  followed  upon  the  safe  return  of 
this   expedition.^    The  Venetians  came  after  a  time  to  perceive 

1  To  get  these  spices  was,  says  Ruge  (p.  203),  "  das  iiusserste  und  letzte  Ziel  der 
portugiesischen  Handelspolitik."  For  some  discussion  of  the  prices  of  pepper,  etc., 
at  this  time,  see  Danvers,  I,  64;  Ruge,  pp.  127-128,  20?-203;  and  especially  the 
tables  of  D'Avenel,  passim.    Cf.  note  3  below. 

Those  who  would  gain  a  conception  of  the  difficulty  of  attaining  anything  approach- 
ing exactitude  of  valuations  in  past  centuries  should  read  the  opening  chapters  of 
U'Avenel,  and  consider  the  herculean  toil  evidenced  in  his  treatise.  In  the  present 
book  no  attempt  could  be  made  to  secure  such  exactitude,  and  wherever  prices  are 
quoted  or  money-values  transferred  into  modern  terms,  it  must  be  understood  that 
only  rough  approximations  are  presented. 

2  Hunter,  I,  104.  King  Manuel  displayed  great  ostentation  in  his  embassy  to  the 
Pope,  announcing  the  tidings  ;  he  attempted  in  some  degree  to  assume  the  leader- 
ship of  Europe,  especially  as  against  the  Turks.     Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  6  ff . 

8  The  statement  has  been  made  that,  in  consequence  of  Da  Gama's  return,  spice- 
prices  experienced  a  sudden  drop  of  50  per  cent  or  more.  Cf.  Adams,  p.  289.  If 
this  statement  is  made  to  apply  directly  or  by  implication  to  more  than  local  and 
exceptional  conditions,  it  does  not  represent  what  one  is  led  to  expect  from  the  first 
infringement  of  a  monopoly-price.  The  Portuguese  were  actuated  as  little  by 
philanthropic  intent  as  had  been  the  Venetians  before  them,  and  could  hardly  have 
bidden  under  the  latter  to  any  extent  greater  than  was  necessary  in  order  to  attract 
their  customers  away.  Cf.  note  2,  p.  73  above.  Some  local  flurries  of  a  speculative 
nature  might  have  been  experienced,  but,  taxed  as  they  were  in  transit,  it  is  incredible 
that  the  Italians  could  have  supported  even  for  a  few  years  such  losses  as  the  halving 
of  prices  would  have  brought  upon  them.     The  detailed  tables  of  prices  of  eastern 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  95 

that  their  worst  apprehensions  had  been  reahzed,  that  both  their 
center  and  their  routes  of  distribution  had  been  superseded  ;  and 
they  made  some  approaches  to  the  king  of  Portugal  with  a  view 
to  saving  at  least  a  share  of  their  disappearing  commercial  advan- 
tage. But  it  was  not  in  the  spirit  of  an  age  imbued  with  the 
Italian  theories  to  refrain  from  utilizing  the  immediate  advantages 
of  the  commercial  upper-hand  ;  cooperation  was  impossible,  and 
the  struggle,  now  rendered  practically  hopeless  for  the  Venetians,^ 
pursued  its  course.  The  scene  of  the  conflict  was  transferred, 
however,  to  regions  nearer  the  sources  of  supply,  and  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  Venetians  was  felt,  not  directly,  but  indirectly  in  the 
person  of  the  Arabs  and  later  of  the  Turks.  The  trade-routes 
toward  the  west,  mainly  in  the  hands  of  the  former,  started  from 
Malacca  and,  diverging  from  its  complementary  port,  Calicut, 
passed  into  the  Red  Sea  and  Persian  Gulf.  At  the  entrance  of 
the  former  lay  Aden,  whence  routes  finally  emerged  into  the  Medi- 
terranean, by  way  of  the  Nile  or  Suez,  over  Cairo  and  Alexandria ; 
it  was  by  way  of  Aden  also  that  the  supplies  of  goods  and  the 
ship-loads  of  pilgrims  destined  for  Mecca  and  other  Moslem  centers 
were  carried.  The  corresponding  port  on  the  Persian  Gulf  route 
was  Ormuz,  an  island-city  ;  from  this  point  the  trade-way  passed 
through  Mesopotamia,  then  westward  (via  caravan)  through  Syria 
to  Beirut.  Through  these  channels  the  Venetians  obtained  the  bulk 
of  their  Oriental  products.  More  immediately,  however,  the  Red 
Sea  traffic  served  the  purposes  and  revenues  of  the  Mameluke 
Sultan  of  Egypt ;  and  the  latter  speedily  became  aware  of  the 
presence  of  the  Portuguese  in  India  through  the  complaints  of 
the  Venetians,  and,  more  effectively,  through  a  decline  in  his  own 

products  given  by  D'Avenel  in  Vol.  IV  (especially  pp.  576-577)  indicate  a  more 
normal  sequence  of  events,  as  do  the  figures  of  Thorold  Rogers  (III,  518-543;  IV, 
656-660).  According  to  the  latter  authority,  spices  were  cheapest  in  England,  in  the 
period  under  discussion,  from  1471  to  1490,  while  their  highest  quotations  are  for 
1521-1540.  The  significant  fact  here  is  that  the  latter  period  follows  closely  upon 
the  date  (1517)  of  the  conquest  of  Egypt  by  the  Ottomans,  an  event  which,  as  has 
been  seen,  practically  put  an  end  to  Venetian  competition.  Cf.  also  Rogers,  IV, 
chap,  xxiii';  Ileyd,  II,  525-526,  531-532.  D'Avenel's  figures  show  no  startling 
changes  in  price-levels  toward  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century.  In  view  of  these  con- 
siderations it  seems  to  the  present  writer  that  the  rather  dramatic  statement  alluded 
to  at  the  beginning  of  this  note  does  not  fairly  represent  those  general  market- 
conditions  with  which  we  are  here  concerned. 

1  In  1521  the  Court  of  Lisbon  refused  an  offer  of  the  Republic  of  Venice  to  buy 
up  all  the  spices  yearly  brought  to  Portugal,  over  and  above  what  Portugal  itself 
required.    Hunter,  I,  187.    See  p.  69  above. 


96  COLONIZATION 

revenues.  To  these  causes  of  irritation  was  added  the  even  more 
disquieting  fact  that  the  victorious  activities  of  the  Christians  in  the 
West  were  now  to  be  transferred  to  a  new  and  promising  field. 
The  Sultan  accordingly  threatened  the  Pope  (Julius  II)  with  war  in 
the  Mediterranean  and  the  East,  and  with  the  destruction  of  the 
Holy  Sepulcher,  in  case  the  activities  of  the  Portuguese  vvere  not 
suspended.  King  Manuel  was  able  to  defy  the  Sultan  through  the 
Pope  ;  and,  in  view  of  the  concourse  of  enemies  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean, the  Sultan  determined  to  crush  the  Portuguese  in  India,  where 
they  could  count  on  no  allies.  The  Portuguese  learned  in  1505  of 
these  plans  and  of  the  formation  of  a  considerable  fleet  designed 
to  approach  India  the  next  year.^ 

The  "Crusade  in  the  East":  Almeida 

Although  Vasco  da  Gama  and  the  sev^eral  captains  who,  up  to 
this  period,  had  succeeded  him,  had  operated  in  behalf  of  the 
king,  —  for,  from  Prince  Henry  down,  these  enterprises  had  taken 
their  direct  origin  in  the  royal  initiative,-  —  they  had  worked 
almost  wholly  for  commercial  ends.  Adventure  was  eagerly  sought, 
but  the  idea  of  conquest  and  subjugation  had  not  as  yet  appeared 
in  any  definite  form.  When  Arab  ships  had  been  seized  and 
plundered,  religious  hatred  had  been  sated  by  a  gruesome  mal- 
treatment of  the  men,  women,  and  children  taken  with  the  vessels  ; 
this  activity  might  be  called  "  religious  piracy,"  were  such  a  term 
self-explanatory.  But  when  the  Portuguese  interests  in  India 
came  to  be  threatened  by  the  inhdel,  there  appeared  in  the  East, 
as  there  had  appeared  in  the  West  years  before,  a  centralization 
and  unification  of  political  and,  through  it,  of  religious  strength 
and  control.  It  is  more  than  a  picturesque  fact  that  the  first 
viceroy  of  India  should  have  been  a  man  who  had  won  a  high 
reputation  with  the  Spaniards  before  Granada.  To  the  Iberians  a 
Moor  was  a  Moor,  and  the  best  man  to  oppose  the  Moors  of  the 
East  was  one  who  had  distinguished  himself  in  conflict  with  those 
of  the  West.    This  man  was  Francisco  d'Almeida,  who  was  hurried 

^  Ruge,  pp.  145-147.  Hunter  remark.s  that  this  conflict  was  "the  third  and  last 
act  in  the  long  conflict  between  mediaeval  Christendom  and  Islam"  (T,  115);  l"^ing 
Manuel  "knew  that  he  had  turned  tlio  flank  of  Islam,  and  that  he  had  the  sympathy 
of  Catholic  Europe  in  this  final  and  greatest  of  the  Crusades"  (I,  116). 

2  Stephens  (p.  176)  says  that  nearly  all  the  great  Portuguese  heroes  of  the  period 
were  of  the  noble  classes. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  97 

off  to  India  in  March,  1505,  to  oppose  the  Sultan's  movement;  it 
is  signilicant  of  the  nature  of  this  expedition  that  it  drew  support 
from  Genoese,  Florentine,  and  German  merchants,  but  met  only 
hostility  from  Venetian  sources.^  Almeida  was  fitted  out  with 
what  was  at  that  time  a  powerful  force  ;  there  were  over  twenty 
ships  and  about  i  500  soldiers  pledged  to  a  service  of  at  least  three 
years.  Other  squadrons  followed,  for  national  enthusiasm  was 
aroused.  After  some  inconsiderable  reverses  he  managed  to  gain 
a  complete  naval  victory  at  Diu  (February,  1509);  in  this  battle 
he  commanded  a  fleet  of  twenty-three  ships  and  1600  soldiers. 
The  Egyptian  ships  were  attacked  systematically,  and  sunk  one 
after  the  other;  the  native  auxiliaries  and  the  city  were  spared, 
for  the  viceroy  could  not  risk  the  hostihty  of  the  local  potentate, 
and  held,  besides,  to  a  general  policy  of  friendly  relations  with  the 
natives. 

The  impending  danger  which  had  called  into  activity  the  patriotic 
and  religious  zeal  of  the  Portuguese  was  thus,  at  least  temporarily, 
repelled.  But  the  popular  sentiment  in  Portugal  was  not  satisfied 
with  this  ;  it  demanded  a  general  crusade  against  the  Mohamme- 
dans in  the  East  wherever  and  whenever  encountered.  It  was  not 
content  with  Almeida's  idea  of  concentrating  a  power  on  the  sea 
which  would  hold  the  most  valuable  parts  of  the  Indian  coast 
tributary  to  the  Portuguese  trade  and  government ;  it  found  its 
ideal,  rather,  in  the  offensive  operations  of  Affonso  d'Albuquerque, 
with  which  Almeida  had  no  sympathy.  Its  goal  was  conquest  and 
the  propagation  of  the  faith.  Thus  it  may  be  said  that  the  Sultan's 
attack  precipitated  in  India  a  consolidation  of  Portuguese  power 
similar  to  that  effected  nearer  home  in  wars  with  the  European 
and  North  African  Moslems.  Of  this  state  of  popular  energy  and 
aggression  the  radical  Albuquerque  expressed  the  spirit  ;  so  that 
with  his  accession  to  the  governorship  the  hitherto  uncertain  policy 
of  the  Portuguese  turned  squarely  toward  conquest.  At  this  parting 
of  the  ways  it  is  useful  to  compare  the  variant  policies  of  these  two 
exceptional  men,  the  first  viceroy  and  his  successor.^  Almeida  had 
started  out  with  a  threefold  task  :  to  secure  a  base  for  permanent 
occupation  in  East  Africa ;  to  effect  the  coercion  of  the  Malabar 
ports  and  the  construction  of  factories  ;  and  to  break  the  Moslem 

1  Ruge,  p.  147. 

2  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  236 ff.,  241-245,  269-270;  Hunter,  I,  118  ff.,  I35ff.; 
Danvers,  I,  xxviii-xxx,  261  ff.;   Whiteway,  p.  16. 


98  COLONIZATION 

sea-power.  By  the  construction  of  a  fort  at  Quiloa  and  by  the 
reduction  of  Mombasa  his  first  purpose  was  realized  ;  by  the 
destruction  of  the  Zamorin's  fleet  and  that  of  the  Arabs,  not  only 
were  the  Malabar  ports  rendered  available  to  the  Portuguese,  but 
the  influence  of  the  latter  was  extended  as  far  as  Ceylon  ;  ^  and  as 
a  consequence  of  the  engagement  at  Diu  the  Indian  Ocean  was 
made  for  a  hundred  years  a  Portuguese  sea.  It  is  little  wonder, 
therefore,  that  Almeida  favored  a  sea-policy  and  opposed  the 
foundation  of  garrisons,  except  at  dominant  points  ;  for  to  his 
mind  they  simply  depleted  his  power.  He  wished  also  to  confine 
his  operations  to  India  alone,  in  order  not  to  divide  his  forces ;  he 
believed  it  would  be  impossible  for  Portugal,  with  its  small  popula- 
tion, effectively  to  maintain  a  colonial  empire  under  Portuguese 
administration.  In  this  view,  as  will  be  seen,  he  was  largely 
justified  by  the  final  outcome. 

Albuquerque 

Albuquerque's  programme,  on  the  other  hand,  representing  the 
more  alluring  idea  of  empire  and  of  a  general  campaign  against 
the  infidel,  appealed  to  the  king  with  a  peculiar  force ;  for  it  fell 
in  with  the  spirit  of  an  age  of  grandiose  movements  in  both  the 
temporal  and  spiritual  fields.  Albuquerque  believed  that  the  whole 
Moslem  world  was  united  against  him  ;  neither  he  nor  the  king 
realized  the  presence  of  a  conflict  between  the  Ottoman  and  Mame- 
luke Sultans.  He  felt,  therefore,  that  command  of  the  sea  was 
not  enough  to  assure  the  Portuguese  of  the  upper-hand  ;  that  a 
land  empire  alone  could  afford  a  sufificient  base  of  operations  during 
the  ups  and  downs  of  a  life-and-death  struggle,  especially  in  the 
case  of  a  metropolis  so  distant  as  was  Portugal  at  this  stage  of 
undeveloped  communications.  F'or  this  reason  he  wished  to  convert 
every  captured  district  into  a  permanent  possession ;  and,  dis- 
believing in  the  utility  of  alliances  with  local  sovereigns,  he  inva- 
riably planned  to  coerce  conquered  princes  into  acknowledging 
Portugal  as  a  suzerain  power.  He  aimed  at  the  command  of  all 
the  trade  between  East  and  West ;  but  he  intended  to  found  such 
dominance  entirely  upon  physical  force,  exercised  directly  and 
solely  by  the  Portuguese.    This  demanded  a  cordon  of  fortresses 

^  Ceylon  was  visited  in  1505  and  conquered  in  1515.  Von  Brandt,  p.  511.  A  good 
general  account  of  tiie  penetration  of  the  eastern  seas  by  Europeans  is  given  by  this 
author. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  99 

and  naval  stations  at  strategical  points,  and  also  factories  and 
colonies  to  meet  the  demands  of  an  enormous  development  of 
exchange  and  to  repair  the  wastage  of  life  entailed  by  this  general 
policy.^  Almeida  could  not  be  accused  of  tenderness  toward  the 
Moslems  ;  but  the  projects  of  Albuquerque  looking  to  their  dis- 
comfiture were  no  less  than  vast,  not  to  say  visionary.  The  old 
crusading  spirit,  as  so  often  in  Spanish  and  Portuguese  colonization, 
was  highly  developed  in  both  men.  Albuquerque,  for  example, 
planned  and  actually  attempted  a  reckless  expedition  for  the  pur- 
pose of  seizing  Mohammed's  bones,  to  hold  as  ransom  for  the 
Holy  Sepulcher,  or  to  burn  in  public  ;  and  even  contemplated  with 
the  utmost  seriousness  the  diversion  of  the  Nile  into  the  Red  Sea 
for  the  purpose  of  ruining  Egypt.  His  actual  activities  in  India 
were  grouped  about  three  main  purposes  :  to  intercept  Moslem 
trade  at  its  base  in  the  upper  Nile  region  and  the  Persian  Gulf ; 
to  destroy  Moslem  trade  on  the  Malabar  coast  by  concentrating 
the  commerce  of  that  region  in  Portuguese  ports  ;  and  to  seize 
the  fountain-heads  of  the  spice-trade  by  taking  Malacca.  The 
Portuguese  were  intent  upon  diverting  to  themselves  the  profits  in 
the  spice-trade  enjoyed  by  Mohammedans  and  Italians;  that  in  the 
attainment  of  this  end  the  unbelievers  would  suffer  was  an  added 
incentive.  In  Albuquerque's  mind  these  objectives  went  hand  in 
hand  with  empire ;  "  he  supplied  no  new  aim,  he  merely  pointed 
out  a  new  method  of  attaining  an  old  object."  ^ 

Differing  thus  in  his  views  from  Almeida,  Albuquerque  got  the 
ear  of  the  king  and  was  sent  out  in  1508  to  succeed  the  viceroy; 
his  title,  however,  was  merely  governador.  He  died  late  in  the 
year  15  15.  Within  the  few  years  of  his  command,  however,  is  to 
be  reckoned  the  real  glory-period  of  Portuguese  dominance  in  India.^ 
For  this  reason,  and  because  during  these  years  there  emerged 
many  a  portent  of  the  dull  decades  to  come,  it  is  fitting  to  dwell 
here  somewhat  at  length  upon  details  and  chronicles  of  events. 

^  Hunter,  I,  119  ff.;  Danvers,  I,  xxviii  ff. ;  Whiteway,  pp.  169  ff. ;  the  annals  of 
Portuguese  India  are  full,  for  example,  of  the  costly  sieges  resulting  from  this  policy. 

2  Hunter,  I,  100  ff.,  125-126;  Whiteway,  p.  16  (quotation);  Martins,  Hist,  de 
Port.,  I,  251,  264.  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  46-47)  regards  Almeida's  policy  as  the  more 
sound;  he  cites  the  costs,  enmities,  jealousies,  etc.,  of  the  conquest  policy,  and  quotes 
a  contemporary,  Sir  Thomas  Roe  (early  seventeenth  century),  upon  the  disadvantages 
of  the  Portuguese  policy  as  laid  down  by  Albuquerque.  Cf.  also  Martins,  Hist,  de 
Port.,  I,  298-299. 

3  An  excellent  brief  article.  "  De  Portugeezen  in  den  Maleischen  Archipel,"  is 
found  in  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind. 


lOO  COLONIZATION 

Albuquerque's  Administration 

The  threefold  purpose  alkKlcd  to  formed  the  basis  of  Albuquei 
que's  action.  He  commenced  operations  with  an  attack  on  Cali- 
cut ;  but  the  ill-success  of  this  and  other  early  ventures  led  him  to 
pause  before  Goa  until  he  had  restored  the  discipline  and  morale 
of  his  forces.  The  soldiers  were  drilled,  and  laxness  in  all  branches 
of  administration  was  corrected  with  characteristic  decision  and 
energy.  Many  enemies  were  thus  made,  but  it  was  only  during 
Albuquerque's  last  years  that  they  succeeded  in  thwarting  his 
designs.  The  disciplined  forces  were  now  turned  against  Goa, 
the  headquarters  of  a  league  whose  object  was  to  eject  the  Portu- 
guese from  India,  and  prospectively  a  good  base  of  operation  for 
the  Turks;  it  fell  in  November,  1510.^  This  result,  as  Albu- 
querque had  foreseen,  greatly  enhanced  the  prestige  of  the  Portu- 
guese, not  only  in  the  East,  where  the  native  princes  hastened  to 
declare  their  allegiance,  but  in  Europe  as  well.  According  to  Albu- 
querque, the  taking  of  Goa  kept  India  in  repose ;  the  city  became 
his  capital  and  that  of  his  successors.  Its  capture  represented  to 
the  Portuguese  the  success  of  the  endeavor  to  control  the  Malabar 
coast.  But  such  local  and  defensive  operations  were  but  the  begin- 
ning of  Albuquerque's  projects  ;  it  remained  to  lay  hands  upon 
the  sources  themselves  of  the  Oriental  trade.  There  had  been  a 
factor  in  Malacca,  the  great  entrepot  of  the  Far  East,  since  1508, 
and  the  importance  of  this  focus  of  trade-routes,  rendered  by 
geographical  and  meteorological  conditions  the  terminal  of  con- 
verging sea-roads,  was  a  cardinal  belief  in  Albuquerque's  mind. 
In  15  1 1,  as  soon  as  his  hands  were  free  on  the  Malabar  coast,  he 
led  an  expedition  which  took  Malacca,  thereafter  destined  to  remain 
in  Portuguese  possession  for  about  a  hundred  years. 

These  operations  at  a  distance  were  doubtless  more  important 
for  Albuquerque's  general  plans,  effecting  as  they  did  a  stoppage 
of  Mohammedan  trade  at  the  source,  but  it  was  an  ideal  dear  to  his 
crusading  spirit  to  attack  the  infidel  at  his  very  doors.  These  were, 
so  far  as  commerce  was  concerned,  Ormuz  and  Aden.^  His  designs 
on  Ormuz  were  revealed  even  before  he  became  governor.  Indeed, 
it  had  become  increasingly  apparent,  since  the  arrival  of  the 
Portuguese,  that  the  real  and  sole  menace  to  their  commercial 
supremacy  came  directly  from  the  north.    The  native  rulers  were 

1  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  260-262  ;  Whiteway,  p.  137.         ^  See  p.  95,  above. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  loi 

regularly  incited  to  opposition  by  Egyptian  agents,  and  the  king 
repeatedly  urged  an  expedition  to  the  Red  Sea.^  In  15 15  the 
governor  was  successful  in  extending  a  sort  of  protectorate  over 
Ormuz  and  its  environs  ;  a  move  which  effectively  closed  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  to  the  Mohammedans.  An  attack  on  Aden,  the  key  to 
the  Red  Sea  route,  failed  after  great  expenditure  of  resources 
and  lives,  but  the  trade  in  these  waters  was  greatly  crippled  by 
the  possession  of  Goa  and  the  other  Indian  ports,  and  by  the 
constant  activities  of  the  Portuguese  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  The 
Mohammedan  ships  were  forced  to  sail  around  Ceylon  and  were 
often  hunted  out  in  waters  even  so  remote.  Thus  the  purpose  of 
intercepting  Mohammedan  trade  C7i  route  was  largely  realized  ;  and 
the  insecurity  caused  by  the  successes  and  restless  energy  of 
Albuquerque  was  an  even  more  deadly  blow.  Ottoman  resources 
were  drained  and  Ottoman  forces  divided  ;  this  proved  the  saving 
of  Europe  itself.^ 

All  these  successes,  crowded  into  the  space  of  a  few  years,  raised 
the  renown  of  Portugal  and  of  the  governor  to  an  extraordinary 
degree.  At  the  end  of  Albuquerque's  life  Portugal  was  the  undis- 
puted mistress  of  the  East,  while  in  India  peace  was  universal  from 
Ormuz  to  Ceylon.  The  interior  of  the  land  "  he  left  so  quiet  and 
well-ordered  that  there  was  never  a  nation  left  so  completely  con- 
quered and  subdued  by  force  of  arms  as  this  was."  ^  Trade  was 
not  endangered  by  robbery ;  east  of  Cape  Comorin  the  kings  were 
at  peace  and  friendly  with  Portugal,  and  even  Malacca  enjoyed 
repose.  The  kings  of  Siam,  Java,  and  even  China  were  glad  to 
make  peace  with  the  redoubtable  conqueror.*  All  these  results 
were  the  outcome  of  a  strong  man's  guidance  ;  the  Portuguese 
were  as  brave  both  before  and  after,  but  they  never  again  swept 
all  before  them.  A  review  of  Albuquerque's  personality  and  inter- 
nal administration  throws  much  light,  partly  by  contrast,  upon  a 
century  of  Portuguese  dominance. 

Albuquerque's  Personality 

He  was  a  man  of  great  sagacity  and  decision  of  character,  as 
fearless  elsewhere  as  he  was  in  battle  ;  his  policy  was  therefore 
an  intelligent,  independent,  and  consistent  one.^     He  was  deeply 

1  Ruge,  p.  177 ;  on  the  "  Rumes,"  cf.  Payne,  Age  of  Disc,  pp.  27  ff. 

2  Hunter,  I,  132. 

8  Danvers,  I,  330.  *  Id.,  I,  330-331.  ^  Whiteway,  pp.  131,  169-171. 


I02  COLONIZATION 

religious,  strictly  loyal,  and  incorruptible  ;  and  so,  while  he  dealt 
hardlv  and  to  our  eyes  mercilessly  with  the  enemies  of  the  faith, 
he  upheld  against  constant  and  treacherous  opposition  standards  of 
rectitude  in  the  colonial  service.  He  had  a  talent  for  the  business 
of  administration  ;  he  labored  incessantly  himself,  and  required  no 
less  of  his  subordinates.  And  yet  he  was  not  so  immersed  in  detail 
that  he  could  not  view  his  own  activities  in  perspective,  and  look 
forward  to  and  plan  for  a  period  of  peace  as  the  end  and  outcome 
of  war.  He  was  fortunately  so  far  removed  from  Lisbon  that  his 
actions  were  not  subject  to  control,  even  if  he  had  wished  it.  The 
fact  of  it  was  that  he  resisted  and  resented  interference,  even  from 
the  king,^  and  it  was  owing  to  the  high  opinion  of  the  latter  that 
he  had  his  own  way  so  largely,  to  Portugal's  profit,  for  the  term 
of  his  command. 

Turning  to  some  of  Albuquerque's  measures,  we  find  his  charac- 
ter reflected  not  only  in  their  excellences  but  also  in  their  defects. 
He  would  not  tolerate  inefficiency  or  slothfulness  in  his  subordi- 
nates ;  he  constantly  appealed  to  Portugal  for  a  better  quality  of 
functionaries.  He  exclaimed  in  exasperation  that  the  latter  were 
so  poorly  trained  that  they  were  "  not  fit  to  purchase  two-penny- 
worth of  bread  in  the  bazaar.  A  clerk  trained  in  the  counting- 
house  of  Bartholomew,  the  Florentine,  would  be  more  useful  than 
all  the  factors  the  king  has  in  India."  ^  Disinterested  himself,  he 
pursued  with  vigor  the  detection  and  punishment  of  dishonest 
officials ;  he  wished  the  temptation  to  unrighteousness  to  be 
removed  by  the  extension  of  the  term  of  offices  from  three  to 
eight  years.  He  himself,  in  spite  of  unexampled  opportunities  for 
amassing  wealth,  left  scarcely  any  property  behind.^  All  presents 
that  came  into  his  hands  passed  on  to  those  of  the  king  or  queen. 
He  had  a  way  of  summarily  disposing,  during  his  morning  pere- 
grinations, of  many  complaints  and  petitions  ;  the  parties  were 
thus  satisfied,  and  processes  spared,  which,  in  the  ordinary  channels, 
would  have  been  indefinitely  spun  out  and  correspondingly  involved 
and  costly.     He  was  interested,  above  all,  in  the  development  of 

1  He  once  retorted  to  the  king,  to  whom  he  practically  refused  obedience  from 
time  to  time,  "  But  do  not  require  of  me  every  year  an  account  of  what  I  am  doing, 
as  if  I  were  a  tax-gatherer."    Danvers,  I,  263. 

2  Whiteway,  p.  174;  cf.  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  298. 

8  He  made  his  will,  and  in  leaving  his  last  wishes  to  his  successor  his  old  humor 
flashed  out :  "  I  beg  he  will  not  put  up  my  goods  to  auction  :  I  do  not  wish  my 
ragged  old  breeches  to  be  seen."    Whiteway,  p.  166;  cf.  p.  174. 


THE  PORTUGUESE   IN  THE  EAST  103 

trade  and  the  attendant  advance  in  the  well-beinf;  of  the  people. 
He  even  checked,  so  far  as  possible,  the  indiscriminate  persecution 
of  the  Moslems,  and  granted  passes  to  Arab  ships  for  trade  other 
than  that  in  spices.^ 

It  was,  however,  in  his  relations  to  the  native  population  that 
his  peculiar  powers  found  their  most  striking  expression.  His 
personality  was  of  the  compelling  sort  which  inspires  the  Oriental 
with  awe  and  which  he  will  follow  blindly.  The  very  heat  of 
Albuquerque's  temper  and  the  swiftness  with  which  action  followed 
on  impulse  captivated  the  imagination  of  the  Easterners,  and  the 
governor's  herculean  toil  and  notable  successes  were  calculated  to 
impress  sturdier  spirits  than  theirs.  But  Albuquerque  was  more  : 
through  quick  perception  or  long  experience  he  understood  the 
workings  of  the  native  mind,  and  aroused  their  respectful  admira- 
tion by  repeatedly  overreaching  them  in  their  own  methods  of 
intrigue  and  wile.^  Albuquerque's  insight  into  local  conditions 
was  generally  unerring ;  for  example,  he  realized  that  in  Malacca 
the  Portuguese  had  replaced  a  foreign  (Mohammedan)  intruder, 
who  was  hated  cordially,  and  so  he  exerted  himself  to  appear,  in 
contrast  to  his  predecessors,  friendly  to  the  native  dynasties.'^  And 
he  was,  though  stern,  approachable  and  just  to  a  degree  remark- 
able in  his  day  ;  his  word  was  scrupulously  kept,  and  a  promised 
punishment  or  reward  seldom  failed  to  be  meted  out.  If  he  him- 
self oppressed,  he  did  not  allow  the  liberty  to  his  subordinates ; 
his  clear-headed  judgment  was  not  warped  by  fear  or  favor.  His 
pithy  and  proverbial  speeches  circulated  among  all  classes.  An 
atmosphere  of  superstitious  awe  enveloped  his  striking  figure ; 
and  after  his  death  the  natives  made  pilgrimages  and  left  offerings 
at  his  tomb  to  secure  his  aid  against  the  oppression  and  injustice 
of  his  successors.* 

1  Whiteway,  pp.  160,  162. 

2  According  to  Whiteway  (pp.  24-25),  these  methods,  successful  only  in  a  master's 
hands,  reacted  banefully  upon  the  Portuguese.  Among  the  moral  causes  of  Portu- 
guese decline,  he  says,  "one  of  the  most  potent  was  the  adaptation  of  the  Oriental 
methods  of  diplomacy  which  placed  Eastern  and  Western  on  the  same  plane,  and  in 
an  intrigue  the  Eastern  won."  Another  cause  was  "  ingrained  suspicion  and  distrust 
of  each  other,"  referable  possibly  to  the  same  methods. 

3  Ruge,  pp.  171-172. 

*  Whiteway,  pp.  166-169;  Hunter,  I,  140.  The  Hindus  still  have  fetiches  which 
they  call  "  Affonso  de  Albuquerques."    Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  267. 


I04 


COLONIZATION 


Albuquerque's  Policy 


The  policy  of  Albuquerque  toward  the  natives  is  said  to  have 
been  modeled  upon  that  of  Alexander  the  Great ;  his  furious 
attacks  in  war  and  his  deft  treatment  of  the  Orientals  certainly 
bore  likeness  to  those  of  the  Macedonian.^  It  was  his  policy,  after 
inflicting  a  thorough-going  and  unquestioned  defeat,  to  bind  the  sub- 
ject people  to  him  through  even-handed  justice  and  even  affection ; 
and  he  never  let  slip  the  opportunity  to  impress  the  susceptible 
Oriental  mind  by  pomp  and  ostentation.  He  left  the  administration 
of  conquered  countries  to  the  natives,  but  kept  the  military  and 
the  revenues  in  his  own  hands.  The  general  arrangements  with 
princes  were  that  the  Portuguese  should  be  allowed  to  erect 
fortresses,  that  merchandise  should  enter  no  Indian  port  save 
Goa,  and  that  the  natives  should  not  receive  Turks  into  their 
kingdoms ;  but  inasmuch  as  the  objects  of  the  Portuguese  were  at 
first  largely  commercial,  the  tribute-system  was  not  an  exaggerated 
one.^  The  colonial,  as  distinguished  from  the  purely  commercial 
and  political  policy  of  Albuquerque  deserves  a  word  ;  as  has  been 
stated,  he  proposed  to  draw  the  men  for  the  armies  and  navies, 
which  would  be  rendered  necessary  by  his  policy  as  distinguished 
from  that  of  Almeida,  from  colonies  in  India.  He  could  not  hope 
for  any  considerable  emigration  of  women  from  Portugal ;  he 
therefore  fostered  unions  between  the  Portuguese  and  the  native 
women.  This  policy  had  been  foreshadowed  by  Da  Gama,  and 
was  one  of  the  expedients  of  Alexander  the  Great.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  the  Portuguese  were,  in  the  home-country,  accustomed 
to  mixed  unions  and  their  offspring,  and  consequently  there  was 
little  or  no  prejudice  to  overcome.  "  In  every  Portuguese  settle- 
ment the  married  men  rapidly  became  a  caste  to  themselves  with 
special  privileges  ;  all  petty  offices  were  reserved  for  them,  and  in 
Goa  all  the  lands  belonging  to  the  King  —  a  very  large  part  of  the 
area  —  were  divided  among  them."  ^  Albuquerque  also  encouraged 
the  married  men  to  engage  in  industrial  pursuits.  It  is  perhaps  an 
anticipation  to  say  that  this  policy  was  totally  unsuccessful ;  as 
will  be  seen,  the  mongrel  type  thus  formed  tended  to  revert,  in  the 
absence  of  regular  infusion  of  the  blood  of  one  of  its  constituent 

1  Danvers,  I,  328  ff. 

2  Danvers,  I,  255.    For  models  of  these  treaties,  see  Hunter,  I,  142  ff. 
8  Whiteway,  p.  177  ;  cf.  p.  17  ;  Danvers,  I,  217. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  105 

elements,  to  the  type  of  the  country  of  its  origin,  and  thus  was 
unable  to  hold  its  own  with  sturdier  races.  Comparison  is  here  chal- 
lenged with  the  results  which  appeared  in  Brazil.  These  "  colonies," 
in  any  case,  amounted  to  little  or  nothing ;  they  were  a  curse 
rather  than  a  blessing.^  In  three  places  only  did  the  Portuguese 
hold  cities  that  had  been  transferred  under  treaty  or  as  a  result  of 
conquest ;  these  were  Diu,  Bassein  with  Salsette,  and  Goa,  all 
upon  small  islands.  Here  only  were  the  Portuguese  masters  ;  the 
consequence  was  that  European  settlers  were  relatively  numerous 
and  that  these  cities  lost  their  native  hue.  Elsewhere  the  Portu- 
guese came  to  dominate  only  so  far  from  their  forts,  or  the  coast, 
as  their  guns  would  carry.  Moreover,  in  spite  of  their  familiarity 
with  a  relatively  warm  climate,  and  their  proverbial  temperance, 
the  Portuguese  succumbed  in  large  numbers  to  the  climate  of  India. 
Their  dense  ignorance  of  the  laws  of  health,  and  the  demoralization 
of  their  customs,  effectually  blocked  all  possible  efforts  toward 
neutralizing  the  changed  environmental  conditions. ^ 

The  relatively  extended  term  of  Albuquerque  gave  to  Portuguese 
policy  a  fixity  from  which  there  was  in  form  little  subsequent 
deviation ;  but  it  will  be  seen  that  the  same  policy,  in  the  hands 
of  inferior  men,  took  on  a  different  aspect  and  led  to  disastrous 
results.  The  fact  is  that  Albuquerque's  policy  was  himself.  He 
was  an  imperator,  with  the  virtues  and  faults  characteristic  of  the 
practically  unlimited  despot.  His  system  was  satisfactory,  there- 
fore, in  his  hands  only  ;  when  his  powerful  grasp  was  relaxed,  a 
thousand  growing  disorders,  hitherto  held  at  bay,  began  to  compass 
the  disintegration  of  the  structure.  These  influences  embittered 
Albuquerque's  last  days.  After  years  of  effort  his  enemies,  often 
the  victims  of  his  inexorable  insistence  upon  purity  in  the  service, 
gained  the  ear  of  the  king  and  effected  his  supersession.  Officials 
whom  he  had  cashiered  were  sent  back  in  positions  of  power ;  one 
of  his  enemies  was  named  as  his  successor.^  "  In  bad  repute  with 
men,"  he  exclaimed,  "  because  of  the  King,  and  in  bad  repute  with 

1  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  260-262 ;  Hunter,  I,  162 ;  Whiteway,  pp.  24-25, 
176-178;  cf.  p.  164,  below.  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  42)  says  :  "  Ce  ne  furent  pas  de  veri- 
tables  colonies  dans  le  sens  etroit  du  mot,  c'est-a-dire  des  etablissements  territoriaux 
destines  a  etre  peuples  par  les  habitants  de  la  metropole,  ce  fut  une  chaine  de  comp- 
toirs  et  de  points  de  ravitaillement,  defendus  par  des  fortresses,  qui  constitua  les 
celebres  possessions  portugaises." 

2  Huge,  p.  199;  Urunialti,  p.  105;  Whiteway,  pp.  24-25;  Lavisse  et  Rambaud, 
IV,  897.  3  Danvers,  I,  326  ff. 


Io6  COLONIZATION 

the  King  because  of  the  men,  it  were  well  that  I  were  gone."  He 
had  lived  a  life  of  toil  and  self-denial,  had  never  been  viceroy,  was 
superseded  as  governor,  yet  he  lifted  up  his  hands  to  heaven, 
"giving  many  thanks  to  our  Lord."  ^  His  was  the  old  crusading 
spirit,  the  deep  loyalty  and  ardent  piety  which  lent  strength  to  the 
Iberians  to  accomplish  unheard-of  deeds  and  die  gladly  for  the  King 
and  the  Faith.  But  in  Albuquerque  we  have  plainly  an  exceptional 
man,  to  whom  the  ordinary  limitations  of  humanity  do  not  apply. 
This  was  realized  after  his  death.  Too  late  King  Manuel  reversed 
the  order  for  his  retirement ;  regrets  for  the  old  warrior  (he  died 
at  the  age  of  63)  replaced  the  scanty  recognition  accorded  him  in 
life.  For  his  capture  of  Malacca  he  had  not  received  even  verbal 
acknowledgment ;  but  when  he  was  dead,  the  superstitious  awe  of 
the  natives  invaded  the  thankless  minds  of  the  Portuguese.  It  was 
provided  in  his  will  that  his  body  should  be  taken  home  to  Portu- 
gal ;  but  the  Portuguese  kings  believed  that  India  would  be  safe 
for  Portugal  only  while  his  bones  rested  there,  and  it  took  a  fulmi- 
nation  of  the  Pope  to  secure  the  carrying-out  of  his  wishes  (1566).^ 

Extent  of  the  Empire 

It  is  not  in  the  plan  of  this  treatise  to  pursue  in  detail  the 
exploits  or  failures  of  Albuquerque's  successors.  In  Albuquerque 
is  found  the  climax  of  Portuguese  power  and  glory  in  the  East,^ 
and  already  in  his  lifetime  decline  had  set  in,  never  to  be  seriously 
interru])ted. 

The  centers  of  Portuguese  influence  in  the  East  ha\-e  been  indi- 
cated in  what  has  gone  before.  No  additions  of  moment  were 
made  to  the  empire  after  the  death  of  Albuquerque.  As  may 
have  been  gathered,  the  East  African  possessions  received  com- 
paratively little  attention  from  him  ;  of  these  something  will  be 
said  further  on.  An  unsuccessful  exj^edition  or  raid  was  occasionally 
directed  toward  the  Red  Sea  coast  or  that  of  the  northern  Arabian 
Sea.  The  final  capture  and  defense  of  Diu,  in  1537  and  1538,  by 
Nuno   da  Cunha  deserves  rank    among  the   best   exploits   of   the 

1  His  words  were  :  "  Mai  com  os  homens  por  amor  d'elrey,  mal  com  elrey  per 
amor  dos  homens,  bom  e  acabar."    Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  266;  Hunter,  I,  128. 

2  On  the  life  and  activities  of  Albuquerque,  see  his  Commentaries  ;  also  Hunter, 
Whiteway,  Dan  vers, /(?j\r/w.  References  are  given  in  these  books  to  primary  sources. 

■■^  "  A  cette  date  de  1515,  la  situation  de  I'ortugal  est  merveilleuse.  Le  petit 
royaume  est  devenu  le  premier  des  Etats  maritimes."     Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  IV,  891. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  107 

Portuguese.  Strong  aid  was  lent  to  Diu  by  the  Turks  ;  the  Portu- 
guese recruits  were  a  poor  lot,  yet  the  spirit  and  vigor  of  the  com- 
mander roused  them  to  truly  heroic  activity.  As  usual  the  sight 
of  the  Crescent  spurred  dormant  energies  to  a  sort  of  irresistible 
frenzy.  1  But  the  bulk  of  attention  at  this  time  was  turned  toward 
the  farther  East.  Ceylon  was  approached  in  Almeida's  time  and 
was  later  brought  into  a  subject  relation.  The  Coromandel  Coast, 
the  region  of  Calcutta,  and  certain  portions  of  Burma  were  visited 
in  a  desultory  manner.  In  Albuquerque's  time  relations  were 
joined  with  some  of  the  rulers  of  Farther  India  and  China.  After 
taking  Malacca,  Albuquerque  sent  an  expedition  to  explore  the 
Moluccas  (151 1);  factors  were  located  in  the  islands  and  in  1564 
Portuguese  suzerainty  was  acknowledged.^  Borneo  was  visited  in 
1530,  and  various  expeditions  penetrated  to  this  and  that  island  of 
the  Archipelago,  to  New  Guinea,  and  even  farther.  Toward  the 
north-east  they  visited  the  Philippines,  and  in  1540  the  first  Portu- 
guese came  to  Japan.  In  none  of  these  cases  were  colonies  founded, 
and  there  were  few  permanent  factories.  However,  by  1571  the 
"empire,"  extending  as  it  did  from  Africa  to  China,  was  thought 
to  be  too  great  for  control  from  a  single  center.  King  Sebastian 
constructed  three  separate  governments  :  that  of  India,  including 
all  territory  from  Cape  Guardafui  to  Ceylon ;  that  of  Monomotapa, 
extending  from  Cape  Corrientes  to  Cape  Guardafui ;  and  that  of 
Malacca,  covering  the  claims  between  Pegu  and  China.  The  head- 
official  of  the  India  department  kept  the  title  of  viceroy ;  the 
others  were  called  governors.^  In  1580,  by  the  accession  of 
Philip  II  to  the  Portuguese  throne,  the  whole  Portuguese  East 
came  under  Spanish  influence  and  remained  so  for  sixty  years. 

The  Army  and  Navy 

The  military  operations  of  the  Portuguese,  especially  during  the 
first  years  of  the  sixteenth  century,  seem  to  our  eyes  remarkable  ; 
their  forces  were  always  small,  but  their  achievements  appear  to 
have  been  accomplished  with  an  almost  ridiculous  ease,  and  in  a 
spirit  of  light-hearted  confidence  and  daring.    The  losses  of  the 

1  Ruge,  pp.  193  ff.  Martins  (Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  276!?.)  describes  the  wretched 
material  upon  which  this  commander  had  to  rely. 

2  On  the  more  detailed  history  of  the  Moluccas,  see  Argensola,  passim. 

3  Danvers,  II,  i  ff. ;  for  a  list  of  the  viceroys  and  governors,  see  Martins,  Hist,  de 
Port.,  I,  291. 


Io8  COLONIZATION 

Portuguese  were  often  of  the  most  trivial  nature,  while  their  oppo- 
nents suffered  crushing  defeats  or  annihilation.^  This  was  so  for 
almost  a  century,  despite  the  growing  demoralization  of  army  and 
administration.  The  element  of  good  fortune  constantly  favored 
the  invaders,  and  came  to  be  reckoned  upon  as  a  matter  of  course. 
Opportune  arrivals  of  unexpected  reenforcements,  timely  ravages 
of  disease  among  the  enemy,  —  such  occurrences  are  the  order  of 
the  day.  Not  a  little  of  the  success  of  the  early  periods  is  referable 
to  that  mood  of  confidence,  rooted  in  the  conviction  of  divine 
approval  and  strengthened  by  good  luck,  which  attended  what  was 
in  reality  a  crusade.  The  truly  heroic  deeds  thus  inspired  brighten 
the  annals  of  conquest.  However,  one  must  not  be  led  by  the 
prolixity  of  Portuguese  descriptions  to  infer  that  even  the  majority 
of  the  engagements  with  the  natives  consisted  of  operations  on 
the  grand  scale  ;  many  of  them  were  merely  "  magnified  street 
brawls."  ^  Nor  must  too  much  importance  be  lent  to  the  originally 
enormous  advantage  of  the  possession  of  cannon  and  fire-arms.  The 
ordnance  and  matchlocks  were  more  effective  at  first  through  the 
noise  of  their  explosions  than  through  the  force  or  accuracy  of 
their  fire ;  indeed,  they  were  often  more  dangerous  to  the  marks- 
man than  to  the  target.^  The  Portuguese  were,  however,  greatly 
superior  in  armor  ;  the  risk  of  the  panoplied  knight  was  suffocation 
rather  than  wounds.  It  must  be  realized  also  that  their  opponents 
were  seldom  well  organized.  The  success  of  the  Portuguese  rested 
rather  upon  their  past  :  the  discipline  and  experience  of  the  Euro- 
pean wars,  the  endurance  and  fearlessness  derived  from  facing 
new  and  strange  vicissitudes,  the  conviction  of  superiority  and  of 
divine  approval,  —  these  are  the  qualities  that  enabled  them  to  win 
with  such  apparent  ease.'*  Indeed,  much  more  peril  lay  in  the  voy- 
age to  India  than  in  the  fighting  which  came  after  ;  on  the  average, 
it  is  said,  not  60  per  cent  of  the  men  who  left  Portugal  for  India 
reached  their  destination  :  of  DaGama's  170  men  only  55  survived 
to  return  to  Portugal.^ 

During  the  century  the  Portuguese  held  an  irregular  coast-line 
of   15,000  miles;   but  this  was  solely  through  their  navy.    That 

1  See,  for  instance,  Danvers,  I,  480-481,  534-535,  565,  566,  567,  56S,  571. 

2  Whiteway,  p.  35;   Hunter,  I,  93-96. 

8  A  shot  fired  point-blank  by  the  Portuguese  at  the  hull  of  an  Egyptian  ship  in  150S 
cleared  the  fighting  top  of  its  defenders.    Whiteway,  p.  39 ;  cf.  pp.  37  ff. 
<  See  Danvers,  I,  377  ff.,  384,  473,  531,  545,  555. 
5  See  Whiteway,  pp.  47,  82. 


THE  rORlUCUKSE  IN  THE  EAST  109 

invisible  agent  was  always  able  to  concentrate,  strike,  and  dis- 
appear ;  it  was  assured  of  an  unquestioned  prestige,  under  local 
conditions,  whatever  became  of  the  army.^  And  its  successes 
against  unmatched  opponents  lent  it  a  world-wide  and  utterly  dis- 
proportionate distinction.  In  spite  of  isolated  exploits  of  great 
brilliancy,  however,  both  arms  of  the  service  speedily  declined  in 
the  sixteenth  century.  At  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Manuel,  "The 
Fortunate,"  decadence  was  already  manifest  throughout  the  Portu- 
guese dominions.^  Albuquerque  is  found  to  complain  bitterly  of  the 
equipments  and  the  men  forwarded  to  him  from  Lisbon.  The 
former  were  flimsy,  and  often  old  and  patched  ;  the  latter  were 
insufficient  in  number  and  of  contemptible  quality.^  The  miscege- 
nation furthered  by  Albuquerque  gradually  lowered  even  this  low 
quality ;  and  the  native  auxiliaries,  although  they  never  came  up 
to  expectation,  were  often  preferred  to  the  Portuguese.  After  a 
time  discipline  was  relaxed,  and  when  the  meager  pay  of  officers 
and  men  ran  behind  and  stopped,  the  army  became  a  military  mob, 
which  sold  its  equipments  and  those  of  the  military  posts,  and 
gambled  away  the  proceeds.  The  old  faith  in  the  saints  degener- 
ated into  vague  and  superstitious  hopes  of  supernatural  aid  ;  the 
spirit  of  the  earlier  years  was  gone,  and  with  it  former  good  fortune. 
The  amount  of  genuine  bad  luck  met  by  the  Portuguese  early  in 
the  seventeenth  century  is  almost  as  striking  as  was  their  good 
luck  at  the  outset.  The  navy  also  suffered,  although  its  decline 
was  not  so  immediately  self-evident.  The  vessels  for  the  India 
defense  and  trade  became  ever  more  unwieldy,  in  the  attempt  to 
make  them  more  imposing,  and  for  decades  their  reputation  rested 
upon  nothing  but  the  inflated  prestige  just  alluded  to.^ 

1  Hunter,  I,  134,  166  ff.  To  such  relatively  small  advances  as  the  Portuguese  made 
in  nautical  matters  the  dictum  of  Foreman  (pp.  12-13)  can  yet  be  applied,  when  he 
says  that  it  is  the  modern  scientific  discoveries  that  have  enlarged  governmental  areas 
and  made  larger  ones  as  compact  as  the  older  and  smaller  ones.         ^  Corvo,  I,  7. 

3  Danvers,  I,  305-306.  Albuciuerque  had  more  faith  in  his  common  sailors  than 
in  his  officers  ;  he  called  them  "  my  cavaliers,"  and  preferred  to  meet  a  crisis  depend- 
ing on  them  alone.    Danvers,  I,  275. 

*  On  the  original  fear  of  the  carracks,  see  Roscher,  p.  256.  The  ships  finally  became 
floating  castles  that  could  not  stand  the  India  voyage.  The  Madre  de  Deos  had  seven 
stories,  was  165  feet  long  and  47  feet  beam.  Hunter,  I,  165  ;  cf.  pp.  160  ff . ;  Martins, 
Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  309,  316.  The  authors  remark  upon  the  progressively  increasing 
casualties  from  shipwreck,  capture  by  enemies,  etc.  Martins  (O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  35- 
36)  contrasts  the  extended  period  1497-1612  with  the  critical  years  1585-1597,  and 
finds  that  the  percentages  of  vessels  lost  in  the  India  service  by  wreck  or  fire  in  the 
two  periods  were  8.4  per  cent  and  33.4  per  cent ;  those  of  ships  captured  by  the  enemy 


no  COLONIZATION 

Monopoly  Policy  and  Demoralization 

All  this  witnesses  for  a  demoralization  of  administration,  center- 
ing, in  last  resort,  in  Lisbon,  and  in  the  king.  This  administration, 
if  it  should  be  so  denominated,  had  in  view  but  two  points  of  policy  : 
to  secure  the  commerce  of  the  East,  and  to  render  it  as  productive 
as  possible.  These  really  reduced  to  one  and  the  same  thing.  It 
has  been  shown  how  the  initiative  in  the  discovery  of  the  Cape 
route  had  been  taken  by  royalty,  and  how  the  succeeding  com- 
mercial operations  had  been  prosecuted  on  the  count  of  the  king ; 
it  was  not  in  the  spirit  of  the  time,  nor  in  the  stage  of  material 
advancement  of  the  people,  that  such  a  movement  should  rise  from 
a  popular  origin.  Hence  the  policy  which  directed  it  is  primarily 
royal,  and  national  only  in  the  sense  that  royal  direction  was  popu- 
larly accepted.  The  royal  policy,  in  conformity  with  current  com- 
mercial ideas,  was  monopolistic,  in  this  showing  its  relationship 
with  that  of  the  republics  of  the  Middle  Ages.  The  system  of 
"  secret  commerce "  was  continued,  being  remodeled,  however, 
upon  the  new  doctrine  of  exclusive  right  based  on  priority  of 
discovery  and  confirmed  by  the  highest  tribunal  of  the  age.^ 

Although  the  exploitation  of  this  monopoly  belonged  to  the  king, 
the  effects  of  his  enterprises  could  not  but  be  national.  When, 
therefore,  Da  Gama  returned  from  the  East,  laden  with  spoils, 
the  effect  upon  all  Portugal  was  galvanic.  A  limitless  field  for 
"conquest,  commerce,  and  conversion"  was  opened,  and  by  contrast 
the  ordinary  interests  of  the  people  seemed  flat  and  unprofitable. 
The  spirit  of  adventure,  the  impulse  to  gamble  with  unheard-of 
chances,  combined  with  distaste  for  the  common  vocations  of  life 
and  a  certain  ardor  for  the  saving  of  souls,  laid  hold  upon  a  people 
as  averse  to  industry  as  they  were  predisposed  to  the  life  of 
hazard.     Every  one  hastened  to  get  a  share  in  the  exploitation  of 

0.5  per  cent  and  3  per  cent.  These  vessels  were  of  from  500  to  600  tons,  carried  crews 
of  120  and  troops  to  the  number  of  250,  and  cost  on  the  average  about  $20,000.  Such 
losses  must  be  referred  largely  to  the  general  demoralization  of  the  service.  See  also 
Hunter,  I,  171. 

1  Hunter,  I,  218-221;  cf.  Varnhagen,  I,  36,  79,  86.  Pilots,  seamen,  and  chart- 
makers  were  long  subjected  to  jealous  scrutiny,  restrictions,  prohibitions,  etc.  ;  and  the 
stock  "  commercial  myths  "  were  retailed. 

About  1534  one  Hotelho  embarked  from  Diu,  with  a  few  men,  in  a  bark  i6J  feet 
long,  9  feet  l)road,  and  4',  feet  deep,  and,  without  seamen  or  pilot,  managed  to  reach 
Lisbon.  The  bark  was  immediately  burned,  that  the  possibility  of  performing  the 
voyage  in  so  small  a  vessel  might  not  be  discovered.    Danvers,  I,  409. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  F:AST  m 

the  East.^  It  is  characteristic  of  the  age,  however,  that  the  chron- 
iclers give  but  little  attention  to  trade  and  its  development.  Such 
subjects,  they  felt,  little  befitted  a  "grave  history"  ;  and  so  acci- 
dental notices  form  the  bulk  of  evidence  along  these  lines.  But  it 
is  clear  that  the  first  operations  in  the  East  were  immensely  profit- 
able. Characteristically  these  enterprises  included  a  large  element 
of  piracy,  or,  according  to  the  ideas  of  the  time,  spoliation  of  the 
infidel.  There  was,  besides,  the  long-distance  traffic,  between 
markets  of  widely  diverse  conjunctures,  and  likewise  the  port-to- 
port  trade  in  the  East,  in  opium  chiefly,  and  other  local  articles. 
Tributes  and  ransoms  were  added  components  of  income.^  The 
net  annual  revenue  of  the  king  from  India  in  early  days,  despite 
the  peculation  to  which  it  was  almost  from  the  outset  exposed, 
is  reckoned  at  about  $750,000;  it  is  said  that  the  king's  profit 
should  have  been  $2,100,000  per  annum.^  It  was  impossible,  in 
the  face  of  such  temptations,  to  anticipate  or  eradicate  the  most 
wholesale  corruption.  The  king  was  merchant-in-chief,  because, 
among  a  people  to  whom  corporate  enterprise  was  scarcely  known, 
he  alone  could  control  sufficient  capital  for  the  purpose  in  hand  ; 
but  his  subjects  were  not  slow  to  improve  a  subsidiary  capacity. 
The  Portuguese  monarchs  were  willing  to  admit  their  subjects  into 
the  eastern  trade  ;  but  only  with  the  permission  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  into  certain  restricted  branches.^    The  trade  resolved 

1  Schjifer,  III,  330  ff.  Martins  (Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  222)  says,  characteristically, 
"All  Portugal  embarked  for  India  in  Cabral's  squadron." 

2  "  A  pirataria  e  o  saque  foram  os  dois  fundamentos  do  dominio  portuguez,  cujo 
nervo  eram  os  canhoes,  cuja  alma  era  a  Pimenta."    Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  233. 

8  Hunter,  I,  174-175.  For  some  of  the  rich  "hauls"  of  the  Portuguese,  see 
Hunter,  I,  170  ff. ;  -Whiteway,  pp.  143-144  ;  Dan  vers, /(?.«/>«  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port., 
I,  271  ff.  Corvo  (I,  9-10)  calculates  that  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  the 
taxes  and  the  monopolies  of  the  Portuguese  dominions  rendered  between  three  and 
four  million  dollars,  in  modern  money,  and  that  the  chief  expenses  amounted  to  60  per 
cent  of  this  sum. 

*  Hunter,  I,  104  ff.,  175-176;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  47-48.  The  great  royal  monopoly 
was  the  pepper  trade.  "  It  was  so  jealously  guarded  that  no  authority  in  India  could 
enter  into  any  agreement  or  make  any  peace  that  affected  it.  It  was  the  cause  of 
most  of  the  coast  wars,  for  the  Muhamedans  strove  by  every  means  to  load  cargoes 
of  pepper  for  the  Red  Sea,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  not  many  years  after 
the  time  of  Albuquerque  all  the  Portuguese,  from  the  Governor  downwards,  traded 
illicitly  in  pepper.  The  prices  paid  by  the  King  were  those  fixed  when  his  ships  first 
visited  the  coast,  before  competition  had  raised  them;  naturally  the  King  got  the 
worst  stuff  in  the  market ;  some  sent  home  .  .  .  was  so  bad  that  33  years  later  it  still 
lay  in  the  Lisbon  warehouses."  Whiteway,  p.  171  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  20. 
On  the  conditions  of  cultivation  of  pepper,  etc.,  see  Wallace,  chap,  xix  ;  on  the  other 
desirable  products  of  the  East,  Cheyney,  pp.  1 1  ff. 


112  COLONIZATION 

itself  then  into  a  royal  monopoly  operated  through  hundreds  of 
subordinates  not  susceptible  of  any  adequate  control  from  the 
far-distant  metropolis.  The  mood  of  these  ofBcials,  who  were 
poorly  paid  in  anticipation  of  their  own  activities  in  accumula- 
tion, soon  became  one  of  unscrupulous  greed  ;  and  the  vital  con- 
ditions of  life  in  the  tropics  further  accentuated  this  attitude. 
All  other  motives  merged  in  the  dominant  one  of  the  speedy 
amassing  of  wealth  ;  and  corruption  in  all  branches  of  the  pub- 
lic service  followed.  Every  one  hastened  to  procure,  through 
slander,  bribery,  flattery,  and  general  parasitism,  some  post  in 
the  service  whence  he  could  derive  gifts,  extorted  moneys,  or 
other  riches.^ 

Naturally  enough  the  king  lost  heavily  through  this  disposition 
on  the  part  of  his  agents.  The  latter  were  at  first  allowed  to  load 
some  small  amounts  of  merchandise  in  the  cabins,  or  to  get  a  low 
percentage  on  the  cargo  ;  but  this  speedily  became  a  competing 
private  trade  on  a  large  scale,  and  the  king's  interests,  especially 
in  the  distant  Indian  ports,  were  regularly  sacrificed.  As  early  as 
15  13  service  on  the  royal  ships  was  shunned,  and  private  traders 
coerced  native  rajahs  to  sell  to  them,  leaving  the  king  to  purchase 
at  higher  prices ;  private  cargoes  were  disposed  of  before  the 
king's  goods  had  their  turn.^  The  king  struggled  against  these 
tendencies  in  vain.  As  early  as  1524  the  aged  Vasco  da  Gama 
was  again  sent  out  to  India,  and  for  the  few  remaining  weeks  of 
his  life  quelled  abuses  with  characteristic  sternness. ^  A  few 
officers,  like  Da  Gama's  son,  Estevao,  completed  their  terms  with 
their  means  depleted  ;  but  the  abuses  suffered  merely  a  temporary 
check.  The  old  spirit  was  gone  :  it  was  no  longer  the  desire  of  the 
soldier  to  shed  his  blood  for  King  and  Faith,  but  all  sorts  of  rascality 
were  excused  on  the  ground  of  insufficiency  of  pay.  The  wages  of 
the  soldier  were  indeed  ridiculously  small.  It  was  tacitly  admitted 
that  any  one  in  India  could  add  to  his  stipend  by  avocations  of 
some  sort ;  and  in  time  the  higher  officials,  representing  the  govern- 
ment and  king,  began  to  pay  off  officers  or  appease  relatives  or 
cast-off  mistresses  by  the  reversion  of  an  office  or  the  "  gift  of  a 

1  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  245-246,  304  ff. ;  Hunter,  I,  175  ff. ;  Lavisse  et 
Rambaud,  IV,  898.  The  Portuguese  government,  despite  the  great  sources  of  income 
that  lay  before  it,  was  never  properly  solvent.    Whiteway,  pp.  175-176. 

2  In  1530  the  Bengal  voyage  from  Malabar  yielded  the  captain  ;[^2450  and  the 
king  ^^78.    Hunter,  I,  177.    Cf.  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  287. 

^  Danvers,  I,  368-374. 


THE  PORTUGUESE   IN  THE  EAST  113 

voyage."  ^  By  such  means  the  Indian  administration,  both  in 
Lisbon  and  in  Goa,  was  thoroughly  dcmoraHzed  ;  in  1552  the  civic 
authorities  of  the  latter  capital  appealed  to  the  king,  asserting  that 
"  In  India  there  is  no  justice,  either  in  your  viceroy,  or  in  those 
who  are  to  mete  it  out.  .  .  .  There  is  no  Moor  who  will  trust 
a  Portuguese."  ^ 

Demoralization  in  the  Metropolis 

It  is  evident  that  such  depravity  of  customs  in  that  portion  of 
the  nation's  life  which  had  to  do  with  the  colonies  must  have  been 
correlative  with  momentous  changes  in  the  metropolis  itself.  Allu- 
sion has  been  made  to  the  decline  of  the  ancient  and  solid  char- 
acter of  the  people  before  the  prospect  of  sudden  wealth.  The 
result  was  a  general  movement  to  the  capital,  which  soon  increased 
in  quantity  and  declined  in  quality  of  population ;  a  movement 
which  early  depleted  the  supply  of  labor  in  agriculture,  and  largely 
increased  the  idle  and  dependent  classes.^  To  meet  the  shortage 
of  labor,  especially  in  the  south  of  Portugal,  natives  of  Africa  were 
introduced  under  a  system  of  slavery,  with  the  result  that,  through 
race-mixture  and  otherwise,  a  heavy  blow  was  struck  at  the  homo- 
geneity and  quality  of  population  in  general.'*  The  growth  of 
estates  dispossessed  the  lesser  nobility  and  gentry  and  caused  them 
the  more  surely  to  drift  into  the  crowded  centers,  which,  at  that 
stage  of  the  arts,  were  the  hotbeds  of  disease  as  well  as  vice.  To 
partially  remedy  this  state  of  things  the  government  came  to  use 
India  as  a  refuge  for  depraved  and  destitute  clients ;  for  one  and 
all  tried  to  force  themselves  into  a  share  of  the  royal  monopoly  by 
besieging  the  doors  of  the  influential.    Young  women  were  shipped 

1  According  to  Falcao,  in  161 2  tlie  China  and  Japan  voyage  was  wortli  $125,000; 
that  to  Goa  by  Mozambique,  #30,000 ;  to  the  Moluccas,  $35,000.  Whiteway,  pp.  74- 
75.  According  to  the  same  authority,  at  the  same  date  the  pay  of  the  captain  at 
Sofala  for  three  years  was  $4250,  and  the  profits  $285,000.  The  salary  was  a 
matter  of  the  utmost  indifference,  and  not  infrequently  decreased.  In  1 550  the  captain 
at  Ormuz  received  $3000  a  year  and  $1580  as  the  salary  of  his  guard;  in  161 2  the 
captain's  pay  had  sunk  to  $2000  a  year,  that  of  his  guards  had  risen  to  $2700,  and  he 
was  allowed  $4300  to  recompense  40  hangers-on  who  were  supported  out  of  public 
funds.    Whiteway,  p.  72.  2  Hunter,  I,  185. 

3  Stephens  (p.  182)  says  that  Lisbon  trebled  its  population  in  80  years,  in  spite  of 
unsanitary  conditions  and  continuous  pestilences.  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  1, 1 75-1 76 ; 
Hunter,  I,  181  ff. 

*  Corvo  (I,  13)  gives  the  annual  importation  of  slaves  into  Lisbon,  from  about 
1535  °"'  ^^  10,000;  into  Portugal,  in  1573,  as  40,000. 


114  COLONIZATION 

off  to  India  with  dowries  of  office  for  those  who  would  marry 
them  ;  the  multipUcation  of  the  forms  of  government  employment 
was  carried  to  a  ridiculous  extent,  but  the  rapidity  of  their  creation 
could  not  keep  pace  with  the  increase  of  applicants.^  For  all  this, 
the  wealth  of  the  Indies  poured  into  Portugal  in  prodigal  abun- 
dance ;  ^  visible  prosperity  increased.  Lisbon  became  the  entrepot 
of  the  western  world.  Yet  at  the  same  time  the  national  wealth, 
which  was  neither  pepper  nor  pearls  nor  gold,  was  well  on  in  its 
decline.  Prices  of  necessities  rose  very  high  ;  population  fell  off ; 
famine  and  disease  wrought  periodic  havoc.  The  regime  of  luxury 
sapped  the  vigor  of  the  upper  classes,  and  the  lot  of  the  sturdy  peas- 
ant farmer  became,  with  the  growth  of  estates  operated  by  slave- 
labor,  ever  more  intolerable.^  "  All  were,  or  aspired  to  hQ,fidalgos  ; 
they  had  themselves  attended  in  the  streets  by  a  multitude  of  serv- 
ants, although  they  often  had  nothing  for  the  latter  to  eat."  ^  The 
lower  classes  lived  upon  the  higher  in  a  subject  relation,  and  the 
higher  upon  the  royal  favor ;  Portugal  as  a  whole  became  dependent 
upon  the  India  trade,  and  the  development  of  natural  resources  fell 
away.  It  is  clearly  to  be  seen  that  if  the  accidental  source  of  wealth 
should  be  removed,  but  little  would  remain  to  fall  back  upon.  Nor 
ought  the  India  trade  itself  to  be  regarded  as  a  fountain  of  riches 
commensurate  with  its  quondam  reputation.  The  possibility  of  un- 
reasonably high  profits  dazzled  the  judgment,  for  the  policy  of  the 
time  and  of  the  frontier-trade  was  directed  toward  the  realization 
of  large  gains  upon  small  quantities  of  merchandise,  rather  than  of 
moderate  profits  upon  large  quantities.  For  this  reason  the  con- 
tinuity and  multiplicity  of  exchanges  were  sacrificed  in  favor  of  a 
disjointed  movement  from  extreme  to  extreme  ;  from  the  feverish 
activity  at  the  arrival  of  the  India  fleet  to  the  dullness  and  torpor 
of  a  sluggish  interim.  And  the  very  object  of  the  military  equip- 
ment of  the  individual  trading-vessels  and  of  their  joint  movement 
increasingly  failed  of  realization  ;  for  the  concentration  of  the  year's 
booty  in  a  single  fleet  was  a  temptation  hardly  to  be  long  resisted 
by  enemies.  By  this  preference  for  magnitude  in  commercial  opera- 
tions all   possibility  of  the  development  of  a  steady  and  normal 

1  Hunter,  I,  185;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  27,  30,  165. 

2  Profits  on  wares  sent  from  the  East  must  have  been  enormous  to  bear  all  the 
costs  of  passage  and  transshipments.  See  Whiteway,  pp.  7-8.  For  a  list  of  the 
imports,  see  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  23-24. 

3  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  IV,  900;  Martins,  Hist.  de.  Port.,  II,  19,  25-26,  73,  no-H2; 
Lindsay,  II,  44.  ^  Corvo,  I,  13. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  115 

commerce,  resting  upon  the  humdrum  business  of  the  small  dealer, 
was  destroyed.^  The  function  of  the  humbler  occupations  had  been 
long  regarded  as  sordid,  and  fit  only  for  the  Jews  ;  and,  at  the 
very  outset  of  their  colonial  career,  the  Portuguese  had  rid  them- 
selves of  this  element  of  their  population.  The  royal  interests  and 
those  of  the  Faith  had  decreed  the  expulsion  of  the  people  renowned 
in  Europe  for  intelligence  and  commercial  probity,  in  whose  hands 
rested  the  whole  machinery  of  commerce.^  The  Portuguese  were 
thus  unable  to  profit  by  the  large  opportunities  placed  in  their 
path,  except  through  a  rude  and  awkward  manipulation  not  differ- 
ing in  essence  from  that  displayed  by  semi-civilized  peoples. 

Corrupt  Administration  in  India 

In  most  respects  the  Portuguese  policy  of  commerce  and  coloni- 
zation is  a  mere  replica  of  the  Spanish,  presently  to  be  described 
in  greater  fullness  ;  indeed,  after  the  accession  of  Phihp  II  to  the 
throne  of  Portugal  the  two  systems  actually  merge  for  many  crit- 
ical years.  The  motive  forces  which  explain  both  cases  have  been 
indicated,  in  general  lines,  above.^  Both  nations  tended  inevitably 
in  the  direction  taken,  for  private  initiative  scarcely  existed,  and 
when  they  had  become  habituated  to  their  system,  it  was  too  late 
to  change.  In  1580,  in  consequence  of  pressure  by  the  Dutch, 
succeeding  the  union  with  Spain,  the  royal  monopoly  was  sold  to 
the  CovipanJiia  Portugueaa  das  Indias  Orientaes ;  but  the  success 
of  this  corporation  and  its  successor  a  century  later  (1697  :  Com- 
panhia  do  Coviniercio  da  India)  was  wrecked  against  the  opposi- 
tion of  spoils-seeking  officials.*  The  environment  was  thoroughly 
unfavorable  for  the  development  of  trade  along  evolved  and  modern 
lines  ;  the  abnormal  gains  of  individuals  brought  only  loss  to  the 
nation,  which,  as  in  the  case  of  Spain,  shouldered,  or  rather  sank 
beneath,  the  taxation  necessary  to  keep  upon  their  feet  a  power 
and  monopoly  from  which  it  derived  no  benefits.  The  material  sent 
to  India  became  progressively  poorer  in  quality.  The  crown  had 
realized  at  the  outset  that  it  must  delegate  an  almost  uncontrolled 
power  to  its  representative  in  the   East.    This  arrangement  was 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  47-48;  Whiteway,  p.  18;  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  IV,  899-900. 

2  See  especially  Schafer,  III,  13  ff.;  p.  188,  below. 
8  Pp.  80  ff. 

*  Hunter,  I,  181-182;  Danvers,  II,  79-80. 


Il6  COLONIZATION 

very  advantageous  in  the  case  of  the  few  disinterested  and  incor- 
ruptible viceroys  and  governors,  although,  as  has  been  seen,  there 
developed  a  tendency  to  suspect  such  a  man  even  as  Albuquerque. 
It  has  been  remarked  how  systematically  the  best  officials  in  India 
were  treated  with  ingratitude  ;  the  officers  in  question  assert  the 
fact  and  the  chroniclers  corroborate  it.  The  reason  lies,  in«good 
part,  in  conditions  already  reviewed  :  many  regulations  and  decrees 
originating  in  the  capital  arrived  belated  because  of  the  distance,  or 
were  ill-advised  owing  to  ignorance  of  local  conditions  in  India. ^  If 
the  viceroy  suspended  or  put  off  the  execution  of  these  orders,  it 
was  felt  to  be  a  contravention  of  royal  power,  an  evidence  of  an 
unmanageable  spirit  aiming  at  independence  ;  if  an  incorruptible 
ruler,  like  Albuquerque,  cashiered  disobedient  nobles  who  had 
come  to  India  simply  to  get  rich  with  all  speed,  he  created  against 
himself  at  Lisbon  an  opposition  unscrupulous  of  means  in  securing 
his  downfall.  Hence  it  was  the  energetic  and  faithful  official  who 
was  most  likely  to  be  inconsiderately  superseded,  insulted,  or  even 
thrown  into  chains.^  Already  in  Albuquerque's  time  the  policy  of 
shortening  the  tenure  of  offices  in  order  to  curb  their  incumbents 
was  begun ;  and,  often  for  good  reasons,  the  attitude  of  the  crown 
became  increasingly  one  of  suspicion.  The  natural  tendency  of 
European  activity  in  the  tropics  is  toward  the  speedy  and  improvi- 
dent use  of  opportunity  for  exploitation ;  and  to  this  tendency  the 
policy  of  short  appointments  and  low  salaries  lent  a  spur,  if  not  a 
sort  of  justification.  By  1518  governors  had  ^gotten  into  the  habit 
of  taking  men  out  with  them  to  fill  all  the  more  important  posts  ; 
and  there  was  established  a  sort  of  baleful  rotation  in  office  wherein 
each  appointee  tried  to  sweep  the  ground  clear  during  his  incum- 
bency. It  went  so  far  that  at  times  the  new  viceroys  seem  to  have 
adopted  a  deliberate  policy  of  discrediting  and  insulting  the  officers 
whom  they  succeeded.  Hence  the  slanders,  peculations,  and  gen- 
eral corruption  already  referred  to.  Naturally  enough,  any  attempts 
to  control  the  viceroy  from  Lisbon,  or  through  a  resident  counter- 
check (intcndant),  simply  rendered  the  administration  cumbrous 
and  immobile.  Captains  became  merchants  and  shunned  war; 
honor   was    travestied  ;   they    were   even   allowed,   in   the   chronic 

^  For  a  conspectus  of  the  laws,  customs,  revenues,  number  of  parishes,  etc.,  in 
India  in  15S4,  see  Menezes's  "tractate."  Here  also  (p.  139)  is  mentioned  the 
rci:;iJemia^  to  whose  Spanish  aftertyjie  attention  will  presently  be  called.  Cf.  p.  307, 
below.  2  Ruge,  p.  198;  Danvers,  1,458. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN   THE  EAST  117 

insolvency  of  the  Indian  government,  to  repay  themselves  irregu- 
larly, and  by  acts  of  piracy  which  constantly  neutralized  efforts  for 
peace.  This  went  on  until  16 14,  when  the  king  ceased  to  struggle 
against  the  trend  of  the  times  ;  he  "  suspended  all  royal  grants  and 
ordered  the  Viceroy  to  put  up  for  sale  by  public  auction  all  com- 
mands of  fortresses,  all  other  of^ces,  and  all  voyages,  and  give 
them  —  on  a  vacancy  occurring  —  to  the  highest  bidder."  This 
document  "  stands  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable  state  confessions 
of  utter  demoralization  on  record."  ^  "  D.  Joao  de  Castro  was  the 
last  man  with  any  pretentions  to  superiority  who  held  office  in  the 
early  days  of  Portuguese  connection  with  India,  and  the  names  of 
his  successors  for  many  generations,  some  indolent,  some  corrupt, 
some  both,  and  all  superstitious,  are  but  the  mile-stones  that  mark 
the  progress  along  the  dismal  path  of  degeneration."  ^ 

Social  Conditions  in  India 

The  Indian  government  could  do  little,  under  the  circumstances, 
for  the  welfare  of  the  land.  Harbor-works,  lighthouses,  charts,  and 
other  necessities  and  conveniences  of  commerce  were  neglected  ; 
in  later  times  the  Portuguese  actually  depended  upon  the  English 
and  Dutch  for  their  knowledge  of  channels  and  shoals.  The  very 
government  was  a  sort  of  organized  robbery;  and  its  example  was 
not  lost  on  the  population.^  The  latter  rapidly  became  Orientalized 
and  worthless.  Life  in  Goa,  which  was  the  type  toward  which 
existence  in  Portuguese  India  ultimately  tended,  was  marked  from 
early  times  by  luxury,  profligacy,  and  sloth.  This  luxury  was  the 
outcome  of  the  enormous  wealth  of  "  Golden  Goa  "  (Goa  Dourado)} 
All  the  work  was  done  by  slaves  ;  the  pursuit  of  a  trade  disgraced 
a  man,  and  domestic  labors  ruined  a  woman's  social  status.    The 

1  Whiteway,  pp.  74-75.  But  it  was  in  the  spirit  of  the  time  and  is  actually 
defended  by  Montesquieu,  Esprit  des  lois.  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  238.  Menezes 
(p.  165)  gives  the  net  income  from  the  estate  of  India  (1584)  as  about  $775,000. 

2  Whiteway,  pp.  324-325  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  275  ff.,  293.  De  Castro  was 
viceroy  from  1545  to  1548.  His  views  upon  the  conditions  of  his  times  are  given  in 
a  letter  to  the  king  quoted  by  Martins  (Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  294).  This  author  contrasts 
him  with  Albuquerque  and  Almeida :  "  The  government  of  India  created  three  great 
men  :  Castro,  who  might  be  called  a  saint ;  Albuquerque,  whom  the  name  of  hero 
better  befits  ;  Almeida,  who  is  a  wise  administrator,  an  intelligent  factor."  Id.,  I,  236. 

8  Whiteway,  pp.  42-43  ;  Danvers,  I,  xxviii  ff. 

*  According  to  a  Portuguese  proverb,  the  man  who  had  seen  Goa  had  as  good  as 
seen  Lisbon  :  "  Quem  vie  Goa  excusa  de  ver  Lisboa."     Hunter,  I,  155. 


Ii8  COLONIZATION 

only  respectable  livelihoods  then  were  the  Church,  the  army, 
government  employ,  or  buccaneering.  Gambling  in  all  its  forms 
provided  recreation  for  idle  minds  and  bodies  ;  the  ccnaua-aystem 
invaded  the  home,  and  domestic  relations  were  corrupted.  Vanity 
led  to  gorgeous  display  of  eccentric  apparel  on  the  part  of  strutting 
idlers.  In  later  times  Portuguese  women,  hopelessly  in  debt, 
begged  in  the  streets  from  gilded  palanquins.  This  life  in  Goa 
was  a  magnificent  type  of  the  life  of  other  Portuguese  settlements. 
On  account  of  scarcity  of  men  in  Portugal,  outlaws  were  banished 
to  India,  and  residence  in  the  colonies  provided  the  punishment 
for  thieves  and  prostitutes.  The  newly  arrived  Portuguese  soldiers, 
ev^en  of  the  better  class,  were  not  paid,  were  the  sport  of  the  older 
inhabitants,  and  either  starved,  begged,  hired  out  as  cutthroats, 
or  deserted  to  native  states  and  changed  their  religion.^  It  was 
this  class  of  Europeans  from  which  the  natives  of  the  East  gained 
their  early  impression  of  western  civilization,  religion,  and  morals. 
This  "last  crusade  against  Islam"  was  scarcely  living  up  to  its 
early  renown.  Turning  more  specifically  to  the  religious  activity 
of  the  Portuguese,  the  state  of  the  case  is  not  bettered.  When 
Cabral  sailed  for  India  in  1500  he  was  liberally  supplied  with 
ecclesiastics  to  hold  up  his  hands  in  the  conversion  of  the  benighted. 
The  attitude  of  these  evangelists  may  be  stated  in  the  words  of 
Barros,  the  official  historian  :  "  The  Moors  and  Gentiles  are  outside 
the  law  of  Jesus  Christ,  which  is  the  true  law  that  every  one  has 
to  keep  under  pain  of  damnation  to  eternal  fire.  If  then  the  soul 
be  so  condemned,  what  right  has  the  body  to  the  privileges  of  our 
laws  .''...  It  is  true  they  are  reasoning  beings,  and  might  if  they 
lived  be  converted  to  the  true  faith,  but  inasmuch  as  they  have 
not  shown  any  desire  as  yet  to  accept  this,  we  Christians  have  no 
duties  towards  thcm."^  Moreover,  the  Pope  was  empowered  to 
turn  over  to  the  faithful  all  the  material  goods  of  the  unbelievers, 
a  doctrine  whose  practical  application  was  not  suffered  to  lapse. 
With  a  "repulsive  mixture  of  unctuousness  and  rapacity"  the 
religious  orders  set  on  foot  an  exploitation  that  could  compare 
with  the  government's  best  efforts.^  To  the  effects  upon  the 
natives  we  shall  presently  come  ;  the  religious  organization  was, 

1  Hunter,    I,    155-158;    TI,    157  ff.;    Whiteway,    pp.    72-73,    261,    335;    Martins, 
Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  273-274. 

2  Hunter,  I,  lofi;  Whiteway,  p.  21  (quoted). 
8  Whiteway,  p.  60. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  119 

besides,  a  great  drain  on  the  resources  of  the  India  government. 
The  zeal  of  the  friars  found  its  outlet  in  building  cloisters  and 
then  in  filling  them.  The  cost  to  the  state  of  the  purely  religious 
establishments  in  Portuguese  India  was,  about  1550,  $35,000;  by 
16 1 2  it  had  risen  to  $130,000  in  the  same  limited  area,  other  semi- 
religious  establishments  costing  over  $30,000  in  addition.  Religious 
property  in  land  had  extended  widely ;  some  attempt  was  made  to 
check  this  development  in  1635.  The  power  of  the  clergy  became 
little  by  little  a  menace  to  the  state  ;  the  Jesuits  retained  armed 
bands  in  defiance  of  the  government,  intrigued  constantly,  and 
even  with  the  Dutch  and  Moors.  Such  activities  led  to  their 
expulsion  from  the  Portuguese  dominions,  by  Pombal,  in  1759.-^ 

Relations  with  the  Natives 

In  considering  the  relations  of  the  Portuguese  to  the  native 
peoples,  the  three  salient  objects  of  the  Portuguese  should  be 
recalled:  these  were  "conquest,  commerce,  and  conversion." 
The  formula  might  well  read  "  commercial  conquest,"  for  the 
trade-motive  was  really  dominant.  But  in  those  days  it  was  thought 
that  a  preliminary  intimidation  formed  a  good  overture  to  success- 
ful exchange  ;  consequently  the  Portuguese  aimed  at  a  regime  of 
terrorism,  and  this  was  seconded  by  intrigue  of  questionable 
nature.  Rival  dynastic  claimants  were  taken  up  and  thrown  over 
according  to  expediency  ;  even  Albuquerque  employed  the  assassin 
to  effect  his  ends.  Conviction  of  the  rectitude  of  the  mission  often 
excused  the  means.  After  intimidation  or  the  attainment  of  political 
ascendency  the  Portuguese  regularly  extorted  tributes,  commercial 
exemptions,  and  privileges,  and  a  correspondingly  unfavorable  treat- 
ment of  rivals.  They  did  not  —  in  fact,  could  not  —  effect  any 
religious  changes.  They  pursued  the  rule  of  expediency,  imposing, 
to  use  a  modern  expression,  "  what  the  traffic  would  bear."  Above 
all,  they  worked  out  their  monopoly  of  the  spice-trade,  first  by 
securing  a  "  most  favored "  position,  and  later,  as  their  power 
waxed,  by  ruthless  prohibitions,  impositions,  and  exclusions.  In 
more  distant  parts  they  descended  periodically  in  force  to  collect 
tribute  in  spices,  or  as  individual  and  favored  merchants  they 
frequented  the  native  markets  and  fairs.     As  has  been  seen,  they 

1  Danvers,  II,  247,  253;  Whiteway,  p.  65;  cf.  index,  sub  "  Botelho,  Simao";  cf. 
pp.  154  ff.,  below. 


I20  COLONIZATION 

seized  all  the  entrepots.^  They  lived,  in  short,  in  a  commercially 
parasitic  relation  upon  the  native  industrial  organization,  and  as 
they  were  able  to  extend  their  power,  they  drained  it  of  its  vitality 
and  bloom.  It  should  be  understood,  for  a  clear  comprehension  of 
the  Portuguese  native  policy,  that  the  invaders,  intolerant  and  igno- 
rant, never  understood  or  tried  to  understand  either  the  superior 
or  the  primitive  native  life.  Ignorance  of  the  native  languages 
persisted  to  a  late  period,  and  offenses  against  native  customs, 
prejudices,  and  superstitions  were  the  order  of  the  time.^  The 
Amboinese,  once  friends,  were  alienated  by  an  attempted  assault 
on  the  wife  of  a  prominent  native.  They  had  adopted  Christianity 
and  begun  to  intermarry  with  the  Portuguese,  but  after  this  time 
Ternate  and  Amboina  were  the  sources  of  recurring  calamities 
and  expense.^  The  natives  of  the  East  hold  much  to  ceremonial, 
religious  and  other,  and  were  constantly  shocked  and  insulted  by 
the  rude  invaders.  They  suffered  atrocious  cruelties,  even  under 
the  better  officials  ;  Almeida  blew  prisoners  from  his  gunsr,  "  salut- 
ing the  town  with  their  fragments";  mutilations  of  men,  women, 
and  children  were  practiced  in  cold  blood.  Garcia  de  Noronha 
blinded  fifteen  relatives  of  the  king  of  Ormuz  by  passing  a  red-hot 
bowl  close  to  their  eyes.* 

In  the  course  of  time  the  relations  of  the  Portuguese  with  native 
peoples  resolved  themselves  into  a  series  of  unprovoked  aggressions, 
attended  by  speedy  retaliation.^  Native  allies  conceived  a  deep 
contempt  for  the  cruel,  bigoted,  and  mercenary  Europeans,  and, 
as  the  Portuguese  power  waned,  they  fell  away  or  went  over  to  the 
Dutch  and  English.  It  was  only  the  fleet,  and  rare  good  fortune, 
combined  with  lack  of  organization  and  inability  to  prosecute  a 
siege,  on  the  part  of  their  enemies,  that  saved  the  Portuguese  from 
destruction  at  the  hands  of  the  King  of  Atjeh,  and  other  native 
rulers,  during  the  sixteenth  century.^ 

1  They  were  peremptory  with  the  most  uncivilized  peoples  (e.g.  of  the  Laccadives), 
where  more  powerful  rajahs  were  treated  with  politic  consideration.  Hunter,  I, 
149.     For  their  experiences  in  Atjeh,  see  Veth,  Atchin,  pp.  60  ff. 

2  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  215;  see  especially  (p.  294)  the  letter  to  the  king  of 
J.  de  Castro  (viceroy,  1545- 1548) ;  Whiteway,  pp.  29-31. 

8  Danvers,  I,  537-53'^,  550;  Argensola, /r/jj/'w. 

*  Hunter,  I,  139  ff. ;  Whiteway,  p.  165.    The  accounts  teem  with  worse  instances. 

6  Danvers,  II,  92-98. 

''  Ataide  (1568-1571)  suppressed  a  dangerous  coalition  with  a  skill  and  firmness 
worthy  of  the  earher  time.  Lavisse  at  Rambaud,  IV,  893;  Zimmermann,  I,  68  ff.,' 
cf.  Danvers,  I,  480-481,  534-535- 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  12 1 

Activities  of  the  Church 

To  the  other  agencies  that  constantly  provoked  the  natives  was 
added  the  activity  of  the  Church.  It  should  be  reahzed  that  an 
exaggeration  of  severity  was  natural  in  the  Portuguese  in  India, 
owing  to  their  ingrained  hatred  and  fear  of  the  arch-enemy  of 
Christianity,  Mohammedanism  ;  Islam  was  already  in  the  East, 
and  its  superior  hold  upon  native  peoples  was  coming  to  be 
realized.  Hence  the  Portuguese  proceeded  in  the  East  with  a 
severity  unknown  in  Brazil.  To  this  element  there  was  likewise 
added  an  ecclesiastical  cupidity,  stimulated  by  possibilities  of  mate- 
rial gain  that  did  not  exist  in  America.  The  clergy  understood 
the  natives  as  little  as  the  laymen,  and  fulminated  against  every- 
thing that  bore  a  heathen,  and  especially  a  real  or  supposedly 
Mohammedan  tinge.  After  the  time  of  Manuel,  fanaticism  became 
more  unbridled  ;  in  1540,  under  orders  of  the  king,  all  the  Hindu 
temples  in  the  island  of  Goa  were  destroyed,  and  the  ecclesiastics 
hastened  to  seize  the  confiscated  lands.  In  1560  Goa  was  made 
an  archbishopric,  and  the  first  inquisitors  were  dispatched  to  harry 
the  resident  Jewish  refugees  from  Portugal.^  The  recommenda- 
tions of  the  first  provincial  council  of  Goa,  in  1567,  adopted  by 
the  state,  at  the  command  of  the  Church,  for  the  conversion  of 
Mohammedans  and  Hindus,  give  some  idea  of  the  aggression  of 
the  Church  upon  the  native  organization.  No  Christian  could 
have  infidel  servants  in  his  house,  or  employ  infidel  doctors  or 
barbers  ;  neither  Hindus  nor  Mohammedans  could  have  any  public 
worship,  all  their  priests  were  banished,  and  even  the  twice-born 
Hindu  was  forbidden  to  wear  the  sacred  cord  of  his  caste ;  the 
Hindus  were  obliged  to  attend  church  in  squads  of  fifty,  on  alter- 
nate Sundays,  to  hear  long  sermons  on  the  benefits  of  the  Christian 
religion.  The  viceroys  were  instructed  to  favor  converts  in  all 
ways,  temporal  as  well  as  spiritual ;  inheritance  was  made  to 
follow  the  kinship  of  faith  rather  than  that  of  blood  ;  the  native 
Christian  could  demand  all  the  privileges  of  the  Portuguese  citizen  ; 
female  converts  could  claim  heritages  as  if  they  had  been  males. 
Political  power  was  taken,  as  far  as  possible,  from  the  unconverted, 
and  justice  was  practically  denied  to  non-Christians.  '  Those  who 
were  not  Christians  must  wear  a  distinctive  dress,  and  must  not 
ride  on  a  horse  or  in  a  palanquin  or  carry  an  umbrella  in  Goa  or 
1  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  IV,  899 ;  Corvo,  I,  8. 


122  COl.OXIZATION 

its  suburbs."  As  a  result  of  these  and  other  senseless  reg;ulations, 
based  upon  clerical  influence,  Goa  and  the  surrounding  islands 
were,  as  early  as  1561,  practically  depopulated  of  natives.^  By 
1729  native  commerce  was  ruined,  owing  to  the  horror  which 
local  merchants,  especially  Moors,  had  of  another  clerical  institu- 
tion, the  Inquisition ;  for  the  latter  had  been  utilized  freely  for 
secular,  not  to  mention  private,  ends,  under  guise  of  effecting 
religious  purity  and  homogeneity.  Its  abolishment  in  India,  in 
1 8 14,  came  too  late  to  atone  for  or  neutralize  its  evil  consequences.^ 
Of  course  the  corruption  of  the  clergy  and  of  the  original  dis- 
interestedness of  faith  occurred,  for  the  most  part,  in  the  centers 
of  Portuguese  power.  Much  unselfish  effort  was  put  forth  in  the 
outlying  parts  by  men  of  the  Xavier  stamp.  The  Portuguese 
undoubtedly  spread  Christianity  abroad  in  the  East  Indies,  both 
among  the  Buddhists  and  the  common  heathen ;  and  their  con- 
verts, when  in  rare  cases  they  were  treated  decently,  were  the 
firmest  prop  of  their  domination.^  Xavier,  indeed,  during  his 
activity  in  the  East  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  boldly 
assailed  the  India  administration  and  exposed  its  corruption.  Con- 
siderable missionary  activity  was  put  forth  in  China,  and  many 
brave  lives  sacrificed  in  Japan  and  in  the  Archipelago.  But  what 
the  Portuguese  gained  by  courage  and  devotion  in  war  and  in  the 
missions,  they  lost  by  avarice  and  attendant  shortsightedness  of 
policy,  and  through  the  scandal  which  the  unbridled  j:)assions  of  a 
low  class  of  representatives  brought  upon  the  nation  as  a  whole."* 
The  resident  Portuguese,  for  there  were  some,  offer  a  typical  case 
of  race-degeneration."'^  Illicit  relations  with  native  women  were 
common  ;  Albuciucrque  had  a  son  by  a  negress.  There  was  never 
any  considerable  immigration  of  European  women,  and  consequently 
no  family  life  of  a  normal  type.  Jorge  Cabral  (1549)  was  the  first 
governor  who  had  his  wife  with  him  in  Goa.''  Miscegenation 
had  been  a  policy  since  Prince  Henry's  time,  both  in  Portugal 
and  the  dependencies,  and  had  shown  only  evil  results  in  both 
cases ;  these  consequences  were  naturally  accentuated  in  the 
tropical  environment. 

^  Whiteway,  pp.  65-67. 

2  Danvers,  I,  xl,  xli.  Autos-da-fe  were  practiced  with  ostentation  and  cold 
cruelty.  Since  Jews  did  not  exist  in  sufficient  numbers,  the  institution  was  speedily 
turned  against  native  victims,  especially  Mohammedans.    Corvo,  I,  86. 

'^  Van  der  Aa,  De  Gids,  i860,  I,  pp.  853-854;  Danvers,  II,  i^off. 

*  See  Ruge,  pp.  213  ff.         ^  Tylor,  Anthropology,  p.  19.         "  Whiteway,  p.  321. 


THE  rORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  123 

Infringement  and  Collapse  of  the  Monopoly 

It  is  clear  that  by  the  opening  of  the  seventeenth  century  the 
Indian  Empire  had  been  long  ready  to  disintegrate  under  the 
impact  of  a  sufficient  shock.  By  this  time,  as  will  later  appear, 
the  nations  of  central  Europe  had  come  to  perceive  the  true  state 
of  the  Portuguese  power.  After  1600,  therefore,  they  appear  with 
progressive  frequency  in  the  East  and  deal  ever  more  deadly  blows 
to  the  waning  power  of  the  Portuguese. 

Portugal's  first  competitor  in  the  East  had  been  the  sister 
Iberian  nation,  Spain.  It  will  be  recalled  how  a  preliminary  divi- 
sion of  the  field  was  made  through  the  offices  of  the  Pope,  in  the 
treaty  of  Tordesillas.^  This  settlement  appeared  to  be  satisfactory 
until,  in  1521,  the  voyage  of  Magellan  led  the  Spaniards  to  the 
Moluccas,  and  until  it  became  evident  that  part  of  South  America 
fell  within  the  Portuguese  sphere.  The  Spice  Islands  being  the 
ultimate  objective  of  both  nations,  it  became  expedient  to  deter- 
mine the  full  perimeter  of  the  great  circle  of  which  the  famous 
Demarcation  Line  formed  half.  For  this  purpose  a  learned  council 
was  summoned  at  Badajoz  and  spent  a  long  time  in  futile  wrangles 
over  a  problem  whose  settlement  was  beyond  the  scientific  powers 
of  the  age.^  The  Portuguese  introduced  a  further  element  of  dis- 
cord by  their  attempt  so  to  manipulate  the  meridians  as  to  include 
both  Brazil  and  the  Moluccas  within  their  hemisphere.  It  is 
questionable  what  outcome  would  have  been  reached  had  not 
Charles  V  converted  the  uncertain  Spanish  claims  into  hard  cash 
by  selling  them  to  the  Portuguese  for  350,000  golden  ducats 
(about  $850,000).^  However,  in  these  centuries  peace  between 
mother-countries  did  not  preclude  constant  strife  in  the  colonies, 
and  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  alternately  expelled  each  other, 
concluded  agreements,  and  bandied  prohibitions  throughout  the 
sixteenth  century.*  Even  the  union  of  Spain  and  Portugal  in  1580 
did  not  put  a  stop  to  petty  warfare.^  The  effects  of  this  union 
with    Spain   can   be    better   appreciated    after   a   review    of    the 

1  p.  90,  above. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  130-131  ;  cf.  note  2,  p.  99,  above. 

3  Convention  of  Zaragoza.  Hunter,  I,  189;  for  details  of  the  history  of  the 
Moluccas,  cf.  Argensola.  '*  See  Danvers,  I,  38S,  458,  463  ff. 

5  For  the  conditions  leading  to  the  accession  of  Philip  II,  see  Martins,  Hist,  de 
Port.,  II,  chaps,  iii,  iv  (a  presentation  rather  picturesque  than  accurate) ;  Stephens, 
pp.  243  ff. ;  Hume,  Spain,  especially  pp.  171  ff.,  250  ff. 


124  COLONIZATION 

Spanish  colonial  system  ;  but  it  may  be  said  here  that  it  exposed 
Portugal,  for  sixty  years,  to  the  results  of  all  the  follies  and  enmi- 
ties of  Philip  II  and  his  successors,  without  affording  any  com- 
pensating advantages.  Philip  II  promised  to  keep  the  Portuguese 
intact  in  their  nationality  and  policy,  but  by  the  nature  of  the  case 
this  was  impossible.  Because  of  this  union  the  aggression  of 
Portugal's  competitors  was  considerably  hastened ;  for  the  Dutch, 
English,  and  French  were  thus  given  a  pretext,  if  not  a  reason,  for 
the  general  development  of  hostilities  in  the  East  and  in  Brazil. 
Nevertheless  it  would  be  wrong  to  charge  to  the  union  of  the 
crowns  anything  more  than  an  acceleration  of  an  already  advanced 
decline.^  For  when  the  Portuguese  had  laid  hand  upon  the  trade 
of  the  East,  they  set  about  what  turned  out  to  be  a  deliberate 
education  of  potential  competitors.  First  of  all  they  stimulated 
the  imagination  and  cupidity  of  the  Dutch  and  English  by  the 
secrecy  and  ostentation  of  their  trade.  They  depended  upon  the 
bugbears  of  papal  disfavor,  an  impregnable  navy,  and  a  deliberate 
exaggeration  of  the  terrors  of  the  deep  to  hold  competition  at  a 
distance,  so  far  as  the  India  voyage  was  concerned.  They  early  pro- 
hibited the  sale  of  charts  to  foreigners,  and  the  service  of  Portu- 
guese seamen  in  foreign  navies.^  In  order  to  distract  attention  from 
the  possibility  of  approaching  the  East,  the  coastwise  traffic  was 
renounced  ;  complacent  in  seeing  the  ships  of  all  nations  flocking 
to  the  harbor  of  Lisbon  rather  than  seeking  the  East,  and  besieging 
the  Casa  da  India,^  the  Portuguese  disdained  the  function  of  dis- 
tribution and  constituted  Lisbon  harbor  as  a  terminal.  Thus  both 
the  Dutch  and  the  English  not  only  conceived  most  highly  colored, 
though  vague,  views  as  to  the  profits  of  the  India  trade,  but  were 
actually  forced  to  develop  a  coastwise  shipping,  which  was  the 
best  of  training-schools  for  the  development  of  sea-power.  The 
weaknesses  of  the  Portuguese  were  learned,  and  isolated  adventurers 
even  dared  to  infringe  their  monopoly.  Experience  taught  the 
truth  about  the  commercial  myths  regarding  the  dangers  of  navi- 
gation, and  with  the  Protestant  movement  the  papal  authority 
became  non-existent.  War  with  Spain  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth 
century  discovered  the  inferiority  of  the  then  combined  Iberian 

1  Danvers,  I,  xl  ff.  ;  II,  39  ff.;  cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  49-50.  Martins  (O  Brazil, 
etc.,  p.  35)  says:  "One  can  affirm  that  India  would  have  been  lost  even  if  the 
Philips  had  not  reigned  in  Spain  ;  just  as  one  can  affirm  that  Brazil  has  been  pre- 
served despite  the  rule  of  the  Bragan9as  in  Portugal." 

2  See  p.  67,  above.  ^  See  note,  p.  228,  below. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  125 

navies  ;  then  the  English  and  Dutch,  debarred  access  to  the 
Lisbon  market,  went  to  the  East  to  trade  for  themselves.  And 
"  the  course  of  trade  was  the  more  easily  diverted  as  there  was  no 
skeleton  of  custom  formed  out  of  existing  trade-routes  to  retard 
the  decay  of  Portugal."  ^  The  fate  of  the  Venetians  had  overtaken 
their  conquerors  ;  monopoly  had  again  raised  up  an  agency  for  its 
own  destruction. 

The  losses  of  the  Portuguese  in  the  East  in  consequence  of  the 
penetration  of  competitors  into  those  regions  will  be  treated  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  dispossessors.  The  empire  needed  but  a 
touch  to  make  it  fall ;  the  incompetence,  treachery,  and  corruption 
displayed  in  these  latter  days  eclipse  the  isolated  acts  of  heroism. 
Illicit  traffic  with  the  enemy  was  common ;  the  revenues  of  the 
government  were  minimized  through  smuggling  and  misappro- 
priation. The  restoration,  in  1640,  did  not  materially  change 
the  situation,  for  the  harm  had  been  done  long  before,  and  decline 
went  on  without  interruption.^  Muscat  was  lost  in  1650  ;  Colombo 
in  1656;  Cochin  and  Cannanore  before  1663  ;  Bombay  was  ceded 
to  the  English  in  1661.^  The  Dutch  gradually  expelled  the  Portu- 
guese from  the  Malay  Archipelago,  until  at  last  they  held  (and 
still  hold)  only  part  of  Timor.  The  Portuguese  have  retained  from 
its  cession  in  1556  up  to  the  present  the  inferior  port  of  Macao 
in  China  :  it  enjoyed  a  passing  importance  before  the  cessation  of 
the  coolie-trade.'* 

In  1670  the  Portuguese  met  for  the  first  time  the  invading 
forces  of  the  Mahrattas,  before  whom  the  Mogul  Empire  had 
crumbled;  and  between  1737  and  1740  they  lost  nearly  all  of 
their  northern  provinces.  Commerce  was  practically  swept  from 
the  sea  by  Arab  pirates  and  by  the  rival  Europeans.^  The  Napo- 
leonic era,  whatever  may  have  been  the  grandiose  Indian  projects 
of  the  Emperor,  brought  nothing  but  misfortune.    From  1844  on, 

1  Whiteway,  p.  18;  cf.  Danvers,  II,  65  ff.,  105  ff.;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  48;  Hunter, 
I,  221  ff.  Martins  (Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  303)  says  that,  despite  the  signs  of  decomposi- 
tion, the  apogee  of  commercial  empire  came  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century. 

2  Danvers,  II,  172-173,  222  ff.,  237  ff. 

3  The  concessions  and  privileges  acquired  by  the  English  are  deplored  by  Martins 
(Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  138  ff.);  cf.  Hunter,  I,  191  ff. ;  II,  190 ff. 

*  Corvo  (IV,  131  ff.)  discusses  the  history  and  final  abolition  of  contract-emigration 
over  Macao  ;  his  attitude  is  one  of  great  hostility  to  the  system  —  in  fact,  as  Minister 
of  the  Marine,  he  was  himself  responsible  for  the  decree  of  abolition.  He  says  that 
this  move  was  not  prejudicial  to  the  prosperity  of  the  station  (p.  167). 

5  Danvers,  II,  367,  373-374.  402,  413- 


1 26  COLONIZATION 

Portuguese  India  has  consisted  only  of  Goa  and  the  dependencies 
of  Daman  and  Diu.  Goa  was  largely  in  ruins  in  1780,  and  it  was 
only  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  that  any  real  effort 
was  made  to  better  the  conditions  of  these  remnants  of  the  empire. 
Such  improvements  have  been  executed  mostly  through  British 
enterprise ;  they  consist  of  roads,  a  railroad  to  British  Indian 
centers,  steamship  service,  telegraphs,  etc.^  It  is  difficult  to  see 
any  future  for  the  few  Portuguese  possessions  in  Asia. 

PORTUGUESE   AFRICA 

The  fate  of  Portuguese  Africa  has  been  reserved,  in  the  interest 
of  clearness,  for  a  place  by  itself.  The  African  stations  were  at 
the  outset  simply  halting-places  upon  the  opening,  and  finally 
opened,  India  way.  The  early  explorers  of  the  west  coast  brought 
back  some  native  products,  and  a  number  of  slaves  ;  but  with  the 
attainment  of  the  ultimate  object  these  lesser  enterprises  passed 
into  abeyance.  The  African  stations  took  a  position  distinctly 
ancillary  to  the  Asiatic ;  an  occasional  expedition  in  search  of 
rumored  gold  mines,  and  a  number  of  brushes  with  the  Kaffirs 
and  other  natives,  saved  their  history  from  being  entirely  tame. 
With  these  halting-places  must  also  be  reckoned  some  of  the 
oceanic  islands,  such  as  St.  Helena  and  Tristan  da  Cunha,  and 
naturally  the  contiguous  coast  islands,  such  as  S.  Thome,  Principe, 
Fernando  Po,  and  Annobom.  Most  of  these  posts,  calculated  as 
they  were  to  meet  the  needs  of  navigators  who  hugged  the  coast, 
became  anachronisms  under  a  more  developed  system.  They  were, 
besides,  situated  among  peoples  too  barbarous  to  become  large 
buyers  and  sellers,  and  in  districts  which  were  insufficiently  fertile 
to  overcome  the  aversion  of  the  Portuguese  to  agricultural  labors  ; 
they  were  consequently  but  feebly  occupied,  were  sometimes  used 
as  penal  colonies,  and  were  easily  seized  by  enemies.^    In  1520  the 

1  Danvers,  II,  442  ff.,  475  ff.  ;  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  305  ff.  For  the  decline  of 
Portugal  itself  during  the  Napoleonic  j^eriod,  see  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  250; 
for  the  conditions  of  an  earlier  jieriod  (i 706-1 750),  see  Branco,  pp.  ^2  ^-i  45  ff-' 
109  ff.;  for  a  sketch  of  Portuguese  colonial  administration,  etc.,  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  see  Danvers,  I,  xliv  ff. ;  Zimmermann,  I,  216  ff.  The  most  exhaustive  hand- 
book on  the  Portuguese  colonies  is  that  of  Corvo,  of  which  Vol.  I,  after  a  brief  intro- 
duction, treats  of  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  S.  Thome  and  Principe,  and  Angola  ;  Vol.  II, 
of  Moyambifiue  ;  Vol.  Ill,  of  African  civilization  ;  and  Vol.  IV,  of  the  Asiatic  colonies. 
A  late  treatise,  modeled  upon  the  German  Kolonial-IIandljuch,  is  that  of  Vasconcellos. 

2  Leroy-15eaulieu,  I,  42;  Johnston,  pp.  28  ff.;  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  271  ff., 
283  ff.    The  latter  author  says  (Civ.  Iber.,  p.  263)  that  within  twenty-five  years  after 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  127 

Portuguese  held  Ouiloa,  Zanzibar,  Mombasa,  Sofala,  Mozambique, 
and  other  ports  of  call  ;  but  by  1698  the  Arabs  had  retaken  every 
stronghold  north  of  the  last-named  factory,  while  the  Dutch  had 
occupied  the  Cape,  and  other  nations  had  encroached  on  the  west 
coast.  The  development  of  the  slave-trade  was  what  k^ept  the 
settlements  alive  for  many  generations  ;  in  particular,  their  prox- 
imity to  Brazil  afforded  especial  advantages  in  a  traffic  which  even 
compensated  in  some  measure  for  the  loss  of  the  India  commerce.^ 
Guinea  and  the  Congo  and  Angola  districts  were  in  early  days  the 
chief  theaters  of  the  trade,  which  reached  its  apogee  in  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries.  From  the  middle  to  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  from  Benguela  and  Loanda  alone,  642,000 
slaves  were  exported;  in  1770  the  revenue  from  the  Angola 
export  was  $150,000.  From  18 17  to  18 19  it  was  $177,000,  while 
other  income  scarcely  reached  $25,000.^  Interest  in  these  human 
products  brought  about  a  general  neglect  or  decline  of  the  African 
possessions  as  respects  agricultural  and  other  development ; 
exploited  almost  solely  in  the  interests  of  the  slave-trade,  they 
lapsed  into  insignificance  when  it  was  crushed.^  A  certain  evasion 
was  practiced  by  shifting  the  trade  to  Mozambique,  but  it  was 
allowed  no  respite  by  its  active  enemies,  and  in  18 10  and  1869 
the  Portuguese  finally  and  with  reluctance  abolished  respectively 
the  trade  and  the  institution.*  As  time  goes  on  and  civilization 
advances  in  these  parts  of  Africa,  illegal  evasions  are  being  more 
and  more  restricted.^ 

Angola 

Angola  constitutes,  according  to  Johnston,  "certainly  the  most 
successful  of  the  Portuguese  attempts  at  the  colonization  of 
Africa."  ^  The  Portuguese  are  inclined  to  esteem  it  above  the 
rest  of  their  possessions  ;  this,  however,  witnesses  rather  to  the 

the  discovery  of  India  the  Portuguese  could  no  longer  hold  their  African  stations 
against  the  foreigner.  1  See  p.  145,  below.  ^  Corvo,  I,  15-16. 

3  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  50-51;  Corvo,  I,  150.  Yet  Martins  (O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  191) 
and  Corvo  (I,  24  ff.)  seem  inclined  to  minimize  this  effect.  For  the  prostration  of 
S.  Thome  and  Principe,  see  Corvo,  I,  100,  105,  111-113,  121-124,  135-136. 

*  Corvo,  11,344-345.  Yet  "before  1849  the  port  of  Mossamedes  was  nothing  more 
than  a  factory  for  the  embarcation  of  negroes  for  Brazil,  America,  and  Cuba."  Id.,  I,  288. 

s  But  compare  the  recent  disclosures  of  Nevinson,  who  has  observed  in  Angola 
conditions  that  recall  the  worst  features  of  evasion. 

6  Johnston,  p.  44;  cf.  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  98-99,  192,  224  ff.  The  latter 
author  is  clear  upon  the  possibilities  of  free  negro  labor.    Id.,  pp.  219-221. 


1 28  COLONIZATION 

unenviable  status  of  the  latter  than  to  the  exaltation  of  the  former. 
For  decades  the  country  was  passed  over  in  favor  of  India ;  it  was 
not  until  1575  that  its  conquest  began,  chiefly  under  Paulo  Diaz, 
and  its  reduction,  even  in  semblance,  took  a  century.  In  fact, 
Angola  is  still  merely  a  "land  of  war  and  trade";  of  settlement, 
there  has  been  practically  none.^  From  the  early  years  of  the 
seventeenth  century  the  Portuguese  attempted,  through  the  estab- 
lishment of  fairs  and  markets,  to  call  some  trade  into  being ;  a 
species  of  fetichistic  Christianity  resulted  in  still  earlier  times  from 
the  activities  of  questionable  missionaries.  Even  these  enterprises 
were  rendered  well-nigh  impossible  of  accomplishment  by  the 
excessive  mortality  of  the  Portuguese  and  by  the  general  corrup- 
tion of  the  service.  Although  Sao  Paulo  de  Loanda  was  founded 
in  1574,  it  took  a  long  time  to  master  the  country  down  to  Ben- 
guela,  and  until  1840  to  reach  the  present  limits.^  Emigrants  will 
not  go  to  Angola,  even  from  the  Cape  Verdes  ;  the  convicts  exiled 
thither  in  earlier  times  proved  a  doubtful  benefit ;  both  men  and 
capital  for  economic  development  are  lacking.'^  All  the  "  significant 
works  of  civilization  "  have  been  conspicuous  by  their  absence ; 
"  there  did  not  exist  in  Angola,  until  1877,  any  organization  in  the 
service  of  the  public  works  "  ;  not  a  road  was  projected  between 
1862  and  1877.  The  country  had  been  torpid  after  its  "long  past 
of  indolence  and  ignorance."  *  A  great  deal  of  this  misfortune  is 
referable  to  the  existence  and  cessation  of  the  slave-trade  ;  for 
during  its  existence  it  smothered  all  other  enterprise,  and  with  its 
cessation  little  of  importance  was  left.  Because  of  the  trade,  Portu- 
guese Africa  suffered  the  incursions  of  the  Dutch  and  the  hostility 
of  the  British,  and  laid  up  for  itself  a  heritage  of  rancor  on  the 
part  of  the  abused  and  demoralized  negro  population.*^  However, 
in  later  times  the  country  had  been  favored  by  the  execution  of 
public  works,  chiefly  roads,  of  a  very  necessary  character.  Portu- 
guese writers  differ  in  their  estimate  of  the  colony's  possibilities, 
but  they  are  unanimous  in  their  condemnation  of  the  governmental 
policy  and  its  supineness.^ 

1  Corvo,  I,  I92ff. 

2  On  the  mortality  of  the  African  climate  and  the  attempts  to  minimize  it,  see 
Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  248  ff.;  Corvo,  I,  140.  A  somewhat  favorable  view  is 
presented  in  a  letter  to  Martins  by  a  Portuguese  colonist  in  Quelimane.  Id.,  p.  235, 
note.  ^  Corvo,  I,  47.  *    Id.,  ]>]).  214,  227,  236. 

•»  See  p.  147,  below;  Corvo,  I,  150,  200,  2S7-28S,  29r>. 

^  Corvo,  I,  230,  268.  Corvo  sees  a  "brilliant  future  "for  Angola  (I,  153).  Martins 
regards   Portuguese   Africa,   as  a  whole,  as   unprofitable,  and,   f(jr   the    Portuguese, 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  THE  EAST  1 29 

Mozambique 

As  for  Mozambique,  its  history  has  been  even  less  edifying. 
"  The  savage  state  which  three  centuries  of  our  rule,  more  or  less 
direct,  did  not  avail  to  transform  ;  the  lack  of  activity  and  of  energy 
in  the  labor  of  the  natives  ;  their  unruly  tendency  toward  war  and 
violence ;  the  lack  of  European  or  even  Asiatic  colonization ;  the 
disastrous  influence  of  the  Mohammedan  Arabs  who  for  many 
centuries  have  weighed  East  Africa  down ;  the  lack  of  capital  and 
of  commercial  activity ;  the  fatal  consequences  of  the  horrible 
and  sterilizing  slave-trade  ;  the  errors  and  vices  of  the  administra- 
tion ;  the  lack  of  facilities  of  transport  for  merchandise  ;  the  monop- 
olies and  exclusions  which  have  embarrassed  foreign  transactions, 
industrial  activity,  and  competition,  —  all  these,  in  fine,  have  con- 
tributed to  the  lack  of  development  of  and  profit  by  the  powerful 
resources,  the  immense  material  riches,  of  Mozambique."  ^  The 
white  population  is  a  vanishing  quantity  and  enterprise  almost  non- 
existent. Mozambique  appeared  of  some  account  in  Portuguese 
eyes  only  when  the  journeys  of  Livingstone  in  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century  had  directed  British  attention  to  that  region. 
The  Portuguese  then  made  some  costly  attempts  to  unite  their 
east  and  west  coast  possessions ;  but  the  advance  of  the  British 
could  not  be  withstood.  The  Portuguese  gained  a  slight  advantage 
from  the  biased  decision  of  Marshal  MacMahon,  who  awarded  them 
the  whole  of  Delagoa  Bay  (1875),  and  from  the  construction  of 
the  railroad  to  the  Transvaal.  But  their  attitude  is  one  of  complaint 
rather  than  action  in  the  face  of  British  pressure.  Little  of  the 
Mozambique  trade  is  in  Portuguese  hands  ;  even  the  Portuguese 
chartered  companies  in  East  Africa  have  been  capitalized  by  the 
English  and  French  ;  Mozambique  has  yielded  a  deficit  regularly 
from  1508  to  our  own  time.  Exchange  is  hampered  in  all  of  Por- 
tuguese Africa  by  the  imposition  of  unreasonable  customs  dues.^ 

One  especial  attempt  by  the  Portuguese  government  to  aid 
settlement  in  East  Africa  deserves  mention.  This  was  the  effort 
to  introduce,  in  the  so-called  prasos  da  coroa,  a  sort  of  proprietary 

hopeless.  The  British  might  be  able  to  make  something  of  it.  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  197  ff., 
212-213,  215,  222-223.  Ribeiro,  in  a  work  upon  The  Portuguese  Colonies,  their 
Present  and  Future,  presents  a  much  more  optimistic  outlook.  Reported  in  the 
U.  S.  Consular  Reports,  No.  1996,  July  6,  1904. 

1  Corvo,  II,  355;  cf.  pp.  263,  278,  et passim. 

2  Johnston,  pp.  45  ff. ;  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  97. 


130  COLONIZATION 

system  not  unlike  that  of  the  early  doacoes  in  Brazil.^  1^'erlile 
crown  land,  chiefly  on  the  banks  of  the  Zambesi,  was  given  for 
three  lives  to  women  who  were  descendants  of  European  Portuguese 
parents,  and  who  must  marry  European  Portuguese  husbands.  The 
prasos  were  limited  in  extent  to  three  square  leagues,  and  males 
were  excluded  in  the  succession  But  the  project  came  to  naught, 
owing  to  labor  difficulties,  the  invasion  of  the  slave-trade,  and  other 
practical  difficulties  ;  new  concessions  were  prohibited  in  1838,  and 
the  institution  was  abolished  in  1854.  It  is  severely  condemned  by 
Corvo  and  others  ;  ^  of  course  it  was  well-nigh  impracticable  in 
tropical  Mozambique.  However,  it  was  resurrected  in  1890  under 
a  more  strict  regulation,  and  is  said  to  have  attained  a  limited 
success.^ 

Portuguese  Influences  in  Africa 

It  can  hardly  be  contended  that  the  Portuguese  have  consciously 
exerted  any  influence  for  Africa's  weal ;  but  they  have  unintention- 
ally conferred  some  notable  benefits  by  their  additions  to  the 
articles  of  local  food-supply  and  comfort.  Fruits  like  the  orange, 
lemon,  and  grape ;  sugar-cane,  maize,  manioc,  tobacco,  and  like 
plants,  at  least  in  superior  varieties,  were  introduced  ;  likewise  some 
animals,  in  particular,  swine.*  The  fact  is  that  the  conditions 
obtaining  in  India  were  present  here  too  on  a  smaller  scale ;  for, 
as  Corvo  says,  "  The  early  Portuguese  did  no  more  than  substitute 
themselves  for  the  Moors  ...  in  the  parts  that  they  occupied  on 
the  coast ;  and  their  influence  extended  to  the  interior  very  slightly, 
unless,  indeed,  through  some  ephemeral  alliances  of  no  value  what- 
ever, or  through  missionaries,  or  without  any  practical  or  lasting 
results.    The  true  conquest  is  still  to  be  made."  ^ 

1  See  pp.  133  ff.,  below. 

2  Corvo,  II,  1 19-12 1,  243. 

8  Zimmermann,  I,  192-193. 

*  On  Portuguese  Africa,  see,  besides  Corvo,  Johnston,  pp.  28  ff. ;  Keltic,  pp.  32  ff., 
136  ff.,  401  ff.  Some  successful  attempts  at  improvement  in  Abyssinia  are  said  to  be 
referable  to  the  period  of  strong  Portuguese  influence  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries.    Ratzel,  Hist,  of  Mankind,  III,  226. 

^  Corvo,  II,  125-126.  This  volume  is  dated  1884.  The  quotation  may  be  found 
in  Keltie,  p.  57.  For  the  luxury  and  corruption  of  an  earlier  period  of  decline,  during 
the  seventeenth  century,  see  Corvo,  II,  67. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE   PORTUGUESE   IN   BRAZIL 

The  exploits  of  the  Portuguese  in  India,  because  of  their  con- 
nection with  the  "golden  East,"  and  their  semi-religious  character, 
have  drawn  the  attention  of  the  world,  not  only  in  earlier  centuries 
but  in  a  later  age  as  well.  The  imagination  of  their  contemporaries 
was  captivated  by  phenomenal  successes  in  the  reaUzation  of  aims 
that  existed  or  came  to  exist  in  the  minds  of  all.  The  Portuguese 
had,  to  all  appearance,  successfully  consummated  the  connection 
long  striven  for  between  the  trade-areas  of  East  and  West,  and 
were  in  consequence  the  envied  holders  of  exclusive  commercial 
advantages.  That  the  worth  of  this  monopoly  was  consistently  over- 
estimated, simply  added  to  the  power  and  reputation  of  its  posses- 
sors. And,  in  subsequent  time,  the  romantic  tale  of  Portuguese 
achievements,  bereft  by  distance  of  any  unpleasant  or  sordid  aspects, 
had  exercised  a  peculiar  fascination  upon  recounters  and  their 
audiences.  The  "  wealth  of  Ormus  and  of  Ind  "  is  familiar  to  those 
whose  interests  lie  far  from  markets  and  colonies.  And  yet,  when 
the  tale  of  the  exploits  in  India  is  done,  we  have  the  really  enduring 
contributions  of  the  Portuguese  to  the  history  of  colonization  still 
to  consider. 

Vasco  da  Gama,  relying  upon  the  accumulations  of  nautical 
experience  made  by  the  captains  who  had  preceded  him,  and  profit- 
ing by  his  own  special  knowledge,  provided  Cabral,  who  commanded 
the  next  Indian  fleet,  with  sailing  directions  which,  to  catch  the 
south-east  trades,  carried  him  far  toward  the  west.^  In  the  pursu- 
ance of  this  course,  or  in  fortuitous  deviation  from  it,  Cabral  made 
the  coast  of  South  America.  He  thus  discovered  (April,  1501) 
what  proved  to  be  the  New  World,  on  the  count  of  Portugal,  some 
nine  years  after  the  voyage  of  Columbus ;  and  the  occurrence  was 
thought  important  enough  to  warrant  the  return  of  one  ship  to 

1  Varnhagen,  I,  17  ff.;  cf.  Rio-Branco,  p.  105  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  217-218; 
Payne,  Age  of  Disc,  p.  35.  For  a  brief  description  of  the  voyage  of  Yaiiez  Pinzon, 
see  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  69-70 ;  reference  to  the  third  voyage  of  Columbus,  id., 
p.  47. 


132  COLONIZATION 

convey  the  news  to  Portugal.  Cabral  was  unable,  of  course,  to  esti- 
mate the  magnitude  of  the  new  acquisition.  He  conceived  it  to  be 
another  of  the  Antilles  Islands,  and  named  it  Ilha  da  Vera  Cruz. 
This  was  subsequently  modified  to  Terra  da  Santa  Crnz,  and  finally 
changed,  upon  the  discovery  of  a  dyewood  similar  to  the  valued 
brazil-wood  of  the  East,  to  Brazil} 

Early  Conditions  of  the  Captaincies 

The  only  appeal  which  Brazil  could  make  to  Portugal  was  on  the 
score  of  profits  from  the  forests,  and  even  of  these  but  little  is  heard. 
It  is  characteristic  of  the  age  and  its  aims  that  the  Portuguese 
repeatedly  tried  to  get  around  or  through  Brazil  toward  the  west, 
and  thus  it  was  presently  (i  501)  discovered  that  the  supposed  island 
was  part  of  a  very  large  land-mass.  For  many  years,  however, 
Brazilian  harbors  were  little  better  than  substitutes,  along  a  more 
satisfactory  route,  for  the  declining  African  stations.  Preoccupa- 
tion with  the  riches  of  In^a.anticipated  any  vital  interest  in  a  rough 
and  virgin  land.  The  government  sent  out  colonists,  but  at  first 
rather  with  a  view  toward  its  own  relief  than  toward  Brazil's  better- 
ment, for  the  exiles  were  mostly  convicts  and  women  of  ill  repute. 
Little  more  was  done  during  the  first  decades  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury than  to  establish  small  settlements  or  factories  on  the  best 
harbors.  According  to  Varnhagen,  the  earliest  real  colony  was  at 
Sao  Vicente,  near  Sao  Paulo.  But  it  was  already  the  intention  of 
the  government  that  the  fleet  which  should  hold  and  defend  the 
Brazilian  coast  should  be  supported  out  of  local  resources.  The 
money  which  Portugal  could  spare  for  such  objects  had  been  swept 
into  the  current  that  set  toward  India.^ 

However,  as  time  went  on,  the  original  nuclei  of  population 
received  additions  from  the  voluntary  immigration  of  a  much 
better  quality  of  colonists.  These  were  represented  in  large  part 
by  Jews,  who  had  fled  from  Portugal  to  escape  the  Inquisition, 
and  who  proposed  to  make  their  homes  in  Brazil.^    This  growth 

^  It  is  perhaps  significant  of  the  relative  predominance  in  Portuguese  minds  of  the 
commercial  over  the  religious  aspects  of  their  new  possession  that  in  this  christening 
the  "  gainful  wood  "  {Jenho  lucrativo)  thus  supplanted  the  "  sacred  wood."  Varnhagen, 
I,  24;"cf.  pp.  17-24;  Watson,  I,  91  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  117-118.  ^ 

2  Varnhagen,  I,  18-20,  30,  43,  53;  Stephens,  pp.  220  ff.,  347.  — ^ 

^  Zimmermann,  I,  119.  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  51-52)  assigns  great  importance  to  this 
element  in  the  population.  Stephens  (pp.  227  ff .)  says  that  Brazilian  colonization  was 
essentially  popular,  not  royally  or  otherwise  artificially  initiated. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  133 

of  population  and  the  increasing  interest  of  the  French  in  South 
America  gradually  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Portuguese  to 
their  lightly  esteemed  dependency.  The  necessities  of  develop- 
ment and  defense  were  met,  in  the  absence  or  impossibility  of  a 
display  of  individual  initiative,  by  the  adoption  (1532)  of  a  semi- 
feudal  system  of  proprietary  grants  or  fiefs.  The  proprietors 
{doiiatarios)  were  lords  who  should  defend  the  country  and  settle 
it  on  their  own  counts,  thus  releasing  government  resources  for 
the  India  enterprises.  In  pursuance  of  this  expedient  the  w^hole 
dependency,  back  theoretically  to  the  Demarcation  meridian,  was 
divided  by  lines  running  parallel  to  the  equator  into  fifteen  sec- 
tions, forming  twelve  hereditary  captaincies  of  from  600  to  12,000 
square  leagues  in  area.^  These  were  distributed  to  favored  per- 
sons, and  so  differed  in  size  with  the  favor  shown.  The  powers  of 
the  donatarios  were,  roughly  speaking,  somewhat  more  than  vice- 
regal. The  home  government  exercised  over  them  a  sort  of  pro- 
tectorate with  limited  control,  in  return  for  the  payment  of  a  few 
taxes  and  the  right  of  instatement  at  every  change  of  possession ; 
the  donatario  could  issue  land-grants,  found  cities,  name  officials 
and  judges,  and  exercise  other  similar  powers.  The  colonists  were 
assured  only  of  protection  of  property,  freedom  of  trade  with  the 
Indians,  and  non-extradition  on  account  of  former  crimes.  Catho- 
lics of  all  nations  were  allowed  to  settle,  but  non-Portuguese  were 
discouraged  from  trade  by  various  restrictions.^ 

The  history  of  the  captaincies  is  for  the  most  part  a  dull  chron- 
icle of  life  on  a  small  scale.  Few  of  them  actually  prospered.  The 
donatarios  were  eager,  of  course,  to  get  people  to  come  with  capi- 
tal and  take  up  land ;  but  their  efforts  met,  on  the  whole,  with 
little  success.  The  scattered  and  backward  native  population  ^ 
offered  but  few  inducements  to  traders.  No  one  believed  that 
Brazil  had  any  value.  Two  ships  a  year  conveyed  from  Portugal 
the  aforesaid  men   and  women    of    questionable    character,*   and 

1  A  map  of  these  doafoes  or  capitanias  is  given  in  Varnhagen,  I,  opp.  p.  88;  a  list 
with  dates,  in  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  10. 

2  The  details  of  the  system  are  to  be  found  in  Varnhagen,  I,  60-63,  72  ff. ;  Wat- 
son, pp.  155  ff.;  Zimmermann,  I,  119  ff.  The  idea  was  earlier  utilized  in  the  Azores 
and  Madeira  Islands  (Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  3  ff.),  and  later,  in  the  form  of  the 
prasos  da  coroa,  in  Mozambique  (Corvo,  II,  119-121,  243). 

3  See  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  133  ff. 

*  Of  these  the  donatario  of  Peniambuco  wrote  to  the  king  ( 1 546) :  "  These  people 
are  \^orse  than  the  plague  ;  therefore  I  beg  you,  for  God's  sake,  to  spare  me  this 
poison  in  the  future."     Quoted  in  Zimmermann,  I,  124. 


134 


COLONIZATION 


brought  back  wood,  parrots,  and  other  curious  products.  The 
scanty  European  population,  exhibiting  scarcely  any  of  those 
qualities  of  energy  and  self-sufficiency  which  we  have  come  to 
associate  with  the  term  "settler,"  took  to  the  ways  of  the  natives 
in  its  attempt  to  conform  to  an  environment  which  it  could  not 
control ;  native  products  were  raised,  and  native  arts  and  crafts 
were  imitated.  Fusion  of  races  began  early,  and  several  varieties 
of  half-breed  came  soon  to  be  distinguished.  On  the  part  of 
the  government  no  effort  was  directed  toward  exploration.  The 
interior  was  unvisited  and  unknown  ;  the  whole  colony  was  sys- 
tematically neglected.  Portuguese  indifference  under  the  pro- 
prietary system  "  recognized  the  independence  of  Brazil  before 
colonizing  it."  ^ 

A  great  deal  of  this  adversity  was  directly  chargeable  to  the 
regime  of  the  donatarios,  and  when,  toward  the  middle  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  Brazil  had  come  to  be  regarded  as  of  some 
importance  to  Portugal,  the  fact  was  immediately  recognized. 
The  original  division  has  been  made  on  too  sweeping  a  scale 
and  with  little  or  no  discrimination  ;  the  grants  were  too  large, 
and  no  reservation  of  land  for  future  assignment  had  been 
made.  The  massing  of  smaller  holdings  about  the  ports  would 
have  concentrated  population  and  encouraged  industry,  whereas 
the  system  adopted  had  effected  the  exact  reverse.  The  dona- 
tarios, also,  had  been  given  too  much  authority.  It  was  impossi- 
ble for  the  supreme  power  from  across  the  Atlantic  to  control  the 
virtually  separate  governments  of  the  captaincies.  The  lives  and 
property  of  the  colonists  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  several  lords, 
and  the  many  complaints  made  to  the  king  witness  for  the  fact 
that  some,  at  least,  of  the  captains  did  not  fail  to  take  advantage 
of  the  situation.  Even  where  they  were  honest,  the  donatarios 
were  generally  pitiful  failures.  Those  in  northern  Brazil  had 
almost  all  come  to  grief  by  1550,  and  misunderstandings  with 
the  natives  and  miniature  wars  of  all  kinds  constituted  the  order, 
or  rather  disorder,  of  the  day.  In  view  of  all  this  the  king  was 
led  in    1 549  to  revoke  the  powers  of  the  captains  while  leaving 

1  Varnhagen,  I,  74;  cf.  pp.  98,  170-172.  Velasco  (p.  566)  reports  the  following  of 
Brazil  in  1574  :  "  Christians  in  this  land  live  in  a  space  of  350  leagues  close  to  the 
coast,  and  they  do  not  settle  in  the  back-country  because  the  Indians  do  not  allow 
it,  and  at  the  same  time  because  they  wish  to  be  near  the  sea  for  jnirjioses  of  trade." 
In  all  the  captaincies  "  they  have  sixteen  i'ortuguese  to\Vns,  in  which  there  are  2  540 
inhabitants." 


THK  rORTUGUESE  IN   BRAZIL  135 

them  their  grants,  and  to  appoint  over  them  a  governor-general, 
who  should  regulate  abuses  and  correct  and  unify  ill-considered 
and  divergent  policies.  The  seat  of  government  was  fixed  at 
Bahia.i 

This  move  led,  of  course,  to  the  break-up  of  the  captaincies, 
although  the  latter  would  inevitably  have  passed  away  with  the 
growth  of  population.  The  system  was,  like  that  of  the  chartered 
company,  simply  a  governmental  makeshift.  The  donatarios  dis- 
played the  semblance  of  administration  and  defense  until  the 
state  had  satisfied  itself  that  it  was  worth  while  to  take  over  the 
burden.  This  persuasion  was  reached  when  the  India  dream  had 
begun  to  betray  its  illusive  nature,  and  when  Brazil  had  com- 
menced to  attract  the  attention  of  European  rivals. ^  "  Little  by 
little  the  kings  of  Portugal  recovered  all  these  fiefs  through 
inheritance,  purchase,  or  otherwise.  The  last  captaincies  still 
existing  under  feudal  regime  were  bought  back  by  the  crown  in 
the  eighteenth  century  in  the  time  of  D.  Jose  I  and  Pombal.^ 

The  fundamental  charge  against  the  captaincy-system  was,  of 
course,  its  artificiality,  or,  to  put  it  another  way,  its  contravention 
of  natural  development.  The  provinces  were  crudely  ruled  off  on 
the  map  with  little  or  no  regard  to  natural  conditions.  The  stream 
of  emigration  was  split  up  into  a  number  of  currents,  each  setting 
under  direction  toward  the  locations  in  each  captaincy  upon  which, 
for  sufficient  or  insufficient  reason,  the  donatarios  had  pitched. 
Consequently,  as  Martins  says,  settlement  started  in  several  dis- 
tinct centers  of  "social  ossification,"  and  the  colony  tended  to 
subdivide  itself  into  a  number  of  disconnected  areas.^  Thus  a 
variety  of  small  centers  of  feeble  development,  and  therefore  ex- 
posed to  many  special  exigencies,  took  the  place  of  several  strong 
and  populous  nuclei  in  localities  naturally  selected  as  favorable 
to  man  and  his  activities.  Again,  the  attempt  to  impose  an  aristo- 
cratic system  upon  a  virgin  country  was  sure  to  encounter  the  fate 
reserved  for  such  attempts,  under  similar  circumstances,  through- 
out the  history  of  colonization.  The  efforts  of  noble  Portuguese 
houses  to  transplant  their   less   promising    offshoots  beyond  the 

1  Vamhagen,  I,  69-71,  192,  200;  Watson,  I,  155-158  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  125  ff. 

2  Cf.  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  52. 

3  Rio-Branco,  pp.  no  ff . ;  Watson,  II,  239;  cf.  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  13. 
For  a  list  of  the  early  governors  of  Brazil,  see  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  25,  note. 

•*  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  126,  127;  cf.  p.  12.  This  tendency  was  later  accentuated  in 
consequence  of  the  "  adventurous  hunt  for  Indians  and  mines." 


136  COLONIZATION 

seas  in  the  natural  course  of  events  came  to  naught.^  The  estab- 
lishment of  the  capital  at  Bahia  was  a  further  exhibition  of  the 
same  artificial  methods ;  although  cartographically  central  among 
the  scattered  nuclei  already  mentioned,  Bahia  was  the  focus  neither 
of  economic  development  nor  of  population.  It  took  a  time  of 
stress,  forcibly  calling  attention  to  the  superiority  in  these  respects 
of  the  southern  provinces,  to  secure  the  removal  of  the  capital  to 
Rio  de  Janeiro.^  One  must,  however,  realize  that  at  the  outset 
the  southern  provinces  were  regarded  as  relatively  unimportant, 
since  they  contributed  none  of  those  tropical  products  which  alone 
appealed  to  the  Portuguese.  The  flow  of  population  to  these  regions 
was  slight  and  almost  unnoticed  before  the  gold  discoveries. 

The  man  chosen  to  be  the  first  governor-general  was  D. 
Thome  de  Souza,  and  the  selection  was  apparently  a  happy  one. 
He  attended  to  the  much-neglected  interests  of  the  crown,  re- 
duced the  excessive  power  of  the  donatarios,  and  established 
better  relations  with  the  Indians.  He  also  saw  the  value  of  the 
"  new  Christians  "  {iiovacs  christidos)  and  tried  to  protect  them. 
Without  using  his  position  to  justify  undue  interference,  and  leav- 
ing locally  established  government,  where  it  was  stable,  alone,  he 
yet  punished  prevalent  acts  of  atrocity  with  great  severity  and 
labored  always  to  curb  the  mutual  hostility  and  to  effect  the  con- 
solidation of  the  almost  independent  captaincies.'^  His  administra- 
tion is  looked  upon  as  one  of  the  landmarks  in  Brazil's  early  history. 
Under  his  successors,  although  they  were  in  general  men  of  an 
inferior  stamp,  population  increased  and  the  state  of  the  colony 
became  more  satisfactory.  This  was  more  particularly  the  case 
during  the  governorship  of  Mem  de  Sa  (15 58-1 570).'* 

Indu-Stry  and  Trade 

At  the  very  outset  of  their  acquaintance  with  Brazil,  as  has 
been  said,  the  Portuguese,  judging  that  country  and  India  accord- 
ing to  the  same  criteria,  regarded  it  as  of  comparatively  slight 
value.  Of  the  one  local  product  which  appealed  to  them  with  any 
force,  relatively  but  small  and  variable  quantities  could  be  gotten 
at  the  coast.  For  the  native  population  of  Brazil  were_and  re- 
mained practically  insensible  to  economic   stimuli,  presenting  in 


1  See  Martins,  O  I'razil,  etc.,  p.  12.  2  c;eg  p    ,50,  below. 

3  Stephens,  pp.  225  ff.  ^  Or  Men  de  Sa,  as  Varnhagen  insists  (I,  233) 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  137 

this  a  complete  contrast  to  the  Eastern  peoples  to  whom  the 
Portuguese  were  used.  In  the  East,  European  demand  impinged 
upon  the  native  rulers,  and  these  took  measures  to  secure  an  in- 
creasing output ;  but  in  South  America,  as  the  Portuguese  knew 
it,  there  was  no  native  organization  to  receive  and  transmit  pres- 
sure. A  certaIn~amouhr"or  settlement  and  of  proHuction  under 
European  management  was  thus  in  Brazil  an  almost  necessary 
condition  for  the  development  of  trade.  It  has  been  seen  that  the 
earliest  settlers  were  largely  convicts  and  fugitive  Jews  ;  the  latter, 
with  characteristic  resource  and  industry,  speedily  introduced  the 
cultivation  of  the  plant  which  furnished  in  time  the  staple  of  Brazil, 
—  the  sugar-ca,rx&.  Sugar-production  once  started  in  a  favoring 
environment,  plantations  developed  rapidly  and  yielded  good  prof- 
its. Each  plantation  demanded  a  rather  numerous  European  per- 
sonnel,^ and  since  the  Portuguese  government,  in  its  low  appraisal 
of  Brazil,  spared  it  a  good  part  of  that  petty  regulation  which  dis- 
courages individual  initiative,  a  number  of  desirable  emigrants 
were  gradually  attracted  across  the  seas.  Because  Brazil  had 
shown  no  promise  of  wealth  in  gold  and  silver,  it  had  for  a  time 
been  on  the  verge  of  official  abandonment.  It  was  the  "  whole- 
some neglect "  which  fell  to  its  share  that  saved  it  in  some  degree, 
especiany^cTuring  its  early  years,  from  the  system  of  ruthless  exploi- 
tation under  which  tropical  dependencies  have  so  often  languished. ^ 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Portuguese  frequented  this  tropical 
climate  with  some  impunity,  it  soon  became  clear  that  they  were 
incapable  of  doing  justice  to  the  sugar-industry  without  aid.  They 
were  not  numerous  enough,  many  were  physically  unable  to  put 
forth  the  effort  required,  and  almost  all  were  by  character  unfitted. 
They  began  early  to  have  recourse  to  native  labor,  and  experienced 
little  difficulty  in  coercing  the  rude  and  mutually  hostile  Indian 
groups  to  their  will.    The  Portuguese  have  always  taken  readily  to 

1  Watson,  II,  120. 

2  "  A  policy  of  rational  freedom  exempted  agriculture,  industry,  and  commerce 
from  vexatious  restrictions,  opening  the  colony  to  foreigners  upon  the  payment  of 
light  differential  duties.  The  imposts  were  moderate,  the  monopolized  articles  few, 
and  the  movement  of  individuals  from  one  captaincy  to  another,  or  from  any  one  of 
them  to  foreign  parts,  was  free.  Such  was  the  first  constitution  of  Portuguese 
America.  ..."  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  lo-ii.  In  fact,  after  1640  and  the  loss 
of  the  Oriental  empire  it  was  seen  to  be  useless  to  prohibit  the  cultivation  of  spices, 
etc.,  in  America.  Id.,  p.  67.  It  was  much  later  (eighteenth  century)  that  limitation  of 
Brazilian  production  in  the  interest  of  Portugal  took  place.  Zimmermann,  I,  172 ; 
Stephens,  pp.  227  ff.  -  " 


138  COLONIZATION 

the  slavery  system,  and  here  it  was  in  many  ways  indispensable  to 
the  preservation  of  economic  life.  But  it  was  not  put  into  operation 
unopposed  ;  if  in  their  material  preoccupations  the  Portuguese  as  a 
whole  had  ceased  to  think  much'  about  the  extension  of  the  faith, 
there  was  among  them  a  class  of  professional  zealots  who  claimed 
to  think  about  nothing  else,  —  the  Jesuits.  This  powerful  order 
set  itself  strongly  against  Indian  slavery,  for  it  contemplated  the 
organization  of  the  untouched  savages,  their  segregation  from  de- 
moralizing association  with  Europeans,  and  their  conversion  en 
masse.  The  incompatibility  between  the  economic  needs  of  tlie 
planters  and  the  religious  aims  of  the  Jesuits  manifested  itself  in 
the  early  days  of  the  Portuguese  settlement,  and  the  story  of  the 
collision  of  the  two  conflicting  interests  forms  a  good  part  of  the 
history  of  the  colony. 

The  country  was,  then,  primarily  an  agricultural  one,  and  sugar 
and  woods  long  formed  its  major  exports.  About  1580  Sao  Sal- 
vador had  57  sugar- works,  exporting  annually  2400  hogsheads  ; 
Pernambuco  had  50.  In  addition  to  sugar,  many  products  for  a 
prevailingly  local  use  were  raised.  The  orange,  lemon,  and  palm 
trees  grew  well,  likewise  the  cocoa  and  tea  plants  ;  there  were  also 
some  valuable  Indian  foods  like  manioc.  Cattle  and  horses,  imported 
from  the  Cape  Verdes,  throve  and  multiplied.  Aside,  therefore, 
from  a  single  main  staple,  Brazil  grew  many  other  products  valu- 
able for  the  maintenance  of  life.  All  through  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries  the  colony  proceeded  toward  a  more  settled 
and  extensive  agricultural  economy,  and  although  only  an  occasional 
portion  of  its  immense  periphery  was  settled,  the  stations  were  of 
a  common  type.  The  colony  became  constantly  more  valuable  to 
Portugal ;  for  one  thing,  the  mother-country  enjoyed  its  exclusive 
trade.  Toward  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  about  forty-five 
ships  came  to  Brazil  annually  for  sugar  and  brazil-wood,  and  Por- 
tugal likewise  monopolized  the  coasting  trade. ^  When  the  deca- 
dence of  India  had  now  become  apparent,  it  was  realized  that  Brazil 
was  the  most  valuable  national  possession,  and  it  went  steadily  on 
in  its  development,  despite  checks  presently  to  be  mentioned,  until 
its  trade  with  Portugal  equaled  that  of  Portugal  with  all  the  coun- 
tries of  Europe. 2 

^  Watson,  pp.  251-252  ;  cf.  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  67. 

2  Varnhagen,  I,  303;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  53.  In  1688,  "the  fleet  which  sailed  from 
Bahia  was  the  largest  which  ever  left  that  port,  and  yet  it  did  not  contain  tonnage 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN   BRAZIL  139 

In  spite  of  the  value  of  Brazilian  sugar,  however,  the  Portuguese 
trade  jiolicy  was,  at  least  in  comparison  with  the  Spanish,  liberal. 
Non-Portuguese  were  early  handicapped  by  certain  disabilities,  but 
these  were  not  i:)rohibitive,  as  is  proved  by  the  constant  increase 
of  foreigners  and  their  factories  from  the  sixteenth  century  on. 
Commerce  was  subjected  to  the  system  of  regular  "  caravans,"  but 
this  was  rendered  but  slightly  oppressive  because  of  the  number  of 
ships  allowed  and  the  number  of  stations  visited. ^  Here  again  the 
treatment  accorded  to  Brazil  was  markedly  distinct  from  the  meas- 
ures that  hampered  the  India  trade.  In  fact,  the  Brazilians  em- 
barked so  eagerly  in  commerce  that  the  civil  and  judicial  officers 
and  even  the  clergy  showed  great  readiness  to  become  involved  in 
speculation.^  The  settlers,  too,  had  something  to  say  about  the 
system.  In  1649  when  a  privileged  company  was  founded,  com- 
manding a  large  number  of  armed  ships  and  a  regiment  of  infantry 
and  artillery,  the  merchants  of  Rio  and  Bahia  were  able  by  their 
representations  to  secure  needed  reform,  and  finally  the  suppression 
of  the  organization  (1720).^ 

What  has  been  said  is  perhaps  enough  to  establish  the  fact  that 
for  two  hundred  years  Brazil's  development  followed  the  line  of 
agricultural  production  and  exchange.  It  is  not  surprising,  there- 
fore, to  find  the  writers  on  Brazil  adopting  a  sort  of  self-congratu- 
latory vein  as  they  remark  upon  the  lateness  of  the  discovery  of 
the  country's  mineral  wealth.  For,  as  they  say,  Brazil's  very  pov- 
erty and  its  consequent  neglect  gave  it  the  opportunity  for  ah 
unhurried,  natural  development  as  a  transplanted  portion  of  the 
Portuguese  nation,  and  as  a  result  they  adduce  the  conservation  in 
Brazil  of  tTie  Portuguese  language,  the  Catholic  religion,  and  many 
another  national  character  which  causes  the  powerful  western 
state,  now  that  India  is  gone,  to  reflect  glory  upon  its  diminutive 
metropolis,  and  to  lend  it  economic  and  other  support."*  This  is  an 
a  posteriori  judgment  with  the  usual  excellences  of  its  kind  ;  the 
Portuguese  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  felt  nothing 

sufficient  for  the  produce.  ..."  A  further  indication  of  commercial  advance  lay  in 
the  betterment  of  the  currency  (1694).    Watson,  II,  109. 

1  These  were  six  in  number,  —  Lisbon,  Oporto,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Parai^ba,  Olinda,  Sao 
Salvador.  Pombal  replaced  the  caravans  with  privileged  companies.  Leroy-Beaulieu, 
I)  53-         ^  Watson,  II,  116-117. 

8  Rio-Branco,  p.  135  ;  Varnhagen,  II,  37  ff. 

*  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  52)  says  :  "  Portuguese  colonization  in  America,  at  least  during 
the  first  two  centuries,  differs  much  from  Spanish  colonization  and  approaches  rather 
the  English  system."    A  brief  series  of  comparisons  follow. 


q^^,.|^->-V■'>^*<  '     '      ^'^^  ^-  ^' 


O'  ,-\  V      \r  S^ 


140 


COLONIZATION 


but  chagrin  at  their  commonplace  colony,  when  they  compared  it 
with  the  golden  soil  of  Peru.  There  were  from  the  outset  certain 
rumors  of  mineral  wealth,  and  convictions  that  "  the  ground  of 
Brazil  and  of  Peru  were  the  same,"  but  iov  generations  no  verifica- 
tion appeared.^  The  discoveries  for  which  the  pioneers  longed  and 
toiled  were  delayed  until  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  history  of  the  colony,  from  the  time  of  Mem  de  Sa  (about 
1570)  until  the  period  just  mentioned,  shows  little  worth  remark 
upon  the  purely  administrative  side.  The  doings  of  many  decades 
are  really  massed  about  two  great  and  protracted  struggles,  —  that 
between  the  p^lanters  and  the  Jesuits  in  regard  to  the  labor  supply^ 
and  that  of  the  Portuguese  colonists  as  a  whole  with  the  aggression 
of  foreign  nations, ^chiefly  France  and  Holland. '-^  That  the  former 
and  internal  contest  was  subject  to  periodic  truces,  during  which 
erstwhile  enemies  worked  shoulder  to  shoulder  in  a  common  cause, 
goes  almost  without  saying,  if  one  recalls  the  traditional  qualities 
of  the  Portuguese  when  forced  to  the  defensive. 


Social  Conditions 

Of  the  quality  of  the  European  population  in  Brazil  something 
has  already  been  said.  Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  Brazil  was 
at  the  outset  practically  a  penal  colony,  it  is  not  difficult  to  under- 
stand why  the  ecclesiastics  soon  found  themselves  obliged  to  raise 
a  voice  against  the  depravity  of  religion  and  morals.  There  was  no 
honor  in  the  public  business,  but  in  its  stead  a  "cynical  egoism." 
Justice,  good  faith,  and  confidence  had  fled  the  land  ;  robberies 
and  assassinations  were  everyday  affairs.  The  average  of  crime  was 
for  some  time  higher  than  in  Portugal  itself.^  This  state  of  things 
was  peculiarly  characteristic  of  the  time  of  the  captaincies.  But 
there  were  other  influences  at  work  to  modify  the  character  of  the 
population,  and  one  was  the  change  of  natural  environment.  The 
climate  of  tropical  Brazil  proved  hurtful  to  many  Europeans,  and 

i  "  There  existed  a  conviction  that  the  '  ground  of  Brazil  and  that  of  Peru  were  the 
same.'  .  .  .  But  it  did  not  please  God  to  ordain  that  this  should  be  confirmed  before 
Brazil  was  more  secure.  The  expeditions  which  were  undertaken  did  not  come  to 
anything.  And  it  is  lucky  that  they  did  not,  for  the  discoveiy  of  mines  in  the  interior 
when  there  were  still  so  few  people  on  the  coast,  would  have  left  the  latter  district 
deserted,  and  the  French  would  have  perchance  seized  upon  it."  Varnhagen,  I,  214; 
of.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  54-55.  ^  Watson,  II,  112. 

3  Watson,  I,  122,  253;  Varnhagen,  I,  203-204,  especially  pp.  185-189. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  141 

new  diseases  or  new  forms  of  old  ones  constantly  appeared.  Of  the 
children  born  not  one  in  three  lived  until  the  Portuguese  mothers 
had  learned  to  adopt  native  methods  of  care-taking.^  If,  in  spite  of 
these  facts,  it  is  said  that  "  in  no  instance  have  Europeans  suffered 
so  little  by  transplantation  from  their  own  country  into  one  of  very 
different  climate  as  did  the  Portuguese  in  Brazil,"  ^  the  implication 
is  that  other  Europeans  suffered  excessively  rather  than  that  the 
Portuguese  escaped  well-nigh  scathless. 

Out  of  this  tropical  climate  and  other  physical  influences  arose 
also  the  plantation-systfim...o£  agriculturCj  to  which  some  allusion 
has  been  made,  and  its  general  adoption  and  prosperity  had  pro- 
duced a  singular  modification  of  customs  on  the  part  of  what  had 
been  at  one  time  a  fairly  laborious  and  economical  element  of  the 
population.  "  In  the  more  flourishing  settlements  .  .  .  nothing 
could  exceed  the  luxury  of  the  female  costume,  the  wives  of  the 
planters  being  attired  in  silks  and  satins  covered  with  the  richest 
embroidery,  with  pearls,  rubies  and  emeralds.  .  .  .  The  ladies  of  r 
Bahia  were  so  indolent  of  habit  that  on  going  abroad  they  had  to 
lean  on  their  pages  lest  they  should  fall.  Even  the  men  —  if  men 
they  might  be  called  —  were  unable  to  descend  the  declivity  on 
which  Bahia  stands,  and  were  carried  down  on  a  contrivance  called 
a  serpentine,  that  is  to  say,  a  hammock  suspended  from  a  pole,  a 
slave  attending  meanwhile  with  a  parasol."^  About  1560  gaming 
had  to  be  prohibited  under  severe  penalties,  for  it  had  become  a 
prevalent  vice  of  an  idle  people.*  The  officials  gambled  with  the 
opportunities  of  the  colony  itself  in  no  less  consistent  a  manner,  and 
the  governors,  appointed  generally  upon  a  three-year  term  as  in 
India,  enriched  themselves  by  every  means.  The  underpaid  func- 
tionaries were  almost  compelled  by  their  exigencies  to  be  dishonest. 
Even  the  priests,  except  the  Jesuits,  were  chiefly  engaged  in 
securing  gain.^  The  population  was  vain  of  material  successes,  but 
raw  and  uncultured,  and  it  was  still  very  small  toward  the  end 
of  the  seventeenth  century.  The  number  of  Portuguese  who  held 
this  vast  area  subject  should  not  be  over-estimated.  Until  mining 
led  them  inland  they  held  small  coast  stations  only  ;  sjiaces  equal  in 
size  to  an  average  European  kingdom  are  still  uninhabited.  During 
the  seventeenth  century  the  numbers  were  "  so  scanty  that  it  seems 
strange  that  the  Portuguese  could  have  at  the  same  time  contended 

1  Southey,  I,  345.  -  Watson,  I,  252-253.  '^  Id.,  TI.  121. 

*  Varnhagen,  I,  252.  ^  Southey,  I,  345;  Watson,  II,  114-115. 


1^2  COLONIZATION 

successfully  with  a  foreign  invader  and  with  hostile  tribes  in  the 
interior."^  In  1585  the  settlements  had  a  population  of  about 
57,000,  of  whom  25,000  were  whites  in  scattered  groups,  18,500 
civilized  Indians,  and  14,000  African  slaves,^  and  the  next  century 
saw  relatively  slight  increase. 


Relations  with  the  Natives  :  The  Labor  Question 

The  whole  system  was  based  upon  the  domination  and  exploita- 
tion of  the  reduced  country  and  people.  For  reasons  assigned,  the 
vital  condition  of  economic  existence  was  a  chcai)  labor  supply,  und 
the  natives  were  early  enslaved.  Against  this  outcome'lhe  Indians 
struggled  with  all  the  desperation  of  the  American  savage,  preferring 
death  and  race-extermination  to  a  servile  station  and  labor.  By  the 
influence  of  the  Jesuits  their  case  was  repeatedly  brought  before 
the  king  and  state,  and  from  early  times  orders  of  various  kinds 
looking  to  their  freedom  were  emitted  from  Lisbon.  Without  a 
strong  local  agency  for  their  enforcement  these  would  have  been  of 
no  avail,  and  as  it  was  they  were  again  and  again  rendered  null  and 
void  by  the  necessities  and  self-will  of  the  colonists.  The  natural 
conditions  demanded  native  slavery,  and  it  took  all  the  force  of  the 
most  powerful  of  religious  and  political  brotherhoods  to  stem  the 
tide.^  The  planters  grew  to  hate  the  Jesuits  as  the  authors  of  their 
misfortunes,  and  did  not  fail  to  assert  that  the  fathers  profited 
largely  by  their  discomfiture.  Yet  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Jesuits 
were  not  opposing  slavery  as  an  institution,  but  the  specific  enslave- 
ment of  the  Indians,  of  heathen  whom  they  wished  to  gather  into 
the  fold  while  they  were  still  uncontaminated  by  contact  with  the 
lambs  already  technically  in,  but  not  as  yet  wholly  above  suspicion. 

Whatever  the  theories,  the  facts  speak  for  themselves.  The 
colonists  at  first  repaid  themselves  for  their  labors  in  reducing  the 
country  by  drawing  upon  the  physical  forces  of  the  conquered.* 
But  as  the  plantation  grew,  these  products  of  "just  wars"  were 
not  numerous  enough,  and  periodic  slave-raids  comparable  to  the 
better-known  razzias  of  Africa  were  the  regular  thing  ;  these  were 

1  Watson,  II,  1 19  ;  cf.  p.  112. 

2  Rio-Branco,  p.  116. 

3  Walson,  I,  161-163;  Vamhagen,  I,  257  ff.  A  good  general  sketch  of  the  Indian 
situation  and  the  conflict  of  planters  and  Jesuits  is  given  by  Zimmermann,  I,  i  2S  ff. 

■♦  Martins,  O  Ikazil,  etc.,  p.  50. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN   BRAZIL  143 

attended  by  an  enormous  waste  of  life  under  cruel  treatment  and 
exposure.  As  slaves  the  Indians  were  not  able  to  perform  the  hard 
labor  imposed  upon  them  and  to  which  they  were  totally  unused, 
and  they  died  away  as  a  race  beneath  it.  At  first  the  colonists  were 
allowed  to  enslave  at  will ;  later  King  Sebastian  issued  a  clerically 
inspired  regulation  (1570)  declaring  all  Indians  free  "excepting 
such  as  should  be  taken  in  war  made  by  command  of  the  king  or 
governor,  or  such  as  were  aggressive  cannibals."  In  still  later  times 
many  similar  decrees  were  published,  but  these  were  almost  invari- 
ably made  to  suit  every  individual  occasion. ^  As  in  the  Spanish 
Indian  legislation,  the  intent  was  of  the  best,  but  the  force  of 
natural  conditions  in  the  distant  colony  completely  negatived  its 
reahzation.  Even  the  so-called  free  Indians,  who  had  voluntarily 
subrnitted  to  the  Portuguese,  were  forced  to  leave  their  families 
destitute  of  support,  while  they  raised  and  prepared  tobacco  on  the 
plantations.^  The  aggressions  of  the  Europeans  rendered  the  efforts 
of  the  Jesuits  in  collecting  the  coast-natives  into  villages,  there  to 
civilize  them  under  a  paternal  direction,  a  constant  disappointment. 
Continued  raids  and  fomentation  of  inter-tribal  strife  brought  it 
about  that  by  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  both  missionaries 
and  slave-raiders  had  to  penetrate  much  farther  into  the  interior  in 
quest  of  converts  and  captives. '^  This  was  particularly  marked  in 
the  district  of  Sao  Paulo  ;  in  this  relatively  temperate  climate  the 
inhabitants  (Paulistas)  exhibited  a  superior  energy  and  persistence 
in  the  enslavement  and  extermination  of  the  natives.  Attacked 
by  the  exasperated  savages,  they  retaliated  in  a  seven  years'  war 
(i  592-1 599),  in  which  about  three  hundred  villages  were  destroyed 
and  thousands  of  Indians  slain  or  enslaved.  Man-hunts  of  this 
nature  then  became  periodic,  and  the  Paulistas  gained  a  disgrace- 
ful reputation  for  their  exploits  in  a  bad  business.  The  bewildered 
natives,  a  prey  to  epidemics  of  disease  strange  to  them,**  with  every- 
thing going  against  them,  became  panic-stricken  and  intractable, 
choosing  death  in  preference  to  the  hazards  of  the  strange  and 

1  Watson,  II,  82-83,  '^5'  115-116;  Varnhagen,  I,  173  ff-;  Zimmermann,  I,  128  ff. 

2  Watson,  II,  84. 

^  Watson,  I,  258.  Varnhagen  (I,  174-178)  regards  the  early  enslavement  as  a 
civilizmg  process,  and  asserts  Aat  the  tales  of  cruelty  represented  exceptional  cases, 
many  of  which  were  punished ;  the  effects  of  a  mistaken  humanitarianism,  sustained 
by  the  Jesuits,  were  deleterious. 

*  Peschel  (Races  of  Man,  p.  151)  quotes  from  travelers,  who  assert  that  the  Portu- 
guese "deposited  the  clothes  of  scarlet-fever  or  small-pox  patients  on  the  hunting- 
grounds  of  the  natives,  in  order  to  spread  the  pestilence  among  them." 


1^4  COLONIZATION 

repulsive  fate  forced  upon  them.^  The  Jesuits,  seeing  the  futihty 
of  their  strenuous  and  for  the  most  part  disinterested  efforts  for 
the  natives,  were  gradually  driven  to  the  conviction  that  it  was 
impossible  to  proceed  with  the  conversion  and  civilization  of  the 
latter  so  long  as  the  civil  authorities  should  have  any  power  over 
them.  During  the  seventeenth  century,  under  the  leadership  of 
the  single-minded  and  energetic  Vieyra,  their  efforts  to  secure  the 
sole  authority  over  the  Indians  were  unremitting.  They  gradually 
gained  extensive  control ;  large  sections  of  the  aboriginal  popula- 
tion were  delivered  entirely  to  them,  and  they  enforced  their 
authority  with  characteristic  fearlessness.^ 

The  jealousy  of  the  settlers  now  passed  the  bounds  of  repression. 
They  were  so  given  over  to  the  slave-system  that  they  could  no 
longer  provide  for  themselves.  A  biological  differentiation  of  func- 
tion, as  it  were,  had  left  them,  like  Darwin's  slave-making  ants,  in  a 
sort  of  parasitic  relation  to  a  subject  race.  "  Men  of  noble  lineage 
could  not  bring  their  children  to  the  city  because  they  had  no  slaves 
to  row  their  canoes."  On  account  of  the  activity  of  the  Jesuits 
many  i:»lantcrs  "  had  no  one  to  fetch  them  wood  or  water,  and  were 
perishing  for  want  of  slaves  to  cultivate  their  lands."  Respect  for 
law,  heretofore  manifested  at  least  in  form,  broke  down,  threats  of 
separation  from  Portugal  were  uttered,  and  a  general  tumult  of 
hostility  to  the  Jesuits  broke  out.  The  mob  dragged  the  fathers 
from  their  cells,  forced  a  resignation  of  control  over  the  Indians  in 
favor  of  the  civil  authorities,  and  undertook  the  speedy  deportation 
of  the  whole  order.  A  skillful  governor^  Segueira,  managed  to 
uphold  authority  without  an  appeal  to  force  (1662),  biitJhe  planters 
did  not  forget  their  day  of  triumph,  and  the  Jesuits  never  again 
dared  so  imperiously  to  assert  their  dominance  in  the  colony's 
affairs.^  Thus  their  struggles  against  the  enslavement  of  natives  on 
the  plantations  were  of  little  ultimate  avail,  and  the  outcome  of  their 
subsequent  efforts  to  save  their  proteges  from  the  mines  was,  as 
will  presently  appear,  still  more  disastrous,  at  least  to  themselves. 

The  Indians  constituted  the  labor  force  nearest  at  hand.  Their 
conquest  and  capture  afforded  an  employment  which  had  been, 
and  is  said  still  to  be,  congenial  to  the  Portuguese  as  a  people.** 

1  Rio-Branco,  pp.  127  ff. ;  cf.  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  25-26;  Watson,  II,  97-98, 
1 1 5-1 16,  270. 

2  Wat.son,  II,  85,  88-89  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  52  ;  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  30,  note. 
8  Watson,  II,  92-94.  *  Watson,  II,  81-82. 


THK   I'ORTUGUESl':   IN   BRAZII. 


145 


Their  initial  cost  was,  especially  at  the  outset,  negligible.  Hence 
the  prevalence  of  Indian  slavery  and  the  resistance  to  its  abolition. 
However,  from  the  earliest  years  of  its  occupation,  Brazil  had 
been  the  destination  of  an  increasing  number  of  African  slaves, 
chiefly  from  the  Guinea  coast. ^  The  various  hindrances  thrown  by 
government  and  clergy  in  the  way  of  the  enslavement  of  the 
Indians  caused  the  less  tenacious  or  more  law-abiding  of  the  culti- 
vators to  have  resource  to  the  imported  labor  supply.  And  it  was 
speedily  recognized  that  the  negro  was  far  superior  to  the  Indian 
for  the  purpose  at  hand.  Indeed,  it  has  been  observed  through 
history  that  the  former  race,  both  by  physique,  resistance  to 
environment,  and  temperament,  has  been  almost  preordained  to 
serve  its  more  energetic  fellows.  But  the  great  difficulty  was  that 
the  planters  could  not  afford  the  initial  cost  of  the  negroes,  evi- 
dent as  was  their  superiority.^  There  was  no  opposition  to  negro 
slavery,  per  se,  however,  on  the  part  of  any  one,  and  it  steadily 
increased  with  the  decline  or  liberation  of  the  natives.  By  1585 
Pernambuco  counted  some  10,000  African  slaves,  Bahia^ooo  to 
4000.  Elsewhere  they  were  relatively  few  in  number,  for  they 
found  their  greatest  usefulness  on  the  sugar-plantations.  At.  one 
time  in  the  seventeenth  century  the  proportion  of  negroes  to 
whites  in  Bahia  was  estimated  at  twenty  to  one,  but  this  was  by 
no  means  true  of  Brazil  as  a  whole. ^  It  need  scarcely  be  said  that 
this  trade  in  human  working-animals  exhibited  the  stock  features  of 
heartlessness  and  incredible  cruelty.  The  voyage  from  Guinea  was 
relatively  short,  but  its  terrors  were  manifold.  There  are  not  lack- 
ing those  who  believe  that  the  scourge  of  yellow  fever  was  fixed 
upon  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  other  American  ports  by  reason  of  the 
dumping  of  filth  and  diseased  corpses  from  the  slavers  into  the 
waters  of  the  harbor  and  its  environs.  Once  at  work,  however, 
the  very  value  of  the  negroes  insured  them  against  such  harshness 
of  treatment  as  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  unadaptable  and  generally 
obdurate  Indians,  and  with  their  increase  there  were  added  to  the 
constituents  of  population  several  new  varieties  of  mongrel,  and  a 
body  of  runaways  or  bush-negroes,  who  ranged  the  forests  in  a 
condition  of  dangerous  tribal  independence.'^ 

1  Vamhagen,  I,  182. 

2  Watson,  II,  III  ;   Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  52.       ^  Watson,  II,  116-117,  121. 

*  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  62-63.  ^o""  ^^^  negro  "  republic"  of  Palmares,  which 
attained  its  greatest  vigor  about  the  middle  or  the  seventeenth  century,  see  Watson, 
II,  iio-lii,  134;  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  64,  66. 


146  COLONIZATION 

Foreign  Aggression 

The  internal  struggle  over  the  labor  question  was  not  allowed, 
in  the  course  of  events,  to  monopolize  the  attention  of  government 
and  people.  The  more  northern  nations  of  Europe  were  gradually 
losing,  as  the  sixteenth  century  wore  on,  both  their  respect  for 
the  papal  awards  to  Spain  and  Portugal  and  their  fear  of  the 
exaggerated  naval  power  of  these  once  irresistible  states.  Pluck- 
ing up  their  courage,  they  began  to  infringe,  first  of  all  upon  the 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  possessions  on  the  Atlantic.  From  the 
time  of  the  discovery  of  Brazil  the  French  had  occasionally  visited 
the  region ;  indeed,  it  was  their  appearance  in  this  quarter  which 
incited  in  the  Portuguese  a  realization  of  the  possible  value  of  their 
neglected  acquisition  in  America.  The  first  serious  attempt  of  the 
French  to  establish  themselves  in  what  is  now  Brazil  occurred  in 
1558,  when  an  adventurer,  Villegagnon,  occupied  an  island  in  the 
bay  of  Rio  de  Janeiro.  He  was  actively  encouraged  by  Coligny,  and 
was  left  unmolested  by  the  Portuguese  for  four  years.  "  Some 
ten  thousand  Huguenots  were  ready  to  emigrate  with  their  arts 
had  they  been  sure  of  meeting  with  toleration,  but  the  governor's 
arbitrary  proceedings  ruined  the  project."  By  this  time  the  court 
at  Lisbon  had  been  aroused  by  the  Jesuit  Nobrega  to  a  realizing 
sense  of  the  rivalry  of  the  French,  and  after  some  hard  fighting 
the  latter  were  expelled  from  their  position.  Several  subsequent 
attempts  of  the  French  in  the  same  region  were  speedily  thwarted  ; 
Rio  was  again  taken  by  them  in  1 7 1 1 ,  but  was  held  for  a  brief 
period  only.  It  was  not  until  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century  that  they  actually  established  themselves  in  Cayenne.^ 

If  the  PVench  peril  was  a  serious  one,  that  which  attended  the 
appearance  of  the  Dutch  came  near  to  being  fatal.  Up  to  the 
incor))oralion  of  Portugal  by  Spain  (1580)  the  Portuguese  and 
Dutch  had  been  common  enemies  and  combatants  against  the 
latter  power,  but  with  the  accession  of  Philip  II  to  the  throne  of 
Portugal,  both  this  and  other  fortunate  rapprocJuniciits  were 
terminated.  For  sixty  years  Portugal  was  destined  to  share  the 
odium  of   Spain  and  to  receive   blows  delivered   at   her.    Dutch 

1  Watson,  I,  160-161  ;  II,  106-108,  184  ;  Vamhagen,  I,  36  ff.,  329  ff.  A  chapter 
on  the  Huguenots  in  Brazil  is  given  in  Parkman's  France  and  J^ngland  in  North 
America,  Part  I  ("  Pioneers  of  France  in  the  New  World,"  chap,  ii)  ;  cf.  Payne,  Age 
of  Disc,  pp.  49-50. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN   BRAZIL  1 47 

successes  in  the  East  had  led  to  the  formation  of  the  West^India 
Company  (jjS2-i^  one  of  whose  main  objects  was  the  harassing  and 
conquest  of  Brazil.  The  difference  between  the  enterprises  of  the 
Dutch  and  the  predatory  expeditions  of  the  French  and  English 
speedily  became  apparent  to  the  Brazilians  ;  they  found,  to  their 
^ton|shrnent,  that  the  Dutch  intended  to  stay.  This  situation 
roused  the  national  spirit  in  the  contests  with  the  Hollanders  as 
it  had  not  been  stirred  in  the  brushes  with  other  Europeans.^ 

The  history  of  the  Dutch  occupation  of  Recife  (Pernambuco) 
and  six  provinces  of  Brazil  might  be  more  fitly  taken  up  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  West  India  Company  and  its  career.'-^  The  Portu- 
guese steadily  opposed  the  Dutch  occupation,  and,  owing  to  the 
shortsighted  and  parsimonious  policy  of  the  company,  with  some 
success.  The  turning-point  came  in  1640  with  the  separation  of 
Poj;tugal  from  Spain  and  the  accession  of  the  house  of  Braganza, 
an  event  which  detached  Portugal  from  the  destiny  of  Spain,  and 
ranged  her  again  among  Spain's  enemies,  among  the  chief  of  whom 
were  the  Dutch.  The  altered  situation  was  at  once  recognized  in 
form,  and  a  truce  for  ten  years  was  arranged  between  the  States- 
General  and  Portugal  (1641J.  This,  however,  was  illusory.  A  year 
was  given  for  notifying  the  truce  to  the  Dutch  authorities  in  the 
Indies,  and  aid  was  afforded  to  Portugal  against  the  common 
enemy ;  but  the  interval  was  employed  in  pushing  forward  the 
Dutch  conquests  in  Brazil,  and  in  seizing  Sao  Paulo  de  Loanda  in 
Angola,  the  source  of  the  entire  supply  of  slaves  for  Brazil.^  This, 
besides  cutting  off  a  lucrative  trade,  was  a  severe  blow  to  the 
prosperity  of  the  plantations ;  and  after  the  recall  of  Count  Nassau 
from  Brazil  the  policy  of  the  Dutch  became  less  and  less  concilia- 
tory, and  the  exasperation  of  the  Portuguese  more  pronounced.  In 
Maranhao,  Bahia,  and  Pernambuco  the  people  began  to  work  for 
their  own  deliverance.  The  general  revolution  was  headed  by  Joao 
Fernandes  Vieira,  a  very  wealthy  planter,  operating  in  the  region 
of  Pernambuco.  It  was  not  at  first  a  universal  movement,  for 
many  thought  it  hopeless  and  wished  for  peace  at  any  price  ;  but 
the  impolitic  procedures  of  the  Dutch,  who  in  their  inability  to 
reach  the  actual  insurgents  began  to  oppress  the  lukewarm  who 

1  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  39-40.  2  q{  pp_  ^j^^  ^^^^  below. 

^  The  prete.xt  given  for  this  action  was  disbelief  in  the  permanent  separation  of 
Spain  and  I'ortugal.  It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  peace  concluded  between 
European  nations  never  strictly  applied,  in  these  earlier  periods,  to  their  respective 
colonies. 


148  COLONIZATION 

had  stayed  at  home,  speedily  rendered  a  neutral  status  untenable. 
The  party  of  Vieira  gathered  momentum,  and  advanced  from  guer- 
rilla warfare  to  battles  and  sieges.  The  West  India  Company  pro- 
vided insufficiently  against  the  danger,  and  the  outcome  was  not  long 
delayed.  The  Dutch,  hampered  by  the  English  war,  were  driven 
by  1654  to  a  surrender  of  all  their  holdings  on  the  coast  of  Brazil, 
and  further  activity  on  the  part  of  Holland  was  discouraged  by  the 
attitude  of  England  and  France.  In  1661  negotiations  were  con- 
cluded whereby  the  Dutch  renounced  attempts  on  Brazil  in  return 
for  certain  considerations  in  money  and  trade  and  the  restoration 
of  their  captured  cannon.^ 

Thus  ended  the  most  serious  danger  to  Portuguese  dominance 
in  Brazil.  Under  a  more  enlightened  policy  on  the  part  of  the 
Dutch  the  whole  destiny  of  the  country  might  have  been  altered. 
But  an  outcome  of  the  kind  described  was  quite  characteristic  of 
the  West  India  Company.  Of  course  the  violence  and  disorder 
of  the  period  were  very  unfavorable  to  the  economic  prosperity  of 
Brazil ;.  in  partial  compensation,  however,  certain  distinct  advantages 
emerged  from  the  Dutch  occupation.  First  of  all,  the  Brazilians 
attained  a  sense  of  self-sufficiency  and  power  and  a  consciousness 
of  unity  not  experienced  before.  Like  the  Spanish-Americans  of 
a  later  period,  they  had  expelled  a  powerful  invader  practically 
unaided,  for  Portugal,  though  in  sympathy  with  the  insurgents, 
did  not  dare  to  offend  her  Dutch  allies  against  Spain  by  openly 
lending  aid.  Thus  the  Brazilians  felt,  in  a  sense,  that  they  had 
attained  their  political  majority.  Portugal  realized  the  changing 
conditions,  and  in  1645  the  colony  was  made  a  priiicipado  by  the 
designation  of  the  king's^eldest  son  and  presumptive  heir  as  Prince, 
of  Brazil. 2  During  this  period  of  misfortune  the  Brazilians  came 
also  to  realize  the  nature  of  the  Inquisition  ^  as  a  check  upon  the 
country's  development,  and  were  able  better  to  secure  commercial 

1  On  the  Dutch  in  Brazil,  see  Watson,  II,  pp.  i  ff. ;  Vamhagen,  I,  335-404; 
Zimmermann,  I,  138  ff . ;  Edmundson,  in  Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,  XI  (1896),  231  ff. ;  XIV 
(1S99),  676  ff. ;  XV  (1900),  38  ff.  2  Vamhagen,  I,  246;  II,  2. 

•'  The  Holy  Office,  as  has  been  intimated,  never  attained  a  firm  footing  in  Brazil ; 
but  it  interfered  more  or  less  regularly  in  affairs.  Immediately  preceding  and  during 
the  union  with  Spain  its  influence  waxed,  and  it  assumed  at  times  an  independent 
judicial  power.  About  1702  a  second  period  of  vigor  ensued,  and  between  1707  and  171 1,. 
160  persons  were  seized  and  persecuted.  The  total  number  of  colonists  condemned 
by  the  Office  acting  in  Lisbon  was  about  500.  At  times  physicians,  lawyers,  and  even 
ecclesiastics  came  under  its  displeasure.  Autos-da-fe  were  relatively  infrequent. 
Varnhagen,  II,  179-183. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN   BRAZIL  149 

and  other  enterprises  against  the  peril  of  confiscation  of  capital, 
ecclesiastical  interference,  and  like  impediments.  A  Brazil  company, 
in  imitation  of  the  Dutch  company,  was  created,  against  clerical 
opposition,  and  aided  considerably  in  bringing  the  war  to  a  success- 
ful end.i  It  should  be  said,  too,  that  the  Brazilians  profited  by  the 
fact  that  the  Dutch  introduced,  as  it  were,  their  country  to  Europe. 
The  conquerors  not  only  described  Brazil,  in  the  course  of  their 
commercial  operations,  to  people  to  whom  it  had  been  but  a  name, 
but  they  also  made  Brazilian  products,  chiefly  sugar  and  rum, 
familiar  articles  in  European  markets.  Their  charts  and  records 
of  soundings  remained  in  use  up  to  a  very  recent  time.  It  can 
hardly  be  said  that  the  Dutch  occupation  exerted  otherwise  any 
considerable  influence  upon  the  future  of  the  country.  The  Hol- 
landers furnished  an  example  of  industry  and  extreme  domestic 
cleanliness  to  a  people  who  had  a  good  deal  to  learn  along  these 
lines.  They  also  benefited  the  country  by  their  experience  in  the 
treatment  of  damp  soils,  in  horticulture,  in  the  construction  of 
public  works,  and  in  other  lines.  But  they  had  not  time  to  develop 
any  of  these  things  to  the  full,  nor  did  they  intermarry  to  any 
great  extent  with  the  Portuguese,  for  difference  of  religion  pre- 
sented insuperable  obstacles.  They  were  in  the  country  twenty- 
five  years,  but  "  when  they  departed  they  left  little  or  no  trace 
behind  them  either  in  religion,  language  or  manners."  ^  In  fact, 
the  departure  of  the  Hollanders  was  signalized  by  a  reaction  toward 
Catholic  fanaticism,  and  oppression  of  the  Jews  and  Protestants.^ 

There  was  no  ominous  menace  to  Brazil  from  other  enemies 
than  the  French  and  Dutch.  During  the  Spanish  predominance 
English  fleets  occasionally  raided  the  coast,  notably  in  1582,  1586, 
and  with  most  damage  in  1594.  Although  considerable  booty  was 
secured,  none  of  these  attacks  threatened  the  conquest  of  the 
country.'* 

The  Gold  and  Diamond  Discoveries 

An  attempt  has  been  made  thus  far  to  clear  up  the  perspective 
of  Brazilian  history  previous  to  the  eighteenth  century  ;  for  with 
the  end  of  the  seventeenth  the  general  trend  of  development  in 
this  colony  takes  a  decided  turn  which  provides  a  convenient  break 

^  Watson,  II,  71-72. 

2  Watson,  II,  118.  Life  in  the  interior  still  remained  distinctly  primitive.  Id.,  II, 
266.  2  Vamhagen,  II,  42.  *  Watson,  II,  254-258. 


150 


COLONIZATION 


in  presentation  and  an  apt  point  of  departure  for  the  ensuing  narra- 
tive. Hitherto  the  colony  had  been  ahnost  wholly  devoted  to 
agriculture  and  the  exchange  of  agricultural  products  ;  ^  but  with 
the  eighteenth  century  there  is  injected  into  its  life  the  new  ele- 
ment of  the  exploitation  of  the  mines,  destined  here  as  elsewhere 
to  set  a  characteristic  stamp  upon  social  development.  But  it  is 
to  be  noted  in  the  case  of  Brazil,  as  has  been  intimated  already, 
that,  unlike  the  majority  of  gold-  and  jewel-producing  countries,  it 
had  already  worked  out  two  centuries  of  development  along  other 
and  substantial  lines  before  the  rush  of  prospectors  and  the  forma- 
tion of  mining  communities  could  introduce  disorder  and  a  perver- 
sion of  steadier  and  more  normal  development. 

Hopes  of  a  second  Peru  were  early  indulged,  but  the  seventeenth 
century  was  well  on  to  its  end  before  any  real  promise  was  disclosed. 
A  succession  of  arduous  exploring  expeditions  culminated  in  1693 
with  the  exhibition  of  some  promising  specimens  of  gold,^  and  the 
consequent  establishment  of  a  smelting-house.  The  district  toward 
which  attention  was  turned  was  Minas  Geraes,  and,  although  the 
section  was  uninviting,  it  speedily  became  the  Mecca  of  those  who 
were  impatient  of  laborious  methods  in  the  acquisition  of  wealth. 
The  stampede  for  claims  was  so  wild  that  special  regulations  had 
to  be  passed  as  early  as  1702  limiting  grants  and  defining  tenure.^ 
The  plantation  system  was  all  but  ruined  ;  farms  were  deserted 
and  ran  to  waste ;  negroes  were  transferred,  by  an  excess  of 
demand  for  their  services,  from  the  sugar-producing  areas  to  the 
mines.  The  rise  in  the  price  of  raw  sugar  disabled  the  refining 
industries,  and  the  French  and  English  in  the  West  Indies,  taking 
advantage  of  the  situation,  began  to  invade  the  European  market 
hitherto  supplied  almost  exclusively  from  Brazil.  With  the  decline 
of  the  staple  commodity,  general  trade  suffered  a  great  reverse. 

1  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  15-16,  summarizes  the  early  development  of  Brazil  as 
follows  :  "  a)  First  material  of  colonization  :  convicts  and  Jews  deported  by  the 
sovereign  ;  escaped  criminals ;  colonists  assembTfed"  l5y  the  Sbiiatarios ;  in  Brazil, 
enslaved  Indians,  and  everywhere  Guinea  negroes,  e.xported  as  instruments  of  labor, 
b)  Species  of  colonial  enterprise  :  agriculture,  characterized  almost  exclusively  by 
the  culture  of  cane  and  the  manufacture  of  sugar,  c)  Social  constitution  :  feudal, 
by  way  of  territorial  grants,  seigniories  or  captaincies;  or  by  mercantile  monopolies, 
as  in  Guinea;  conjointly  with  the  governors-general  as  representatives  of  the  sover- 
eign. Ecclesiastical  organization ;  in  imitation  of  the  kingdom,  in  bishoprics  and 
parishes.  Free  missions,  chiefly  of  Jesuits."  For  the  status  of  Brazil  at  the  end  of 
the  seventeenth  century,  see  Varnhagen,  IT,  92  ff.,  136  ff. 

2  For  the  earlier  efforts,  see  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  7S,  note. 

8  The  regulations  in  force  about  17 10  are  rehearsed  in  Varnhagen,  II,  103  ff. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN   BRAZIL  151 

Some  attempts  were  made  to  remedy  this  situation,  but  they  were 
presently  given  up,  for  the  Lisbon  government  was  not  hard  to 
persuade  that  mining  was  more  profitable  than  sugar-raising.^  The 
old  preoccupations  which  had  once  rendered  Brazil  inconsiderable 
to  the  Portuguese  now  exalted  it  to  a  position  of  superlative  im-  1 
portance.  With  the  development  of  the  mines,  then,  it  may  be  f 
said  that  Brazil  ceased  for  the  time  to  be  an  agricultural  colony. 
And  the  discovery  in  1730  of  the  diamond  fields,  also  in  the  Minas 
Geraes,  carried  the  change  considerably  farther.  Brazil  fell  back 
from  its  dignified  status  as  a  producing  and  developing  region  intcj 
the  position  of  a  California  or  a  South  Africa. 

The  results  of  heightened  interest  on  the  part  of  the  home 
government  began  at  once  to  make  themselves  visible.  The  crown 
demanded  its  fifths  and  marked  out  its  allotments,  and,  as  was 
inevitable  under  the  conditions,  it  gradually  enacted  more  and 
stricter  regulations  in  its  effort  to  control  the  illicit  export  of  gold 
dust.  All  the  gold  was  to  pass  through  the  royal  smelting-house. 
Restrictions  of  the  entrance  of  foreigners  to  Brazil  were  rendered 
more  stringent  than  before,  and  even  the  Portuguese  were  required 
to  exhibit  passports.  The  ineffectiveness  of  the  crown  levies  on 
the  gold  production  led  in  time  to  the  substitution  of  a  poll-tax 
upon  slaves ;  and  yet,  in  spit6  of  its  strenuous  efforts,  the  govern- 
■ment  was  constantly  defrauded.  In  the  case  of  the  diamonds,  the 
system  of  the  royal  fifths  was  found  impracticable  from  the  first, 
and  a  capitation  tax  on  slaves  was  early  adopted.  The  diamonds 
were  to  be  remitted  in  the  royal  ships  only,  .one  per  cent  on  their 
value  being  charged  as  freight.  It  was  necessary  likewise  to  limit 
the  output  of  diamonds,  for  within  two  years  their  price  in  Europe 
had  declined  seventy-five  per  cent.^  The  state  undertook  to  re- 
serve the  diamond  country  and  to  limit  the  extraction,  and  the 
profits  thus  derived  were  very  large.  Between  1700  and  1820 
Portugal  consistently  drew  from  the  takings  and  taxes  in  gold 
mines  and  diamond  fields  a  revenue  upon  which  rivals  looked 
with   undisguised   envy.^    However,  prosperity  based   upon  such 

1  Watson,  II,  171-174;  Vamhagen,  II,  174  ff. 

2  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  55-56)  defends  upon  economic  grounds  this  limitation  of  out- 
put, at  the  same  time  stigmatizing  the  means  adopted  by  the  government.  Cf.  Watson, 
II,  171-172,  186-190,  244-245;   Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  80. 

3  Definite  estimates  of  such  income  are,  of  course,  impossible.  Eschwege  calculated 
the  total  product  of  the  fifths  as  about  $65,000,000.  They  are  thought  by  others  to 
have  reached  a  minimum  of  $2,000,000  annually.    See  note  appended  to  this  chapter. 


152  COLONIZATION 

hazardous  undertakings  is  apt  to  be  illusory.  It  has  been  cal- 
culated by  a  competent  authority  that  the  value  of  the  diamonds 
extracted  between  1740  and  1820  scarcely  equaled  the  product  of 
eighteen  months  derived  from  the  sugar-  and  coffee-plantations.^ 

The  social  effects  of  the  discovery  of  the  mines  were  naturally 
very  marked.  The  passion  for  gambling  with  large  hazards  induced 
a  general  movement  among  the  population  towards  the  uncertain 
and  away  from  the  secure  and  substantial.  In  a  certain  sense  the 
temper  of  the  Portuguese  in  India  was  reproduced.  That  this 
movement  was  not  more  disastrous  than  it  was,  is  referable  largely 
to  the  tardiness  of  the  discoveries,  as  occasion  has  already  been 
taken  to  show.  Of  course  the  mining  districts  themselves  were 
the  centers  of  turbulence,  irregularities,  and  disorder.  In  the  arid 
interior  conditions  of  existence  were  very  hazardous.  Life  in  the 
diamond  fields  was  about  synonymous  with  sojourn  in  a  desert. 
The  necessaries  of  life  rose  to  famine  prices.  Men  were  driven  by 
a  shortage  of  food  to  cultivation  or  cattle-raising,  occupations  which 
were  often  found  to  be  more  profitable  than  mining.  However, 
the  great  enticements  of  the  golden  harvest  led  to  a  considerable 
settlement,^  much  of  which  was  referable  to  the  immigration  of 
the  stubborn,  independent,  often  half-Indian  Paulistas.  In  1776 
Minas  Geraes  had  a  population  of  some  320,ooo.''  The  temper  of 
the  miners  was  lawless  from  the  outset,  and  they  had  to  be  quelled 
again  and  again  by  governmental  forces,  as  well  as  constantly  spied 
upon  and  restrained  in  the  interest  of  the  crown  revenues.  Insur- 
rections against  such  restraints  were  put  down  only  after  prolonged 
resistance,  and  by  summary  methods.  Again,  the  large  importation 
of  negroes  into  Minas  Geraes  rendered  race-confhcts  the  order  of 
the  day,  and  special  effort  had  to  be  put  forth  to  check  the  forma- 
tion by  escaped  slaves  of  dangerous  predatory  bands.    However, 

1  Eschwege,  quoted  in  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  55-56. 

2  "  Brazil  attracted,  early  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the  entire  Portuguese  emigra- 
tion. The  rapidity  with  which  this  emigration  developed  was  such  that  I)om  Joao  V 
.  .  .  promulgated  a  decree  in  1720  in  order  '  to  prohibit  the  yearly  migration  from  this 
country  to  the  captaincies  of  Brazil  of  so  many  people  .  .  .  chiefly  from  the  province 
of  Minho,  which,  from  being  the  most  populous,  to-day  finds  itself  in  a  state  of  not 
having  enough  people  to  cultivate  the  soil,  or  to  perform  social  services.'  "  Corvo, 
1,15. 

8  Watson,  I,  269.  Martins  believes  that  the  very  names  of  the  new  mining  settle- 
ments, which  are  mainly  of  local  origin  and  seldom  I'ortuguese,  witness  a  progressive 
nationalization  or  assimilation  of  the  stream  of  immigration.  O  l^razil,  etc.,  p.  cS5  and 
note.  lie  also  thinks  the  frontier  education  was  one  that  strengthened  the  love  for 
independence  and  at  least  indirectly  contributed  to  the  emancipation.    Id.,  p.  79. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  153 

despite  the  perversion  of  law  and  order  that  resulted  from  the  gold 
and  diamond  discoveries,  the  outcome  of  the  movement  toward  the 
interior  was  a  progressively  increasing  exploration  of  the  country, 
its  resources  and  waterways.^ 


The  Expulsion  of  the  Jesuits 

One  of  the  consequences  of  the  gold  discoveries  was,  naturally 
enough,  the  accentuation  of  differences  regarding  the  treatment 
of  the  natives,  for  not  only  were  slaves  of  all  kinds  in  demand  at 
the  mines,  where  their  position  could  scarcely  be  better  than  on 
the  plantations,  but  the  penetration  of  the  interior  and  the  rapid 
growth  of  European  population  worked  toward  the  infringement 
of  that  isolation  in  which  the  Jesuits  desired  to  keep  their  actual 
or  prospective  converts.  The  idea  of  the  Jesuits,  which  perhaps 
appears  more  typically  in  the  Paraguay  missions,^  was  to  keep  the 
Indians  under  their  own  tutelage  and  in  a  life  of  repose  under  dis- 
cipline. They  divided  the  country  systematically,  and  their  aldeias, 
or  industrial  missions,  rose  at  regular  points  over  the  whole.  They 
labored  excessively,  building  churches  and  establishing  schools, 
learning  native  tongues  and  translating  into  them  the  prayers  of 
the  Church.  Their  system  was  mild  and  paternal ;  they  neither 
corporally  punished  their  charges  nor  would  they  sell  or  otherwise 
part  with  them.  They  did  much  to  introduce  civilization  among 
the  Indians,  and,  in  order  to  make  their  work  secure  and  to  spare 
bad  examples,  they  strove  to  keep  the  settlers  at  a  distance.^  In 
this  they  were  aided  by  the  laws  of  Pedro  II  (1667- 1706),  which 
forbade  Portuguese  to  dwell  in  the  missions.  However,  the  Indians 
in  Brazil,  still  subject  to  civil  authority,  never  clung  to  the  fathers 
as  did  the  Guarani's  of  Paraguay ;  nor  could  the  settlement  of  the  ^, 
whites  be  prevented,  when  strong  enough  motives  for  such  estab-  *"'*^ 
lishment  were  once  developed.  But  the  activity  of  the  Jesuits,  *~'^ 
hateful  as  it  was  to  the  planters,  and  the  legislation  secured  in  '  -  "^ 
favor  of  the  Indians,  were  not  without  their  influence.  For  when 
the  mines  were  opened  the  effect  upon  the  condition  of  the  natives  '^  C^i-,,^ 
was  far  less  disastrous  than  would  have  been  anticipated.  This  was 
partially  due,  of  course,  to  the  increased  use  of  negro  labor.^    The 

1  Watson,  II,  171  ;  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  19,  32-34,  8o-8r. 

2  Cf.  pp.  287-294,  below.  2  Watson,  II,  267. 
*  Id.,  pp.  170,  201-202  ;  Vamhagen,  II,  93  ff. 


154  COLONIZATION 

natives'  sphere  of  rights  had  been  extended,  and  with  fewer  quali- 
fications as  time  went  on.  It  is  a  curious  coincidence  that  the 
Indians  were  made  unqualifiedly  free  before  the  law  almost  coinci- 
dently  with  the  expulsion  from  Brazil  of  their  old-time  defenders, 
the  Jesuits  (1758). ^ 

It  has  been  shown  how  the  popular  mind  became  inflamed 
against  the  Jesuits  in  consequence  of  the  determined  efforts  of  the 
latter  to  prevent  the  settlers  from  taking  full  advantage  of  what 
seemed  to  them  a  naturally  provided  labor  supply.  It  was  practi- 
cally impossible  to  persuade  the  planters  that  the  Jesuits  were  dis- 
interested antagonists.  The  conviction  grew  apace  that  the  aldeias 
were  simply  competing  plantations,  worked  at  a  merely  nominal 
cost  by  converts  adroitly  turned  into  slaves.  There  was  much 
color  to  this  persuasion,  for  the  missions  did  not  lag  behind  in 
production.  The  planters  felt  that  they  were  being  overreached 
even  before  the  opening  of  the  mines,  and  when,  in  consequence 
of  this  latter  event,  they  lost  a  large  proportion  of  their  workers, 
and  the  price  of  negroes  rose,  their  exasperation  over  the  relatively 
prosperous  status  of  the  Jesuit  plantations  steadily  increased.  The 
Company  had  become  "a  true  industrial  association  with  which  no 
single  capitalist  could  compete."  ^  It  had  acquired  or  assumed  a 
degree  of  political  power,  in  the  attainment  of  its  economic  strength, 
which  galled  the  settlers,  especially  in  the  southern  provinces 
where  poj)ulation  was  more  dense.  The  fathers  were  driven  from 
the  south  first  of  all,  and  then  from  the  Bahia  region.  They  were 
not  secure  even  in  the  extreme  north. ^  It  is  probable,  therefore, 
that  with  the  growth  of  population  Brazil  would  alone  have  rid 
herself  of  her  incubus,  but  it  was  from  the  metropolis  which  had 
fostered  the  Jesuits  that  final  relief  came. 

King  John  V  (i  706-1750)  had  been  the  unresisting  tool  of  the 
Society,*  but  with  the  accession  of  Jos6  I  (1750)  the  situation 
changed.  Carvalho,  the  Marquis  of  Pombal,  became  the  dominant 
figure  of  the  new  reign,  and,  in  the  estimation  of  some,  the  most 
eminent  statesman  of  his  time.^  Of  his  many  projects,  those  which 
touch  vitally  upon  our  subject  were  the  freeing  of  the  Indians  in 
Brazil  and  the  universal  and  merciless  pursuit  of  the  Jesuit  order. 

1  Martins,  O  15razil,  etc.,  p.  30,  note ;  for  a  general  account  of  the  Indian  legisla- 
tion, etc.,  see  Zimmerman,  I,  I36ff. 

2  Varnhagen,  I,  260  ;  cf.  pp.  257-261  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  1S5  ;  Rio-Branco, 
p.  131.  '  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  70-73. 

*  Cf.  Branco,  Port,  na  Epocha  de  D.  Joao  \, passim.  ^  Watson,  II,  232. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  155 

Pombal's  object  in  freeing  the  Indians  was  that  they  should  blend 
with  the  Portuguese  population  in  Brazil ;  his  hostility  to  the 
Jesuits  resulted  from  his  desire  to  strengthen  the  monarchy  both 
in  Lisbon  and  in  the  colonies.^  In  1757  the  temporal  power  of 
the  mission  was  suppressed.  The  Indians  were  definitely  freed  in 
1758,  and  the  aldeias  were  transformed  into  villages  under  common 
law.  Naturally  the  Society  suffered  much  from  this  cancellation 
of  its  means  of  support,  being  reduced  almost  to  penury.  Lay 
directors  were  appointed  to  carry  out  the  royal  purpose  of  Christian- 
izing and  civilizing  the  Indians ;  needless  to  say,  they  neither 
possessed  the  preparation  nor  gained  the  successes  of  the  Jesuits.^ 
But  there  was  more  opportunity  given  for  the  amalgamation  of 
races,  and  it  was  improved.  "  This  is  the  true  reason,"  says  Varn- 
hagen,  "  why  the  Indian  type  has  disappeared  almost  absolutely 
from  our  provinces."  ^  From  this  time  on  little  is  heard  of  the 
natives,  for,  as  will  be  seen,  the  possibilities  of  African  slave-labor 
began  to  engross  the  attention  of  those  who  had  hitherto  made 
requisition  upon  the  Indians. 

As  for  the  Jesuits,  the  reasons  for  their  expulsion  from  Portugal 
and  the  colonies  go  back  to  a  series  of  wide-reaching  activities  of 
which  the  championing  of  the  Indians  was  but  one.  "  For  two 
hundred  years  the  Society  had  exercised  unbounded  influence  over 
kings  and  courts.  Its  machinery  for  governing  was  so  perfect,  and 
its  system  was  so  subtle,  that  it  began  to  appear  to  statesmen 
that  unless  this  ambitious  order  were  speedily  and  effectually 
opposed  it  must  soon  dominate  Christendom.  .  .  .  The  doctrines 
of  Ignatius  Loyola  admitted  of  nothing  short  of  an  absolute  obedi- 
ence. .  .  .  Kings  were  afraid  to  act  without  the  approbation  of  an 
Order  whose  system  of  espionage  was  so  complete  as  even  to  baffle 
secret  confidential  intercourse  between  sovereigns  and  statesmen. 
No  one  Catholic  monarch  felt  himself  strong  enough  single-handed 
to  throw  off  the  humiliating  yoke."  ^  Meanwhile  the  economic  and 
political  strength  of  the  order  waxed  steadily ;  it  had  already,  and 

1  Rio-Branco,  p.  146  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  204-205  ;  cf.  pp.  207-208  ;  cf.  also 
Branco,  pp.  109  ff. 

2  Watson,  II,  236-237  ;  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  72-73";  Rio-Branco,  pp.  148- 
149.  ^  Varnhagen,  I,  205. 

*  Watson,  II,  232.    For  an  extremely  eloquent  arraignment  of  the  Jesuits,  see 
Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  289-294;  Hist,  de  Port.,  II,  85-100,  147  ff.,  and  elsewhere  in    *"^ 
this  author's  works  ;  somewhat  the  same  judgment,  with  special  reference  to  the 
Jesuits  iu  the  Philippines,  is  passed  by  Montero^y  Vidal  (II,  141  ff.). 


1^6  COLONIZATION 

with  considerable  success,  resisted  the  royal  authority  in  India. 
A  strong  desire  to  free  his  country  from  this  element  led  Pombal 
to  seize  the  Jesuits  in  Portugal  and  ship  them  off  to  the  Papal 
States  (1759),  and  to  decree  their  expulsion  from  Brazil  together 
with  the  other  colonies,  an  operation  which  was  carried  out  in 
America  with  considerable  gusto,  and,  it  is  said,  with  much 
brutality.^  Their  expulsion  from  P>ance  (1764)  and  Spain  (1767) 
followed,  —  events  which  attest  the  widespread  misgivings  occa- 
sioned by  their  economical  and  political  activities. 

The  ignominious  exit  of  the  Jesuits  from  Brazil  must  not  divert 
attention  from  the  great  services  performed  by  them  before,  having 
become  conscious  of  the  power  of  their  well-knit  organization, 
they  yielded  to  the  temptations  of  wealth  and  power.  They  per- 
formed herculean  toil  in  their  attempts  to  better  the  condition  of 
the  natives,  and  their  preaching  was  not  wholly  in  vain,  even 
amidst  the  exigencies  of  frontier-life.  By  1750  no  hostile  tribes 
remained  on  the  banks  of  the  Amazon  throughout  its  entire  course. 
Such  as  had  not  submitted  to  the  missionaries  had  retired  into  the 
interior.^  We  may  pause  here  to  note  that,  partly  because  of  the 
activities  of  the  Jesuits,  Brazil  had  suffered  from  none  of  the  dire- 
ful native  wars  common  in  the  earlier  stages  of  a  colony's  life. 
The  teaching  of  the  Jesuits  and  their  paternal  system  may  have 
unduly  hampered  the  development  of  initiative  on  the  part  of  their 
proselytes.  Their  methods  may  often  have  been  questionable  and 
their  lives  scandalous.  It  is  significant,  however,  that  the  natives 
could  with  difficulty  be  induced  to  leave  the  missions  and  work  for 
the  settlers.  The  Jesuits  were  often,  no  doubt,  especially  in  later 
decades,  examples  of  apathy  and  inculcators  of  superstition,  but 
"  the  conquest  and  colonization  of  Portuguese  America  in  the  six- 
teenth and  seventeenth  centuries  is  in  large  part  their  work.  As 
missionaries,  they  succeeded  in  winning  thousands  of  Indians  for 
civilization,  and  the  native  race  became,  thanks  to  their  devotion, 
a  considerable  factor  in  the  formation  of  the  l^razilian  people."  ^ 

One  of  the  outcomes  of  Jesuit  ojjposition  to  Indian  servitude 

was  the  growth  of  African  slavery  and  the  slave-trade.     Despite 

the  cost  of  the  negro,  the  colonist  was  forced  to  use  him,  when  the 

^        fathers  had  gained  their  day  of  success  and  had  drawn  the  native 

1  Watson,  II,  233-234,  237-238  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  52-53  ;  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port., 
II,  i47-i.(.S,  153,  182  ff.;  Varnhagen,  II,  194  ff.  2  Watson,  II,  15S-159,  199-202. 

3  Rio-Branco,  p.  149;  cf.  Watson,  II,  114-115,  123;  Varnhagen,  I,  202,  243. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  I  57 

peoples  into  the  missions  under  their  paternal  protection.  But  it 
was  the  delicts  of  Pombal,  freeing  the  Indians  and  giving  them 
actually  or  prospectively  the  same  rights  as  the  Portuguese,  that 
lent  to  the  negro  slave-trade  an  impetus  hitherto  unknown. ^  "  In 
the  first  years  [1755  ff.]  of  the  existence  of  the  Conipaiihia  do  Grao- 
Pard  the  import  of  slaves, into  Brazil  amounted  to  100,000  per 
annum;  of  these  22,000  to  43,000  had  Rio  as  their  destination. 
.  .  .  From  1759  to  1803  the  colonial  registers  give,  as  consigned 
from  Angola  to  Brazil,  642,000  negroes.  The  income  from  the 
exportation  of  negroes  is  estimated  at  i6ocontos  [$160,000].  .  .  . 
From  18 1 7  to  18 19  the  average  shipment  for  Brazil  was  22,000,  and, 
despite  the  legal  cessation  of  the  traffic,  as  late  as  1839  there  still 
issued  from  Angola  35  cargoes  of  slaves."  ^  These  great  numbers 
were  demanded  partially  in  consequence  of  a  heavy  death-rate  on 
the  passage  and  in  the  colony.  To  get  65,000  slaves  to  Brazil  it 
was  necessary  to  start  with  some  100,000,  and  of  the  65,000  some 
3000  to  5000  died  in  the  first  two  months  after  arrival.  The 
profits  of  the  trade  were  of  course  high  ;  "  the  mine  of  negro  labor 
was  worth  as  much  as  or  more  than  the  New  World  mines  of  silver 
and  gold."  "The  colony  acquired  decidedly  and  definitively  the 
character  common  to  all  the  [plantation]  colonies  of  North  America 
and  the  Antilles,  —  abandonment  and  extinction  of  the  indigenous 
races,  colonization  by  whites,  and  negro  slave-labor."  ^  The  results 
for  Brazil  of  the  prohibition  of  the  slave-trade  and  the  activities  of 
the  British  cruisers  were  similar  to  those  experienced  by  those 
other  American  districts  which  were  devoted  to  tropical  agriculture. 
If  the  outcome  was  less  disastrous,  it  was  because  part  of  Brazil 
was  a  true  settlement  colony,  and  because  even  the  tropical  portions 
had  gotten  a  start  early  in  the  country's  history. 

1  Vamhagen,  I,  181-185;  ^f-  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  30,  note. 

2  M.  de  Sa,  O  Trabalho  Rural  Af  ricano,  quoted  in  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  56, 
note.  The  close  natural  connection  between  Brazil  and  the  source  from  which  it 
drew  its  indispensable  labor  supply,  the  West  African  stations,  should  receive 
especial  attention.  Cf.  p.  127,  above.  When  the  Dutch  occupied  Brazil  (see  p.  147, 
above)  they  were  led  as  a  matter  of  course  to  acquire  the  slave-stations;  after  their 
departure  the  Portuguese  again  managed  to  secure  these  complementary  districts. 
See  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  vii,  37-38. 

3  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  54,  58-59,  73,  75  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  53. 


158  COLONIZATION 

Conditions  Preceding  Independence 

The  gradual  exhaustion  of  the  mines  toward  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century  allowed^TIie^Glony,  though  with  some  distress, 
to  return  to  its  former  and  interrupted  course  of  material  develop- 
ment. Abandonment  of  the  famous,  but  now  sterile,  source  of 
wealth  was  hard,  and  it  took  almost  a  quarter  of  a  century  to  give 
it  up.  It  is  during  this  period  of  transformation  that  Brazil,  by 
the  fact  of  its  separation  from  Portugal,  passes  from  the  field  of 
our  researches.  However,  before  it  ceased  to  be  a  colony,  Brazil 
had  already  turned  back  toward  the  type  of  life  in  vogue  before 
the  gold  discoveries.  The  province  of  Minas  Geraes  had  been  the 
first  to  suffer  from  the  decline  of  the  mines  and  the  ensuing 
economic  crisis.  Early  in  the  nineteenth  century,  while  its  inhabit- 
ants were  vacillating  between  the  mining  of  failing  deposits  and 
agriculture,  many  parts  of  the  jDrovince  were  .practically^- in  ruins. 
Apathy  and  abandonment  of  alr'Sffof't  were  all  but  universal.^  In 
time,  however,  it  was  seen  that  cotton,  coffee,  tobacco,  and  other 
products  of  the  soil  promised  a  better  and  more  solid  yield  than 
had  the  mines  at  their  best.  With  this  turn  of  the  tide  population 
began  to  grow  with  great  rapidity  again,  and  export  and  coast 
trade  took  on  new  life.^  The  opening  up  of  the  interior  had  fol- 
lowed the  development  of  the  mines  and  had  not  ceased  with  their 
virtual  abandonment.  King  Jose  I  and  Pombal  had  always  had 
the  interests  of  Brazil  at  heart,  and  the  latter  benevolent  despot 
had  formed  in  1755  a  commercial  company  for  Maranhao  and  Para 
which  had  aided  much  in  the  exploration  and  colonization  of  these 
regions.^  Pombal  likewise  curbed  the  power  of  religious  establish- 
ments other  than  those  of  the  Jesuits,  and  rendered  life  in  Brazil 
more  endurable  for  the  Jews.^  By  1800  Brazil  had  a  population 
of  3,200,000,  half  negro-slaves;  in  1817-1818,  3,817,900,  without 
counting  children  under  ten  years  of  age.  Of  these,  about  i  ,000,- 
000  were  whites,  260,000  civilized  Indians,  526,000  mulattoes  or 
free   negroes,   and    1,930,000   slaves.    In   1800  Brazilian  exports 

^  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  86-89. 

2  Id.,  pp.  168-170. 

3  Watson,  II,  238-239;  Rio-Branco,  p.  146. 

*  Watson,  II,  242-243.  Official  corrujjtion,  was,  however,  rife.  The  desire  to  get 
rich  quickly  invaded  the  minds  of  the  colonial  appointees  as  it  had  in  India.  The 
population  was  still  raw  and  illiterate.    Zimmermann,  I,  173  ff. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN   BRAZIL  1 59 

and   imports    amounted    to    over    ^11,000,000    and    $10,000,000 
respectively.^ 

The  advance  of  the  Portuguese  toward  the  interior  in  conse- 
quence of  the  discovery  of  gold  and  diamonds  revived  the  old 
contentions  whose  settlement  was  the  object  of  the  treaty  of 
Tordesillas.2  The  Demarcation  Line  had  been  respected  neither 
by  the  Portuguese  in  Brazil  nor  the  Spanish  in  the  East  Indies. 
Spain  had  kept  the  Philippines  and  exacted  an  indemnity  or 
purchase-price  for  the  Moluccas.  Admitting  these  facts  as  evi- 
dence of  a  western  shift  of  the  Pacific  demarcation  meridian,  Por- 
tugal could  claim  a  good  part  of  Patagonia,  Paraguay,  and  the  Plata 
region.  But  by  a  treaty  of  1750,  a  division  which  rested  upon 
the  principle  of  the  maintenance  of  present  holdings,  boundaries 
essentially  the  same  as  those  of  to-day  were  established.  Unrealiz- 
able pretensions  based  upon  the  famous  papal  bull  were  thus 
abandoned ;  the  temper  of  1493  had  long  passed.  Portugal 
renounced  any  rights  to  the  navigation  of  the  Plata,  and  all 
trade  between  the  two  nations  was  forbidden.^ 

Factors  Leading  to  Independence 

In  order  now  to  understand  the  impelling  forces  of  that  move- 
ment which  made  of  Brazil  an  independent  state,  it  is  necessary  to 
recall  the  fact  that  a  certain  part  of  the  country  lay  within  a  tem- 
perate region,  and  as  a  result  of  vital  and  other  conditions  was 
fitted  to  work  out  the  line  of  development  natural  to  such  environ- 
ment. This  favored  district  was  the  south.  From  early  times  its 
population  had  been  superior  in  quantity  and  quality  to  that  of  the 
tropical  regions,  and  the  fact  that  the  mines  lay  within  it  lent  it  a 
still  greater  attractive  power.  "  Mountains,  rivers,  mines,  men, 
geography,  and  human  choice  coincided  to  give  to  the  region  of 
Sao  Paulo-Minas  the  supremacy  over  all  Portuguese  America.""^ 
This  district  was  at  first  neglected  as  especially  unpromising  accord- 
ing to  the  ideas  of  the  time.  It  came,  however,  to  a  position  of 
leadership  in  all  Brazilian  history  :  in  the  exploration  of  the  interior, 

1  Rio-Branco,  pp.  149-1 52  ;  cf.  Watson,  II,  268  ;  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  68-69. 
An  estimate  quoted  in  Humboldt's  Essai  (II,  855)  gives,  for  1776,  1,900,000;  and  for 
1798,  3,300,000  (800,000  whites,  1,000,000  Indians,  and  1,500,000  negroes).  The 
latter  figures  are  said  to  be  too  low,  and  the  Portuguese  informant  judges  4,000,000 
to  be  nearer  the  truth.  ^  p   ^q,  above.  ^  Watson,  II,   144,  218,  220;  cf.  p.  212. 

*  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  125;  cf.  Stephens,  pp.  163  ff. 


l6o  COLONIZATION 

in  Indian  wars  and  slave  raids,  in  mine  discovery,  in  the  beating  off 
of  attacks  from  without.  The  PauHstas  were  the  most  energetic, 
stubborn,  and  independent  component  of  the  population  of  the 
colony.  As  contrasted  with  the  north,  the  progress  of  the  south 
was  less  speedy  but  more  solid ;  while  in  the  north  attention 
turned  to  an  e.\otic  culture  dependent  upon  an  imported  labor 
supply,  the  south  exhibited  a  system  approaching  that  of  "free 
colonization."  The  north  still  formed  a  Portuguese  "  plantation," 
while  the  south  had  acquired  many  of  the  rudiments  of  a  develop- 
ing nation.  This  supremacy  was  recognized  by  the  transference  of 
the  capital  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  from  Bahia  to 
Rio  de  Janeiro.^ 

The  temper  of  this  region  was  never  tractable.  It  was  quarrel- 
some rather,  violent  and  revolutionary,  particularly  after  the  infu- 
sion of  the  miner  element.  When  the  eighteenth  century  was 
drawing  to  a  close,  the  ground  was  already  prepared  for  almost 
any  degree  of  political  assertion.  The  principles  of  the  French 
Revolution  and  the  example  of  the  American  united  to  render  the 
Brazilians  more  uneasy;  indeed,  a  revolution  broke  out  in  Minas 
Geraes  in  1789,  which  witnessed  in  some  degree  to  the  receptivity 
of  the  Paulistas  for  the  doctrines  of  the  French  philosophers.  It 
was  repressed  with  needless  severity.^  Now  it  was  precisely  during 
this  disturbed  period  that  the  great  European  struggles  impinged 
indirectly  upon  the  local  situation,  and  with  a  result  unique  in  the 
history  of  colonization.  I"or,  in  consequence  of  Napoleon's  activi- 
ties in  the  Peninsula,  the  crown  of  Portugal  itself  was  forced  to 
emigrate  into  its  great  transatlantic  i)ossession,  thus  completely 
perturbing  the  antecedent  status  of  affairs.  Socially,  a  veritable 
experiment  in  the  admixture  of  oil  and  water  ensued  ;  the  Portu- 
guese "  mandarinate "    was  brought   into  close   proximity   to  the 

^  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  31-32,  46-48,  75-77.  "The  Brazilian  nation  evolved 
in  colonial  fashion  {coloiiinlmente)  in  the  north,  but  organically  and  spontaneously 
in  the  south.  Semi-independent,  the  region  of  S.  I'aulo-Minas  with  the  great  bay  of 
Rio-Janeiro,  the  national  capital  of  a  future  empire,  was  working  out  in  obscurity  an 
organic  structure ;  while  the  Brazil  of  officialdom,  of  brilliance  and  opulence,  the 
Brazil  of  the  viceroys  and  governors,  was  seated  in  the  north,  in  Bahia  and  I'ernam- 
buco.  That  Brazil,  however,  was  not  geographically  the  center  of  the  empire.  Its 
climate  seemed  to  condemn  it  to  the  eternal  condition  of  a  colony  dependent  upon 
an  exotic  culture  and  upon  African  slavery,  or  to  the  unhappy  lot  of  a  Jesuit  Para- 
guay." Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  76.  For  the  general  status  of  Brazil  at  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  see  Vamhagen,  II,  236  ff. 

2  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  101-104  ;  Rio-Branco,  p.  151  ;  cf.  Varnhagen,  II,  269 ff. 


THE  PORTUGUESE  IN  BRAZIL  l6l 

Paulista  type,  rudfc  and  democratic.  There  was  likewise  an  inver- 
sion, as  it  were,  of  political  relationship  between  Portugal  and 
Brazil,  whereby  the  latter  became  the  dominant  state  and  the  for- 
mer the  dependency.^  Rio  de  Janeiro  constituted,  to  all  practical 
intents,  the  capital  of  the  Portuguese  empire.  Results  of  great  sig- 
nificance could  not  fail  to  follow  upon  this  situation. 

The  royal  family  of  the  Braganzas  arrived  in  Brazil  early  in 
i8d8,  thus  realizing  a  transference  of  the  court  projected  by 
~JoIm^IV  in  the  seventeenth  century,  by  Da  Cunha  in  1736,  and 
by  Pombal  in  1761.  The  country  at  once,  and  by  the  logic  of  the 
situation,  became  an  independent  empire.  The  king  hastened  to 
issue  a  series  of  decrees  assuring  to  Brazil  such  industrial  and 
other  advantages  as  the  metropolis  had  possessed  :  agriculture, 
manufacture,  and  commerce  were  put  on  their  feet  and  encouraged, 
foreigners  freely  admitted,  departments,  courts,  and  councils  estab- 
lished, roads  built  and  exploration  furthered,  schools,  libraries, 
and  scientific  projects  supported.  In  18 15  Brazil  was  accorded 
the  title  of  Realm.  For  seven  years  the  country  was  adminis- 
tered directly  by  local  officials  under  a  local  sovereign  ;  this 
event  was  e.xtremely  opportune,  for  it  had  the  merit  of  placing  in 
evidence  and  politically  sanctioning  an  inevitable  and  imminent 
change  of  Brazil's  status.^  It  also  had  a  more  lasting  effect  in 
binding  the  various  Brazilian  provinces  together,  both  politically 
and  economically  (through  the  construction  of  roads  and  other 
means  of  inter-communication),  as  the  Spanish  South  American 
colonies,  for  example,  were  never  united.^  And  when  the  king, 
against  his  will,  was  "forced  by  the  insistence  of  England  to 
return  to  Lisbon,  he  left  behind  his  oldest  son,  Dom  Pedro,  as 
regent  of  the  realm. 

For  all  the  benefits  of  the  royal  sojourn,  however,  the  Brazilians 
were  glad  to  see  it  end.  The  European  court  was  an  exotic  plant 
in  the  rude  new  country,  and  the  ways  of  the  aristocracy  palled 
upon  the  hardy  settlers  of  the  Paulista  type.  There  was  nothing 
in  common  between  the  two.  When  now  the  Lisbon  Cortes 
opposed  the  royal  policy,  voted  the  suppression  of  schools  and 
higher  courts,  ordered  the  dissolution  of  the  central  government 

1  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  94  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  56-57  ;  Vamhagen,  II,  297  ff. ; 
Zitnmermann,  I,  411. 

2  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  94.  For  the  emigration  of  the  Braganzas,  see  also 
pp.  90  ff. ;  Rio-Branco,  pp.  154-155;  Watson,  II,  263  ff.;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  56-57; 
general  sketch  of  the  period  in  Zimmermann,  I,  175  ff.        ^  Watson,  II,  260,  270. 


1 62  COLONIZATION 

in  Rio  and  the  recall  of  Dom  Pedro,  and  tried  to  break  Brazilian 
unity  by  attaching  each  province  separately  to  the  metropolis,  an 
almost  universal  movement  in  favor  of  Brazilian  autonomy  set  in. 
Dom  Pedro,  in  response  to  overtures  on  the  part  of  the  people  of 
Rio  and  Sao-Paulo,  declared  (January,  1822)  that  he  would  remain 
in  the  country.  The  Portuguese  troops  who  opposed  the  resolu- 
tion were  allowed  to  depart  for  Portugal,  and  the  prince,  after 
proclaiming  the  independence  of  Brazil  (September  7,  1822),  was 
acclaimed  first  perpetual  protector,  then  constitutional  emperor 
(October  12).  It  was  impossible  for  the  metropolis  to  resist  this 
culmination,  for  it  had  "  a  smaller  population  and  perhaps  less 
wealth  than  its  colony.  It  resigned  itself  cheerfully  to  an  inevita- 
ble fact,"  ^  and  Brazilian  independence  was  recognized  in  1825.'"^ 

Achievements  of  the  Portuguese  in  Brazil 

The  achievements  of  the  Portuguese  in  Brazil  deserve  a  word 
of  notice  in  perspective,  and  by  way  of  comparison  with  those  of 
other  peoples  operating  under  similar  conditions.  The  case  is  well 
put  by  Leroy-Beaulieu  :  "  The  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  and 
the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  brought  to  Brazil  none  of  those 
calamities  which  broke  over  the  English  and  Spanish  possessions. 
Portugal  followed  in  all  the  European  conflicts  the  destiny  of  Eng- 
land, the  mistress  of  the  seas,  from  which  it  resulted  that  free 
circulation  between  the  metropolis  and  the  colonies  was  never 
interrupted  :  Brazil  was  in  a  position  to  gain  rather  than  to  lose 
during  the  maritime  wars  of  the  Europeans,  for  these  smote  the 
sugar  islands  of  her  rivals  while  leaving  her  intact.  If  the  separa- 
tion of  Brazil  and  Portugal  came  to  pass  without  violence  and 
almost  without  shock,  this  must  not  be  regarded  as  a  fortuitous 
circumstance.  It  was  not  alone  the  diminutiveness  and  powerless- 
ness  of  the  metropolis  which  rendered  the  transition  so  easy  ;  the 
colony  was  ready  for  independence,  and,  when  it  had  detached 
itself  from  its  trunk  like  a  ripe  fruit,  it  did  not  cease  to  grow  and 
prosper.  The  fact  is  that  the  Portuguese  administration  in  Brazil, 
despite  its  errors  and  faults,  .  .  .  had  not  been  very  oppressive  ; 
liberty  had   been   the   cradle  of   colonization.     The  abundance  of 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  57  ;  figure.s  for  the  decline  of  Portugal's  commerce  in  Martins, 
O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  249. 

2  Riolkanco,  pp.  163-164;  for  the  activities  of  Jose  Bonifacio  and  the  character 
of  Dom  I'edro,  see  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  pp.  107,  111-116. 


THE  PORTUGUESK   IN  BRAZIE  163 

fertile  lands,  the  absence  of  exaggerated  regulation,  the  feebleness 
of  the  main  viortc,  had  allowed  the  colony,  in  spite  of  certain 
restrictions  and  monopolies,  to  reach  conditions  which  were  normal 
and  appropriate  to  an  adult  age."  ^  Brazil  was  likewise  saved  from 
the  Inquisition,  the  Santo  Officio,  "  from  that  Status  in  Statu 
whose  dictation,  superior  to  all  law,  diminished  the  majesty  of  the 
king,  the  power  of  the  government,  the  justice  of  the  courts, 
the  ecclesiastical  authority  of  the  prelates,  and  the  liberty  of  the 
people  —  liberty  not  only  to  discuss  but  even  as  it  were  to  think. 
No  special  inquisition  was  ever  created  in  Brazil."  ^ 

"The  relations  of  Portugal  with  Brazil  are,  besides,  much  more 
familiar,  more  intimate,  more  frequent,  than  those  of  Spain  with 
her  former  colonies  in  America.  This  has  been  seen  by  the  num- 
ber of  Portuguese  who  [still]  emigrate  to  Brazil.  Several  years 
ago  the  trade  with  Brazil  represented  about  one -sixth  of  the  export 
and  one-seventeenth  of  the  import  movement  of  the  total  trade  of 
Portugal.  ...  In  the  Indies  a  jealous,  narrow,  and  ambitious  pol- 
icy lost  no  time  in  ruining  the  edifice  of  Portuguese  power  ;  in 
Africa  a  disgraceful  and  degrading  trade  afforded  Portugal  a 
debasing  wealth ;  in  Brazil  alone  the  Portuguese  demonstrated 
themselves  colonists.  They  managed  to  blend  the  spirit  of  adven- 
ture in  a  just  degree  with  practical  patience  and  laborious  per- 
severance, and  they  thus  succeeded  in  realizing  one  of  the  aims, 
if  it  is  not  the  sole  object,  of  colonization,  the  creation  of  a  great 
state,  rich,  industrious,  and  free."  ^ 

These  statements  may  serve  to  bring  out  the  special  achieve- 
ments of  the  Portuguese  in  America  as  distinguished  both  from 
those  of  other  nations  in  the  New  World  and  from  those  of  the 
same  nation  in  the  Old.  It  is  probable  that  Leroy-Beaulieu,  in  his 
partisanship  for  the  Latin  nations  ^  and  his  solicitude  for  their 
future  and  the  persistence  of  what  is  distinctive  in  their  culture, 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  56.  It  should  be  realized  that  Brazil  is  about  ninety  times  the 
size  of  Portugal.    Cf.  Watson,  II,  113. 

-  Vamhagen,  I,  88.  ^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  58,  59. 

*  He  also  applauds  the  Germans  and  Scandinavians  for  their  efforts  in  the  colonial 
field,  remarking  (I,  186,  note) :  "  II  ne  faut  pas  desirer  la  disparition  des  especes  ou 
des  races,  quand  elles  ont  des  qualites  solides.  Or,  I'amoindrissement  de  son  rang 
relatif  dans  le  monde,  I'abaissenient  indefini  du  coefficient  qu'il  represente  dans  la 
population  totale  du  globe,  equivalent  presque  pour  un  peuple  a  sa  disparition."  He 
adds,  more  concretely  (p.  187,  note)  :  "  On  a  trop  longtemps  laisse  le  monde  entier 
livre  aux  Anglo-Saxons,  c'est  une  cause  d'appauvrissement  futur  pour  la  civilisation 
humaine." 


164  COLONIZATION 

somewhat  exaggerates  the  favorable  case  of  Brazil.  But  it  is  clear 
enough,  nevertheless,  that,  partly  because  the  colony  furnished  a 
fa\orable  environment,  partly  because  it  was  let  alone,  partly  be- 
cause it  was  treated  with  less  incompetence  than  ordinarily,  partly 
for  a  number  of  lesser  reasons,  Brazil  has  become  an  independent 
nation  whose  kindly  feeling  for  the  metropolis,  unbroken  by  bloody 
revolutionary  struggles,  is  an  international  asset ;  for  it  adds  much 
to  the  importance  of  an  otherwise  insignificant  parent  state.  Con- 
tinuous infusions  of  Portuguese  blood,  due  to  an  immigration 
motived  not  by  governmental  but  by  popular  initiative,  have  gradu- 
ally overcome  the  native  strain  of  what  was  a  largely  mongrel  popu- 
lation, and  a  fortunate  reversion  toward  the  more  developed  ethnic 
component,  with  its  happier  adaptation  to  modern  conditions,  has 
ensued.  The  contrast  with  the  outcome  in  the  Portuguese  East 
is  sharp.  In  Brazil  there  has  arisen  a  new  and  powerful  sponsor 
for  that  in  language,  religion,  customs,  and  literature  which  is 
Portuguese.  To  a  certain  degree  a  nation  and  its  life  have  been 
transplanted,  and  a  new  society,  inheriting  its  distinctive  charac- 
ters from  an  old,  has  come  into  a  relative  fullness  of  strength. 

Conclusion  of  Portuguese  Colonization 

After  all,  however,  there  has  been  but  a  single  and  brief  period 
during  which  Portugal  was  enabled  to  hold  the  center  of  the  stage 
in  the  working-out  of  the  world's  history,  and  that  was  when  she 
had  succeeded  in  making  the  first  direct  contact  between  Europe 
and  Asia,  the  West  and  the  East.  Fitted  for  some  such  desperate 
exploit,  and  through  its  achievement  the  objects  of  envy  of  the 
rest  of  the  western  world,  the  Portuguese  could  not  maintain 
through  cool  and  rational  means  what  they  had  gained  by  dash 
and  the  impetus  of  enthusiasm.  Even  the  Portuguese  historians 
were  wont  perpetually  to  confuse  personal  heroism  with  political 
achievement.^  Administration  was  beyond  the  intrepid  path- 
breakers,  facing  as  they  did  a  situation  which  called  for  the 
handling  of  problems  new  to  men.  It  would  have  been  hard  in 
that  age  to  have  found  any  people  in  Europe  which  would  have 
met  the  new  situation  untrammeled  with  the  convictions,  preju- 
dices, and  other  intellectual  handicaps  to  which  Portugal  largely 
owed  her  disasters.^    Portugal  was  in  truth  the  fine  flower  of  the 

1  Hunter,  T,  92  ;  cf.  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  95  ;  Whiteway,  pp.  24-25. 

2  Cf.  Martins,  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  296;  for  a  list  of  the  causes  of  Portuguese 
decadence,  see  Corvo,  TV,  88  ff. 


THE  PORTUGUESE   IN   BRAZIL  165 

age  ;  all  wished  to  do  as  she  was  doing.  There  was  not  so  much 
incongruity  between  the  specifically  Portuguese  methods  and  the 
medium  in  which  they  were  applied  and  failed,  as  between  the  gen- 
eral methods  characteristic  of  an  undeveloped  age  and  the  new  envi- 
ronment suddenly  thrown  open  —  of  world-wide  commerce,  distant 
empire,  and  the  contact  with  alien  races.  The  transition  from 
that  mediterranean  or  "thalassic"  stage  of  commerce  and  coloni- 
zation to  the  oceanic  stage  was  sure  to  cause  throes  of  misunder- 
standing, and  failure  in  adjustment.  Portugal  was  destined,  for 
reasons  stated,  to  be  the  first  to  plunge  into  a  task  far  beyond  her 
power  of  numbers  or  grade  of  discipline.  Thus  she  did  not  reach 
the  goal,  but  fell  back,  becoming  as  the  years  went  on  less  and 
less  able  to  dominate  the  situation,  deriving  a  waning  benefit  from 
the  relics  of  her  old  empire.  She  spent  her  strength  before  the 
race  was  really  begun.  In  her  decline  she  has  been  unable  to 
attend  properly  to  matters  now  regarded  as  fundamental  in  coloni- 
zation :  preparatory  works  of  various  kinds  {roads,  surveys,  harbor- 
works,  etc.),  hygienic  measures,  educative  systems,  and  enterprises 
of  all  kinds.  She  has  fallen  into  a  more  or  less  dependent  relation 
with  the  nation  which  was  able  to  seize  the  dominant  place  in  the 
modern  world-movements  of  trade  and  colonization,  —  the  British.^ 
Amidst  these  failures,  however,  Brazil  stands  forth  as  a  success 
due  to  largely  uncontrolled  and  natural  development ;  it  is  only  the 
more  visionary,  or  the  practical  in  more  visionary  moods,  who  an- 
ticipate for  it  the  menace  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  encroachment,  or  fear 
political  interference  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  of  America.^ 

Note  on  Brazilian  Revenue 

For  various  reasons  it  is  impossible  to  get  any  exact  figures  for  the  revenue 
derived  from  the  gold  mines  of  Brazil.  Reckoning  must  start  out,  for  the  most 
part,  from  the  amount  of  the  government  fifths  as  a  basis.  These  are  not 
always  distinguishable  from  other  items  of  revenue,  and  for  other  reasons  are 
uncertain.  No  calculations  such  as  those  of  Humboldt  for  Spanish  America 
are  available,  and  when  the  attempt  is  made  to  ascertain  the  total  production 
of  the  mines,  estimates  enter  for  the  most  part  into  the  region  of  rough  guess- 
work. The  amount  to  which  the  government  was  defrauded  is  indeterminable, 
although  it  is  known  to  have  been  large.  The  case  is  much  worse  when  the 
diamond  revenue  and  production  are  considered  ;  here  the  system  of  taxation 

1  Corvo,  I,  140;  IV,  59-60,  etc.;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  59.  Martins,  citing  statistics, 
speaks  of  the  "denationalization"  of  Portuguese  commerce  with  the  colonies. 
O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  197,  note  ;  cf.  Hist,  de  Port.,  I,  16. 

2  Cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  58. 


1 66  COLONIZATION 

varied  between  two  incommensurable  bases,  and  evasion  was  still  more  diffi- 
cult to  detect. 

The  subjoined  collection  of  estimates  can  give,  therefore,  no  more  than  a 
general  idea  of  the  situation  ;  it  is  given  for  what  it  is  worth.  W'at.son  *  says 
that  the  fifths  of  gold  from  Minas  Geraes  were  assumed  to  amount  to  loo 
arrobas  (over  3200  pounds)  ;  in  1753  they  reached  a  value  of  nearly  $2,000,- 
000.  That  year  the  fleet  from  Rio  de  Janeiro  was  believed  to  have  brought 
home  gold,  silver,  and  goods  worth  #15,000,000.  The  bullion  and  jewels  sent 
to  Lisbon  in  1754  were  estimated  at  a  million  moidores  ($6,500,000).  On  an 
average  of  sixteen  years  the  royal  fifths  exceeded  100  arrobas.  Stephens - 
gives  the  following:  entire  amount  of  gold  extracted,  $225,000,000;  yearly 
revenue  to  crown  from  fifths,  $1,500,000.  Martins*''  says  that  D.  Joao  V  (1706- 
1750)  received  about  130,000,000  crusados  (over  $50,000,000)  from  the  gold- 
works,  and,  among  other  items,  swelling  this  figure,  40,000,000  cruzados 
($16,000,000)  from  diamonds.  The  same  author''  states  that  Eschwege  cal- 
culated the  total  product  of  the  fifths  at  $64,800,000.  They  rendered  about 
$2,000,000  annually;  some  think  double  that  sum.  In  1809  Minas  produced 
for  the  fifth  over  4800  pounds  of  gold;  and  in  1820  the  total  product  of  the 
revenue  was  scarcely  $240,000,  the  value  of  440  kilograms.'''  Martins's  cata- 
logue of  estimates,  containing  some  rather  inaccessible  data,  is  translated  in 
full  below.  All  these  calculations  should  be  taken  cum  grano ;  they  should 
be  compared,  by  one  who  wishes  a  greater  precision,  with  those  of  Humboldt 
for  Spanish  America.  It  should  also  be  realized  that  these  sums  appeared  far 
greater  in  the  eighteenth  century  than  they  would  at  the  present  time.  For 
purposes  of  comparison  the  following  facts  may  be  appended :  value  of  fine 
gold  per  ounce  at  the  present  time,  $20.67  ;  go'd  production  of  the  world  :  1885, 
$108,435,600;  1895,  $198,763,600  ;  1900,  $254,576,300  ;  1904,  $347,000,000. 
Whole  stock  of  gold  in  the  world,  about  $6,150,000,000.^  A  cursory  review 
of  various  national  crop  reports  will  show  the  superiority  of  agriculture  and 
other  kindsof  economy,  once  despised  in  comparison  with  the  mining  of  precious 
metals. 

Estimates  of  the  Yield  of  Gold  and  Diamonds 

(Translation  from  Martins,  O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  83,  note.) 
The  insuflficiency  of  the  registers  and  the  importance  of  contraband  render 

impossible  the  determination  of  the  sum  of  production  of  the  Brazilian  mines. 

We  give,  however,  certain  selections  upon  the  topic. 

Humboldt,  in  his  Essay  on  New  Spain, ^  calculates  thus  : 

From  1699  to  1755  there  came  registered  to  Europe    .  480,000,000  piasters 

From  1756  to  1803  there  came  registered  to  Europe    .  204,544,000  piasters 

Not  registered 171,000,000  piasters 

Total  855,544,000  piasters 

Gold  in  coin  and  the  arts  in  Brazil ? 

I'roduction  from  1803  to  1815,  yearly  (30,000  marcos) .  4,360,000  piasters 

1  II,  244.         2  p.  348.         3  Hist,  de  Port..  TI,  151.         •»  O  Brazil,  etc.,  ]x  84,  note. 
'"  Other  estimates  are  to  be  found  in  liranco,  I'ort.  na  Epocha,  etc.,  p.  99;   Martins, 
O  Brazil,  etc.,  p.  83,  note.  "^  Moody's  Magazine,  December,  1905,  p.  20. 

^  Essai,  II,  643-644. 


THE  PORTUGUESE   IN   BRAZIL 


167 


The  mines  of  Goyaz  apparently  produced  annually  (middle  of  the  eight- 
eenth century)  150  arrobas  of  gold. 

Ayres  do  Cazal  says  that  the  first  fleet  of  Cuyabd  looted  by  the  Payaguas 
in  Paraguay  (1730)  bore  22,000  libras  of  gold;  and  that  in  1731  there  went 
out  from  Matto-G rosso  to  S.  Paulo  25,600  libras. 

In  1773  the  gold  produced  in  Minas  weighed  118  arrobas,  and  from  1773 
to  181 2  the  total  was  6895  arrobas,  worth  85,000,000  cruzados. 

From  1752  to  1773  the  total  registered  production  was  6400  to  8600  kilos 
per  annum,  and  the  contraband  more  than  as  much  again. 

Here  are  the  figures  of  Chevalier :  ^ 


Annual  Production  op  America 

Brazil 

Other  Countries 

At  the  beginning  of  the ) 
century                           ) 

kilos  3,700,  fr.  12,744,000 

kilos  10,418,  fr.  35,885,000 

Before  the  discovery  of  ) 
the  California  mines    ) 

kilos  2,500,  fr.  8,611,000 

kilos  12,715,  fr.  43,796,000 

The  following  are  the  tables  of  Baron  von  Eschwege  in  his  Pluto 
Brasiliensis :  - 

Extraction  of  Gold 

Minas  Geraes  1700  to   1820 351687  arrobas 

Goyaz  1720  to   1730 9,212  arrobas 

Matto-Grosso  1712  to   1820 3,107  arrobas 

S.  Paulo  1600  to  1820 4,650  arrobas 

This  excludes  contraband,  confiscation,  etc.  The  total  production  of  Brazil 
might  have  reached  from  1600  to  1820,  63,417  arrobas  of  a  value  of  391,000 
contos  of  reis. 

In  1  735,  according  to  Constancio,  the  diamond  mines  produced  a  million  and 
a  half  of  cruzados  annually.  The  district  of  Diamantina  (Minas)  yielded,  in 
1808,  from  20,000  to  25,000  carats,  and  in  1809  the  treasure  of  Rio  allowed 
D.  Joao  VI  to  decree  an  annual  sale  in  London  of  20,000  carats  to  guarantee 
the  debt-charges. 

Up  to  1 794,  according  to  the  Correio  braziliense,^  the  total  expense  of  the 
extraction  had  arisen  to  6185  contos,  the  product  being  48,547  oitavas  [eighths 
of  an  ounce]  of  diamonds.  The  work  was,  as  is  known,  a  royal  monopoly,  and  the 
diamonds  went,  on  the  count  of  the  national  finances,  to  Amsterdam  to  be  cut 
and  sold.  From  1802  to  i8ig  they  were  adjudicated  to  the  service  of  the  loan 
raised  in  Amsterdam,  and  the  firm  of  Hope  was  the  consignee.  During  this 
period  the  house  in  question  received  348,926  carats,  liquidating  8,810,479 
florins.  This  sum,  however,  does  not  represent  the  total  production  ;  there 
must  be  added  the  value  of  diamonds  of  greater  size  and  price,  preserved  in 
the  Treasury,  and  all  those  which  circulated  in  the  hands  of  individuals  in 
the  Reino-unido. 

1  Coursd'ficonomie  Politique,  in,  397,  401.  Marlins's  figures  are  wrong.        ^r-33- 
■^  Nos.  79,  81,  and  in.    See  a  chart  of  A.  Patricio  de  Anderlecht,  in  the  Padre 
Arnaro,  London,  1821,  t.  IV,  343. 


CHAPTER    V 

THE  BEGINNINGS  AND  THE  SETFING  OF  SPANISH 
COLONIZATION 

In  passing  from  the  colonial  enterprises  of  the  Portuguese  to 
those  of  the  Spanish,  strong  contrasts  clue  to  racial  differences 
in  the  two  peoples  are  conspicuously  absent  ;  and  the  same  may 
be  said  of  those  rooting  in  antecedent  history.  The  common 
motive  forces  which  led  to  the  exploits  of  the  two  Iberian  nations 
have  been  reviewed  in  a  former  passage.^  It  is  necessary  only  to 
recall  the  religious  unity  and  political  coherence  forced  upon  them 
by  the  western  crusade  against  the  Moslem  invader ;  the  enthusi- 
asm, love  of  adventure,  taste  for  gambling  with  large  hazards, 
impatience  with  a  humdrum  existence,  and  the  overpowering  greed 
begotten  of  preceding  generations  of  war  and  rapine  ;  and  finally 
the  benefits  derived  from  the  presence  and  efforts  of  an  alien 
industrious  people,  and  the  deep  national  disaster  incurred  or 
about  to  be  incurred  through  its  expulsion.  These  considerations 
being  recalled,  it  is  possible  to  turn  without  further  preliminaries 
to  the  more  special  and  local  conditions  of  Spain  in  order  to  find 
what  particular  preparation  lay  behind  her  activities  in  the  Dis- 
coveries period  and  later. 

Political  and  Religious  Unification 

The  case  is  not  so  simple  as  that  of  Portugal.  Politically  the 
provinces  which  were  to  become  Spain  had  never  been  soundly 
welded  together ;  their  union  was  more  accidental  than  natural  or 
inevitable.  The  need  of  concert  against  the  Moors  appealed,  with 
the  gradual  retirement  of  the  latter,  chiefly  to  the  South.  It  was 
really  the  much  opposed  union  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  (1469), 
rather  than  any  inherent  necessity,  which  represented  the  draw- 
ing together  of  the  two  leading  kingdoms.  Nevertheless  this 
union  powerfully  furthered  political  concentration  under  a  strong 

1  Pp.  80  ff.,  above. 
1 68 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  169 

monarchy.  Ferdinand,  upon  whom  had  been  conferred  the  grand- 
mastership  of  the  three  miUtary  orders,  Santiago,  Alcantara,  and 
Calatrava,  came  thus  to  be  the  "sole  and  only  leader  of  the  old 
chivalry  of  Spain,  as  of  its  modern  military  system."  The  two 
sovereigns,  united  in  their  purposes,  grasped  the  situation  and  con- 
stantly built  up  their  power  by  breaking  that  of  the  nobles  and 
by  resolutely  repressing  disorder;  "the  unity  of  the  king  and 
queen  was  so  entire,  and  the  personality  of  each  so  strong,  that  for 
purposes  of  external  policy  Castile  and  Aragon  were  already  Spain."  ^ 
The  subsequent  extension  of  the  Spanish  dominions  but  added  to 
this  power.  "  It  placed  them  on  a  pedestal  high  above  the  strong- 
est nobleman,  or  the  wealthiest  ecclesiastic  ;  it  gave  distance  and 
atmosphere  to  royalty.  Yet  this  very  extension  would  have  been 
impossible  or  dangerous  had  not  king  and  queen  resolutely  increased 
also  the  intension  of  their  power."  ^ 

However  unhomogeneous  by  nature  the  several  districts  of  Spain 
may  have  been,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Catholic  Sovereigns 
soon  attained  a  position  from  which  they  could  dispose  of  the 
forces  of  Spain  as  of  a  nation  politically  unified.  Indeed,  the  po- 
litical unity  seems  as  a  practical  factor  to  have  surpassed  the 
religious,  in  spite  of  the  aftermath  of  passion  following  upon  the 
Moorish  wars  ;  ^  for  these  sovereigns,  perhaps  not  deliberately  but 
in  any  case  opportunely,  played  upon  the  religious  interests  com- 
mon to  all  sections,  interweaving  with  the  success  of  their  grand 
crusade  against  the  Moorish  kingdoms  many  a  strand  of  political 
loyalty  to  themselves,  and  extending  their  rule  through  actual  con- 
quest."* In  many  ways  the  cementation  of  religious  unity  appears 
to  have  been  merged  into  or  even  to  have  been  secondary  to  the 
establishment  and  preservation  of  the  monarchy  ;  the  Inquisition 
was  later  employed  as  an  effective  political  agency,  and  in  Spain, 
as  in  few  other  Catholic  countries,  the  sovereign  dominated  the 
Church.'''  At  the  same  time,  as  will  be  seen,  the  religious  motive 
flowed  in  a  powerful  current  through  the  minds  of  individuals, 
high  and  low,  and  through  the  life  of  the  nation  at  large.  Certainly 
at  the  end  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella's  reign  an  effective  coherence 

1  Hume,  pp.  I,  12-14. 

2  Id.,  pp.  II,  19-24,  29-30  ;  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  179,220  ;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,p.  7. 
The  same  process  was  carried  forward  by  Charles  V  and  Philip  II.  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl., 
pp.  12-16.  ^  Cf.  Colmeiro,  I,  219. 

*  Navarre,  for  instance,  was  conquered  in  151 2. 
6  Hume,  pp.  128-131  ;  cf.  Fabie,  p.  41. 


I70  COLONIZATION 

along  all  lines  had  been  secured  ;  "  with  a  disciplined  infantry,  a 
guileful  diplomacy,  a  powerful  Church,  Spain  was  fully  equipped 
for  the  conquest  of  territory  or  the  control  of  opinion."  ^ 

Economic  Strength 

The  question  of  the  economic  strength  of  Spain  at  the  entrance 
of  her  world-career  still  remains.  The  opinion  has  been  offered 
that  both  Spain  and  Portugal  were  led  by  enthusiasm  for  King 
and  Church  into  enterprises  which  placed  too  severe  a  strain  upon 
their  material  resources.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that 
Spain's  economic  development  was  relatively  backward,  for  it  is 
morally  certain  that  there  was  no  nation  in  Europe  that  could 
have  coped  with  the  new  and  dangerous  situation  with  which  Spain 
was  presently  to  find  herself  confronted.  To  one  who  pauses  in 
amazement  over  the  absurd  restrictions  placed  upon  industry  and 
trade  by  the  casuistries  of  the  mediaeval  system,  the  periodic  and 
capricious  alteration  of  the  coinage  and  other  ill-advised  and  unfair 
measures,  it  seems  well-nigh  impossible  that  any  economic  develop- 
ment whatever  should  have  taken  place  ;  ^  but  one  must  reflect 
that  the  prescrijHions  of  the  canons  weighed  upon  all  Euroi)ean 
nations  except  the  most  advanced  and  skillful  of  evaders,  and 
really  represented  an  honest  though  blundering  attempt  at  the 
solution  of  the  rising  problems  of  society.  Despite  all  these  draw- 
backs, it  would  be  difficult  to  show  that  Spain,  upon  the  eve  of  the 
Discoveries,  was  not  economically  as  well  prepared  for  her  open- 
ing career  as  were  several  other  states  of  later  times  with  which  it 
has  been  the  custom  to  compare  Sjmin  to  her  disadvantage.''^  The 
period  of  Spanish  decline,  once  believed  to  have  been  in  full  swing 
before  the  sixteenth  century,  was  yet  to  be  ushered  in  ;  in  fact 
the  exigencies  of  the  opening  century  were  largely  responsible  for 
its  coming. 

Traces  of  industrial  development  in  Castile  and  Aragon  were 
slight   up   to  the  fourteenth  century,   when  some  protection  was 

1  Hume,  p.  30;  cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  3;  Clarke,  pp.  353-356;  Cheyney,  pp.  79  ff. 
For  an  eloquent  but  perhaps  "  impressionistic  "  account  of  the  factors  of  royalty  and 
the  Church,  see  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  158  ff. 

2  Colmeiro,  I,  405  ff. ;  chaps,  xlv,  xlvi,  xlvii,  1,  etc. 

^  The    Spanish  and  Portuguese   were  confronted  with  a  series  of  problems  for 
whose  solution  they  were,  as  was  the  rest  of  the  western  world,  by  education  unfitted. 
\     The  Dutch  and  English,  in  a  later  time,  profited  by  their  errors.    Martins,  Civ.  Iber., 
pp.  261-263. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COT,ONIZATION  171 

extended  to  the  arts  and  crafts.  Unable  to  maintain  the  level  of 
Moorish  agriculture,  the  Spaniards  allowed  aqueducts  and  other 
irrigation  devices  to  remain  in  the  ruins  to  which  war  had  reduced 
them,  and  turned  their  attention  more  particularly  to  an  occu]:)ation 
which  made  fewer  demands  upon  their  warlike  minds  and  unsettled 
dispositions,  —  cattle-raising.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  physical 
character  of  the  Peninsula  favored  sheep  over  grain ;  but  the 
extensions  of  privilege  granted  to  the  owners  of  flocks  over  the 
cultivators  of  ground  were  plainly  excessive,  and  they  choked 
whatever  agricultural  development  was  possible.  Valencia  supplied 
but  one-third  of  her  own  needs  along  this  line,  and  Catalonia  and 
Aragon  were  almost  wholly  dependent  upon  importation  from 
Sicily,  the  Balearic  Islands,  and  elsewhere.  Castile,  depending 
upon  her  ill-treated  Moriscos,  managed  even  to  export  a  little  grain 
up  to  the  time  when  the  latter  were  crushed  and  expelled.  In  the 
fifteenth  century  the  chief  raw  products  of  Spain  were  wool,  wine, 
and  iron.^  Industries  were  far  from  being  self-sufficient,  for  almost 
all  industrial  products  were  imported-;  the  realization  of  the  fact 
that  "  wealth  was  being  drawn  from  the  country  "  to  pay  for  them, 
motived  the  efforts  of  Isabella  to  build  up  industries,  although  as 
respects  agriculture  and  cattle-raising  no  great  departure  from 
traditional  policy  was  attempted. ^ 

Of  all  those  9CCupations  whose  pursuit  builds  up  national  material 
wealth,  commerce  was  as  little  neglected  as  any.  Spain  had  lain 
in  the  path  of  trade  for  many  centuries  and  could  not  but  have 
profited  by  her  position.  Cadiz  (Gades)  had  been  famous  in  Phoeni- 
cian times  ;  and  the  Italians  of  the  Middle  Ages  had  met  a  fierce 
competition,  especially  in  the  African  trade,  from  the  merchant- 
shipping  of  Barcelona.  The  parts  of  the  Peninsula  accessible  from 
the  sea  had  been  visited  and  enriched  by  the  sojourn  of  Phoenician, 
Greek,  Carthaginian,  Roman,  and  Arab.  In  the  first  half  of  the 
fourteenth  century  regulations  of  Castilian  commerce  with  England 
and  the  Netherlands  occur,  and  in  1348  the  barbarous  "  strand-law  " 
was  abolished.^  Barcelona  entered  the  field  somewhat  earlier,  and 
the  inhabitants  of  other  districts  learned  more  of  the  sea  with  the 
extension  of    their   fisheries.     The    very  need   of   imported   food 

1  Colmeiro,  I,  300  ff.;  II,  112  ff.;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  8,  22-26,  32-35.  On  the 
Consejo  de  la  Mesta,  see  also  Hume,  p.  84  ;   Clarke,  p.  356. 

2  Haebler,  pp.  8,  47  ;   Hume,  pp.  S5-86. 

8  Wappaus,  I,  348 ;  Lindsay,  I,  471,  548-549,  554  ff. 


172  COLONIZATION 

and  other  products  forced  the  development  of  commerce,  and 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  as  soon  as  their  hands  were  freed  from 
wars,  are  found  to  have  directed  close  attention  to  the  require- 
ments of  a  sea-borne  traffic.-^  Indeed,  as  has  been  seen,  the  very 
entrance  into  the  heritage  of  the  Moslems  could  not  but  open  the 
eyes  of  the  conquerors  to  its  value.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
weakness  of  the  Spaniard  in  the  matter  of  industrial  pursuits,  he 
certainly  experienced  an  economic  awakening  as  well  as  a  spiritual 
revival  and  an  access  of  loyalty  to  a  centralized  power  during  the 
course  of  the  decades  which  just  preceded  the  capture  of  Granada.^ 

Comparison  of  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  Discoveries 

In  judging  of  Spain's  preparedness  to  meet  her  destiny,  one  finds 
himself  laying  more  stress  upon  the  religious  and  political,  rather 
than  upon  the  economic  factors.  Yet  it  is  not  the  strength  or 
weakness  of  any  special  factor,  economic  or  other,  upon  which 
judgment  must  be  rested,  but  rather  the  sum  total  of  all  the  ele- 
ments which  combined  to  constitute  national  strength  or  weakness. 
Thus  judging,  Spain  is  found  to  have  been  strong  for  an  inspired 
effort,  but  to  have  possessed  scarcely  enough  stamina  to  react 
against  a  severe  and  enduring  strain.  It  is  plain,  in  any  case,  from 
what  has  been  said,  and  from  a  closer  study  of  Spain's  economic 
conditions  in  the  fifteenth  century,  that  a  display  of  individual 
initiative  was  as  little  to  be  expected  in  Spain  as  in  Portugal.  This 
fact,  and  the  concentration  and  exaltation  of  the  royal  power,  led 
naturally,  in  one  case  as  in  the  other,  to  the  lodgment  of  the  new 
enterprises  in  the  hands  of  the  sovereigns.  What  we  miss,  how- 
ever, in  the  case  of  Spain,  is  the  presence,  as  in  Portugal,  of  a 
directing  mind,  reaching  out  in  a  series  of  tentatives  leading  to  an 

ultimate  and  at  length  consciously  visualized  aim  ;  there  was  no 

Spanish  Prince  Henry.  But  the  fact  is  that  Henry  the  Navigator 
performed  his  service,  not  for  Portugal  alone,  but  for  the  whole  of 

1  Colmeiro,  I,  377  ff .,  391  ff. ;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  44-46. 

2  "  The  period  during  which  Spanish  territory  was  divided  between  the  Christians 
and  the  Mohammedans  appears,  from  the  standpoint  of  social  enHghtenment,  tlie 
most  hopeful  in  the  history  of  the  Peninsula.  The  process  of  race  affiliation  and 
assimilation  had  begun,  and,  through  the  mingling  of  the  elements  present,  there  was 
forming  a  new  nation,  big  with  the  prospects  of  great  material  achievements  and  of 
splendid  cultivation.  ...  Its  resources  for  establishing  a  high  grade  of  civilization 
appear  to  have  exceeded  those  of  any  other  Western  nation  at  that  time."  Moses, 
p.  10. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  173 

Europe ;  and  that  the  final  success  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  West 
represents  one  of  the  forms  of  a  grand  dual  consummation  of  which 
Da  Gama's  exploit  was  the  more  immediately  evident.  For  it  is 
plainly  stated  by  the  son  of  the  Genoese  discoverer  of  America  that 
the  latter  attained  many  of  his  ideas,  and  their  final  clarification, 
while  in  Portugal.  Columbus  married  the  daughter  (and  the  pair 
lived  with  the  widow)  of  one  of  Prince  Henry's  captains,  and  he 
came  into  a  certain  sea-dog  heritage  thereby.^  As  is  well  known, 
he  tried  his  fortune  first  of  all  at  the  Portuguese  court,  and  there 
attained  a  degree  of  success  represented  by  a  treacherous  attempt 
at  appropriation  of  his  ideas.  His  grand  projects  were  in  so  far  not 
the  dreams  of  a  visionary,  but  an  increment  of  constructive  imagi- 
nation, added  to  the  persistent,  steady,  and  dogged  perseverance 
of  the  Portuguese-English  prince,  who  avowedly  built  upon  the 
accumulated  experience  and  wisdom  of  the  past.  It  is  with  a  sense 
of  satisfaction  that  one  perceives  the  continuity  of  the  efforts  of 
these  two  men,  and  feels  himself  justified  in  discounting  once  again 
the  asserted  value  of  intuition  and  inspired  speculation  over  com- 
monplace toil  in  the  world. ^  At  the  same  time  the  attainment  of 
Columbus  cannot  but  convey  an  impression  of  the  accidental  and 
fortuitous  which  that  of  Vasco  da  Gama  does  not. 

The  cases  of  the  two  nations  and  their  discoverers  may  be  aligned 
for  comparison  and  contrast  by  the  consideration  that,  in  Spain, 
Columbus  was  really  the  talented  source  of  a  novel  enterprise, 
while  Da  Gama  was  simply  an  agent  —  one  of  many  —  in  the  elab- 
oration of  a  settled  pohcy.^  For  Spain  Columbus  furnished  the 
ideas  and  put  them  into  practice,  receiving  material  aid  only  from 

1  Hunter,  I,  76-77  ;  Major,  pp.  347-348  ;  Beazley,  in  Azurara,  II,  xxxv. 

2  Forthestudiousness  of  Columbus,  see  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,p.  11.  Haebler(Amer- 
ika,  p.  335)  says  that  the  only  part  of  the  enterprise  of  Columbus  which  was  peculiarly 
his  own,  was  his  decision  to  steer  across  a  trackless,  endless  ocean,  in  the  knowledge 
that  weeks  or  months  would  pass  before  land  would  be  seen.  Columbus  was  thus  the 
way-breaker  from  the  "thalassic"  to  the  "oceanic  "  stage  of  navigation.  Cf.  Foreman 
(p.  30),  who  credits  the  Portuguese  with  the  exploits  of  Magellan  and  Elcano  as  well. 

3  "  It  is  not  difficult  to  understand  why  the  king  of  Portugal  should  have  hesitated 
to  accept  the  proposition  of  Columbus.  Nearly  seventy  years  of  continued  effort  on 
the  part  of  the  Portuguese  to  realise  the  great  conception  of  Prince  Henry  afforded 
substantial  proof  of  their  conviction  of  the  soundness  of  that  conception.  .  .  .  That 
route,  therefore,  .  .  .  was  identical  with  their  hopes  in  the  future  as  well  as  their  pre- 
dilections in  the  past."  Major,  p.  354.  It  is  equally  clear  that  Columbus  could  hope 
for  no  interest  on  the  part  of  Genoa  and  Venice,  whose  preoccupation  lay  in  keeping 
the  Oriental  trade  in  its  old  channels.  The  discoverer  turned  naturally  to  the  states 
bordering  on  the  ocean.    Payne,  pp.  21-22. 


1 74  COLONIZATION 

the  government ;  for  Portugal,  Da  Gama  simply  carried  out  royal 
instructions.  The  prospects  of  realization  lay  for  both  in  the  support 
of  royalty  —  the  hopes  of  Columbus  were  centered  on  kings  alone. 
Columbus  carried  in  his  own  mind  the  religious  obsession  _of  the 
time  and  place,  and  through  it  appealed  most  strongly  to  Isabella  ;  ^ 
his  i)lans  and  pleas  looked  to  the  regaining  of  the  Holy  Sepulcher, 
to  the  extension  of  the  Faith ;  and  with  the  queen  who  sent  him, 
material  considerations  seem  to  have  played  a  relatively  insignifi- 
cant role.  Prince  Henry  and  his  successors  were  crusaders,  too, 
and  fervent  in  the  Faith  ;  Albuquerque's  designs  on  the  bones  of 
'the  Prophet  haunted  him;  but  an  unmistakable  strain  of  commer- 
cial sagacity  existed  in  Henry  and  was  impressed  upon  the  policy 
he  bequeathed  to  those  who  took  up  his  work.  For  these  and  other 
reasons  the  Portuguese  exploits  not  only  give  the  impression  of 
being  consistent  outgrowths  of  the  national  system,  with  more 
momentum  at  first  than  those  of  the  Spanish,  but  they  likewise 
appear  to  fall  into  a  more  logical  sequence  with  the  earlier  move- 
ments of  trade  and  of  national  expansion. 

Effects  of  the  Discovery  of  America 

America  as  an  outlet  for  Spain's  forces  was  thus  opened  by  a 
foreigner,  suddenly  and  without  warning.^  The  results  were  prob- 
ably more  accentuated  in  Spain  than  in  Portugal.  For  while  to  the 
bulk  of  the  people  in  either  country  the  Discoveries  came,  as  it  were, 
unawares,  the  directors  of  the  Portuguese  voyages  had  always  had 
Africa,  with  its  possibilities,  before  them,  and,  in  the  later  decades 
of  the  fifteenth  century,  had  been  seeing  more  and  more  light 
toward  the  consummation  of  what  became  their  highest  and  final 
purpose.  Spain,  on  the  other  hand,  with  no  series  of  experiments 
to  rely  upon,  and  no  continent  to  skirt,  was  really  dependent  upon 
chance,  or,  as  piety  would  have  it,  upon  Divine  Providence  for  her 
position  in  the  new  world-order  that  was  being  evolved.  There  was 
no  chance  to  duplicate  the  performance  of  Da  Gama,  for  the  vice- 
gerent of  God  had  assured  to  the  Portuguese  who  were  able  and 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  76,  79,  82,  etc. 

^  The  romantic  stui-y  of  Columbus  has  been  told  often  and  well ;  for  this  reason, 
and  because  our  present  studies  center  about  collective  rather  than  individual  enter- 
prise and  activities,  no  rehearsal  of  the  discoverer's  life  is  attempted.  See  Bourne, 
Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  8-25,  47,  and  bibliography.  On  his  rights  and  those  of  his  early 
successors,  see  Fabie,  pp.  13  ff.,  27  ff.,  86. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  175 

willing  to  defend  it  a  monopoly  of  the  fruits  of  Prince  Henry's 
activities.  The  exaltation  of  mood  that  followed  upon  the  sup- 
posed attainment  of  the  East  by  Columb\is  can  be  the  better 
apprehended  for  these  considerations.  In  spite  of  all,  Spain  was 
not  to  be  left  out ;  she,  too,  was  to  have  a  chance  to  serve  God  and 
herself  on  the  grand  scale.  The  reception  of  Columbus  by  people 
and  sovereign  witnesses  to  this  attitude.  As  Martins,  somewhat 
extravagantly,  puts  it  :  "  Men  thought  of  the  millions  of  souls  to 
be  won  for  God  !  Of  the  mountains  of  gold  to  bring  home  !  Of 
the  great  battles,  the  vast  kingdoms  to  conquer !  They  saw  all  the 
crosses,  commanderies,  riches,  captaincies,  and  glory.  This  shower 
of  fortunate  possibilities  fell  upon  a  nation  in  the  plenitude  of  life, 
in  the  meridian  of  force,  and  in  the  ardor  of  faith.  All  the  future 
captains  of  the  Indies  were  formed  in  that  moment.  Columbus 
revolutionized  the  anterior  direction  of  the  current  of  national 
genius,  directing  it  to  that  world  which  he  discovered."  ^ 

The  Demarcation 

The  first  move  of  the  Catholic  Sovereigns  was  to  assure  their 
permanent  possession  of  the  "  East"  as  it  had  been  opened  up  to 
them  despite  the  sanctioned  monopoly  of  the  Portuguese.  Might 
not  the  new  lands  be  claimed  from  them  by  the  king  of  Portugal 
by  virtue  of  the  bull  secured  from  a  former  Pope  .-"  ^  As  has  been 
previously  narrated,  they  succeeded  so  far  as  to  cause  the  issuance 
of  a  new  bull  by  Alexander  VI  (May  4,  1493),  which  recognized  in 
the  new  worlds  a  dual  "sphere  of  influence"  of  the  two  favored 
Catholic  nations.  This  outcome  was  not  palatable  to  King  John  of 
Portugal,  and  he  would  have  fought  Spain  if  he  had  dared.  The 
Portuguese  did  not  wish  to  be  restricted  to  the  original  100  leagues 
west  of  the  African  islands,  for  this  would  have  prevented  them 
from  taking  advantage  of  the  trade-winds  to  evade  the  calms  of  the 
African  coast.  Spain  yielded  to  Portuguese  representations,  and 
the  demarcation  meridian  was  shifted  270  leagues  farther  west  by 
an  agreement  of  June  7,  1494.  As  will  be  understood,  the  instru- 
ments, charts,  etc.,  of  the  time  were  inadequate  for  the  meas- 
urement of  longitude  and  so  for  the  exact  fixation  of  any  such 

1  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  p.  238.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  fortunes  of  Columbus 
^at  the  Spanish  court  remained  dubious  until  it  was  seen  that  Granada  was  about  to 
fall.  Then  only  the  new  crusade,  substituted  for  the  old,  was  in  order.  Cf.  Haebler, 
Amerika,  pp.  356,  357  ;  Moses,  p.  15.  ^  See  p.  89,  above;  cf.  Saco,  pp.  52-53. 


176  COLONIZATION 

demarcation  ;  of  a  consequence  disputes  were  sure  to  arise.  These 
appeared  unmistakably  after  the  voyage  of  Magellan  (1521),  when 
it  became  necessary  to  fix  the  other  half  of  the  great  circle  of  which 
the  Atlantic  meridian  was  part.  A  council  summoned  at  Badajoz 
in  April,  1524,  failed  to  settle  the  question.  The  Portuguese  were 
really  served  by  uncertainty,  for  if  the  line  were  measured  from 
the  eastern  end  of  the  Azores  archipelago  they  would  lose  re- 
cently discovered  Brazil;  if  from^the  western  end,  the  Moluccas. 
Charles  V  finally  sold  his  rights  to  the  latter  islands,  so  that  the 
Portuguese  actually  gained  both  their  objects,  and  the  dispute  fell 
into  oblivion.^ 

The  appeal  of  the  two  European  nations  which  first  systematic- 
ally approached  the  newly  discovered  regions,  to  the  great  political 
and  religious  arbiter  of  Europe,  the  Pope,  set  in  motion  a  train  of 
consequences  which  may  here  be  foreshadowed.  The  policy  of 
exclusion,  as  has  been  seen,  was  not  new ;  but  the  invocation,  to 
secure  such  exclusion,  of  that  which  alone  stood  for  international 
law,  gave  to  the  long-prevalent  national  policy  a  wider  significance. 
A  ix)licy  sanctioned  by  the  head  of  Christendom,  and  consistently 
enforced  by  the  states  most  prominently  in  the  eye  of  the  western 
world,  was  sure  to  be  erected  into  a  sort  of  universal  and  unques- 
tioned dogma.  The  triumphal  progress  of  this  dogma  through  the 
succeeding  centuries  can  be  traced  in  the  narrative  which  follows. 

V  Early  Policy  of  Spain 

The  words  of  Columbus  and  others  make  it  clear  that  the 
original  intentions  of  Spain  with  regard  to  America  were  ai)proxi- 
mately  those  of  Portugal  in  the  case  of  India ;  ^  she  ai:)pears  to 
have  been  more  eager  to  gain  native  converts,  but  she  was  as 
keenly  alive  to  the  getting  of  spices  and  gold.  However,  after 
some  years  of  disappointments,  it  was  recognized  that  the  Nucvo 
Mimdo  was  not  the  East,  and  that  cloves,  cinnamon,  and  other 
Oriental  spices  were  not  to  be  found.^    And  it  was  not  so  very 

1  For  an  excellent  brief  treatment  of  the  Demarcation,  see  Bourne,  Essays  in 
Crit.,  pp.  193-217;  cf.  also  p.  159,  above. 

2  Cf.  I'ayne,  p.  24.  Instances  will  appear  in  what  follows  of  the  Spanish  tendency 
to  utilize  I'ortuguese  models.  Indeed,  it  is  often  through  the  better-known  Spanish 
types  that  one  arrives  at  some  conception  of  the  Portuguese. 

^  Premiums  offered  by  the  government  in  1529  for  the  collection  of  cloves,  ginger, 
cinnamon,  and  other  .spices  seem  to  indicate  that  hope  was  not  yet  extinct.  Bourne, 
Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  217;  cf.  Fabie,  j)p.  i(')3-i64. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  177 

long  before  it  became  evident  that  there  was  no  easily  accessible 
passage  through  the  new  land-mass  to  the  much  desired  desti- 
nation. There  were  few  who  cared  to  contemplate  a  voyage  over 
the  course  of  the  redoubtable  Magellan.  Consequently  Spain  was 
unable,  after  all,  to  compete  with  Portugal  for  the  heritage  of 
Venice.  It  was  early  discovered,  however,  that  gold  was  to  be 
found  in  the  New  World,  and  that  there  existed  people  whose 
bodies  could  be  utilized  by  a  parasitic  organization  to  accjuire  the 
gold,  while  their  souls  were  being  inducted  into  the  true  faith. 
The  relation  of  Spain  to  America  soon  reduced  itself  to  the  simple 
old  terms,  Cgncjuest  and  Conversion,  herein  recalling  the  Portuguese 
attitude  toward  India  and  Africa.  Any  extended  parallelism  be- 
tween the  operations  of  the  two  nations  is  not,  however,  to  be 
made  out,  owing  to  a  diversity  of  colonial  environment,  both 
physical  and  ethnic,  and  to  differences  of  national  strength.  There 
was  no  spice-trade  in  America,  the  conquests  were  far  more 
thorough-going,  the  subject  peoples  upon  a  much  lower  stage  of 
culture ;  there  was  no  competing  religion  of  a  high  order  as  in  the 
East,  for  a  long  time  no  European  intruders,  and  never  any  such 
disastrous  period  of  foreign  administration  as  the  year  1580  initi- 
ated for  Portugal. 

The  Conquests 

The  interest  of  the  Spaniards  in  agricultural  development  and 
in  actual  settlement  was  sUght.^  The  plantation  system  came  to 
some  development  in  later  times,  when  certain  products  had 
attained  an  unforeseen  importance,  but  these  articles  were  largely 
luxuries  and  of  tropical  origin. ^  The  great  temperate  regions  of 
North  and  South  America  were  uninteresting  and  repellent ;  such 
lands,  yielding  neither  gold  nor  tropical  products,  were  denomi- 
nated "worthless  territories";^  the  discoveries  of  De  Soto,  Coro- 
nado,  Cabe^a  de  Vaca,  Ponce  de  Leon,  De  Solis,  and  Cabot  were 
not  followed  up ;  ^  it  was  those  of  Cortes,  Pizarro,  and  their  lesser 
aftertypes  that  received  instantaneous  recognition,  for  they  opened 
alluring  avenues  for  the  unleashing  of  the  spirit  of  adventure  and 

1  See  p.  207,  below. 

2  See  pp.  10  ff.,  above.  The  expedition  to  Florida  was  condemned  by  the  objection, 
"  For  what  purpose  do  we  need  such  products  as  are  identical  with  those  of  southern 
Europe  ? "    Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  2. 

8  Tier r as  de  ningitn  provecho.    Peschel,  Races  of  Man,  p.  211. 
*  See  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  chaps,  v-xi;  Watson,  I,  91  ff. 


178  COLONIZATION 

the  satisfaction  of  greed. ^  The  conquests  of  the  Spaniards  deserve 
to  be  termed  magnificent ;  they  are  as  wonderful  as  the  exploits  of 
the  Portuguese  under  the  early  viceroys.  The  martial  spirit  of  the 
Spaniards,  as  of  the  Portuguese,  has  been  traced  to  their  antecedent 
training ;  ^  it  was  also  derivable  to  no  small  degree  from  their 
nature  and  natural  conditions.  "  The  Spaniards  were  admirable 
military  material.  Sober  and  temperate,  they  were  more  easily 
provisioned  than  any  European  troops  except  the  Turks.  .  .  . 
Spanish  troops  .  .  .  have  always  been  celebrated  for  marching 
powers.  Peculiarly  uneducated,  they  had  remarkable  natural  intelli- 
gence in  soldiery.  .  .  .  They  distinguished  themselves  especially  in 
the  attack  and  defence  of  fortresses,  and  in  retreats."  ^  The  value 
of  these  qualities,  and  of  the  superior  resistance  of  a  more  south- 
ern people  to  the  strains  of  a  tropical  climate,  will  appear  in  any 
account  of  the  American  conquests.  Such  admirably  adapted 
soldiers  of  fortune,  the  Spaniards  found  in  America  an  extended 
and,  on  the  whole,  easy  field  for  their  purpose  of  exploitation. 
From  the  original  headquarters,  Santo  Domingo  (Espanola),  con- 
querors licensed  by  the  kings  reached  out  to  Cuba  (15 11)  and 
Florida  (15  13);  to  the  Isthmus  (Balboa,  15  13)  and  Venezuela  (i  527); 
and,  greatest  of  all,  to  Mexico  (Cortes,  15  19)  and  Peru  (Pizarro 
and  Almagro,  1531).  Later  years  saw  the  invasion  of  Lower 
California  (1534),  the  Plata  regions  (1534),  and  of  Chile  (1535).'* 
The  Spanish  power  came  actually  to  be  felt  from  Plorida  and 
Louisiana  to  Tierra  del  Fuego,  excluding,  of  course,  Portuguese 
South  America.^ 

In  order  to  render  more  definite  the  motives  and  procedures  of 
the  Spanish  conquests,  it  may  be  useful  to  recall  certain  aspects 
of  those  two  great  enterprises,  accounts  of  which,  from  the  hand 
of  Prescott,  have  made  them  household  words.  Each  of  these 
expeditions  represents  an  outcome  of  individual  adventure,  rather 

1  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  378  ff.  "  The  importance  of  New  Granada  in  the  eyes  of 
the  Spaniards  lay  in  its  being  the  source  whence  the  best  emeralds  were  procured." 
Watson,  IT,  151.  ^  Pp.  80  ff.,  above. 

2  Hume,  p.  29. 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  159  ff. ;  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  378  ff. ;  Watson, /(zj-j/w. 
On  the  significance  of  the  term  "Florida,"  see  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  175. 

^  "  Under  the  pressure  of  the  immense  excitement  which  resulted  from  the  dis- 
coveries of  Columbus,  the  entire  eastern  coast  of  the  American  continent,  from 
Labrador  in  the  north  to  Terra  del  Fueti^o  in  the  south,  was  explored  within  about 
thirty  years  from  A.i).  1492."  Watson,  1, 105.  For  the  great  changes  of  the  Discoveries 
period,  see  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  1 90-1 91. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  179 

than  a  deliberate  state-enterprise  ;  ^  the  luster  of  the  unknown 
always  attracted  the  Spanish  commanders,  for  they  could  from 
the  nature  of  the  case  conduct  no  definite  program  like  that 
of  Albuquerque.  Cortes,  it  is  true,  made  use  of  royal  troops, 
but  in  reckless  disregard  of  the  commands  of  his  superior,  the 
governor  of  Cuba ;  it  was,  indeed,  the  victory  of  Cortes  over 
the  government's  punitive  expedition  which  gave  him  the  strength 
to  subdue  the  Aztec  empire.  Pizarro  and  Almagro  were  in  effect 
merely  the  active  members  of  a  triple  partnership,  for  which 
De  Luque  secured  the  financial  support.'-^  Both  expeditions  repre- 
sented gambling  with  large  hazards  for  the  sake  of  golden  pros- 
pects whose  realization  was  relied  upon  to  excuse  irregularities ; 
the  case  of  Balboa  shows  what  might  have  happened  to  the 
conquerors.  That  the  brigandage  of  Pizarro  should  be  invested 
with  a  religious  character,  begun  as  it  was  under  the  patronage  of 
the  Holy  Trinity  and  the  Virgin,  and  with  the  sacrament  of  com- 
munion, is  in  line  with  the  spirit  of  the  age.^  The  insignificant 
number  of  the  followers  of  Cortes  and  Pizarro  is  again  evidence 
of  the  essentially  adventurous  nature  of  their  enterprises,  as  well 
as  of  the  self-reliance  and  military  daring  of  this  nation  of  seasoned 
soldiers.  Cortes  had  about  400  Europeans  with  him,  and  Pizarro 
168.*  Even  though  the  Spaniards  were  superior  in  weapons  and 
discipline,  and  were  enabled  besides  to  impose  upon  the  supersti- 
tions of  the  natives  with  their  horses,  guns,  and  negro  attendants, 
yet  the  odds  were  overwhelmingly  against  them.^  In  both  cases 
these  odds  were  reduced  by  acts  of  reckless  boldness  in  the  seizure 
of  the  persons  of  the  semi-divine  rulers,  and  by  a  policy  of  alliance 
with  conflicting  factions.  Again,  predominance  once  established, 
it  became  the  object  alike  of  Cortes  and  of  Pizarro  to  secure  by  any 

1  "  A  fact  of  great  importance  in  revealing  the  economic  characteristics  of  Spanish 
rule  in  America  was,  that  discoveries  and  settlements  were  usually  made,  not  at  the 
expense  of  the  state,  but  with  private  funds.  If  at  any  time  the  crown  made  advances 
for  the  support  of  an  expedition,  it  was  regarded  as  a  loan  to  be  repaid  out  of  the 
first  proceeds  of  the  undertaking  ;  and  assurance  was  given  that  the  settlements  should 
remain  under  Spanish  authority."  Moses,  p.  262.  Cf.  the  case  of  Pizarro,  id.,  pp.  iii- 
1 13.       2  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  379  ff.       ^  Qf  Watson,  I,  in,  116;  Moses,  p.  in. 

*  Cortes  had  also  200  Indians,  16  horses,  and  14  cannon;  Pizarro  had  no  allies  at 
all.    Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  370,  3S0;  Watson,  I,  124. 

8  The  natives  thought  the  horsemen  were  centaurs,  and  stood  aghast  to  see  the 
beast  and  man  parts  separate  themselves.  And,  as  is  well  known,  they  at  first  re- 
garded the  Spaniards  as  beings  of  a  divine  nature,  come  in  accordance  with  an  ancient 
promise  of  their  god  Quetzalcoatl.  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  370-371;  cf.  p.  289.  Cf. 
Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  1 51-157  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  267  ff.,  285  ff. 


l8o  COLONIZATION 

means  the  treasure  which  would  enrich  themselves  and  secure 
justification  at  court.  In  both  instances,  finally,  the  state  asserted 
itself,  sequestered  the  conquerors  or  their  representatives,  and 
entered  into  a  wider  activity  in  governmental  exploitation. 

These  cases  are  but  types  of  what  the  rest  of  the  explorers 
hoped  to  do ;  that  personal  adventure  and  self-aggrandizement 
were  the  driving  motives  is  rendered  the  more  likely  by  the  fact 
that,  of  all  the  explorers,  few  besides  Cortes  possessed  a  station, 
education,  and  other  qualities  which  raised  them  above  the  type 
of  the  poor  and  ignorant  soldier  of  fortune.  Pizarro,  Balboa,  and 
others  were  plainly  ruined  men,  grasping  at  straws  to  gain  rein- 
statement. The  prevalence  and  effectiveness  of  these  motives  is 
attested  by  the  number  and  extent  of  the  expeditions,  and  in  turn 
cast  light  upon  the  material  qualities  and  predisposition  of  the 
Spaniards  as  indicated  above. 

Conquest  in  the  hope  of  exploitation  may  then  be  regarded  as 
the  primal  activity  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  New  World.  For  many 
years  this  exploitation  had  reference  almost  exclusively  to  mineral 
wealth  ;  hence  the  relations  of  Spain  to  America,  although  they 
were  begun  in  the  hope  of  reaching  the  East  and  its  spices,  really 
stand  apart  from  the  series  of  national  enterprises  resulting  in 
colonization,  which,  from  the  Phoenicians  to  the  Portuguese  and 
Dutch,  were  centered  about  the  acquisition  for  Europe  of  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  Orient.  If,  however,  the  conquests  had  been  effected 
in  somewhat  irregular  ways,  and  through,  as  it  were,  unauthorized 
agents,  it  was  not  in  the  disposition  of  the  Catholic  Sovereigns 
that  they  should  be  thus  administered.  When  Cortes  had  been 
recalled  to  a  position  of  inactive  elevation  at  court,  and  the  preten- 
sions of  the  Pizarro  family  had  been  finally  disposed  of,  the  mon- 
archs  laid  a  heavy  hand  upon  their  continental  possessions  in  the 
New  World,  as  they  had  upon  the  island-empire  of  Columbus. 
Henceforth  direction  in  all  particulars,  whether  effective  or  not, 
emanated  from  Spain,  and  no  one  subject  was  allowed  to  hold  the 
center  of  the  stage  for  any  extended  period. 

In  Spain  the  tidings  of  the  discoveries  and  then  of  the  conquests 
had  been,  naturally  enough,  productive  of  great  pojuilar  excitement. 
Columbus  had  about  as  much  difficulty  in  keeping  down  the  number 
of  his  comjilement  for  the  second  voyage  as  he  had  in  raising  a 
scanty  crew  for  the  first. ^    The  various  motives  that  have  been 

^  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  360. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  i8l 

mentioned  contributed  to  this  result  ;  but  that  material  considera- 
tions overweighed  all  others  is  made  probable  by  the  decline  of 
enthusiasm  when  the  life  of  romantic  adventure  and  quickly 
acquired  wealth  failed  immediately  to  materialize.  After  hopes 
had  been  again  raised  in  later  years  the  hand  of  the  state  had 
already  descended  in  restriction  of  freedom  of  emigration. 

The  Early  Strength  of  Spain 

Before,  now,  the  colonial  policy  of  Spain  is  "further  considered, 
it  seems  in  place  to  isolate  as  far  as  we  are  able  the  colonial  activi- 
ties of  Spain  from  her  other  activities.  It  is  always  a  fascinating 
problem  to  attempt  to  determine  the  effect  upon  a  country  and 
people  of  a  colonial  career  ;  and  it  is  the  more  so  in  the  case  of 
Spain  in  view  of  the  fact  that  her  subsequent  and  tragic  fate  has 
not  infrequently  been  explained  to  be,  at  least  in  good  part,  the  re- 
sult of  her  New  World  conquests  and  of  their  attendant  reactions 
upon  the  mother-country,  its  organization  and  people.  Unques- 
tionably the  over-sea  enterprises  carried  in  themselves,  or  in  their 
wake,  many  contributing  causes  to  Spain's  subsequent  misfortune  ; 
but  these  cannot  well  be  estimated  unless  they  are  disengaged  so 
far  as  possible  from  other  and  much  more  serious  causes  for  such 
an  extraordinarily  dire  result. 

Some  discussion  of  the  preparedness  of  Spain  for  her  colonial 
activities  has  already  been  set  forth.  In  1500  Spain  was  really 
strong,  not  only  in  her  religious  and  political  unity  and  enthusiasm, 
but  also  in  her  economic  org^ani^ation.  This  state  of  affairs  suffered 
little  diminution  during  the  early  decades  of  the  opening  century. 
The  king,  as  real  head  of  the  State  and  Church,  increased  in  power, 
and  was,  in  the  time  of  Philip  II,  about  as  nearly  unlimited  in 
action  as  the  head  of  a  relatively  civilized  state  may  ever  be  ;  and 
on  the  whole  this  was  with  the  approval  of  the  people.  No  Spanish 
king  was  more  popular  than  Philip  II.  That  such  a  state  of  the 
popular  mind  was  induced  by  fetichistic  adoration  of  what  Was 
royal  and  ecclesiastical,  rather  than  by  any  rational  considerations, 
but  added  to  its  fervor  and  contagion.  Economically,  too,  Spain 
continued  strong  for  some  decades,  albeit  partly,  as  before,  upon 
borrowed  force.  She  profited,  among  other  things,  by  a  foreign 
king  whose  whole  education  and  experience  inclined  him  to  go 
counter  to  the  restrictive   ideas  of  the  more  genuinely  Spanish 


1 82  COLONIZATION 

sovereigns.  However,  before  the  time  of  Charles  V,^  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella  strongly  favored  industry,  especially  as  it  formed  the 
basis  of  trade;  for  example,  they  founded  a  consulate  in  1494  in 
Burgos,  the  first  of  a  series  whose  services  to  Spanish  trade  were 
signal.  This  attitude  was  maintained  by  Charles,  within  whose 
reign  falls  Spain's  period  of  greatest  commercial  energy.  The 
immigration  of  foreign  artisans  was  encouraged  by  him  and  his 
predecessors,  despite  the  opposition  of  the  Cortes.  "  Manufactures, 
chiefly  wool  and  silk,  increased  tenfold  in  the  course  of  a  century ; 
the  great  fairs  drew  buyers  from  foreign  lands  ;  it  seemed  as  though 
the  inborn  Spanish  dislike  of  commerce  and  industry  had  been 
overcome  "  '^  These  conditions  lasted  on  into  the  time  of  Philip  II  ; 
it  is  difficult  to  determine  the  date  at  which  decline  may  be  said 
to  have  set  in,  but  the  situation  was  still  hopeful  in  1560.  "Spain 
was  at  that  time  not  only  at  the  climax  of  power,  but  also  at  the 
summit  of  her  prosperity,  and  she  owed  this  far  more  to  trade  and 
industry  than  to  the  gold  of  Mexico  and  the  silver  of  Potosi.  The 
wool  industry  alone  supported  almost  a  third  of  the  Spanish  popu- 
lation, and  in  Castile  itself  it  occupied  the  inhabitants  almost  ex- 
clusively." ^  With  all  this  came  the  growth  of  the  merchant  marine 
and  the  navy  —  one  and  the  same  thing,  for  the  most  part,  in  those 
days  ;  Spain  "  in  the  time  of  the  Catholic  Kings  possessed  over  a 
thousand  merchant  ships,  and  there  was  no  nation  whose  maritime 
power  equalled  ours."  *  Wars  were  fought  by  Charles  in  defense 
of  trade  or  for  its  extension,  and  his  treaties  with  England  wit- 
ness his  preoccupation  with  commerce.^  And  if  the  growth  of  a 
national  literature  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  outcome  of  the  quickening 
of  national  life,  the  time  of  the  three  consecutive  Philips  calls  for 
an  antecedent  period  of  economic  and  other  power.^  In  what  de- 
gree these  phenomena  were  referable  to  entrance  upon  the  colonial 
career  itself  will  be  clearer  presently ;  naturally  enough,  there  was 
a  baffling  interplay  of  causes  and  results,  actions  and  reactions. 

Spanish  Decadence  and  its  Causes 

It  would  be  safe  to  say,  however,  that  the  forces  which  made 
for  decadence  had  begun  to  turn  the  scale  by   the  middle  of  the 

1  The  Emperor  Charles  V  was  Kirvg  Carlos  I  of  Spain,  but  he  is  referred  to  in  this 
book  under  the  better-known  title. 

2  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  lo,  47,  49-50,  58-59;  Clarke,  p.  357;  Colmeiro,  IT,  185- 
188,  197  ff.  8  Haebler,  Wirt.  HI.,  pp.  66  ff . ;  Colmeiro,  II,  185. 

*  Colmeiro,  II,  465.      ''  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  HI.,  pp.  54-55.       "  Cf.  Hume,  pp.  246-247. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  183 

sixteenth  century.  Colmeiro  finds  the  first  indication  of  the  decline 
oF  mahvffacture  in  ValladoUd  in  1537,  and  oflPers  evidence  to  show 
that  within  twenty  years  of  that  date  Spain  could  no  longer  meet 
the  domestic  demand  for  textiles.^  Whatever  the  dale  preferred 
for  the  first  visible  signs  of  decadence,  all  reliable  accounts  would 
agree  that  its  progress  was  clearly  manifest  by  the  end  of  the  cen- 
tury in  question,  that  it  was  astonishingly  rapid,  and  varied  by 
remarkably  few  reactions  toward  the  former,  if  fictitious,  prosper- 
ity. Details  of  Spanish  history  do  not  appertain  to  our  discussion  ; 
given  a  realization  of  the  fatal  sweep  of  Spanish  destiny,  it  is 
desirable  here  only  to  rehearse  the  probable  causes  other  than 
those  which  might  be  called  specifically  colonial.  The  authorities 
make  little  question  but  that  the  destructive  agencies  were  in  the 
main  of  a^^olitical  nature  ;  if  the  government  had  been  a  fortunate 
one,  or  even  a,n  indifferent  one,  such  deep  destruction  would  scarcely 
have  been  entailed. ^  In  so  far  as  the  people  stood  behind  the  kings 
in  their  ill  actions  and  policies,  results  were,  of  course,  inevitably 
the  outcome  of  race-character  and  education.  That  the  Spanish 
were  predisposed  to  a  religious  and  political  autocracy  we  have 
already  seen.  When,  therefore,  it  is  asserted  that  the  causes  of 
decadence  were  mainly  political,  the  meaning  is  that  they  emerged 
in  the  form  of  unthwarted  measures,  decrees,  etc.,  to  which  subse- 
quent damage  may  be  aptly  and  logically  referred.  There  were, 
however,  other  misfortunes  of  a  political  nature  which  appear  to 
have  been  as  nearly  fortuitous  as  such  things  may  be  ;  which  would 
scarcely  have  existed  but  for  the  fact  that  certain  men,  and  not 
others,  were  the  Spanish  kings.  These  should  be  cleared  from 
the  path  first  of  all ;  plainly  they  are  not  referable  to  the  colonial 
career. 

"Accidental"  Causes 

Spain  suffered  from  the  Hapsburgs  because  of  their  hereditary 
peculiarities  and  degeneracy  ;  genius  in  Charles  V  speedily  ran  down 
irvfb  the  gloomy  and  self -immolating  conscientiousness  of  Philip  II  ; 
and  the  grotesque  defectiveness  of  the  impotent,  k)lling-tongued, 
pin-hunting  Charles  II  was  but  a  question  of  time  and  inbreeding 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  186-188;  cf.  p.  440. 

2  "  Hatte  die  nationalokonomische  Einsicht  der  Regierung  und  der  Landesvertreter 
nur  einigertnassen  Sciiritt  gehalten  mit  dem  grossartigen  Aufschwunge  des  Unterneh- 
mungsgeistes  im  Volke,  so  ware  der  Verfall  Spaniens  um  Jahrliunderte  verschoben, 
wenn  nicht  unmoglich  gemacht  worden."    llaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  35. 


1 84  COLONIZATION 

from  the  insane  Jiiana,  mother  of  the  first  Charles.  The  morbid 
mind  of  Philip  II  was  at  the  bottom  of  many  positive  regulations 
of  a  harmful  nature,  and  the  progressive  imbecility  of  his  succes- 
sors threw  a  baneful  influence  into  the  hands  of  unworthy  panders 
and  dependents.  The  fact,  again,  that  Charles  V  became  Roman 
Emperor,  and  that  he  and  Philip  II  were  drawn  or  tempted  into 
foreign  wars  of  a  costly  nature  simply  because  they  were  the 
descendants  of  certain  ancestors,  was,  in  a  certain  sense,  a  matter  of 
chance;  but  it  was  responsible  in  large  measure  for  the  economic 
downfall  of  Spain.  Taxation  for  Peninsular  and  American  projects 
could  never  otherwise  have  been  so  ruinously  high  ;  the  loyalty 
to  King  and  Church  would  not  have  been  so  extravagantly  drawn 
upon.  The  disastrous  wars  in  the  Low  Countries  might  have  been 
avoided  if  Charles  had  not  been  a  Hollander  and  Philip  a  mono- 
maniac upon  the  subject  of  his  divine  mission. ^  The  personal 
character  of  the  latter,  in  particular,  furnished  a  specific  cause  for 
governmental  aberrations  during  a  crucial  period.  Conscientious 
to  a  degree,  he  was  slow,  distrustful,  secretive  ;  modest  and  labori- 
ous, he  was  so  conscious  of  divine  inspiration  as  to  become  rigid 
and  unadaptable  in  methods.  Early  and  late  he  toiled  at  his  desk ; 
matters  of  the  smallest  importance  were  exhaustively  discussed 
with  uninspired  spirits  who  could  endure  and  thrive  upon  such  a 
deadly  routine.  Men  of  parts  and  initiative  were  shut  out  from 
control  of  affairs,  and  all  free  play  of  intelligence  and  intuition  was 
paralyzed.  Questions  of  broad  principle  were  excluded  by  a  mass 
of  sordid  minutiae.  Delay  was  inevitable  under  such  a  system  of 
grinding,  dragging  toil ;  ambassadors  fretted  and  fumed  and  lost 
opportunities,  for  instructions  were  delayed,  between  the  delibera- 
tions of  Philip  and  the  inadequacy  of  means  of  communication, 
for  weeks  and  months.  Jealous  of  his  divine  prerogatives,  Philip 
hoped  to  make  of  a  man  like  Farnese  a  mere  machine  ;  "  cold  half- 
confidcnce  and  semi-veiled  distrust  were  given  in  grudging  return 
for  slavish  obedience  to  the  orders  of  an  anchorite  a  thousand  miles 
away."  The  Duke  of  Medina  Sidonia  protested  his  unfitness  for 
the  command  of  the  great  Armada,  but  Philip  insisted  ;  having  in 
mind  the  very  fact  of  the  duke's  incompetence  and  self-distrust, 
he  "doubtless  hoped  to  command  the  Armada  from  his  cell  in 

1  Ilume,  pp.  vi-vii,  194-196,  299-302,  306-307,  317;  for  the  strains  incident  upon 
Philip  IPs  establishment  of  claims  to  the  throne  of  Portugal,  see  id.,  pp.  171,  250- 
254,  279-285. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  185 

the  Escorial."  ^  For  his  own  purposes  likewise,  Philip  fomented 
jealousy  and  distrust  among  his  secretaries.  Yet  "  the  nation 
gave  him  credit  for  all  his  laborious  good  intentions  in  its  behalf, 
and  loved  him  accordingly  ;  but  it  credited  him  with  a  wisdom  he 
did  not  possess.  No  country  in  the  world  has  ever  been  so  com- 
pletely ruined  as  Spain  was  by  the  avoidable  faults  and  follies  of 
its  governors."  ^ 

Before  leaving  what  might  be  termed  the  accidental  causes  of 
Spain's  decline,  mention  should  likewise  be  made  of  the  pure  bad 
luck  which  attended  her  upon  her  downward  path,  as  it  accom- 
panied and  dragged  down  Portugal  in  hers.  Pestilence,  floods, 
hurricanes,  earthquakes,  and  other  calamities  well-nigh  impossible 
to  foresee  swept  the  empire  with  all  the  thoroughness  and  diabolical 
timeliness  of  mischance  when  the  tide  of  men's  affairs  is  no  longer 
at  flood.^ 

Political  Causes  for  Decline 

Here  are  grave  causes  for  a  nation's  decline  ;  but  they  are  only 
a  beginning.  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Spanish  people  had 
exalted  the  ever  more  centralized  power  of  the  king  to  the  position 
of  a  fetich,  and  this  is  in  itself,  a  sufficient  explanation  of  their 
non-resistance  to  many  a  wild  and  vicious  decree.  In  the  royal 
measures  now  to  be  recounted,  the  status  of  popular  feeling  must 
bear  its  share  of  responsibility,  for  those  who  in  other  countries 
and  under  other  conditions  might  have  restrained  disastrous 
policies,  in  Spain  lent  them  rather  support.  Ignorance  and  super- 
stition led  the  people  to  refer  the  rolling  up  of  their  calamities 
rather  to  God  than  to  themselves,  and  in  truly  primitive  fashion 
to  seek  a  reconciliation  through  propitiation  rather  than  relief  as 
the  result  of  rational  analysis  and  action  logically  based  upon  it."^ 

^  Hume,  pp.  189,  180. 

2  Hume,  pp.  136-137  ;  for  the  above  general  characterization  of  Philip,  see  pp.  119, 
122,  134,  136 ff.,  169-170,  180,  1S9-196;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  15-16;  Blok,  III, 
449-450.  For  a  striking  characterization  of  Philip,  see  the  play  "  El  Haz  de  Lena," 
by  Nuiiez  de  Arce ;  the  introduction  in  Schevill's  edition  is  important. 

2  Hume,  pp.  306-307. 

*  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  17;  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  p.  263.  "It  is  the  fatal  delusion 
that  liberty  and  national  welfare  depend  solely  upon  good  government,  instead  of 
good  government  depending  upon  united  and  cooperative  individual  e.xertion,  that 
has  brought  the  Spanish  nation  to  its  present  state  of  deplorable  impotence." 
Foreman,  p.  219. 


1 86  COLONIZATION 

The  most  disastrous  enterprises  of  the  kings,  taking  origin  in 
religious  prepossessions,  were  the  insistence  upon  a  single  faith  at 
home  and  the  attempt  to  enforce  conformity  abroad  ;  the  oppres- 
sion and  expulsion  of  the  Jews,  Moriscos,  and  foreigners  from 
Spain ;  and  the  religious  wars  in  other  parts  of  Europe.  The 
general  causes  leading  to  tHe  banishment  of  the  Moriscos  have 
been  dwelt  upon  before  ;  here  it  is  necessary  only  to  recall  the  fact 
that  beneath  the  religious  hatred  lay  motives  of  a  more  material 
nature, — jealousy,  covetousness,  irritation  at  habits  of  industry 
and  frugality ;  fear,  fictitious  or  real,  of  political  plots,  —  motives 
whose  very  character  witnesses  to  the  solid  economic  virtues  and 
energy  of  the  subject  race.  The  case  of  the  Jews  was  similar. 
The  whole  procedure  reduced  itself,  industrially  speaking,  to  skim- 
ming off  the  cream  of  the  population  ;  it  was,  indeed,  even  more 
serious  than  this.  For  the  state  was  further  relatively  weakened 
by  the  strengthening  of  such  national  rivals  as  received  these  exiles 
with  their  specialized  dexterities  and  handicrafts.  The  expulsion  of 
Moriscos  and  Jews  from  Spain  ranks  with  the  persecution  of  the 
Huguenots  in  France  as  a  grand,  even  if  inevitable,  political 
blunder.  Together  with  this  goes  also  the  oppression  of  the  Low 
Countries,  and  the  consequent  emigration,  largely  to  England,  of 
their  skilled  artisans.^  And  as  .for  the  religious  wars  in  which 
Spain  undertook  to  champion  Catholicism,  they  form  a  whole 
section  of  European  history  and  require  no  detailing.  Those  which 
bear  most  closely  upon  colonial  affairs,  and  which  were  in  many 
respects  the  most  disastrous,  were  the  attempted  reduction  of  the 
Low  Countries  and  the  ambitious  enterprises  directed  against 
England.^  And  to  the  count  of  disasters  arising  out  of  religious 
conflicts  must  be  presently  reckoned  the  reverses  in  America  and 
elsewhere,  referable  in  good  part  to  the  exasperation  of  Protestant 
nations  at  the  arrogant  pretensions  of  the  Spaniards,  and  at  their 
cruel  bigotry,  —  a  quality  doubly  happy  in  its  results  in  that  it 
served  God  by  burning  or  dismembering  alive  His  human  enemies, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  destroyed  for  His  adherents  a  brood  of 
hateful  competitors. 

^  Colmeiro,  II,  chap.  Iv;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  164;  Hume,  pp.  16-18,  152-155, 
210-213;  Moses,  p.  15;  Clarke,  pp.  359-360.    See  pp.  81-82,  above. 

*  Hume,  pp.  130-131,  184,  206-208,  218-219,  232-243,  267-268;  cf.  pp.  256,  370, 
below. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  187 

Treatment  of  Foreigners 

Relations  with  foreign  merchants  were  marked  by  less  cruelty, 
but  were  scarcely  more  rational.  Owing  to  the  character  (jf  their 
past,  the  Spanish  were  as  little  fitted  by  training  as  by  nature  for 
the  discharge  of  the  more  specialized  economic  functions.  There 
was  little  or  no  native  business  talent,  and  the  hidalgos,  w'th  their 
strong  military  and  other  biases,  despised  and  hated  it  in  others  ; 
for  the  treatment  of  the  foreign  merchants  the  sovereigns  were 
assuredly  not  solely  to  blame.  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  encouraged 
the  presence  in  Spain  of  German,  French,  and  Italian  colonies  ;  to 
propositions  of  exclusion  presented  by  the  Cortes,  Ferdinand 
averred  that  Spain  could  not  do  without  the  foreigners.  For  it 
was  they  who  supplied  the  capital  and  the  apparatus  of  production 
and  exchange,  and  farmed  the  revenues  ;  and  they  were  the  more 
indispensable  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Jews.  Indeed,  as  time 
went  on,  they  became  the  real  support  of  the  empire,  and  after 
the  death  of  Philip  II  their  activities  were  absolutely  essential  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  public  credit.^  But  it  is  little  surprising 
that  the  Spanish  looked  with  increasing  distrust  and  exasperation 
upon  the  rich  monopolies  enjoyed  by  the  foreign  capitalists,  notably 
the  German  Fugger,  and  that  repeated  attempts  were  made  to 
force  them  to  surrender  or  to  disgorge.  These  attempts  met  with 
little  success  in  view  of  the  royal  necessities  and  policy,  but  they 
did  drive  the  foreigners  to  an  ever-increasing  haste  and  unscrupu- 
lousness  in  the  piling-up  of  profits.  The  whole  situation  made  for 
the  progressive  decline  of  what  economic  strength  Spain  had,  and 
the  general  attitude  toward  producers  and  exchangers  made  of  the 
latter  a  group  of  rapacious  and  predatory  aliens  where  they  might 
have  become  active  factors  in  a  sturdy  economic  life.  The  fact 
that  all  this  was  inevitable  in  the  setting  of  the  time  excludes  the 
colonial  career  as  a  specific  cause. 

Treatment  of  Jews  and  Moriscos 

Some  writers  have  asserted  the  causal  relation  between  the 
treatment  of  foreigners,  and  especially  the  expulsion  of  Jews  and 
Moriscos,  and  the  subsequent  numerical  decline  in  the   Spanish 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  208-212,  235-236,  258-259,  567-568;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  51, 
165-171;  Hume,  p.  87.  On  the  dependence  of  Spain  upon  foreigners  for  a  labor 
force  and  for  transport  facilities,  see  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  81,  83-84  ;  Hume,  p.  285. 


1 88  COLONIZATION 

population.  Emigration  to  the  Indies  has  likewise  been  taken  to 
explain  this  disaster.  The  inefficiency  of  the  latter  factor  as  a  cause 
will  be  shown  presently  ;  ^  and  as  for  the  former,  it  should  at  least 
be  set  in  a  more  precise  relation  to  that  which  it  is  supposed  to 
explain.  The  number  of  Moriscos  expelled  is  variously  estimated 
from  300,000  to  1 ,000,000  ;  Lea,  who  has  made  the  subject  a  matter 
of  exhaustive  research,  decides  that  500,000  is  not  far  from  the 
truth.  The  number  of  Jews  expelled  is  reckoned  as  low  as  200,000, 
but  more  generally  at  between  400,000  and  800, ooo.^  This  repre- 
sents unquestionably  a  heavy  quantitative  loss  in  material  strength, 
but  it  does  not  at  all  sufficiently  explain  the  subsequent  decline. 
Since  Darwin's  time,  and  before,  there  has  been  no  doubt  as  to  the 
possibility  of  the  rapid  increase  of  any  species  up  to  the  limits 
assigned  by  its  life  conditions.  Of  a  consequence  it  is  to  these  latter 
that  the  careful  observer  is  bound  to  look  for  an  explanation  of 
Spanish  depopulation.  History  is  full  of  cases  where  the  ravages 
of  wars,  plagues,  and  other  calamities  have  been  succeeded  by  a 
national  fecundity  under  freer  conditions  which  speedily  filled  all 
gaps  in  the  ranks.  He  would  miss  the  full  significance  of  the 
expulsion  in  question,  however,  who  failed  to  note  that  men  make, 
to  a  large  degree,  their  own  life  conditions,  and  that  it  was  pre- 
cisely that  part  of  the  population  which  represented  the  most 
energetic  and  successful  assault  upon  natural  conditions  which 
was  driven  from  the  scene.  That  is  to  say,  while  the  quantitative 
injury  to  population  consequent  upon  the  expulsion  was  almost 
negligible,  the  qualitative  injury  was  no  less  than  ruinous.^  And 
the  same  line  of  argument  may  apply  with  equal  force  to  the  with- 
drawal from  the  propagation  of  the  race,  through  religious  celibacy, 
through  the  ambition  to  be  an  hidalgo,  or  even  through  army 
service,  of  the  most  promising  of  the  Spanish  youth.*    The  quality 

1  P.  210,  below. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  62;  Hume,  p.  213;  Lea,  Moriscos,  pp.  359  ff.;  Inquis.,  I,  84  ff., 
131  ff.,  142;  III,  231  ff.,  3i7ff.,  388ff. ;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  153;   Moses,  p.  15. 

^  To  gain  a  clearer  conception  of  what  the  merely  quantitative  loss  meant  to  Spain, 
her  500,000  exiles  might  represent  to  us  a  loss  of  4,500,000  to  5,000,000  in  a  popula- 
tion of  80,000,000.  But  since  the  United  States  are  so  largely  industrial,  these  figures 
would  have  to  be  considerably  increased  in  order  correctly  to  parallel  the  qualitative 
loss  suffered  by  Spain.  Add  now  the  results  of  persecutions,  insecurity  of  vocation 
and  trade,  etc.,  and  the  whole  foots  up  to  an  appalling  calamity.  The  practice  of 
infanticide  attained  considerable  development  at  this  time. 

*  Schallmayer,  pp.  1 1 1  ff.,  223  ff. ;  Uarwin,  Desc.  of  Man,  p.  144  ;  Galton,  pp.  356  ff. 
Still,  sacerdotal  celibacy  was  "  more  an  ideal  than  a  fact."    Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer., 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  189 

of  Ihc  population  declined,  its  vigor  was  sapped,  and  the  result 
could  not  fail  presently  to  appear  in  a  diminution  of  numbers. 
Under  Philip  III  the  number  of  marriages  is  said  to  have  decreased 
almost  one-half. 1  The  degree  of  depopulation  is  a  matter  of  dis- 
pute;  Haebler  gives  the  total  population  of  the  Peninsula  in  1723 
as  5,777,900, — about  three  million  below  the  figures  for  1594, 
and  one  million  below  those  of  I54i-^ 

Legislation  and  Regulation 

It  has  been  stated  that  the  woes  of  Spain  were  due  prevailingly 
to  bad  government,  supported  or  at  least  unchecked  by  public 
opinion.  The  ..expulsion  of  the  Jews  and  Moriscos  was  merely  the 
clima.x  of  a  course  of  class-legislation,  and  the  latter  was  by  no 
means  confined  to  the  period  in  which  class  meant  race.  It  is  now 
in  place,  with  no  further  specific  reference  to  Jew  and  Morisco,  to 
pass  in  review,  as  hastily  as  consideration  for  clearness  will  permit, 
the  main  types  of  legislation  to  which  Spain's  calamities  were  due. 
It  is  to  be  noted,  first  of  all,  that  the  government,  partially  in  con- 
sequence of  its  sense  of  divine  guidance  and  universal  responsibility, 
was,  through  all  the  earlier  colonial  period,  possessed  of  a  very 
monomania  for  regulation  ;  regulation  not  alone  on  the  grand  scale, 
but  also  upon  one  of  pitiful  and  incredible  pettiness,  whose  sordid 
and  fatuous  detail,  the  specialist  alone  is  called  upon  to  follow.  In 
general,  however,  regulatory  measures  touching  the  industrial  or- 
ganization turned  upon  theory  derived  from  mediaeval  sources  ; 
or  represented  contradictory  experiments  in  time  of  trouble,  pur- 
sued with  no  adequate  idea  of  economic  laws ;  or  took  their  origin 
in  an  ever  more  insatiable  hunger  for  revenue.  Out  of  her  past 
Spain  retained  contempt  for  agriculture,  industry,  and  trade,  espe- 
cially upon  the  small  scale  ;  while,  therefore,  such  vital  improve- 
ments as  those  of  irrigation,  communication,  and  transportation 
were  neglected,  the  government  spent  its  efforts  in  making  detailed 
and  rigid  rules  for  the  movement  and  sale  of  goods,  with  the  result 

p.  307.   For  a  general  treatment  of  the  subject,  see  Lea,  Sacerdotal  Celibacy,  especially 
chaps,  xix,  xxi,  and  pp.  392-393. 

1  For  a  discussion  of  depopulation  in  Spain,  together  with  proposed  remedies,  see 
Colmeiro,  II,  chaps.  Iv,  Ivi,  pp.  12  ff.,  43  ff.,  156  ff.;  this  author  is  corrected  to  some 
extent  by  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  146-157.  See  also  Hume,  pp.  212  ff.,  297  ;  Martins, 
Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  261-262;  Blok,  III,  131  ff. 

2  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  1 58.  For  summaries  of  the  causes  of  this  decline,  see  id.,  pp.  1 53-1 54  >' 
Colmeiro,  II,  15-17;  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  p.  261. 


190 


COLONIZATION 


of  crushing  free  competition ;  for  trade  was  thus  subjected  to  a 
system  of  costly  and  harassing  examination.  In  contrast  with  the 
modern  system,  the  object  was  the  protection  of  the  consumer ;  ^ 
and  it  was  pursued  well-nigh  as  vigorously  as  the  safeguarding  of 
the  producer  has  been  in  the  United  States.  Preference  was  ac- 
corded to  the  gild  system,  under  close  scrutiny  ;  frauds,  actual  and 
imaginary,  were  guarded  against ;  prices  were  regulated,  exporta- 
tion prohibited.  All  this  left  no  time  to  keep  the  currency  sound, 
or  even  to  suppress  or  buy  off  the  pirates  of  the  Mediterranean  ; 
and  the  immediate  result,  as  far  as  the  machinery  of  government 
was  concerned,  was  an  endlessly  complicated  bureaucracy .'"^  The 
harassment  of  this  detailed  regulation,  whose  repetition  witnesses 
to  the  resistance  and  evasion  which  it  met,  fell  almost  wholly  upon 
the  useful  classes  ;  it  fostered  rather  than  harmed  the  beggar  and 
the  priest.^ 

When,  now,  such  ill-advised  measures  had  produced  a  paralysis 
of  economic  life,  the  inexperienced  government  of  an  ignorant  and 
passive  people  was  driven  to  make  changes  whose  appropriateness 
could  be  but  a  matter  of  chance."*  All  sorts  of  political  nostrums 
in  the  hands  of  unpractical  theorists  or  charlatans  [arbitn'stas)  were 
applied  ;  unprincipled  favorites  swayed  the  royal  mind.  The  accu- 
mulation of  church-property  went  on  apace  ;  law-suits,  lo  retain 
what  little  they  had,  ruined  the  poor,  while  sumptuary  laws  were 
ineffective  in  restraining  extravagance.  Policies  were  adopted  and 
reversed  with  the  utmost  inconsequence.^ 

But  it  is  when  revenue  considerations  are  added  to  our  category 
that  the  worst  economic  conditions  come  to  light.  Multiform  and 
exacting  taxation,  both  at  the  boundaries  and  within,  ground  down 
the  productive  part  of  the  community.  Monopolies  ;  alteration  of 
the  coinage  ;  repudiation  of  debts,  and  other  forms  of  governmental 

1  Owing,  no  doubt,  to  the  preponderance  of  the  upper  middle  class  in  the  Cortes. 
See  p.  195,  below. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  167-178  (the  Afesta),  180-183,  235,  237-239,  241,  244,  267-272, 
296,  472-474,  487  ff.,  498,  583,  585  ff.  {arbitristas);  Hume,  pp.  vi-vii,  85-S6,  197-19S, 
244,  265;  Clarke,  pp.  356-357;  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  62-63.      ^  See  p.  82,  above. 

*  "  The  afflictions  of  the  Spanish  monarchy  went  on  increasing,  toward  the  end  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  without  the  public  men  or  the  government  l:)eing  able  to  con- 
jecture why,  des])ite  the  treasures  of  the  Indies,  the  realm  was  so  poor.  .  .  .  Kvery 
one  clamored  for  the  remedy  and  no  one  came  to  the  rescue  with  rational  counsel." 
Colmeiro,  II,  504. 

^  Colmeiro,  II,  190,  197  ff.,  252-253,  259-260 ;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  17-19,  35-36, 
40-43;   Hume,  pp.  S6-87,  197-198;  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  261-263. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  191 

dishonesty  ;  forced  loans  ;  confiscations  at  slight  provocation  ;  the 
reduction  of  interest  rates  ;  the  indiscriminate  farming  of  the  rev- 
enues, inducing  deep  corruption,  —  these  were  some  of  the  forms 
of  the  financial  policy.  Unpaid  soldiers  who  plundered  right  and 
left,  and  an  army  and  navy  supplied  with  deteriorated  and  useless 
stores,  were  some  of  the  visible  signs  of  bankruptcy  and  corrup- 
tion. For  while  the  revenues  were  unreasonably  large,  that  part 
of  them  which  was  left  for  the  government,  after  they  had  passed 
through  many  unscrupulous  hands,  was  rarely  sufficient  to  meet 
immediate  needs. ^ 


Attempted  Reform 

Two  centuries  of  this  kind  of  thing  were  enough  to  have  ruined 
a  prosperity  more  firmly  rooted  than  that  of  Spain.  When,  there- 
fore, in  the  eighteenth  century,  under  Philip  V  and  especially  under 
Charles  III,  sincere  and  intelligent  efforts  were  made  to  reverse 
an  inveterate  policy  and  to  neutralize  its  effects,  it  was  already 
too  late  to  mend.  "  The  status  of  the  monarchy  at  the  beginning 
of  the  eighteenth  century  was  such  that  one  political  writer  com- 
pared Spain  to  a  building  which  was  afire  in  many  parts  at  the 
same  time,  so  that  it  was  necessary  to  rush  to  the  aid  of  them 
all."  2  Philip  V  (1700- 1 746)  attacked  with  vigor  most  of  the  evils 
detailed  above  ;  not  always  wisely,  but  with  good  intent.  He  owed 
much  to  his  French  ministers  —  indeed,  Spain  seems  to  have  been 
not  infrequently  rescued  from  herself  by  the  suspected  foreigner. 
And  even  at  this  late  day  the  nation  rallied  with  unexpected 
patriotism  and  strength.  Ferdinand  VI  (i  746-1 759)  carried  the 
reforms  still  farther;  and  the  ministries  of  Ensenada  (i 743-1 754) 
and  of  Aranda  (1766-1773),  the  latter  under  the  enlightened 
Charles  III,  represented  a  greater  return  to  prosperity  than  could 
reasonably  have  been  expected.  At  this  period  came  the  expulsion 
of  the  Jesuits.  But  the  death  of  Charles  III  (1788),  "the  only 
good,  great  and  patriotic  king  that  Providence  had  vouchsafed  to 
Spain  in  modern  times,"  ^  allowed  the  scepter  to  fall  once  more 
into  incompetent  hands,  directed  by  contemptible  favorites.    Then 

1  Haebler,  Wirt.  BL,  pp.  14,  135-138;  Colmeiro,  II,  26,  542;  Hume,  pp.  181  ff., 
193-196,  208-210,  214-215,  226-227,  257  ff.,  285. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  215  ;  cf.  Hume,  p.  222. 

3  Hume,  p.  41 1.  Aranda  was  at  first  minister  of  Charles  IV  (1792),  but  was  speedily 
removed. 


192  COLONIZATION 

comes  the  age  of  Napoleon,  with  all  the  misfortune  it  brought  to 
Spain,  to  be  followed  by  the  general  prostration  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  the  tinal  disappearance  of  the  "  Empire  "  at  its  end.^ 

Taxation 

Inasmuch  as  the  administrative  evils  detailed  were  grouped  so 
consistently  about  over-taxation,  and  because  the  greed  for  revenue 
fell  upon  the  colonies  as  upon  victims  devoted,  it  is  fitting  to  enter 
somewhat  more  fully  upon  the  system  of  taxation  before  taking  up 
the  more  general  economic  and  social  factors  of  Spanish  decline. 
One  relation  stands  out  in  the  raising  of  revenue  :  taxation  varied 
directly,  not  with  the  development  of  the  colonial  empire,  but  with 
the  extent  and  frequency  of  the  foreign  wars  which  resulted  largely 
from  the  policies  enumerated.  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  although 
their  intentions  were  of  the  best,  found  it  necessary  to  resort  to 
extraordinary  taxation  to  carry  through  the  conquest  of  Granada ; 
and  their  successors,  plunged  into  ever  greater  expenditures  of  the 
same  kind,  were  never  able  to  carry  out  the  last  wish  of  Isabella 
with  regard  to  the  repeal  of  these  taxes  {jiiros).  No  successful 
attempt  at  reduction  came  under  the  Hapsburgs  ;  in  contrast  to 
the  later  impositions,  those  of  the  Catholic  Sovereigns  seem  light 
and  reasonable.^  Charles  V  became  more  and  more  deeply  en- 
tangled in  foreign  wars,  and  was  obliged,  against  his  will,  to  raise 
the  means  to  prosecute  them.  And  yet,  in  his  time,  owing  to  the 
threefold  rise  in  prices,  with  a  corresponding  fall  in  the  value  of 
money,  the  tax-payer  really  contributed  lesser  values  than  at  the 
opening  of  the  century.  Despite,  however,  the  larger  sums  at  his 
disposal,  Charles  was  not  infrequently  unable  to  follow  up  an 
advantage,  or  even  to  pay  his  troops,  and  when  he  passed  over 
the  rule  to  Philip  he  transferred  with  it  a  considerable  increase  in 
the  public  debt.  No  doubt  this  was  due  in  some  considerable 
degree  to  the  dishonesty  of  the  collectors,  who  absorbed  at  times 
almost  a  half  of  the  contributions.^  But  it  was  to  Philip  II  and  his 
successors  that  Spain  owed  the  relentless  draining  of  her  resources 
before  which  her  recuperative  powers  failed.  Philip's  extraordinary 
demands  for  the  pursuit  of  the  several  phases  of  his  divine  mission. 

^  Colmeiro,  II,  87-109,  218-225  ^   Hume,  pp.  327-328,  351,  356,  3S1-382,  388-391, 

399  ff- 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  539-540,  565,  578-579;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  108. 

*  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  64-C5,  109,  1 17-1 18,  163  ;    Colmeiro,  II,  546  ff.,  556,  558. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  193 

were  combined  with  the  most  reckless  system  of  collection  —  a 
constant  farming  (nit  of  future  revenue  at  ruinous  rates  to  foreign 
capitalists  —  and  a  feebleness  of  conscience  strongly  contrasting 
with  its  morbid  strength  as  exhibited  elsewhere  in  his  life.  Colossal 
sums  were  sunk  in  religious  wars,  to  say  nothing  of  uncounted 
ducats  that  were  swept  away  by  misfortunes  frequently  recurring 
and  not  to  be  forecasted.  The  king  at  one  and  the  same  time 
depended  upon  Genoese  bankers,  and  frightened  them  into  unscrupu- 
lousness  and  rapacity  by  arbitrary  and  oppressive  measures.  His 
finances  grew  steadily  more  hopeless,  until,  as  a  virtual  pauper,  — 
had  he  not  been  a  king,  —  he  left  behind  him  a  debt  of  a  hundred 
million  ducats.^  And  the  favorites  who  ruled  Spain  under  the  later 
degenerate  Hapsburgs  pursued  toward  the  same  end  of  ruin,  but 
sordidly  and  with  rascality,  the  policy  dictated  to  Philip  by  a  certain 
morbid  and  ignorant,  but  high-minded,  narrowness  and  bigotry. 

The  most  obvious  source  of  revenue  was,  naturally,  the  Cortes  ; 
and  the  servicio,  the  subsidy  demanded  at  each  of  its  sessions,  was 
paid  with  astonishing  submission.  At  most  the  king  had  to  listen 
first  to  a  series  of  petitions  and  complaints.  The  servicio  ran 
regularly,  under  Philip  II,  into  millions  of  dollars.^  Aside  from 
this  triennial  tax  however,  the  government  leaned  directly  and  con- 
stantly upon  the  people.  The  most  hateful  of  the  food-taxes  was 
the  mil/ones,  introduced  in  embryo  by  Philip  II  (1590)  in  conse- 
quence of  the  Armada  disaster  ;  an  excise  which  was  increased  and 
developed,  and  which  for  over  two  hundred  years  weighed  (at  length 
to  the  extent  of  one-eighth  of  the  value)  on  wine,  vinegar,  meat, 
and  oil,  the  principal  food  of  the  people.  Debasement  of  the  coin- 
age also  fell  with  severity  upon  the  cost  of  living.^  A  further  ex- 
travagant method  of  raising  revenue  was  through  Xhtjinvs  whose 
suppression  Isabella  had  wished  :  "  The  Crown  raised  a  loan,  and 
assigned  the  product  of  certain  estates  or  taxes  in  payment  of 
interest,  often  at  the  rate  of  ten  per  cent."  Naturally,  the  foreign 
capitalists  were  most  likely  to  profit  by  this.  And  there  were  sold 
besides  such  favors  as  the  legitimization  of  illegitimate  children, 
titles,  newly  made  positions  in  councils,  and  the  like  —  anything 
that  would  add  to  income.* 

1  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  123-130,  131  ff.,  134. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  541  ff.,  583;  Haebler,  Wirt.  BL,  p.  in  ;  Hume,  pp.  26-27. 

3  Colmeiro,  II,  233,  542  ff. ;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  129-130;  Hume,  pp.  179, 
201  ff.,  271-272. 

*  Hume,  p.  27  ;   Colmeiro,  II,  579-580;   Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  115-116. 


1 94  COLONIZATION 

One  of  the  heaviest  and  most  ill  advised  of  the  taxes  was  incident 
upon  trade,  and  through  it,  of  course,  upon  production  :  the  alcabala, 
which  became  no  less  than  a  tax  of  ten  per  cent  upon  all  exchanges 
of  commodities,  ad  valorem,  and  usually  farmed.  Such  a  tax  needs 
no  comment.^  In  addition,  agriculture  was  severely  taxed  because 
Philip  thought  it  could  bear  it ;  the  farmer's  very  plow  and  hoe 
were  not  safe  in  his  own  hands.^  The  internal  and  external  cus- 
toms-dues rendered  legitimate  commercial  profit  extremely  haz- 
ardous and  smuggling  very  profitable  ;  applied  to  the  Netherlands 
they  infuriated  a  merchant-people  and  incited  to  war.^  And  by 
various  moves,  which  threatened  an  indefinite  postponement  of 
payment  or  even  a  repudiation  of  the  state's  debts,  the  foreign 
merchants  resident  in  Spain  were  rendered  insecure,  and  so  the 
more  ready  to  impose  upon  an  ignorant  people.  Even  ecclesias- 
tical taxation  {subsidio)  was  not  totally  excluded.'*  Between  the 
year  of  his  accession  and  1573  Philip  had  well-nigh  doubled  the 
state-income.^ 

It  is  plain  that  the  country  was  being  systematically  and  cynically 
bled  of  its  resources  of  all  varieties.  This  process  explains  a  very 
large  part  of  the  decline  of  national  vigor  in  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries.  The  time  of  Philip  III  brought  peace,  and 
the  age  of  the  Bourbons  real  efforts  toward  reform,  but  the  strain 
had  been  too  prolonged  and  too  pitiless ;  resiliency  was  gone. 
"Finally,"  says  Colmeiro,  "the  deplorable  state  of  our  treasury 
during  the  whole  of  the  domination  of  the  house  of  Austria,  and 
its  extraordinary  obligations,  owing  to  wars,  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury .  .  .  had  accumulated  deficit  upon  deficit  until  the  Spanish 
nation  was  oppressed  with  the  weight  of  a  debt  of  13,250,207,506 
reals."  •'  Expenditures  constantly  outran  income,  however  unreason- 
ably the  latter  might  be  increased.  The  extravagance  of  the  palace 
under  Charles  II  (1665- 1700)  and  Philip  V  (i  700-1 746)  formed  a 
marked  contrast  to  the  parsimony  of  Philip  II.' 

1  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  73  ff.,  iio-ii  I,  118-122  ;  Blok,  III,  83  ff. ;  Hume,  pp.  135, 
157-159,  198-200,  245-246.  "Bread  paid  three  times  over,  as  corn,  as  meal,  and  as 
manufactured."    Clarke,  I,  356. 

2  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  37,  39-40;   Blok,  III,  132  ff. 

8  Hume,  pp.  159-160;  cf.  pp.  155,  227-228,  271;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  54-55, 
62-63,77-81;  Colmeiro,  II,  261-262.        *  Haebler,  Wirt.  BL,  pp.  70-72  ;  Hume,  p.  27. 

^  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,p.  122;  Blok,  III,  155  ff.;  for  a  general  sketch  of  Philip's  ex- 
ploits in  tax-laying,  see  Haebler,  id.,  pp.  118  ff. 

"  Colmeiro,  II,  584 ;  cf.pp.  544-545,  565,  570,575-576;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,pp.  87- 
88,  i34-i35>  '38-143-  ''  ^f-  Hume,  pp.  2S6-287,  382. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  195 

Economic  and  Social  Causes  for  Decline 

In  the  rehearsal  of  what  have  been  called  in  a  broad  sense  the 
political  factors  leading  to  national  impoverishment,  a  sufficiently 
threatening  set  of  conditions  has  been  disclosed.  In  order,  however, 
to  get  the  effects  of  Spain's  colonial  career  into  a  proper  perspec- 
tive, it  is  necessary  still  to  consider  several  important  factors  which 
might  be  called  economic  and  social,  and  which  represent  popular 
persuasion  and  habits  of  thought  and  of  action  rather  than  a  definite 
state-policy.  The  national  economic  character  of  the  Spaniards 
was  such  as  in  any  case  to  have  rendered  their  supremacy  but 
short-lived  in  an  era  characterized  by  the  steady  gain  of  the  indus- 
trial and  commercial  type  over  the  military.^  The  attitude  of  re- 
garding the  industrial  organization  as  a  contemptible  appendage 
upon  the  social  structure  persisted  during  the  centuries  that  suc- 
ceeded the  Discoveries  period,  and  it  placed  industry  and  commerce 
at  a  disadvantage  only  partially  portrayed  in  the  actual  statutes 
and  their  implications.  Mediaeval  ideas,  together  with  prejudices 
against  the  Moors,  and  the  inevitable  teachings  of  their  own  mili- 
tarism conspired  to  create  and  nourish  this  disesteem  of  the  gain- 
ful occupations  (oficios  vilcs  y  baxos).  The  Spaniards  were  not 
alone  among  the  nations  in  this  view,  but  being  so  largely  hidalgos, 
or  aspirants  to  that  station,  they  naturally  formed  an  extreme  and 
unadaptable  case.  The  law  made  the  matter  worse,  because  it  re- 
flected this  attitude,  and  custom  and  precedent  backed  the  law  up 
strongly.  The  infamy  of  labor  might  even  pass  on  to  one's  family, 
or  carry  with  it  exclusion  from  office.  This  political  ignominy  of 
toil  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  interests  of  industry  and  com- 
niefce  were  never  adequately  represented  in  the  Cortes.^  It  also 
explains  the  tendency  of  the  whole  population  toward  display  and 
luxury,  for  these  were  the  badges,  as  the  example  of  the  upper 
classes  proved,  of  a  respectability  unsullied  by  usefulness.^  And 
the  curse  of  vagabondage  itself,  though  referable  in  part  to  love  of 
adventure,  was  really  the  result  of  such  contempt  for  and  discour- 
agement of  industry.  "  The  caballero,  before  whom  peace  closed 
the  path  of  glory  and  fortune,  enlisted  in  the  crusading  armies,  or 

^  Cf.  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  255-256. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  26-27  !   Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  61  ;  Hume,  p.  136. 
^  Colmeiro,  II,  26;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  37;  for  the  sumptuary  legislation  and  its 
causes,  see  Colmeiro,  II,  524-537;   Hume,  p.  170. 


196  COLONIZATION 

placed  himself  in  the  service  of  a  foreign  prince  at  whose  side  he 
could  go  on  in  the  profession  of  arms ;  and  the  villein,  accustomed 
to  live  and  thrive  on  the  spoils  of  the  enemy,  suffered  the  yoke  of 
labor  with  impatience.  Even  though  he  had  formed  the  resolution 
to  stay  at  home  and  gain  by  his  industry  the  support  of  his  family, 
he  was  prevented  by  conditions  :  now  by  the  lack  of  land  from 
becoming  a  cultivator ;  now  by  the  gilds  and  their  ordinances  if  he 
set  out  to  make  himself  an  artisan ;  and  again  by  the  shortage  of 
his  capital  if  he  wished  to  follow  the  example  of  the  merchant.  And, 
finally,  the  laws  which  left  liberty  and  property  all  but  unprotected, 
the  exclusive  and  monopolistic  privileges,  the  royalties  and  dues, 
the  alterations  of  the  coinage,  the  insecurity  of  the  roads,  the  con- 
fusion of  the  taxes,  and  the  whole  medley  of  economic  errors  char- 
acteristic of  that  period,  condemned  him  to  enforced  idleness." 
Thus  mendicancy  became  worse  and  worse  during  the  sixteenth, 
seventeenth,  and  eighteenth  centuries.^ 

Even  the  attempts  to  favor  the  industrial  vocations  resulted  in 
no  progress  ;  for  they  started  out  from  the  mediieval  prepossessions 
of  a  people  that  knew  nothing  of  industrial  progress  and  could 
not,  economically  speaking,  think  rationally.  So  that  while  other 
European  nations,  through  the  forced  and  recurring  inconsistencies 
of  their  own  practice,  made  heavy  inroads  into  whatever  obsolete 
theories  they  professed, —  and  were  at  last  obliged  to  make  the 
theories  square  with  the  objective  facts,  —  Spain  long  clung  to 
traditional  doctrines  with  the  virtuous  consistency  of  inexperience.^ 
Among  the  professions  social  selection  favored  types  whose  domi- 
nance in  the  world  was  already  a  thing  of  the  past,  and  whose 
association  could  not  form  a  national  structure  fit  long  to  compete 
under  the  new  conditions  imposed  upon  the  strife  of  nations. 
Spain  "  put  her  money  on  the  wrong  horse  "  when  she  favored 
over  the  merchant  the  soldier  or  priest.  Naturally,  as  time  went 
on  and  the  young  refused  to  disgrace  themselves  with  toil,  the 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  21. 

-  Louis  XIV  said  of  Spain  :  "  It  is  sufficient  in  Spain  that  an  abuse  be  old-estab- 
lished for  it  to  be  scrupulously  maintained  without  any  care  being  taken  to  consider 
whether  a  thing  which  perhaps  may  have  been  good  in  the  past  is  bad  for  the 
present."  Hume,  p.  320.  In  1678  (treaty  of  Nimeguen),  when  Spain  was  utterly 
bankrupt  and  humiliated,  "the  overwhelming  grandeur  and  w'ealth  of  its  own  mon- 
arch continued  to  be  an  article  of  national  faith  ;  and  his  clemency  in  letting  his 
enemies  off  so  easily,  a  matter  for  admiring  congratulation  upon  his  magnanimity." 
Id.,  p.  294.  See  also  Colmeiro,  II,  243,  246-248  (gild  system),  139  (system  of  inherit- 
ance, etc.). 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  197 

proportion  of  political  hangers-on  and  sycophants,  of  priests  or 
commoner  mendicants,  increased.  Corruption  and  the  undermining 
of  moral  standards  gained  headway  year  by  year.  That  the  colonial 
enterprises  were  responsible  for  all  this  can  therefore  be  denied  ; 
it  would  have  been  in  all  but  degree  the  same,  had  America  never 
been  discovered. 

Religious  Causes  for  Decline 

Submissiveness  to  the  exactions  of  the  kings  has  several  times 
been  noted  as  a  Spanish  trait ;  and  the  importance  assigned  to  the 
minister  of  the  faith  by  a  loyal,  ignorant,  and  superstitious  people 
invited  economic  and  social  consequences  of  an  extreme  type.  So 
many  landholders  had  been  led,  especially  in  the  frequent  times 
of  stress,  epidemic,  or  of  expectation  of  the  end  of  the  world, 
to  insure  themselves  for  the  life  to  come,  that  by  1600  a  large  por- 
tion of  the  best  land  in  Spain  had  come  into  the  possession  of  the 
Church ;  and  once  there  it  became  inalienable.  The  phenomena, 
then,  of  the  latifjuidia  were  not  long  delayed  in  their  appearance, 
for  the  dispossessed  migrated  to  the  towns  and  too  often  became 
sturdy  ruffians  therein.  "  Ecclesiastical  amortization  absorbed  the 
larger  and  better  part  of  the  landed  property,  and  against  this  rock 
all  the  forces  of  agriculture  were  shipwrecked.  The  clergy  afforded 
liberal  succor  to  the  poor ;  but  its  blind  and  indiscreet  charity 
often  fomented  sloth  and  its  unproductive  monopoly  of  the  land 
rendered  labor  sterile."  ^  Not  only  that :  "  in  reality  there  were 
many  who  took  the  habit  and  entered  religious  institutions,  fleeing 
from  the  labors  and  miseries  of  the  world  in  order  to  enjoy  the 
sweetness  of  idleness  ;  and  not  because  they  were  led  to  this  life 
through  devotion,  penitence,  or  the  love  of  a  life  of  contemplation. 
These  are  the  words  of  the  Council  of  Castile  in  1619."  ^ 

As  time  went  on  this  double  process  of  robbing  industry  of  the 
best  Jands_and  the  land  of  its  complement  of  workers  proceeded 
apace,  being  rather  strengthened  and  justified  than  weakened  by 
later  developments  :  it  was  not  until  a  much  later  time  that  Church 
and  State  were  shorn  to  any  considerable  degree  of  their  land- 
monopoly.^    Again,  careers  for  the  ambitious  seemed  to  become 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  160;  cf.  pp.  28  ff.,  131-133,  139,  146-148;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p. 
153.    The  ecclesiastical  rights  even  struck  at  the  royal  power.    Colmeiro,  II,  157-15S. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  151. 

3  Colmeiro,  II,  159  (Philip  IV);  cf.  pp.  131-133,  162-163;  see  the  account  of  the 
report  in  1618  of  the  Council  of  Castile,  in  Hume  (pp.  221-222). 


198  COLONIZATION 

less  and  less  attainable  except  through  the  Chunh.  "  Tn  justice," 
says  Colmeiro/  "we  ought  to  condone  the  inclination  ot  the 
Spaniard  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  to  take 
refuge  in  the  religious  establishments.  Those  professions  which 
held  out  hopes  of  fortune  were  few.  The  toga  and  the  uniform 
appealed  very  aptly  to  the  vanity  and  presumption  of  the  caballeros 
and  hidalgos,  while  agriculture,  the  mechanic  arts,  and  commerce 
were  suitable  only  to  an  humble  station,  inasmuch  as  they  were 
regarded  as  lowly  occupations.  The  Church  was  a  neutral  field, 
where  noble  and  plebeian  mingled  and  became  indistinguishable. 
All,  ascetic  as  well  as  worldly,  proud  and  modest,  lazy  and  diligent, 
wise  and  ignorant,  found  in  the  Church  a  harbor  of  refuge  from 
the  storms  of  the  age,  without  thereby  renouncing,  however,  the 
opportunity  of  embarcation  upon  the  high  sea  of  the  Court,  and 
upon  functions  and  offices  of  greater  honor  and  authority,  when 
occasion,  acceptable  or  unavoidable,  should  have  cast  them  into 
the  tumult  of  affairs.  Spanish  history  is  full  of  cardinals  who 
became  ministers,  of  prelate-ambassadors,  or  bishojvprcsidcnts  of 
Castile.  It  offers  us  the  example  even  of  a  mere  priest  like  Pedro 
de  la  Gasca,  named  pacificator  and  governor  of  Peru ;  and  of 
certain  good  and  simple  ecclesiastics  sent  out  to  check  the  insolence 
of  the  captains,  administer  justice,  and  bring  order  and  accord  into 
various  parts  of  the  Indies." 

The  religious  loyalty  of  the  Spaniards,  strong  as  it  was,  did  not 
remain  proof  against  the  very  evident  evils  of  this  exaltation  of  the 
power  of  the  Church;  in  1619  the  Council  of  Castile  proposed 
that  licenses  should  be  necessary  for  new  religious  foundations, 
and  that  a  minimum  age  limit  should  be  set  for  those  entering  the 
religious  life.^  But  it  was  not  until  the  eighteenth  century  that 
the  great  estates  were  broken  uj)  and  sold  under  full  property 
rights.  And  as  for  the  numbers  of  the  religious,  an  estimate  of 
Davila,  reported  by  other  authorities  to  be  moderate,  assigned  to 
Spain  (about  1623)  9000  convents  and  100,000  personS  of  ecclesi- 
astical status  —  30,000  of  the  secular  and  70,000  of  the  regular 
clergy.  In  1768  the  census  showed  148,815  curates,  monks,  nuns, 
etc.,  and  in  1787,  although  certain  semi-connected  persons  were 
not  counted,  there  still  remained  138,761.  In  1797  the  number 
had  decreased  by   15,000.'^    To  gain  a  correct  impressicMi  of  the 

1  II,  I  ^4-155  ;  cf.  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  151.,  p.  154.        2  (^;Q]iy,eij-o  jj   ,^o  ;    Hume,  p.  222. 

'  Colmeiro,  II,    149;  cf.  II,  52.    This  author  was  not  able  to  find  the  reported 

estimate  of  Davila,  and  regards  the  above  numbers  as  excessive.    Upon  scanning  the 


CONDl'lIONS  OF  SPANISH   COLONIZATION 


199 


strain  brought  upon  the  nation  by  these  estabhshmcnts,  it  must  be 
reahzed  not  only  that  most  of  the  members  of  the  orders  were 
withdrawn  from  any  profitable  service  to  society,  but  that  it  was 
really  the  pick  of  the  population  that  was  thus  cut  out  from  social 
service,  and  in  theory  from  the  propagation  of  the  race.  They  had 
to  be  supported  by  an  already  over-burdened  laboring-class,  yet 
they  consistently  interfered  with  and  injured  the  useful  occupations. 
When  the  Inquisition  was  at  its  climax  of  power  and  ferocity,  they 
systematically  forced  from  his  place  in  the  society  any  one  who 
possessed  activity  and  independence  of  mind  enough  to  fall  into 
religious  or  political  heresy.^ 

Nor  must  the  interruption  or  stoppage  and  the  consequent 
demoralization  of  labor,  caused  by  the  over-development  of  reli- 
gious exercises,  fail  of  mention ;  it  is  even  to  this  day  a  distinct 
hindrance  to  the  growth  of  industry  in  Spain.  Festivals  and  holi- 
days in  honor  of  this  or  that  saint  took  up  a  large  fraction  of  the 
working  days  of  the  year ;  Campomanes  counted  ninety-three 
fiestas  in  the  year,  and  Colmeiro,^  reckoning  8,000,000  laborers  at 
a  minimum  wage  of  two  reals  a  day,  foots  up  the  annual  loss  at 
1,488,000,000  reals.  The  almost  800,000,000  days'  labor  sacri- 
ficed per  annum,  with  the  resulting  irregularity  in  habits,  and  the 
acquired  taste  for  amusement,  are  of  course  far  more  striking  and 
serious  than  any  loss  calculable  in  money.  Again,  the  hours  of 
labor  were  always  short,  and  tended  to  become  shorter  ;  in  Aragon, 
in  1640,  the  working  hours  were  five  per  day,  and  what  was  done 
was  scanty,  costly,  and  poor.^ 

It  is  indeed  hard  to  see  where  the  workers  of  this  society  were, 
or  to  what  economic  support  it  owed  the  deferring  of  its  decline. 
For  while  the  lower  classes  starved  rather  than  work,  the  upper 
had  to  be  restrained  from  a  senseless  luxury  by  repeated  sumptuary 
laws.  It  is  not  surprising,  under  these  conditions,  that  a  great 
burst  of  immorality  in  nobles,  clergy,  and  common  people  followed 

7\atro  the  present  writer  found  no  such  specific  estimate,  but  counted  up  about 
2000  convents  and  40,000  religiosos  alone.  P'igures  for  the  nunneries,  hospitals,  etc., 
were  incomplete,  but  it  is  not  difficult  to  believe  that  the  estimate  given  in  the  text 
needs  comparatively  little  discount,  especially  when  it  is  compared  with  Colmeiro's 
figures  for  the  eighteenth  century.  Davila  says  (p.  308)  that  in  all  the  parishes,  con- 
vents, hospitals,  etc.,  which  he  has  named,  no  fewer  than  a  million  masses  are  said 
each  year.  The  tone  and  matter  of  the  Teatro  are  certainly  evidence  of  the  strength 
in  numbers  and  in  social  importance  of  the  clergy. 

1  Hume,  p.  304;  cf.  Galton,  pp.  357-359;  see  p.  188,  above. 

2  II,  53-54.  ^  Colmeiro,  II,  23. 


200  COLOM/AriOX 

upon  economic  decline  :  petty  vanity,  venality,  all  kinds  of  corrup- 
tion, looseness  of  sexual  relations,  and  other  vices  from  which  the 
nation  had  formerly  been  relatively  free,  invaded  all  walks  of  life.^ 


The  Colonial  Career  as  a  Cause  for  Decline 

No  considerable  part  of  the  factors  that  made  for  decline,  and 
which  have  now  been  recounted,  can  be  charged  to  the  colonial 
career.  They  lay  in  the  constitution  of  the  race,  in  the  results  of 
mediaeval  and  later  European  systems  and  complications,  theories, 
and  institutions  ;  they  were  sufficient  to  have  ruined  Spain  even 
though  America  had  never  been  discovered.  The  effect  uj^on 
them  of  the  colonial  enterprises  was,  at  the  most,  contributary  ; 
not  creative,  determinative,  or  even  prominent.  They  were  there 
already.  What  the  colonial  experiences  did  was  to  evoke,  as  a 
special  case,  a  pronounced  and  striking  exhibition  of  what  had  come 
to  be  the  national  way  of  doing  things  ;  and  if  it  stimulated  fateful 
impulses  and  policies  not  elsewhere  so  active,  it  is  in  this  sense 
only  that  it  may  be  considered  to  have  hastened  an  evil  destiny. 
For  example,  the  possession  of  the  colonial  empire  drew  Spain  into 
hostilities  whose  cost  had  to  be  covered  by  an  added  increase  of 
taxation  ;  but  this  was  largely  because  the  external  possessions 
afforded  Spain  a  stage  in  plain  sight  and  directly  in  the  path  of 
her  most  enterprising  rivals,  upon  which  her  hateful  and  obstructive 
policy  could  be  displayed.  Possibly  the  enlarged  sphere  of  Philip 
IPs  accountability  to  God  may  have  intensified  his  effort  to  live  up 
to  his  destiny.  Such  effects  were,  however,  relatively  insignificant; 
and  with  reference  to  the  taxation,  to  which  the  authorities  refer 
so  large  a  part  of  Spain's  exhaustion,  it  will  presently  be  seen  that 
the  metropolis  was  far  from  being  required  to  expend  money  on 
America ;  the  New  World  was  rather  an  abused  source  of  income. 

It  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  the  effect  of  the  Discoveries  was 
to  enhance  the  characteristic  feeling  for  King  and  Church,  bearing 
witness  as  they  did  to  the  world-power  of  both  ;  and  both  were  no 
doubt  stimulated  to  an  extravagancy  of  self-confidence  and  pre- 
sumption for  the  very  reason  that  they  saw  themselves  the  holders 
of  such  universally  envied  advantages.^  We  of  the  present  day  can 
scarcely  call  before  the  imagination  a  semblance  of  the  excitement 

^  Colmeiro,  II,  524  ff.  ;   Ilume,  pp.  169-170,  221  ff. 

2  (3f_  Koscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  42  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  35-36. 


CONDITIONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  201 

and  elation  of  the  period  under  review ;  ^  comparison  may  be 
made  perhaps  with  the  emotions  excited  here  and  there  by  the 
gold  discoveries  in  the  Transvaal  and  Alaska,  or,  farther  back,  in 
California  and  Australia  The  pretentious  titles  assumed  by  the 
king  of  Portugal  after  the  attainment  of  India  ^  reflect  an  exalted 
frame  of  mind,  and  the  pious  ecstasies  of  an  Azurara  betray  excite- 
ment before  the  prospect  of  extended  religious  dominion.  Perhaps 
the  additional  prestige  thus  lent  the  Spanish  rulers  rendered  them 
less  assailable  for  criticism  in  their  series  of  unfortunate  measures. 
In  fact,  it  was  the  very  refusal  of  Spain  to  adapt  herself  to  the 
conditions  of  a  new  destiny  which  made  the  colonial  career  so 
disastrous.  She  was  not  alone  in  mistaking  her  way  in  an  un- 
charted course,  but  she  occupied  a  bad  and  almost  unique  eminence 
in  that  she  seemed  to  learn  nothing  by  experience.  Conditions 
were  not  studied  with  the  idea  of  better  coping  with  them.  Other 
nations  managed  to  dodge  and  shift  ground  and  adapt,  —  profiting 
not  infrequently  by  the  mishaps  undergone  before  their  eyes  by 
Spain,  —  but  Spain  pursued  a  course  of  rare  and  ruinous  con- 
sistency.^ 

Taking  up  now  the  larger  economic  and  social  effects  of  the 
colonial  career,  which  are  here  distinguished  for  the  sake  of  clear- 
ness from  the  more  purely  political  or  administrative,  the  case 
becom.es  considerably  less  simple  and  evident.  A  larger  share  in 
Spanish  decline  seems  referable  to  the  relations  with  America  ;  and 
it  is  possible  to  appreciate  the  standpoint  of  those  older  Spanish 
observers  of  affairs  who  used  to  query  whether  the  Indies  had  not 
been  a  curse,  and  not  infrequently  answered  themselves  in  the 
affrrmativc*  For,  first  of  all,  the  discoveries  and  conquests  opened 
an  illimitable  range  for  the  adventurous  military  and  missionary 
spirit,  thus  promoting  the  diffusion  over  a  wide  and  uncertain 
field  of  such  forces  as  might  have  been  rendered  productive  if 
closer  confined.  Beside  the  prospective  treasures  of  the  Indies, 
former  wealth  seemed  of  little  account.  The  Spanish  non-industrial 
type  and  ideal  attained  thus  a  new  lease  of  life  when  the  situation 
at  home  was  already  calling  for  their  effacement.  If  the  military 
and  ecclesiastical  professions  in  Spain  were  at  the  saturation-point 

1  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  190  ff.  -  See  p.  94,  above. 

3  The  unavailing  efforts  of  the  Netherlander  Charles  V  to  limit  the  application  of 
mercantile  doctrines  are  significant.    Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  11-14. 
•*  Cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  421,  440-442;   Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  30. 


202  COLONIZATION 

there  was  chance  enough  in  the  Indies  ;  thus  Cerv^antes  and  other 
contemporary  writers  represent  the  situation.^  Of  a  consequence, 
as  in  the  less-known  case  of  Portugal,^  the  tendency  to  dependency 
and  sycophancy  was  largely  increased,  and  the  steps  of  every  man 
of  importance  were  dogged  by  hangers-on  hopeful  of  undeserved 
chances  in  life.  The  plain  tendency  toward  corruption  in  public 
affairs  was  naturally  increased ;  and  the  demoralization  of  the 
people  under  the  regime  of  unreasonable  luxury  for  some,  incredi- 
ble but  unresisting  poverty,  devoid  of  all  self-respect,  for  others, 
and  indiscriminate  charity  for  social  parasites,  was  intensified.  In 
short,  the  social  shortcomings,  natural  or  acquired,  were  enhanced 
all  along  the  line  by  the  entrance  into  Spanish  life  of  the  new 
factor  of  romance  and  hazard  represented  by  the  acquisition  of 
America.^ 

The  Mercantile  System 

Neglecting  minor  effects,  which  are  either  deducible  from  the 
rather  extended  treatment  already  accorded,  or  will  appear  in  the 
ensuing  narrative,  there  yet  remains  one  prominent  factor  in 
Spain's  decline  to  which,  from  Adam  Smith  down,  a  considerable 
degree  of  importance  has  been  assigned,  especially  by  economists. 
This  is  the  effect  of  the  mercantile  system  as  adopted  by  Si:»ain  in 
her  relations  to  her  colonies.  One  of  the  stock  illustraticMis  of  the 
fallacy  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  views  regarding 
the  identity  of  money  (coin)  and  wealth  has  been  afforded  by  the 
fact  that  Spain,  although  the  recipient  of  an  uninterrupted  golden 
stream  from  the  New  World,  yet  grew  steadily  poorer  and  more 
miserable,  declined  in  population,  and  sunk  from  a  position  of 
preeminence  to  one  of  humiliation  and  degradation.  It  was  partially 
to  get  this  contention  into  a  proper  setting  that  the  causes  for  the 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  3  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  37.  It  is  jjerhaps  superfluous  to 
point  out,  in  this  connection,  the  great  importance  for  the  study  of  colonial  affairs  of 
the  impressions  preserved  in  contemporary  literature. 

2  See  pp.  113  ff.,  above. 

3  Cf.  Martins,  Civ.  Iber.,  pp.  255-256  ;  Colmeiro,  I,  253.  "The  highest  ambition 
of  the  nation  in  its  golden  age  was  to  be  to  Europe  just  what  the  nobility,  the  clergy 
and  the  army  were  to  single  nations.  Consequently  there  was  an  enormous  pre- 
ponderance of  personal  service  in  the  industrial  organism,  and  much  of  this  was 
purely  for  ostentation.  Nowhere  in  the  world  were  there  so  many  nobles,  so  many 
ofificers,  civil  and  military,  so  many  lawyers  and  clerks,  priests  and  monks,  so  many 
students  and  school-boys,  with  their  servants.  ]5ut  as  truly,  nowhere  in  the  world 
were  there  so  many  beggars  and  vagabonds."    Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  3-4. 


coNDrrioNs  of  Spanish  colonization         203 

decline  of  Spain  have  been  so  extensively  recounted  ;  and  now, 
admitting  freely  the  disastrous  nature  of  any  such  economic  pre- 
possession, the  reader  is  in  a  position  to  draw  his  own  conclusion 
as  to  its  share  in  the  whole  process.  Plainly,  however  harmful,  it 
could  have  constituted  only  one  factor  among  several  scarcely  less 
effective.  Taking  the  matter  up  upon  its  own  account,  it  is  note- 
worthy, first  of  all,  that  Spain  never  developed  the  mercantile 
system  ///  ex  tens  o ;  never  so  far  as  did  England,  for  example.  She 
naturally  followed  her  prototypes,  the  Italians  and  Portuguese,  in 
their  policies  of  monopoly  and  exclusion  ;  she  regarded  the  colonies, 
in  practice  at  least,  as  destined  to  subserve  the  necessities  and 
desires  of  the  metropolis.  But  the  Spaniards  were  not  enough  of 
_an^mdustrial  and  merchant  people  to  adopt  unconsciously,  or  even 
as  the  result  of  rational  reflection,  any  but  the  crudest  and  most 
obvious  phases  of  the  system. ^  The  crudest  dogma  of  the  mercan- 
tilists was  probably  that  which  confounded  the  metallic  species  of 
wealth  with  the  general  term,  and  this  view,  largely  because  they 
had  the  bullion,  and  because  they  knew  they  were,  on  that  account, 
envied  and  feared  by  the  rest  of  Christendom,  the  Spaniards  applied 
in  an  extreme.^ 

The  Inflow  of  Bullion  r 

It  has  been  shown  how,  in  default  of  spices  and  like  products, 
the  whole  attention  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  New  World  was  turned 
predominantly,  and  at  first  almost  exclusively,  to  the  search  for 
precious  metals.  Anticipating  somewhat,^  it  is  fair  to  say  that 
between  1525  and  1825  a  quantity  of  buUion  was  entered  via  Spain 
upon  the  markets  of  the  world,  which  utterly  dwarfed  any  former 
experience  of  the  race.  The  contemporary  and  subsequent  litera- 
ture of  Europe  reflects  the  impression  made  upon  the  western 
world  by  this  period,  and  in  particular  by  its  opening  episodes.  Inas- 
much, now,  as  the  circulation  of  commodities  between  Spain  and 

1  Cf.  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  42;   Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  26;  Moses,  pp.  300-301. 

2  See  pp.  227  ff., below.  "  While  heaven  was  exerting  itself  to  rain  gold  and  silver  to 
slake  the  burning  thirst  of  our  forebears,  the  doctrine  prevailed  which  regarded  the 
precious  metals  as  the  sum  of  all  the  temporal  riches  of  life,  the  blood  of  all  peoples 
and  nations,  and  the  nerve  of  all  the  powers  of  the  earth.  The  art  of  governing  con- 
sisted in  retaining  the  rivers  of  gold  and  silver  which  flowed  from  the  Indies,  and  in 
hoarding  up  their  abundance  in  Spain  without  spilling  a  drop  for  the  benefit  of 
foreigners."  Colnieiro,  II,  437-438.  For  a  comparison  of  the  "metal-policies"  of 
Spain  and  England,  see  Moses,  pp.  300-301.  ^  gee  pp.  208  ff.,  below. 


204  COLONIZATION 

the  rest  of  the  world  was  impeded,  not  only  by  the  desire  to  hoard 
gold,  but  also  by  the  advancing  feebleness  of  Spain's  industrial  life, 
and  by  the  artificial  barriers  placed  in  the  j^ath  of  trade,  money 
tended  to  stagnate  along  the  avenues  of  exchange.  An  immediate 
effect  was  an  extraordinary  rise  of  prices  which  outdid  that  of  the 
first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century.  It  must  be  understood  that 
before  the  influx  of  gold  prices  had  already  gone  up  by  reason  of 
the  industrial  conditions  of  Spain;  between  15  19  and  1565  they 
rose  on  the  average  about  300  per  cent.  Double  prices  were  com- 
plained of  as  early  as  1528.  But  whereas  money  was  by  1558  down 
to  one-third  of  its  earlier  purchasing  power,  it  declined  between 
that  date  and  1632  to  one-fifth.^  Wheat  rose  from  110  to  952 
maravedi's,  and  the  other  grains  kept  the  pace.^  Naturally  a  con- 
siderable impulse  was  given  to  industry  by  this  prevalence  of  high 
prices ;  but  real  wages  soon  experienced  a  decline.  Meanwhile  it 
cost  so  much  to  produce  in  Spain  that  foreigners  could  pay  the 
heavy  dues  demanded  of  importers  and  yet  undersell  the  Spanish 
producers.^  Thus  was  the  periodic  flood  of  gold  which  accompanied 
the  returning  galleons  drained  away,  and  with  the  greater  speed  as 
Spain  was  forced  the  more  consistently  to  rely  upon  foreign  pro- 
ducers to  supply  her  needs. "*  And  so  the  Spanish  coins  came  really 
to  flood  the  world,  being  found  in  China  and  Japan,  the  East  Indies, 
Persia,  Constantinople,  Cairo,  and  Barbary,  —  "  destinations  of  the 
larger  part  of  the  silver  of  Spain,  because  scarcely  any  other  coin 
was  current  among  those  remote  tribes  than  pieces  of  eight  {rcalcs 

1  Haebler,  Wirt.  BL,  pp.  i6off.  ;  cf.  p.  32  ;  Colmeiro,  II,  445,  451.  By  i  55S  Philip  II 
was  acting  upon  the  theory  that  coin  had  fallen  40  per  cent  in  value.  Colmeiro,  11, 
449.  The  general  level  of  prices  in  Europe  from  1200  to  1800  is  treated  by  D'Avenel 
in  his  monumental  work.  He  says  (I,  15-16)  that  prices  began  to  rise  about  1500  and 
were  speeded  after  1525  through  the  incoming  of  American  bullion.  The  value  of 
money  fell  one-third  between  1530  and  1 560  ;  then  about  one-half  by  1600.  The  price 
of  merchandise  tripled  in  70  years.  The  following  table  is  taken  from  notes  on  pages 
27  and  32  of  Volume  I. 

Purchasing  Power  of  the  Precious  Metals  compared  with  their  Present  (iSgo) 
Value  taken  as  Unity 

1451-1500  ....  6  1626-1650  ....  2.50 

1501-1525  ....  5  1651-1675  ....  2 

1526-1550  ....  4  1676-1700  ....  ,2.33 

'S5'->S7S  ....  3  1701-1725  ....  2.7s 

1576-1600  2.50  1726-1750  ....  3 

1601-1625  ....  3  '                                          1751-1775  .     .     •     ■  2.33 

iTjb-ijcp  ....  2 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  232. 

=5  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  15;  cf.  pp.  52-53;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  38;  Cunningham, 
pp.  518-520;  Clarke,  p.  357.  •*  Colmeiro,  II,  443-447. 


CONDl'llONS  OF  SPANISH  COLONIZATION  205 

de  a  ocho)  and  Castilian  doubloons.  It  was  for  so  short  a  time  that 
we  enjoyed  the  treasures  of  the  fleets  and  galleons  that  they 
dampened  our  soil  without  watering  it."  ^ 

The  natural  results  of  this  constant  inflation  of  the  stock  of 
bullion  were  economic  instability,  insecurity  of  trade,  and  a  great 
amount  of  social  misery ;  and  when  to  such  natural  inflation,  if  it 
may  be  so  called,  were  added  periodic  capricious  alterations  of  the 
currency  on  the  part  of  king  and  irresponsible  favorites,  the  case 
was  by  so  much  the  worse. ^  What  the  Spaniards,  and  indeed  all 
the  nations  of  the  time  who  were  not  shaken  in  their  dogmas  by 
being  forced  constantly  to  test  them  in  practice,  failed  to  see  is 
what  one  of  their  own  writers  of  1684  stated  so  clearly:  "The 
most  necessary  metal,"  the  anonymous  one  asserts,  "  the  most 
noble,  precious  and  sure  which  has  ever  existed  or  will  exist,  is  the 
sweat  of  the  brow  ;  it  ought  to  be  designated  the  unique  element 
in  the  conservation  of  realms.  For  where  this  metal  shall  be  want- 
ing, gold  and  silver  cannot  hold  their  place,  since  it  is  alone  the 
sweat  of  the  individual  which  constitutes  the  universal  coin  of  the 
world."  ^  Instead,  however,  of  adopting  rational  means  for  deliver- 
ing themselves  from  the  results  of  price-inflation,  recourse  was  had 
to  acts  of  legislation  aimed  at  the  symptoms  alone  ;  and  such  price- 
regulation  simply  aggravated  the  economic  ills.'* 

The  cult  of  the  metals  was  certainly  pursued  to  the  extreme  ; 
but  the  other  dogmas  of  the  mercantilists  seem  to  have  suffered 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  439.  "  The  permanent  gain  from  the  treasure  went  to  the  countries 
which  could  employ  it  as  capital  for  industrial  or  agricultural  development.  This 
Spain  could  not  do.  Even  in  the  Low  Countries  her  system  forced  a  migration  of 
industry.  Foreigners  were  forced  to  go  into  banking  and  their  failure  in  this  witnessed 
to  the  fact  that  the  treasure  was  passing  into  foreign  hands.  Thus  the  prosperous 
element  were  the  Dutch,  who  used  this  treasure  of  Spanish  America  as  capital  in 
commercial  shipping  and  industry."  Cunningham,  p.  521  ;  cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  440-442  ; 
Hume,  p.  305.  Realization  of  these  conditions  brought  the  doubt  referred  to  (p.  201, 
above)  as  to  the  real  value  to  Spain  of  the  Indies.  "  En  fin  algunos  llegaron  a  poner 
en  duda  si  el  descubrimiento  y  conquista  de  las  Indias  habia  sido,  un  bien  6  un  mal 
para  Espaiia,  puesto  que  al  cabo  si  nosotros  cogiamos  las  floves,  los  demas  reinos  y 
provincias  de  Europa  se  llevaban  el  fruto." 

2  "  There  is  another  powerful  cause  of  dearth  which  has  been  passed  over  hitherto 
by  the  political  writers,  and  which  nevertheless  played  a  very  prominent  part  in  the 
general  rise  of  the  prices  of  our  goods  and  products,  namely,  the  frequent  alterations 
of  the  money.  With  their  eyes  upon  the  inflow  of  the  riches  of  America,  they  do  not 
note  that  the  value  of  merchandise  rose  proportionately  with  the  decline  in  weight 
and  quality  of  our  esatdos  and  reales"    Colmeiro,  II,  452  ;  cf.  pp.  492-494. 

3  Colmeiro,  II,  227-228.  Other  isolated  pamphleteers  urged  the  same  views;  cf. 
pp.  226-227,  452.  *  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  32,  35-36;  Clarke,  p.  357. 


2o6  COLONIZATION 

considerable  attack  and  modification.  Colmeiro^  says  that  the  rigor 
of  the  system  was  tempered  as  far  as  the  theories  regarding  the 
precious  metals  would  permit.  Haebler,  a  more  modern  authority 
and  of  great  weight,  sees  in  the  operation  of  mercantilism,  espe- 
cially as  it  demanded  the  exclusion  of  foreign  merchants,  a  "  strong 
factor"  in  Spanish  decadence.^  But  touching  this  exclusion,  the 
Spanish,  as  has  been  seen,^  were  never,  even  in  their  early  history, 
fond  of  strangers  ;  and  it  seems  doubtful  if  an  economic  theory  not 
reenforced  by  the  uncommon  intolerance,  bigotry,  and  race-hatred 
of  the  Spanish  could  explain  the  rigor  of  the  treatment  accorded 
to  aliens,  from  the  Jews  and  Moriscos  on.  Again,  the  foreigners 
were  never  entirely  excluded,  and  were  even  the  objects  of  favor- 
able discrimination  in  the  time  of  Charles  II  (latter  half  of  the 
seventeenth  century).'*  The  fact  is,  as  Haebler  says  in  another 
work,''^  that  Spain  was  economically  too  weak  to  react  against  con- 
ditions :  "  If  Spain  had  been  an  economically  sound  state,  it  would 
have  been  as  little  likely  to  collapse  in  consecjuence  of  the  super- 
fluity of  gold  and  silver  as  in  actuality  England  has  been  harmed 
by  the  treasures  of  India."  "  It  is  certain,"  says  Colmeiro,*^  "  that 
other  industrial  nations  of  Europe  suffered  from  the  same  or  simi- 
lar errors  ;  but  they  corrected  themselves  with  greater  timeliness, 
while  we  persevered  for  a  long  period  in  the  policy  which  consum- 
mated our  ruin." 

1 II,  226-227. 

2  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  14. 

3  See  pp.  187  ff.,  above. 

*  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl,  pp.  89-90. 

^  Amerika,  p.  418. 

8  II,  452.  "  Bending  every  energy  for  years  to  stay  the  tide  of  change  and  progress, 
suppressing  freedom  of  thought  with  relentless  vigor,  and  quarantining  herself  and 
her  dependencies  against  new  ideas,  conservatism  grew  to  be  her  [Spain's]  settled  habit 
and  the  organs  of  government  became  ossified.  I'olicies  of  commercial  restriction 
which  were  justifiable  or  at  least  rationally  explicable  in  the  sixteenth  century  lasted 
on,  proof  against  innovation  or  improvement,  until  the  eighteenth  century  and  later." 
Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  48. 


CHAPTER   VI 

SPANISH  AMERICA  :  POPULATION,  INDUSTRY,  AND  TRADE 

In  the  conclusions  to  which  the  foregoing  account  of  Spain  and 
Spanish  policy  have  led,  we  now  possess  a  setting  or  perspective 
for  the  colonial  career  itself.  For  a  nation  like  the  Spaniards,  it 
has  been  seen,  the  first  and  most  engrossing  interest  in  any  new 
world  must  have  lain  in  the  large  element  of  hazard  and  adventure 
which  it  offered.  The  expeditions  and  conquests  were  motived  by 
the  desire  for  wealth  won  speedily  in  the  opening  up  of  a  mysteri- 
ously attractive  Unknown.  How  far  and  with  what  sincerity  the 
crusading  spirit  entered  into  the  situation  will  appear  a  little  later  ; 
but  earlier  experiences  in  the  subjection  of  the  Moors  had  certainly 
made  the  Spaniard  aware  of  the  great  material  advantages  to  be 
gained  by  reducing  empires  such  as  Montezuma  and  the  Inca  held. 
Enterprises  reached  out  in  all  the  directions  indicated  by  rumor  as 
the  approaches  to  more  developed  and  richer  civilizations  ;  and  the 
booty  thus  gathered  was  so  large  as  to  afford  a  certain  realization 
to  the  visions  of  Columbus.  Naturally  the  state  had  always  re- 
ceived a  generous  share  of  such  takings, —  a  share  which  sometimes 
stood  for  propitiation  on  the  part  of  insubordinate  adventurers. 
Even  at  the  outset  the  government  as  represented  by  Columbus 
had  demanded  gold  in  quantities  which  were  beyond  the  power 
of  the  natives  to  furnish. ^  The  yield  to  the  king  from  Pizarro's 
enterprise  reached,  reckoned  as  a  fifth,  almost  a  million  ducats  ; 
the  Inca's  ransom  is  estimated  as  having  been  the  equivalent  of 
1^17,500,000,  and  out  of  this  ransom  Pizarro  paid  to  every  knight 
of  his  army  8000  pesos  ^  and  to  every  foot  soldier  half  of  that 
amount.  These  values  are  enhanced  when  it  is  realized  that  the 
precious  metals  at  that  time  possessed  purchasing  power  consider- 
ably above  that  of  later  periods.^ 

1  See  p.  262,  below. 

2  Bourne  (Hist.  Introd.,  p.  50)  renders  the  Spanish  peso  as  dollar,  adding:  "The 
reader  will  bear  in  mind  the  varying  purchasing  power  of  the  dollar.  To  arrive  at  an 
appro.ximate  equivalent,  ten  may  be  used  as  a  multiplier  for  the  sixteenth  and  early 
seventeenth  centuries,  and  five  for  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century."  Humboldt 
(Essai,  n,  64CS)  gives  the  Inca's  ransom  as  3,838,058  piasters. 

^  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  382;  Watson,  I,  130;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  41. 

207 


2o8  COLONIZATION 

Mine-Production  and  Revenue 

When,  now,  the  acquisition  of  the  gold  came  to  turn  upon  extrac- 
tion rather  than  ui)on  looting,  the  state  laid  its  hand  with  vigor 
upon  an  obvious  source  of  revenue,  and  the  regular  fifths-system 
was  put  into  operation.  The  mines  proved  almost  from  the  first  to 
be  a  source  of  incredible  metallic  wealth  ;  after  the  conquest  of 
Mexico  the  average  annual  output  about  doubled  ;  and  with  the 
discovery  of  the  quicksilver  process,  their  productivity  was  greatly 
augmented.  "  The  mine-owners  promised  to  freight  the  ships  of 
the  New  Spain  fleet  to  the  masts  with  silver  if  they  could  only  get 
enough  quicksilver";  the  inevitable  effect  of  this  was  the  stimula- 
tion of  the  Almaden  mines  in  Spain  (held  from  1563  to  1641  by  the 
Fugger)  and  a  considerable  consequent  increase  in  royal  revenue.^ 
Then  came  the  discovery  of  the  astonishing  Potosi  deposits  {1546), 
and  the  takings  in  the  precious  metals  soared  to  undreamed-of 
amounts.  In  the  earlier  and  less  productive  period  (1506)  the 
annual  importation  of  gold  into  Spain  reached  a  value  of  some 
$1,200,000  ;  this  had  risen  by  1 556  to  700,000  ducats  for  the  crown 
alone.^  The  royal  taxes  from  the  Potosi  deposits  alone  amounted, 
from  1556  to  1783,  to  over  3,000,000,000  reals,  while  from  1754 
to  1 791  there  were  coined  in  Lima  over  3,000,000,000  reals, 
and  from  1792  to  1813  over  2,200,000,000.'^  Estimates  given  by 
Watson^  fix  the  annual  import  of  Spain  in  American  gold  and  silver 
at  $20,000,000,  while  Peru  yielded  the  crown  some  $5,000,000 
annual  revenue.  In  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  the 
fifth  of  the  annual  i)roduct  of  the  mines  was  reckoned  as  $7,425,000, 
and  the  king's  net  revenue  from  America  as  $6,750,000.'^ 

The  estimates  of  Humboldt,  taking  into  account  his  sagacity, 
wide  experience  in  Europe  and  America,  and  general  scientific  re- 
liability, prol)ably  form  the  best  guesses  at  our  disposal  ui)on  the 
matter  in  question.  He  estimated  the  annual  yield  of  the  mines  of 
New  Spain  at  $23,000,000;^  the  total  yield  from  1493  to  1803  at 

'  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  pp.  415-416;  during  the  time  of  Ferdinand,  however,  the 
colonies  had  yielded  only  50,000  to  70,000  ducats.  Id.,  p.  1 14.  On  early  mining  con- 
cessions and  their  terms,  see  Fabie,  pp.  49,  86,  etc.  On  the  mines  in  general,  see 
Humboldt,  Essai,  II,  book  iv,  chap.  xi.  An  attempt  to  infringe  upon  the  royal  fifth 
was  punishable  by  death.    Watson,  I,  121. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  104;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  114. 

3  Colmeiro,  II,  429.  *  II,  139,  145.  ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  239. 
'•  This  estimate  is  the  same  as  Bancroft's.    Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  298,  note. 


SPANISH   AMI:R1(\\:    POPULATION   AND    IkADl'.        209 

5,706,700,000  pesos,  and  the  total  annual  production  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nineteenth  century  at  43,500,000  pesos,  or  about 
ten  times  the  known  production  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  The 
average  annual  production,  as  calculated  by  the  same  authority,  is 
represented  in  the  following  table  :  ^ 

1492-1500 250,000  jjesos 

1 500- 1 545 3,000,000     " 

1545-1600 11,000,000     " 

1 600- 1 700 16,000,000     " 

1700-1750 22,500,000     " 

1750-1803 35,300,000     " 

To  these  figures  Colmeiro  ^  adds  the  following  from  the  Spanish 
minister  of  finance,  Canga  Argiielles  : 

Entered  into  the  public  treasury  : 

1808-1814 30,000,000  pesos 

1814 5'439.^75      " 

1816 100,000      " 

1818 2,472,627      " 

It  must  be  understood,  as  mentioned  above,  that  in  any  estimates 
of,  or  based  upon,  the  royal  fifths,  a  large  element  of  error  is  repre- 
sented by  the  constant  evasion  and  peculations  ^  which  were  invited 
both  by  the  richness  of  the  field  exploited,  by  the  monopoly  policy 
of  the  government,  and  by  the  system  itself  of  collection  and  su- 
pervision. Occasionally,  on  the  other  hand,  even  under  Charles  V, 
the  whole  cargo  of  the  bullion-fleets  was  confiscated  to  meet  a 
pressing  emergency.*  But,  even  if  the  total  receipts  in  bullion  of 
king  and  private  importers  are  discounted  by  a  large  percentage, 
they  must  have  represented  a  powerful  and  consistent  attraction 
away  from  the  development  of  a  settled  industrial  economy.  It 
was  in  the  order  of  events  that  a  non-industrial  people  should  have 
been  so  dazzled  by  these  extraordinary  yields  of  metallic  treasure 
as  never  to  have  seriously  considered  the  immensely  larger  and 
steadier  profits  to  be  gained  through  the  more  commonplace  and 
less  picturesque  vocations  of  agriculture  and  trade.  The  results  of 
such  prepossessions  upon  Spain  have  been  indicated  ;  and  they 
were,  in  many  respects,  duplicated  in  the  colonies.    But  the  latter 

1  Humboldt,  Essai,  II,  chap,  xi,  652.  Quoted  in  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  301  ;  cf. 
Cunningham,  Econ.  Change,  p.  518.  2  jj^  435-436. 

8  V^'^atson,  II,  139;  see  also  note  appended  to  chap,  iv,  above.  For  thefts  from 
the  mines,  see  Humboldt,  Essai,  II,  555. 

*  It  was  in  1535  that  Charles  first  confiscated  all  the  precious  metals  brought  by 
the  fleet.    Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  114;   Hume,  p.  89. 


2IO  COLONIZATION 

suffered  also  from  the  increasing  demands  for  revenue  of  a  govern- 
ment which  could  get  less  and  less  at  home,  and  from  the  debasing 
effect  of  the  constant  endeavor  to  evade  or  circumvent  such 
demands.^  This  last  result  will  appear  more  clearly  when  the 
general  policy  of  monopoly  and  restriction  is  considered.-  Never- 
theless, "  the  Si)anish  colonies  fulfilled  their  i:)urpose  down  into 
the  eighteenth  century.  They  provided  the  mother-countr)'  with  the 
financial  resources  of  which  it  stood  in  unconditional  need  to  main- 
tain its  position  in  the  European  concert,  —  and  so  abundantly  that 
the  envy  of  all  other  countries  was  awakened  and  they  were  induced 
not  only  to  go  into  colonial  enterprises  on  their  own  accounts,  but 
also  to  relieve  the  Spaniard  of  as  many  as  they  could  of  his 
colonial   prizes."  ^ 

Emigration  to  America 

In  view  of  the  attitude  of  both  state  '^  and  individuals  toward  the 
New  World,  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  why  early  emigration 
was  of  so  poor  a  quality.  Indeed,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  word 
"emigration  "  should  be  used  either  of  the  early  movement  of  the 
Spaniards  to  the  New  World,  or  of  that  of  the  Portuguese  to 
India.  The  motive  of  the  incomer  w^as,  in  both  cases,  to  return, 
as  soon  as  return  with  a  competence  was  possible ;  and  the  women 
who  accompanied  the  earlier  voyagers  were  extremely  few.  The 
description  given  by  Columbus  of  the  insurgents  of  1498,  even 
though  discounted  considerably,  is  witness  for  the  fact  that  emi- 
gration began  most  unpropitiously."''  Leroy-Beaulieu  ^  distinguishes 
two  classes  which  took  part  in  the  founding  of  the  Spanish  colonies  : 
adventurers  recruited  especially  from  the  nobility  and  army,  men 
whom  the  end  of  the  Moorish  wars  had  left  without  employment 
or  resources ;  and  the  clergy  who  were  to  convert  the  pagans. 
Doubtless  these  were  the  main  classes  recognized  ;  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  Catholic  Sovereigns  "  to  give  the  posts  and  offices 
to  caballcros,  hidalgos  -Sindi  gcnte  principal  -AwOi.  to  distinguished  and 

1  Cf.  Watson,  II,  139.        2  See  pp.  226  ff.,  below.  •'  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  419. 

*  Ilaebler  (Amerika,  p.  368)  opposes  the  old  view  that  the  whole  stale-policy  was 
directed  predominantly  and  continuously  toward  the  acquisition  of  metallic  wealth. 
At  first,  naturally  enough  in  the  setting  of  its  time,  the  government  neglected  every- 
thing else  in  favor  of  the  advantages  which  it  hoped  to  gain  from  the  support  of 
Columbus's  schemes.  But  metal  exploitation  was  not  "  from  the  beginning  and  con- 
tinuously the  directing  view-point  of  the  Spanish  colonial  policy." 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  49-50.  ^  I,  4. 


SPANISH  AMERICA  :    POPULATION  AND  TRADE       2  i  i 

prudent  persons  of  good  family,"  so  that  the  "conquest  and  pacif- 
ication of  those  lands  and  the  colonization  of  the  New  World 
might  be  entrusted  to  the  flower  of  the  nobility  and  virtue  of 
Castile."  Nevertheless,  Ferdinand  found  it  necessary  later,  in 
order  to  keep  up  a  declining  emigration,  to  commute  sentences  of 
death  or  mutilation  to  i)erpetual  or  limited  sojourn  in  the  islands. 
"  There  went,  besides,  the  soldiers  of  fortune,  men  of  valiant 
spirit  and  of  endurance,  tested,  some  of  them,  in  the  campaigns  in 
Italy  and  Flanders,  men  of  stout  heart  who  fought  with  the  hope 
of  enriching  themselves  with  the  spoils  of  war,  and  never  admitted 
that  they  were  content  with  their  lot,  since,  although  they  received 
great  favors,  they  held  their  services  poorly  paid.  And  when  the 
fervor  of  the  discoveries  and  conquests  was  over,  there  began  the 
emigration  of  the  plain  and  common  folk,  in  part  honorable  and 
laborious,  in  part  stow-aways  and  license-evaders  or  vicious  crimi- 
nal adventurers."  ^  In  any  case  they  came,  not  to  labor,  "  but  as 
conquerors  who  take  possession  of  the  wealth  and  the  persons  of  a 
vanquished  people  and  force  the  latter  to  labor  for  their  profit.  In 
such  a  system  it  is  understandable  that  if  the  conquest  was  rapid, 
the  settlement  was  slow."  ^  Of  the  elements  here  mentioned  the 
clergy  is  reserved  for  a  later  treatment.  But  the  results  of  having 
the  nobles,  with  their  lofty  contempt  of  labor,  as  constituents  of 
the  early  colonial  bands  appear  even  in  the  time  of  Columbus's 
second  voyage.  When  most  of  the  laborers  became  disabled,  in 
consequence  of  the  climate  and  of  the  hardships,  the  Italian  admiral 
adopted  the  un-Spanish  recourse  of  ordering  the  gentlemen  "  to 
take  hold  and  work,  under  threat  of  severe  penalty.  To  add  the 
degradation  of  labor  with  .their  hands  to  their  suffering  was  too 
much  for  the  Spanish  hidalgos,  and  Columbus  never  escaped  from 
the  resentment  engendered  at  this  time." '^  The  history  of  the 
insurrections,  factions,  and  acts  of  violence,  and  the  tales  of 
deeds  of  lust,  cruelty,  and  general  scoundrelism  certainly  betray 
the  abundant  presence  in  the  society  of  degraded  and  degenerate 
elements. 

Restriction  of  Emigration 

During  preparation  for  the  second  voyage  of  Columbus  the 
climax  of  national  excitement  over  the  Indies  was  evidenced,  as 
has  been  noted,'*  by  the  throngs  which  besieged  the  authorities  for 

1  Colmeiro,  IT,  379-3S0 ;  cf.  IIae1)ler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  29-30. 

2  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  5.  ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  40.  *  P.  180,  above. 


2  12  COLONIZATION 

permission  to  embark.  At  that  time  it  was  necessary  to  adopt 
certain  restrictive  regulations,  and  these,  although  the  fever  of 
popular  interest  never  again  approached  so  nearly  to  delirium, 
became  the  prototypes  for  a  policy  of  restriction  of  emigration 
which  was  adhered  to  and  extended  during  the  whole  period  of 
colonial  predominance  and  beyond.^  From  the  time  of  Charles  V, 
no  Spaniard  could  go  to  the  Indies  without  express  permission 
from  the  crown,  and  then  for  only  a  stated  time  ;  and  "  whoever 
sought  permission  had  not  merely  to  furnish  a  sufficient  reason, 
but  to  present  in  addition  satisfactory  proofs  regarding  his  morals 
and  especially  that  neither  he  nor  his  ancestors  for  two  genera- 
tions had  been  punished  by  the  Inquisition  (law  of  1518)."^  This 
restriction-system  was  not  palatable  to  Charles  V,  who  granted 
numerous  exceptions  in  favor  of  all  the  subjects  of  his  kingdoms 
and  lordships,  and  even  admitted  the  Welser  and  Fugger  families 
within  the  pale  of  the  monopoly.'^  But  under  Philip  the  lines  were 
more  sharply  drawn ;  for  example,  the  permission  granted  was 
usually  limited  to  a  certain  province,  and  the  journey  had  to  be  as 
nearly  direct  as  possible.  Emigrants  had  to  reside  in  the  locations 
and  practice  the  vocations  indicated  in  their  licenses.  Creoles 
educated  in  Europe  required  official  permission  to  return  ;  ship- 
masters had  to  declare  under  oath  that  they  had  on  board  no 
unlicensed  person.*  The  details  of  these  restrictions  occupy 
seventy-three  laws  in  the  code. 

From  what  has  been  said  of  the  disposition  of  the  Spanish,  and 
of  the  quality  of  the  early  emigration  to  the  Indies,  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  derive  the  reasons  for  this  legislation  ;  and  although  it 
represents  over-detailed  regulation,  it  was  not  entirely  uncalled  for. 
From  this  point  of  view  the  conscientiousness  of  the  Spaniard 
stands  in  not  unfavorable  contrast  with  the  indifference  of  the 
Briton.^  However,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  motives 
were  not  all.  There  was  a  monopoly  to  be  safeguarded  and  an 
empire  to  be  held,  and  held  in  subjection  ;  and  the  secretiveness 
which  developed  many  ages  before  in  the  dissimulation  of  profitable 
trade-advantages  had  descended  unquestioned  to  the  Spanish. 

1  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  p.  360. 

2  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  6;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  17-18;  Moses,  p.  56.  Restric- 
tion of  movement  within  the  Peninsula  had  been  previously  applied.  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  I!!., 
p.  155.      3  Boume,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  243,  245  ;  cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  380. 

*  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  17-18;   Moses,  pp.  58-63. 

^  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  246-248;  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  pp.  416-417. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    POPULATION  AND  TRADE       213 

It  is  of  course  unjustifiable  to  depend  upon  the  prescriptions  of 
Spanish  law-codes  in  determining  the  conditions  in  the  colonies  ; 
but  despite  i)robable  suspensions  and  infractions  of  the  regulations, 
and  occasional  panic  flights  from  the  relentless  tax-gatherer/  it  is 
probable  that  emigration  to  the  colonies  was,  through  all  the  period 
of  Spanish  dominance,  very  slight.  The  population  of  the  home- 
country  was  neither  numerous  nor  enterprising  enough  to  break 
over  the  barriers.  Annual  emigration  from  Spain  to  the  captaincy- 
general  of  Caracas  was  estimated  as  one  hundred  at  most;  during 
the  sixteenth  century  the  entire  movement  from  Spain  to  America 
is  thought  not  to  have  much  exceeded  a  thousand  or  fifteen  hundred. 
"About  1546  there  were  in  Peru  upwards  of  6000  Spaniards; 
four  years  later  there  are  said  to  have  been  in  all  the  New  World 
only  1 5,000."  2  In  1574  a  competent  official  enumerates  in  the 
New  World  some  two  hundred  Spanish  cities  and  towns,  contain- 
ing, together  with  stock-farms  and  plantations,  about  160,000  Span- 
iards. In  the  city  of  Mexico  there  were  about  15,000  Spaniards 
of  all  vocations ;  in  Vera  Cruz,  200  Spanish  families  ;  in  Yucatan, 
300  householders;  in  South  America,  some  13,500  households; 
in  Quito,  400  families ;  in  Lima,  2000  families.^  Although  the 
error  in  these  figures  may  be  considerable,  the  fact  is  patent 
that  emigration  was  slight ;  and  it  is  to  be  feared,  despite  the 
efforts  to  rule  out  turbulent  adventurers  anxious  only  "  to  get 
rich  quickly,  and  not  content  with  food  and  clothing,  which 
every  moderately  industrious  man  was  assured  of,"  *  that  the 
type  appealed  to  by  the  logic  of  the  situation  was  generally  a 
disappointment. 

One  other  fact  to  which  reference  has  been  made  ^  as  a  distinc- 
tive characteristic  of  the  non-settlement  colony  is  that  the  emigrants, 
such  as  they  were,  were  almost  wholly  men.  The  objects  of  emi- 
gration—  adventure,  etc.  —  excluded  nearly  all  women  who  were 
not  objectionable ;  and  these,  as  we  have  seen,  the  conscientious 
Spanish  laws  refused  to  foist  upon  the  colonies.  The  privilege  of 
going  to  the  Indies  was  strictly  withheld  from  all  single  women ; 
and  it  was  even  difficult  to  return  and  get  a  wife  who  had  been 
left  behind.    At  the  same  time,  married  men  were  encouraged  to 

1  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl,  p.  153. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  17-18;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amen,  p.  250. 
^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  ig6,  198-200  (from  Velasco). 

■*  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  246. 
''  See  p.  14,  above. 


214 


COLONIZATION 


take  their  wives. ^  The  net  result  was,  naturally,  a  prevailing 
absence  of  Spanish  women,  married  or  marriageable ;  and  the 
inevitable  results  followed.  And  when,  with  the  attainment  of  the 
temperate  altitudes,  real  colonies  of  settlement  could  have  been 
developed,  this  phase  of  the  restrictive  system,  or  a  predisposition 
brought  about  by  its  earlier  effectiveness,  still  prevailed  to  keep 
the  unit  of  the  society  the  individual,  or  the  family  based  on  a 
mixed  union,  rather  than  the  family  as  known  at  home.  The  natural 
increase  of  the  pure  Spaniards  in  the  New  World  was  bound  there- 
fore to  be  negligible. 

Despite  this  general  policy,  however,  there  were  sporadic  pro- 
visions for  the  encouragement  of  emigration  which  had  actual 
settlement  as  its  object.  Columbus  himself  took  over  prospective 
settlers  ;  and,  in  April,  1495,  the  sovereigns  actually  adopted  a  plan 
of  voluntary  assisted  emigration  to  Espanola.  Here,  however,  the 
rights  of  the  admiral  were  infringed  and  the  monopoly  system  pre- 
vailed :  "  It  is  melancholy  to  observe  to  wiiat  extremities  Colum- 
bus was  reduced  to  get  colonists  beyond  those  numbered  on  the 
royal  pay-list."  ^  Whether  the  sovereigns  w^ould  have  succeeded 
in  attracting  a  satisfactory  quantity  and  cjuality  of  settlers  remains 
doubtful,  for,  although  their  terms  were  extremely  liberal,  the  lot 
of  the  cultivator  was  not  hard  at  this  time  in  Spain.  Naturally, 
however,  a  like  liberal-mindedness  regarding  colonization  was  not 
to  be  expected  of  Philip  and  his  successors.  In  15  18  most  liberal 
offers  were  made  in  the  hope'  of  inducing  workers  to  go  to  the 
New  World  and  help  take  the  pressure  off  the  natives  :  free  pas- 
sage and  living  on  shipboard  ;  lands  and  live-stock  on  arrival  ; 
relief  for  twenty  years  from  the  alcabala  and  nearly  all  other  taxes  ; 
premiums  for  production,  etc.  Again,  in  1529,  "a  new  plan  was 
tried,  —  that  of  establishing  feudal  lordships.''^  If  any  one  would 
take  over  to  Espanola  fifty  married  couples,  twenty-five  free 
whites  and  twenty-five  negro  slaves,  build  a  church  and  fort  and 

1  Moses,  p.  59.  "  In  striking  contrast  to  the  subsequent  policy  of  Louis  XIV  in 
Canada  and  Louisiana  and  of  the  EngHsh  generally,  the  emigration  of  single  women 
to  the  colonies  was  not  favored  in  the  later  legislation,  and  the  king  reserved  to  him- 
self the  power  to  grant  the  necessary  license  if  exception  was  to  be  made.  It  was 
therefore  inevitable  that  there  should  be  an  excess  of  white  men  in  the  colonies  and 
that  marriage  with  Indian  women  should  be  common.  It  was  Humboldt's  estimate 
in  1803  that  not  one-tenth  of  the  Kuropean-bom  Spaniards  in  Mexico  were  women." 
Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  265-266. 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  45-46,  215-216. 

3  Cf.  pp.  133  ff.,  above. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    POPULATION   AND  TRADE 


215 


support  the  clergyman,  pay  the  freight  and  supply  provisions  for 
the  emigrants,  build  their  houses,  give  each  couple  two  cows,  two 
bulls,  fifty  sheep,  one  mare,  ten  pigs,  and  six  chickens,  and  make 
the  settlement  within  a  year,  completing  twenty-five  stone  houses 
within  five  years  and  fifty  within  ten  —  he  was  to  receive  an  area 
of  about  sixty  square  miles,  with  its  mines  (subject  to  the  king's 
royalty  of  one-fifth),  its  fisheries,  one-fifth  of  the  royal  income  from 
the  territory,  the  right  of  patronage  for  the  church,  etc. ;  and 
finally  his  family  should  be  raised  to  the  nobility  and  granted  a 
coat  of  arms."  ^  But  this  proposition  ran  counter  to  the  prevail-  / 
ing  imj^ulse  of  the  time,  namely,  to  steer  straight  for  the  mines ; 
no  toilsome  industry  could  compete  with  the  visions  of  a  Potosi'.^ 

Constituents  of  Population 

Of  a  consequence,  colonial  wealth  and  population  early  tended 
to  concentrate  upon  the  plateaus  and  in  the  high  valleys  of  the 
Cordilleras.  The  life-conditions  in  lower  altitudes  had  been  found 
questionable  by  Columbus,  even  in  the  islands  ;  and  the  Atlantic 
shores  of  both  Americas  were  considerably  worse.  Neglecting  the 
"  worthless  regions  "  which  lay  outside  the  tropics,  the  only  health- 
ful and  at  the  same  time  wealth-producing  areas  were  the  interior 
altitudes  ;  and  it  was  only  there,  of  all  of  Spanish  America,  that 
a  numerous  population  was  to  be  found  .^  That  these  conditions 
were  persistent  is  proved  by  the  figures  given  by  Humboldt  for 
the  period  of  his  visit  (about  1800).  There  were  then,  for  every 
hundred  inhabitants,  the  following  number  of  whites :  in  New 
Spain  (excluding  the  so-called  interior  provinces),  16  ;  in  Peru,  12  ; 
in  Jamaica,  10;  in  the  city  of  Mexico,  51  ;  and,  for  purposes  of 
comparison,  in  the  United  States,  83.*  It  must  not  be  understood, 
however,  that  the  distribution  of  the  Spanish  immigrants  was,  in 
any  sense,  an  even  one.  It  was  a  town  population  above  all  else 
which  they  formed  ;  and  even  the  dwellers  in  rural  districts  tended 
to  cohere  into  villages.  This  phenomenon  is  due  to  a  number  of 
causes,  some  of  which  will  appear  presently ;  Leroy-Beaulieu  ^ 
sums  them  up  as  follows  :  "  When,  in  a  new  country,  one  sees  the 
population  flowing  wholly  to  the  towns,  he  may  be  sure  that  local 
production  is  feeble,  that  the  majority  of  the  colonists  are  useless 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  217,  249  (quoted  from  Saco,  pp.  147-149). 
,       2  (3f_  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  41. 

«  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  18.  *  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  18.  ^  j^  7. 


2i6  COLONIZATION 

persons,  speculators  or  functionaries,  not  workers,  and  that  there 
is  beneath  them  a  vanquished  population  exploited  for  the  profit 
of  the  victorious  class."  In  addition  such  agglomeration  was  a 
national  trait  of  the  Spanish  and  no  doubt  represented  in  part  the 
result  of  having  lived  long  amidst  a  hostile  vanquished  people  ; 
but  it  was  very  ill  adapted,  in  any  case,  to  the  development  of 
industry.  Probably  also  the  government  had  some  interest  in 
restraining  whatever  diffusive  tendency  the  population  exhibited.^ 

If,  now,  the  early  settlement  by  the  Spaniards  was  so  slight 
and  was  subject  to  but  inconsiderable  natural  hicrcase  ;  ^  and  if, 
owing  to  restrictions  of  emigration  from  Spain,  which,  it  must  be 
supposed,  allowed  of  comparatively  little  evasion,  the  number  of 
new  recruits  was  never  large  ;  and  if,  finally,  the  pure  Spaniards 
and  the  native-born  Spaniards,  or  Creoles,  tended  inaptly  to  gather 
in  unnaturally  large  groups  ;  then  it  is  evident  that  the  constant 
and  determining  constituent  of  the  population,  biologically  speak- 
ing, must  have  been  the  native  element.  It  was  too  large  to  be 
eradicated,  except  in  isolated  stations  such  as  the  islands ;  being 
acclimated,  it  was  almost  everywhere  present ;  but,  since  it  usually 
possessed  less  civilization  and  unity  than  the  Europeans,  it  was  pre- 
vailingly and  hopelessly  subject.  Class-division  between  the  two 
strata  of  population  was  therefore  inevitable.  Owing,  however,  to 
the  exigencies  of  the  type  of  settlement  practiced  by  the  Spaniards, 
—  a  form  demanded,  so  far  as  the  tropical  areas  were  concerned, 
by  the  very  nature  of  things,  ^  —  and  to  the  fact  that  they  had  never 
acquired,  or  had  lost  as  the  result  of  experience,  any  aversion  to 
race-mixture,  the  immediate  result  of  their  contact  with  the  native 
Americans  was  a  large-scale  miscegenation.  Bui  the  incxitablc  con- 
sequence of  this  was  the  addition  of  a  third  sub-division  or  class  to 
the  population.  Nor  was  this  j*11:  the  introducti(Mi  of  negro  slaves 
resulted  in  the  course  of  time  in  the  creation  of  several  other  species 
of  mongrel,  each  of  which  had  a  more  or  less  clearly  defined  i:)osi- 
tion  in  the  society.  Social  distinctions  between  the  Peninsular 
Spaniards  and  the  Creoles  completed  the  class-stratification.  The 
main  constituents  di  the  j^opulation,  taken  as  ethnic  and  social 
types,  were  as  follows  ;  their  several  political  abilities  and  disabili- 
ties will  provide  a  topic  for  a  later  page.^  The  Spaniards  who  had 
arrived  from  Europe  were  called  chapctoiics  (or  gacliupines) ;  and 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  6-7. 

2  For  the  influence  of  altered  environmental  conditions  upon  national  increase,  cf. 
Darwin,  Orig.  of  Sp.,  II,  26.  '^  See  pp.  4  ff.,  above.  *  Pp.  312  ff.,  below. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   POPULATION  AND  TRADE        217 


next  in  order  came  the  criollos  (creolcs)  or  the  descendants  of 
Europeans  (or  even  Africans)  settled  in  America,  a  class  which 
early  exhibited  the  degeneracy  characteristic  of  a  parasitic  and 
unacclimated  stock.  A  third  class  was  formed  of  mongrels  of 
Europeans  with  the  aborigines  or  (later)  with  the  negroes  ;  these 
were  called  respectively  mestizos  and  ntulatos,  and  the  former  mul- 
tiplied so  rapidly  as  to  constitute  a  very  considerable  portion  of  the 
population  of  Spanish  America.  It  may  be  said  in  passing  that  the 
same  phenomenon  took  place,  but  in  a  far  less  degree,  in  the  Philip- 
pines.^ Next  in  order  were  the  negros,  and  finally  the  last  and 
lowest  class,  the  indios,  or  natives.  And,  naturally,  there  came  to 
exist  between  these  main  components  of  population  many  transi- 
tional grades  which  approximated  to  one  or  the  other  class  or  con- 
stituted small  anomalous  groups.^ 

During  the  earlier  periods  the  Indian  element,  so  far  as  numbers 
are  concerned,  was,  of  course,  predominant.  In  1576  a  reasonably 
reliable  estimate  gives  for  the  New  World  the  following  figures  : 
Spaniards  (and  Creoles),  160,000  ;  Indians,  about  5,000,000  ;  negro 
slaves,  40,000 ;  and  a  "  large  number  of  mestizos  and  mulattoes." 
In  the  city  of  Mexico  the  proportion  of  Spanish  to  Indians  (1574) 
was  15,000  against  150,000  ;  in  the  province  north  of  Mexico,  130 
against  114,000,  counting  merely  the  tribute-payers;  in  South 
America,  13,500  "households"  against  880,000  tributaries;  in 
Lima,  2000  families  against  an  Indian  population  of  some  25,000.^ 
The  estimate  of  Humboldt,  over  two  hundred  years  later,  gives 
some  idea  of  what  the  course  of  development  had  been.  He  reports 
the  proportion  of  whites  to  the  whole  population  which  is  quoted 
above,*  and  later  the  following  figures  :  '"^ 


In  Mexico 

In  Guatemala   .... 
In  Colombia      .... 
In  Peru  and  Chile 
In  Buenos  Ayres  .     . 
In  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico 


Indians 


3,700,000 

880,000 

720,000 

1,030,000 

1,200,000 


7,530,000 


Whi 


1,230,000 
280,000 
642,000 
465,000 
320,000 
339,000 


3,276,000 


387,000 
389,000 


776,000 


Mestizos 


1,860,000 
420,000 

1,256,000 
853,000 
742,000 
197,000 


5,328,000 


1  See  p.  346,  below.  ^  Watson,  II,  132-135  ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  20; 

Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  266-267;  Colmeiro,  II,  391-392. 

3  Velasco,  in  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  196-200,  196-197  (quoted);  cf.  pp.  278-279. 

*P.  215. 

^  In  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  18.  There  were  scarcely  any  negroes  in  Mexico. 
Humboldt,  Essai,  I,    130.     For  the  jiroportion  of  the  elements  of  population  in  the 


2l8 


COLONIZATION 


For  a  later  period  (latter   half   of   nineteenth   century)    Roscher 
assembles  the  following  percentages  :  ^ 


Whites  (%) 

Indians(%) 

Mixed  (%) 

Negroes  (%) 

Mexico  .... 

12.5 

60. 

27-5 

(included  in  "  mixed") 

Central  America . 

5-0 

56. 

38. 

I. 

Panama .... 

5-5 

7.2 

87.3  (mestizos,  74.6) 

(included  in  "  mixed") 

Ecuador      .     . 

8. 

50. 

Peru 

M- 

57- 

29.    (mestizos,  22.  ) 

(included  in  "  mixed  ") 

Venezuela  . 

27.5 

-3-3 

44. 

5-- 

Reflection  upon  the  foregoing  figures  will  show  no  very  serious 
error  in  estimating  the  averages  of  the  constituent  elements  of  the 
mainland  population  as  follows  :  Indians,  not  much  less  than  50 
percent;  mestizos,  about  33  percent;  whites  (a  shifting  popula- 
tion) less  than  20  per  cent ;  negroes,  not  over  5  or  6  per  cent. 
Though  rough  approximations,  these  percentages  are  close  enough 
for  the  present  purpose. 

Race-Mixture 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  pure  Spaniards  and  negroes  consti- 
tuted such  a  small  fraction  of  the  population,  it  is  plain  tliat  the 
prevailing  ethnic  mixture,  the  mestizo,  was  bound  to  revert  toward 
the  Indian  component.^  It  had  only  caste  considerations  to  pre- 
serve it  from  this  fate;  for  it  appears  improbable,  from  the  biologi- 
cal standpoint,  that  this  newly  formed  cross  should  have  so  differed 
from  other  such  mixtures  as  to  have  been  able  to  preserv^e  its  new 
character  by  breeding  strictly  within  itself.  Despite  a  later  more 
free  influx  of  the  European  element,  the  reversion  referred  to  seems 
to  have  taken  place.'^  Whether  the  Spanish-American  mixture,  in 
its  varying  proportions,  was  a  favorable  one,  is  a  difficult  cjuestion. 
Anthropologists  as  a  rule  look  with  little  favor  upon  a  mixed  race 
whose  parent-components  are  widely  diverse  in  their  stages  of 
evolution,  however  much  they  may  enthuse  over  the  results  of  a 
blend  such  as  has  occurred  between  European  stocks  in  the  United 
States.  The  present  generally  unstable  status  of  the  Spanish 
American  "republics"  is  often  popularly  referred  to  the  character 

Antilles  as  against  other  parts  of  America,  see  id.,  p.  ii6.  The  proportion  of  men  to 
women  in  New  Spain  is  given  (id.,  p.  138  ;  cf.  p.  140)  as  100  to  95.  ^  Sp.Col.  Sys.,  p.  18. 
2  According  to  Humboldt  (Essai,  I,  135)  seven-eighths  of  the  "castas  "  were  mesti- 
zos. Moses,  pp.  196,  285;  Ratzel,  Hist,  of  Mankind,  II,  27;  Darwin,  Variation,  etc., 
11,  64  ff.    Rut  cf.  Darwin,  Descent,  p.  196.  ^  Cf.  the  case  in  Brazil,  p.  164,  above. 


k 


li   -  'nM     _ 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    POPULATION   AND    TRADK        219 

of  an  unfortunate  hybrid  race.^  Judgment  as  to  the  constitutional 
quality  of  This  population  should  be  reserved,  however,  until  the 
conditions  under  which  it  lived  and  developed  have  been  carefully 
scrutinized.  It  is  certainly  important  to  try  to  appraise  the  Spanish- 
American  stock,  for  there  has  never  existed  in  historic  times  any 
other  such  experiment  in  the  mixture  of  really  alien  races.  The 
natural  lack  of  antipathy  to  such  miscegenation  exhibited  by  the 
Iberians,  combined  with  the  natural  and  artificial  conditions  inher- 
ent in  the  physical  and  climatic  environment  and  in  the  Spanish 
system,  all  contributed  to  produce  an  cxperimentum  in  extremis.^ 
It  may  be  asserted  in  a  general  way  that  the  parts  of  the  former 
Spanish  empire  which  rank  to-day  with  the  colonies  of  pure  Euro- 
pean race  are,  above  all,  the  temperate  Argentine  region,  and,  in 
addition,  such  other  sections  of  South  America  as  have  become 
the  objectives  of  German,  Italian,  and  other  immigration.  No 
Spanish  section  proper,  excepting  Mexico,  can  lay  claim  to  a  popu- 
lation comparable  in  qualities  and  efficiency  with  that  of  the  other 
European  colonies  in  temperate  regions.  Again,  the  population  of 
the  really  tropical  colonies  of  the  Spanish  can  scarcely  bear  com- 
parison with  that  of  India  or  Java,  despite  the  evident  misrule 
long  practiced  in  the  latter.  Any  such  comparison,  however,  is 
very  hazardous,  for  the  multiplicity-of -causes  error  must  be  con- 
stantly guarded  against.  In  its  net  results  race-mixture  plus  other 
factors  seems  scarcely  to  have  produced  a  favorable  human  type 


in  Spanish  America ;  taken  at  its  very  best  it  has  not  represented 
a  striking  success.  Even  the  French  writers  who  advocate  the 
policy  in  their  North  African  colonies  are  inclined  to  admit  this. 
The  biological  value  of  a  cross  is  established  to  some  degree 
by  its  fecundity ;  and  in  this  respect  there  is,  if  one  accepts 
the  statement  of  Bernard  Moses,  a  marked  contrast  between  the 
Spanish-American  race  and,  for  example,  the  crosses  between  the 
closer  related  stocks  of  the  United  States.  This  student  of  Spanish 
America  asserts^  that  "  at  the  end  of  any  considerable  period,  the 
increase  in  the  English  colony,  even  when  allowance  has  been  made 

1  Cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  391-392 ;  Darwin,  Orig.  of  Sp.,  II,  i  ff. ;  Bordier,  Col.,  pp.  47- 
54  ;  Le  Bon,  pp.  52-56. 

2  The  government  favored  miscegenation  to  encompass  the  fusion  of  the  two 
races,  thus  "  avoiding  the  extinction  of  the  natives  which  has  taken  place  in  the 
countries  occupied  by  the  other  nations  of  Europe."    Fabie,  p.  52. 

3  Pp.  309-310.  Humboldt  (Essai,  I,  65)  shows  the  slower  growth  of  Mexican 
population. 


220  COLONIZATION 

for  different  physical  conditions,  will  be  found  to  have  far  outrun 
the  increase  of  the  combined  Spanish  and  native  populations." 

Interrelation  of  Classes 

A  marked  suspicion  and  antipathy  characterized  relations  between 
the  population-constituents  named.  This  was  largely  due  to  the  pol- 
icy of  Spain  in  fostering  antagonism  which  existed  in  the  nature  of 
things.  Naturally  the  Spanish  officials  held  in  contempt  the  Creoles 
and  especially  the  mestizos  who  formed  the  industrial  element  in 
the  colonies  ;  the  mixed  races  felt  superior  to  the  native  or  negro 
stocks  from  which  they  had  sprung ;  ^  the  negroes,  rejoicing  in 
greater  physical  strength  and  in  the  favor  of  their  masters,  treated 
the  Indians  with  insolence  and  scorn ;  while  the  latter,  in  their 
unenviable  position,  hated  all  their  oppressors  and  insulters  in 
varying  degrees.^  Plainly  there  was  no  hope  of  this  caste-system 
developing  anything  approaching  a  homogeneity  of  population, 
especially  under  the  policy  of  inculcation  of  antipathies  practiced 
by  the  metropolis.  The  fact  that  marriage  between  the  different 
degrees  of  color  was  considered  a  incsalliatice  naturally  prevented 
any  speedy  obliteration  of  such  class  distinction.^  Again,  the 
local  Spanish  spirit  of  provincial  pride  and  distinction  had  invaded 
the  New  World  ;  "  everywhere  in  Spanish  America  there  existed 
the  most  violent  antipathy  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  coast 
and  those  of  the  mountains,  as,  for  example,  Vera  Cruz  and 
Mexico ;  the  former  were  accused  of  being  frivolous,  the  latter 
of  being  slow.  Few  countries  contain  in  themselves  such  numer- 
ous differences  in  climate  and  mode  of  living  as  the  ticrra  calicnte 
and  ticrra  f via  in  Spanish  America,  the  inhabitants  of  which  despise 
each  other  heartily."  The  separate  colonies  too  were  all  so  differ- 
ent from  one  another  as  to  have  little  natural  sympathy.'* 

1  <i  The  aversion  between  mulattoes  and  negroes  was  as  great  as  that  between 
i>^       whites  and  negroes.    The  civil  position  of  every  class  depended  mainly  and  naturally 
"  upon  the  greater  or  less  whiteness  of  their  complexion.     Todo  bianco  es  cnlhilUro." 

*^'<  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  21. 

"  The  different  shades  were  classified  with  minute  attention,  not  only  by  the  force 
of  custom  but  also  by  the  law.  When  there  was  only  a  si.xth  of  negro  or  Indian  blood 
in  the  veins  of  a  colonist,  the  law  granted  him  the  title  of  white :  que  se  tcuga  por 
bianco.  Each  casta  was  full  of  envy  for  those  above  and  of  contempt  for  those  below." 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  1 1  ;  cf.  Roscher,  pp.  149-151.  ^  Watson,  II,  132-135. 

8  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  20;  Colmeiro,  II,  291-292.    "  If  the  Spanish  emigrant 
rose  in  fortune,  he  would  marry  into  a  wealthy  creole  family ;  if  he  fell,  he  would 
marry  into  one  of  the  blends."    Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  267. 
*  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  21 ;  cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  11.^ 


i>>^^ 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    POPULATION  AND  TRADE       22  1 

Industrial  Organization 

Having  obtained  some  idea  of  the  constituents  of  population, 
interest  now  centers  upon  the  way  in  which  the  society  thus  formed 
pursued  the  struggle  for  existence.  As  for  the  Spaniards  them- 
selves, it  has  been  shown  how,  at  the  outset,  attempts  to  develop 
agriculture  were  rendered  futile  by  the  overpowering  attraction  of 
the^ite  of~advenjure  j  and  to  this  negative  factor  a  second  was 
added  through  the  inability  of  the  immigrants  to  withstand  the 
climatic  and  other  environmental  changes  to  which  they  were 
subjected. 1  Plantation  development  in  the  hands  of  the  whites 
alone  was  practically  an  impossibility  ;  it  could  succeed  only  through 
the  aid  of  better-adapted  human  organisms.  Likewise  the  old  d^s-^ 
dainjor  manuaMabor  persisted  unbroken  —  fostered  rather  by  the 
New  World  conditions.  During  a  considerable  period,  therefore, 
the  colonies  remained  dependent  upon  the  metropolis  for  the  very 
means  of  existence,  this  period  coinciding  with  the  impulse  to 
Spanish  industries  alluded  to  above  and  bringing  with  its  concki- 
sion  the  decline  of  the  same.^ 

Economic  insufificiency,  of  an  at  least  temporary  nature,  was  an 
inevitable  consequence  of  the  natural  conditions  and  of  the  temper 
of  the  invading  group.  For  in  the  islands  the  stock  conditions  of 
the  tropical  colony  prevailed,  and  in  those  areas  where  altitude 
corrected  latitude,  attention  was  turned  for  long  decades  almost 
exclusively  to  the  mines.^  In  the  mining-industry,  as  in  most  of 
their  occupations  in  America,  the  Spaniards  were  owners,  overseers, 
and  directors,  rather  than  performers,  and  the  story  of  the  mines, 
'clespite  the  humanity  of  the  laws,  is  in  good  part  the  story  of  the 
oppression  and  decline  of  the  native  races.^  In  a  general  way  the 
mines  were  opened  and  operated  by  private  individuals  or  groups, 
on  the  condition  of  paying  a  fifth  of  the  output  to  the  crown.  The 
methods  were  crude,  particularly  before  the  application  of  the 
quicksilver  process,  and  wasteful  of  hfe  ;  of  the  output  something 
is  said  in  another  place.^    Great  fortunes  were  undoubtedly  gained 

1  For  the  vicissitudes  of  the  early  period,  see  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  25-26, 
34-37,  204-209,  217-218;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  2. 

2  P.  182,  above.  Cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  255-256,  399-400;  Clarke,  p.  356;  Haebler, 
Wirt.  BL,  pp.  30-32,34-35,  56-59;  Amerika,  pp.  367-368  ;  Cunningham,  pp.  518-519; 
Hume,  pp.  83-85.  3  Cf.  p.  12,  above. 

*  See  pp.  265  ff.,  below;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  261-264. 

^  Pp.  208  ff.,  above.  The  quicksilver  process  was  introduced  into  Mexico  in  1 566,  and 
into  Peru  in  1574.    Encycl.  Brit,  sub  "  Silver,  Mexican  process."    For  the  introduction 


222  COLONIZATION 

by  individuals,  especially  since  the  fifths  were  notoriously  evaded. 
The  whole  atmosphere  was  that  of  the  fortuitous  or  aleatory,  hazard 
replacing  rational  calculation  aimed  at  the  dcxclopmcnt  of  solid 
economic  resource  ;  the  whole  body  of  the  conquerors  and  their 
immediate  successors,  overwhelmingly  attracted  by  the  prospect, 
through  a  lucky  discovery,  of  sudden  wealth,  paid  but  scant  atten- 
tion to  the  development  of  any  form  of  tame  industry.  In  fact, 
about  the  only  agricultural  resource  of  the  Spanish  island-colonies, 
before  the  wider  extension  of  the  empire,  was  the  production  of 
^sugarj__in  which  they  depended  almost  entirely  upon  native  labor. 
The  later  inclusion  of  areas  where  maize,  maguey  (agave),  cacao, 
vanilla,  cochineal,  etc.,  could  be  produced,  naturally  rendered  the 
settlements  less  dependent.^  Moving  thus  from  the  islands  and 
the  coasts  to  the  plateau -country,  they  encountered  climatic,,  topo- 
graphical, and  other  conditions  remarkably  like  those  of  the  home- 
land. So  far  as  nature  was  concerned,  there  was  no  reason  why  a 
considerable  development  of  agricultural  economy  should  not  have 
taken  place.  But  the  national  character  of  the  Spanish,  and  the 
restrictive  policy  extended  over  them,  prevented  this.  Cortes  alone 
among  the  conquerors  seems  not  to  have  been  utterly  consumed 
by  the  desire  for  gold.^  It  is  doubtful  if  the  temperate-zone  prod- 
ucts would  have  been  much  developed  in  the  absence  of  the  native 
or  mixed  elements  in  the  population ;  that  agriculture  was  a 
distinctly  secondary  consideration  in  Spanish  minds  is  proved  by 
the  fact  that  "  the  regions  which  were  best  adapted  to  agricultural 
colonies,  as,  for  example,  Caracas,  Guiana,  Buenos  Ayres,  were 
neglected  by  the  Spaniards  for  centuries."  ^  It  was  apparent  to 
no  one  that  the  potato, — of  which  the  first  European  discoverers 
were  Pizarro  and  his  band,  and  which  was  thus  known  to  Europe 
only  after  1526,  — and  the  febrifuge  quinine,  introduced  to  Europe 
by  the  Jesuits,  in  1632,  were  wortli  far  more  to  the  world  than 
Potosi.^  Whatever  the  purpose  of  the  government,^  the  popular 
objective  was  not  production  but  exploitation. 

of  the  amalgamation  process  into  the  Potosi  region,  Humboldt  (Essai,  I,  624)  gives 
the  date  1571.         ^  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  399;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  298-299. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  2,  note  3. 

^  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  2  ;  see  pp.  316  ff.,  below. 

*  Quinine,  as  then  made,  was  worth  in  Europe  in  1640  a  hundred  crowns  ($125)  a 
pound ;  during  the  colonial  period  it  was  practically  the  sole  article  of  export  of 
Quito.    Watson,  I,  113,  155. 

^  See  p.  214,  above;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  216-219,  249-250;  Watson,  1, 136. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   POPULATION  AND  'I'RADE       223 

As  a  consequence  it  was  not  until  recourse  was  had  to  a  levy 
upon  the  vital  forces  of  the  conquered,  that  anything  of  significance 
was  accomplished  in  the  way  of  agricultural  production.  Then, 
despite  the  ruthless  using  up  of  these  vital  assets  in  the  mines,  the 
interior  mainland,  chiefly  Mexico,  began  to  exhibit  signs  of  eco- 
pomic  self-suflficiency  and  even  of  affluence.^  But  the  cultivation 
of  the  ground  never  received  in  the  early  days  any  such  impulse  as 
it  did'  in  the  tropical  plantations  of  other  nations  ;  the  fleets  carried 
away  from  New  Spain  and  the  islands  certain  amounts  of  natural 
products  other  than  metals,  but  the  development  of  such  a  mine 
of  agricultural  wealth  as  Cuba  remained  rudimentary  until  a  fatal 
breach  had  been  made  into  the  restrictive  system  by  which  com- 
merce had  been  tight-bound. ^  In  fact,  it  can  hardly  be  said  that 
the  Spaniards  founded  any  plantation  colonies  with  security  in  the 

'"■sbTEeefit'h  and  seventeenth  centuries.  The  superior  attractiveness 
of  Mexico  and  Peru  early  drained  away  the  Spanish  population  of 
the  islands,  so  that  by  1574  the  number  of  the  Spanish  in  the  city 
of  Santo  Domingo,  for  example,  was  only  about  1000,  and  Havana 
harbored  only  50.  Santiago  had  fallen  from  1000  to  30.^  Colmeiro 
says,^  having  in  mind  chiefly  tropical  production,  that  the  whole 
of  Spanish  America  remained  sterile  in  Spanish  hands;  "in  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  Martinique  and  Barbados  pro- 
duced more  for  France  and  England  than  all  the  islands,  provinces, 

^Ehgdoms~and  empires  of  America  for  the  Spaniards."  Allowing 
for  a  considerable  degree  of  exaggeration,  and  realizing  that  this 
result  was  due  to  a  number  of  contributing  causes,  it  is  inevitable 
that  the  observer  should  conclude  that  for  three  centuries  the 
glantation-agriculture  of  Spanish  America  was  a  failure. 

Besides  agriculture  there  was  one  other  productive  vocation  in  r"- 
the  colonies,  namely  stock-raising.    The  climate  and  soil  combined    ii'<J><-'*C 
to  favor  this  occupation,  which  was  besides  more  congenial  to  the 

1  See  pp.  303  ff.,  below;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  198-200,  29S-300. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  250  ;  cf.  p.  299.  "  Tlie  Spanish  settlements,  despite  all 
efforts  of  the  government  to  the  contrary,  had  long  remained  little  more  than  perma- 
nent trading-stations.  In  barter  with  the  natives  the  settlers  accumulated  what  objects 
of  value  they  could,  and,  always  with  native  aid,  they  dug  and  washed  for  precious 
metals.  But  no  matter  how  often  the  government  sent  seeds  and  plants  over  the 
ocean,  cultivation  did  not  prosper ;  for  the  natives  did  not  understand  it,  and  the 
colonists  on  their  part  regarded  such  occupation  as  beneath  them.  And  because,  now, 
valuable  products  of  the  soil  were  present  only  in  limited  quantity,  the  barter-trade 
was  soon  exhausted."  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  p.  399.  The  foregoing  has  especial  refer-  ;> 
ence  to  the  islands.  ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  197-198.  *  II,  421. 


224 


COLONIZATION 


restless  hidalgo.^  Moreover,  the  cattle  throve  in  the  new  environ- 
ment, as  superior  animals  naturalized  into  regions  whose  fauna  offer 
little  competition  are  wont  to  thrive.^  They  lived  in  a  half-wild 
state  ;  the  horses  in  particular  soon  showed  a  tendency  to  reversion 
from  domestication,  the  visible  outcome  of  which  was  represented 
by  the  droves  of  wild  horses  of  the  more  northern  plains.  Never- 
theless beef  was  cheap,  and  considerable  exports  of  hides  were 
made  long  before  the  present  stock-breeding  areas  of  the  Pampas 
were  opened.^ 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  small  results  attained  by  agriculture 
and  stock-raising  are  referable  in  any  important  degree  to  the 
application  directly  to  them  of  restrictive  regulations,  mercantile 
or  other.  In  fact,  it  was  for  the  interest  of  Spain  that  the  colonies 
should  produce  sugar  and  other  tropical  products  for  her,  and  it 
was  only  such  important  temperate-zone  products  as  grapes  and 
olives  which  were  looked  upon  with  disfavor  as  duplicating  those 
of  the  Peninsula.  Charles  V  and  Philip  II  favored  even  the  hide 
and  raw-wool  industry  of  the  New  World.'*  Indirectly,  however, 
the  restrictions  on  commerce  impinged  with  force  upon  all  forms 
of  production.  And  to  these  restrictions  were  added  by  the  consti- 
tution of  the  Spanish  system  the  unfavorable  conditions  represented 
by  the  extension  of  ecclesiastical  and  private  estates  {ina^razgos), 
and  by  the  collection  of  tithes.^ 

The  case  is  similar  in  respect  to  the  manufacturing  industries  ; 
no  such  direct  restriction  was  intended  as  that  of  the  English  in 
North  America.  Spain  had  few  manufactures  for  which  she  sought 
either  a  supply  region  of  raw  materials  or  a  demand  region  for 
finished  products.  Consequently  she  is  found  to  have  favored, 
though  to  little  purpose,  the  development  in  the  colonies  of  the 
mechanic  arts,  such  as  spinning  and  weaving,  sugar-refining,  and 
the  like.*'    Where  restrictions  were  actually  put  in  force  and  with 

^  Cf.  p.  171,  above. 

2  Darwin,  Orig.  of  Sp.,  I,  loo-ioi,  136  ff.,  225;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  218, 
on  tiie  wild  hogs  in  E.spanola.  ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  200,  298-299. 

*  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  42-43;  Moses,  p.  284;  Watson,  II,  213.  But  the 
colonies  were  mainly  dependent  for  their  subsistence.    Watson,  II,  153. 

^  See  pp.  297  ff.,  below;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  22;  Watson,  II,  131-132. 

"  Colmeiro,  II,  395-396;  cf.  Ro.scher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  42  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  24, 
26.  The  exportation  of  manufactures  to  the  colonies  was  subject  to  absolute  prohi- 
bition, "in  order  to  start  there  at  once  manufactories  for  silk,  cloth  and  leather-work 
which  might  relieve  the  mother-country  of  care  for  the  colonies."  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  HI., 
p.  62 ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  300. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:    POPULATION   AND  TRADE        225 

widely  deleterious  results,  it  was  for  local  reasons,  and  not  infrc- 
tjuentiy  with  a  view  to  the  protection  of  the  natives  ;  ^  of  the 
mercantile  system  as  applied  to  dependencies  but  few  and  vanish- 
ing traces  occur.  When  the  colonists  complain  of  restrictions,  it 
is  largely  those  of  trade  which  they  have  in  mind.  Nevertheless, 
as  might  be  expected,  the  growth  of  manufactures  was  slower  even 
than  that  of  the  other  vocations.'-^ 

In  fact,  the  Spaniards  in  the  New  World  were,  for  many  decades, 
either  exploitmg  the  mines  or  living  in  some  other  sort  of  unpro- 
ductive parasitic  relation  upon  the  native  population.^  Aside  from 
the  priests,  who  really  pretended  to  return  some  equivalent  to  the 
natives,  and  often  did  so,  the  Spaniards  and  Creoles  seem  to  have 
been  interested  chiefly  in  squabbling  for  property,  preferment, 
offices,  or  titles, — in  floating  about  on  the  surface  of  the  economic 
currents  from  which  they  derived,  without  return  service,  such 
livelihood  as  they  could.  For  instance,  one  traveler  stated  that 
"  the  whole  population  of  Spanish  America  was  divided  into  two 
classes  :  those  who  ruined  themselves  by  law-suits  and  those  who 
enriched  themselves  by  the  same  means."  In  a  population  of 
3 1 ,000,  Caracas  had  600  judges,  lawyers,  and  clerks.  "  There  is 
no  one,  white  or  almost  white,  who  does  not  desire  to  be  a  lawyer, 
priest  or  monk  ;  those  who  are  unable  to  give  such  scope  to  their 
pretensions  aim,  at  least,  at  being  notaries,  secretaries,  clerks  of 
church-sacristans,  or  attaches  of  some  religious  community,  such 
as  lay  brothers,  pupils,  or  foundlings.  Thus  the  fields  lie  de- 
serted and  their  fertility  arraigns  our  inactivity.  Cultivation  of  the 
soil  is  despised.  Every  one  wants  to  be  a  gentleman  or  to  live  in 
idleness."^  It  was  many  years  before  cultivators,  industrials,  and 
merchants  gained  numbers  and  a  station  in  society  such  as  secured 
for  them  any  consideration  in  comparison  with  the  adventurers, 
clergy,  and  officials.^ 

'  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  43 ;   Leroy-Beaulieu,  p.  24. 

2  "  Until  far  into  the  second  half  of  the  sixteenth  century  no  kind  of  industry 
could  gain  a  foothold  in  the  colonies."    Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  59. 

^  As  early  as  1508,  the  colonists,  after  petitioning  the  government  for  other  favors 
and  exemptions  from  interference,  recpiest  that  the  artisans  be  required  to  resist  the 
temptations  to  secure  allotments  of  Indians,  and  desert  their  trades.  15ourne,  Sp.  in 
Amer.,  pp.  217-218.  Thus  the  very  logic  of  natural  conditions  may  be  seen  to  have 
militated  against  industry. 

■*  Depons  (IT,  63  ff. ;  and  T,  186)  in  Roscher,  pp.  156-157. 

^  Cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  4-5. 


2  26  COLONIZATION 

Trade-Restriction 

The  markedly  non-productive  character  of  Spanish  America, 
whatever  its  more  general  ethnic,  economic,  and  social  causes,  was 
certainly  accentuated  by  the  cordon  of  restrictions  imposed  upon  ex- 
change, especially  as  between  the  mother-country  and  the  colonies. 
In  the  latter  areas  there  was  at  first  little  question  of  local  exchange, 
insomuch  as  they  were  economically  dependent  upon  Spain  for  sup- 
plies purchasable  by  the  export  of  treasure  and  other  articles  destined 
to  pass  through  but  few  hands.  But  with  the  growth  of  production, 
a  merchant  class,  composed  mostly  of  European  Spaniards,  slowly 
arose.  It  is  difficult  to  discover  the  relative  numbers  of  this  class  ; 
in  Vera  Cruz  (1574)  there  were  200  families  of  Spaniards,  all  mer- 
chants and  shopkeepers ;  ^  but  in  the  New  \Yorld  as  a  whole  the 
merchants  certainly  formed  but  a  small  minority.  They  appear, 
however,  not  to  have  been  heavily  taxed  or  oppressed.  The  alca- 
bala  was  introduced  in  1558,  but  on  the  low  basis  of  two  per  cent ; 
and  although  this  was  later  raised,^  it  seems  never  to  have  produced 
any  special  outcry.  A  subsequent  consideration  of  the  other  taxes 
levied  in  America  ^  will  show  that  inter-colonial  exchange  was  not 
singled  out  for  unreasonable  treatment ;  indeed  it  was,  strictly 
speaking,  too  insignificant  to  draw  attention  except  as  it  suffered 
indirectly  through  its  connection  with  the  general  exchange  between 
Spain  and  America. 

To  this  topic  we  now  turn ;  and  it  is  here  that  we  meet  the 
extraordinary  system  of  restriction  which  has  riveted  the  atten- 
tion of  economists  from  Adam  Smith  down.  In  the  earliest  years 
Charles  V  is  found  to  be,  as  usual,  the  exponent  of  a  liberal  policy  : 
under  Isabella  only  Castilians  had  been  allowed  to  enjoy  the  fruits 
of  the  new  Castilian  discoveries  ;  Ferdinand  had  extended  such 
privileges  of  emigration  and  trade  to  Aragon  ;  but  Charles  granted 
them  to  all  his  subjects  without  distinction  of  nationality  (1526). 
In  the  first  decades  succeeding  the  discovery  there  appear  to  have 
existed  the  beginnings  of  a  lively  trade  between  Spain  and  the 
colonies  ;  certainly  the  period  of  Spain's  prosperity  under  Charles  '^ 
is  referable  in  no  insignificant  degree  to  the  stimulus  of  having  to 
provide  and  being  allowed  to  provide  the  means  of  comfort  and 
luxury  for  adventurers  and  colonists  who  had  considerable  wealth 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  199.  '  Pp.  314  ff.,  below. 

2  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  118-119.  *  See  p.  182,  above. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:    POPULATION   AND  TRADE       227 

together  with  extravagant  tastes,  and  who  would  not  engage  in 
productive  industry.  Large  exports  to  America  of  wines,  manu- 
factures, and  other  characteristic  products  of  the  Peninsula  were 
imperatively  demanded.  Restrictions  were  removed  from  agricul- 
ture and  manufacture,  and  even  beggars  and  vagabonds  were  im- 
pressed into  the  factories  of  Valladolid,  Zamora,  and  Salamanca.^ 
In  15  18  fear  of  foreign  competition  had  so  far  disappeared  that  the 
prohibition  of  the  importation  of  silk-fabrics  was  removed.  There 
was  a  considerable  shifting  of  occupation  toward  industry  and 
trade.^  The  result  was  a  rather  lively  exchange  between  the 
mother-country  and  the  colonies;  for  example,  about  1550  Cadiz 
and  Seville  exported  140,000  centners  of  wine  to  America.  The 
colonial  demand  exceeded  Spain's  power  of  supply,  and  the  com- 
petition of  foreigners  was  invited ;  Charles  V  admitted  certain 
Germans,  as  has  been  seen,  into  the  colonial  trade. ^ 

Monopoly  Policy 

But  the  course  of  things  at  home  did  not  admit  of  a  normal 
development  from  these  beginnings.^  "  On  the  whole,  it  appears 
that  the  large  colonial  demands  for  food  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
large  supplies  of  foreign  manufactures  on  the  other,  prevented 
a  healthy  reaction  of  commercial  on  agricultural  and  industrial 
development ;  Spain  was  left  exhausted  by  the  feverish  activity 
which  had  been  temporarily  induced,  and  which  passed  away."  ^ 
Even  during  the  reign  of  Charles  it  was  found  necessary,  in  view 
of  the  European  situation,  to  begin  the  process  of  restriction,  a  J' 
policy  much  more  in  harmony  with  Spanish  prepossessions  than 
that  of  freedom  ;  and  under  Philip  it  was  developed  rapidly  and 
with  general  approval.  Neither  Spaniards  nor  Portuguese  had 
ever  emerged  from  the  spell  of  the  monopoly  system  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  typically  represented  by  that  of  Venice.  "The  colonial 
system,"  says  Colmeiro,*^  "was  nothing  else  than  the  extension  of 
the  common  code  of  Europe  to  the  American  dominion.  The 
economic  regime  of  the  ancient  world  rested  upon  privilege  and 
prohibition,  and  just  as  the  provinces  of  a  single  kingdom  were 
^^rvTded  and  separated  by  customs-houses,  thus  also  the  colonies 

^  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  57,  59;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  287  ;  Hume,  pp.  83-85. 

2  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  57  ;  Colmeiro,  II,  255-256. 

'  Pp.  187,  212,  above.    Cf.  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  367  ;  Cunningham,  p.  518. 

*  See  pp.  204  ff.,  above.  '^  Cunningham,  p.  520.  ''  II,  423. 


2  28  COLONIZATION 

lived  apart  from  the  mother-country,  excepting  for  the  bond  of  a 
reciprocal  commerce."  Jt  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the 
Spanish  took  as  a  model  the  Portuguese  system  rather  than  the 
more  remote  Venetian ;  they  were  expecting  to  meet  with  condi- 
tions similar  to  those  encountered  by  the  Portuguese  in  India : 
large  cities  and  prosperous  states  admitting  of  an  extended  trade. 
Hence,  among  other  things,  the  apparatus  for  the  direction  of  trade 
and  the  preservation  of  monopoly,  and  especially  the  Casa  de  Con- 
tratacioti,  or  House  of  Trade,  modeled  upon  the  Portuguese  Casa_ 
dc  Giiiuif,  the  forerunner  of  the  Casa  da  India}  To  this  and  other 
devices  for  securing  monopoly  attention  will  presently  be  given ; 
but  the  broad  consideration  to  be  borne  in  mind  as  the  chief  factor 
leading  to  restrictions  of  many  kinds  is  the  monopoly  policy  itself. 
This  policy  has  appeared  already  in  the  history,  commercial  and 
colonial,  of  all  the  anterior  peoples  who  in  succession  or  as  rivals 
controlled  the  exchange  between  the  East  and  West,  or,  to  express 
it  in  its  final  terms,  between  the  complementary  trade-areas  of  the 
tropics  and  cooler  regions.  Exclusion  of  others  from  such  rich 
advantages  was  entirely  natural,  upon  an  undeveloped  stage  of 
economic  and  social  progress  ;  it  represents,  indeed,  an  ineradicable 
motive  of  self-seeking  in  the  battle  of  life  as  waged  by  individuals 
and  groups  ;  in  the  minds  of  most,  if  not  all  nations  its  inferiority 
to  a  more  generous  and  cosmopolitan  policy  still  awaits  practical 
demonstration.  What  is  peculiar  to  the  Spanish  system  and  its 
prototypes  is  the  crude,  extreme,  and  baldly  consistent  exhibition 
of  the  exclusion-principle  rather  than  that  principle  itself. 

The  Seville  Monopoly 

The  expression  of  the  exclusion-principle  as  respects  foreign 
nations  is  reserved  for  a  later  page  ;  ^  it  is  rather  in  its  application 
as  between  sections  of  the  Spanish  dominions  that  it  now  engages 
our  attention.  The  most  obvious  example  of  this  is  the  reservation 
of  the  trade  with  the  Indies,  at  first  (until  1529)  exclusively  to 
Seville,  and  later  to  that  city  and  Cadiz.    Such  a  proceeding  was 

^  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  392;  cf.  p.  66,  above.  It  is  a  disappointment  to  tlie  author 
not  to  be  aljle  to  furnish  at  least  a  brief  account  of  the  Portuguese  Casa\  but  con- 
siderable effort  expended  in  the  search  for  materials  has  failed  to  yield,  as  yet,  any 
results  of  importance.  Inquiries  made  in  the  Peninsula  by  a  colleague  have  been  so 
fruitless  as  to  suggest  that  the  Casa  da  Lnfia  is  a  matter  of  curious  interest  rather 
than  of  historical  importance.  -  I'p.  242  ff.,  below. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    POPULATION   AND  TRADE       229 

plainly  after  the  Portuf^uese  model,  for  the  India  trade  of  Portu<;al 
had  been  centered  at  Lisbon.  "  This  preference  for  Seville  came 
from  the  fact  that  it  was  the  only  large  place  in  the  kingdom  of 
Castile  that  could  carry  on  ocean-commerce  and  at  the  same  time 
had  a  considerable  river  trade.  Then,  again,  since  the  kingdom  of 
Castile  alone  had  borne  the  expense  and  dangers  of  the_discovery 
of  America,  it  wanted  to  have  all  the  profit  of  it."  ^  Further 
reasons  for  the  exceptional  status  of  Seville,  less  plainly  dictated 
by  a  monopoly  policy,  are  to  be  found.  The  establishment  of  the 
Casa  de  Contratacion  in  1503,  for  example,  was  the  outward  and 
visible  embodiment  of  a  policy  of  strict  supervision  ;  and  the  need 
for  such  control  was  found  in  the  estimation  and  collection  of 
royal  and  royally  assigned  revenue.  The  discovered  lands  "  were 
regarded  less  as  the  territorial  growth  of  Spain  or  Castile  than  as 
an  extension  of  the  royal  domain  of  the  Castilian  kings";  and  the  . 
income  transferred  by  the  sovereigns  to  the  great  admiral  had  to 
be  strictly  accounted.  It  was  the  natural  result,  upon  a  stage 
where  the  machinery  of  revenue-collection  was  yet  crude,  to  per- 
sist in  the  mediaeval  idea  of  a  "staple-port,"  and  to  force  all  (a 
income-producing  currents  of  trade  through  a  "narrows"  where 
they  could  be  estimated  and  levied  upon.  Again,  in  an  age  where 
piracy  was  rife,  and  merchant-ships,  sailing  upon  the  ocean  at  their 
own  risk,  could  not  yet  be  differentiated  from  war-craft,  it  was  in 
the  nature  of  national  insurance  that  inspection  of  vessels,  crews, 
and  passengers  should  be  rigidly  enforced  ;  and  it  was  easier  to 
control  all  this,  and  later  the  religious  character  of  emigrants,^ 
from  a  single  ofifice,  more  highly  organized.  The  weight  of  motives 
other  than  fiscal  is  witnessed  by  the  fact  that  for  some  time  the 
trade  to  the  Indies  was  not  taxed. ^ 
'  However,  the  monopoly  idea  is  implicit  in  some  degree  in  all 
these  considerations,  as  it  had  been  in  making  Cadiz  the  staple  of 
JJie^receding  Barbary  trade.  It  was  in  the  spirit  of  the  place  and 
time.  With  all  his  liberal  ideas,  Charles  V,  who  up  to  the  end  of 
his  reign  meditated  an  assault  upon  the  Seville  monopoly ,"*  was 
yet  obliged  to  decree,  "  on  pain  of  death  and  confiscation,  that 
every  Spaniard,  embark  where  he  would,  must  direct  his  journey 
back  from  America  only  to  Seville ;  and  soon  the  journey  out  was 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  32-33;  Ixroy-Beaulieu,  I,  27.  *  P.  212,  above. 

8  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  410;  Wirt.  Kl.,  pp.  50-51 ;   Hume,  p.  88. 
■»  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  53. 


230  COLONIZATION 

permissible  only  from  Seville."  The  very  fact  that  the  starting- 
places  were  not  at  first  designated,  although  the  final  return-desti- 
nation was,  and  that  "  in  particular  all  gold  and  silver,  all  pearls 
and  precious  stones  could  be  brought  only  to  Seville,"^  betrays  the 
early  development  of  the  monopoly  idea  as  distinguished  from  that 
of  benevolent  supervision.  Again,  when,  in  1529,  Coruna,  Bayona, 
Avilcs,  Laredo,  Bilbao,  San  Sebastian,  Cartagena,  and  Malaga  re- 
ceived permission  to  send  out  vessels  to  America,  the  latter  were 
obliged  to  return  over  Seville,? 

The  benefits  conferred  by  this  monopoly  upon  the  favored  city 
were  all  that  could  have  been  expected.  In  1552  the  import-restric- 
tions were  greatly  reduced  and  Seville  became  the  entrepot  of  a 
stream  of  trade,  artificial  though  it  may  have  been,  whose  terminals 
were  the  countries  of  Europe  on  the  one  hand  and  America  on  the 
other  ;  the  merchants  of  Seville  thus  reaped  a  double  gain,  acting  as 
they  did  as  factors  for  foreigners  who  were  excluded  both  in  person 
and  in  proxy  from  the  colonies.  The  more  Spanish  industry  declined 
the  more  decidedly  did  the  commercial  operations  at  Seville  take  on 
the  character  and  afford  the  easy  gains  of  a  transit-traffic,  "  so  that 
Seville  became  the  richest  and  most  populous  city  of  the  monarchy 
as  well  as  an  inexhaustible  treasure-house  for  the  crown.  ...  At 
a  time  when  throughout  Spain  the  decline  of  trade  and  industry 
gave  cause  for  the  most  serious  complaints,  the  merchant-popula- 
tion of  Seville  were  erecting,  in  quick  succession,  truly  monumental 
edifices."  ^  Many  a  time  a  single  returning  fleet  brought  them 
back  more  than  a  thousand  millions  of  maravedi's,  and  "  not  a  few 
of  their  daughters  became  the  ancestresses  of  newly  vivified  noble 
families  which  in  their  traditions  harked  back  to  Pelayo."  "*  But 
Cadiz  began  to  put  forth  rival  claims  for  the  American  trade  as 
early  as  1550,  and  after  1680  was  plainly  preferred  by  commerce. 
The  sanding-up  of  the  Guadalquivir,  and  the  greater  draught  of 
vessels,  which  made  it  imjiossible  for  them  to  pass  the  bar  of  San 
Lucar,  combined  to  render  Seville  obsolete.  The  official  change 
was  delayed  only  imtil  1717,  and  brought  with  it  the  end  of  this 
city's  prosperity.  The  system  of  the  staple  was  yet  maintained 
for  about  fifty  years.^ 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.^  p.  32. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  402  ;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  54 ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  283. 

8  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  75-76 ;  cf.  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  44  ;  Clarke,  p.  356. 

*  Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  69;  Colmeiro,  II,  401-402. 

''  Colmeiro,  II,  402,  408;   Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  425  ;  Wirt.  BL,  p.  76. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:    POPULATION   AND  TRADE        231 

It  is  (lilTicult  to  disengage  the  effects  of  one  measure  of  restric- 
tion from  the  whole,  but  it  may  be  said  that  the  rest  of  Spain 
suffered  from  the  excess  of  favor  and  opportunity  vouchsafed  to 
Seville;  "naturally  this  transit-trade  of  Seville  heli)ed  on  the 
decline  of  Spanish  industry  by  drawing  from  it,  to  the  advantage 
of  foreign  countries,  an  important  part  of  its  commissions."  ^ 
"The  error  lay  in  the  persistence  with  which,  after  the  great  dis- 
coveries and  conquests,  .  .  .  the  commerce  of  the  New  World  was 
still  concentrated  in  Seville  or  Cadiz ;  in  governing  the  much 
according  to  the  rule  of  the  little,  and  in  converting  an  ephemeral 
ordinance  into  a  perpetual  privilege.  Thus  the  Indies  came  to  be 
the  patrimony  of  a  single  city  of  the  realm  ;  and  the  interior 
provinces  of  Spain,  and  those  which  occupied  the  littoral  of  the 
Cantabrian  or  Mediterranean,  could  hardly  enjoy  the  benefits  of 
trade  with  America  by  reason  of  the  re-iraposition  of  tolls  in 
transit,  of  the  municipal  duties  and  other  taxes,  and  of  the  rise  in 
charges  for  transportation,^ — all  of  which  made  our  manufactures 
dear  and  inclined  the  scales  of  competition  in  favor  of  those  of  the 
foreigners."  ^ 

The  Casa  de  Contratacion 

Reserving  for  a  later  page  '^  the  effects  upon  the  colonies  of  the 
single-emporium  policy,  we  now  turn  to  the  consideration  of  other 
manifestations  of  the  all-regulating  activity  of  the  government.  The 
general  supervision  of  communications  and  trade  will  appear  most 
plainly,  perhaps,  in  an  account  of  the  agency  designed  to  carry 
them  out  :  the  House  or  Board  of  Trade,  the  Oisa  dc  Contratacion. 
This  organization  was  established  at  Seville  in  1503,  and  at  first 
appears  to  have  been  designed  to  look  after  the  trade-interests  of 
the  crown,  under  the  contracts  with  Columbus  ;  later  it  extended 
a  progressively  augmenting  control  over  the  whole  of  the  trade 
with  the  colonies,  including  all  correspondence  connected  therewith. 

1  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  76.  '■^  E)i  razon  de  los partes y  fletcs. 

•^  C'olmeiio,  II,  408.  "Of  the  manufactures  exported  to  America,  the  greater  part 
(it  is  said  nineteen-twentieths)  was  made  in  England,  Holland,  France,  etc.,  and  the 
Spaniards  themselves,  apart  from  their  own  illicit  trade,  had  only  two  kinds  of  profit 
from  it.  In  the  first  place  the  national  treasury  secured  the  considerable  customs 
which  had  to  be  paid  in  transit  through  Spain.  Second,  the  merchants,  ship-owners, 
etc.,  gained  from  the  many  charges  which  were  added  to  the  price  of  the  goods  and 
were  paid  again  by  the  Americans.  In  order  to  avoid  .  .  .  the  customs  an  immense 
partial  smuggling  was  carried  on  at  Cadiz."    Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  44. 

4  Pp.  zy]  ff.,  below. 


232  COLONlZA'i'lON 

Increasing  as  it  did  in  authority,  it  likewise  took  on  judicial  and 
administrative  functions,  acting  as  an  adjunct  to  the  Council  ot"  the 
Indies  {Conscjo  dc  Indias),  but  in  such  manner  that  it  disposed  of 
all  minor  business  independently.  It  was  "  at  once  a  board  of  trade, 
a  commercial  court,  and  a  clearing  house  for  the  American  traffic  "  ;  ^ 
it  "  regulated  the  number  of  shijjs  and  the  bulk  and  value  of  their 
freights,  received  and  distributed  the  precious  metals  and  the 
merchandise  from  the  Indies,"  and  kept  itself  informed  regarding 
the  extension  and  possibilities  of  trade.  A  certain  amount  even  of 
instruction  was  associated  with  its  other  activities  ;  especial  atten- 
tion was  given  to  nautical  subjects  and  the  education  of  pilots.^ 
An  efficient  agent  of  trade-supervision  and  extension  was  thereby 
created,  and  constituted,  in  the  time  of  Charles  V,  an  object  of 
envy  and  emulation  even  to  a  Henry  VIII.  "No  ship  was  per- 
mitted to  sail  from  Spain  to  America,  or  land  from  there,  until  it 
had  been  inspected  by  the  officers  of  the  Casa  and  had  received  a 
license.  Of  everything  a  most  careful  register  was  kept."  '^  "  The 
historical  significance  of  the  organization  known  as  the  Casa  de 
Contratacion  lay  in  the  fact  that  for  a  long  time  it  held  the  key 
to  the  New  World"  and  enabled  the  Spanish  king  to  apply  the 
extraordinarily  rigid  system  of  commercial  restriction  which  has 
drawn  invectives  from  economists  of  the  succeeding  centuries.* 

The  Fleets  and  Galleons  ;  the  Fairs 

But  the  Casa  was  only  one  agency,  however  imjiortant,  in  the 
general  apparatus  of  regulation,  here  applied  to  trade  ;  it  constituted 
the  sleepless  eye  of  the  Seville  monopoly,  and  was  later  transferred 
with  the  latter  to  Cadiz.  Regulation  and  cramping  restriction  did 
not,  however,  begin  and  end  at  the  Peninsular  terminal  ;  it  accom- 
panied the  vehicles  of  commerce  to  the  colonies,  determining 
schedules,  routes,  destinations,  and  manner  of  sailing  to  and  fro, 
impressing  its  characteristic  stamp  upon  markets,  methods  of  ex- 
change, and  all  the  other  factors  and  phenomena  of  trade.     During 

1  Armstrong,  II,  47  ;  cf.  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  pp.  391-395,  412  ;  for  it.s  officers  and 
personnel  in  general,  see  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  222-223 ;  for  early  legislation 
concerning  it,  see  Fabie,  pp.  42-45,  71-73,  104  ff.,  etc.  Moses  (chap,  iii)  has  made  a 
rather  exhaustive  study  of  the  Casa. 

2  Hume,  p.  88 ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  222;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  32. 

3  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  32. 

*  Moses,  p.  50.  This  author  regards  the  system  of  restriction  as  the  most  rigid  ever 
framed. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   POPULATION  AND  TRADE       233 

the  earlier  years  this  influence  extended  but  Httle  beyond  the  Euro- 
pean terminal  ;  under  a  proper  license,  a  vessel  might  sail  when 
she  willed,  and  whither.      But  with  the  increase  in  the  number 
of  pirates  and  their  insistence  and  skill  in  following  the  scent  of 
spoil,  need  was  felt  of  the  mutual  protection  of  association  during 
voyages.     Charles  V  decreed  in  1526^  and  Philip  II  more  urgently   . 
in  1 56 1 j^  that  the  ships  should  sail  in  company.    Thus  were  organ- 
ized the  famous  Jlo fas  2ir\d  galeones ,  companies  of  merchant  vessels 
to  which,  in  order  to  insure  complete  safety,  there  were  assigned         — -;«^ 
regular  convoys  of  war-vessels.^    The  establishment  of  the  fleets,  ^r"^ 
as  of  other  factors  in  the  restrictive  system,  seems  to  have  been'.  ,i^JJjj 
almost  wholly  in  the  interests  of  trade  ;  but  this  complex  of  pater-      '^<aa-^ 
nal  measures  was  sure  to  increase  in  rigidity  and  oppressiveness  as  JUUj^ 
the  Spanish  kings,  in  their  increasing  financial  embarrassment,  be- 
came alive  to  the  fiscal  possibilities  of  America.    The  collection  of 
dues  was,  facilitated  by  the  fleet  system  ;  wholesale  confiscation, 
whether  contemplated  or  not,  was  easier.    Moreover  the  control  of 
emigration,  and  so  the  detection  of  prospective  settlers  of  tainted 
faith,  became  more  certain. 

The  definite  legal  establishment  of  the  system  was  the  work  of 
Philip  II;  his  ordinance  of  1561  required  the  annual  equipment, 
mainly  in  Seville  and  Cadiz,  of  two  fleets  and  a  naval  escort  for 
the  Indies  —  one  for  New  Spain  and  the  other  for  Tierra  Firme 
(northern  coast  region  of  South  America).  The  former  started  in 
April  or  May  ;  the  latter  in  August  or  September,  later  in  March. 
The  sections  parted  at  the  island  of  Dominica,  and  made  rendezvous 
for  the  return  at  Havana,  putting  in  at  the  Azores  to  learn  if  the 
coast  of  Spain  was  free  from  pirates.  Six  or  more  ships  might 
procure  a  license  for  return  without  waiting  for  the  rest.^  All  the 
details  of  navigation  were  laboriously  prescribed,  and  the  destina- 
tions'of-i^ie  various  vessels  were  scheduled  ;  little  or  nothing  was 
left  to  chance  or  to  the  free  play  of  initiative  in  taking  advantage 
of  unforeseen  opportunity.  One  or  more  ships  were  detailed  to  the 
several  islands  and  smaller  mainland  ports,  but  the  great  majority 
proceeded  either  to  Vera  Cruz  or  to  Puerto  Bello  on  the  Isthmus. 
These  ports  became  to  the  New  World  what  Seville  was  to  Spain, 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  401-404;  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  54;  Amerika,  pp.  413-415.  The 
flotas  had  Vera  Cruz  as  their  destination,  the  galeones  went  as  far  as  Puerto  Bello. 
Professor  Bourne  informs  the  author  that  he  regards  the  distinction  usually  made  be- 
tween the  flotas  and  galeones  as  an  imaginary  one. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  284-285,  288. 


H 


234  COLONIZATION 

and  with  results  the  more  deleterious,  as  discrimination  was  exer- 
cised over  wider  areas  and  more  helpless  victims.^ 

A  natural  issue  of  this  primitive  system  of  distribution  was  the 
fair  at  the  terminals  ;  under  the  conditions  no  regular  market  in 
the  modern  sense  could  exist.  There  was  an  annual  fair  at  Vera 
Cruz,  but  the  most  pronounced  type  was  that  of  Puerto  Bello,  by 
which  practically  all  of  South  America  was  supplied.  Here  the 
products  of  the  Peruvian  fleet  were  exchanged,  during  forty  days, 
for  those  brought  by  the  galleons  ;  the  period  was  one  of  tremen- 
dous activity,  of  feverish  effort  to  take  advantage  of  a  strictly 
limited  contact  with  the  outside  world  ;  bales  of  goods  and  billets 
of  silver  obstructed  the  streets.  Great  profits  were  made  during 
the  exchange  of  goods  worth  up  to  forty  million  pesos,  but  the 
period  of  the  fair  was  bounded  on  both  sides  by  a  long  "dead 
time "  of  commercial  stagnation.  The  evils  of  the  system  were 
inevitably  enhanced  by  the  crowding  of  many  people  into  noto- 
riously unwholesome  ports  and  by  the  untoward  economic  condi- 
tions incident  to  the  whole  situation.^ 

The  fact  that  the  fleet  system  had  been  employed  by  the  I^ortu- 
guese,  and  later  appealed,  at  least  in  modified  form,  to  the  Dutch 
and  English,  seems  to  mark  it  as  a  device  of  some  generality,  and 
as  probably  finding  its  justification,  therefore,  in  general  rather 
than  local  conditions.  This  conclusion  seems  to  be  reasonable  when 
the  insufificiency  of  the  ships  for  ocean-voyaging,  the  small  nauti- 
cal skill,  the  increasing  prevalence  of  corsairs  upon  the  south- 
western coast  of  Eurojie,  and,  above  all,  the  universal  adherence 
to  the  mono))oly  jirinciple,  are  recalled.  Here,  again,  Spain  exhib- 
ited a  i)rofound  ccniservatism  and  maladaptability.  "  Staples,  cara- 
vans, trading-companies,  —  these  are  arrangements  which  serve 
admirably  only  for  the  beginnings  of  trade  and  for  the  lower  stages 
of  civilization  ;  but  Spain  tried  to  i)erpetuate  them  in  her  colonies. 
Indeed,  where  not  only  the  state  but  the  whole  society  rests  upon 
medicEval  principles  —  i.e.  a  caste-system,  absence  of  a  single  na- 
tionality, great  power  of  the  church  —  there  it  is  that  the  impos- 
sibility of  much  departure  from  these  principles,  even  in  trade, 
appears.  Highly  artificial  governments,  which  are  at  the  same  time 
conscious  of  their  own  weakness,  have  from  of  old  felt  the  need  of 

^  Cf.  p.  23S,  below. 

2  The  mortality  of  Spaniards  wa.s  high,  and  the  atmosphere  was  one  of  merciless 
greed.     Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Anier.,pp.  291-293;  Colnieiro,  II,  403-404. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:   POPULATION   AND  TRADE       235 

limiting  trade,  as  far  as  possible,  to  a  minimum;  —  trade  which 
binds  peoples  together,  and  which  might  introduce,  along  with 
foreign  wares,  foreign  ideas  and  influences  as  well."  ^  In  other 
words,  the  fleet-and-fair  system  was  another  of  the  anachronisms 
to  which  Spain,  with  characteristic  consistency,  clung  ;  that  it  con- 
travened a  normal  development  is  shown  no  less  by  constant  at- 
tempts to  evade  its  restrictions  ^  than  by  the  animation  of  economic 
relations  which  followed  close  upon  its  extinction. 


Further  Restriction  :  the  Privileged  Companies 

But  before  passing  judgment  upon  this  phase  of  the  general 
system  of  monopoly  and  regulation,  it  will  clarify  counsel  to  pursue 
Spanish  trade  restriction  into  a  few  of  its  remoter  outreachings.  For 
example,  the  forwarding  of  goods  beyond  the  Isthmus  was  subject  to 
police-regulations  even  more  hampering  than  those  described.  The 
whole  trade  with  the  Philippines  was  forced  into  one  vessel  per 
annum,  and  short  periods  of  feverish  activity  lapsing  out  of  and 
back  into  lassitude  marked  the  commercial  life  of  that  colony ;  the 
other  details  of  regulation  as  disclosed  in  America  applied,  mutatis 
mutandis,  in  the  Asiatic  region."^  Again,  there  was  absolutely  no 
provision  made  for  direct  trade  with  Buenos  Ayres  or  Chile  ;  their 
products  and  supplies  must  perforce  go  via  Peru  and  its  yearly 
fleet  to  Panama;  "  if  a  settler  on  the  bank  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata 
wished  some  article  of  European  production,  for  a  long  time  the 
route  by  which  it  could  reach  him  in  the  course  of  legitimate  trade 
was  from  Seville  to  Porto  Bello,  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
from  Panama  to  Lima,  and  from  Lima  across  the  continent  to  its 
destination."*  "From  1535  to  1579  direct  trade  between  Buenos 
Ayres  and  Spain  was  prohibited.  Thereafter  the  policy  vacillated  be- 
tween absolute  prohibition  and  the  permission  of  a  few  vessels  spe- 
cially licensed."^  In  fact,  police  measures  were  applied  generally 
to  the  communications  between  the  several  American  provinces ;  ^ 
this  was  doubtless  due  prevailingly  to  political  considerations,  but 
it  impinged  severely  upon  the  development  of  trade  and  largely 
neutralized  its  beneficial  influences. 

^  Roscher,  p.  165.       ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  286.       ^  See  pp.  347  ff.,  below. 
*  Moses,  pp.  285-286 ;  cf.  pp.  208-209 ;   Watson,  II,  208 ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys., 
p.  36;  see  p.  318,  below. 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  290.       ^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  6,  18-19  ;  see  p.  245,  below. 


236  COLONIZATION 

The  monopoly  principle  worked  out  into  still  another  form, 
deemed  detrimental  by  the  colonists  and  by  students  of  the  sub- 
ject, namely,  privileged  companies.  It  did  not  take  certain  favored 
commercial  houses  long  to  attain  practical  control  over  the  limited 
trading-system;  "especially  so  when  the  merchants  of  Seville 
from  the  time  of  Charles  V,  and  those  of  Mexico  and  Lima  from 
the  time  of  Philip  II,  became  privileged  corporations  with  an 
elected  prior  and  consuls  at  their  head.  For  example,  the  trade 
with  the  silver  fleet  was  in  the  sole  possession  of  eight  or  ten  large 
Mexican  houses."  Naturally  these  organizations  were  interested, 
conformably  with  the  policy  of  the  day,  in  keeping  the  market 
understocked  ;  their  policy  was  "  to  raise  prices  to  the  point  where 
reduction  in  the  amount  of  sales  would  have  caused  them  more  of 
damage  than  the  costliness  of  the  merchandise  would  have  returned 
in  profit."  And  the  interests  of  the  several  companies  were 
effectively  enough  pooled  to  allow  of  no  inconsistency  of  policy 
between  them.  The  whole  arrangement  was  not  so  different  from 
that  of  the  Dutch  and  English  companies  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury.^ In  spite  of  this  fact,  however,  the  regime  of  the  privileged 
companies  was  less  oppressive  than  that  of  the  government ;  in 
1728  the  trade  of  Caracas  was  surrendered  to  a  company  organized 
at  Guipuzcoa  {Conipania  Guipjizcoana)  because  the  government 
was  discouraged  in  its  efforts  to  overcome  smuggling.  The  very 
existence  of  this  company  depended  upon  its  being  able  to  stop 
the  operations  of  foreign  traders  and  to  transfer  to  itself  the 
exchange  which  they  were  carrying  on ;  so  it  armed  its  ships  and 
actually  succeeded  in  considerably  limiting  the  contraband  traffic  ; 
it  also  promoted  trade,  for  its  restrictions,  while  rigid,  were  mild 
in  comparison  with  what  went  before.  Caracas,  apart  from  the 
company,  had  connection  with  the  Canary  Islands  by  one  regis- 
tered ship,  and  enjoyed  free  trade  with  Vera  Cruz ;  yet  for  the 
sixteen  years  before  the  founding  of  the  company  not  a  ship  had 
sailed  from  Caracas  for  Spain,  and  in  twenty  years  only  five  from 
Spain  to  Cardcas.  Under  the  more  moderate  restriction  the  cattle 
business  trebled  in  a  short  time,  the  cocoa-trade  doubled,  and  the 
price  of  cocoa  in  Spain  fell  fifty  per  cent.^ 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  34;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  28;  cf.  Colmeiro,  TI,  454  ff. ; 
Watson,  II,  142. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  37-38,  and  note;  cf.  Watson,  II,  156;  Moses,  pp. 
166-170.    The  Compatiia  Guiptizcoana  retained  its  privileges  until  1778. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   POPULATION   AND  TRADE        237 

But  the  companies  were  only  relatively  beneficial.  Their  history 
justifies  the  condemnation  accorded  them  by  modern  economists. 
"  They  live  upon  monopoly,  become  weakened  through  extrava- 
gance and  poor  direction  of  business  and  perish  oppressed  by  the 
weight  of  their  debts,  involving  in  their  ruin  many  individuals  and 
families.  .  .  There  is  no  doubt  that  Charles  Ili  followed  the 
counsels  of  a  wise  and  generous  policy  in  dictating  laws  and  regu- 
lations to  secure  free  trade  of  the  metropolis  with  its  colonies ; 
and  it  was  right  here,  and  by  that  exercise  of  discretion,  that  he 
gave  the  coup  de  grace  to  the  companies  existing  in  1765,3— a  clear 
proof  that  their  life  is  the  death  and  their  death  the  life  of  general 
trade."  ^ 

Results  of  Restriction 

If  this  can  be  said  of  the  companies,  it  is  of  course  doubly  true 
of  the  still  more  evil  system  which  they  occasionally  replaced. 
But  the  latter  was  so  firmly  established  and  so  tenaciously  and 
tyrannously  maintained  that  it  could  scarcely  disintegrate  as  a 
result  of  agitation  and  resistance  within  the  empire  ;  the  power 
that  broke  it  finally  struck  from  without,  and  its  interference  was 
invited  by  the  very  height  of  pretension  and  presumption  exhibited 
by  the  system.  Nevertheless  there  was  resistance  within,  even 
though  it  commonly  took  the  form  of  connivance  with  foreign 
invasion.  The  colonies  suffered  progressively  from  restriction  as 
they  advanced  in  population  and  resources  ;  they  were  the  victims 
of  irrational  exploitation  and  needed  but  slight  contact  with  freer 
systems  in  order  to  realize  it.  "  The  clearest  result  of  this  organi- 
zation of  commerce  was  to  diminish  the  supply  of  European  goods 
in  America  without  other  compensation  than  the  enormous  profits 
made  by  a  corporation  of  merchants."  ^  While  at  the  outset  any 
system  was  good  that  provided  safe  supplies,  even  though  they 
were  very  dear,  for  a  small  dependent  population,  as  time  went 
on  the  inadequacy  of  the  means  employed  pressed  home  in  ways 
both  direct  and  indirect.  The  old-time  tendency  to  prefer  large 
profits  upon  a  small  movement  of  merchandise  became  more  glar- 
ingly anachronistic  as  colonial  production  increased  and  diversified. 
The  effect  on  colonies  of  such  restriction  has  been  shown  up  more 
spectacularly  as  a  result  of  the  sturdier  resistance  of  the  English 
colonies  in  the  temperate  zone  against  that  policy  which  culminated 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  462-463.  ^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  29 ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  294. 


238  COLONIZATION 

in  the  Navigation  Acts.  In  Spanish  America  the  fleet  system  and 
what  went  with  it  were  all  but  prohibitive  of  any  great  development 
of  colonial  exportation;  by  them  the  life  of  the  colonics  as  expressed 
in  trade  was  restrained  upon  a  stage  from  which  the  dominant 
people  of  the  future  were  already  emerging.  The  colonists  peti- 
tioned in  vain  against  the  impregnable  fortification  of  vested  inter- 
ests and  the  rooted  governmental  system  of  suspicious  surveillance.^ 
But  the  realm  was  hermetically  sealed  that  the  victor  might  the 
more  conveniently  prey  upon  the  victim  ;  "  the  supplying  of  a 
great  kingdom  was  carried  on  like  the  provisioning  of  a  blockaded 
fortress."  ^  Free  competition  being  thus  eliminated,  and  in  the 
relative  superfluity  of  gold  and  silver,  prices  in  Spain  were  at  first 
five  times,  and  even,  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  thrice 
those  in  the  colonies.  "  Toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
Varinas  tobacco  cost,  in  Spain,  four  times,  and  in  the  rest  of 
Europe  seven  times  as  much  as  in  America."  "'  The  rising  reser- 
voir of  American  commodities  was  restrained  by  an  ever-sufficient 
and  rigid  barrier  from  overflow  upon  the  waiting  markets  of  the 
world.  Meanwhile  the  holders  of  the  monopoly  gained  from  lOO 
to  300,  and  in  some  cases  500  per  cent  from  this  frontier-trade 
and  its  artificial  restriction.^  Of  course  the  means  of  communica- 
tion, even  with  the  metropolis,  were  entirely  insignificant.  It  is 
not  sufficient  to  explain  the  small  exportation  of  the  colonies, 
particularly  in  bulkier  objects,  by  discanting  upon  freight-charges 
and  by  recalling  the  fact  that  ships  were  small  and  consequently 
must  carry  great  value  in  small  bulk  ;  prices  were  high  enough  in 
Spain  to  cover  heavy  costs,  and  numbers  and. frequency  of  vessels 
and  voyages  could  and  would  have  made  up  for  size  had  the  sys- 
tem approached  that  of  freedom.  But  it  was  precisely  number  and 
frequency  that  engaged  the  invidious  attention  of  the  regulators. 
"  When  the  trade  of  Seville  was  at  the  height  of  its  prosperity, 
both  fleets  did  not  carry  more  than  27,500  tons,  while,  for  example, 
in  1836  the  little  island  of  Mauritius  [under  a  free  system]  sent 
17,690  tons  to  England  and  received  18,576  tons  from  her.^    The 

1  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  217-218. 

2  Iluniboldt,  quoted  in  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  34. 

8  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  412,  414-415;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  283-284;  Ro- 
scher, Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  34.  *  Colmeiro,  II,  404 ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  34. 

^  "  Thus  a  little  island  lost  in  the  Indian  Ocean  with  a  population  of  less  than 
150,000  had  ...  a  commercial  movement  much  more  considerable  than  that  of  the 
whole  of  Spanish  America  during  the  best  times  of  the  system  of  the  galleons  and 
the  silver  fleet."    Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  29. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   POPULATION   AND  TRADE       239 

last  silver  fleet  arrived  in  1778J  previously,  the  annual  exportation 
from  Vera  Cruz  reached,  on  an  average,  617,000  piastres;  after 
1787,  2,840,000  piastres  annually.  The  total  exports  to  and 
imports  from  Spanish  America  in  1778  amounted  to  148,500,000 
reals,  carried  by  about  300  ships,  and  paying  duties  of  6,500,000 
reals.  Ten  years  later  the  trade-movement  had  risen  to  1,104,500,- 
000  reals  yielding  55,000,000  in  duties."  As  occasion  will  appear 
later  to  show,  a  similar  buoyancy  under  removal  of  pressure  was 
exhibited  by  Cuba.^ 

The  fleets  were  small  and  slow  ;  they  were  intended,  as  the  term 
"  silver  fleet  "  indicates,  to  carry  mainly  one  kind  of  product,  that 
of  exploitation.  They  did  not  follow  out  even  the  meager  yearly 
schedule;  "during  the  latter  part  of  the  sixteenth  century  the 
regularity  of  the  voyages  of  the  fleets  to  New  Spain  was  disturbed 
by  the  war  with  the  Netherlands  and  England,  so  that  only  eleven 
fleets  arrived  at  Vera  Cruz  in  the  last  twenty  years  of  the  century."  ^ 
The  policy  of  Spain  which  led  her  into  constant  strife  with  other 
nations  ^  thus  impinged  upon  the  bound  and  helpless  colonies  ;  in 
fact,  the  fleet  system,  concentrating  masses  of  treasure  as  it  did, 
tempted  aggressors  to  render  its  activity  less  regular  and  efficient. 
In  the  absence  of  competition  this  agency  stamped  the  commercial 
development  of  the  colonies  with  the  character  of  discontinuity 
and  artificiality.  The  words  of  Leroy-Beaulieu,'*  already  cjuoted  in 
connection  with  the  Portuguese,  aptly  apply  to  the  present  case  : 
"  Une  surexcitation  extraordinaire  quand  un  de  ces  vaisseaux 
arrivait,  suivie  de  la  plus  grande  torpeur  des  que  ce  vaisseau  etait 
parti.  La  continuite  des  echanges,  leur  multiplicite,  I'abondance 
des  transactions  plus  que  leur  importance  :  voila  ce  qui  donne  au 
commerce  de  I'essor,  ce  qui  en  entretient  I'activite,  ce  qui  le  rend 
productif  et  progressif." 

Even  supposing  the  Spanish  system  to  have  been  favorable  to 
agriculture  and  manufacture  in  the  abstract,  or  as  local  vocations, 
the  narrow  and  selfish  policy  persisted  in  respecting  exchange 
could  not  but  have  rendered  such  favors  in  effect  illusory  and  even 
cynical.  Interference  was  ever  poised  to  pounce  upon  commerce 
which  strayed  from  the  paths  whose  treading  meant  wealth  for  the 
few.  The  provinces  were  all  cut  off  from  one  another,  for  inter- 
colonial exchange  had  no  picturesque  side,  but  was  simply  low-lived 

^  Roscher,  p.  166;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  287-288;  p.  330,  below. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  286.  ^  See  p.  200,  above,  and  pp.  242  ff.,  below. 

*  I,  48 ;  see  p.  114,  above. 


240  COLONIZATION 

1  trade. ^  The  special  aggravation  of  the  situation  lay  in  "  the  fact 
'  that  the  mother-country,  to  which  the  colonies  were  chained  in  all 
I  economic  matters,  was,  after  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
really  retrograding";^  so  that  the  life  of  the  new  societies  was 
joined  to  the  destiny  of  one  already  becoming  decrepit  to  the 
degree  above  described.^  It  is  comprehensible,  then,  why  the 
colonies  got  along  better,  despite  the  absence  of  the  fleets,  in  war- 
time, and  why  prosperity  followed  the  throwing  off  of  Spanish 
rule.^  With  more  specific  reference  to  Buenos  Ayres,  one  writer 
declares  :  "  The  trade  restrictions  which  were  imposed  upon  the 
colonies,  instead  of  permitting  them  to  start  with  the  advantages 
of  the  achievements  of  European  civilization,  in  many  cases  drove 
them  back  to  the  barbarism  of  the  aborigines,  and  doomed  them 
to  go  over  again  the  painful  way  up  to  civilization,  which  their 
ancestors  had  trod  in  Europe.  To  go  from  Spain  to  America, 
except  to  a  few  privileged  places,  was  not  merely  to  go  into  exile, 
but  even  to  renounce  civilization."  ^ 

Disintegration  of  the  Restrictive  System 

The  pressure  against  the  restrictive  system  as  described,  applied 
largely  from  without,  but  also  consequent  in  part  upon  enlighten- 
ment within,  began  to  take  visible  effect  early  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  Ports  were  opened  to  merchants  during  wars,  however 
speedily  they  were  closed  with  the  beginning  of  peace  ;  the  English 
were  admitted  to  the  Puerto  Bello  fair,  with  the  result  that  smuggling 
speedily  increased.  "The  galleons  fell  rather  rapidly  from  15,000 
to  2,000  tons  (about  1737).  After  1740  permission  was  granted 
to  fit  out  so-called  register-ships  in  the  intervals  between  fleet  and 
fleet,  especially  to  such  parties  as  had  a  share  in  no  fleet.  About 
1748  the  galleons  were  entirely  given  up;  now  one  could  sail  di- 
rectly to  Chile  and  Peru  around  Cape  Horn,  and  Panama  and  Puerto 
Bello  collapsed.  But  on  the  other  side  trade  was  still  fettered  to 
the  monopoly  of  Cadiz  and  paid  high  royal  licenses."  In  1765  the 
West  Indies  were  opened  to  all  Spaniards  and  to  a  number  of 
different  ports  under  a  duty  of  six  per  cent ;  this  system  was  ex- 
tended to  Peru,  Chile,  Buenos  Ayres,  New  Granada,  and  Guatemala 

^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  26;  RoBcher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  33-35;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer., 
pp.  291-292  ;  cf.  pp.  195  ff.,  above,  and  3i6ff.,  below.      ^  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  35. 

^  Pp.  182  ff.  Enlightened  Spanish  opinion  protested  against  the  system  under  dis- 
cussion as  destructive  to  Spain.    Colmeiro,  II,  410-41 1. 

••  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  31-32.  ^  Moses,  p.  286. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:    POPULATION   AND  TRADE        241 

in  1778,  and  finally,  a  decade  later,  to  New  Spain.  "The  more 
important  a  colony  was  for  the  mother-land,  the  later  was  it  re- 
solved to  open  it  to  free  trade.  Furthermore,  the  duty  on  many 
classes  of  goods  was  lowered,  and  in  1774  the  previously  existing 
prohibition  of  internal  trade  between  Peru,  Guatemala,  New  Spain 
and  New  Granada  was  removed."  ^  An  experiment  in  opening  all 
Spanish  harbors  to  trade  (1748)  resulted  in  so  many  bankruptcies 
in  the  ranks  of  the  pampered  Cadiz  houses  that  it  had  to  be  given 
up.2  In  1778  the  transatlantic  commerce  experienced  a  complete 
transformation  :  the  fleet  system  was  renounced  finally  and  the 
Cadiz-Seville  monopoly  done  away  with.  In  place  of  the  latter, 
nine  of  the  most  important  ports  of  Spain  were  granted  the  right 
to  send  ships  to  the  colonies,  while  across  the  ocean  no  less  than 
twenty-two  harbors  were  opened  to  direct  commerce  with  the 
metropolis.  And  a  reasonable  system  of  taxation  of  trade  was 
introduced.^ 

The  end  of  the  eighteenth  and  the  first  years  of  the  nineteenth 
century  saw,  therefore,  the  initiation  of  a  liberal  policy.  This  was 
mainly  the  work  of  the  one  modern  Spanish  king,  Charles  III 
( 1 759-1 788),  and  his  ministers,  Aranda  and  Galvez.  The  measures 
carried  through  by  his  government  resulted  in  a  great  expansion 
of  trade  which  reacted  powerfully  upon  agriculture  and  industry. 
Scientific  expeditions,  the  most  notable  of  which  were  those  of 
Alexander  von  Humboldt  and  his  companion  Bonpland,  were  insti- 
tuted at  royal  initiative.  "  Upon  this  field  the  Spanish  colonial 
policy  ranked  among  the  enlightened."  ^  But  reform,  however  well- 
intentioned  and  extensive,  could  not  measure  up  to  the  demands  of 
a  set  of  provinces  so  long  repressed,  and  now  at  length  alive  to 
all  the  possibilities  of  freedom  as  taught  them  by  other  peoples ; 
in  a  short  time  they  were  working  out  their  own  salvation,  and  in 
the  injured  and  hostile  state  of  mind  engendered  by  separation  in 
strife  and  bloodshed.  Spain's  later  trade-relations  with  her  for- 
mer colonies  have  never  been  large ;  she  has  received  little  or  no 
preferential  treatment,  contrasting  unfavorably  in  this  respect  with 
Portugal  in  the  latter's  relations  with  Brazil.^ 

1  Roscher,  pp.  169-170;  Watson,  II,  143-144;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  32-33. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  39,  note. 

3  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  425-426 ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  297  ;  Watson,  pp. 
212-213. 

*  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  427.  But  Spain  still  reserved  many  special  privileges  for 
herself;  Watson,  II,  212-213.  ^^^  ^  ^^^^  °f  ^^^  exports  and  imports  at  Vera  Cruz 
for  1803,  see  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  44,  note.  ^  Cf.  pp.  162-164,  above. 


CHAPTER  VII 

SPANISH  AMERICA :  RELATIONS  WITH  FOREIGNERS  AND 

NATIVES 

It  is  in  the  plan  of  this  book  lo  supplement  the  more  general 
survey  of  the  Spanish  system  as  applied  to  the  colonies  with  a 
rather  more  special  account  of  the  outlying  parts  of  the  empire. 
The  history  of  these  outer  areas  shows  enough  variation  from  that 
of  New  Spain  and  Tierra  Firme  needlessly  to  confuse  a  perspective 
of  the  colonial  system,  while  it  seems  adapted,  considered  apart,  to 
throw  certain  side-lights  upon  that  which  is  more  general.  Hence 
our  treatment  of  the  restrictive  system  will  proceed,  with  only 
casual  reference  to  Buenos  Ayres  and  Chile,  Cuba  and  the  Philip- 
pines, directly  to  the  external  influences  leading  to  its  collapse. 

The  Exclusion  Policy 

It  has  been  explained  how  this  system  introduced  limitations 
as  respects  places,  means,  and  times ;  discriminations  also  against 
persons  and  groups  within  the  empire  have  been  involved  in  the 
monopoly  idea.  Conformably,  however,  with  Spanish  preposses- 
sions, the  most  severe  discrimination  was  bound  to  be  that  directed 
against  foreigners,  especially  as  these  were  heretics.  Here,  again, 
we  find  the  Emperor  Charles  initiating  the  system  in  a  cosmopoli- 
tan spirit  that  evoked  Spanish  displeasure  ;  he  improved  upon  the 
extension  granted  by  Ferdinand,  and,  taking  advantage  of  his 
imperial  station,  opened  trade  with  the  New  World  to  all  his  many 
and  varied  subjects. ^  The  emperor's  theory  was  that  the  new 
lands,  for  other  reasons  as  well  as  fiscal  ones,  needed  forces  for 
their  development,  and  he  could  not  fail,  as  a  Netherlander,  to  see 
that  these  could  not  be  furnished  by  non-industrial  Sjiain.  Hence 
he  enlisted  two  of  the  strongest  industrial  factors  of  the  day,  the 
German  families  of  the  Fugger  and  Welscr,  in  the  opening-up  of 
America,  and  was  willing  to  admit  rather  generally  those  who  were 

1  P.  212,  above;  IJourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  282. 
242 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES        243 

not  foreigners  to  him,  however  alien  they  were  to  Spain.  This 
course  was  reversed  as  time  went  on  and  the  participation  of 
foreigners  was  viewed  with  increasing  disfavor.  Monoi)oly  ideas 
were  in  the  spirit  of  the  time  and  not  in  Spanish  minds  alone  : 
"  Foreigners  were  excluded  from  trade  with  our  colonies,  as  our 
men  were  from  theirs,  for  in  the  whole  world  the  policy  of  monop- 
oly in  favor  of  the  mother-country  was  held  to  be  a  wise  one."  ^ 
After  Charles  the  rigidity  of  the  exclusion  of  aliens  developed  apace. 
By  1592  all  unnaturalized  foreigners  were  prohibited  from  going  to 
the  Indies,  and  this  policy  was  adhered  to  until  the  downfall  of 
Spain's  rule  on  the  mainland.  With  what  success  this  was  accom- 
plisKed  may  be  judged  from  the  account  of  Humboldt  (about  1800)  : 
in  five  years'  travel  he  happened  upon  but  one  German  resident ; 
and  he  found  the  inhabitants  of  remoter  provinces  hardly  able 
to  conceive  that  there  could  be  Europeans  who  did  not  speak 
Spanish. 2 

It  should  be  realized  that,  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  in  the  main- 
tenance of  pretensions  to  such  monopoly,  Spain  was  at  the  outset 
abundantly  able  to  defend  her  title.  She  was  regarded  in  the  early 
sixteenth  century  as  unquestionably  the  first  land-power  as  well  as 
the  first  sea-power  in  the  world  ;  and  even  the  prowess  of  the 
individual  Spaniard  was  greatly  feared.  Her  only  competitor  was  ^^ 
Portugal ;  and  avoidance  of  collision  with  the  latter  was  sought  in 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  Tordesillas.^  This  reputation  was 
enjoyed  for  some  time  after  it  had  ceased  to  be  justified,  and  did 
not  lose  its  menace  until  after  the  defeat  of  the  Invincible  Armada 
in  1588.  Of  a  consequence  the  captains  were  few  and  daring  who 
despised  the  early  apparatus  to  secure  exclusion  possessed  by  the 
Spaniards.  And  to  this  material  discouragement  of  invasion  was 
added  the  powerful  menace  involved  in  the  confirmation  by  the 
Pope  of  the  Spanish,  as  of  the  Portuguese,  monopoly.  It  took  the 
Reformation  to  shatter  this  supernatural  sanction,  and  it  was  a 
long  time,  despite  the  incitement  of  rich  booty,  before  the  passing 
of  old  attitudes  and  the  fading  of  the  survivals  of  former  piety  had 
removed  all  hesitation  about  invading  the  forbidden  regions. 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  397-398;  Moses,  pp.  162-164  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  329  ff. 

2  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  246-247. 

8  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  29;  cf.  pp.  90  and  123,  above. 


.V 


244  COLONIZATION 

The  Safeguarding  of  the  Monopoly 

The  Spaniards,  then,  "  claimed  lo  be  the  absohitc  lords  of  the 
traffic  with  the  Indies  and  regarded  all  participation  on  the  part  of 
foreigners  as  a  manifest  usurpation."  ^  The  very  envy  which  their 
American  possessions  provoked  confirmed  them  in  this  attitude  ; 
consequently  their  disposition  toward  foreign  interlopers  was  a 
compound  of  arrogance,  self-righteous  bigotry,  and  rage.  It  mo- 
tived such  proceedings  against  invading  groups  as  the  massacre  in 
cold  blood  of  the  French  in  Florida  (1564-1567),^  and  such  cruel 
treatment  of  isolated  foreigners  as  the  Inquisition  alone  knew  how 
to  allot.  "  Until  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  Span- 
iards treated  the  entry  of  any  foreign  ship  into  American  waters 
as  a  crime.  Shipmasters  who  were  stranded  on  their  shores  were 
frequently  executed  or  sent  to  the  Mexican  mines  for  life."  And 
when,  later,  aliens  were  tolerated  in  America,  their  orthodoxy  was 
subject  to  recurrent  and  exasperating  scrutiny  on  the  part  of  the 
Holy  Office.  "  Later  suspicion  was  aroused  respecting  the  colonists 
themselves  ;  the  idea  was  to  impede  that  introduction  of  foreign 
ideas  which  sometimes  accompanies  the  merchandise  from  foreign 
ports.  The  laws  were  Draconian  and  the  j^ractices  pitiless.  Com- 
merce with  the  foreigner,  in  the  absence  of  express  permission, 
was  prohibited  on  pain  of  death  and  confiscation."  ^ 

In  these  and  many  other  restrictions  the  spirit  of  the  monopoly- 
hcjlder  is  revealed  ;  for  they  cannot  be  justified  by  benevolent  intent, 
nor  explained  purely  as  the  outcome  of  religious  tenets  or  of  eco- 
nomic theories,  even  if  the  mercantile  system  be  included.  With 
regard  to  the  latter,  Leroy-Beaulieu  ■*  says  :  "It  is  almost  exclu- 
sively to  that  morbid  and  chronic  state  of  distrust  and  suspicion 
that  the  exclusive  and  restrictive  organization  imposed  by  Spain 
upon  the  commerce  of  her  colonies  must  be  attributed  ;  it  is  an 
error  to  see  in  all  these  restrictions  an  application  of  the  mercantile 
system  —  for  such  a  view  rests  upon  a  confusion  of  periods.  It  is 
perfectly  possible  that  in  the  long  run  false  economic  theories  had 
grafted  themselves  upon  the  i:)()litical  motives  which  had  brought 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  416-417. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p]).  176-1.S0,  189;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  29;  Leroy 
Heaulieu,  I,  23. 

8  Ro.scher,  Sp.  T'ol.  Sys.,  p]).  2S-29 ;    Leroy-Heaulieii,  I,  23;   Moses,  pp.  62-63. 
'  I,  24. 


SPANISH  AMERICA  :    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES        245 

forth  the  commercial  system  of  Spain,  but  it  is  inexact  to  assert 
that  this  system  found  its  first  cause  in  the  said  economic  theories. 
It  was  with  the  purpose  of  excluding  foreigners,  not  of  favoring  the 
manufacturers  of  the  metropolis,  that  Spain  applied  such  strict 
regulation  to  the  relations  of  America  with  Europe."  "A  state 
which  conceals  within  itself  numerous  and  important  conflicting 
elements,  and  can  remain  master  of  them  only  by  means  of  a  very 
artificial  governmental  machinery,  will  always  be  inclined  to  restrict 
as  far  as  possible  the  intercourse  of  its  own  people  with  foreigners."  ^ 
To  what  extent  such  conditions  prevailed  in  Spain  and  the  colonies 
it  has  been  the  aim  of  much  of  the  foregoing  to  show. 

The  very  constitution  of  physical  nature  in  Spanish  America 
lent  itself  aptly  to  the  enforcement  of  measures  of  exclusion  such 
as  could  never  have  been  maintained  so  successfully,  for  example, 
along  the  coast  north  of  Florida.  The  experience  of  the  Dutch 
West  India  Company  seems  to  bear  this  out.^  Owing  to  the  tropical 
climate  and  its  concomitants,  especially  yellow  fever,  the  coasts 
of  New  Spain  and  Tierra  F'irme  were  practically  uninhabitable  for 
Europeans,  or  even  Indians ;  and  those  of  Peru  and  Chile  were 
largely  desert  for  lack  of  rain.  Of  a  consequence  the  population 
was  concentrated  upon  interior  plateaus ;  and  the  highlands  were 
accessible,  in  the  absence  of  rivers  of  any  claim  to  navigability, 
only  by  means  of  very  steep  and  tiresome  mountain  roads.  More- 
over, there  were  but  two  passable  harbors  on  the  eastern  coast  of 
New  Spain  :  Vera  Cruz  and  Campeche,  both  controlled  strategic- 
ally by  Havana ;  and  New  Granada  had  scarcely  any  outlets  on 
the  Gulf.  The  Isthmus,  even  after  Magellan's  passage,  effectually 
closed  the  whole  Pacific  coast,  and  its  two  harbors,  Puerto  Bello 
and  Panama,  provided,  with  the  few  above-named,  ideal  points  of 
supervision  for  the  whole  stream  of  trade.  Again,  the  very 
approaches  were  difificult,  for  the  prevailing  winds  of  the  Gulf 
seriously  impeded  navigation  upon  its  sixteenth-  to  eighteenth- 
century  stage,  and  the  voyage  down  the  west  coast  of  South 
America  was  long  and  tedious.^  And,  finally,  the  Spaniards  held 
all  the  island  harbors,  thus  controlling  way-stations  as  well  as 
terminals.  Realizing  the  strength  of  its  position,  the  government 
made  no  effort  to  improve  upon  natural  conditions  ;  it  accentuated 

1  Roscher,  p.  158.  2  cf  pp  ^j^  ff ^  below. 

2  "  Ulloa  relates  a  popular  anecdote  of  a  .ship-captain  who  married  a  wife  in  Payta, 
but  before  he  arrived  in  Callao  had  a  son  who  was  able  to  read  ;  and  the  distance 
covered  amounted  only  to  140  leagues."    Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  22,  note. 


246  COT.OXIZATION 

them  rather,  and  preserved  them.  No  port  was  allowed  within 
eighty-five  leagues  of  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  ;  the  roads  and 
harbors  were  purposely  neglected.  After  the  reign  of  Charles  V 
a  possible  passage  through  the  Isthmus  was  neither  sought  nor 
desired.^  Internal  communications  were  thwarted  or  actually  pro- 
hibited. The  provinces  were  in  effect  removed  to  the  greatest 
distance  possible  both  from  each  other  and  from  Europe  ;  and 
those  which  could  not  be  so  isolated  (Caracas,  Orinoco  region, 
Buenos  Ay  res)  became  objects  of  the  systematic  neglect  of  the 
mother-country.  It  was  felt  that  foreign  influence  called  forth 
objectionable  leanings  toward  independence ;  and,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  movement  for  separation  did  begin  in  Caracas  and  Buenos 
Ayres.^ 

Despite  all  these  elaborate  devices  for  purging  off  the  foreigner, 
the  Spanish  could  not  keep  him  out  of  America  any  more  than 
they  could  do  without  him  in  Spain.  In  fact,  a  large  percentage 
of  the  gains  of  Spanish  merchants  came  from  activities  as  middle- 
men between  the  productive  nations  of  Europe  and  Spanish 
America ;  and  even  from  commissions  as  agents  of  the  foreign 
merchants.^  Whatever  mercantilists  there  were  among  the  Span- 
ish must  have  been  shocked  to  find  that  Spain's  commerce  was 
"passive"  with  all  the  nations  of  the  world  and  "active"  with 
the  Indies  alone.*  Attempts  were  made  to  shorten  the  role  of  the 
foreign  producers,  and  in  particular  a  decree  was  issued  early  in 
1603  "which  imposed  an  additional  ta.x  of  30  per  cent  upon  the 
import  and  export  of  all  wares  whose  owners  were  not  in  a  position 
to  demonstrate  that  neither  the  goods  nor  the  vessels  had  had  any 
connection  with  the  Netherlands  nor  were  destined  for  any  such. 
This  was  all  that  was  needed  to  bring  the  passive  trade  also  of  Spain 
to  complete  ruin,  for  even  without  this  she  possessed  no  longer  any 
active  trade.  Even  without  the  new  tax-vexations  every  incoming 
or  outgoing  ship  was  subjected  no  less  than  seven  times  to  visita- 
tion and  control  on  the  part  of  the  most  diverse  authorities,  and 

^  Charles  V  supported  the  wish  of  Cortes  and  Pizarro  for  the  finding  of  a  passage 
or  the  piercing  of  the  Isthmus  ;  even  PhiHp  II  cherished  similar  ideas  at  first,  but  later 
forbade  even  the  mention  of  such  a  canal.  The  Spanish  Cortes  ordered  the  cutting 
through  of  the  Isthmus  in  1814.    Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  30,  note  5. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  vSys.,pp.  29-31  ;  cf.  p.  36.  "  We  are  told  that  .  .  .  the  Spaniards, 
in  order  to  impede  the  intercourse  by  land  Ijetween  the  provinces,  had  left  isolated 
Indian  races  on  the  intervening  frontiers  intentionally  unconquered.  ..."    Id.,  p.  22. 

^  Colmeiro,  II,  418-419. 

*  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  43-44  ;  Colmeiro,  II,  440. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES        247 

was  naturally  compelled  just  so  often  to  pay  now  larger,  now 
smaller  sums.  .  .  .  But  Henry  IV  of  France  retorted  to  the  Span- 
ish measures  by  a  general  prohibition  of'  trade  with  Spain.  The 
natural  result  of  this  was  that  the  tax-decree  had  at  once  to  be 
susi)cnded  ;  and  then  one  nation  after  another  obtained  exempticjii 
from  the  measure  through  new  trade-agreements."  ^ 

The  Infringement  of  the  Monopoly 

In  the  attempt  to  maintain  exclusion  in  the  colonies  it  speedily 
became  evident  that  the  Spanish  were  contending  with  two  parties 
whose  interests  were  one :  the  foreigners  and  the  colonists.  The 
exaggerated  respect  for  the  Spanish  arms  had  de:reased  rapidly 
toward  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  when  it  was  seen  ever 
more  clearly  that  Spanish  pretensions  were  analogous  to  those  of 
the  Portuguese  in  respect  of  their  emptiness  ;  and  the  old  rever- 
ence for  and  fear  of  the  papal  sanction  was  yielding  before  more 
rational  thinking.  But  it  was  just  about  this  time  that  the  monopoly 
was  enforced  most  strictly,  and  so,  to  all  appearance,  must  be  most 
rich  and  powerful.  It  is  precisely  when  a  monopoly  bears  this 
reputation  that  it  is  about  to  become  the  object  of  general  assault 
and  attempted  infringement,  for  it  promises  the  greatest  premiums 
for  its  own  breaking.  The  first  open  blow  was  struck  at  the 
monopoly  system  during  the  third  war  between  Spain  and  France, 
just  before  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  ;  thus  France  seems 
to  have  led  the  movement  through  her  privateers.  And  she  fol- 
lowed it  up  in  a  more  covert  way  by  secretly  encouraging  the  cor- 
sairs whose  presence  off  the  southern  and  western  coasts  of  the 
Peninsula  had  supplied  one  of  the  original  motives  for  the  fleet 
system.^  But  the  defense  of  the  Spaniards  upon  the  European  side 
of  the  Atlantic,  though  not  always  effective,  was  too  good  for  her 
adversaries  ;  so  the  pirates  turned  their  attention  to  the  source  of 
wealth,  the  colonies,  and  thither  they  were  followed  by  adventurers 
who  were  at  first  none  the  less  pirates  because  they  did  not  fly  the 
black  flag  and  did  make  some  pretense  at  trade. ^    Foremost  of  these 

1  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  79-80. 

2  Of  these  buccaneers  zx^^filihisters  Haebler  says  (Amerika,  p.  424)  :  "  These  home- 
less and  lawless  robber-bands  were  composed  of  subjects  of  all  countries  and  rulers; 
Spaniards  alone  could  find  no  place  in  their  society.  While  they  associated  peacefully 
with  other  nations,  they  pursued  everything  Spanish  with  the  most  appalling  hatred. 
Therefore  the  enemies  of  Spain  often  employed  and  in  part  protected  them," 

8  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  419-420. 


248  COLONI/.A'IION 

came  the  Dutch  and  English,  the  former  fresh  from  the  exposure 
of  the  Portuguese  pretensions  and  from  the  wars  of  independence 
from  Spain,  with  their  legacy  of  contempt  and  hatred  of  the 
oppressor ;  the  latter  long  trained  in  the  school  of  seamanship  and 
piracy  that  flourished  with  royal  connivance  under  the  name  of  the 
Channel  Rovers,  and  preyed  with  peculiar  satisfaction  upon  the 
property  and  subjects  of  the  monarch  most  hated  and  feared,  and 
presently  to  be  conquered.  It  is  but  natural  that  the  mode  of 
approach  to  Spanish  America  should  have  exhibited  in  about  equal 
degree  the  components  of  open  hostility  and  of  evasion  ;  the  one 
passed  readily  into  the  other  according  as  the  aggressors  were 
superior  or  inferior  to  the  local  Spanish  defense.  For  example, 
advantage  was  taken  of  the  well-known  demand  in  the  Spanish 
colonies  for  negro  slaves  ^  in  order  to  introduce  there,  often  with 
the  acquiescence  of  the  Spanish  authorities,  cargoes  of  Africans 
plundered  from  the  Portuguese  on  the  Guinea  coast.  During  this 
operation,  however,  the  importers  were  keenly  alive  to  any  chance 
for  offering  violence  ;  and  if  it  presented  itself,  they  managed  often 
so  to  provoke  the  Spanish  as  to  lend  to  their  own  aggression  the 
character  of  defense  from  unwarranted  attack.  In  the  sixties  of 
the  century  in  question  this  kind  of  trade  was  entered  into  by  nu- 
merous English  ships  ;  and  Drake  did  not  hesitate,  under  favorable 
conditions,  to  make  a  real  attack  on  Nombre  de  Dios  and  Panama 

If  we  seek  to  distinguish  evasion  through  contraband  trade  from 
direct  hostilities,  we  find,  first  of  all,  that  certain  outlying  regions, 
as,  for  instance,  those  of  the  Orinoco  and  La  Plata,  offered  the 
most  promising  objective  points  :  "  everywhere  the  finest  oppor- 
tunities to  land,  but  nevertheless  a  thin  population  and  neglect  on 
the  part  of  the  Spaniards.  It  was  therefore  in  these  places  that 
the  S])anish  revenue  system  received  its  most  grievous  wounds 
from  smuggling."  ^  But  the  invasion  speedily  extended  from  the 
outskirts  toward  the  center,  being  favored  by  the  colonists  :  "  There 
was  joined  to  the  necessary  scarcity  of  goods  the  oppression  of  the 
gild-ordinances  which  hindered  the  manufacture  of  fabrics,  hats 
and  any  other  article  of  clothing  destined  for  our  American 
dominicms,  in  the  variety  suitable  to  the  difference  of  climates, 
while  the  foreigners  succeeded  in  gratifying  the  taste  and  even  the 

i  Cf.  p.  280,  below.  2  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  pp.  420-421. 

■^  Koscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  36-37. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES        249 

caprice  of  the  consumers."  ^  In  other  words,  the  foreigners  catered 
to  local  demand  and  profited  largely,  while  the  colonists  got  from 
them  alone  what  they  wanted,  both  in  c|uantity,  quality,  and  time. 
Of  a  consequence  contraband  trade  became  very  popular,  and  pres- 
ently the  West  Indian  possessions  of  Holland,  as  well  as  those 
of  England  and  France,  became  smuggling-stations  on  a  very 
large  scale.  "Shortly  before  1740  the  English  alone  are  said  to 
have  had  as  much  share  in  the  Spanish  colonial  trade  in  ways 
prohibited  as  the  Spaniards  themselves  had  in  the  authorized 
ways." '^  Spanish  political  writers  complained  that  the  foreigners 
were  the  ones  who  really  benefited  by  the  trade  with  America, 
being  free  in  their  illicit  trafific  from  the  taxes  which  handicapped 
the  Spanish  industries.^  It  need  be  added  of  the  contraband  trade 
only  that  it  increased  and  penetrated  beyond  the  power  of  the 
government  to  check  it  —  a  state  of  affairs  self-confessed  in  the 
founding  of  the  Conipania  Guipuzcoana.'^ 

The  Asientos  :  Illicit  Traffic 

One  of  the  methods  by  which  the  thin  edge  of  the  steel  was 
inserted  between  the  armor-joints  of  the  restrictive  system  was 
the  extortion  of  commercial  privileges  as  the  result  of  success  in 
war.  Spain  was  pretty  generally  vulnerable  because  she  was  con- 
stantly at  war  or  on  the  verge  of  it ;  and  quite  often  her  antagonists 
were  the  Netherlands  and  England,  when  she  usually  ended  by 
having  to  make  concessions.  Neither  rival  had  any  scruple  about 
driving  the  wedge  home,  but  it  was  the  English  who  secured  the 
lion's  share  of  advantage.  The  Dutch  effected  entrance,  through 
the  treaty  of  Miinster  (1648),  into  the  ports  of  the  Indies,  East 
and  West,  and  other  slrch  considerable  concessions  were  wrung  by 
foFce  ;  but  the  most  spectacular  and  disastrous  was  that  secured  by 
the  English  in  the  so-called  Asiento  of  17 13  (Peace  of  Utrecht). 
The  Spaniards  had  never  been  able  to  supply  their  colonies  with 
a  requisite  labor  force  to  take  the  place  of  the  freed  Indians  ;^  it 
has  been  seen  that  foreign  captains  got  almost  their  first  insight 
into  American  conditions  by  providing  slaves  to  whom  even  the 
authorities  could  not  refuse  entrance.  During  the  personal  union 
with  Portugal  (i  580-1640)  slave-trading  contracts  were  awarded  to 

^  Colmeiro,  II,  415-416. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  37  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  294  ;  Moses,  pp.  288-292, 
cf.  pp.  316  ff.,  below.      3  Colmeiro,  II,  415.      *  Cf.  p.  236,  above.      ^  P.  2S2,  below. 


2  50  COLONIZATION 

Portuguese,  since  the  latter  held  the  supply-areas  on  the  African 
coast .^  Such  contracts  for  slave-importation  were  termed  asicntos, 
of  which  the  most  famous  was  the  Asiento  secured  by  the  Eng- 
lish. Reservation  is  made  of  its  bearing  upon  the  slave-system  for 
a  later  treatment ;  ^  but  its  service  in  disintegrating  the  monopoly 
system,  as  applied  especially  to  commerce,  was  certainly  signal. 
For  not  only  did  the _  English  secure  the  right  of  importing  4800 
slaves  per  annum  for  thirty  years,  but,  a  still  greater  concession, 
they  were  for  that  time  to  be  regarded  and  treated,  in  suspension 
of  the  laws  excluding  foreigners,  "  as  if  they  were  subjects  of  the 
crown  of  Spain";  the  only  restriction  being  "that  there  shall  not 
reside  in  any  one  of  the  said  ports  of  the  Indies  more  than  four  or 
six  Englishmen."  '^  Moreover,  England  was  to  be  allowed  to  send 
one  registered  ship  of  five  hundred  tons  burden  to  Puerto  Bello,  a 
concession  of  which  the  factors  of  the  English  South  Sea  Company 
took  advantage  by  covertly  increasing  this  ship's  capacity  and  by 
accompanying  her  with  transports  which  kept  out  of  sight  by  day 
and  from  which  her  cargo  was  rendered  marvelously  inexhausti 
ble  by  night.  By  such  means,  by  more  direct  smuggling,  and  by 
the  competition  of  the  Co^npaTiia  Gnipuzcoana  and  other  like  priv- 
ileged organizations,  the  commerce  of  the  fleets  was  sapped  until 
all  they  had  to  carry  was  fhe  king's  royalty  of  one-fifth  of  the~pFod- 
uct  of  the  silver  mines.*  In  1735  Philip  V  was  shortsighted  enough 
to  forbid  to  the  merchants  of  Mexico  and  Peru  the  making  of  re- 
mittances of  funds  to  Spain  in  order  that  they  might  be  sent  mer- 
chandise in  return  ;  "  and  in  reality  the  colonists  did  not  send  these 
by  the  fleets  and  galleons  to  Cadiz  but,  through  the  factors  of  the 
English  Company,  to  London,  employing  deception  in  revenge  for 
violence."  ^ 

In  this  and  other  ways  the  English  obtained  an  exact  knowledge 
of  the  tastes  and  needs  of  the  colonists,  and  could  extend  their 
smuggling  from  Jamaica  over  an  extraordinarily  wide  range.  Spain 
suffered  increasingly  by  comparison,  in  the  eyes  of  the  colonists, 
for  she  could  not  if  she  would  supply  their  needs  ;  so  that  presently 
Holland  followed  England,  Curasao  began  to  compete  with  |amaicaj 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  273.  Ships  trading  in  slaves  were  exempt  from  exami- 
nation or  duty.     Hume,  p.  374.  2  pp.  2S0  ff.,  below. 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  243  ff. ;  Moses,  p.  275. 

*  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  274-275,  295-296  ;  Colmeiro,  II,  420-421  ;  Leroy- 
Beaulieu,  I,  30-31 ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  38  ;  Watson,  II,  143;  Moses,  pp.  273-283. 

^  Colmeiro,  II,  420. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES        251 

and  in  time  every  manufacturing  nation  of  Europe,  and  even  the 
North  American  colonists,  had  part  in  the  Spanish  American  trade. ^ 
Even  at  the  beginning-  of  the  eighteenth  century  "the  contraband 
for  the  Spanish  colonies  had  risen  to  the  dignity  of  an  institution 
and  had  attained  a  degree  of  regularity  and  of  organization  which 
the  world  has  not  known  either  before  or  since."  And  the  result 
for  the  colonies  themselves  was  most  happy.^  For  Si)anish  trade, 
on  the  other  hand,  this  meant  ruin.  The  Dutch  gained  control  of 
all  the  commerce  of  Caracas;  it  will  be  recalled  that  from  1712  to 
1728  only  one  vessel  had  left  Caracas  for  Spain,  and  from  1708  to 
1728  but  five  had  sailed  from  Spain  to  Caracas.  While  of  all  the 
countries  of  the  world  Caracas  produced  the  most  cacao,  and  Spain 
consumed  the  most,  the  Dutch  had  the  trade  entirely  in  hand.^ 
"  The  direct  traffic  of  Spain  in  the  New  World  had  so  diminished 
that,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the  number  of  ships  which  each 
year  left  our  ports  in  cargo  for  American  ports  did  not  reach 
forty,  while  those  of  other  nations  passed  the  number  of  three 
hundred."  ^  It  is  plain  that  through  the  smuggling  alone  the  in- 
tegrity not  only  of  the  monopoly  system,  but  even  of  the  empire 
was  dangerously  menaced. 

Territorial  Aggressions 

For  their  illicit  trade  the  English,  Dutch,  and  French,  not  to 
mention  the  buccaneers,  needed  headquarters  and  a  base ;  but 
the  attainment  of  such  foot-holds  implied  territorial  aggression  ; 
and  this,  since  the  occupation  of  such  stations  must  ultimately  be 
an  open  one,  meant  overt  hostilities.  The  most  natural  locations 
for  the  contraband  stations  were  the  islands  ;  and  the  occupation 
of  these,  especially  the  smaller  ones,  was  easier  because  Spain,  pre- 
occupied with  the  regions  of  treasure-promise,  accorded  them  little 
attention.  During  the  early  part  of  the  sixteenth  century  they  had 
been  occasionally  visited  by  Spanish  hunters  of  Indian  slaves,  but 
were  later  deserted  and  left  uninhabited.  As  early  as  1605  the 
English  took  possession  of  Barbados,  and  in  1623  actually  settled 
in  St.  Kitts  ;  while  during  the  years  immediately  following,  the 
English,  Dutch,  and  French  laid  hand  upon  almost  all  the  smaller 
Antilles.    Even  Denmark  and,  for  a  brief  period,  Sweden  seized 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  38-39  ;  Moses,  p.  283 ;  Watson,  II,  143. 

2  I.eroy-Beaiilieu,  I,  30;   Moses,  pp.  169-170. 

^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  32.  *  Colmeiro,  II,  418. 


252  COLONIZATION 

and  held  diminutive  islands.  Up  to  1670  Spain  rco^ardcd  all  these 
enterprises  as  attacks  upon  her  empire,  and  punished  them,  where 
opportunity  offered,  accordingly. ^  Protests  were  of  no  avail,  for 
European  governments  could  disavow ;  none  of  them  could  con- 
trol its  own  pirates,  or  assumed  to  do  so.  And  besides,  to  refei 
still  again  to  an  important  consideration,  a  state  of  peace  in 
Europe  did  not  at  all  imply  at  this  period  an  analogous  condition 
in  the  colonies,  then,  in  effect,  far  more  remote  than  now.^  So 
that,  even  during  the  periods  when  open  wars  were  most  carefully 
guarded  against,  predatory  expeditions  were  a  regular  thing  in 
American  waters  ;  and  when  actual  war  broke  out,  these  naturally 
increased  very  markedly.  After  1585  scarcely  a  year  passed  when 
English  fleets  in  greater  or  less  numbers  did  not  harry  the  coasts 
of  Spain  and  of  the  colonies.  And  after  the  defeat  of  the  Invincible 
Armada  had  caused  the  halo  to  fade  from  Spanish  naval  prestige, 
they  began  to  compete  for  the  actual  control  of  the  sea.  "  The 
expeditions  of  1595,  159*^  and  1616  against  Guiana,  conducted  by 
Raleigh,  were  the  first  serious  efforts  of  the  foreigners  in  the  South 
American  continent  not  only  to  occupy  the  coast,  but  also  to  pene- 
trate the  interior."  ^ 

One  of  the  constant  temptations  to  which  the  nations  who  held 
these  little  empires  in  the  Antilles  were  subjected  was  to  try  issue 
with  the  silver  fleet ;  for,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Portuguese  sea- 
caravans,  the  concentration  of  treasure  provoked  an  irresistible 
inclination  to  test  the  strength  of  its  convoy.  But  this  was  re- 
doubtable enough  to  resist  anything  weaker  than  a  regular  navy, 
the  employment  of  which  meant  open  war.  Pirates  and  privateers 
hung  about  the  treasure-ships  and,  despite  reverses,  managed  to 
cut  out  an  occasional  prize  to  their  great  profit,  but  it  was  only  in 
time  of  war  that  the  fleet  as  a  whole  was  actually  attacked.  How- 
ever, there  were  sufficient  wars  to  lend  plentiful  occasion  for  such 
a  wholesale  enterprise  ;  the  Dutch  in  1607  resisted  the  demand 
that  a  truce  should  be  effective  on  both  sea  and  land,  for  they 
were  expecting  to  intercept  the  silver  fleet  off  the  Azores  and 
were  loath  to  give  up  the  favorite  device  of  fighting  Spain  with 
her  own  money.'*  In  1627  they  actually  took  the  fleet  from  New 
Spain,  and  besides  this  time  secured  large  booty  from  it  on  many 
other  occasions  ;   while  England  followed  hard  after  with  numerous 

1  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  ]5p.  423-424  ;  cf.  pp.  300,  340,  below. 

2  Cf.  p.  147,  note  3,  above.         ^  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  p.  421.         *  Hume,  p.  207. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES         253 

and  damaging;  lesser  attacks.  In  167 1  Morgan  and  the  buccaneers 
stole  the  accumulated  hoard  of  silver  at  Puerto  Bello.  The  fact  that 
the  fleet  was  often  discontinued  in  time  of  war  shows  the  extent 
of  the  depredations  feared.^  The  periods  of  war  likewise  introduced 
the  peoples  of  the  outlying  districts  of  the  empire  to  foreign  mer- 
chants, and  with  great  profit  and  edification  upon  both  sides.  In 
1702,  for  instance,  during  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  cer- 
tain ships  authorized  by  Louis  XIV  passed  through  the  forbidden 
Straits  of  Magellan  from  St.-Malo  to  Lima ;  and  since  they  found 
the  country  destitute  of  the  European  merchandise  it  required  they 
were  enabled  to  realize  800  per  cent  upon  their  cargoes.^  Because 
contraband  could  not  be  restricted  so  closely  during  wars,  the  latter 
really  brought  prosperity  to  the  colonies.^ 

The  first  point-blank  attack  upon  the  empire  was  that  of  Crom- 
well in  1655,  directed  at  Santo  Domingo  (Espaiiola)  and  culminat- 
"ini;-  \\  ilh  the  permanent  occupation  of  Jamaica  ;  this  was  dictated 
largely  by  the  personal  prepossessions  of  the  Protector,^  and  was 
not  repeated  in  so  direct  a  manner  until  the  capture  of  Havana  in 
1762.  But  the  extent  of  the  British  contraband  trade  which  devel- 
oped from  privileges  accorded  under  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  galled 
the  Spaniards  so  sorely  that  reprisals  and  mutual  recriminations 
were  the  order  of  the  day.  Hostilities  were  openly  initiated  by  the 
sack  of  Puerto  Bello  and  other  exploits  of  Vernon  in  1739,  and  for 
once  a  vigorous  reaction  took  place.  Vernon  was  repelled  from 
Cartagena,  and  Spanish  corsairs  took  English  merchantmen  in  a 
few  months  to  the  value  of  ^1,170,000.  All  Englishmen  were 
expelled  from  Spain  and  trade  with  them  was  strictly  prohibited.  .■^ 
The  force  of  this  resistance  was  due  largely  to  the  temporary  pre-  '  *'^ 
dominance  in  Spain  of  wise  administration  under  the  statesman  f^^>-^*-^ 
Patiiio,  who  had  imitated  the  policy  of  England  and  Holland.^  But  '"^  '  "^  '^ 
the  former  burden  of  misrule  always  rolled  back  with  irresistible 
inertia,  and  in  1762,  after  carrying  everything  before  them  and 
capturing  Grenada,  St.  Vincent,  St.  Lucia,  and  Tobago,  the  English 
took  Havana  and  treasure  to  the  value  of  ^15,000,000,  an  enormous 
quantity  of  arms  and  stores,  and  twelve  ships  of  war ;  in  the  same 
year  Manila  surrendered  to  an  English  fleet.    The  one  instrument 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  401  ;  Hume,  pp.  290—291. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  421  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  294-295. 
^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  31  ;  cf.  p.  251,  above. 

*  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  424 ;  Hume,  p.  277  ;  cf.  Woodward,  pp.  129-130. 
5  Hume,  pp.  374-380,  395  ;  cf.  p.  256,  below. 


2  54  COLONIZATION 

possessed  by  the  Spaniards  which  upheld  their  monopoly  in  earlier 
times,  and  after  the  divine  dispensation  securing  it  had  lost  its 
force,  was  their  navy.  It  has  been  seen  that  through  most  of  the 
sixteenth  century  Spain  was  the  first  naval  power  in  existence ; 
and  the  union  with  Portugal,  her  only  serious  rival,  in  1580,  con- 
siderably augmented  the  size  of  the  fleets  at  her  disposal.  Besides 
policing  the  New  World,  she  was  able  to  muster  J64  vessels,  well 
equipped  and  manned,  to  fight  the  Turks  at  Lepanto  (1571),  and 
shortly  thereafter  130  sail  with  10,000  men  on  the  occasion  of  fit- 
ting out  the  Invincible  Armada.  Again,  —  for  the  merchant-ma- 
rine of  those  days  was  much  more  than  a  cipher  in  war-times,  — 
she  had,  even  under  the  Catholic  Kings,  over  1000  merchant-ships. 
The  contrast,  seventy  years  after  the  Armada,  is  sharp  :  "in  1656 
the  whole  squadron  of  Spain  was  reduced  to  six  galleys  in  poor 
repair,  the  miserable  remnant  of  the  sixty  which  some  writers 
suppose  her  to  have  had  in  1535."^  And  as  for  the  merchant- 
vessels,  they  were  mostly  replaced  by  those  of  foreign  nations.^ 
This  represents  a  disastrous  decline,  and  an  efficiency  in  the  main- 
tenance of  former  advantages  diminished  almost  to  nothing. 

Decline  of  the  Spanish  Sea-Power 

Throughout  our  preceding  studies  in  the  field  of  commerce  and 
colonization,  that  metropolis  seems  to  have  held  the  center  of  the 
stage  which  possessed  the  most  efficient,  if  not  the  largest,  marine. 
Cases  still  to  be  cited  demonstrate  the  same  fact,  that  commercial 
and  colonial  empire  go  with  the  prevailing  sea-power.  It  is  some- 
times difficult  in  a  limited  field  to  judge  which  one  —  the  empire 
or  the  navy  —  was  the  factor  that  called  forth  the  other  as  a 
result :  whether,  to  put  it  in  a  more  modern  form,  trade  followed 
the  flag,  or  the  flag  trade.  However,  there  is  no  question,  given  a 
colonial  empire  founded,  as  most  of  them  have  been,  upon  trade  and 
across  the  sea,  that  under  conditions  of  competition  a  strong  navy 
is  all  but  indispensable  for  its  preservation.  It  is  no  wonder,  then, 
that  Spain  could  not  defend  or  hold  her  colonies,  even  though  Span- 
ish America  was  geographically  isolated  and  approachable  through 
a  few  points  only. 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  465-467  ;   Ilaebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  pp.  56-57,  8r. 

2  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  85;  Colmeiro,  II,  440,  471  ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp. 
43-44- 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES        255 

The  decline  of  the  much-needed  navy  is  but  another  phase  of 
the  disastrous  destiny  which  fell  upon  Spain  in  consequence,  of 
conditions  and  policies  detailed  above.  The  deterioration  of  the 
merchant-marine,  and  of  the  navy  as  well,  scarcely  needs  explana- 
tion after  the  restrictive  policy  is  fully  apprehended  :  "  in  general 
the  causes  for  the  decadence  of  Spain  in  the  seventeenth  century 
also  hold  good  for  her  retrogression  in  navigation,  for  without  agri- 
culture  or  fiqurishing.  manufactures  no  commerce  is  possible,  and 
without  commerce  there  is  nojnerchant  marine  or  navy."  ^  "  The  ( 
lack  of  competition  condemned  this  marine  to  immobility  :  it  made 
no  progress  and  was  in  the  eighteenth  century  what  it  had  been  in 


the  sixteenth."  ^  These  quotations  give  the  core  of  the  matter,  but 
some  attention  may  be  called  to  a  f^w  selected  details  of  unwise 
policy  and  stubborn  conservatism.  Naturally  the  regime  of  taxa- 
tion and  of  minute  and  suspicious  regulation  smote  the  Spanish 
ship-builder  and  seaman  as  they  did  the  rest  of  the  useful  members 
of  society  ;  ^  but  assuming  all  this,  which  was  general  and  need  not 
be  repeated,  it  is  to  the  special  system  of  restriction  represented 
by  the  fleets  and  galleons  that  attention  is  now  directed.  First  of 
all,  as  respects  the  merchant-shipping,  the  size  of  the  fleet  was 
limited  ;  it  needed  not  to  be  large,  for  there  was  not  much  product 
of  Spanish  industry  to  take,  and  foreign  goods  were,  on  principle, 
anathema ;  again,  the  return  cargo  made  demands  that  were  no 
greater.  But  few  ships  were  needed,  and  if  there  had  not  been 
some  evasion  of  the  system,  still  fewer  would  have  been  called  for 
even  by  the  trade  of  a  hemisphere.  Thirty  for  the  year  was  a  fair 
average  ;  and  as  almost  all  of  the  other  trade  possible  for  Spaniards 
was  discouraged,  it  is  no  wonder  that  presently  less  than  half  of 
the  ships  in  Spanish  harbors  were  Spanish,  and  that  there  was 
scarcely  any  Spanish  merchant-marine  left  outside  of  the  fleets."* 
Under  the  system  quality  was  called  for  with  about  as  little 
urgency  as  number.  As  all  the  ships  had  to  go  together,  the  pace 
was  that  of  the  slowest ;  all  were  armed  to  a  greater  or  less  degree 
and  lumbered  heavily,  like  floating  castles,  upon  their  way.  The 
naval  escort  of  the  fleets  consisted  normally  of  nine  galleons  and 
eight  frigates,  manned  by  1 500  persons,  of  whom  950  were  marines;" 

1  Colmeiro,  II,  470  ;  cf.  pp.  468-469. 

2  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  36.  ^  Cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  468,  470-471. 

■*  Haebler,  Wirt.  Bl.,  p.  85.    For  a  general  treatment  of  the  Spanish  shipping,  see 
Lindsay,  I,  554-620.  ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  286-287. 


256  COLONIZATION 

and  the  average  length  of  the  voyage  for  the  whole  aggregation, 
from  Spain  to  Mexico,  was  over  ten  weeks  for  the  estimated  6500 
miles. ^  The  small  demands  of  the  system,  and  the  early  security 
of  the  monopoly,  allowed  the  persistence  of  obsolescent  models, 
both  of  merchant  and  war  vessels.  Great  transformations  had 
indeed  taken  place  since  Columbus  set  out  with  a  flagship  of  at 
most  280  tons  and  two  only  partially  decked  tenders  of  certainly 
less  than  150  and  100  tons;  but  the  changes  were  more  striking 
to  the  eye  than  profitable  for  the  type.  Like  the  Portuguese 
carracks,  the  galleons  imposed  at  first  by  their  very  size  and 
unwieldy  bulk,  and  for  decades  there  appeared  to  the  backward 
and  unpractical  Spanish  no  need,  present  or  prospective,  of  change. 
Even  the  arts  of  seamanship,  at  first  so  great  a  care  to  the  Casa  de 
Contratacion,'^  were  suffered  to  become  antiquated.  The  whole 
decline  of  the  navy,  which  had  been  rapidly  retrograding  under 
cover  of  an  inflated  reputation,  became  evident  with  the  destruction 
of  the  Invincible  Armada ;  for  here  the  question  as  to  the  best 
adapted  type  of  vessel  and  of  naval  tactics  was  settled,  for  that 
stage  of  history,  once  and  for  all.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into 
detail  respecting  the  defeat  of  the  Armada,  for  the  story  has  been 
often  and  eloquently  told,  but  it  may  be  said,  in  a  word,  that  the 
Spanish  vessels  were  out-sailed,  out-maneuvered,  out-generaled  ; 
for  one  light  blow  received  many  severe  ones,  and  were  finally 
destroyed  or  forced  into  a  long  and  disastrous  homeward  journey 
around  Scotland.  Much  even  of  their  ill-fortune  harked  back  to 
the  incompetence  fostered  by  the  system  of  the  recluse  who  sent 
them.^  By  the  time  of  the  last  Austrian  king  the  sovereign  had 
no  ships  to  protect  trade  any  more  than  his  subjects  had  them  to 
trade  with  ;  merchants  lost  courage  and  ceased  to  struggle,  for 
their  ships  disappeared  into  the  hands  of  foreigners  and  trade  was 
destroyed  almost  as  thoroughly  as  agriculture  and  industry  had 
been.'*  In  the  eighteenth  century  some  attempt  was  made  to  revive 
the  merchant-marine  by  imitating  the  English  Navigation  Acts, 
but  the  whole  situation  was  so  bad  as  to  admit  of  little  alleviation.'^ 

'  Colmeiro,  II,  470  ff. ;  I.eroy-Beaulieu,  I,  36.  "The  voyage  from  Panama  to 
Lima  [1500  miles]  usually  took  two  months,  and  if  continued  to  Chile,  two  more. 
This  was  partly  owing  to  head  winds  and  adverse  currents,  for  the  return  voyage 
could  be  accomplished  in  less  than  half  the  time."  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  288.  On 
the  crossing  of  the  Pacific,  see  p.  348,  below,  and  refs. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  222-223.        ^  q{  Woodward,  pp.  29,61  ;  ]).  1S4,  above. 

*  Hume,  pp.  271,  304-305.  ''  Cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  471-472. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND    NATIVES         257 

THE  CONTACT  OF   RACES 

When  Roscher  says  *  that  the  Spanish  colonies  were  originally 
pure  conquest-colonies,  he  has  in  mind,  as  his  following  treatment 
demonstrates,  chiefly  the  phenomena  of  the  contact  of  races.  This 
is  the  topic  which  is  now  to  engage  our  attention  for  a  considerable 
space  ;  for  this  contact  of  races  called  forth  what  are  in  many 
respects  the  most  characteristic  phases  of  the  Spanish  colonial 
system  ;  ^  and  its  outcome,  for  better  or  worse,  has  determined  the 
destiny,  at  least  for  centuries  to  come,  of  a  large  section  of  the 
human  race. 

When  the  Spanish  arrived,  even  in  their  relatively  insignificant 
numbers,  in  America,  they  started  the  first  case  in  history  of  the 
permanejiL-CDatact  of  two  races  widely  separated  in  civilization, 
this  contact  taking  place  within  the  habitat  of  the  lower  race.  The 
Mediterranean  colonizers  had  never  encountered  this  eventuality  ; 
and  the  Portuguese  did  not  locate  in  India,  Africa,  or  the  Malay 
region  in  sufficient  numbers  to  create  the  conditions  of  real  race- 
contact.  In  India,  indeed,  they  met  a  race  in  many  ways  their 
superior  in  civilization.  But  the  Spaniards  found  an  ethnic  strain, 
whatever  its  origin,  which  was  new  to  the  civilized  world  ;  and  they 
lived  beside  it,  molded  its  life,  and  intermingled  with  it  for  many 
years  and  decades.  To  it  they  applied,  instinctively  or  with  con- 
scientious consistency,  a  policy  or  lack  of  policy  which  was  the  out- 
come of  their  own  separate  Aryan,  European,  and  local  history.  It 
may  be  said,  in  partial  anticipation,  that  the  case  was  analogous  in 
the  Philippines. 3  So  that  we  have  in  the  Spanish  colonies,  if  we 
care  so  to  view  the  situation,  the  first  historical  meeting,  upon  a 
scale  that  deserves  the  name,  of  two  of  the  great  varieties  or  sub- 
species of  the  genus  Homo. 

1  P.  133- 

2  The  most  noteworthy  brief  account  of  the  Indian  policy  of  Spain  is  from  the 
hand  of  the  veteran  authority,  Henry  C.  Lea.  It  offers  corroborative  evidence  for  the 
argument  of  this  chapter  and'oppose5""^t115^ittempts  at  exculpation  which  have  been 
fashionable  of  late  years."  The  narrative  is  built  about  the  biography  of  Las  Casas, 
to  whose  testimony  a  just  amount  of  weight  is  given.  Dr.  Lea  begins  and  ends  his 
article  with  practically  the  same  statement :  the  Spanish  relations  with  the  Indians 
show  the  essential  mildness  and  good  will  of  the  powers  at  Madrid,  but  they  likewise 
form  an  example  of  "  how  the  kindly  intentions  of  governments,  expres.sed  in  benefi- 
cent legislation,  may  be  rendered  nugatory  when  administration  is  intrusted  to  un- 

"w'uithy  IkiiuIs  or  when  sufficient  influence  is  brought  to  bear  by  those  who  profit  from 
abuses."  8  See  pp.  347  ff.,  below. 


U,JjL     (^^ 


\M      ""^  " 


f\r^,\^\'\ 


258  COLONIZATION 

The  Conflict  of  the  Economic  Need  and  the  Religious 

Motive 

The  Spaniards  started  out,  naturally  enough,  with  no  conception 
of  the  real  state  of  the  case  :  they  expected  to  encounter  a  numer- 
ous and  highly  cultured  Oriental  population,  with  whom  they  could 
trade  advantageously,  taking  to  themselves  all  the  gains  formerly 
reaped  by  the  Arab,  Turk,  and  Venetian  middle-man  ;  and  likewise 
to  find  the  old  enemy,  Islam,  with  which  they  were  prepared  to 
try  issue.  IrTofher  words,  while  conquest  was  in  mind,  it  was  not 
exactly  the  kind  of  subjugation  later  carried  out ;  and  if  religious 
aims  were  cherished,  they  were  directed  upon  the  old  lines  of 
crusade  rather  than  upon  that  of  such  conversion  of  primitive 
heathen  as  Prince  Henry  had  projected  for  non-Mohammedan 
Africa.  There  was  need,  therefore,  of  a  considerable  readjustment 
of  views  and  intents  when  the  truth  began  to  dawn  upon  the  minds 
of  sovereigns  and  people.  The  first  natives  encountered  by  Colum- 
bus, and  exhibited  through  specimens  in  Spain,  were  a  curiosity. 
Though  called  "  Indios,"  they  were  regarded  as  outlying  Oriental 
tribes,  as  the  natives  of  islands  off  the  coast  of  the  Grand  Khan ; 
there  were  no  especial  designs  upon  them,  but  rather  sympathy  for 
them,  and  pity,  and  the  pious  desire  to  insure  them  the  hopes  of  a 
Catholic  heaven.^  The  designs  were  on  the  more  remote  and  cul- 
tured states  and  their  trade,  and  had  no  gold  appeared  in  Espanola 
this  attitude  might  have  persisted  longer.  Certainly  one  of  the 
most  impolitic  things  Columbus  ever  did  was  to  send  these  wards 
of  the  Church  home  as  slaves.^  The  queen  could  not  support  this 
policy,  modeled  as  it  was  upon  that  of  the  Portuguese  ;  and  even 
in  her  will,  as  if  foreseeing  what  was  to  come,  she  recommended 
with  especial  earnestness  the  protection  of  the  natives  against  the 
greed  of  their  conquerors.'^  The  key  to  the  queen's  attitude  lay 
in  her  strong  religious  nature,  wherein  material  advantages  weighed 
but  little  when  their  attainment  was  conceived  to  be  detrimental 
to  the  extension  of  the  faith.'*    Had  the  discoverers  encountered 

^  The  following  provision  (1503)  may  serve  as  an  example  of  paternalism:  the 
governor  was  to  order  that  the  Indians  "nose  baiian  con  tanta  frequencia  como 
solian,  porque  los  Reyes  eran  informados  de  que  eso  les  haci'a  mucho  dafio."  Fabie, 
p.  52.  2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  50-51  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  232,  note. 

3  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  395-396. 

*  Cf.  the  instructions  of  Columbus,  the  very  first  of  which  read  :  "  Que  procure  la 
conversion  de  los  Indios  a  la  fe."  Fabie,  p.  18;  Zimmermann,  I,  232  ;  cf.  Bourne, 
Sp.  in  .\m<jr.,  p.  207. 


SPANISH  AMERICA  :    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES       -259 

Moslems  in  America,  the  religious  and  material  motives  would  have 
been  in  accord,  mutually  reenforcing  each  other,  as  they  did  with 
the  Portuguese  in  India ;  but  as  it  was,  these  two  great  driving 
factors  are  found  to  have  worked  at  cross  purposes  with  the  Span- 
iards, as  they  did  with  the  Portuguese  in  Brazil,  producing  through 
many  decades  an  inconsistency  between  legislation  and  execution, 
and  a  constant  strife  between  the  champions  of  conversion  and  those 
of  production  and  trade. 

Thus,  with  the  disappointing  encounter  with  a  primitive  race  and 
with  the  scent  of  the  precious  metals  to  disconcert  the  situation, 
the  unscrupulous  discoverers  threw  off  the  mantle  of  religion,  or 
rather  adapted  it  to  new  purposes ;  these  as  yet  good-natured 
islanders  should  be  used  in  getting  gold,  for,  after  all,  they  were 
the  conquered,  and  were  likewise  about  to  owe  their  salvation  to 
their  lords. ^  Apparently,  to  judge  by  the  fate  of  the  first  colony 
Columbus  left,  this  idea  of  superiority  to  such  a  strange  and  foolish 
race  speedily  worked  out  into  appropriation  of  all  they  had,  includ- 
ing their  women.^  Then  came  Columbus,  preoccupied  with  the 
necessity  of  proving  his  discovery  to  be  something,  as  values  were 
thenj^ecLkoned,,^  —  if  not  spices,  at  least  gold,  —  and  the  divergence 
between  the  "theoretic"  policy  of  Isabella  and  the  "practical" 
working-out  of  an  economic  and  political  problem  was  already 
begun.  For  many  subsequent  decades  of  the  Spanish  rule,  the 
exploiters  of  the  colonial  resources  were  driven  to  employ  the 
natives  as  their  instruments,  while  the  home-powers,  with  church- 
men at  their  elbows,  were  laboring  over  the  drawing-up  of  benevo- 
lent and  humanitarian  legislation  whose  underlying  purpose  was 
native  well-being  and  conversion.  As  in  Brazil,  the  clergy  sought 
the  scene  of  the  combat,  fought  bravely  for  their  charges  against 
the  inertia  of  an  unfavorable  economic  conjuncture,  gained  some 
successes,  especially  by  acquiescing  in  the  substitution  of  another 
slave-labor  supply  —  in  short,  held  up  on  the  ground  the  less 
materialistic  policy  with  which  the  authorities  were  disposed  to 
treat  the  natives  at  the  start. 

1  Martins  (Civ.  Iber.,  p.  242)  quotes  from  Lope  de  Vega : 

No  los  lieva  cristiandad 
Sino  el  oro  y  la  codicia. 

-  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  42  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  235.  In  Peru  there  was,  after  the 
conquest,  no  protection  whatever  for  the  women  of  the  country,  from  the  Virgins  of 
the  Sun,  down.    Watson,  I,  173. 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  44.   . 


26o    •  COLONIZATION 


Subjugation 

The  subjection  of  the  islanders  was  but  a  slight  matter ;  but 
when  the  emerging  motives  of  adventure  and  the  search  for  metallic 
booty  had,  as  above  described/  drawn  the  Spaniards  to  the  main- 
land, the  conquests,  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word,  began.  Subjuga- 
tion, so  far  as  the  natives  were  concerned,  was  carried  through 
with  remarkable  ease,  except  in  the  case  of  the  Araucanians  of 
Chile  ;  wherever  else  the  Spaniards  set  seriously  to  work  to  reduce 
the  tribes,  success  soon  attended  their  arms.  Without  going  into 
detail,  it  may  be  said  that  the  American  Indians  had  never  advanced 
to  the  stage  of  strong  and  coherent  state  organization  :  "  The  Aztec 
power  was  a  military  despotism  exercised  by  three  confederated 
warlike  tribes,  who  lived  upon  the  plunder  of  their  enemies  and  the 
tribute  of  their  subjects.  War  for  food  and  war  for  victims  for 
their  sacrifices  was  their  chief  occupation."  Their  subjects  were 
ever  ready  to  revolt ;  and  before  the  enlightened  and  resourceful 
Cortes,  their  resistance  speedily  disintegrated.^  Similarly  in  the 
only  other  region  of  high  indigenous  culture,  Peru,  no  national 
opposition  was  met  ;  the  overthrow  of  the  theocracy  meant  the 
demoralization  of  the  state  and  the  breaking-away  of  its  depend- 
encies. The  same  inability  to  prosecute  a  siege  to  the  end,  upon  a 
primitive  stage  of  military  and  other  development,  saved  the  Span- 
ish in  Cuzco,  as  it  had  the  Portuguese  over  and  over  again  in  the 
East.^  The  Caribs  (=  cannibals)  of  Tierra  Firme  afforded  consider- 
able resistance  to  the  Spaniards  for  a  time,  but  later,  like  other 
tribes  of  the  tropics,  became  the  victims  of  slave-raids  ;  nothing 
was  made  out  of  the  natives  of  the  north  of  Mexico,  of  Texas, 
Louisiana,  and  Florida,'^  except  through  missions,  and  the  same 
may  be  said  of  those  of  the  south  temperate  zone.  Indeed,  it  was 
here  that  constant  setbacks  were  experienced  through  the  protracted 
Araucanian  wars.  For,  beginning  with  the  first  expedition  of 
Almagro,  in  1535,  the  Araucanians,  a  peculiarly  patriotic  and  in- 
vincible people,  kept  up,  through  intermittent  wars,  a  successful 
resistance  of  encroachment  upon  their  rights,  until  the  treaty  of 
1785  secured  them  tranquillity  for  the  rest  of  the  colonial  period.-'' 

1  Pp.  177  ff.  2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  154-155,  1571  354- 

8  Watson,  I,  128  ff.  *  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  160-161. 

^  Watson,  I,  97,  162  ff.;  Moses,  pp.  155-156;  Zimmermann,  I,  343  ff. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES        261 

Conquest,  then,  of  the  native  populatior  rnay  be  said  to  have 
been  confined  to  the  islands  and  to  Mexico  and  Peru.  What  con- 
tact occurred  elsewhere,  unless  merely  ephemeral,  was  almost 
wholly  the  work  of  the  missions  ;  and  this,  for  the  present,  is  left 
out  of  account.  As  spoils  of  their  conquests,  the  Spaniards  took 
possession  of  the  private  and  corporate  wealth  of  the  conquered, 
and  were  soon  led,  in  the  absence  of  labor  force,  to  levy  also  upon 
their  vital  powers,  —  that  is,  to  introduce  the  system  of  slavery. 
It  has  been  seen  that  this  was  first  done  in  the  islands,  and  in  the 
desire  to  get  gold  ;  but  it  was  the  possession  of  the  Mexican  and 
Peruvian  mines,  as  a  result  of  the  historic  conquests,  which  first 
lent  to  the  slave  system  a  stimulus  heretofore  unknown.  The 
metallic  treasure  must  be  gotten,  but  the  Spaniards  were  too  few 
and  could  not  or  would  not  work  ;  hence  the  native,  who  did  not 
want  to  work  either,  must.  Although,  then,  the  mines  were  not  in 
a  tropical  region,  the  situation  closely  approached  that  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  tropics  ;  there  were  plainly  no  results  to  be 
attained  unless  the  natives  were  enslaved.  Here  is  where  the 
colonists'  needs  and  the  government's  desires  came  into  conflict, 
and,  whatever  the  laws,  there  was  no  question  as  to  what  the 
practice  would  be.^ 

"The  Indians  were  considered,  during  different  periods  of 
Spanish  colonization,  under  three  different  aspects  :  at  first  as 
genuine  slaves  whose  lot  was  uncontrollably  in  the  hands  of  the 
Eiiropeans  ;  then  as  serfs  attached  to  the  soil  and  subjected  to  the 
corvee  and  to  pecuniary  and  personal  obligations  ;  and  in  the  end 
as  freemen,  not  however  possessing  full  civil  rights,  but  remaining 
un3er"the  tutelage  of  their  superiors,  and  incompetent  to  make  a 
vahd  contract  above  a  certain  hmit."  ^ 

Enslavement 

Under  Ferdinand,  and  even  in  later  times,  it  was  lawful  to  enslave 
cannibal  tribes,  or  those  taken  in  armed  resistance  to  cultivation 
and  Christianity  ;  ^  during  the  first  turbulent  years,  then,  when 
there  was  practically  no  control,  and  what  little  there  was  had 
fallen,  at  Isabella's  death,  into  the  hands  of  the  lukewarm  and 
more  grasping  Ferdinand,  the  ancient  right  of  the  victor  was 
generally  applied.    This  speedily  degenerated  into  slave-hunting 

1  Cf.  pp.  12  ff.  and  142  ff.,  above.  ^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  12. 

3  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  397-398  ;  Fabie,  p.  55. 


262  COLONIZATION 

pure  and  simple,  f'^'"  the  oppression  exercised  in  Espanola  early 
reduced  the  working  force  of  that  island,  and  rendered  a  substitute 
necessary.  Hence  the  terrible  raids  through  the  islands  and,  later, 
the  general  deportation  of  whole  tribes  to  the  mines. ^  "  In  the 
early  times  of  the  conquest  the  Indians  were  abandoned  without 
defence  to  the  rapacity  of  the  Spanish  adventurers."  ^  The  plainly 
exceptional  Cortes  managed  to  control  conditions  in  Mexico  to  a 
considerable  extent ;  but  in  Peru  the  same  ruthlessness  was  the 
rule.  "  When  Peru  was  divided  amongst  the  conquerors,  each  of 
the  latter  was  eager  to  obtain  an  instantaneous  recompense  for  his 
services.  Men  accustomed  to  the  carelessness  of  a  military  life  had 
neither  the  industry  to  carry  on  any  plan  of  regular  cultivation  nor 
patience  to  wait  for  its  slow  returns.  Disdaining  to  profit  by  the 
certain  results  of  agriculture  in  the  fertile  valleys,  they  selected 
for  their  habitations  the  mountainous  regions,  which  abounded  in 
the  precious  mines.  In  order  to  develop  these,  many  hands  were 
wanted  ;  and  the  natives  were  accordingly  driven  in  crowds  to  the 
mountains.  The  sudden  transition  from  the  sultry  valleys  to  the 
penetrating  air  of  the  higher  altitudes  combined  with  inordinate 
labor  and  scanty  nourishment  to  produce  an  unwonted  despondency, 
under  which  they  rapidly  melted  away."  ^  And  where  slavery  was 
not  ostensibly  in  vogue,  it  was  represented  by  an  unreasonable 
tribute-system.  Gold  was  demanded  where  gold  was  not,  at  least 
in  sufficient  quantities ;  a  friendly  cacique  (chief)  in  Espaiiola 
*'  offered  to  put  an  enormous  tract  of  land  under  cultivation  for 
growing  grain  if  the  admiral  would  only  not  demand  gold,  but 
Columbus  needed  gold  to  demonstrate  that  the  colony  would  be 
profitable";  even  when  he  reduced  the  gold-tribute  one-half,  he 
was  still  demanding  the  impossible.'* 

The  original  idea  was  to  handle  the  Indians  as  free  subjects  of 
the  crown,  and,  aside  from  the  tribute,  to  hold  them  to  paid  labor 
through  their  caciques,  thus  imposing  the  Spanish  system  ui)on 
the  semi-feudal  native  one.''    But  there  were  several  fundamental 

1  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  194,  389;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  3S,  43.  Ildw  the 
Spaniards  utilized  the  superstitions  of  the  natives  for  their  own  ends  is  again  illus- 
trated by  the  reported  fate  of  some  Bahama  islanders.  They  thought  the  white-faced, 
Ijearded  S])aniards  were  messengers  from  the  over-sea  heaven  of  their  ancestors,  come 
to  take  them  there.  Upon  the  assurance  of  the  Spaniards  that  this  was  true,  they  came 
into  the  vessels  in  crowds.  But  when  they  later  found  themselves  in  the  gold-mines  of 
Espanola  they  fled  to  the  mountains  or  sea,  or  killed  themselves.   Zimmermann,  I,  249. 

2  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  12.  ^  Watson,  II,  127  ;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  254. 
^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  44.  '' Id.,  pp.  206,  353;  Zimmermann,  I,  246. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FORl'JGNKRS  AND    NATIVES         263 

difficulties  in  this  system,  the  chief  of  which  were  that  the  Indians 
did  not  wish  to  labor  either  as  long  or  as  hard  as  the  impatient 
exploiters  wished,  nor  at  the  occupations  which  the  latter  desired  ; 
and  that,  in  the  limitation  and  simplicity  of  their  needs,  they  re- 
sponded but  feebly  and  irregularly  to  the  economic  stimulus  of 
wages.  And  the  Si)aniards,  for  their  part,  were  but  little  disposed 
to  employ  economic  stimuli  where  others,  far  more  effective,  were 
suggested  by  the  very  logic  of  the  situation  ;  they  did  not  intend 
to  forego  the  high  rewards  of  unquestioned  power  over  a  despised 
race  for  the  sake  of  religious  or  metaphysical  scruples  which  they 
did  not  share,  held  by  unpractical  people  who  could  not  coerce.^ 

But  in  order  to  get  the  native  situation  before  one  still  more 
comprehensively,  it  is  necessary  to  reflect  not  only  upon  the  general 
character  and  disposition  of  the  Spaniard  and  his  government,  but 
also  upon  the  personality  of  the  Indian  and  the  temperament  of 
his  race.  Even  a  cursory  study  of  the  native  American  reveals  the 
fact  that  he  has  never  been  successfully  enslaved.  Slavery  in  the 
sense  of  any  wholesale  appropriation  of  the  enemy's  vital  forces 
did  not  exist  upon  the  continent  prior  to  its  discovery  ;  the  stages 
of  the  arts  and  the  development  of  governmental  organization  would 
not  admit  of  it.  Torture  of  male  prisoners  was  more  likely  than 
their  preservation,  even  through  adoption  ;  a  tribute-relation,  as 
imposed  by  the  Aztecs,  was  scarcely  endured.  The  race  had  been 
schooled  to  submissiveness  as  little  as  to  agricultural  labors.  Hence 
the  ineffectiveness  of  the  Indians  under  the  wage-system  and  their 
irreconcilability  to  that  of  slavery ;  the  latter  appeared  to  them 
repulsive  and  unendurable,  and  to  escape  from  it  the  Indians  of 
Spanish,  as  of  Portuguese  America,  did  not  balk  at  the  extremest 
recourse,  as  their  swift  decline  in  numbers  testifies.  The  newly- 
met  scions  of  long-separated  human  groups  were  therefore  in  no 
position  to  fall  easily  into  some  mutually  satisfactory  relation  ;  the 
ethnic  strains  were  so  estranged  as  to  demand  indefinite  years  of 
wrangling  and  oscillation  before  mere  proximity  could  be  trans- 
formed into  anything  approaching  kindly  feeling  and  unity  of  pur- 
pose. As  has  been  seen,  the  problems  set  by  the  contact  were 
solved,  if  at  all,  mainly  by  either  miscegenation  or  the  elimination 
of  one  of  the  warring  components.  What  example  and  education 
did,  we  have  yet  to  inquire. 

1  Cf.  pp.  25S  ff.,  above,  and  277  ff.,  below;  Keller,  Sociol  View,  etc. 


264  COLONIZATION 

The  Rhpartimientos  and  Encomiendas 

The  first  modification  of  the  rough-and-ready  methods  through 
rational  control  was  represented  by  the  attachment  of  the  Indian 
to  the  soil,  or  his  elevation  to  a  sort  of  serfdom.  Columbus  had 
been  obliged  in  1497  to  compound  with  certain  insurgents  on  the 
basis  of  allotments  to  them  of  lands  which  carried  with  them  the 
enforced  labor  of  the  Indians.  This  was  a  system  rendered  familiar 
in  the  Peninsula  through  the  Moorish  conquests,  where  it  embodied 
the  recognition  of  the  rights  of  victors  over  the  vanquished. ^  The 
earliest  designation  given  to  such  an  allotment  was  rcpartiviicnto  or 
"distribution";  and  the  repartimiento  was  employed  extensively, 
under  royal  order,  by  Ovando  (i 502-1  509).  He  allotted  to  one 
Spaniard  fifty,  to  another  one  hundred  Indians  under  their  chiefs ; 
and  still  other  such  groups  to  cultivate  lands  for  the  king.  These 
assignments  were  accompanied  with  a  patent  reading :  "  To  you, 
so-and-so,  are  given  in  trust  ("  se  .  .  .  encomiendan  ")  under  chief 
so-and-so,  fifty  or  one  hundred  Indians,  with  the  chief,  for  you  to 
make  use  of  them  in  your  farms  and  mines,  and  you  are  to  teach 
them  the  things  of  our  holy  Catholic  faith."  It  is  plain  that  the  eye 
of  the  Spaniard  was  upon  the  labor  force  at  least  as  much  as  upon 
the  land  ;  and  for  generations,  as  it  turned  out,  upon  the  possibility 
of  enforcing  labor  rather  than  of  effecting  conversion.^  The  evils 
of  this  system,  as  applied  to  a  refractory  race,  will  presently  appear  ; 
Isabella,  with  characteristic  sincerity  of  purpose,  was  led  to  abolish 
the  practice,  "  but  after  her  death  and  about  the  year  1.509  it  was 
re-established  under  the  dissembling  title  of  oicoviienda."  ^ 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  206;  Colmeiro,  II,  381;  Moses,  pp.  110-113.  "The 
American  concjueror  with  his  encomienda  of  Indians  differed  little  from  the  Andalu- 
sian  or  Valencian  noble  with  his  Moorish  vassal  peasantry."    Bourne,  id.,  p.  256. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  210. 

3  Colmeiro,  II,  383.  Repartir  is  a  plain  colorless  word  meaning  to  divide  or  dis- 
tribute ;  encometidiir  implies  benevolent  intent,  i.e.  to  give  in  trust. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  Spanish  Americans  the  assurance  to  the  Indians  of  tlie 
rights  of  free  sul:)jects  could  only  mean  the  ruin  of  the  colony.  For  the  Europeans 
either  could  not  labor  (in  the  hotter  regions)  or  would  not  where  they  could,  since  their 
whole  philosophy  of  life  militated  against  anything  of  the  kind.  Of  a  consequence, 
jjroductivity  in  the  colonies  was  unthinkable  without  native  labor.  "  But  the  Indian 
was  not  to  be  moved,  without  a  certain  measure  of  compulsion,  either  to  a  degree  of 
industry  adequate  to  the  needs  of  the  colonies,  or  even  to  a  lasting  relation  of  friendli- 
ness to  the  colonists.  But  this  was  absolutely  necessary  if  the  civilization  of  the 
natives,  and  above  all  their  conversion  to  Christianity,  so  strongly  emphasized  from 
the  outset  in  the  history  of  the  discoveries,  were  to  be  successfully  carried  out.  There- 
fore both  lay  and  clerical  authorities  united  in  the  declaration  that  the  concession  of 


SPANISH  AMERICA  :    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES        265 

Decline  of  the  Native  Population 

It  is  plain  that  the  encomicnda,  neglecting  for  the  present  its 
religious  and  social  aspects,  really  represented  compulsory  labor, 
perhaps  in  a  somewhat  milder  form,  under  a  more  palatable  name. 
The  natives,  whether  or  no,  were  to  work  the  allotments  of  their 
lords  or  the  king.  But,  in  the  relative  unattractiveness  of  agricul- 
ture, this  meant,  especially  under  the  earlier  repartimientos,  labor 
in  the  mines.  At  first  the  term  of  this  service  lasted  six  months, 
and  later  eight,  involving,  since  the  mines  were  generally  from 
thirty  to  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  distant,  separation  of  families 
and  excessive  burden  on  the  wives. ^  The  labor  in  the  mines  was 
difficult  and  the  rations  scanty  ;  great  cruelties  were  unquestionably 
practiced  ;  and  the  effect  upon  the  physique  of  the  miners  was  very 
serious.  The  lot  of  subjected  peoples  whose  enforced  services  have 
taken  the  form  of  working  in  mines  has  been,  throughout  history, 
an  unhappy  and  baneful  one  ;  and  here,  where  the  masters  were 
rude  adventurers  in  the  possession  of  resources  out  of  which  they 
were  anxious  to  extract  only  the  maximum  of  immediate  profit,  the 
chance  of  mitigation  was  slight.  Las  Casas  no  doubt  exaggerates 
many  of  the  ills  of  which  he  speaks  ;  ^  but  we  possess  clear  testi- 
mony as  to  the  character  of  the  early  treatment  of  the  Indians, 
before  and  for  a  time  after  the  establishment  of  the  allotment 
system,  in  the  fact  of  their  practical  extinction  in  certain  wide 
districts. 

Depopulation  proceeded  most  rapidly  in  the  Antilles,  as  was 
natural.  The  islands  were  the  first  meeting-ground  of  the  two 
races,  and  the  islanders  were  less  numerous  in  proportion  to  the 
invaders  ;  upon  the  continent,  especially  in  Mexico,  the  efforts  of 
Cortes  and  of  the  clergy  were  interposed  to  mitigate  the  violence 
of  racial  collision  where  the  victor  knew  scarcely  more  pity  for 

unlimited  freedom  to  the  natives  meant  the  ruin  of  the  colonies,  in  ways  both  spiritual 
and  economic.  Out  of  the  negotiations  which  took  place  in  this  way  and  that,  over 
the  subject,  there  emerged  finally  the  system  of  repartimientos  and  encomiendas. 
Under  this  system  the  personal  freedom  of  the  natives  was  recognized,  it  is  true,  in 
principle.  But  in  order  to  promote  their  education  up  to  the  European  type  of 
civilization  and  their  conversion  to  the  Christian  doctrine,  they  were  assigned  (re- 
partir)  to  individual  colonists,  or  put  under  their  protection  (encomendar)."  Haebler, 
Amerika,  p.  396.  ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  210-21 1  ;  Watson,  II,  135. 

2  Las  Casas  went  to  the  Indies  in  1502.  He  began  preaching  against  Indian 
slavery  in  Utli.'  ^^^  published  his  book  on  the  "destruction  of  the  Indies"  in  1552. 
For  his  worR^^'it  bore  on  the  question  of  African  slavery,  see  Saco,  pp.  92  ff.  ""~' 


266  COLONIZATION 

the  unmatched  victim  than  beast  does  for  beast. ^  But  in  the  An- 
tilles the  native  race  was  almost  annihilated.  In  the  first  three 
years  of  conquest  the  population  of  Espanola  was  supposed  to  have 
been  reduced  by  at  least  two-thirds. ^  Peschel,  an  experienced  eth- 
nologist and  a  critical  historian,  after  weighing  all  the  evidence, 
places  the  population  of  Esimiiola  in  1492  at  less  than  300,000 
and  at  over  200,000.  In  1508  the  number  of  the  natives  was 
60,000;  in  1 5  10,  46,000;  in  15  12,  20,000;  and  in  15  14,  14,000. 
In  1548  it  was  doubtful  if  500  natives  of  pure  stock  remained, 
and  in  1570  only  two  villages  of  Indians  were  left.  A  similar  fate 
befell  all  the  islands.^ 

The  fate  of  the  natives  upon  the  mainland  was  not  so  swift  or 
so  sweeping.  The  accepted  impression  has  been  that  prompt  de- 
cline took  place  there  also  ;  and  this  view  seems  to  be  correct. 
Colmeiro  says,"*  with  some  exaggeration,  doubtless,  that  "the  pop- 
ulation of  the  Indies  diminished  with  such  rapidity  that  America, 
in  the  course  of  two  hundred  years,  seemed  little  more  than 
a  desert.  Mexico  and  Peru  .  .  .  were,  toward  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  all  but  uncultivated  and  depopulated."  That 
there  was  a  great  decline  in  the  native  population  of  the  mining- 
regions  or  near  them  during  the  earlier  years  of  occupation  no  one 
seems  to  deny.  Velasco,  whose  report  dates  from  1574,  says'''  that 
"  in  all  the  discovered  districts  the  natives  were  at  the  outset  much 
more  numerous  than  since,  for  in  many  provinces  where  there  used 
to  be  a  great  multitude  of  them,  they  have  almost  totally  ceased  to 
be."  He  goes  on  to  enumerate  the  causes  of  this  result,  among 
which  figure  war,  self-destruction,  flight  to  the  mountains  followed 
by  starvation,  illnesses,  and  bad  treatment.  Labor,  especially  in 
the  mines,  was  excessive,  and  was  supplemented  by  toil  in  pearl- 
fishing,  agriculture,  and  the  erection  of  buildings.  Humboldt  says  ^ 
that  this  was  particularly  the  case  in  Peru,  where  evil  conditions 
had  persisted  down  to  his  own  times ;  fatigue,  shortage  of  food 
and  of  sleep,  and  strains  upon  the  physique  in  consequence  of 
sudden  changes  of  temperature   in  moving  from  lower  to  higher 

^  In  1574  the  upland  Indian.s  were  increasing  in  number,  while  tho.se  of  the  plains 
were  diminishing.     Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  199. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  44  ;  according  to  Fabic  (p.  58),  the  native  population 
of  Espanola  was  reduced  much,  but  probably  not  to  one-tenth  of  its  former  number, 
as  Las  Casas  says. 

^  Velasco,  p.  94  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  213-214  ;  cf.  Haebler,  Anierika,  p.  397 

*  II,  387.  6  P.  26.  c  Kssai,  I,  72. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES     267 

altitudes  had  depopulated  Peru  to  such  a  degree  that  its  status  in 
1800  was  considerably  worse  than  that  of  Mexico.  As  for  actual 
numbers,  Humboldt,  discarding  early  and  extravagant  estimates, 
accepts  600,000  for  the  native  population  of  Peru  in  1793  as 
against  1,500,000  in  1575.^  This  estimate  is  certainly  a  favorable 
one  as  compared  with  those  of  Velasco  and  the  viceroys.^  The 
viceroys  Castel-Fuerte  (1736)  and  Superunda  (1756)  remark  on  the 
decline  of  the  natives,  charge  it  to  the  work  in  the  mines,  and 
suggest  remedies  ;  the  latter  calls  attention  to  the  absolute  depend- 
ence of  the  Spaniards  upon  the  natives  and  mentions  his  misgiv- 
ings as  to  latent  conspiracy.^  The  conduct  of  the  Spaniards  from 
the  outset  seems  to  have  been  of  the  most  savage  and  ruthless 
type,  following  few  of  the  dictates  of  humanity  or  even  economy. 
"  The  provident  arrangements  of  the  Incas  in  behalf  of  their  sub- 
jects were  suffered  to  fall  into  decay.  The  granaries  were  emptied  ; 
the  flocks  of  llamas  were  wantonly  slaughtered  ;  whilst  the  lives  of 
the  Indians  themselves  were  held  so  cheap  that  they  were  not  only 
systematically  worked  beyond  their  strength  until  they  died,  but 
were  even  occasionally  hunted  by  blood-hounds  for  the  mere  amuse- 
ment of  their  conquerors."  It  is  no  wonder  that  they  were  always 
ready  to  rise  against  their  oppressors.*    In    1780,  indeed,  there 

1  Essai,  I,  55. 

2  An  examination  of  the  reports  of  the  viceroys  and  of  Velasco's  compendium  has 
yielded  the  following  figures  for  the  Indian  population  in  the  viceroyalty  of  Peru: 

1574  680,000  tributaries  (Velasco,  p.  400) ;  of  these 

190,000  tributaries  in  the  audiencia  of  Quito  (Velasco,  p.  405) 
1590  {circa)  311,257  tributaries  (Relaciones,  11,  333) 

1761  143,363  tributaries  (612,780  persons)  (Memorias,  IV,  Appendix,  p.  15) 

1796  608,894  persons     (Memorias,  VI,  Appendix,  p.  9) 

The  viceroy  who  reports  for  1796  accepts  a  general  decline  of  1,000,000  up  to  that 
date  (Memorias,  VI,  77),  and  adds  that  the  number  of  mestizos  is  244,436  (Memorias, 
VI,  Appendix,  p.  9).  It  will  be  noted  that  the  alternative  estimates  for  1761  furnish 
a  rough  multiple  (nearly  4^)  by  whose  employment  the  "tributaries"  can  be  con- 
verted into  "  persons." 

As  to  the  comparative  reliability  of  these  estimates  a  word  might  be  said.  Per- 
haps the  accounts  of  the  viceroys  are  the  most  reliable  documents,  as  these  officers 
in  their  reports  to  their  successors  had  little  reason  for  misrepresentation,  conscious 
or  unconscious.  Humboldt  was  a  model  observer,  a  thoroughly  trained  scientist,  and 
a  man  of  the  world  of  wide  and  varied  experience  ;  few  authorities  merit  more  con- 
fidence. It  is  possible  that  he  was  led  to  present  the  more  favorable  aspects  of  affairs, 
especially  in  view  of  his  evident  conviction  that  conditions  were  on  the  straight  road 
to  betterment.  Velasco  is  very  highly  esteemed  by  Professor  Bourne  (cf.  Sp.  in  Amer., 
pp.  196,  335)  and  seems  to  the  author  as  rehable  as  an  official  recorder  in  that  age 
could  be  expected  to  be. 

3  Memorias,  III,  132;  IV,  88-S9,  94,  100.  *  Watson,  I,  173. 


268  COLONIZATION 

occurred  an  uprising  under  the  Inca  Tupac.  Amaru,  who  had  long 
attempted  in  vain  to  alleviate  the  lot  of  his  race ;  and  the  result 
was  the  annihilation   of  the  whole   Inca  tribe  (1783)^^  general 
campaign  of  extermination,  numerous  inhuman  deeds  of  violence^ 
and  the  unspeakable  embitterment  of  the  Indians  in  general.^ 

The  case  in  Mexico  was  not  so  bad,  for  Mexico  benefited,  after 
the  first  shocks  of  the  conquest,  from  the  sagacious  rule  of  C'i>riL's  ; 
it  was  nearer  to  Spain,  and  so  more  easily  controllable.  Humboldt 
compares  it,  to  its  great  advantage,  with  Peru,  in  respect  of  the 
treatment  of  the  natives.  He  states,  however,  that  the  numbers  in 
the  region  of  the  city  of  Mexico  were,  in  his  time,  only  a  third  of 
the  old  population,  and  that  the  condition  of  the  Mexican  cultiva- 
tors in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  was  very  pitiable. 
Better  treatment  and  a  consequent  increase  in  population  came  only 
in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  especially  in  its  latter  half  under  the 
administration  of  Charles  III  and  Galvez.  Humboldt's  optimistic 
opinions  refer  almost  wholly  to  contemporary  conditions;  in  1793 
the  total  population,  he  thinks,  was  fully  5,200,000,  and  in  1803, 
5,800,000  ;  and  these  numbers  he  regards  as  above  those  of  the 
pre-Spanish  period.^  Endeavoring  to  get  actual  figures  for  native 
population,  one  finds  that  for  1570  Velasco ^  gives  to  New  Spain 
(i.e.  the  archbishoprics  of  Mexico,  Tlaxcala,  Guaxaca,  and  Mechoa- 
can)  691,000  Indian  tributaries,  or  about  3,000,000  persons.  Two 
hundred  and  twenty-three  years  later  (1793)  Humboldt*  takes  the 
Indian  population  to  exceed  2,500,000,  exclusive  of  half-breeds, 
remarking  that  it  has  increased  considerably  in  fifty  years. ^  What 
it  was  before  the  time  of  Charles  HI  we  are  left  to  infer. 

1  Humboldt,  Essai,  1,112-113;  cf.  Zimmermann,  I,  371-372.  The  figures  of  the 
latter  author,  since,  in  the  absence  of  references,  they  could  not  be  checked,  and  since 
considerable  carelessness  or  credulity  appears  in  his  work,  have  been,  for  the  most 
part,  neglected.  Those  given  in  the  preceding  reference,  hov^-ever,  have  been  found, 
by  chance,  to  be  nearly  correct  in  so  far  as  they  refer  to  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  Hence  the  following  data  are  added  for  what  they  may  be  worth.  Zimmer- 
mann says  (I,  370)  that  in  1573  there  were  11,199  laborers  for  the  Potosi  mines,  but 
that  in  1673,  although  the  same  regulations  were  in  force,  there  were  only  1674  ;  that 
encomiendas  of  1000  grown  men  were  reduced  in  a  century  to  100. 

2  Essai,  I,  56,  57,  65,  73,  194;  cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  387,  note. 

3  Pp.  182,  187,  207,  227,  240.  *  Essai,  I,  76. 

•^  Humboldt's  estimates  allow  for  errors  of  under-enumeration  where  Velasco's  do 
not.  If  the  Indians  form,  as  Humboldt  says  (I,  76),  two-fifths  of  the  total  population, 
and  the  uncorrected  whole  is  4,483,529  (I,  57),  the  number  of  Indians  would  be,  un- 
corrected, less  than  2,000,000.  As  for  the  concealment  in  returns,  to  cover  which  he 
adds  one-sixth  or  one-seventh,  he  remarks   (I,  58)  :  "  Dans  le  nouveau  continent, 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES     269 

Conditions  elsewhere  on  the  mainland  are  more  difficult  to  deter- 
mine and  are  not  of  special  importance.^  It  is  clear  enough  from 
the  above  that  depopulation  took  place  with  great  rapidity  pre- 
ceding the  thorough  establishment  of  control,  and  especially  in 
those  regions  (of  plantations  and  mines)  where  a  labor  force  was 
in  imperative  demand. 

Causes  of  Depopulation 

When,  now,  the  attempt  is  made  to  determine,  with  some  approxi- 
mation, what  part  of  so  disastrous  a  result  was  due  to  the  Spanish 
system,  it  is  necessary  first  of  all  to  clear  the  ground  by  recogniz- 
ing and  then  excluding  certain  general  factors,  ethnological  and 
other,  and  their  probable  consequences.  The  phenomenon  of  the 
declme  of  a  native  race  in  contact  with  one  more  highly  civilized  is 
not,  as  has  been  previously  shown,^  an  exceptional  occurrence  dur- 
_ing  the  last  four  centuries.  It  occurs,  indeed,  in  spite  of  policies  of 
a  benevolent  character  which  have  actually  been  put  into  execu- 
tion. Under  such  conditions,  decline  seems  to  be  owing  to  nothing 
tangible  and  remediable,  but  to  the  inevitable  workings  of  biologic 
and  other  laws  the  action  of  which  is  generally  very  obscure,  but 
which  is  clearly  set  into  operation  by  more  or  less  evident  or  sub- 
tle changes  in  environmental  conditions.  The  introduction  of  the 
micro-organisms  of  disease,  for  example,  among  peoples  never 
rendered  even  slightly  immune  through  the  action  of  natural 
selection  ;  the  introduction  of  strong  alcoholic  drinks,  or  of  drugs, 
among  tribes  whose  intoxicants  were  weak  in  their  alcoholic  con- 
tent or  whose  narcotics  or  stimulants  were  mild,  —  these  are  re- 
sults of  contact  which  have  been  responsible  for  much  mortality 
and  degradation  among  native  peoples.  And  there  is  a  further  con- 
sequence of  contact  which  is  all  the  more  determinative  because  it 
occurs  unconsciously  and  as  a  necessary  function  of  the  diversity 
of  the  culture  of  the  races  thus  brought  together.  The  travelers 
report  the  natives,  though  not  directly  ill-treated,  and  even  though 
favored,  as  dying  of  homesickness,  or  nostalgia^  as  it  has  been 

comme  dans  I'ancien,  le  peuple  considere  tout  denombrement  comme  le  presage 
sinistre  d'une  operation  de  finances."  For  birth-rates,  etc.,  in  Mexico,  cf.  I,  6[  ff.  ; 
for  the  easy  conditions  in  the  mines,  II,  book  iv,  chap.  xi. 

1  Since  Velasco  (p.  2)  assigns  1,500,000  Indian  tributaries  to  all  Spanish  America, 
and  6So,ooo  plus  691,000  to  Peru  and  New  Spain,  there  remain  only  some  130,000  for 
the  other  districts,  of  whom  there  were  some  80,000  to  90,000  in  Chile  (p.  514;  cf.  p.  551). 

2  Pp.  5  ff.,  above. 


270  COLONIZATION 

called.  What  this  means,  however,  is  not  that  they  have  been 
removed  from  their  habitat,  but  that  gradually  their  environment 
jias  been  so  altered  that  they  are  no  longer  adapted  to  it,  or  feel 
at  home  in  it :  a  hunting-tribe  is  surrounded  by  cattle-ranges  or 
farms,  for  example,  and  subjected  to  the  civilized  institution  of 
private  property  in  land.  Now  it  is  a  well-recognized  biological 
fact  that  alteration  of  environment  is  likely  to  find  one  of  its  first 
visible  effects  in  derangements  of  the  reproductive  system  ;  ^  and 
whether  or  not  this  be  true  of  man  in  the  case  of  a  change  such  as 
the  one  under  consideration,  there  certainly  is  involved  a  thorough 
alteration  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  struggle  for  existence 
is  pursued,  and  this  cannot  fail  ultimately,  in  event  of  the  usual 
inability  of  the  native  to  rise  at  once  to  a  much  more  evolved 
stage  of  the  arts,  to  have  its  effect  upon  numbers  and  strength  of 
the  population. 

Considering  these  more  general  points,  now,  in  their  relation 
to  the  Spanish-American  contact,  it  is  possible  to  assign  great 
mortality  to  the  introduction  of  diseases,  especially  the  eruptive 
diseases,  the  chief  of  which  was  small-pox.  In  15 18  the  natives 
died  from  this  disease  "like  sheep  with  the  distemper";  it  ap- 
peared in  Mexico  at  the  outset  of  the  conquest  and  swept  off  in 
some  provinces  half  the  population,  seeming  to  be  particularly  fatal 
to  women.  Again,  the  Indians  always  suffered  severely  from  the 
inferior  eruptiv^e  diseases  such  as  measles,  for  they  possessed  no 
knowledge  of  the  means  of  treatment,  but  usually  employed  the 
steam-bath  and  cold  plunge  for  all  illnesses  indiscriminately.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  diseases  of  the  respiratory  system  ;  other 
epidemics  also,  including  finally  yellow  fever,  resulted  from  the 
presence  of  the  Europeans  in  the  local  environment.  And  the 
famines  consequent  to  conquest,  besides  bringing  their  own  special 
and  perhaps  unavoidable  mortality,  simply  enforced  the  ravages  of 
disease.^  It  is,  however,  perfectly  evident  that  maladies  could  not 
have  produced  the  extreme  and  continuous  depopulation  to  which 
reference  has  been  made  ;  such  c|uantitative  injuries  to  population 
are  speedily  made  up,  if  the  life-conditions  are  otherwise  favorable.^ 
Diseases  have  occurred  in  colonies  of  other  nations,  and  in  the 
later  history  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  but  without  such  extended 

1  Cf.  Darwin,  Descent,  pp.  iS5ff. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  212-213;  Colmeiro,  II,  387-388;  Haebler,  Amerika, 
P-  397!  Watson,  I,  219;  II,  127.  3  cf  p   jgg^  above. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES     271 

consequences.  Nor  could  the  innocent  or  willful  introduction  of 
alcoholic  poison  have  played  any  considerable  role  in  Spanish 
America  ;  for  the  Spaniards  were  peculiarly  temperate,  even  in  the 
use  of  their  own  light  wines,  and  could  not  have  introduced  in  very 
considerable  quantities  the  consuming  "  hre-water  "  which  demoral- 
ized the  more  ncnlhcrn  tribes.  Again,  the  change  of  environment 
brought  about  unconsciously  by  the  encroachment  of  the  bearers 
of  a  new  regime  of  civilization,  by  the  steady  transformation  of  the 
region  into  one  of  a  higher  industrial  economy,  could  not  have 
occurred,  in  any  generality,  the  immigrants  being  what  they  were 
in  numbers  and  character,  in  Spanish  America.  The  causes  of 
depopulation  must  have_been  ,ffiore.jQ£a.Land  direct  than  those 
which  have  been  cited. 

In  fact^The  comm.on  explanations  of  this  phenomenon  are  based 
upon-  such  local  considerations.  The  savagery  of  the  conquests  and 
raids  ;  resulting  famines  ;  ^  heavy  taxes  ;  tFe  greed  for  immediate 
gain  which  did  not  scruple  at  overloading  the  natives  with  hard 
and  unaccustomed  labor,  and  even  impossible  tasks,  while  stinting 
them  regularly  in  their  food  ;  the  imposition  of  similar  labor  in 
particular  upon  women  and  children  ;  the  separation  of  families ; 
the  transference  of  plain-dwellers  to  the  mountains,^ — these  are 
causes  not  necessarily  inherent  in  race-contact,  but  which  easily 
explain  a  great  mortality  and  race-decline.  It  is  also  clear  that  the 
effects  of  the  actual  wars  of  conquest  and  their  train  of  woes  may 
be  eliminated  from  consideration  as  enduring  factors  of  depopula- 
tion ;  their  effects  could  not  have  been  so  persistent.  What  is  left 
are  the  divers  manifestations  of  selfish  greed  in  the  exploitation, 
particularly  in  plantation  and  mine  (hence  chiefly  in  the  islands,  in 
Mexico  and  Peru),  of  a  practically  defenseless  subject  race.  What- 
ever the  legislation,  this  was  the  fact.^  The  very  actions  of  the 
natives  reveal  the  state  of  the  case  :  they  fled  to  inaccessible 
places,  and  there  died  or  dragged  out  a  miserable  existence  ;  they 
renounced  cultivation  at  the  risk  of  starvation,  if  only  they  might 

1  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  398;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  211. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.212,  214;  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  367 ;  Watson,  II, 
126-127,  131  ;  cf.  Letourneau,  Commerce,  p.  214. 

8  Colmeiro  (II,  400)  inveighs  especially  against  the  system  of  allotments  of  mer- 
chandise made  by  the  officials  for  the  Indian  families.  The  latter  were  obliged  to 
receive  goods  in  quantities  and  at  a  high  price,  and,  not  being  able  to  pay  at  once, 
they  were  drawn  into  an  oppressive  debt-relation  which  hampered  all  progress  and 
filled  the  breasts  of  the  natives  with  hatred  "against  the  metropolis,  and  against  the 
infamous  alliance  of  commerce  and  justice." 


2  72  COLONIZATION 

injure  the  Spaniards  ;  they  destroyed  themselves  in  numbers  ;  in 
their  misery  and  despondency  they  even  reduced  an  already  de- 
clining birth-rate  by  renunciation  of  procreation  or  by  infanticide.^ 
It  does  not  seem  just  to  charge  these  truly  pitiable  results,  without 
qualification,  to  the  monopoly-system  ;  ^  had  such  destruction  per- 
sisted through  centuries  and  throughout  the  colonial  world,  such 
an  explanation  would  have  been  rendered  more  apposite,  for  the 
monopoly-idea,  as  has  been  seen,  was  universally  in  evidence.  But 
the  haste  in  getting  wealth,  and  especially  metallic  treasure,  was 
more  generally  determinative  of  the  character  of  the  early  race- 
contact  than  any  defined  system  could  be ;  and  this  it  was  which 
motived  irrational  oppression.  No  doubt  the  frame  of  mind  which 
found  institutional  expression  in  the  system  was  bound,  given  con- 
ditions of  contact  with  a  subject  race,  to  pursue  such  an  advantage 
in  the  competition  of  life  with  thorough  and  consistent  unscFupu- 
lousness  ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  any  direct  causal  connection 
between  the  upholding  of  a  monopoly  in  favor  of  Seville,  or  the 
fleets,  or  Vera  Cruz,  or  Spain  as  a  whole,  and  the  wantonness  of 
the  destruction  of  the  Indians  at  the  hands  of  the  rude  adventurers 
who  constituted  the  vanguard  of  the  Spanish  in  America. 

Protective  Legislation 

Indeed,  as  a  system  of  any  kind  became  more  workable,  the 
figures  given  indicate  that  the  decline  of  the  native  population  was 
retarded  rather  than  accelerated  ;  the  instances  of  extreme  depopu- 
lation were  confined  in  the  main  to  the  opening,  or  least-controlled, 
periods  in  the  history  of  the  colonies.'^  Where  there  was  intelligence 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  43,  210-21 1  ;  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  p.  397  ;  Peschel,  Races, 
p.  151;  Watson,  II,  126.  They  were  quite  willing  to  take  their  chances  elsewhere  than 
in  heaven  if,  as  they  were  informed,  the  Spaniards  were  to  frequent  the  latter  place. 

-  "  The  rnost^  p^robable  cause  of  the  diminution  of  the  Indians  is  the  oppression 
itself  of  the  colonial  system," which  limited  the  progress  of  agriculture,  hindered  the 
establishment  of  factories  and  looms,  rendered  commerce  sluggish,  and,  in  fine, 
choked  up  all  the  springs  of  public  wealth  in  order  to  perpetuate  an  alisurd  and 
ruinous  monopoly.  Without  adequate  means  of  subsistence,  the  population  not  only 
couM  not  increase  but  could  not  maintain  itself  on  the  old  level.  The  ill  treatment 
of  the  Indians  and  the  unseasonable  wars  with  the  barbarous  tribes  are  simply  con- 
comitants of  the  mail!  trend  of  events."    Colmeiro,  II,  388. 

3  The  true  sign  of  real  and  permanent  increase  in  population,  says  llunilioldt 
(Essai,  I,  64  ;  cf.  p.  102  ;  Velasco,  p.  26),  is  the  increase  of  means  of  subsistence.  This 
was  evidently  taking  place  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Preceding  conditions 
can  be  inferred  from  the  foregoing  description  of  the  industrial  organization  in 
Spanish  America. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND   NATIVES      273 

and  a  strong  hand,  such  oppression  of  the  natives  was  much  less 
pronounced.  In  Mexico,  for  example,  the  desire  of  Cortes,  which 
was  that  of  the  crown,  was  to  avoid  such  wasting  oTThe  popula- 
tion as  had  taken  place  in  the  islands ;  the  encomienda  system  was 
limited  to  four  generations,  after  which  the  encomiendas  would 
revert  to  the  crown.  The  tribute  demanded  was  not  to  be  more 
thanthat  which  was  supported  under  Aztec  rule.^  Not  a  few  other 
regulations  were  carried  into  effect  to  the  betterment  of  the  natives' 
lot.  But  that  the  encomienda  system,  however  modified  by  the 
many  edicts  incorporated  in  the  Recopilacioit^  effected  anything 
approaching  eradication  of  evils  may  be  seriously  doubted.  The 
whole  economic  and  social  conjuncture  was  against  control  of  the 
Indian  question  :  the  colonists  needed  a  labor  force  in  order  to 
realize  their  purposes  of  exploitation,  and  it  was  unthinkable  that 
men  of  their  stamp  should  not  utilize  the  one  at  hand,  and  the 
more  ruthlessly  as  it  was  cheap  and  helpless.  Under  the  facilities 
of  communication  of  the  day,  especially  as  abridged  for  an  enor- 
mous empire  with  a  thin  and  scattered  population  by  the  Spanish 
system  of  isolation,  there  could  be  little  respect  for  a  distant,  poorly 
informed,^  and  slowly  operating  control.  Add  the  inefficiency  and 
vacillation  of  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  the  picture  of  incompe- 
tence to  carry  legislation  into  effect  is  nearly  complete.  Finally, 
the  very  representatives  of  metropolitan  control,  the  governors  and 
viceroys,  were  largely  imbued  or  soon  infected  by  the  spirit  of  their 
subordinates  and  outdid  them  in  their  own  line  ;  or  were  weak  and 
inefficient,  and  over-ridden  or  intimidated  even  when  their  inten- 
tions were  good.  The  difficulties  of  even  the  able,  determined, 
and  conscientious  representative  of  the  crown  will  presently  ap- 
pear, as  well  as  the  benefits  assured  to  the  natives  by  his  occasional 
interposition.  The  rapid  succession  of  the  viceroys  and  governors 
rendered  the  development  of  any  consistent  policy  all  but  im- 
possible. 

In  fact,  it  was,  in  good  part,  "  the  persons,  not  the  laws,  which 
nourished  the  propensity  for  war  and  conquest ;  so  that  whether  a 
governor  was  clever  and  prudent  or  stupid  and  impetuous  deter- 
mined the  good  or  ill  treatment  of  the  Indians.    In  the  city  of 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  256;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  12;  Zimmermann,  I,  300  ff. 
Elsewhere  the  encomieiida-tenure  became  in  some  cases  even  shorter. 

2  Recopilacion  de  Leyes  de  los  Reinos  de  las  Indias,  a  collection  of  legislation 
made  in  1681.    Colmeiro,  II,  382-383.  ^  cf.  p.  -jq^,  below. 


74 


COLONIZATION 


Mexico,  for  example,  several  years  after  pacification  and  subjection 
to  our  rule,  the  greater  part  of  the  Indians  had  learned  nearly  all 
the  vocations  of  Castile,  and  were  accomplished  silver-smiths, 
lapidaries,  painters  and  intaglio-makers,  knew  how  to  read  and 
write,  wove  textiles  of  silk  and  wool,  made  hats,  and  bettered  the 
cultivation  of  the  fields.  Others  enjoyed  exorbitant  privileges  and 
scarcely  recognized  vassalage  to  the  crown  ;  but  all  lived  at  the 
mercy  of  the  encomenderos  who  held  them  in  the  status  of  slaves, 
or  of  the  alcaldes  ^  who  tyrannized  over  them,  making  them  work 
for  them  and  appropriating  the  fruits  of  their  labors.  In  a  word, 
inasmuch  as  the  laws  and  royal  decrees  broke  down  with  distance 
from  the  metropolis  to  the  colonies,  the  condition  of  the  Indians 
was  bound  to  be,  and  was  in  reality,  very  precarious."  ^ 

This  is  the  key  to  the  whole  matter  of  Indian  administration. 
The  native  laws  were  exceptionally  humane,  among  those  of  all 
history ;  alone  among  modern  nations  Spain  "  tried  to  put  into 
practice  in  her  relations  with  conquered  peoples  the  precepts  of 
humanity,  justice,  and  religion."  ^  But  they  could  not  be  enforced 
with  any  regularity.  "  Whilst  excellent  laws  and  regulations  for  the 
well-being  and  proper  treatment  of  the  natives  of  America  were 
constantly  being  enacted  in  Spain,  we  nowhere  read  of  wholesome 
examples  being  made  of  the  wrong-doers,  who  treated  these  laws 
as  a  dead  letter.  Even  the  laws  and  regulations,  good  and  well- 
meant  as  they  were,  were  not  the  result  of  the  reaction  of  public 
opinion  against  the  ill  treatment  of  the  Indians,  but  were  brought 
about  by  a  few  humane  ecclesiastics  who  had  been  helpless  eye- 
witnesses of  the  atrocities."  ^  The  laws  were  often  merely  protests  ; 
their  recurring  injunctions  arc  to  be  taken  in  general,  especially  in 
their  repetition,'^  rather  as  registered  criticisms  of  an  anterior  state 
of  affairs  than  as  really  effective  measures  of  future  control  which 
can  be  assumed  to  have  been  carried  out.  The  "  Protector  of 
the  Indians,"  even  when  he  was  a  Las  Casas,  was  almost  power- 
less. "  In  practice  the  treatment  of  the  Indians  was  by  no  means 
always  in  accord  with  the  beneficent  purpose  of  t^e  laws."  *^ 

1  Local  judges  with  some  executive  powers;  cf.  German  Kichtcr. 

2  Colmeiro,  II,  3S5-386;  cf.  Koscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  9;  Moses,  p.  96. 
8  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  11.  *  Watson,  I,  70. 

^  "The  laws  upon  this  point  [i.e.  the  duties  of  the  encomendero]  are  explicit,  but 
were  the  customs  in  conformity  with  the  laws  .-'...  These  laws  are  so  often  repeated, 
the  same  prescriptions  return  so  frequently  with  so  few  years'  interval,  that  one  may  well 
ask  himself  whether  they  were  not  perpetually  violated.  Great  abuses  must  have  taken 
place."    Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  13.      ^  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  9;  cf.  Watson,  II,  135-136. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES     275 

Las  Casas  :  the  New  Laws 

What  has  been  said  is  perhaps  enough  to  indicate  that  Spanish 
Indian  legislation  was  scrupulous  fr(>j]i-_Lh£..earliest  time.  Slavery 
was  limited  and  finally  abolished  in  1530;  the  tributes  were  made 
more  reasonable  and  protectors  of  the  Indians  appointed;  the 
encomenderos  were  required  to  protect,  educate,  civilize,  and 
convert  their  charges  ;  and  their  conduct  was  carefully  prescribed, 
even  to  the  point  of  requiring  their  speedy  marriage,  restraining 
their  presence  in  the  Indian  villages,  prohibiting  absenteeism,  and 
so  on.^  Although  regulation  necessarily  proceeded  in  a  tentative 
way,  striking  at  abuses  as  they  cropped  up,  there  was  already,  by 
the  end  of  the  first  fifty  years  after  the  discovery,  a  considerable 
body  of  Indian  laws.^  It  was  at  this  time,  however,  that  the  famous 
attack  of  Las  Casas  ^  upon  the  native  policy  was  delivered  to 
Charles  V.  If  one  credited  its  utterances  to  the  full,  as  they  were 
credited  at  the  time  and  for  many  decades  after,  there  is  nothing 
left  to  say  except  that  the  enforcement  of  benevolent  legislation  had 
been  thus  far  totally  impotent.  It  is  impossible  here  to  dwell  upon 
the  life  and  work  of  Las  Casas,  but  it  is  perfectly  evident  to  one  who 
runs  that  his  arraignment  reveals  the  feverish  and  neurotic  tone  of 
the  reformer  possessed  of  a  fixed  idea  ;  of  the  forerunner  of  calmer 
and  more  constructive  men — one  whose  destiny  seems  to  be  to  evoke 
popular  enthusiasm  or  rage  by  which  the  latter  may  profit.  Of  a  con- 
sequence his  statements  call  for  considerable  correction  for  error."^ 

Nevertheless  there  is,  in  his  work,  enough  concrete  evidence 
that  can  scarcely  be  false,  even  though  it  is  selected,  to  demon- 
strate that  the  laws  had  been  of  comparatively  slight  effect.  And 
that  the  more  elementary  and  fundamental  of  these  statutes  had 
been  consistently  set  aside  is  made  conspicuously  evident  by  the 
resistance  encountered  in  their  enforcement  when  reembodied  in 
the  so-called  "New  Laws"  of  1542.  The  emperor  had  allowed 
Las  Casas,  who  hacTbBen  sent  out 'by  Ximencs  as  early  as  15  16  as 
Protector  of  the  Indians,  an  almost  free  hand  ;  and  the  latter  had 
incorporated  and  reaffirmed  in  his  new  code  all  the  most  stringent, 

'  Colmeiro,  II,  382-383  ;  Boume,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  259-260  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  13. 

2  Fabie's  Ensayo  covers  the  legislation  of  this  period. 

^  Brevissima  Relacion  de  la  Destruycion  de  las  Indias  ;  a  "  voluminous  plea  "  pre- 
pared for  presentation  in  1540,  and  published  in  1552.    Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  257. 

*  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  257,  where  the  author  denominates  Las  Casas  the 
"  Lloyd  GaiTison  of  Indian  Kiyhts";   Watson,  I,  75< 


276  COLONIZATION 

because  the  most  axiomatic,  of  the  preceding  legislation,  garnished, 
of  course,  with  certain  favored  measures  of  his  own.  The  New 
Laws,  for  example,  absolutely  re-prohibited  the  enslavement  of 
the  Indians ;  all  slaves  whose  masters  could  not  prove  a  just  title 
were  to  be  liberated.  They  also  attacked  the  semi-slavery  of  the 
encomiendas,  for  it  was  really  from  personal  dissatisfaction  with 
his  own  role  as  an  encomendero  that  Las  Casas  set  out.  "  Encomi- 
endas belonging  to  officials,  churchmen,  and  charitable  institutions 
were  to  be  given  up ;  encomenderos  who  had  abused  their  Indians 
were  to  forfeit  their  holdings  ;  no  new  encomiendas  were  to  be 
granted,  and  existing  ones  were  to  lapse  on  the  death  of  the 
holder."  ^  In  short,  the  laws  were  aimed  squarely  against  the 
exploitation  of  the  man-resources  of  the  New  World.  The  details, 
given  this  attitude,  were  negligible  ;.  it  was  precisely  upon  this 
main  contention  that  the  issue  between  the  legislator  and  the 
colonist  was  joined.  The  colonist  was  confronted  by  the  dilemma 
of  working  himself,  which  he  could  not  or  would  not  do,  or  resist- 
ing the  removal  of  the  only  means  he  had  for  realizing  anything 
for  his  past  enterprise,  services,  or  toadyism.  Even  if  the  freed 
natives  would  work  for  wages,  which,  and  with  considerable  reason, 
he  doubted,  yet  he  rebelled  against  paying  for  what  had  been  done 
so  much  more  simply  by  the  old  system.  Consequently  the  New 
Laws  were  received  with  deep  hostility  by  the  colonists.  In  Mexico 
they  were  incapable  of  enforcement,  especially  as  concerned  the 
limitation  of  the  encomiendas  ;  "  that  the  attempt  .  .  .  did  not 
lead  to  bloodshed  in  a  popular  uprising  in  Mexico  was  in  large 
measure  due  to  the  wise  discretion  of  the  viceroy,  Mendoza,"  who 
deferred  the  execution  of  the  laws.  Attempts  at  enforcement,  nine 
years  later,  encountered  as  undiminished  opposition.  Even  the 
ecclesiastics  were,  with  rare  exception,  "in  favor  of  continuing 
the  encomiendas,  and  opposed  to  the  liberation  of  the  Indians."^ 
The  laws  were  published  in  Mexico,  March  24, 1544,  and  Charles  V 
granted  the  desired  revocation  October  20,  1545.^  Their  application 
was  delayed,  especially  in  Peru  ;  trouble  was  seen  to  be  imminent 
in  that  newer  and  more  turbulent  province,  and  in  1542  it  was 
resolved  to  appoint  a  viceroy  and  a  royal  audiencia,  through  whom 
the  new  legislation  might  be  carried  into  effect.    In  spite  of  the 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  255;  Moses,  p.  loi.  2  Moses,  pp.  101-104. 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  255.  The  crown  hud  tried  already  (1523)  to  forliid  the 
granting  of  repartimientos  in  Mexico,  and  to  revoke  those  already  granted,  hut  the 
order  had  to  be  withdrawn.    Moses,  p.  95. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES     277 

resistance,  shortly  before,  to  the  attempts  of  Vaca  de  Castro  to 
Hmit  the  re[)artiniientos,  it  was  probably  not  foreseen  by  the  govern- 
ment that  tlie  i)r()jectecl  laws  struck  at  the  very  foundation  of  the 
colonial  society.  But  "  the  Spanish  settlers  in  Peru,  with  remark- 
able unanimity,  felt  that  the  enforcement  of  these  laws  would 
deprive  them  of  whatever  material  advantages  and  prospects  they 
possessed  "  ;  and  they  lent  the  more  attention  to  the  projects  of 
Gonzalo  Pizarro.^  The  task  of  crushing  this  incipient  rebellion  and 
of  introducing  the  New  Laws  was  intrusted  to  a  tactless  man,  De 
Vela,  whose  attempt  at  execution  of  the  latter  speedily  led  to  armed 
collision  and  his  death.  Pizarro  thus  gained  control  of  the  whole 
of  Peru.  This  remarkable  manner  in  which  Pedro_cle_.la  Gasca 
restored  allegiance  to  the  crown  (i  546-1 548)  does  not  pertain  to 
the  present  subject,  but  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  he  disposed  of 
Pizarro  and  gained  a  perfectly  free  hand.  Yet  even  he  did  not  see 
his  way  clear  to  the  enforcement  of  the  prohibition  of  personal 
service,  for  this  measure,  above  all  else,  had  been  the  cause  of  the 
rebellion.  He  was  forced  to  compromise  and  managed  to  leave 
the  condition  of  the  Indians  "on  as  good  a  footing  as  colonial  exi- 
gencies might  admit  of."  To  a  man  of  any  perception,  as  soon  as 
he  had  arrived  on  the  scene,  the  impossibility  of  carrying  out  the 
Laws  to  the  letter  became  immediately  self-evident.  The  rougher 
type  of  the  frontier  would  not  endure  the  diminution  of  what  they 
conceiv^ed  to  be  meager  payment  for  great  and  admittedly  arduous 
services  ;  "  and  more  than  one  governor,  in  the  effort  to  enforce 
respect  for  the  laws  touching  the  encomiendas,  was  thrust  aside  by 
his  decivilized  contemporaries."  ^ 

Effectiveness  of  Governmental  Control 

That  the  New  Laws  did  not  shatter  the  encomienda  system,  as 
was  designed  by  Las  Casas  at  least,  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that 
in  1574,  out  of  160,000  Spaniards  in  the  New  World,  4000  were 

1  See  p.  304,  below. 

2  Watson,  I,  172,  175,  206;  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  397 ;  Moses,  pp.  102,  122  ff. 
"  The  crown  had  ...  to  adopt  some  other  policy  than  uncompromising  coercion,  or 
run  the  risk  of  losing  Peru  completely."  Moses,  p.  126.  Naturally  enough,  the  prete.vt 
of  humanitarianism  and  religion  was  employed  in  justifying  the  repartimientos.  As  it 
was  "  evident  that  the  colonists  could  not  support  themselves  without  the  services 
of  the  Indians,  the  ecclesiastics  and  the  leaders  of  the  expedition  [Pizarro's]  all 
agreed  that  a  repartimiento  of  the  natives  would  serve  the  cause  of  religion,  and 
tend  greatly  to  their  spiritual  welfare,  since  they  would  thus  have  the  opportunity  of 
being  initiated  in  the  true  faith."    Moses,  p.  115. 


i 


278  COLONIZATION 

reckoned  to  be  encomenderos.  The  Indians  were  divided  into  3700 
repartimientos  belonging  to  the  king  or  private  persons.  In  the 
bishopric  of  Tlaxcala  there  were  200  Indian  villages  containing 
215,000  tributaries  divided  into  127  repartimientos.  Of  these,  61 
belonged  to  the  crown  and  66  to  private  encomenderos.  In  Yu- 
catan there  were  300  householders,  of  whom  130  were  encomen- 
deros. In  Lima,  of  2000  Spanish  families,  30  held  encomiendas  ; 
the  Indians  of  the  district,  25,000  or  26,000  in  number,  were 
divided  into  136  repartimientos,  of  which  six  were  royal. ^  But 
while  the  argument  thus  far  tends  to  demonstrate  the  ineffective- 
ness of  the  earlier  laws,  and  while  their  repetition  after  the  middle 
of  the  sixteenth  century  implies  that  enforcement  still  remained 
lax  in  many  places  and  times,  it  is  not  meant  to  assert  that  they 
were  of  no  avail.  The  Spanish  government  never  gave  up,  nor  did 
the  clergy ;  and  after  the  empire  was  brought  into  a  more  settled 
order,  this  persistence  had  its  effects.  What  retarded  the  process 
was,  on  the  one  hand,  theideleterious  effect  of  the  monopoly-appa- 
ratus, which  set  back  the  development  of  such  ease  and  frequency 
of  communication  as  would  have  enabled  the  metropolis  to  over- 
come, among  other  disadvantages,  its  remoteness  from  its  scattered 
provinces  ;  and  on  the  other^  the  character  and  personnel  of  the 
local  administration,  to  which  attention  will  presently  turn.^ 

The  government  did  not  cease  to  scrutinize  and  attempt  to  con- 
trol the  encomenderos.  It  was  not  in  the  character  of  Philip  II,  at 
least,  to  stay  his  hand  in  a  matter  of  regulation  which  appealed  to 
his  conscience  and  to  his  European  clerical  advisers,  simply  because 
the  individuals  to  be  regulated  objected  almost  as  one  man.  So 
the  attempted  regulation  of  the  encomiendas  goes  on  through  the 
decades  ;  several  typical  examples  may  be  given.  "  No  encomen- 
dero  could  own  a  house  in  his  village  or  stay  there  more  than  one 
night  (law  of  1609,  1618);  not  even  his  nearest  relatives  or  his 
slaves  could  enter  the  encomienda  (law  of  1574,  1550,  and  often). 
He  was  forbidden  to  maintain  any  industrial  establishment  in  the 
encomienda  (law  of  162 1),  or  to  take  into  his  liouse  any  of  the 
inhabitants  (law  of  1528)."    Indians  were  on  no  account  to  be  sold 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  196-200.  The  figures  are  from  Velasco.  The  terms 
encomienda  and  repartimiento  were  all  but  synonymous  in  the  time  of  Las  Casas. 
Id.,  p.  206,  note  4. 

2  P.  310,  below.  "  Under  the  conditions  of  communii  ation  .  .  .  the  actual  practice 
of  Mexico  was  determined  r3.ther  by  the  wishes  of  Ihu  local  authorities  than  by  the 
will  of  the  king  of  Spain."    Moses,  p.  96. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:    FORKKiNERS   AND    NATIVES      279 

by  the  cncomcndcros.  None  of  the  officers  of  the  government  might 
participate  in  the  system  of  enforced  labor,  even  indirectly.  The 
Indians  were  compelled  to  labor  in  mining,  road-making,  cattle- 
raising,  maize-culture,  and  like  production  of  necessities,  but  were 
exempt  from  plantation  service  where  the  vine,  olive,  and  sugar- 
cane were  cultivated,  and  from  labor  in  factories  and  sugar-mills. 
In  Peru  not  over  one-seventh,  in  Mexico  one  twenty-fifth  of  the 
Indians  could  be  summoned  to  general  service  ;  and  for  that  of  the 
mines  {tniia)  only  those  within  a  radius  of  thirty  miles.  Natives 
were  not  to  be  transported  from  the  plains  to  the  elevated  regions. 
The  imposition  of  irregular  personal  services  (carrying  in  a  litter, 
for  example)  and  of  porterage  in  general  was  forbidden  ;  it  was  not 
intended  that  the  natives  should  continue  to  be  beasts  of  burden. 
General  injunctions  are  liberally  interspersed  to  suggest  the  proper 
attitude  of  mind  in  all  these  matters.^ 

Unquestionably  the  conditions  of  the  natives  were  bettered  as 
the  government  gradually  got  the  situation  in  hand  ;  hence  they 
were  better  off  in  Mexico  than  elsewhere.  In  some  cases  the  mita 
was  shown  not  to  be  excessive  by  the  fact  that  the  initayos  worked 
overtime  to  gain  the  high  wages  promised.^  A  competent  author- 
ity states  that  "  in  the  last  years  of  the  Spanish  colonial  rule  there 
were  in  general  scarcely  any  well-founded  complaints  about  the 
situation  of  the  Indians  :  a  certain  status  of  minority  and  depend- 
ence, where  it  existed,  was  due  far  more  to  the  outcome  of  the 
natural  situation  and  of  generations  of  ancient  usage,  than  to  that 
of  the  perverted  application  of  the  laws."  ^  Nevertheless  the  en- 
comienda  system  did  not  appeal,  even  in  a  mitigated  form,  to 
Galvez  and  Charles  III  (i 759-1 788),  and  the  king  abolished  it.^ 

It  is  much  to  be  doubted  whether  the  well-meaning  Spanish 
legislation  ever  possessed  an  apparatus  of  local  enforcement  of  a 
character  thorough-going  enough  to  insure  the  desired  economic 
treatment  of  the  Indian,  except  in  certain  restricted  districts  and 
where  the  pressure  to  secure  mine-workers  was  not  so  urgent. 
Leroy-Beaulieu  ^  ventures  the  opinion  that  "  when  once  the  Crown 
of  Castile  could  by  its  laws  curb  the  undisciplined   bands  of  the 

^  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  4-6;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  260-261  ;  Colmeiro, 
II,  382  ff.;   Watson,  II,  135. 

2  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  399;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  12  ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  6. 

3  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  409. 

*  Cf.  Humboldt,  Essai,  I,  102.  Galvez  was  visitaJor-i:;eneral\.o  America  (1761-1774) 
and  was  appointed  Alinistro  Universal  de  Indias  in  1775.  ^  I,  12. 


28o  COLONIZATION 

first  invaders,  the  lot  of  the  Indians  was  so  far  alleviated  that  one 
might  ask  himself  if  the  conquest  had  not,  at  least  for  the  Mexicans, 
bettered  their  destinies."  But,  as  Leroy-Beaulieu  at  once  adtluces 
the  suppression  of  human  sacrifices,  he  is  evidently  reflecting  upon 
Spanish  successes  in  conferring  positive  and  largely  immaterial 
benefits  rather  than  upon  actual  results  attained  in  thwarting  un- 
scrupulous demands  upon  the  life -forces  of  the  natives.  In  1803 
Humboldt  gained  an  impression  of  Indian  life  which  is  expressed 
by  the  words  "  une  grande  miscre."  ^  It  is  very  difficult  to  see 
where  the  position  of  the  Indian  was  economically  better  under  the 
Spanish  regime  than  it  liad  been  under  native  rule.  What  the 
Spanish  laws  did,  where  they  did  anything,  was  to  soften  the  rigors 
of  a  slavery  or  semi-slavery  that  was  formerly  unknown  and  to 
render  this  service  endurable  instead  of  utterly  destructive.  The 
fortunes  of  the  Indians  took  a  sudden  and  great  fall  as  the  result 
of  the  discovery  ;  they  were  restored  in  part  by  the  benevolent 
laws,  where  enforced  ;  but  that  they  ever  reached  their  status  under 
the  pre-Columbian  conditions,  who  could  maintain  ?  Spain  is  to  be 
praised  for  her  efforts  rather  than  censured  for  their  only  partial 
success.  What  colonizing  people  would  cast  the  first  stone  .-*  The 
passions  unleashed  in  such  a  contact  of  races  as  that  in  Spanish 
America  were  inherent  in  the  situation  and  in  human  nature  ;  and 
"since  it  was  the  first  important  case  of  its  kind  in  human  history, 
the  task  of  control  was  the  more  difficult.  But  that  to  which  the 
conquered  owed  their  misfortunes  was  not  disease,  nor  any  other 
impersonal  cause,  but  the  avidity  of  the  conquerors,  leading  to 
reckless  exploitation  of  the  conquered. 

Necro  Slavery 

One  of  the  indications,  however,  that  the  Spanish  laws  were,  at 
least  for  a  time,  locally  effecti\'e  is  afforded  by  the  earl)-  introduc- 
tion of  a  slave-labor  supply  from  without  ;  for  if  they  had  had  a 
free  hand  with  the  Indians,  it  is  probable  that  the  Spanish  would 
have  been  slower  in  taking  up  with  the  slavery  of  the  negro,  despite 

1  Essai  Politique,  I,  103:  "  Les  Indiens  mexicains,  en  les  considerant  en  masse, 
presentent  le  tal^leau  d'une  grande  misere."  They  are  "in  a  state  of  extreme  abase- 
ment "  (p.  106;  cf.  pp.  59,  82,  loS,  etc.).  To  the  present  writer  it  seems  clear,  in  view 
of  Humboldt's  many  other  expressions  of  pity,  etc.,  respecting  the  Indians,  that  his 
remark  (p.  100)  should  not  be  interpreted  in  the  sense  taken  by  Professor  Bourne 
(Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  263);  in  aligning  the  Indians'  status  with  that  of  the  lower  classes 
in  Europe,  Humboldt  purposes  only  a  comparison  of  evils. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    FOREIGNERS  AND  NATIVES     28 1 

the  lattcr's  superiority  for  their  purposes.  Some  such  agency  for 
effecting  the  development  of  natural  resources  was  indispensable 
if  the  Spaniards  were  to  profit  by  either  the  mines  or  the  planta- 
tions. As  early  as_i  5  10,  when  the  severity  of  the  labor  in  the  mines 
began  to  tell  on  the  Indians,  a  few  negroes  were  introduced  ;  they 
experienced  a  high  death-rate,  but  were  so  much  more  efficient  than 
the  Indians  that  in  1 5  1 1  measures  were  taken  to  encourage  their 
direct  shipment  from  Guinea.  This  trade  naturally  developed  with 
the  decline  of  the  Indian  tribes  of  the  islands,  and  perhaps  with  suc- 
cess in  protecting  them  by  law ;  "  in  the  whole  export-trade  which 
Spain  maintained  with  her  colonies  there  was  still  only  one  article 
which  could  measure  up  in  importance  with  quicksilver,  and  that 
was  the  negro  slave."  The  method  of  procuring  negroes  was  by 
letting  out  a  contract  or  asiento,  the  first  of  which  appeared  in 
I5_ij'^^ .During  the  union  of  Spain  and  Portugal  (i 580-1640)  these 
asientos  were  granted  largely  to  the  Portuguese  as  the  holders  of 
the  sources  of  supply  ;^  and  it  was  the  Asiento  of  17 13,  as  will  be 
recalled,  which  really  opened  Spanish  America  to  the  British. 

What  the  Spanish  government  was  trying  to  do  was  to  satisfy  at 
the  same  time  "the  demands  of  economic  production  and  humane 
feeling";  and  in  this  case  it  was  "by  sparing  the  Indian  at  the 
expense  of  the  African  "  that  the  reconciliation  was  to  be  made. 
The  agitation  of  Las  Casas  furthered  this  policy  powerfully  ;  for, 
like  the  agitators  in  Brazil,  his  opposition  was  not  to  slavery  as 
slavery,  but  to  the  enslavement  of  the  Indians.^  However,  negro- 
slavery  never  became  widespread  outside  of  the  tropical  regions, 
the  Antilles,  and  the  northern  coast  region  of  South  America;-^ 
according  to  Humboldt  not  over  a  hundred  negroes  were  imported 
annually  into  Mexico.  Figures  given  above '^  indicate  the  negro- 
component  of  the  population  of  various  districts.  In  general  it  may 
be  said  that  the  demand  for  negroes  varied  according  to  the  develop- 
ment of  that  prime  tropical  employment,  sugar-production.    "The 

1  Bounie,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  270-273;  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  416-418.  Saco  treats 
most  fully  the  whole  subject  of  slavery  in  America  ;  for  early  conditions,  cf.  pp.  6i  ff. ; 
for  the  asientos,  cf.  pp.  no,  146,  et passitn. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  270-271;  Colmeiro,  II,  389;  Haebler,  Amerika, 
pp.  400,  417. 

3  Humboldt's  figures  for  the  total  number  in  South  America  are  776,000.  Bourne, 
Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  275.  Caracas  took  by  far  the  larger  portion  of  those  who  reached 
the  mainland;  there  were,  in  1822,  387,000  on  the  mainland,  of  whom  Caracas  pos- 
sessed 218,400.    Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  10. 

*  I'p.  215  ff. ;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  278. 


282  COLONIZATION 

development  of  the^sugar  industry  and  the  growth  of  slavery  were 
dependent  upon  each  other,  especially  after  the  mines  in  the  Antilles 
gave  out.  Each  trapiche,  or  sugar-mill,  run  by  horses  or  mules, 
required  thirty  or  forty  negroes,  and  each  water-mill  eighty  at  the 
least.  Had  the  commerce  of  the  islands  been  reasonably  free, 
plantation  slavery  on  a  large  scale  would  have  rapidly  developed, 
and  the  history  of  Hayti  and  the  English  islands  would  have  been 
anticipated  a  century  by  the  Spaniards."  ^  But  despite  the  relief 
supposed  to  have  been  given  to  the  Indians,  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment did  not  favor  the  wholesale  introduction  of  the  negro  ;  in 
earlier  days  a  ratio  of  slaves  to  whites  of  over  three  to  one  was  re- 
garded as  dangerous.  The  asiento-holders  did  not  introduce  much 
over  3000  slaves  a  year  between  1 550  and  1750.  A  sequel  of  insur- 
rections, one  finally  culminating  in  the  establishment  of  the  negro- 
state  of  Haiti,  testifies  to  the  justification,  though  distant,  of  some 
of  the  misgivings.  Naturally,  however,  the  planters,  bent  on  gain 
and  caring  little  for  larger  policies,  took  precautions  hardly,  clam- 
ored for  more  slaves,  and  were  willing  to  get  them  by  any  means 
that  were  effective.  There  resulted  the  contraband  operations  of 
ihe  English  and  French  corsairs  to  which  allusion  has  been  made.'-^ 
Because  of  their  value,  due  partially  to  their  rarity,  but  more  to 
a  race-temperament  which  is  adapted  to  the  slave-status,  the  negro 
received  kindly  treatment,  and  really  ranked  above  the  native  in 
the  scale  of  castes.^  "The  Spanish  laws  and  the  administration 
favored  eraancipation^t_every  turn,"  with  the  result  that  there 
existed  a  "  large  number  of  free  colored  people  everywhere  in  the 
Spanish  colonies."  If  the  Spanish  system  had  not  been  so  restrict- 
ive as  to  paralyze  plantation-production  the  case  would  probably 
have  been  different.  "  In  general  the  slaves  were  not  overworked 
for  the  same  reasons  that  kept  their  masters  from  overwork";  and 
in  the  dulling  of  interest  in  tropical  production  lay  also  the  reasons 
for  omission  of  all  severe  measures  looking  toward  security  from 
uprisings.* 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  272  ;  cf.  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,p.  10,  note. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  275-276  ;  cf.  p.  207  ;  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  399-400; 
p.  247,  above. 

3  Cf.  p.  217,  above.  The  Spanish  term  castas,  it  must  be  understood,  does  not 
connote  the  rigidity  and  exclusiveness  which  are  associated  with  the  word  when  used 
in  reference,  for  example,  to  India.  The  castas  are  rather  the  ethnological  divisions 
of  the  population.     Cf.  Saco,  pp.  225  ff. 

*  Houme,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  2So-2cSi  ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  .Sys.,  p.  ro,  note;  Leroy- 
Beaulieu,  I,  17.    Nevertheless  the  mortahty  of  the  negroes  was  high.    Saco,  p.  130. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

SPANISH   AMERICA:    MISSIONS,  CLERGY,  GOVERNMENT 
Indian  Village   Life 

Returning  now  to  the  consideration  of  the  Indians,  the  question 
of  their  labor  as  slaves  or  serfs  yields  place  to  the  more  general 
one  of  their  treatment  outside  of  their  connection  with  the  services 
of  the  encomienda,  that  is,  in  their  villages  or  in  the  missions. 
Ovando,  in  1503,  had  been  instructed  to  establish  the  Indians  in 
villages,  assigning  them  lands  which  they  could  not  alienate, 
appointing  a  protector,  erecting  school-houses,  and  the  like.  This 
was  largely  for  the  purpose  of  restraining  them  from  their  tend- 
ency to  withdraw  from  any  sort  of  relationship  with  the  Span- 
iards ;  ^  later,  this  village  system  was  more  widely  extended  in 
regions  as  yet  but  sparsely  occupied  by  the  Europeans.  Here  the 
natives  remained  subject  to  their  own  caciques,  whose  tenure  was 
hereditary  and  who  in  general  had  charge  of  such  part  of  the 
administration  as  directly  touched  the  natives,  while  the  supervi- 
sion of  the  whole  lay  in  the  hands  of  several  local  or  native  officials 
(alcaldes  and  rcgidores)  who  were  annually  elected  by  the  residents. 
These  offices  were  not  purchasable  as  in  the  Spanish  towns,  and 
were  filled,  in  Humboldt's  time,  by  respectable  and  conscientious 
men.  One  of  the  duties  of  the  protectors  was  the  collection  of  the 
revenue ;  and  they  were  especially  to  guard  against  oppression  of 
the  natives  at  the  hands  of  their  chiefs. 

Thus,  while  the  towns  and  their  Indian  inhabitants  were  subject 
to  Spanish  laws  and  magistrates,  the  inner  life  of  the  village  went 
on  along  traditional  lines  ;  the  society  was  regulated,  however,  espe- 
cially as  to  its  external  relations,  with  considerable  care.  Like  the 
Portuguese,  the  Spaniards  looked  with  suspicion  upon  the  kind 
of  European  who  might  through  trade  or  otherwise  come  into 
contact  with  the  Indians;  police  regulations  restrained  Spaniards, 
mestizos,  negroes,  and  mulattoes  from  settlement  in  the  villages; 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  209-210.  On  the  early  Indian  legislation,  see  Fabie, 
PP-  34-35'  79.  87  ff-,  etc. 

283 


284  COLONIZATION 

and  a  law  of  1600  forbade  even  merchants  to  sojourn  therein  over 
two  nights.  No  Indian,  again,  might  live  outside  his  village,  or 
change  his  dwelling-place  without  permission  of  the  authorities,  — 
regulations  which  were  intended  in  part  to  restrain  relapses  into 
the  barbarism  of  the  hunter's  life.  The  provision  that  Indians 
could  not  own  weapons  or  ride  on  horseback  probably  rested  upon 
similar  considerations.  No  wine  was  to  be  sold  in  the  villages, 
and  the  alcoholic  content  of  the  native  pulque  was  not  to  be  in- 
creased by  adulteration.  The  attention  to  be  paid  to  conversion 
dictated  regulations  as  to  the  presence  of  churches  and  priests,  the 
expenses  of  whose  maintenance  came  from  the  encomendero,  royal 
or  other ;  schools  also,  for  the  teaching  of  Spanish,  were  directed 
to  be  opened.  For  all  these  benefits  the  Indians  were  supposed  to 
pay  little,  being  exempted  entirely,  for  example,  from  the  alcabala.^ 
In  short,  the  so-called  "  reduced  "  ^  or  village  Indians  remained  in 
a  protected  status.  "  On  account  of  their  ignorance,  and  weak 
minds,"  they  were  treated  with  indulgence,  as  perpetual  minors; 
"  as  late  as  Humboldt's  time  the  laws  of  Isabella  and  Charles  V. 
were  still  in  existence  —  laws  which  declared  the  Indians  minors 
for  life,  so  that,  for  example,  they  might  not,  on  their  own 
responsibility,  contract  debts  of  over  five  dollars.  No  pucden 
tratar  y  contratar.  Neither  their  real  estate  nor  their  personal 
effects  could  be  sold  except  in  due  legal  form  (law  of  1571),  and 
the  law  gave  its  consent  then  only  when  it  found  the  trade  advan- 
tageous to  the  Indian.  On  the  other  hand,  guilt  in  a  criminal  case 
could  be  pronounced  only  on  the  agreeing  testimony  of  six  Indians 
because  of  their  great  and  universally  prevailing  lack  of  truthful- 
ness." ^  Here,  again,  we  have  a  system  which  is  a  credit  to  the 
good  intentions  and  honor  of  the  Spanish  government,  and  to  which, 
in  all  likelihood,  approximation  was  made  in  proportion  as  the 
Spanish  jurisdiction  was  settled  and  fortified.  But  it  is  clear  that 
the  net  result  must  have  been  the  hindrance  of  the  development  of 
industry  in  America,  and  so  must  have  been  generally  combated  or 
evaded  upon  the  ground.'*    Naturally,  as  the  encomiendas  reverted 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  14;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Anier.,  pp.  25S-259  ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col. 
Sys.,  pp.  6-7;  Watson,  II,  135-136. 

'^  Redticir  means  "  to  convert  to  the  Catholic  faith."  A  reduccioit  (reduction)  was 
"el  pueblo  de  indios  convertidos  4  la  verdadera  religion  (neophytorum  oppidum)." 

3  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  7.  The  Indians  were  not  expected  to  emerge  from  this 
minority.    Leroy  Beaulieu,  I,  13-14. 

*  Cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  p.  14;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  263. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT      285 

gradually  to  the  king,  the  administration  of  the  villages  became 
more  direct  and  so  probably  more  strictly  in  accord  with  the  legal 
enactments. 

Extension  of  Religious  Influence 

The  provisions  which  have  been  but  casually  noted  hitherto 
respecting  the  conversion  and  religious  training  of  the  Indians  call 
for  some  special  mention.  It  was,  as  has  been  seen,  one  of  the 
chief  preoccupations  of  Isabella,  as  revealed  in  the  first  of  the 
directions  given  to  Columbus,  that  the  heathen  should  be  con- 
verted ;  and  she  adds  that  Friar  Buil  and  others  shall  accompany 
the  discoverer  to  assist  in  good  works. ^  To  Ovando,  again,  the 
injunction  was  given  that  the  Indians  should  not  be  disposed  against 
Christianity.^  In  other  words,  the  attitude  of  the  Spanish  in 
America  was  not  to  be  the  militant  one  characteristic  of  the  colli- 
sion of  CJinstianity  with  Mohammedanism,  as,  for  example,  in  the 
PoHuguese  East ;  it  was  to  be  paternal,  inspired  by  pity  called 
forth  by  ignorance  of  the  faith,  and  adapted  to  a  state  of  intellect 
scarcely  able  to  comprehend  the  dogmas  of  the  Church.  For  this 
reason,  again,  the  religious  policy  of  the  Spanish  does  not  preserve 
a  direct  sequence  from  the  Crusades  as  did  that  of  the  Portuguese 
as  represented  typically  by  the  activities  of  Albuquerque.  Colum- 
bus expected  something  more  nearly  like  the  experiences  of  the 
Portuguese  ;  he  had  no  idea  of  coming  upon  a  whole  new  and  virgin 
field.  But  when  the  truth  began,  at  least  in  part,  to  dawn  upon 
the  Spanish  kings  and  church  that  here  lay  an  almost  limitless 
opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  the  positive  function  of  religious 
construction  practically  ab  origine,  the  accession  of  zeal  in  the  con- 
quest of  souls  set  on  foot  a  series  of  missionary  enterprises  hardly 
matched,  of  their  kind,  in  history.  "  The  work  of  conversion  .  .  . 
followed  upon  the  heels  of  conquest,  indefatigable  friars  devoting 
every  moment  to  preaching!  baptizing  and  learning  the  native  lan- 
guages .  .  .  Every  town,  Indian  as  well  as  Spanish,  was  by  law  re- 
quired to  have  its  church,  hospital  and  school  for  teaching  Indian 

1  "  Que  procure  la  conversion  de  los  Indies  a  la  fe :  paraayuda  de  lo  qual  va  Frai 
Buil  con  otros  religiosos,  quienes  podran  ayudarse  de  los  indios  que  vinieron  para 
lenguas.  Para  que  los  indios  amen  nuestra  religion,  se  les  trate  mui  bien  y  amorosa- 
mente,  se  les  daran  graciosamente  algunas  cosas  de  mercaderias  de  rescate  nuestras : 
i  el  Almirante  castigue  mucho  a  quien  les  trate  mal."    Fabie,  p.  16. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  207. 


2  86  COLONIZATION 

children  Spanish  and  the  elements  of  religion."  ^  Naturally  the 
friars  extended  their  ministrations  first  and  most  directly  over 
the  Indians  of  the  towns  and  villages  ;  but  the  really  independent 
portion  of  their  activity  had  to  do  with  those  natives  who  had  not 
been  "  reduced  "  to  village  life  and  placed  under  the  systematic 
control  of  encomendero  or  government.  The  most  striking  enter- 
prises of  the  priests  were  those  tnisiones  which  preceded  or  lay 
without  the  extension  of  the  power  of  the  state.  In  wide  regions 
relatively  or  totally  unoccupied  by  Europeans,  they  alone  repre- 
sented the  forces  making  for  civilization  and  conversion  ;  thus  they 
constituted,  as  Humboldt  pointed  out,  a  sort  of  intermediary  status 
between  the  true  colony  and  what  might  well  be  called,  from  the 
standpoint  of  civilization,  the  desert.^ 

They  were  thus  part  of  the  apparatus  of  conquest ;  the  fore- 
runners too  often,  and  quite  against  their  will,  of  the  soldier  and 
the  exploiting  slave-raider,  cultivator,  or  merchant.  That  the 
religious  motive  was  utilized  as  a  cloak  for  more  material  ones, 
during  the  conquest,  has  been  already  indicated  ;  the  very  attack 
upon  the  Inca  was  rendered  ostensibly  more  justifiable  by  his 
expressed  contempt  for  the  Bible  and  for  the  bishop  who  sought, 
stans  pede  in  uno,  to  explain  to  him  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 
Likewise  the  missions  had  to  be  repeatedly  restrained  from  con- 
verting the  Indians  by  force  ;  regulations  to  that  effect  were  put 
forth,  "and  yet  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  quite  customary  for 
missionaries,  whenever  slaves  {poitos)  seemed  necessary,  at  the 
head  of  their  soldiers  and  converted  Indians  {Indios  rcdncidos)  to 
make  inroads  upon  the  territory  of  the  heathen  in  order  to  seize 
young  people  there  {entrada^  cojiquista  dc  almas).''  ^  For  all  this, 
however,  the  methods  of  conversion  were  generally  peaceable ; 
despite  their  own  enthusiasm  for  the  faith,  the  friars  seem  to  have 
taken  a  sane  view  of  their  self-imposed  task  and  its  possibilities 
and  impossibilities.  They  allowed  the. Indians  the  gratification  of 
their  simple  vanity  in  their  long  hair,  indulged  them  as  no  Spaniard 
would  have  been  indulged  respecting  confession,  penances,  feast- 
days,  hearing  of  masses,  fasts,  marriage  within  spiritual  relation- 
ship [parentela  spirituals),  and  so  on.  Even  the  eating  of  human 
flesh  was  overlooked.    The  Indians  were  regarded  as  children  and 

^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  303,  304. 

2  Cf.  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  401  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  15. 

^  Cf.  pp.  142  ff.,  above;  Watson,  I,  127;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  9  (([uoted.) 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT      287 

^o  treated  ;  theoretically  at  least  the  Inquisition  never  had  to  do 
yvhKJthGm^  There  were  never  any  real  prosecutions  for  heresy, 
for  who  could  treat  the  vagaries  of  a  child  as  significant  enough  to 
bear  that  name  ?  This  policy  has  been  called  humane,  and  it  was 
doubtless  so  ;  but  it  was  either  blundered  into  with  rare  fortune  or 
deliberately  adopted  with  extraordinary  discernment.  Mere  con- 
version, that  is,  the  acceptation  of  the  newly  introduced  cult  and 
its  adaptation  to  local  conditions,  is  not  so  very  difficult  for  a 
native  people  not  under  the  dominance  of  some  more  than  primitive 
religion  ;  it  is  when  the  customs  and  habitudes  {inorcs)^  sanctioned 
by  the  respective  religions  come  up  for  adjustment  that  the  real 
strains  of  contact  appear.^  It  is  here  that  an  uncompromising 
rigidity  on  the  part  of  the  more  developed  system  may  result  in 
the  destruction  of  all  possibility  of  modifying  the  less  evolved,  and 
it  was  just  here  that  the  Spanish  clergy  introduced  their  principle 
of  indulgence  and  forbearance. 

The  Missions 

If  now  the  work  among  the  wild  Indians  was  successful,  "they 
were  gathered  together  in  a  village  called  a  mission,  where,  under 
the  increasing  supervision  of  the  friars,  they  were  taught  the  ele- 
ments of  letters  and  trained  to  peaceful,  industrious  and  religious 
lives.  In  fact,  every  mission  was  an  industrial  school,  in  which 
the  simple  arts  were  taught  by  the  friars,  themselves  in  origin 
plain  Spanish  peasants.  The  discipline  of  the  mission  was  as 
minute  as  that  of  a  school :  the  unmarried  youth  and  maidens  were 
locked  in  at  night ;  the  day's  work  began  and  ended  with  prayers 
and  the  catechism  ;  each  Indian,  besides  cultivating  his  own  plot 
of  land,  worked  two  hours  a  day  on  the  farm  belonging  to  the  vil- 
lage, the  produce  of  which  went  to  the  support  of  the  church. 
The  mission  was  recruited  by  inducing  the  wild  Indians  to  join  it, 
and  also  by  kidnapping  them.  Spanish  America  from  California 
and  Texas  to  Paraguay  and  Chile  was  fringed  with  such  estab- 
lishments, the  outposts  of  civilization,  where  many  thousands 
of  Indians  went  through  a  schooling  which  ended  only  with  their 
lives.    In  the  process  of  time  a  mission  was  slowly  transformed 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  7.  Negro  slaves  were  treated  with  similar  clemency. 
Id.,  p.  10,  note.  2  cf   Sumner,  Folkways. 

^  E.g.  the  Spanish  found  the  jiolygamy  of  the  chiefs  especially  difficult  to  deal 
with.    Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  304. 


288  COLONIZATION 

into  a  '  pueblo  de  Indios '  .  .  .  and  the  mission  frontier  was 
pushed  out  a  little  farther."  Later  the  whites  gradually  established 
themselves  among  the  Indians.  "  The  missions  become  Si)anish 
villages,  and  the  natives  lose  even  the  remembrance  of  their  natural 
idiom.  Such  is  the  progress  of  civilization  from  the  coasts  toward 
the  interior  —  a  slow  progress  shackled  by  the  passions  of  man, 
but  sure  and  uniform."  ^  It  was  not  until  after  the  conquests  were 
over  (middle  of  the  seventeenth  century)  that  the  missionary  enter-  > 
prises  really  began  to  discharge  these  important  functions.  But 
after  that  time,  with  their  forts  ox  presidios,  guns  and  cavalry,  they 
formed  for  the  government,  and  with  little  cost  to  it,  the  best 
of  outposts. 2  In  their  influence  as  nuclei  of  civilization  they  were 
remotely  similar  to  the  Roman  coloniae. 

The  tact  of  the  friars  in  not  insisting  upon  instantaneous  and 
absolute  change  of  old  habitudes  has  already  been  accorded  some 
attention.  But  as  explanatory  of  the  really  astonishing  influence 
exerted  by  them  upon  their  charges,  decided  emphasis  must  be 
laid  upon  the  fact  brought  out  in  foregoing  quotations,  namely, 
that  the  basis  of  their  whole  system  was  industrial.  It  was  their 
demonstration  of  success  in  the  organization  of  industry  which 
held  their  charges  to  them.  The  Indian,  particularly  of  Mexico, 
was  quite  able  to  see  the  aptness  of  new  agricultural  methods  and 
mechanic  arts,  and  valued  them  and  the  greater  ease  of  living  con- 
sequent upon  their  exercise  enough  to  be  willing  to  accept  all  the 
religious  ])araphernalia  and  ceremony  which,  in  this  case,  accom- 
panied them.  The  missionaries  preserved,  first  of  all,  the  natural 
resources  which  had  often  previously  been  wasted  :  their  strict 
regulation  protected  game  and  favored  domestication  and  breeding. 
Then  they  got  together  from  200  Indians  (in  the  inland  missions) 
up  to  from  800  to  2000  (near  the  sea),  and  engaged  them  in  a 
style  of  production  clearly  superior  to  that  which  they  had  been 
practicing,  but  yet  easily  maintainable  under  the  priests'  direction. 
"The  finest  mission  of  New  California,  San  Gabriel  Arcangel, 
still  in  1834  numbered  almost  3,000  Indians  and  pos'sessed  105,000 
head  of  horned  cattle,  20,000  horses,  and  over  40,000  sheep  ;  they 
harvested  annually  20,000  fancgas  (20,000  to  40,000  bushels)  of 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  305-306  ;  and  Humboldt,  quoted  in  id.,  p.  306.  For  a 
brief  description  of  the  mission,  with  references  to  more  detailed  accounts,  see 
Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  12. 

2  Ro.scher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  12-13. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT      289 

corn,  500  barrels  of  wine,  and  as  much  brandy."  ^  "  The  foundation, 
the  maintenance,  and,  up  to  a  certain  point,  the  prosperity  of  such 
estabhshments  is  one  of  the  most  notable  facts  of  Spanish  coloniza- 
tion. These  little  societies  were  productive  beyond  the  personal 
consumption  of  their  members  :  they  carried  on  a  rather  notable 
commerce  in  foodstuffs  and  in  articles  for  exportation ;  they 
exchanged  this  surplus  of  production  for  ornaments  for  the  church. 
They  thus  responded,  although  in  a  measure  peculiarly  limited,  to 
the  two  mercantile  desiderata  of  colonization  :  they  furnished 
Europe  with  the  raw  products,  and  they  drew  upon  Europe  for 
manufactured  articles  :  they  constituted  a  region  of  demand  and 
of  supply."  ^  In  other  words,  they  attracted  their  charges,  through 
the  example  of  their  own  efforts  and  productions,  and  by  means  of 
this  limited  participation  in  the  trade  of  the  outside  world,  within 
the  range  of  influences  which  profoundly  modified  the  industrial 
basis  of  their  social  organization.  They  assembled  the  natives  into 
relatively  large  aggregations  and  then  set  before  them  a  standard 
of  economy  somewhat  higher  than  their  own,  but  not  so  lofty  that 
its  benefits  were  not  immediately  self-evident.  In  short,  they  began 
and  continued  their  enterprise  with  the  direct  effort  to  modify  the 
organization  of  industry,  —  to  better  organize  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence,—  introducing  changes  in  the  matter  of  religion,  marriage- 
system,  etc.,  with  tactful  deliberation.'^  This  is  one  of  the  more 
general  reasons  for  their  success  in  dealing  with  a  situation  before 
which  so  many  peoples  have  failed. 

Seclusion  of  the  Natives 

In  fact,  the  misioneros  seemed  to  feel  that  immediate  and  full 
contact  with  a  higher  civilization  could  do  only  harm  to  their 
charges.  Consequently  the  seclusion  practiced  in  the  villages 
found  its  extreme  type  in  the  mission ;  and  it  was  expressly  stated 
that  it  was  the  enlightened  people  [gente  de  razoji)  with  whom  the 
natives  were  not  to  have  intercourse.  The  padres  superintended 
the  traveler  during  his  sojourn  and  speeded  him  forward  as  soon 
as  possible  ;  usually  a  single  night's  lodging  was  the  extreme  of 
tolerance.  Thus,  too,  was  trade  controlled  :  "  the  missionary,  who 
did  not  himself  disdain  to  trade,  was  to  form  the  only  connection 

1  Roscher,  p.  143;  cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  15. 

'^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  i6;  cf.  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  13. 

8  Cf.  Keller,  Sociol.  View,  etc. 


290  COLONIZATION 

between  the  mission  and  the  outside  world."  ^  In  view  of  the 
character  of  Spanish  emigrants  in  the  earher  periods  such  a  strict 
poHcy  of  sechision  seems  somewhat  justified  ;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  very  presence  of  the  Indians  gave  point  to  many  of  the  con- 
scientious government's  restrictions  of  movement  imposed  upon 
the  Spaniards.^  But  the  poUcy  led  to  frequent  collisions  with 
secular  authorities,  and,  had  production  with  a  view  to  exportation 
reached  any  considerable  development  under  the  Spanish  system, 
doubtless  the  same  phenomena  of  conflict  between  clergy  and 
settlers  observed  in  Brazil  would  here  have  been  repeated. 

On  the  whole,  and  despite  the  fact  that  the  clergy  deteriorated 
somewhat  in  morals  in  the  new  environment,  the  control  of  the 
Indians  seems  to  have  been  in  good  hands.  Here  again  the  omni- 
present governmental  regulations  forbade  the  missionaries  to  accept 
any  perquisites  whatever  beyond  their  small  salaries  ;  and,  although 
such  prohibitions  were  here  eluded,  as  they  were  on  other  fields, 
still  the  picture  of  the  priests  is  one,  in  general,  of  the  endurance 
of  "  the  greatest  hardships  with  almost  indescribable  resignation  "  ; 
of  "  silent  and  pious  enthusiasm."  ^  There  was,  in  the  Spanish 
dominions,  scarcely  any  temptation  to  actual  competition  between 
the  missions  and  the  planters,  and  consequently  the  former  did  not 
exhibit  the  worldliness  and  lust  for  power  characteristic  of  many  of 
the  aldeias  of  Brazil.  Whatever  the  artificial  seclusion,  the  geo- 
graphical was  too  thorough-going  to  admit  of  much  participation 
in  the  struggle  for  wealth,  even  though  the  missions  h^id  been 
climatically  so  situated  as  to  have  produced  the  tropical  products 
upon  which  attention  centered.  By  the  time,  too,  that  the  mission 
had  been  included  within  the  slowly  expanding  area  of  intercourse 
with  the  outside  world,  it  was  no  longer  a  mission. 

The  services  of  the  clergy  in  the  education  of  the  natives,  aside 
from  the  important  training  given  in  industry,  have  been  indirectly 
touched  upon  in  the  foregoing.  Indeed,  the  mechanic  arts  were 
themselves  taught  in  the  city  schools.  Both  the  crown  and  the 
Church  were  solicitous  for  education  in  the  colonies,  not  only  for 
the  Indians  but  for  the  rest  of  the  population  as  well.  To  this  we 
shall   revert.    But  the  instruction  as   given  in   the  missions  was 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  13-14  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  15-16. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  247-248. 

"  Piippig  in  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  14;  for  the  inunorality  of  the  clergy,  see 
p.  299,  below,  and  p.  188,  note  4,  above. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT      291 

necessarily  slight,  consisting  of  reading,  writing,  singing,  and  the 
like.^  At  the  most  it  may  have  given  an  initial  impetus  to  some 
individuals  of  more  than  ordinary  powers,  who  might  then  take 
advantage  of  a  higher  instruction  from  which  they  were  not  de- 
barred, but  to  which  they  were,  rather,  invited. 

The  Jesuit  Reductions  in  Paraguay 

Before  closing  the  topic  of  the  missions,  it  remains  to  sketch 
briefly  the  history  of  the  most  reputed  of  them  all  —  the  Jesuit 
Reductions  in  Paraguay.  The  Jesuits  had  been  active  in  America 
from  early  times,  but  rather  more  in  the  Portuguese  possessions 
than  in  those  of  the  Spanish.  In  particular  they  had  been  endeavor- 
ing to  rescue  the  Guarani  Indians  from  the  persecution  of  theJPor- 
tuguese_slaye-raiders  and  the  colonists  of  Asuncion  and  Buenos 
Ayres.  Finding  that  the  commoner  method  of  simply  collecting 
the  Indians  about  them  in  the  wilderness  really  acted  as  a  tempta- 
tion to  raiders,  whom  they  could  not  resist  without  organization, 
and  whom  the  state  could  not  quell  in  that  distant  corner  of  the 
empire,  they  strove  for  a  certain  autonomy  and  grant  of  local 
power.  They  attained  such  an  exceptional  status  in  1608,  when 
Philip  III  assigned  them  a  field  in  Paraguay,  which  was  under  no 
civil  power,  and  where  they  might,  exempt  from  colonial  control, 
undertake  the  civilization  and  conversion  of  the  Indians  on  the 
grand  scale.  Two  friars  arrived  in  16 10  and  established  the  first 
reduction,  called  Loreto,  upon  the  upper  Parana ;  the  neighbor- 
ing natives  were  invited  to  resort  there  to  receive  instruction  and 
become  members  of  the  community.  It  is  not  surprising  that  they 
did  so  in  numbers,  for  the  contrast  between  the  ways  of  the  Jesuits 
and  those  of  the  European  settlers  and  raiders  was  such  as  to 
attract  confidence.^  Once  in  control  of  their  charges,  the  Jesuits 
speedily  put  into  operation  a  most  skillful  adaptation  of  the  com- 
munism natural  to  primitive  tribes  who  have  never  yet  attained  to 
an  agricultural  economy.  Their  model  might  well  have  been  in 
many  respects  the  Inca  state  with  its  denial  of  private  property  and 
with  its  universal  obligation  to  labor.  And  for  this  society  they 
created  a  defensive  force  which  gave  it  the  character  of  an  inde- 
pendent state  and  secured  it  against  its  enemies  for  many  years. 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  308-309. 

-  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  403-406 ;  Watson,  I,  266-267.  ^o''  ^  fairly  complete 
thougli  rambling  treatment  of  the  Jesuits  in  Paraguay,  see  Zimmermann,  I,  377  ff. 

0-^  ^.  CUv<;v>.  , 


292  COLONIZATION 

Roschcr  ^  provides  the  best  brief  sketch  of  the  internal  relations 
of  the  reduction  :  "  In  every  mission  the  Indians  chose  their  own 
gober?iador,  although,  naturally,  subject  to  the  veto  of  the  priest,  to 
whom,  likewise,  all  the  punitory  sentences  of  the  gobenmdorh-^d  to 
be  submitted  for  confirmation.  These  punishments  had  altogether 
the  character  of  church  penances.  Usually  the  affairs  of  the  mis- 
sion were  divided  between  two  monks  ;  the  elder  had  the  spiritual 
oversight,  the  younger  the  secular  economic  control.  With  great 
shrewdness  the  Indians  were  formed  into  a  military  organization 
and,  allured  by  the  splendor  of  uniforms,  titles  and  the  like,  they 
came  to  constitute  a  well-constructed  machine.  All  foreign  neces- 
sities were  paid  for  by  the  sale  of  Paraguay  tea  \^jiiatc'\  which  the 
order  managed  '  because  the  Indians  are  too  timid.'  Then,  too,  the 
laborers  and  such  people  worked  under  the  direction  of  the  priest, 
and  even  the  public  slaughter-house  was  managed  by  him.  Work 
on  the  conuco  [i.e.  on  the  common  land]  claimed  two  days  of  every 
week.  The  beginning  and  ending  of  a  day's  work  were  marked  off 
by  church  ceremonies  ;  likewise  the  hour  and  manner  of  meals, 
dress,  and  so  on  were  arranged  once  for  all  by  the  mission.  '  The 
missionaries,'  says  Duflot  de  Mofras,  '  had  solved  the  great  problem 
of  making  work  attractive.  They  had  brought  the  Indians  to  the 
realization  that,  grouped  about  the  mission,  they  were  safer  from 
the  attacks  of  hostile  tribes,  and  that  they  could  maintain  them- 
selves more  comfortably  and  plentifully  from  the  light  and  varying 
work  of  the  mission  than  from  the  insecure  and  dangerous  spoil  of 
the  chase  and  of  robbery.'  In  every  mission  there  was  a  special 
house,  called  bcaterio,  where  women  of  bad  repute  were  kept  under 
surveillance  ;  here  also  resorted  childless  married  women  during  the 
absence  of  their  husbands.  In  similar  cloistered  seclusion  young 
maidens  {monjas)  were  reared  up  to  marriageable  age.  The  mission- 
aries, too,  had  charge  of  the  diversions,  combining  with  them  in- 
struction in  all  kinds  of  vocal  and  instrumental  music.  One  may  see 
how  ably  the  community  of  property  which  obtains  among  almost 
all  quite  rude  peoples  was  here  retained,  and  yet  was  freed  from  its 
natural  defects  by  a  remarkably  appropriate  organization  of  labor." 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Jesuits  employed  the  same  tactful- 
ness  exemplified  by  the  missionaries  above  described,  but  in  a 
degree  exhibiting  even  more  insight  and  discernment.  The  com- 
munal arrangements,  the  pomp  of  uniform  and  title,  the  cerenK)nies 

'  V\y.  145-146;  cf.  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  pp.  405-407. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT     293 

dividini,^  off  the  day,  the  seclusion  of  young  women,  the  attention 
paid  to  diversion  and  play,  —  these  and  many  other  minor  details 
could  not  have  gone  astray  in  their  effect  upon  native  predisposi- 
tions. The  compulsion  to  light  labor  was  taken,  again,  as  the  basis 
operandi ;  "  the  monks  followed  the  only  intelligent  course  for 
missions  among  heathen  —  they  realized  that  conversion  has  to 
begin"  with  civilization."  ^  Since  the  Jesuits  had  all  the  power,  they 
were  responsible  for  all  the  general  results  of  their  experiment.  So 
far  as  the  natives  were  concerned  there  seems  to  have  been  little 
question  that  they  found  it  satisfactory ;  for  they  consistently 
followed  the  fathers  and  made  every  attempt  to  retain  them  when 
the  state  decreed  their  recall.  The  reductions  grew  in  numbers 
and  population,  so  that  by  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  there 
were  forty  large  establishments,  the  greatest  of  which  contained 
from  15,000  to  20,000  souls.  At  a  very  early  period  of  their  domi- 
nance the  order  controlled  a  military  force  of  7000.  That  the 
growth  of  these  stations  was  so  rapid  during  their  first  quarter- 
century  was  due  in  great  part  to  the  desire  for  protection  against 
the  furious  Paulista  raids  of  that  period;  and  that  this  protection 
was  found  efficacious  admits  of  no  doubt. ^  What  the  Jesuits  have 
been  blamed  for  is  that  they  made  of  their  charges  mere  apes  and 
parrots,  incapable  of  progress  and  invention  if  left  to  themselves. 
The  old  accusations  against  communism,  that  it  destroys  emulation 
and  individual  initiative,  were  lodged  against  the  reduction..  Again, 
the  protests  were  directed  against  the  rigorous  seclusion  policy, 
for  in  this  the  Paraguay  Jesuits  rivaled  all  other  missionaries  be- 
cause they  had  the  power  to  do  so.  They  admitted  no  European 
even  within  the  bounds  of  their  reductions,  "  and,  having  themselves 
no  ties  of  kindred  by  marriage  or  otherwise  with  those  around 
them,  remained  a  distinct  class  apart.  Their  disciples  were  not 
even  instructed  in  the  Spanish  or  any  other  European  tongue,  save 
so  much,  perhaps,  as  was  implied  by  their  being  taught  to  patter 
certain  prayers  by  rote."  ^  But  this  amounted,  the  critics  of  the 
Jesuits  have  regularly  asserted,  to  the  inducing  of  a  mental  and 
moral  imbecility  in  a  group  held  in  virtual  servitude  for  ulterior 
ends.  One  author*  puts  it  thus  :  "  One  of  the  two  following  causes 
appears  reasonable, — either  the  administration  of  the  Jesuits  was 

1  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  406. 

2  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  407  ;   Watson,  I,  269,  271,  276,  279 ;  p.  144,  above. 
8  Watson,  I,  272  ;  cf.  pp.  271-277  ;  p.  287,  above.  ■*  Watson,  I,  278. 


294  COLONIZATION 

contrary  to  the'  civilization  of  the  Indians,  or  they  were  such  a 
people  as  were  incapable  of  emerging  from  their  primitive  state  of 
infancy." 

To  such  comments  the  Jesuits  bluntly  replied  "  that  the  Indians 
could  not  have  been  developed  out  of  the  condition  of  perpetual 
childhood  ;  that  a  larger  measure  of  individual  freedom  would  only 
have  injured  the  individual  and  general  weal."  ^  It  is  probable  that 
they  were  correct  in  principle  ;  and  it  is  likely  also  that  the  objec- 
tions of  the  colonists  were  based  upon  something  more  solid  than 
a  theoretic  dispute  concerning  the  best  way  to  exercise  benevolent 
intent  toward  the  savage.  But  the  experiment  was  to  produce  no 
demonstrable  result. 

Expulsion  of  the  Jesuits 

The  colonists  had  not  welcomed  the  interference  of  the  Jesuits 
with  their  own  way  of  working  out  the  Indian  question,  and  as  the 
reductions  waxed  in  numbers  and  prosperity  their  discontent  and 
jealousy,  fostered  doubtless  by  the  sight  of  Jesuit  ambition  and 
independent  policy,  took  on  more  ominous  proportions.  For  here, 
as  elsewhere,  the  inevitable  success  which  attended  the  first  intent, 
vigorous,  and  fearless  onslaught  of  the  strictly  disciplined  monks, 
was  speedily  metamorphosed  into  characteristic  presumption  and 
odious  self-sufficiency.  Without  following  out  the  details,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  settlers  determined  to  possess  their  own  Indians 
and  to  put  an  end  to  Jesuit  pretensions  to  actual  empire,  and 
that  out  of  the  resulting  situation,  together  with  a  boundary  dis- 
pute with  Portugal  in  Ikazil,  rose  the  War  of  the  Seven  Reduc- 
tions (175 3-1 761).  Certain  Guarani's  were  obliged  to  removelroni 
seven  missions  located  in  territory  ceded  to  the  Portuguese ;  they 
were  insufficiently  provided  for,  became  wearied  and  exasperated, 
and  finally  resisted  the  treaty;  and  the  other  twenty-four  reductions 
showed  sympathy.  The  Jesuits  then  became  the  scape-goats,  being 
held  by  the  trcaty-commissif)ners  to  persuade  the  Indians,  and  at 
the  same  time  distrusted  by  the  latter  as  the  causes  of  all  their 
troubles.  War  was  declared  untimely,  and  probably  under  local 
pressure,  upon  the  Seven  Reductions.  The  Jesuit  Provincial  then 
addressed  to  the  authorities,  in  the  name  of  the  order,  a  general 
resignation   of  control   of   all   the   communities ;    but   it  was   not 

1  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  407. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH   AND  GOVERNMENT      295 

accepted.  The  fathers  were  summoned  by  the  government  to 
deHvcr  up  the  revolting  reductions  without  resistance  ;  they  were 
the  sole  cause  of  the  rebellion  and  would  otherwise  be  guilty  of 
high  treason.  And  when,  finally,  Spain  and  Portugal  had  grown 
weary  of  the  demarcation  question,  the  priests  were  required  to 
collect  the  scattered  remnants  of  the  natives  and  encourage  them 
to  repair  their  ruined  towns  and  recultivate  their  devastated 
country.^ 

In  1767  came  the  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits  and  the  "last  signifi- 
cant phase  in  the  native-policy  of  Latin  America."  ^  After  this 
time,  in  Paraguay  as  elsewhere,  the  lay  authorities  controlled  the 
Indians  together  with  the  rest  of  the  population.  The  impover- 
ishment of  the  Paraguay  communities  under  the  shortsighted 
exploitation  of  the  controllers,  who  "  regarded  the  goods  of  these 
communities  as  a  mine  which  they  might  not  be  allowed  to  work 
but  a  short  time,"  bears  witness  again  to  the  real  virtues  of  the 
Jesuit  rule.  The  Jesuits  were  more  intelligent  than  their  succes- 
sors ;  they  were  skillful,  moderate,  and  economical ;  "  they  looked 
upon  the  towns  as  their  own  work,  and  regarded  them  as  their 
peculiar  property  and  sought  to  improve  them."  ^ 

Conclusion  of  the  Spanish  Native-Policy 

Returning  now  to  a  final  glance  over  the  Spanish  native-policy 
and  its  results,  it  is  necessary  to  recall  not  only  the  economic, 
social,  and  religious  aspects  of  the  case,  but  also  to  retain  within 
the  perspective  that  prime  phenomenon  in  the  contact  of  races  in 
Spanish  America,  miscegenation.  Viewed  in  the  large  we  have, 
then,  first  of  all,  the  creation  of  what  might  rank  as  a  mongrel 
race,  the  Spanish-American.  Opinions  are  still  too  widely  diver- 
gent regarding  the  suitability  of  this  race  to  world-conditions  to 
allow  of  the  determination  of  a  consensus.  But  that  it  constitutes 
a  really  important  advance  in  the  process  of  the  modification  of 
humanity  toward  the  necessary  type  of  the  future,  few  would 
assert.  If  the  evolutionary  process  consists,  in  the  last  analysis, 
in  weeding  out  races  which  are  less  fit  to  compete  in  the  larger 
struggles  of  a  later  age  and  of  a  world  more  fully  occupied,  then 
there  seems  here  to  have  been  called  into  being  a  new  nondescript, 

^  Watson,  II,  222-231  ;  cf.  I,  279.  2  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  409. 

3  Moses,  p.  235;  cf.  Fabie,  p.  22. 


296  COLONIZATION 

whose  ultimate  fate  is  not  so  clean-cut  as  that  of  either  of  its  racial 
components.  The  Spaniards,  unlike  the  more  northern  peoples, 
particularly  those  of  English  origin,  have  been  willing  to  depart 
from  the  European  standard  and  affiliate  with  a  lower  race  ;  "  in 
Spanish  America,  the  Spaniards  have  mingled  their  blood  with  the 
blood  of  the  natives,  and  have  compromised  with  them  in  the 
formation  of  political  and  religious  institutions.  The  English  policy 
has  tended  to  exterminate  the  barbarians  ;  under  Spanish  dominion 
the  Indians  have,  indeed,  perished  in  great  numbers,  but  those 
who  have  survived  have  entered  to  form  a  constituent  part  of  the 
new  nation."  ^  Whether  the  Spanish  policy,  however  well  it  com- 
pares in  immediate  effects  with  the  uncompromising  practice  of 
the  English  and  of  the  Americans  of  the  United  States,  represents 
a  process  suited  to  world-conditions,  is  a  question  which  must 
await  a  definitive  answer  in  future  generations. 

When  now  the  results  of  Spanish  native-policy,  aside  from  race- 
mixture,  are  made  the  subject  of  reflection,  it  is  seen  that  there 
could  be  no  such  conflict  of  races  as  has  so  generally  occurred  in 
temperate  regions.  In  the  tropical  areas  of  Spanish  America, 
excepting  the  islands,  the  native  element  remained  strong  or  the 
mixed  race  arose  ;  there  was  naturally  no  formation  of  European 
communities  to  compete  with  and  destroy  the  natives.  In  the 
limited  areas  of  the  islands  the  natives  disappeared  before  temporary 
or  shifting  concentrations  of  greater  numbers  ;  there  was  here  no 
conflict  and  competition  of  societies.  On  the  Mexican  and  South 
American  plateaus  there  were  no  factors  in  the  environment  which 
were  prohibitive  of  the  development  of  the  farm  colony.  Commu- 
nication with  the  outside  world  was  difficult,  but  no  more  so  than 
in  many  another  colony  of  settlement.  To  be  siu'c,  the  natives 
declined  before  the  hardships  of  labor  in  the  mines ;  but  here 
again,  for  reasons  of  Spanish  character  and  policy,  real  European 
societies  were  not  founded.  Hence  there  could  not  have  been  an 
advancing  frontier  of  the  English  type,  "with  its  clean  sweep,  its 
clash  of  elemental  human  forces";  with  its  results  of  a  home 
established  "  for  a  more  advanced  civilisation  and  a  less  variously 
mixed  population,  and  its  justification  like  that  accorded  perforce 
to  the  inexorable  processes  of  nature."  ^  The  temperate  plateaus 
of  the  New  World  make  the  impression,  if  the  terms  be  allowed, 
of  unsettled  colonies  of  settlement. 

'  Moses,  pp.  306-307.  -  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Anier.,  p.  306;  Moses,  p.  306. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT     297 

Since,  then,  there  was  no  real  race-conflict  resulting  from  the 
impact,  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  of  rival  societies,  there  was 
left  a  free  field  for  the  religious  and  benevolent  operations  of  the 
exclusively  male  communities  of  the  clergy ;  and  there  resulted 
that  gradual  and  all  but  unconscious  advance  of  frontiers  which 
has  been  described.^  The  missionary  had  time  to  exert  an  unhur- 
ried influence  before  the  settlers  were  upon  his  heels,  introducing 
economic  and  social  factors  into  the  situation  which  would  not 
have  been  consonant  with  his  aims,  or  methods,  or  even  presence. 
Consequently,  even  though  the  assertion  be  not  accepted  that  "  as 
the  child  physically  and  mentally  passes  rapidly  through  the  earlier 
development  of  the  race,  so  the  natives  of  New  Spain  in  a  genera- 
tion and  a  half  were  lifted  through  whole  stages  of  human  evolu- 
tion," ^  yet  it  is  freely  admitted  that,  as  within  limited  districts 
much  was  done  speedily,  so  over  greater  areas  a  good  deal  was 
accomplished,  though  in  slower  tempo.  If  such  uplifting  of  a  native 
race  has  not  been  matched  on  earth,  if  it  is  "one  of  the  great 
achievements  of  human  history,"  ^  it  must  still  be  recognized  that 
many  of  the  uniquely  favoring  conditions  were  neither  created  by 
the  Spanish  nor  consciously  taken  into  account.  What  the  Spanish 
system  did  was,  negatively,  to  keep  out  those  who  might  have  com- 
peted with  the  natives,  with  results  analogous  to  those  commonly 
met  with  in  settlement  colonies,  —  and  the  object  of  this  exclusion 
was  dictated  only  partially  by  religious  and  benevolent  purposes 
respecting  the  natives  ;  and  what  it  did  positively  was  to  intrust 
the  latter  to  the  clerical  agents  selected.  The  importance  of  the 
clergy  and  the  tactfulness  of  their  measures  were  certainly  very 
great ;  clerical  successes  in  America  cause  Roscher,*  with  other 
cases  likewise  in  mind,  to  assert  that  "barbarous  peoples  who  are 
unable  to  maintain  their  complete  independence  are  most  gently 
subjected  by  a  strong  Church." 

Clerical  Organization 

Although  the  most  important  part  of  the  work  of  the  Church  in 
America  has  now  been  sketched,  the  method  of  presentation  has 

1  Pp.  287  ff.,  above. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  201 .  It  is  perhaps  captious  to  point  out  that  the  strength 
of  this  comparison,  granted  that  it  is  not  calculated  to  carry  an  argumentative  weight  not 
sustainable  by  analogy,  rests  in  a  confusion  of  ontogenetic,  phylogenetic,  and  societal 
evolution.      ^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  195-196;  cf.  pp.  196-201,  303-304,  353-354- 

*  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  15. 


298  COLONIZATION 

not  yet  admitted  of  an  account  of  the  general  clerical  organization, 
apart  from  its  purposes.  The  chief  characteristic  of  the  Church 
in  Spanish  America  is,  perhaps,  its  subjection  to  the  crown. 
"  Because  no  monarch  of  the  world  was  esteemed  so  Catholic  as 
the  Spanish,  so  none  had  such  a  power  over  his  country's  church 
with  the  permission  of  the  pope.  .  .  .  This  influence  was  even 
much  greater  in  America,  a  papal  donation.  No  priest  could  go  to 
America  without  the  express  permission  of  the  king  (law  of  1522 
and  later).  The  ecclesiastical  patronage  of  the  whole  of  the  Indies 
belonged  exclusively  to  the  crown ;  by  it  all  bishops  were  nomi- 
nated to  the  pope,  and  all  canons  to  the  prelates  (law  of  1508). 
Again,  no  papal  bull  could  extend  to  America  except  by  permission 
of  the  Council  of  the  Indies.  One  of  the  most  important  prerog- 
atives was  the  royal  sale  of  indulgences ;  similarly  the  annates 
flowed  not  into  the  papal  but  into  the  royal  treasury."  Members 
of  the  religious  orders  went  to  America  in  most  cases  at  the  king's 
expense,  and  remained  under  his  jurisdiction.  "  The  long  list 
of  ordinances  limiting  the  movements  and  general  activity  of  the 
members  of  the  religious  orders  indicates  to  what  marvelous  lengths 
and  into  what  minute  details  Spain's  restrictive  system  extended."  ^ 
As  in  Spain,  the  clergy  was  composed  of  the  regulars,  or  members 
of  orders,  and  of  the  seculars  of  all  grades  ;  the  regulars  held  the 
large  uK^iasteries  in  the  cities  and  were  likewise  distributed  up 
and  down  the  country  in  smaller  groups,  and  their  fields  and  those 
of  the  seculars  were  carefully  delimited.  Clerical  labors  consisted 
mainly  of  parish  work  in  Spanish  towns,  teaching  and  i)arish  work 
in  Indian  villages  {doctrind),  and  the  specific  mission  work.  The 
different  orders  followed  divers  ])olicies  :  the  Dominicans  emplo)-ed 
fire  and  sword,  purposely  destroying  many  of  the  monuments  of 
earlier  culture,  though  they  preserved  others ;  the  Franciscans 
attached  little  importance  to  science,  but  preached  with  fervent 
love;  the  Jesuits,  admitted  in  1664  to  missionary  work,  pursued  a 
more  varied  policy,  and  did  much  for  geography,  philology,  and 
the  like.'  Despite  the  strict  control  of  the  king,  who  had  triennial 
reports  from  his  officers  upon  the  number  and  activity  of  the 
monks,  the  extent  and  power  of  the  church-establishments  increased 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  11  ;  Moses,  pp.  61-62  ;  Watson,  II,  136-1  37  ;  Bourne, 
Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  302-303.  The  annate  was  the  first  year's  revenue  of  bishops  or 
other  ecclesiastics. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  j^p.  304-305;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  17;  Watson,  II, 
137  ;  Moses,  pp.  61-62. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT      299 

with  great  rapidity,  especially  in  the  second  half  of  the  sixteenth 
century.  In  1600  there  were  in  New  Spain  400  convents  of  the 
Several  orders  and  400  districts  in  charge  of  clergymen. ^  The 
economic  burden  entailed  by  the  presence  of  the  clergy  was  very 
oppressive,  for  "it  enjoyed  more  extended  tithes  here  than  in 
other  places  and  they  were  collected  with  greater  precision.  As 
early  as  the  year  1501  the  payment  of  the  tithes  had  been  ordered 
in  all  the  colonies  ^  and  the  method  of  collection  regulated  by  law. 
All  the  products  of  agriculture  were  subjected  to  this  tax  ;  sugar, 
indigo,  and  cochineal  as  well  as  maize  or  wheat."  Such  a  land-tax, 
in  a  new  country,  according  to  Leroy-Beaulieu,  is  "essentially 
prohibitive  of  cultivation."  Again,  the  extension  of  the  mortmain 
was  a  distinct  obstacle  to  production;  "in  new  countries  where 
the  lands  have  not  enough  value  to  be  leased,  the  ill-cultivated 
possessions  of  the  mainmorte  constitute  often  vast  expanses  of 
poor  pasture  which  arrest  the  agricultural  development  of  the 
districts  wherein  they  are  located.  The  mainmorte  was  incredibly 
developed  in  Spanish  America."^  The  Church  "  held^  aj30ut_QD£.._ 
half  of  all  the  p rope rty  J n _t h e  colonies,  and  was  directed  by  men 
not  always  in  the  fullest  sympathy  with  those  interests  on  which 
the  material  prosperity  of  society  depends.  On  the  economic 
affairs  of  Spanish  America,  as  on  those  of  Spain,  the  church  cast 
the  blight  of  its  dead  hand."  In  1 576  Lima,  for  example,  contained 
five  monasteries  and  two  convents,  a  convent  for  mestizo  girls  and 
a  house  of  sisters  of  charity,  and  two  large  and  rich  hospitals,  one 
for  Spaniards  and  one  for  Indians  ;  this  for  a  population  of  some 
2000  Spanish  families  and  26,000  Indians.*  And  as  the  power  of 
the  clergy  increased,  constant  defra.uding  of  the  crown  occurred ; 
the  Jesuits,  by  far  the  richest  and  most  powerful  order,  were  con- 
spicuous for  such  practice  until  their  expulsion  in  1767.^ 

Policy  and  Influence  of  the  Clergy 

But  what  the  Jesuits  usually  were  in  their  private  life,  many 
of  the  clergy  certainly  were  not.  Isabella's  purging  of  the  morals  of 
the  clergy  was  not  sufficiently  drastic  to  render  them  proof  against 
the  temptations  of  new  conditions,  and  concubinage  became  a  not 

1  Moses,  p.  251  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  337.  2  por  that  date,  "all  the  colonies"  means 
practically  Espanola.  ^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  22. 

*  Moses,  p.  31 1  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  200;  Zimmermann,  I,  342. 
^  Zimmermann,  I,  337,  366  ff. 


300 


COLONIZATION 


uncommon  thing,  as  practiced  by  regulars  and  seculars  in  the  New 
World.  Morals  in  general  were  much  relaxed  among  a  class  of 
religious  adventurers  whose  chances  at  home  had  been  small.  As 
late  as  the  reign  of  Ferdinand  VI  (i  746-1 759)  an  edict  was  issued 
prohibiting  regulars  of  any  denomination  from  taking  charge  of 
parishes.^  In  reckoning  up  the  services  of  the  clergy  in  civilizing 
the  Indians,  some  attention  should  be  accorded  to  this  aspect  of 
their  case,  although  such  irregularities  probably  affected  the  out- 
come but  little,  one  way  or  the  other. 

Except  for  the  Indians,  the  Church  displayed  as  little  tolerance 
in  America  as  in  Spain.  Reference  has  been  made  to  the  treat- 
ment of  heretics  when  military  operations  or  chance  threw  llicm 
into  Spanish  hands  ;  and  it  has  been  shown  with  what  care  the 
genealogies  of  prospective  emigrants  were  scrutinized  in  order  to 
select  only  the  spotless.  It  is  probably  a  testimony  to  the  early 
strictness  of  this  examination  that  the  introduction  of  the  Inquisi- 
tion into  Spanish  America  was  not  authorized  until  1569,  and  that 
its  history  there  was  relatively  free  from  the  grim  spectacles  often 
viewed  in  Spain.  The  Holy  Office  began  promptly  upon  its  arrival 
in  1574  "  by  pouncing  on  all  of  Hawkins's  men  who  had  been  put 
ashore  in  1568  that  could  be  got  hold  of";  the  first  Mexican 
auto-da-fe  was  celebrated  in  that  year.  But  in  general  it  could  find 
but  small  game  amongst  a  population  scarcely  intellectual  enough 
to  doubt,  and  spent  most  of  its  efforts  in  harrying  foreign  heretics, 
Jews,  witches,  and  bigamists.  In  an  activity  of  277  years  the 
inquisition  put  to  death  in  Mexico  forty-one  unreconciled  heretics  ; 
in  Peru,  within  the  same  period,  there  were  celebrated  twenty-nine 
autos-da-fe,  fifty-nine  persons  being  burned  at  the  stake.  As  for 
the  Indians  in  their  relation  to  the  Inquisition,  there  was  a  law 
conferring  upon  them  exemption  from  its  searchings ;  for  their 
misdemeanors  were  adjudged  to  be  those  of  childish  irresponsibles, 
and  over  them  was  held  the  threat  of  the  rod  rather  than  that  of 
the  more  terrible  apparatus  of  the  Holy  Office.'-^ 

The  ecclesiastical  censorship  was  wielded  with  vigor,  the  entire 
control  of  the  press  being  given,  with  detailed  prescriptions,  into  the 
hands  of  the  Inquisition.  Heavy  fines  and  temporary  banishment 
were  the  punishments  of  booksellers  who  could  not  produce  a  cat- 
alogue of  prohibited  books,  or  who  sold  one  of  tlicm  ;    travelers 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  306-308;  Watson,  II,  137-13CS. 

2  Moses,  pp.  310-31 1  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  243-244,  312-314  ;  Zininieiniiinn, 
I.  341-342. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT 


301 


crossing  the  frontier  with  such  an  article  in  concealment  suffered 
a  fine  of  200  ducats.  The  agents  of  the  Inquisition  might  enter 
private  houses  at  any  hour  of  day  or  night  in  the  search  for  pro- 
hibited books  or  any  similar  articles.  Thus  the  Inquisition  came 
to  exercise  a  repressive  influence  upon  the  growth  of  ideas  and 
civilization  comparable  only  with  that  of  the  state  as  directed 
against  commerce  and  external  communication.  And  when,  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  an  intellectual  awakening  was  actually  threat- 
ened, the  Office  made  haste  to  tighten  the  strait-jacket ;  the  cata- 
logues of  prohibited  or  expurgated  books  grew  to  include  the  works 
of  5420  authors.  On  the  lists  occurred  the  names  of  the  leading 
thinkers  of  the  century. ^  Whatever  the  clergy  may  have  done  for 
the  Indians,  its  influence  could  not  have  conduced,  under  such  a 
system,  to  any  great  advancement  for  people  of  greater  possibilities. 
The  higher  education  which  they  professed  to  give  was,  for  many 
generations,  merely  scholastic  and  theological.  It  was  owing  largely 
to  the  Jesuits  that  advance  was  made  in  the  scientific  study  of  the 
native  languages,  and  in  some  other  fields.  The  Inquisition  had 
no  special  objection  to  the  pious  and  orthodox  study  of  geography, 
linguistics,  ethnography,  and  history,  and  it  was  almost  inevitable 
that  a  knowledge  of  these  subjects  should  be  forced  upon  the 
clergy,  particularly  the  viisioneros,  in  their  work.  In  fact,  it  is 
hardly  just  to  credit  the  clergy  in  general  with  scientific  intent ; 
their  preservation  of  certain  material,  like  their  destruction  of 
much  more,  was  a  casual  and  almost  accidental  consequence  of 
their  main  preoccupation  —  the  civilization  and  conversion  of  the 
Indians.  It  is  lucky  that  certain  information  highly  prized  by  a 
later  age  happened  to  be  desirable  for  the  realization  of  their  then 
purposes.  There  was  created,  certainly,  a  considerable  educational 
plant.  In  later  times,  doubtless,  knowledge  was  pursued  for  its 
own  sake,  and  it  cannot  be  denied  that  notable  authors  occasionally 
appeared  ;  but  the  whole  educational  system  was  vitiated  by  the 
persistence  of  mediaeval  prepossessions  and  was  unfit  to  rear  up  a 
people  to  take  its  place  in  the  modern  world. ^ 

Whatever  the  destiny  of  Spanish  America,  the  Church  has  con- 
tributed largely  to  make  it  what  it  has  been  and  will  be  ;  for  the 
religious  coherence  of  Spain  and  her  colonies  was  much  stronger 
than  the  political  could  be  made,  despite  all  the  bonds  forged  by 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  31  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  314. 

2  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  308-316;  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  401-402. 


302  COLONIZATION 

the  colonial  policy.  For  "  when  the  struggle  for  Spanish  inclei:)cnd- 
ence  came,  .  .  .  the  bond  of  ecclesiastical  union  and  s)ni[xithy 
remained,  always  Rawing  a  large  part  of  several  nations  back  to 
allegiance  with  Spain.  .  .  .  Even  after  the  Si:)anish-Amcricans 
had  achieved  their  political  independence,  they  remained  still  in  a 
strong  ecclesiastical  alliance  with  the  mother-country."  ^ 


COLONIAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Much  has  been  said,  from  time  to  time,  in  the  foregoing,  con- 
cerning the  policy  and  actions  of  the  government.  Some  of  its 
agencies,  as  these  controlled  the  activities  under  discussion  at  the 
time,  have  been  described.  But,  as  in  the  case  of  the  clergy,  it 
has  seemed  best  to  reserve  for  this  later  place  an  account,  in  its 
main  and  general  lines,  of  the  machinery  of  government.  And  the 
attempt  to  gain  a  perspective  of  its  development  will  carry  us  back 
once  more  to  the  time  of  the  descobridorcs  and  conquistadores. 
"  During  the  process  of  exploration  and  settlement,  authority  in 
America  rested  in  the  hands  of  leaders  of  expeditions  and  colonies, 
who  usually  bore  the  title  of  adclantado,"  a  title  formerly  applied 
to  the  commanders  in  the  wars  against  the  Moors,  and  whose  use 
in  the  New  World  may  stand  for  a  certain  transference  of  the 
crusading  spirit  to  a  new  field.^  Who  the  adelantados  were,  by 
what  means  and  under  what  circumstances  they  attacked  their 
enterprises,  and  with  what  successes,  has  already  been  indicated.'"^ 
Gradually,  however,  the  conquests  reached  their  limits,  and,  first 
locally,  then  more  generally,  the  passion  for  discovery,  which  had 
been  fed  by  fancy  and  by  hope  of  the  acquisition  of  fabulous  wealth 
through  the  opening  of  strange  and  unheard-of  sources,  found  for 
the  Spaniards  no  further  promise  of  satisfaction.  "  In  its  place 
emerged  the  serious  and  difficult  task  of  organizing  the  endless 
extent  of  territory  of  which  they  now  possessed  some  knowledge, 
even  though  it  was  rperely  superficial.  The  epoch  of  the  coiiqnista 
had  come  to  an  end,  and  that  of  the  coloniaje,  the  colonial  economy, 
had  begun."  ^  Roughly  speaking,  the  close  of  the  period  of  conquest 
may  be  taken  as  1550.^ 

1  Moses,  pp.  31 1 -31 2. 

2  From  adelantar,  to  further,  or  extend.    Cf.  Moses,  pp.  68-69. 

•''  I'p.  177  ff.,  above.  *  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  p.  391. 

^  The  e.\]5ecliti()ii  of  Orellana  (1541)  was  the  last  important  example  of  the  El 
Dorado  enterprises.    Ruge,  p.  455.    Of  course  the  area  of  conquest  extended  more 


SPANISH  AMERICA:  CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT      303 

The  Conquistadores 

When  it  came  to  organization,  however,  the  immediate  destiny 
of  the  colony  depended  largely  upon  the  personality  of  the  con- 
queror ;  Mexico  and  Peru  may  be  taken,  as  the  most  valued 
conquests,  to  afford  the  most  striking  contrast.  In  Mexico  the 
determining  factor,  despite  greater  nearness  to  the  metropolis,  was 
Cortes,  for  he  combined  the  qualities  of  the  superior  organizer 
"witTTThose  of  the  intrepid  leader.  In  all  his  exigencies  Cortes 
"  revealed  such  inflexibility  of  resolution,  never-failing  presence  of 
mind,  unwavering  self-control,  such  readiness  to  strike  or  to  con- 
ciliate as  best  fitted  the  case,  such  consideration  for  his  own  men 
and  for  the  conquered,  such  constructive  statesmanship,  such  down- 
right business  ability,  such  scientific  and  practical  interest  in 
geographical  exploration  that  he  is  easily  the  greatest  of  the  con- 
quistadores, if  not  the  ablest  man  that  Spain  produced  in  that 
age."  In  consequence  of  his  enlightened  efforts  the  country  began 
to  possess  an  organized  means  of  defense,  the  rebuilt  city  of  Mexico 
came  in  a  few  years  to  have  thousands  of  inhabitants,  and  a  net- 
work of  smaller  European  settlements  spread  over  the  whole 
country  of  Montezuma.^  The  shocks  of  conquest  and  the  heavings 
to  and  fro,  back  to  a  state  of  relatively  stable  equilibrium,  were 
thus  minimized,  and  Mexico  gave  little  cause  for  uneasiness  and 
anxiety. 

The  case  of  Peru  was  very  different.  The  first  attempt  to  estab- 
lish royal  control  ended  in  total  failure  ;  Peru  came  near  to  acquir- 
ing independence,  an  example  which,  according  to  Hume,^  the 
other  colonies  would  speedily  have  followed.  Francisco  Pizarro  had 
been  given  in  1529  the  practically  absolute  authority  of  captain- 
general,  and  permission  had  been  accorded  him  and  his  associates 
to  extend  their  conquests  at  their  own  expense.  But  Almagro's 
jealousy  of  what  he  regarded  as  undue  preferential  treatment  of 
Pizarro,  matched  with  the  latter's  envy  of  the  former's  successes 
in  Chile,  led  to  internal  strife  ;  and  the  quarrel  was  carried  on  by 
Almagro's  son  after  Pizarro  had  inflicted  a  traitor's  death  upon 
the  father.    Upon  such  an  unsettled  society  came  now,  in   1544, 

slowly,  and  in  the  outlying  regions  or  the  mountains  native  tribes  either  retained  their 
barbarous  independence  unbroken  or  regained  it  from  time  to  time.    Watson,  II,  147. 
1  Bourne,  Spain  in  America,  p.  157   (quoted);    Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  375-376; 
Moses,  p.  79.  2  p  gi_ 


304  COLONIZATION 

the  viceroy  De  Vela,  with  commission  to  put  the  "  New  Laws  " 
respecting  IncHan  freedom  and  rights  into  execution.  Resistance 
to  these  measures  was  rendered  more  bitter  by  reason  of  the^brupt 
and  tactless  proceedings  of  the  viceroy  ;  largely  in  consequence 
of  such  discontent  the  last  of  the  Pizarros,  Gonzalo,  was  forced 
into  what  was  practically  a  rebellion,  as  its  head.  The  viceroy  was 
taken  prisoner  and  Pizarro  proclaimed  governor  and  captain-general 
until  the  king's  pleasure  should  be  known.  Pizarro  could  easily 
have  made  himself  an  independent  sovereign  at  this  time,  for  his 
authority  was  undisputed  from  Quito  to  Chile,  while  the  mines  of 
Potosi  supplied  a  royal  revenue.  But,  fortunately  for  the  crown, 
he  vacillated,  hesitating  to  throw  off  his  allegiance,  until  the  pleni- 
potentiary Gasca  managed  to  work  upon  Spanish  loyalty  and  won 
the  empire  back  for  the  king.^  And  at  length,  a'fter  the  final 
cessation  of  the  civil  wars  (1555),  the  lawless  society  was  brought 
into  order  by  the  vigor  and  severity  of  the  viceroy  Mendoza.^ 

Transfer  of  the  Metropolitan  Svstem  :  the  King 

When,  now,  the  conjrol  of  the  king  began  to  replace  the 
licensed  conquests  of  the  adelantados,  the  common  phenomenon 
of  the  application  of  metropolitan  political  institutions  to  the 
colonial  field  at  once  appeared.  "  The  whole  drift  of  Spanish 
political  life  in  the  sixteenth  century  .  .  .  was  toward  the  strength- 
ening of  the  power  of  the  crown  and  the  loss  by  the  Cortes  of  its 
legislative  function.  .  .  .  The  government  of  Spanish  America  was 
pre-eminently  monarchical."  From  what  has  been  recounted  con- 
cerning the  power  of  the  Spanish  sovereigns  it  is  not  difficult  to 
understand  how  "  Spanish  America  did  not  belong  to  Spain,  but 
was  a  part  of  the  hereditary  domains  of  the  sovereigns  of  Castile 
as  heirs  of  Queen  Isabella,  with  which  the  cortes  of  Castile  had 
little  more  to  do  than  with  the  kingdom  of  Naples  or  the  Nether- 
lands." Hence  it  is  more  clearly  to  be  seen  that  the  king  was  little 
susceptible  to  control  in  the  management  of  his  own  ;  that  while 
"  the  laws  of  Castile  were  made  by  the  king  with  the  advice  of  his 
councils  .  .  .  the  laws  of  Spanish  America  were  made  by  the  king 
tlirougli  the  Council  of  the  Indies."     A  monojioly  such  as  that  of 

1  Moses,  pp.  111-113;  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  384  ff. ;  Watson,  I,  117-11Q,  134- 
136,  140-141,  177-182,  187-188,  190-197,  203-204;  Zimmermann,  I,  319  ff.;  see 
p.  277,  above. 

2  Moses,  pj).  134-T37;   Wats(jn,  II,  127-131. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT      305 

Seville  was  his  to  give.^  "The  colonies  of  Spain,  although  the 
funds  for  their  original  settlement  were  largely  private,  were,  like 
the  Roman  colonies,  creations  of  the  central  political  organization, 
and  were  upheld  and  controlled  by  a  power  outside  of  themselves." 
T^hey  were  from  the  outset,  at  any  rate,  equipped  with  ample  legal 
machinery,  built  upon  the  genuine  Spanish  pattern.^ 

One  of  the  main  characteristics  of  the  colonial  administration, 
perfectly  in  consonance  with  the  policy  of  a  Philip  II,  was  its 
secrecy.  No  reports  were  published,  and  the  inquisitorial  powers 
"oTThe"  Church  were  enlisted  in  the  maintenance  of  mystery.  Of 
course  this  is  another  outgrowth  of  the. exclusion  policy,  especially 
as  respects  foreigners  ;  Count  Revillagigedo  was  seriously  blamed 
for  publishing  statistics  of  Spanish  American  population,  and  thus 
informing  rival  nations  of  the  small  number  of  Spaniards  in  the 
colonies.  Because  of  this  absence  of  information  the  most  mis- 
taken opinions  prevailed  in  Europe  respecting  the  Spanish  colo- 
nies; "while,  in  the  sixteenth  century,  every  one  exaggerated  their 
prosperity,  their  riches  and  population,  in  the  eighteenth  every 
one  depreciated  them  beyond  measure."  In  fact,  the  principle 
of  secrecy,  combined  with  the  deliberate  neglect  of  means  of 
communication,  referred  to  in  another  place,  actually  left  the 
government  itself  poorly  informed  of  affairs  in  the  colonies  ;  so 
that  sometimes  it  became  aware  of  important  happenings  only 
through  the  reports  of  foreigners.^  The  other  determining  charac- 
teristics of  the  administrative  policy  will  appear  in  a  review  of  the 
agencies  employed,  but  it  may  be  said  preliminarily  that,  together 
with  the  .Spanish  institutions,  came  also  the  Spanish  political  habi- 
tudes of  mind  ;  besides  secrecy  there  existed  suspicion,  the  tendency 
towardminute  regulation,  and  other  characteristics  of  the  metro- 
politan administration. 

The  Council  of  the  Indies 

Taking  the  king,  now,  to  be  the  source  of  all  legislation  and 
government,  the  body  nearest  him  was  the  Conscjo  dc  Iiidias,  the 
Supreme  Council  of  the  Indies,  founded  by  Ferdinand  in  i  5  1 1,  and 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  228,  221  ;  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  395  ;  Moses,  pp.  18-22, 
298-299;  cf.  295-296;  Watson,  II,  127,  131.         ^  Moses,  pp.  298-299  ;  Hume,  p.  91. 

3  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  21  ;  cf.  pp.  18,  23  ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  35  ;  p.  245,  above. 
This  was  not  so  bad  in  the  earliest  years,  but  later  the  development  of  means  of  rela- 
tively rapid  communication  was  looked  upon  as  a  highly  dangerous  innovation.  Moses, 
pp.  64-65  ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  22. 


3o6  COLONIZATION 

finally  orj^anized  in  1542.  "This  board  originally  embodied  all 
financial,  police,  military,  ecclesiastical  and  commercial  authority, 
and  at  the  same  time  serv^ed  as  a  high  court  of  appeal  in  civil 
actions.  .  .  .  Endowed  with  the  entire  royal  prerogative,  it  had,  at 
all  times,  to  remain  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  court.  New  laws 
could  be  passed  only  by  a  majority  of  at  least  two-thirds.  For  a 
century  the  Council  of  the  Indies  was  universally  and  deservedly 
held  in  the  greatest  esteem.  Its  members  were  chosen  preferably 
from  those  who  had  held  high  ofifices  in  America  with  distinction."  ^ 
The  Council  was  a  most  dignified  body,  therefore,  and  it  performed 
its  tasks  in  a  worthy  manner,  collecting  information,  initiating 
schemes  for  improvement,  nominating  all  officials,  civil  and  eccle- 
siastical, and  calling  them  to  account,  and  otherwise  controlling 
and  supervising  large  policies  and  details.  A  worthy  monument  to 
its  activities  and  intentions  for  two  centuries  is  formed  by  the 
Recopilacion  de  Leyes  de  los  Reinos  dc  las  Indias,  a  body  of  law 
evidently  dictated  by  the  broadest  considerations  of  humanity. 
Its  industry  and  the  seriousness  with  which  it  took  its  functions 
are  indicated  by  the  fact  that  it  was  to  meet  five  hours  daily, 
except  on  church  holidays ;  however  numerous  the  latter,  the 
Counselors  certainly  labored  well  and  long  as  compared  with  a 
considerable  part  of  the  population.'^  But  it  must  be  recognized 
that  the  Council  came  to  constitute  the  most  stubborn  conservator 
of  the  traditional  policies  whose  effects  have  been  passed  in  review  ; 
so  that  when,  under  the  Bourbons,  more  liberal  measures  were 
adopted  respecting  America,  it  had  to  be  suppressed.  It  was  suc- 
ceeded by  a  Ministry  of  the  Indies,  which  in  turn  passed  away 
under  Cliarlcs  IV,  through  the  distribution  of  its  functions  among 
the  five  ministries  of  the  state.  The  Council  was  at  this  time 
resuscitated  in  outward  form,  but  its  utility  was  gone.'^ 

The  Vicef^oy  and  Audiencia 

This  body,  in  its  period  of  vigor,  conferred  all  offices  in  America 
and  held  accountable  every  incumbent,  from  the  loftiest  down. 
The  most  important  of  all  the  officers  was,  naturally,  the  king's 
representati\e,  the  viceroy.  This  official  possessed  by  delegation 
the  entire  royal  authority,  and  his  person  was  surrounded  by  retinue 

1  Koscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  25-26;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  224-225 ;  Saco, 
pp.66ff.  '^  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  225-7226;  Wat.son,  II,  130. 

2  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  20,  30 ;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  26,  note. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT     307 

and  ceremonial  of  a  truly  pompous  character.  Nevertheless  he 
was  hedged  about  with  checks  of  many  kinds,  for  the  independ- 
ence necessarily  granted  him  because  of  the  remoteness  of  the 
colonies  from  the  mother-country  made  him  a  shining  object  for 
the  perennial  suspicion  characteristic  of  the  Spanish  administration. 
To  secure  unity  and  sequence  of  policy  the  colonial  affairs  were 
directed  first  by  Fonseca,  then  by  the  Council  of  the  Indies,  and 
the  viceroy's  duties  were  at  length  specified  to  such  an  extent  that 
over  seventy  laws  in  the  Recopilacion  are  devoted  to  him.  Again, 
there  was  set  over  against  him  the  midiencia  or  court  of  appeals, 
presently  to  receive  notice,  and  the  whole  clerical  organization. 
Even  Columbus,  with  his  extensive  grants,  never  afterward  dupli- 
cated, had  been  given  full  instructions,  and  the  tendency  to  regu- 
late gained  strength  with  time.^  One  of  the  most  obvious  methods, 
practiced  also  by  the  Portuguese,  of  curtailing  opportunity  for  the 
viceroy,  was  the  limitation  of  his  term,  which  was  fixed  at  three, 
later  at  five,  years,  subject  to  royal  extension.  The  first  two  vice- 
roys reigned  fifteen  and  fourteen  years  respectively ;  but  from 
1535  to  182 1  sixty-two  incumbents  held  the  office,  averaging  a 
little  over  four  and  one-half  years.  Again,  persons  of  very  dis- 
tinguished rank  were  seldom  appointed.  Numerous  apparently 
petty  restrictions  hedged  about  the  private  life  of  the  viceroy ; 
inspectors  were  sometimes  sent  out ;  and,  finally,  the  viceroy, 
upon  his  retirement  from  office,  was  subject  to  the  rcsidencia  ^  or 
inquest  into  his  conduct  during  his  term.  "  The  Council  of  the 
Indies  appointed  for  this  a  particularly  prominent  jurist,  who  had 
to  be  ready  for  months  to  receive  charges  of  every  kind  against 
the  outgoing  official.  The  justice  of  these  charges  was  decided  in 
Spain,  and  no  viceroy  or  other  officer  could  receive  the  slightest 
new  appointment  without  first  successfully  meeting  this  test." 
Vaca  de  Castro  was  detained  twelve  years  as  state-prisoner,  while 
his  conduct  was  being  laboriously  analyzed,  although  in  the  end  he 
was  approved  and  granted  due  honors.  "  The  wellnigh  proverbial 
ingratitude  of  the  Spanish  court  towards  its  great  discoverers 
and  conquerors  is  at  bottom  nothing  more  than  the  painful  intro- 
duction of  the  later  colonial  policy  of  permitting  no  one  to  become 

1  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  393  ff. ;    Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  23  ff. ;    Bourne,  Sp. 
in  Amer.,  pp.  229-230  ;   Moses,  p.  87  ;   Watson,  II,  128  ff. 

2  The  Portuguese  practiced  the  "  legidencia"  in  India,  but  apparently  upon  inferior 
ofificers.     Menezes,  p.  139. 


3o8  COLONIZATION 

too  powerful."  ^  Comparison  with  the  case  of  Albuquerque  and 
others  of  the  Portuguese  viceroys  and  governors  is  here  challenged. 
And  wlial  is  said  respecting  the  viceroy  applies  to  the  captain- 
general,  who  was  simply  the  "king  of  a  smaller  kingdom."  No 
efforts,  however,  to  break  the  essential  power  of  the  viceroy  really 
succeeded,  limited  though  he  may  have  been.^ 

The  position  of  the  conscientious  viceroy  was  one  of  arduous 
labor  and  trying  responsibility  ;  he  had,  among  other  duties,  to 
contribute  toward  the  continuity  of  the  colonial  policy  a  general 
report  embodying  information  and  counsel  for  his  successors. '"^ 
Mendoza  was  granted  in  1535  a  salary  of  6000  ducats,  and  2000 
for  the  expenses  of  his  bodyguard.  In  the  seventeenth  century 
the  viceroy  of  New  Spain  received  20,000  ducats,  and  of  Peru, 
30,000.  In  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  salary  of  the 
viceroy  of  Mexico  was  raised  to  60,000  pesos,  12,000  of  which  he 
was  expected  to  devote  to  his  captain-general.  The  captain-general 
of  Caracas  held  office  on  the  average  seven  years  and  received 
9000  pesos.  Naturally  perquisites  might  add  considerably  to  these 
stipends.  The  viceroyalty  of  Peru  appears  from  the  above  to  have 
ranked  as  a  higher  dignity  than  that  of  New  Spain ;  successful 
viceroys  in  the  latter  province  were  often  promoted  to  Peru.* 

The  check  which  was  set  up  as  the  most  definite  and  tangible 
counterbalance  to  the  viceroy  who  might  be  wielding,  or  suspected 
of  planning  to  wield,  too  much  power,  was  the  aitdiencia.  In 
Espanola  a  court  independent  of  the  governor  was  established 
(15  10)  to  hear  appeals  from  the  decisions  of  the  governor's  jus- 
tices; this  is  taken  as  the  beginning  of  the  audiencia,  "a  body 
which  also  became  the  mouth-piece  of  colonial  needs  by  presenting 
memorials  to  the  Council  of  the  Indies."  ^  On  the  mainland  the 
adelantados  were  superseded  by  the  audiencias,  or  balanced  by 
them.  In  1527  it  was  thought  prudent  to  curtail  the  po\\er  of 
Cortes,  and  the  conviction  that  no  single  minister  would  be  able 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  23-24  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  229-232;  Watson, 
p.  183;  Moses,  pp.  86-87,  90-91,  144.  The  residencia  was  of  varying  efficiency.  Bourne, 
Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  232. 

2  Bourne,  Sp.  in  -Xmer.,  p.  331  ;   Moses,  pp.  107-108. 

3  The  Relaciones  and  Memorias  cited  in  the  bibliography  of  this  book. 

*  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp,  229-231,  331;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  41  ;  Moses, 
pp.  86,  90. 

''  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  227-228.  On  the  germ  of  the  audiencia,  legally  con- 
sidered, cf.  Fable,  pp.  S3  ff-  This  author  (p.  24)  regards  the  instruction  given  to 
Columbus  as  the  prototype  of  all  succeeding  legislation. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT     309 

to  do  this  led  to  the  selection  of  a  collegiate  body.^  The  audiencia 
in  general  was  a  sort  of  council  of  state,  corresponding  roughly  to 
the  Council  of  JKe  Inches, in  Spain.  It  had  great  restraining  power 
over  the  viceroy,  for  the  Spanish  government  turned  to  it  for  in- 
formation as  to  his  conduct;  "that  in  some  respects  the  powers 
of  the  viceroy  and  the  audiencia  were  co-ordinate  may  be  seen  in 
the  fact  lliat  each  without  informing  the  other  might  corresponds^ 
directly  with  the  king.''  The  audiencia  acted  in  place  of  the  gover- 
nor m  case  of  absences  or  vacancies,  and  its  commands  were 
regarded  as  if  they  emanated  from  the  king  himself.  Persons  who 
felt  wronged  by  viceregal  decisions  could  appeal  to  the  audiencia ; 
the  fact  that  in  important  cases  such  appeal  was  carried  to  the 
Council  of  the  Indies  reveals  the  kinship  of  the  two  bodies.  Again, 
the  audiencia  exercised  a  direct  supervision  over  the  economic,  re- 
ligious, and  other  conditions  of  its  district,  for  one  of  its  members 
was  delegated  every  three  years  to  make  a  thorough  inspection, 
extending  even  to  the  testing  of  the  purity  of  drugs  in  apothecary 
shops.  The  closest  attention  is  said  to  have  been  given  to  the 
selection  of  proper  men  for  the  audiencia ;  because  of  their  high 
rank  and  good  salary  they  were  more  than  ordinarily  independent, 
and  uncommon  precaution  was  taken  to  detach  them  from  social 
connections  and  business  relations  calculated  to  impair  their  im- 
partiality.^ 

The  political  divisions  of  the  empire,  after  the  conquests  were 
over,  were  based  upon  the  viceroyalties  and  audiencias.  "  In  the 
year  1574  the  Spanish  American  world  was  officially  described  as 
consisting  of  two  kingdoms  :  New  Spain,  comprising  the  main-land 
and  islands  north  of  the  isthmus,  and  also  that  part  of  South 
America  which  is  now  Venezuela ;  and  Peru,  comprising  the 
isthmus  and  all  the  territory  from  New  Spain  to  Patagonia  except 
Brazil."  A  third  viceroyalty  was  added  in  iJjS  at  Bogota,  the 
capital  of  New  Granada,  the  later  Colombia,  and  a  fourth  in  1776 
at  Buenos  Ayres.  The  other  lesser  divisions  of  the  empire,  most 
of  them  dating  from  the  eighteenth  century,  were  the  captaincies- 
general :  Guatemala  (1527);  Venezuela  (1773);  Cuba  {1777); 
Chile  (1778).  The  American  audiencias  were,  in  the  seventeenth 
century,    under   Philip    IV,   eleven  in   number :    Santo   Domingo, 

^  Moses,  pp.  69,  80. 

^  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  24-25;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  232-234;  Moses, 
pp.  69-72. 


3IO  COLONIZATION 

Mexico,  Panama,  Lima,  Guatemala,  Guadalajara,  Bogota,  La  Plata, 
Quito,  Chile,  Buenos  Ayres.^ 

Character  and  Results  of  the  System 

It  is  not  necessary  for  our  purpose  to  pursue  the  colonial  admin- 
istration into  its  subdivisions  —  the  "governments,"  the  municij^al 
councils  (cabildos),  officials,  etc.^  The  characteristic  of  the  whole 
system,  both  in  the  large  and  in  its  details,  was  perennial  regula^_ 
tion  from  above,  constant  balancing  and  counterbalancing  of  power.— 
The  system  was  like  a  complicated  machine  calculated  to  make  of 
each  member  of  the  government  an  obstacle  to  the  action  of  the 
other  members.''^  "  This  official  system,  with  its  good  and  bad 
features,  had  taken  very  early  and  deep  root  in  Spain,"'*  and  could 
not  well  escape  transference  to  America.  And,  aside  from  this 
system,  one  most  ill-adapted  to  a  new  country  and  a  more  unde- 
veloped society,  the  colonial  ofificial  personnel  was  very  far  from 
being  a  model  one.  The  praiseworthy  intent  in  respect  to  appoint- 
ments, voiced  in  the  precepts  of  many  of  the  laws,  did  not  material- 
ize at  all  prevalently  in  practice.  With  such  sovereigns  as  Spain 
had  for  many  critical  decades,  men  feeble  and  degenerate  and 
s^vayed  by  unscrupulous  favorites,  it  would  have  been  little  short 
of  miraculous  if  the  colonial  appointments  had  been  exemplary. 
Aside  from  their  inapplicability  under  the  economic  and  social  con- 
ditions, the  Spanish  laws  lacked,  then,  a  medium  of  interpretation 
and  enforcement  in  the  personnel  of  the  colonial  functionaries.  "  It 
was  impossible  for  the  best  governors  to  put  into  practice  measures 
which  were  of  the  most  incontestable  utility  to  the  public  interest, 
while  magistrates  with  small  scruple  had  full  facility  in  enriching 
themselves  and  their  favorites."  As  to  the  captains-general,  "their 
power  soon  became  very  limited  and  nothing  at  all  remained  to 
them  but  a  grand  ceremonial,  an  enormous  patronage  and  the 
chance  to  enrich  themselves  in  a  thousand  illegal  ways."  ^^  Again, 
one  of  the  regular  sources  of  the  royal  revenue  was  the  sale  of 
offices  as  the  latter  increased  in  number  with  the  expansion  of  the 

1  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  229,  232,  331  ;  Watson,  II,  12S;  Moses,  p.  161. 

2  Cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p]).  234-237. 
'*  Merivale,  in  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  19. 

■*  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  23. 

''  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  19;  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  41  ;  Moses,  p.  96;  cf.  Bourne, 
Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  242  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  340,  355-356. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT     311 

king's  domain  (1557  on);  whatever  may  be  said  in  extenuation  of 
this  practice,  it  was  certainly  one  the  exercise  of  which  was  not 
destined  to  educate  and  equip  a  society  or  series  of  societies  for 
the  struggle  of  the  sequent  age.  It  is  one  thing  to  demonstrate  a 
practice  of  this  kind  as  natural  in  the  setting  of  its  time  —  so  is 
cannibalism  —  and  it  is  thus  scientifically  futile  to  pass  moral  judg- 
ments upon  it ;  but  it  is  equally  profitless  to  seek  to  excuse  or  to 
have  recourse  to  the  tu  qiioque  retort.^  It  is  not  that  the  Spanish 
system  was  morally  bad  ;  it  is  that  it  was  hopelessly  anachronistic 
and  unsuitable  ;  persisting  in  doleful  consistency  where  the  powers 
of  the  next  age  were  adaptive,  it  virtually  retrograded  and  became 
survivalistic. 

For  one  thing,  it  taught  the  Spanish-American  societies  in  no 
respect  that  self-reliance,  visibly  shown  in  the  power  of  self- 
restraint  and  self-government,  in  the  poise,  which  the  nations  that 
succeeded  Spain  as  lords  of  affairs  have  in  general  so  steadily  ex- 
hibited. One  author,  who  is  inclined  to  minimize  all  the  factors 
except  education,  puts  the  case  as  follows  :  "  Under  the  rigid  rule 
of  the  Council  of  the  Indies  and  its  subordinates,  the  great  body 
of  the  people  in  the  Spanish  colonies  learned  only  one  lesson,  and 
that  was  the  necessity  of  obedience.  The  power  of  self-direction 
or  self-control  they  had  no  opportunity  to  acquire.  They  only 
learned  to  follow  ;  not  because  they  saw  any  reason  for  going  in 
one  direction  rather  than  in  another,  but  because  they  were  domi- 
nated by  a  superstition  or  habit  favoring  obedience,  born  of  long 
subjection  to  absolute  rule,  and  of  inexperience  in  matters  of  public 
concern.  The  result  of  this  was  to  make  possible  quiet  and  orderly 
conduct,  as  long  as  the  power  of  the  parent  state  remained  un- 
shaken ;  but  it  did  not  prepare  the  way  for  independent  national 
action.  When,  therefore,  the  tie  of  allegiance  to  Spain  was  severed, 
the  communities  were  like  a  ship  without  a  rudder  or  ballast. 
There  were  no  points  of  advantage  that  could  be  used  to  give  them 
consistent  movement  in  any  direction.  They  were  subject  to  the 
shifting  currents  of  uninstructed  prejudice.  While  the  bulk  of 
the  people  were  willing  to  render  obedience,  they  were  without 
the  means  of  determining  to  whom  it  should  be  rendered.  They 
were  perfect  material  for  the  demagogue,  or  the  pliant  tools  of 
revolutionists.  The  Spanish-American  attempts  at  self-government 
haye^-therefore,  in  most  cases  had  a  sorry  outcome  ;  not  because 

"1  ef.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  237-239. 


3  I  2  COLOxXIZATlON 

of  any  original  incapacity  in  the  stock,  but  because  of  the  lament- 
able political  education  which  the  dependencies  received  during 
their  three  centuries  of  bondage  to  Spain."  ^  The  Spanish  colonial 
government  was  the  product  of  anterior  and  contemporary  Spanish 
history,  embodying  the  working-out  in  a  new  and  ruder  environ- 
ment of  the  system  evolved  in  an  older  and  non-progressive  land. 
It  was  only  under  the  sought-for  seclusion  that  it  could  stand;  light 
and  knowledge  were  inconsistent  with  its  endurance.^ 


Class  Discriminations 

One  of  the  interesting  phases  of  this  futurd^s_system  was  the 
class  division  which  it  fostered;  here  again  appears  the  policy  of 
distrust,  working  out  into  the  principle  of  divide  ut  impcres.  The 
class  distinctions  were,  as  has  been  seen,^  partially  racial  or  social, 
and  so  inevitable  ;  but  there  was  no  attempt  made  to  amalgamate 
the  unhomogeneous  elements.  Quite  the  opposite  :  the  lines  of 
cleavage  were  accentuated  and  demarkcd.  "  Mexico,"  says  Hum- 
boldt,^ "is  the  land  of  inequality."  For  example,  the  European 
Spaniard  (chapeton  or  gachupin)  was  consistently  favored  over  the 
American-born  Spaniard  (creole).  "  Legally  the  creole  was  on 
complete  equality  with  the  chapeton  ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
until  1637  only  twelve  of  the  369  bishops  had  been  Creoles,  and 
until  1808  only  one  of  fifty  viceroys  of  New  Spain  had  been  a 
Creole.  Wappaus  knew  of  only  four  Creoles  among  160  viceroys, 
and  only  fourteen  among  602  cajitains-general  or  governors.  To 
the  excluded  this  must  have  been  all  the  more  irritating,  since 
they  had  in  their  midst  a  numerous  and  brilliant  nobility."  ^  'J_It_ 
was  in  the  cabildos  (municipal  councils)  only  of  all  the  machinery 
of  government  that  the  Spanish  Creoles  had  a  prominent  or  con- 
trolling share."  The  effects  of  such  preferential  treatment  may  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that_j;he  republicans  of  Buenos  Ayres,  upon 
lifting  the  standard  of  revolt,  stated  such  exclusion  to  be  one  of 
the  chief  of  their  grievances.^ 

1  Moses,  jjp.  302-303;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  235,  263;  Danvin,  quoted  in 
Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  46. 

2  See  pp.  322  ff.,  below;  cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  5. 
*  Pp.  215  ff.,  above.  *  Essai,  I,  103. 

^  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  19-20.    The  single  creole  viceroy  was  Juan  de  Acuna, 
Marquis  of  Casa  Fuerte  (1722-1734).    Humboldt,  Essai,  I,  203. 
*>  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  236-237  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  9. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND  GOVERNMENT     313 

The  intention  behind  this  pf)licy  was  to  keep  the  "  old  Spaniards," 
as  the  natives  of  Spain  were  called,  so  loaded  with  favors  and 
honors  as  to  secure  in  their  envied  status  one  of  the  surest  guaran- 
ties of  Spanish-American  dependence.  On  the  other  hand  the 
native-born  were  to  be  held  as  far  as  possible  in  a  pliable  status  of 
simplicity  and  ignorance  :  "  the  viceroy,  Gil  de  Lemcs,  uttered  to 
the  colleges  of  Lima  this  characteristic  language  :  '  Learn  to  read, 
to  write^and  to  say  your  prayers  :  this  is  all  an  American  ought  to 
Toiow.'  "  ^  "  The  tremendous  pride  and  stiff  ceremonialism  which 
characterize  the  Spaniards  in  Spain  had  developed  here  incom- 
parably more,  so  that  all  cordiality  was  smothered  beneath  it,  and, 
more  than  that,  numberless  family  quarrels,  denunciations,  etc.,  re- 
sulted from  it."  ^  A  special  mark  of  favor  granted  to  the  chapeton 
was  the  feudal  estate  or  fief,  a  grant  taking  origin  from  the  time 
of  the  conquistadores,  when  it  was  assigned  to  the  families  of  the 
latter  or  to  court  favorites.  The  fiefs  were  extensive  and  proved 
a  great  detriment  to  production,  but,  since  the  government  held 
the  more  to  such  grants  as  the  provinces  were  more  distant,  they 
seem  to  have  been  the  visible  expression  of  misgivings  as  to  the 
growth  of  a  very  considerable  agricultural  and  creole  population. 
The  political  accentuation  of  class  distinction  led  also  to  the  inordi- 
nate love  of  titles  and  rank,  especially  among  the  Creoles,  and  the 
consequent  or  correlative  contempt  for  productive  employments. 
But  the  dissemination  of  discord  was  effected  within  the  lower 
social  groups  as  well  as  the  upper,  and  at  the  same  time  care  was 
taken  to  deprive  the  former  of  their  natural  leaders.  The  implac- 
able antipathy  between  Indians  and  negroes,  for  example,  was  made 
into  political  capital ;  any  general  union  to  shake  off  the  common 
yoke  was  rendered  almost  impossible.'^ 

In  short,  as  respects  governmental  treatment  of  class  distinction, 
Spanish  America  represents  a  "classic  ground  for  the  so-called 
official  aristocracy."  ^  "By  the  establishment  of  a  numerous 
nobility  which  sustained  a  rigid  system  of  entails,  by  the  con- 
stitution of  a  powerful  clergy  endowed  with  all  the  old  temporal 
privileges   in   all  their  fulness,  by   the  omnipotence  of   the  royal 

^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  9,  10;  Watson,  II,  132  and  ff. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  22. 

'  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  19-21  ;  Watson,  II,  134. 

*  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  23.  This  author  regards  the  independent  bureaucracy 
in  Spain  as  a  bulwark  against  arbitrary  despotism,  "and  the  class  exclusiveness  and 
arrogance  of  the  numerous  officials  as  a  help  to  independence  against  temptation." 


314  COLONIZATION 

functionaries,  by  the  restrictions  of  all  sorts  presented  to  the 
initiative  of  her  subjects,  Spain  had  wished  to  found  an  old  society 
in  a  new  country :  in  that  phrase  can  be  summed  ui5~the  whole  ot 
"Spanish  colonization."  ^ 


Colonial  Revenue 

Before  following  the  later  stages  of  Spanish  policy  in  Spanish 
America  to  their  final  outcome  in  revolution,  it  is  perhaj)s  in  place 
to  introduce  a  few  facts  concerning  the  sources  of  revenue  in  the 
New  World  aside  from  the  mining  royalties.  The  importance  of 
the  latter,  and  the  expedition  shown  by  the  state  in  laying  hands 
upon  them,  have  been  discussed  ;  it  should  be  mentioned  that,  in 
Peru  at  least,  the  demand  for  a  large  revenue  stood  constantly  in 
the  way  of  establishing  a  good  government.  Whatever  her  humanP 
tarian  aims,  Spain  had  to  have  the  ducats,  and  "  in  her  decline 
toward  bankruptcy  was  practically  insatiable."  ^  But,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  taxes  apart  from  the  fifths,  they  were  much  the  same 
in  kind  as  those  in  Spain  :  the  alcabala ;  export  and  import  divties 
(about  1 5  per  cent)  ;  convoy-tax  ;  receipts  from  the  sale  of  offices 
and  indulgences ;  monopolies  of  gunpowder,  salt,  tobacco,  and 
quicksTTver^ ;  and  a  part  of  the  church  income.  "In  1746  the 
total  revenue  of  New  Spain  was  estimated  at  3,552,680  pesos. 
A  little  less  than  half  a  century  later,  in  1796,  it  had  risen  to 
$19,400,000,  of  which  probably  $3,500,000  represents  the  king's 
mining  royalties,  leaving  about  $16,000,000  from  taxation  from  a 
population  of  five  million."  "*  This  would  not  have  been  severe  in 
the  absence  of  the  restriction  which,  as  has  been  seen,  checked 
the  development  of  economic  strength  ;  and  if  it  had  borne  equally 
upon  the  poor  and  the  wealthy.  Naturally  the  mining  royalties 
received  the  most  attention ;  and  the  other  taxes,  notably  the 
alcabala,  were  not  so  severe  as  in  Spain.  But  it  is  impossible  to 
believe  that  any  such  complex  of  dues  was  not  detrimental  in  the 
extreme  to  the  development  of  the  new  societies. 

What  revenue  the  crown  actually  derived  from  America  it  is 
difficult  to  say ;   some  estimates  of  the  yield  of  the  mines  have 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  5. 

2  Moses,  pp.  137-138. 

8  On  the  quicksilver  royalty  and  its  yield,  cf.  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  44-45. 
*  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  239-241  ;  Watson,  II,  145. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CHURCH  AND   GOVERNMENT     315 

been  given  above.  But  the  collection  of  statistics  made  by  Roscher  ^ 
from  Humboldt  and  others  certainly  demonstrates  a  considerable 
hiatus  between  the  gross  and  net  revenue.  Of  course  the  king 
possessed  the  equivalent  of  income  in  the  opportunity  afforded 
him  by  the  well-paid  offices,  loaded  often  with  perquisites,  which, 
in  lieu  of  other  gifts,  he  could  bestow  upon  distinguished  men  or 
favorites.2 

1"  The  actual  surplus  which,  in  Humboldt's  time,  flowed  into  the  treasury  at 
Madrid  from  the  colonial  administration  was  estimated  at  the  following  amounts : 
from  New  Spain,  from  5,000,000  to  6,000,000  piastres  annually;  from  Peru,  1,000,000 
at  the  highest ;  from  Buenos  Ayres,  from  600,000  to  700,000;  and  from  New  Granada, 
from  400,000  to  500,000.  In  the  remaining  provinces  the  expenditure  was  at  least 
equal  to  the  receipts;  in  fact,  regular  appropriations  {sitiiados)  of  probably  3,500,000 
had  to  be  sent  annually  to  the  Spanish  West  Indies,  Florida,  Louisiana,  the  Philip- 
pines, and  Chile  to  help  out  their  domestic  administration.  From  Lima  a  contribu- 
tion of  100,000  pesos  went  to  Santiago  and  Concepcion  every  year,  half  in  silver  and 
half  in  supplies  for  the  garrison  there.  Valdivia  received  annually  70,000  pesos  like- 
wise from  Lima.  The  supplementary  contribution  for  San  Domingo  is  said  to  have 
amounted  to  200,000  silver  piastres  annually,  or  from  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century  to  1784,  inclusive,  to  about  17,000,000.  Before  the  establishment  of  the 
Guipi'izcoa  company  two-thirds  of  the  expenditure  of  Caracas,  Maracaibo,  and 
Cumana  had  to  be  supplied  from  Mexico.  Taken  all  together  the  exports  from 
Spanish  America  towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  amounted  to  9,800,000 
piastres  more  than  the  imports.  Whatever  portion  of  this  is  not  to  be  reckoned  in 
the  above-mentioned  government  surplus  must  have  flowed  into  the  hands  of  private 
individuals  in  Spain."  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  40;  cf.  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer., 
p.  241  ;   Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  36. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  41  ;   Hume,  p.  396. 


CHAPTER    IX 

SPANISH  AMERICA:  BUENOS  AYRES,  THE  REVOLUTION, 
CUBA.    THE  PHILIPPINES.    AFRICA 

One  section  of  the  Spanish  American  empire  still  awaits  dispo- 
sition in  the  general  scheme  of  Spanish  theory  and  policy  :  the 
temi)erate  regions  of  the  south,  Argentina,  Paraguay,  and  Chile. 
These  areas  have  been  thus  isolated,  aside  from  certain  inevitable 
references  to  them,  because,  by  reason  of  their  physiographical 
and  other  natural  conditions,  they  clearly  exemplify  a  special  phase 
of  Spanish  colonial  history  and  policy,  and  were  thus  marked  out 
for  a  specifically  different  destiny. 

Early  Conditions 

The  Plata  was  discovered  by  Magellan  in  15  19,  but  it  was  not 
until  1534  that  any  attempt  at  colonization  of  the  region  took 
place;  Almagro  made  a  campaign  in  Chile  in  1 535-1 537,  and 
Santiago  was  founded  by  Valdivia  in  1541  ;  Irala  penetrated  the 
Paraguay  region  (in  search  of  treasure)  in  1540.  But  any  effective 
settlement  in  any  of  these  districts  was  long  delayed  ;  in  Buenos 
Ayres,  for  example,  until  1562.^  It  will  be  recalled  that  the 
Spaniards  took  but  slight  interest  in  regions  which  furnished 
neither  precious  metals  nor  articles  of  production  complementary 
to  those  of  European  origin.  Apropos  of  voyages  toward  regions 
north  of  Plorida,  a  member  of  the  Council  of  the  Indies  remarked  : 
'*  What  need  have  we  of  these  things  which  are  common  with  all 
the  peoples  of  Europe  ?  To  the  South,  to  the  South,  for  the  riches 
of  the  Aequinoctiall  they  that  seek  riches  must  go,  not  unto  the 
cold  and  frozen  North."  ^  Hence  the  development  of  what  is  now 
the  United  States  of  America  was  not  seriously  considered,  and 
for  many  decades  and  generations  the  southern  regions  of  South 

1  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  3S5-3S6,  41. |;  Moses,  pp.  1.47-148,  192;  Watson,  I, 
98-103,  148-150;   P)Ourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  192-193;  Zinimermann,  I,  326-327. 

2  Quoted  in  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  page  142 ;  cf.  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  385- 
386,  402.  ^ 

316 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   THE  SOUTHERN  COLONIES      317 

America  were  left  to  unaided  and  actually  impeded  settlers,  and 
to  the  missions.  In  consequence  of  such  neglect,  the  settlers  of 
Buenos  Ayres  early  undertook  the  management  of  their  own  affairs, 
electing  as  leader  a  notable  man,  Irala,  who  organized  the  colony 
and  extended  its  borders  (1537).^  In  Chile,  Valdivia  established  a 
form  of  feudalism  similar  to  that  introduced  in  Mexico  and  Peru, 
and  fought  the  first  wars  against  the  Araucanians.^ 

Emigration  to  Buenos  Ayres  and  Paraguay  was  never  large,  and 
included  few  European  women  ;  relations  with  the  natives  were 
cordial,  and  miscegenation  was  prevalent  as  it  was  in  no  other 
Spanish  American  district.  Therefore  the  population  always  exhib- 
ited a  predominance  of  the  Indian  stock,  even  though  the  number 
of  those  actually  denominated  mestizos  was  small,  and,  especially  in 
Paraguay,  "  became  characterized  by  Indian  rather  than  by  Spanish 
traits."  ^  Otherwise  the  stock  phenomena  of  the  temperate  colony 
are  in  evidence  :  the  Indians  were,  between  i  580  and  1740,  gradu- 
ally pushed  back  from  the  littoral,  but  with  comparatively  little 
violence;  then,  from  1740  to  1881  they  were  warred  upon  by  the 
now  more  numerous  and  powerful  race.  They  could  not  become 
civilized,  and  miscegenation  seems  to  have  been  their  single,  though 
partial,  preservative.^  In  Chile,  on  the  other  hand,  the  temper  of 
the  natives  admitted  of  no  close  affiliation  ;  their  relatively  advanced 
civilization  declined  before  the  depredations  of  the  Spaniards  and 
in  consequence  of  prolonged  wars.  So  that  while  the  usual  racial 
mixtures  occurred  in  Chile,  the  white  element  exhibited  a  predomi- 
nance scarcely  duplicated  in  Spanish  America.^  Conditions  of  racial 
contact  were  in  Chile  more  nearly  analogous  to  those  found  else- 
where in  temperate  colonies  than  to  those  characteristic  of  any 
other  part  of  the  Spanish  empire. 

1  This  was  done  with  the  sanction  of  Charles  V.  Moses,  pp.  192-193 ;  Watson, 
I,  103-104;  Zimmermann,  I,  326  ff. 

2  Cf.  p.  260,  above  ;  Moses,  pp.  147-148  ;  Watson,  I,  148-150. 

3  Moses,  p.  196 ;  Haebler,  Amerika,  pp.  387,  403  ;  Watson,  1, 104,  271-272.  Velasco 
(p.  551)  gives  to  the  Plata  region  for  1574  only  three  Spanish  settlements  of  about 
400  inhabitants,  almost  all  encomenderos,  and  more  than  2000  mestizos.  The  census 
of  the  Buenos  Ayres  colony  in  1776  gives  the  following  elements  of  population 
(Daireaux,   I,  45)  :  ^^^^  country 

Spanish iS;7i9  9>732 

Indians 544  i)54z 

Mestizos 674  I 

--   ,  t  1,020 

Mulattoes 3,i53  ' 

Negroes 4,ii5  ^3° 

*  Daireaux,  I,  49  ff.,  60  ff.       ^  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  19;  Watson,  II,  165-166. 


3i8  COLONIZATION 

But  the  rapid  growth  of  these  regions  was  contravened  not  only 
by  the  general  indisposition  of  the  Spaniard  for  the  humdrum  ex- 
istence of  the  farm  colony,  but  also  by  Spanish  policy  itself.  As 
has  been  seen,  Argentina  and  Chile  were  regarded  commercially 
and  politically  as  mere  appendages  of  Peru  ;  they  constituted  the 
extreme  frontier  and  were  accessible  only  via  the  Isthmus  and 
Lima.^  This  roundabout  route  of  trade  so  enhanced  prices  at  the 
destination  that  Argentine  life  of  the  early  periods  had  to  order  it- 
self in  the  most  simple  manner  :  "  in  contrast  with  the  conditions 
of  civilized  life  which  the  denser  population  of  Peru  made  possible, 
the  life  of  the  sparse  and  slowly  increasing  population  on  the  plains 
of  Buenos  Aires  drifted  toward  a  state  of  barbarism."  -  The  value 
of  the  unlimited  herds  was  little  better  than  nil  ;  "in  the  early 
years  of  the  eighteenth  century,  even  after  the  port  of  Buenos  Aires 
had  been  opened  to  the  extent  of  admitting  two  small  vessels 
annually,  an  ox  was  worth  one  dollar,  a  sheep  from  three  to  four 
cents,  and  a  mare  ten  cents.  The  prices  had  risen  to  this  amount 
from  a  still  lower  point  under  the  influence  of  the  demand  made  by 
these  vessels  for  hides,  strengthened  by  the  larger  demand  of  the 
contraband  trade  of  the  English  and  Portuguese."  But  this  manner 
of  seclusion  was  not  destined  to  endure  ;  when  Buenos  Ayres  be- 
came in  time  one  of  the  chief  terminals  of  contraband  traffic,  it 
did  not  fail  speedily  to  realize  the  enormity  of  the  system  to  which 
it  had  been  subjected.  "  It  was  clear  enough  to  the  people  of  the 
Argentine  that  to  them  a  closed  port  meant  poverty,  and  a  free 
port  prosperity."  Their  opposition  to  the  Spanish  policy,  and,  in 
fact,  to  the  Spanish  fuTF,  which  appeared  in  the  begmmng  ot  the 
nineteenth  century,  "  was  no  sentimental  opposition,  but  rested  on 
the  hard  basis  of  economical  considerations."  ^ 

The  first  real  recognition  of  Buenos  Ayres  came  in  1620,  when 
it  was  declared  a  separate  colony,  though  still  subordinate  to  Peru, 
to  comprise  all  the  regions  of  the  Plata  below  the  confluence  of  the 
Paraguay  and  Parana.*  There  was  some  wealth  in  the  Argentine 
region,  and  it  was  gradually  laying  solid  foundations  for  its  future 
importance  and  prosperity.  But  the  latter  did  not  actually  appear 
until,  in   1776,  Buenos  Ayres  was  erected  into  a  viceroyalty  and 

'  (f.  p.  235,  above;   Moses,  pp.  18S-189. 

'■^  Moses,  p.  207  ;  cf.  pp.  20S-209,  268-270;  Watson,  II,  208;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer., 
pp.  204,  290-291. 

^  Moses,  p.  287  ;  cf.  Watson,  11,  207. 

*  Watson,  I,  204  ff.,  265;  Ilaebler,  Amerika,  p.  414. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   THE  SOUTHERN  COLONIES      319 

delivered  from  some  of  the  vexatious  conditions  of  its  former  sub- 
ordinate status.^  It  thus  became  a  preferred  port  for  trade  with 
the  southerly  colonies,  for  vessels  bound  for  Chile  and  Peru  were 
now  allowed  to  proceed  by  the  Cape  Horn  route.  Under  these 
new  laws,  Buenos  Ayres  "  speedily  took  an  equal  place,  by  reason 
of  the  wealth  of  its  agricultural  and  pastoral  economy,  beside  the 
richest  colonial  provinces  of  Spain."  Freedom  of  trade  stimulated 
all  industry.^  This  economic  movement  gained  such  momentum 
that  not  only  could  restriction  not  be  re-introduced,  but  the  days 
of  political  submission  to  a  distrusted  rule  were  numbered. 

Contrasts  with  the  Northern  Colonies 

A  point  of  clean-cut  distinction  between  the  Buenos  Ayres  region 
and  those  farther  to  the  north  appears  in  the  treatment  of  the 
natives.  The  Spanish  emigration  to  the  former  district,  small  as  it 
was,  was  motived  by  intentions  of  settlement.  Had  it  been  unre- 
stricted and  included  both  sexes,  the  fate  of  the  natives  must  have 
approached  that  observed  elsewhere  under  conditions  of  contact  in 
regions  where  the  more  civilized  race  can  live  and  reproduce  itself 
rapidly.^  As  it  was,  the  native  policy  of  the  settlers  was  one  of 
fellowship  leading  toliTiscegeliation.  Of  thenatives  no  very  great 
labors  wer'e^demanded,  for  there  were  no  mines  or  tropical  planta- 
tions, and  the  isolated  community  provided  merely  for  its  own 
simple  needs  ;  thus  the  Indians  labored  moderately  as  cultijvators_ 
or  herdsmen,^  or,  in  remoter  districts,  came  under  Jesuit  control  in 
the  reductions.  Naturally  the  settlers  resisted  the  interference  of 
the  latter,  even  though  the  natives  were  not  in  such  a  degree 
indispensable  to  them  as  to  the  miners  and  planters.  But  the 
motives  for  ruthless  oppression  and  exploitation  of  the  human 
working-animal  were,  owing  to  environmental  conditions,  conspicu- 
ous in  their  absence. 

One  of  the  results  of  the  breaking  of  the  policy  of  seclusion  by 
the  contraband  trade,  which,  besides,  affected  the  Indians  through 
the  wasteful  War  of  the  Seven  Reductions,  was  the  boundary  dis- 
pute  withjheJPortuguese  in  Brazil.^  Early  in  the  eighteenth  century 
the  governor  of  Buenos  Ayres,  being  reprimanded  by  the  viceroy 
of  Peru  for  the  negligence  or  connivance  of  his  government  with 

1  Watson,  II,  216;  Zimmermann,  I,  374  ff.  2  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  426. 

3  Cf.  p.  5,  above.  *  W^atson,  I,  266,  271-272  ;  Haebler,  Amerika,  p.  403. 

^  Cf.  pp.  159  and  294,  above. 


320  COLONIZATION 

the  smugglers,  asserted  that  the  contraband  traffic  could  not  be 
stopped  ;  that  either  the  markets  must  be  thrown  open  to  legiti- 
mate trade,  or  that  the  Portuguese  must  be  expelled  from  Uruguay 
(Banda  Oriental).  After  considerable  strife  the_treaty_oLi75g_Avas 
adopted  ;  it  stipulated  that  Portugal  should  cede  to  Spain  the  whole 
eastern  bank  of  the  Plata,  and  in  return  should  receive  the  seven 
missionary  towns  on  the  Uruguay.  Hence  the  War  of  the  Seven 
Reductions ;  later  negotiations  fixed  the  holdings,  as  has  been 
seen,  according  to  the  principle  of  actual  occupation.^  These 
strifes  had  been  largely  fought  out  by  the  settlers  themselves,  and 
:  had  inspired  in  them  a  certain  degree  of  self-confidence  and  inde- 
pendence, in  addition  to  that  engendered  by  carrying  on  trartic  witlT 
impunity  in  direct  violation  of  Spain's  restrictive  commercial  regu- 
lations, and  by  frequently  electing  their  own  officers.^  Isolation 
and  neglect  were  bringing  forth  their  fruits  of  alienation  and  dis- 
affection. But  the  years  1806  and  1807  saw  further  developments 
f  which  strengthened  the  sentiment  of  self-sufficiency.    The  English, 

■^^  '  in  the  course  of  their  struggle  witli  Napoleon,  saw  fit  in  J_8p6  to 
make  a  descent  upon  Montevideo  and  Buenos  Ayres,  then  colonies 
of  a  prospectively  Bonapartist  kingdom.  No  especial  difficulty  was 
experienced  in  reducing  the  towns.  But,  although  almost  totally 
unaided  by  the  mother-country,  the  settlers  and  Indians,  under  the 
I  Frenchman  Liniers,  managed  to  expel  a  strong  English  force  from 

BuenQS  Ayres  and  to  negotiate  the  evacuation  of  Montevideo  as 
/  well.  The  results  were  inevitable  ;  a  dominant  iiower  had  been 
worsted,  and  without  aid,  and  the  natural  conclusion  was  that  the 
colony  could  take  care  of  its  own  interests.  Moreover,  it  was  un- 
willing to  give  up  the  gain  from  freedom  of  trade  vvith  England, 
which  it  had  enjoyed  during  the  occupation.  Yet  no  voice  was 
raised  at  this  time  in  favor  of  separation  ;  ^  if  there  were  such  ideas, 
they  were  as  yet  inchoate.  Buenos  Ayres  simply  profited  by  her 
strength,  and  by  the  end  of  the  colonial  period  had  attracted  immi- 
gration, and  increased  to  such  a  degree  that  the  population  num- 
bered about  800,000,  of  whom  only  about  a  half  were  Indians. 
Chile  experienced  a  more  commonplace  and  uneventful  develop- 
ment, was  more  hampered,  as  being  less  isolated,  by  the  activity 
of  the  government,  —  for  instance  in  the  policy  of  granting  great 
entailed  estates,  —  but  afforded  in  general  a  smaller  replica  of  the 

^  Watson,  II,  209  ff.;  Moses,  pp.  213  ff.;  cf.  p.  159,  above. 

2  Cf.  Moses,  p.  i88.  ^  Watson,  II,  272  ff. ;  Zininiermann,  I.  437  ff. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   THE  SOUTHERN  COLONIES      321 

conditions  on  the  eastern  coast.     In  1787  Santiago  contained  over 
40,000  inhabitants  and  tlie  number  was  rapidly  increasing.^ 

It  is  clear  that  the  cases  of  the  southern  colonies,  especially  that 
of  Buenos  Ayres,  constituted  as  distinct  a  divergency  from  those 
of  the  other  Si)anish  colonies  as  did  the  history  of  the  Portuguese 
SacT^Pa u  1  o_d i s t ric t  from  that  of  the  rest  of  Brazil.  The  general 
explanation  has  been  given  in  treating  of  the  latter  case,  and  in 
more  general  terms  in  our  preliminary  classification  of  colonies  ;  ^ 
it  is  largely  a  matter  of  physical,  especially  climatic  environment. 
The  situation  is  well  set  forth  by  Leroy-Beaulieu,^  whose  remarks 
are  worth  reproducing  m  extcnso :  "  It  is  an  observation  of  Hum- 
boldt that  there  is  no  country  in  the  world  where  the  social  status 
issubject  to  such  a  degree  to  the  influence  of  climate  and  of  the 
disposition  of  the  soil  as  it  is  in  Spanish  America.  The  examination 
ofthe  physical  constitution  of  the  different  provinces  is,  in  fact, 
indispensable  to  the  understanding  of  their  economic  organization. 
In  the  extreme  northern  and  southern  districts,  in  the  interior 
provinces  of  Mexico,  and  in  the  Pampas  of  the  Plata,  immense 
plains,  somewhat  dry  and  of  temperate  climate,  became  the  seat 
of  a  pastoral  population.  The  domestic  animals  of  Europe  multi- 
plied in  astonishing  fashion  in  these  pasture-lands,  and  came  to 
constitute  the  chief  wealth  of  the  colonists.  The  latter  originated, 
for  the  most  part,  from  the  pure  Spanish  race.  The  Indiansjwere 
few  in  number  in  these  districts,  and  they  manifested  a  warlike 
disposition  which  preserved  them  from  subjection ;  and  on  the 
other  hand,  the  poverty  of  the  colonists  prevented  the  introduc- 
tion of  slavery.  The  Creole  in  these  regions  obeyed  the  law  which 
m  our  day  governs  colonists  of  European  origin  :  he  isolated  him- 
self from  his  companions  in  order  to  have  a  larger  space  and  one 
sufficienl;  for  the  pasturage  of  his  immense  herds.  This  is  the  way 
the  shepherds  of  the  Cape  or  of  Australia  are  doing.  A  perpetual 
struggle  against  the  Indians  and  a  rude  life  of  labors  and  watchings 
tempered  with  vigor  these  scions  of  the  old  Castilians.  Towns  .  .  . 
were  rare  and  served  only  as  refuges  against  Indian  invasions.  This 
pastoral  civilization  became  eminently  useful  to  Europe  through 
the  primary  products,  wools  and  hides,  with  which  it  supplied 
European  manufactories. 

1  Moses,  p.  148;  Watson,  II,  164-165;  Ro.scher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  19. 

2  Cf.  pp.  14  ff.,  above. 

3  1,  16-17. 


322  coi.OM/.vnoN 

"  The  hot  and  fertile  regions  with  easy  access  to  the  sea,  Hke 
Guatemala  and  Venezuela,  presented  a  quite  different  civilization  : 
there  the  great  wealth  of  the  inhabitants  consisted  in  the  products 
of  exportation  characteristic  of  the  tropical  climates, — coffee,  cot- 
ton, sugar,  cacao.  The  status  of  society  then  approximated  to  that 
of  the  West  Indies.  The  whites  enriched  themselves  through  the 
product  of  their  plantations,  which  increased  much  in  quantity  and 
value  during  the  eighteenth  century.  Manual  labor  was  performed 
by  the  Indians  in  places  where  they  were  numerous,  by  the  mixed 
races  which  were  so  common  in  certain  provinces,  and  especially 
by  the  negroes."  Here  is  a  fundamental  contrast  in  colonial  life- 
conditions,  and  a  further  justification  of  the  segregation  of  the  real 
settlement  colonies  of  the  Spaniards  from  those  depending  upon 
the  mines  and  the  plantations  —  for  the  latter  two  may  be  treated 
as  allied  species  of  the  exploitation  colony.  The  economic,  social, 
and  political  consequences  of  the  contrast  have  been  set  forth  in 
general  terms  in  a  preceding  chapter ;  ^  and  they  are  yet  clearly 
in  evidence  in  Spanish  America  as  the  first  century  after  emanci- 
pation draws  on  to  its  close.  The  only  relatively  stable  states  of 
Spanish  America  at  the  present  timerafe"tBb'se  \vFose  lite-condT^ 
tions  have  allowed  of  free  immigration  and  unimpedc'd  ]ir()pagation 
of  European  stocks  ;  and  of  these  states,  the  most  i)r()gressive, 
despite  its  past  disadvantages  of  remoteness  and  other  drawbacks, 
is  Argentina. 

But  Argentine  self-sufficiency  and  independence  were  a  result  of 
isolation  as  well  as  of  climatic  and  allied  conditions.  This  factor  was 
of  great  importance;  for  whereas  Mexico,  a  prevailingly  temperate 
colony,  lacking  isolation,  was  less  insistent  upon  independence,  tlie 
neglected  Caracas,  a  tropical  colony,  became  one  of  the  chief  centers 
of  revolt  against  Spain.  But  we  move  on  to  consider  briefly  the 
immediate  antecedents  of  the  revolutionary  struggle,  limiting  atten- 
tion still  to  those  colonies  which  won  independence  in  1825,  that 
is,  to  Spanish  America  in  the  narrower  sense. 

Movements  toward  Independence 

It  is  clear  that  the  Spanish  system,  as  we  have  come  to  see  it, 
was  not  calculated  to  harmonize  with  the  spirit  of  a  more  modern 
age  —  that   its   great  menace  was   enlightenment.    But,   however 

1  Pp.  7  ff.,  above. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:   THE  REVOLUTION  323 

strictly  guarded  against,  enlightenment  was  bound  to  come  ;  the 
penetration  of  the  once  almost  absolute  seclusion  of  the  colonies 
through  contraband  trade,  the  asiento-agreements,  and  otherwise, 
soon  afforded  the  Spanish  Americans  food  for  reflection  and  for  a 
comparison  of  their  own  status  with  that  of  the  rest  of  the  colonial 
world.  Indeed,  it  is  not  at  all  impossible  that  the  liberal  policy  of 
Charles  III,  inspired  by  Aranda  (1766  and  following)  and  continued 
by  Galvez  after  1775,  contributed  rather  to  the  break-up  of  the 
empire  than  to  its  preservation  ;  for  it  was  too  late  to  put  new 
wine  into  old  bottles.  Moreover,  the  subsequent  vacillation  back 
to  the  old  policy  completely  nullified  preceding  wisdom,  so  far  as 
the  retention  of  the  colonial  empire  was  concerned,  and  made  of 
the  liberal  regime  a  simple  incident  in  a  consistently  anachronistic 
policy.^ 

With  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  of  the  outside  world  there 
early  came  to  the  Spanish-Americans  the  stirring  story  of  the 
American  Revolution  and  the  foundation  of  a  great  republic  based 
"upon  principles  which  their  resentment  of  the  Spanish  policy  led 
them  to  regard  as  the  sum  of  truth  and  political  desirability.  Upon 
the  heels  of  this  movement,  itself  in  great  part  a  revolt  against  a 
political  and  economic  "system,"  came  the  more  feverish  French 
Revolution,  enacting  into  a  universal  dogma  the  rights  of  man, 
and  constituting  a  violent  and  infectious  reaction  against  the 
mediaevalism  inherent  in  royal  rights,  caste-systems,  and  other 
principles  fixedly  embodied  in  the  Spanish  system.  The  Creoles 
and  mestizos  had  long  chafed  against  political  discrimination  and 
were  quite  ready  to  subscribe  to  any  and  all  of  the  principles  of 
the  new  political  evangel.  That  Spain  lent  aid  to  the  American 
revolt  but  stimulated  this  attitude.  Tumults  arose  in  Peru  and 
Buenos  Ayres  immediately  after  the  American  Revolution,  and 
anarchy  reigned  for  months.  Agitators  arose  in  the  chief  cities, 
the  foremost  of  them  being  General  Miranda  of  Caracas,  who 
approached  England,  France,  and  Russia  in  behalf  of  the  colonies, 
and  under  whose  leadership  the  Gran  Reunion  Americana  was 
formed  in  London. ^ 

1  For  the  liberal  reaction  of  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  see  Leroy- 
Beaulieu,  I,  32-34  ;  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  316  ;  Hume,  p.  396;  Zimmermann,  I, 
362  ff.,  429  ff. 

2  Hume,  p.  407  ;  Watson,  II,  272;  Humboldt,  Essai,  I,  115;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I, 
10;  Zimmermann,  I,  436  ff.  The  basis  of  the  treatment  of  this  whole  period  is  the 
work  of  Mitre_gs  condensed  by  lulling. 


324 


COLONIZATION 


In  the  meantime  Spain  was  in  no  condition  to  control  the  situ- 
ation;  during  her  constant  wars  "the  colonies  had  been  allowed 
to  go  on  in  their  own  way,  Spanish  governors  and  officials,  clerical 
and  lay,  plundering  right  and  left,  with  little  or  no  thought  of  the 
benefit  of  the  people  over  whom  they  ruled."  In  1783  Aranda 
had  plainly  before  him  the  prospects  of  the  separation  of  the 
American  colonies.^  But  it  was  again,  as  in  the  case  of  Portugal, 
the  European  wars  which  brought  the  situation  to  its  climax. 
"  The  terrible  shock  given  the  mother-country  by  Napoleon  was 
.  .  .  the  principal  cause  for  the  revolt  of  the  colonics  :  tlie  captivity 
of  the  old  royal  house,  the  elevation  of  the  Bonapartist  dynasty, 
the  frightful  war  with  France,  and  finally  the  rapid  alternation  of 
absolutist  and  constitutional  rule  through  revolution  in  Spain  herself. 
As  a  result  the  old  carefully  transmitted  structure  of  colonial  insti- 
tutions, ideas,  and  policy  was  thrown  completely  out  of  joint.  The 
keystone,  as  it  were,  was  removed.  This  was  the  more  markedly 
the  case  since  many  of  the  highest  colonial  officials  exhibited  a 
significant  vacillation  between  the  legitimate  kings  and  the  usurper. 
Because  at  the  same  time  the  mother-country  was  in  such  pressing 
need  of  the  political  help  of  the  English,  it  was  now  impossible  to 
repel  their  commercial  invasions  of  the  colonial  markets.  ...  In 
addition,  after  the  restoration  of  general  peace  in  Europe,  the 
English  both  privately  .  .  .  and  as  a  part  of  public  policy  .  .  . 
favored  strongly  the  separation  of  the  Spanish  colonies  from  the 
mother-country."^  It  was  believed  that  the  colonies  were  an.xious 
to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  Spain,  and  attention  and  aid  were  accorded 
to  Miranda  and  others  in  the  prosecution  of  their  projects.  Trafal- 
gar (1805)  had  destroyed  the  navy,  almost  the  last  vestige  of  the 
apparatus  of  colonial  control,  and  the  end,  whatever  the  attempts 
to  avert  it,  could  be  only  a  matter  of  time.''^ 

It  does  not  lie  within  the  province  of  this  book  to  trace  the 
history  of  the  revolutionary  struggle  ;  except  for  its  general  aspects, 
or  as  it  throws  light  upon  what  has  gone  before,  it  scarcely  forms 
a  part  of  the  subject  of  colonization.  But  it  cannot  be  otherwise 
than  enlightening  to  realize,  among  other  things,  that  the  strength 
of  the  revolutionary  movement  appeared  (18 10)  in  Argentina,  its 
origin,  however,  having  taken  place  in  the  Caracas  region  ;  that 
the   struggle   displayed   a   marked  jerocity    of   character  and    left 

^  TTume,  p.  396  ;  Zinimermaim,  I,  363,  429. 

2  Koscher,  p.  176.  •'  Wat.soii,  II,  271-272;  Ziiiimermann,  I,  436. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:   THE  REVOLUTION  325 

behind  it  a  legacy  of  lasting  hostility  ;  and  that  the  revolutionists 
were  effecUialjy  aided  by  foreigners,  especially  the  English,  and  in 
a  less  degree  by  the  emancipated  Americans.^ 


Grievances  of  the  Colonists  :  the  Revolution 

What  the  colonists  fought  for  was  the  overthrow  of  the  Spanish 
system  of  restriction.  A  manifesto  issued  in__i8 18. cites  the  main 
points  of  contention.  It  demanded  the  following  :  equality  of  rights 
with  the  inhabitants  of  the  metropolis  (this  being  the  protest  of  the 
Creoles  against  the  discrimination  they  felt  ever  more  strongly  2) ; 
entire  liberty  of  cultivation  and  of  manufacture  ;  liberty  of  impor- 
tation and  exportation  as  respects  all  the  ports  of  Spain  and  of 
friehclIyTbimtnes  -freedom  of  commerce  between  Spanish  America 
and  Asia ;  the  same  liberty  with  the  Philippines  ;  '^  the  abolition 
of  every  governmental  monopoly,  an  indemnification  to  be  made 
through  taxation  ;  liberty  to  exploit  the  silver  mines  ;  reservation 
of  half  of  the  public  functions  for  American  Spaniards  (this  point 
being  designed  to  fortify  the  one  first  cited)  ;  the  establishment 
of  -Si  junta  in  every  capital  to  see  to  it  that  this  latter  disposition 
should  be  always  carried  out.  "Such  were  the  just  demands  of  the 
malcontents.  And  it  was  not  alone  the  upper  classes,  it  was  the 
mass  of  the  people  itself  which  was  penetrated  by  the  necessity  of 
these  reforms."^  What  they  wanted  was  liberty  —  freedom  —  as- 
the  repetition  of  the  term  indicates.  The  repeated  discrimination 
against  the  native  Spaniards  and  the  mestizos  in  favor  of  the 
exploiting  class,  the  European  Spaniards,  is  what  made  the  struggle 
so  fierce  and  relentless. 

Mitre,  the  first  constitutional  president  of  the  Argentine 
Republic,  gives  the  following  synopsis  of  the  Revolution.^  "  In 
.the  year  iSo^the  first  tremors  of  the  revolution  began  to  be  felt 
simultaneously  in  the  two  extremities  and  in  the  center  of  South 
America ;  the  fact  that  its  several  forms  were  identical,  their 
immediate  purposes  the  same,  and  their  aims  analogous,  reveals  as 
of  long  standing  an  innate  predisposition  and  an  organic  solidarity 

1  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  30-31  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  to;  Moses,  p.  187;  Zim- 
mermann,  I,  442  ff. 

-  For  the  resentment  of  the  Creoles,  cf.  Humboldt,  Essai,  I,  11 4-1 15. 
3  Cf.  pp.  347-349.  below. 

*  Leroy-Beaulleu,  I,  34  ;  cf.  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  pp.  26,  note;  4(')-47. 
'"  Hist,  de  San  Martin,  I,  8-9. 


326  COLONIZATION 

of  the  living  whole.  In  iSio,  simultaneously,  without  a  mutual 
understanding  between  the  parties,  and  as  if  in  obedience  to  an 
inborn  impulse,  all  the  Spanish  American  colonies  rose  in  insur- 
rection, proclaiming  the  principle  of  self-government,  the  germ  of 
their  independence  and  liberty.  Six  years  later  all  the  insurrec- 
tions in  South  America  had  been  smothered  (i 8 14-18 1 6)  and  the 
United  Provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  alone  had  kept  their  foot- 
ing. The  latter,  after  expelling  from  their  soil  all  their  former 
masters,  declared  their  independence  before  the  world,  and,  through 
making  common  cause  with  them,  gave  to  the  conquered  colonies 
the  signal  for  the  great  and  last  conflict.  IrL.i^Si/  the_Argentine 
revolution,  which  had  become  an  American  movement,  developed 
a  plan  of  campaign,  and  a  policy  of  emancipation  that  were  to 
embrace  the  continent.  The  revolutionists  took  the  offensive  and 
wrought  a  change  in  the  destiny  of  the  struggle  that  had  begun  ; 
they  advanced  across  the  Andes  and  freed  Chile,  and  then,  united 
with  Chile,  gained  control  of  the  Pacific,  liberated  Peru,  and  carried 
their  delivering  arms  to  the  equator,  thus  assisting  the  Colombian 
revolution  to  its  triumph.  This  vigorous  forward  movement  made 
itself  felt  in  the  northern  extremity  of  the  southern  continent, 
which,  in  its  turn,  conquered  and  expelled  the  champions  of  the 
metropolis,  evolved  through  the  same  phases  as  the  Argentine 
revolt,  assumed  the  offensive,  crossed  the  Andes,  became  general- 
ized as  an  American  movement,  and  converged  toward  the  center 
—  where  the  two  forces  of  emancipation  effected  their  union,  as 
has  been  said.  The  strife  remained  confined  to  the  highlands  of 
Peru,  the  last  refuge  of  the  Spanish  domination  already  wounded 
unto  death  in  the  battles  of  Chacabuco  and  Maipu,  Carabobo  and 
Boyaca.  From  this  time  on,  Spanish  American  independence 
ceased  to  be  a  military  antl  political  problem  and  became  simply  a 
question  of  time  and  of  .persistent  effort.  The  Spanish  American 
colonies  were  free  in  fact  and  by  right,  through  their  own  strength 
and  without  external  aid  ;  they  fought  alone  in  the  face  of  the 
count r)'s  absolutist  powers  in  alliance  against  tlicni,  and  from  the 
colonial  chaos  arose  a  new  world  in  due  order  —  a  world  crowned 
by  a  sky  in  which  gleamed  the  i)olar  and  the  ecjuatorial  stars.  Few 
times  has  the  earth  presented  a  similar  j^olitical  genesis,  few  times 
an  historical  epic  more  heroic." 

It  should   be   noted   that   whenever  tlie  Spaniards  effected   any 
]iaciru\'ili()ii,  it  had  been  attended  by  sucli  cruelties  and  was  followed 


SPANISH   AMERICA:  THE  REVOLUTION  327 

proniiiUy  by  such  tactlessness  of  policy  that  the  temper  of  tlie 
revolt  was  strengthened  rather  than  impaired.  Heavy  forced  loans, 
confiscations  of  i)atriots'  property,  and  trials  for  high  treason 
attended  the  restoration  of  Spanish  authority.  Yet  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  situation  was  not  much  helped  by  the  few  exhi- 
bitions of  a  different  spirit :  what  freedom  was  allowed,  for  instance 
to  tlie  i)ress,  was  at  once  used  in  spreading  separatist  ideas.  In 
general,  however,  the  successes  of  the  counter-revolution  meant 
the  reaffirmation  of  the  essential  features  of  the  old  system. 

In  Mexico,  Iturbide  won  over  the  soldiers  and  had  himself  pro- 
claimed in  1822  the  Emperor  Augustin  I  ;  this  ill-advised  move 
was,  however,  but  the  overture  to  the  formation,  in  1824,  of  the 
Republic  of  the  United  States  of  Mexico,  with  a  constitution 
modeled  upon  that  of  its  northern  neighbor.  In  18 19  Florida  had 
passed  into  the  hands  of  the  United  States  of  America.  By  1824 
all  the  former  colonies  upon  the  mainland  were  lost  to  Spain.  But 
the  end  might  have  been  yet  delayed  had  it  not  been  for  the 
active  partisanship  of  England  ;  she,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  by 
reason  of  feebler  strength,  the  United  States,  had  aided  with  nien 
and  credit  upon  many  former  occasions.  Trade  interests  in  the  final 
and  complete  invasion  of  the  old  monopoly  were  combined  with 
sentimental  sympathy,  and  any  number  of  formal  governmental 
prohibitions  on  the  ground  of  the  friendship  of  England  and  Spain 
could  not  avail.  President  Monroe  recognized  Colombia  as  an 
independent  state  at  the  end  of  1823,  and  England  withstood  a 
continental  alliance  whose  purpose  was  to  support  Spain.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  promulgated  at  about  the  same  time  ;  and 
in  1824  English  consuls  were  dispatched,  first  to  Argentina,  then 
to  Mexico,  Chile,  and  Colombia.  Upon  January  i,  1825,  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  republics  was  recognized  by  England  and  so  stood 
as  -A.  fait  accompli} 

Thus  was  the  hampering  monopoly  system  finally  broken,  and 
largely  through  the  agency  of  the  rising  commercial  and  colonial 
world-power,  Great  Britain  ;  the  fate  of  the  Venetians  and  Portu- 
guese, n(jt  to  mention  more  ancient  holders  of  monopoly,  had  over- 
taken still  another  aspirant  for  exclusive  rights  to  trade.  "  In  the 
case  of  the  Spanish  dependency,  the  bands  binding  it  to  the 
mother-country  have  been  rigid  and  unelastic,  so  that  they  have 

1  The  foregoing  sketch  of  the  Emancipation  i.s  condensed  from  Mitre,  with  some 
reference  to  Zimmeimann,  I,  444-475. 


328  COLONIZATION 

parted  with  the  first  considerable  strain,  and  the  colony  has  been 
irretrievably  severed  from  its  superior.  The  English  dependencies, 
on  the  contrary,  have  found  themselves  at  the  end  of  an  elastic 
lie.  When  they  have  tugged  to  be  free,  the  cord  has  }  ielded,  but 
has  gradually  drawn  them  backward  when  their  discontent  was 
past.  .  .  .  But  Spain,  or  the  Spanish  king,  insisted  on  an  essential 
uniformity  throughout  the  Spanish  dominions ;  in  other  words, 
obedience  to  that  [)olicy  which  would  contribute  most  to  the  selfish 
interests  of  the  mother-country.  The  outcome  of  rigid  adherence 
to  Spanish  policy  has  been  the  loss  by  Spain  of  her  vast  colonial 
possessions  and  abundant  sources  of  wealth.  .  .  .  The  tratlitions 
with  which  Spanish  America  began  her  career  were  the  traditicjns 
of  despotism,  and  any  permanent  advance  towards  liberty  had  to 
be  made  in  oi)])osition  to  these  traditions."  ^  And  the  separation 
was  one  which  left  ineffaceable  scars  behind  it.  Kindly  feeling  did 
not  return,  and  commercial  relations  between  Spain  and  her  former 
colonies  became  practically  nil ;  "  to-day  Spain  takes  less  part  in 
the  commerce  of  Peru  than  does,  for  example,  Sweden,  not  to 
mention  Italy."  In  the  shipping  reports  for  1876  Spain  is  found 
to  be  considerably  behind  Sweden  and  is  included  under  "various," 
her  shipping  amounting  in  all  to  8154  tons.  The  same  is  true  in 
Chile  and  Argentina.  "  Thus  the  relations  of  Spain  with  her  old 
colonies  have  nearly  ceased  ;  she  furnishes  still,  however,  immi- 
grants in  considerable  number."  ^ 

Summary  of  Spanish  Influence 

After  what  has  been  said,  it  is  unnecessary  to  summarize  at  any 
length,  in  view  of  its  results,  the  activity  of  the  Si)anish  in  America. 
It  has  been  the  order  of  the  day  to  criticise  them  severely  ;  recently, 
however,  we  have  had  a  rehabilitation  or  an  apologia  representing 
the  swing  of  judgment  in  the  oi)posite  direction.^  Among  patriotic 
Spanish  writers,  one  of  extraordinary  ability  and  distinction  has 
often  been  quoted  —  Colmeiro  ;  and  an  ending  may  be  made  of 
specifically  Spanish  America  by  a  quotation  from  him,  representing 
jirobably  the  best  he  has  to  say.  "  We  have  dissimulated  neither 
the  faults  nor  the  errors  committed  by  the  Spanish  in  America  — 
from  which  the  peoples  who  founded  colonies  in  those  days  were 

1  Moses,  pp.  305,  308-309. 

2  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  3S-40 ;   Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  48. 

8  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer. ;  cf.  especially  pp.  202-204,  242,  316-319. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CUBA  AND  PUERTO  RICO        329 

not  exempt,  because  they  had  their  roots  in  the  age  and  in  the 
system.  But  those  authors  are  writing  with  passion,  and  merit 
little  credence,  who  paint  us  as  ferocious  wild  beasts,  or  at  least 
as  barbarians  thirsting  for  blood  and  gold,  and  forgetting  good 
works.  It  was  the  Spaniards  who  introduced  into  the  Indies  the 
ox,  the  ass  and  the  horse,  pigs,  sheep  and  goats,  and  a  multitude 
of  domesticated  birds,  for  the  comfort  and  pleasure  of  the  inhab- 
itants ;  it  was  they  who  transplanted  the  vine,  olive,  pomegranate, 
orange,  lemon,  and  almost  all  our  fruit  trees;  they  introduced  the 
sugar-cane  and  founded  the  first  sugar-refineries ;  they  taught  the 
art  of  raising  silk,  they  sowed  flax  and  hemp,  and  propagated 
various  garden  plants  and  vegetables  ;  they,  in  fine,  juirged  the 
land  of  idolatry,  eradicated  the  sacrifices  of  human  blood,  pursued 
the  cannibals,  and  punished  their  cruelties  and  abominations."  ^ 

CUBA  AND  PUERTO  RICO 

Although  Spanish  America  was  lost  in  1825,  a  Spanish  colonial 
empire  was  destined  yet  to  endure  for  over  seventy  years.  Of  the 
West  Indies  we  have  still  to  consider  Cuba,  whicH  virtually  was 
not  reckoned  as  an  important  part  of  the  enipire  until  late  in  the 
eighteenth  century ;  and,  of  less  importance,  Puerto  Rico.  And 
there  also  remains  the  empire  in  the  East,  especially  the  Philip- 
pines, to  which  only  casual  attention  has  been  accorded  in  the 
foregoing. 

Cuba  stands  for  the  latest  phases  of  the  Spanish  system  and  the 
latter-day  resistance  accorded  to  a  prolongation  of  the  anachronistic 
policy  which  led  to  the  falling-away  of  the  mainland  colonies. 
Cuba  actually  suffered  less  beneath  the  old  repressive  system  than 
did  the  other  sections  of  Spanish  America.  She  rebelled  against 
the  native  laws  as  did  the  other  tropical  colonies,  but,  despite  her 
almost  unrivaled  natural  resources,  she  never  attained  a  status  of 
population  ^  or  of  wealth,  calculated  to  react  with  force  against  the 
enormity  of  the  repression  to  which  she  was  subjected,  until  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Cuba  was  revealed  to  the  world 
only^after  Havana  had  been  taken  by  the  English  in  1762;  the 
possibilities  of  her  commerce  then  became  apparent.  Although 
she  had  profited  to  some  degree  by  the  more  enlightened  policy  of 

J  Colmeiio,  11,  421-422. 

2  Cf.  Humboldt,  Isla  de  Cuba,  chap,  iii ;  Saco,  earlier  chapters, /</«/>«. 


330  COLONIZATION 

the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century,  her  economic  awakening 
was  due  largely  to  the  impact  of  external  forces.  This  is  what 
Leroy-Beaulieu  means  when  he  says  that  the  history  of  Cuba 
(and  Puerto  Rico)  is  of  recent  date  :  during  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  Cuba  was  characterized  by  "a  status  of 
mediocre  and  obscure  prosperity,  a  rather  general  competency,  a 
mild  civilization,  good  treatment  of  the  slave  population,  slight 
financial  resources,  and  the  need  of  aid  and  of  subsidies  from  the 
metropolis.  A  combination  of  exceptionally  favorable  circum- 
stances," he  adds,  "  brought  about  a  radical  change  in  the  con- 
ditions of  this  colony  and  placed  it  in  a  few  years  above  all  the 
Antilles."  ^ 

The  English,  during  their  ten  months'  tenure  of  Havana,  had 
opened  the  port  to  all  English  ships,  and  the  immediate  result  was 
that,  during  this  period,  instead  of  the  usual  five  or  six  merchant 
vessels,  727  entered  the  harbor.  The  same  period  saw  as  many 
slaves  (3000)  imported  as  the  preceding  twenty  years  had  afforded 
under  the  privileged  companies.  "The  enlightened  Charles  III  of 
Spain,  profiting  by  this  example,  opened  the  trade  of  the  islands 
in  1765  and  of  Louisiana  in  1768  to  eight  Spanish  ports  besides 
Cadiz,  and  relaxed  many  of  the  regulations  that  had  hampered 
the  merchants."^  "The  trade  with  Cuba,  which  in  1765  required 
scarcely  six  ships,  required  over  two  hundred  in  1778,  after  all 
Spaniards  had  been  allowed  to  share  in  it  by  paying  a  duty  of  six 
per  cent.  From  1765  to  1770  the  income  from  duties  at  Havana 
trebled,  while  the  exportation  from  the  whole  island  increased 
fivefold.  Before  1765  this  magnificent  island,  which  was  able  to 
provide  all  Europe  with  sugar,  did  not  have  even  enough  for  the 
consumption  of  the  mother-country."  -^  It  can  thus  be  seen  that  "  the 
prosperity  of  Cuba  dates  from  the  English  capture  of  Havana"  ;  * 
that  is  to  say,  from  the  first  direct  subversion  of  stock  Spanish 
policy.  Allusion  need  scarcely  be  made  to  the  fact  that  such  a 
desirable  end   was   regularly  thus  attained   in   Spanish  America. 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  251,  252;  cf.  Humboldt,  Isla  de  Cuba,  p.  248.  The  latter 
author  considers  in  some  detail  the  geographical  and  other  natural  advantages 
possessed  by  the  island,  and  especially  by  the  port  of  Havana.  See  his  chapters  : 
Consideraciones  Generales,  Extension,  Clima,  Comercio,  fassifii.  Merivale  (quoted 
by  Leroy-Beaulieu,  L  253)  notes  that,  by  reason  of  its  elongation,  there  is  no  produc- 
tive part  of  Cuba  which  is  over  forty  miles  from  the  coast. 

2  I'.ourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  296-297  ;  Saco,  p.  325;  Zimniermann,  I,  396. 
•'  Koscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  36.  ■•  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  297. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CUBA  AND   PUERTO   RICO       331 

But  the  great  material  advance  of  the  island  took  place  somewhat 
later  and  attained  a  sort  of  acme  during  the  series  of  revolutions, 
first  in  Spain  herself,  and  then  in  the  colonies  of  the  mainland. 
Cuba,  therefore,  seems  in  a  way  to  have  arisen  from  the  collapse 
of  the  American  empire,  and  its  history  to  form  a  prolongation  of 
Spanish  American  history  after  the  great  crisis.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  island  has  been  singled  out  for  separate  treatment  ; 
a  sketch  of  its  nineteenth-century  vicissitudes  really  exhibits  the 
last  phase,  prolonged  over  seven  decades,  of  Spanish  American 
colonial  policy  and  methods. 

Cuba  after  1800 

What  differentiates  Cuba  after  1800  most  sharply,  for  present 
purposes,  from  the  rest  of  Spanish  America,  is^e  composition  of 
jts  population.  Indeed,  the  island  long  before  that  date  formed  a 
marked  exception  to  the  general  rule  in  this  respect.  The  fact 
that,  besides  lying  farther  to  the  north,  it  was  an  island,  seems  to 
have  been  determinative,  in  large  degree,  of  its  diverse  destiny. 
With  the  rest  of  the  Antilles  it  early  lost  its  native  population ;  ^ 
hence  the  rarity  of  the  Spanish-American  hybrid,  the  absence  of 
race-conflicts  and  of  the  complex  stratification  into  classes,  the 
exclusion  of  the  mission,  and  so  on.  Again,  the  more  temperate 
climate,  especialFy  in  the  loftier  interior,  permitted  and  invited  a 
larger  settlement  of  Europeans.  Despite  the  fact  that  Cuba  was 
the  Queen  of  the  Antilles  in  the  production  of  stock  products  of  a 
warmer  zone,  she  approached  far  closer  to  the  type  of  the  colony 
of  settlement  than  did  any  other  of  the  Spanish  American  colonies 
between  the  tropics.  At  the  end  of  the  year  1825  Cuba  is  thought 
by  Humboldt  to  have  had  a  population  of  325,000  whites  in  a 
total  of  715,000.^  This  was  after  a  considerable  importation  of 
slaves,  —  the  census  of  1775  gives:  whites,  95,419;  mulattoes, 
24,751  ;  negroes,  50,200.  In  1 791,  of  137,800  inhabitants  of  the 
jurisdiction  of  Havana,  73,000  were  whites  and  64,800  people  of 
color.  These  figures  may  be  compared  with  those  already  recorded  ^ 
for  different  sections  of  Spanish  America,  and  with  those  which 
Humboldt   and   others   give   for   divers    non-Spanish    sections    of 

1  On  the  disappearance  of  the  Cuban  natives  see  Humboldt,  Isla  de  Cuba,  pp.  1 26  ff. 

2  Rough  estimates  for  1850  are:  605,160  whites,  694,070  colored.  In  the  latter 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  whites  constituted  over  half  of  the  population. 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  254,  264.  ^  See  pp.  215  ff.,  above. 


332  COLONIZATION 

the  Antilles ;  for  example,  the  proportion  of  colored  population, 
negroes  and  mulattoes,  amounted,  it  is  said,  for  the  whole  of  the 
Antilles,  to  83  per  cent  of  the  total.  And  the  suggestion  of  the 
colony  of  settlement  becomes  the  more  pronounced  when  it  is 
realized,  for  example,  that  in  1775  there  were  40,864  while 
women  in  Cuba  to  54,555  white  men.^  Again,  the  percentage  of 
Spaniards  was  raised  by  the  flow  of  loyalists  thither  during  the 
revolutionary  period  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu  compares  it  to  the  movement 
of  English  loyalists  to  Canada  during  the  American  Revolution.'-^ 

Si)ain  held  in  Cuba,  therefore,  after  the  falling-away  of  the 
mainland  possessions,  the  nucleus  of  a  real  colony  of  Europeans, 
inspired,  at  least  in  good  part,  with  loyalty  to  herself.  Many  of  the 
blacks  and  mulattoes  were  free  men,'^  and  identitied  with  the  main- 
tenance of  Spanish  rule.  The  island  has  been  perhaps  the  most 
potentially  productive  section  of  any  colonial  empire.  Here  was 
yet  another  opportunity  for  Spain,  recently  chastened  in  a  most 
suggestive  and  pointed  manner,  to  develop  a  modern  policy. 

In  addition  to  the  benefits  of  the  liberal  policy  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century,  Cuba  fell  upon  slill  another  piece  of  fortune, 
economically  speaking,  in  the  general  abolition,  in  1812  and  follow- 
ing, of  the  slave-trade  ;  upon  her,  "  given  the  method  of  cultivation 
adopted  in  all  the  sugar  colonies,  it  conferred,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  production,  an  incontestable  advantage."  For  while  the 
other  islands  lost  their  labor  force,  Cuba's  was  recruited  ;  and  the 
consequent  decline  of  their  production  was  pure  profit  for  her. 
"  She  avoided  that  dismal  transition  which  was  to  cost  the  EngUsh 
and  French  planters  so  dear.  By  a  remarkable  spirit  of  prudence 
and  initiative,  even  while  they  were  maintaining  slavery,  the 
planters  of  the  Spanish  islands  introduced  into  their  cultivation 
and  their  manufacture  all  the  progress  of  which  these  were  sus- 
ceptible." Moreover,  for  the  very  reason  that  she  was  thus  pros- 
perous, Cuba  drew  to  herself  a  large  immigration  of  the  European 
races.  Again  the  passing  of  the  "  colonial  pact "  left  Cuba  undis- 
criminated against  in  France  and  England,  and  "  the  Cuban 
planters  saw  open  before  them  twcL_great^jTiarkets  in  which  the 

illumboldi,  Isla  de  ("uba,  pp.  97-109;  cf.  table,  pp.  9S-99 ;  yet  in  the  typical 
exploitation  period  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  Oallenga  (p.  36)  could 
call  Havana  a  "city  without  women." 

-  Leroy-I5eaulieu,  T,  254. 

3  Humboldt,  Isla  de  Cuba,  pp.  100  ff. 


SPANISH   AMKRTCA:   CUBA   AND   PUIIKIO    RICO        ^;^t^ 

natural  and  artificial  conditions  of  their  production  assured  them 
great  advantages."  ^ 

It  is  plainly  to  be  seen  that  the  continued  prosj^erity  of  the  island, 
and  so  the  progress  of  its  cultivation,  hinged  ui)on  the  free  utiliza- 
tion of  the  uniquely  favorable  economic  advantages  recounted. 
The  fate  of  Cuba  was  bound  up  in  that  of  her  plantation  production  ; 
but  it  was  upon  this  that  the  attention  of  the  metropolis  was  to  be 
fixed.  Hence  the  history  of  Cuba,  for  the  present  purpose,  to  the 
exclusion  of  most  of  such  other  topics  as  have  engaged  attention 
in  the  survey  of  other  sections  of  Spanish  America,  narrows  down 
to  the  attitude  of  the  Spanish  administration  toward  Cuban  trade. 

The  Supply  of  Labor 

For  the  moment,  however,  it  will  clarify  counsel  to  devote  a 
few  words  to  the  labor  force  over  which  the  Cubans  had  control. 
That  the  whites  themselves  could  labor  to  a  certain  degree  with 
impunity  seems  undeniable  ;  ^  there  were,  at  any  rate,  too  many  of 
them  for  all  to  be  owners  or  overseers.    But  the  bulk  of  the  heavy 
labor,  in  consonance  with  sub-tropical  conditions,  fell  upon  a  more 
fully  acclimatized  race  ;  and,  the  natives  having  disappeared,  this 
was  at  first  the  African,  imported  in  relatively  small  numbers  under 
the  familiar  system  of  the  asiento.*'^    Cuba  had  in  her  early  days 
very  little  use  for  slaves,  inasmuch  as  the  chief  local  occupation 
was  cattle-raising.    The  Asiento  of  17 13  only  slightly  increased  the 
importation;  in  1763  there  were  but  32,000  slaves  in  the  island; 
the  whole  number  introduced  between   1521  and   1763  is  thought  ^L4A>- 
by  Humboldt  to  have  been  no  more  than  60,000.     But  between  ^^,^c-,__fc. 
1 763  and   1 7QO  there  were  received  at  Havana  24,875,  and  else-     i-fT^ 
where  in  the  island  some  6000.    The  prohibition  of  the  slave-trade  ^^ 
north  of  the  equator  (18 17)  and  its  entire  abolition  (1820)  were   \ 
preceded  by  the  introduction  of  225,574  slaves  between  1790  and 
1820,  through  the  port  of  Havana  alone.     It  is  reckoned  by  Hum- 
boldt  that   the   whole   island  received   at  least    320,000  negroes 
between  1791  and  1825,  as  against  93,500  in  all  the  decades  pre- 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  254-255.  Even  after  the  direct  traffic  was  universally  sup- 
pressed, Cuba  still  imported  illicitly  a  considerable  number  of  blacks. 

2  Cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  264. 

8  P.  249,  above;  during  the  earlier  centuries  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  constantly 
demanded  more  slaves  and  at  the  same  time  feared  slave-uprisings.  Saco,  earlier 
chapters,  passim. 


334  COLONIZATION 

ceding.  It  is  easily  seen  that  the  emergence  of  Cuba  into  a  copi- 
ously productive  status  called  for  an  immediate  and  large  increase 
of  the  human  labor  force  ;  and  that  the  result  was  the  creation  of 
an  important  constituent  of  population  with  which  reckoning  had, 
in  future,  to  be  made.  And  it  must  be  added  that  tolerance  of 
race-mixture  resulted  in  the  formation  of  a  considerable  body  of 
mulattoes  ;  in  1775  there  were  some  24,750;  in  181 1,  70,000.^ 
The  conditions  of  the  colored  population  were  remarkably  favor- 
able :  even  Humboldt,^  who  hates  the  system  of  slavery  so  cordially, 
takes  pains  to  demonstrate  this.  The  possibility  of  attaining 
freedom  is  perhaps  as  good  an  evidence  as  any  of  the  slave's  status; 
and  in  Cuba,  in  1825,  one-third  of  the  people  of  color  were  free. 
The  free^element,  white  and  colored,  reached  in  Cuba  64  per  cent 
of  the  total  population,  as  against  scarcely  19  per  cent  in  the 
English  Antilles.  These  considerations  will  aid  the  American  to 
a  realization  of  the  fact  that  Cuba  in  some  respects  more  nearly 
resembled  the  southern  states  of  his  country  than  it  did  the  rest 
of  the  Spanish  colonies.^ 

Anticipating  somewhat,  it  may  be  said  that  toward  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century  ^  a  strenuous  effort  was  made  to  meet  a 
growing  need  for  a  labor  supply.  Immigration  of  European  families 
was  encouraged,  and  Yucatecs,  and  especially  Chinese,  were  intro- 
duced. Of  the  latter,  5560  were  imported  in  1859,  and  before 
i860  some  17,000;  of  these,  only  seven  were  women.  Further 
requisition  upon  the  Chinese  in  i860  resulted  in  the  presence  in 
Cuba,  in  1862,  of  over  60,000;  the  regular  cost  of  their  intro- 
duction was  $300  to  $400  per  head.    In  1884  there  were  in  Cuba 

1  Humboldt,  Isla  de  Cuba,  pp.  141-147,  109;  between  1799  and  1S03  there  were 
imported  into  Havana  34,500  negroes,  of  whom  seven  per  cent  died  per  annum. 
Ilumljoldt,  Essai,  I,  131.  ^  i^la  de  Cuba,  pp.  97-100. 

^  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  256)  states  that  the  development  of  wealth  and  of  the  slave-trade 
changed  the  lot  of  the  slaves.  "  The  Spanish  planter  became  more  cruel  and  immoral 
than  the  other  Europeans:  the  Cuban  sugar-plantations  are  exploited,  thanks  to  the 
slave-trade,  at  an  enormous  expense  of  human  lives,  losses  which  new  recruits  replace 
without  ce.ssation.  The  slave-trade  being  prohibited,  commerce  in  slaves  goes  on  as 
contraband,  and  their  condition  is  rendered  worse  in  default  of  the  protection  of 
the  legal  prescriptions  which  regulated  the  trade."  He  adds,  upon  the  authority  of 
Merivale  :  "  The  average  life  of  a  Cuban  slave  is  only  ten  years  ;  in  Barbados,  during 
the  worst  period  of  English  slavery,  it  was  seventeen  years."  On  the  later  conditions 
of  slave  and  free  labor,  emancipation,  etc.,  consult  Gallenga,  pp.  75  ff.,  91  ff.,  chap.  vi. 
Cf.  Bordier,  Col.,  p.  78. 

*  For  conditions  of  native  population,  sugar-production,  etc.,  as  they  appeared  at 
this  time  to  a  young  Dane,  see  "  Th.,  "  Erindringer,  etc.,  latter  Y>a.rt,  passim. 


SPANISH   AMERICA:    CUBA  AND   PUERTO   RICO        335 

some  70,000  Chinese  men ;  of  women,  only  1000.  The  usual 
abuses  of  the  coolie  system  did  not  fail  to  appear,  as  well  as  the 
stock  disadvantages  to  a  colonial  society  of  the  presence  of  such 
aliens  in  its  midst.  Upon  a  revelation  of  the  oppressiveness  and 
rascality  of  the  system  there  ensued  uprisings  in  Canton  against 
the  coolie-agents  and  a  formal  protest  to  the  European  consuls 
from  the  governor  of  Shanghai.^ 

Spanish  Policy  in  Cuba 

Having  accentuated  these  main  points  of  dissimilarity  between 
Cuba  and  the  rest  of  Spanish  America,  and  refraining  from  the 
rehearsal  of  what  they  had  in  common,  we  now  turn  to  the  consider- 
ation of  post-revolutionary  Spanish  policy  in  America,  as  applied 
typically  to  "The  Pearl  of  the  Antilles." 

Early  in  the  nineteenth  century  it  seemed  that  Spain  had 
learned  her  lesson,  and  that  there  lay  before  Cuba  an  unhampered 
development  of  great  resources.  Measures  were  taken  in  18 17  by 
Ferdinand  VII  which  looked  toward  a  continued  moderation  in 
the  matter  of  government  requisitions.  But  as  time  went  on,  the 
inveterate  tendency  toward  exploitation  and  exclusion  again  mani- 
fested itself.  Again  Spain  retrograded  through  failing  to  advance 
with  the  times.  Tariffs  which  had  been  moderate  (7^  to  33I  per 
cent  ad  valorem)  in  1809,  became  exorbitant  when  the  other  powers 
had  deserted  their  former  policy  based  upon  the  "  colonial  pact  " 
and  mercantilism;  the jjlanters- found  cause  of  complaint  about 
their  status  when  they  came  to  compare  it  with  that  of  the  colonies 
of  Jamaica,  Martinique,  and  Barbados.  One  of  their  chief  grievances 
lay  in  the  unfavorable  situation  in  which  they  were  placed  with 
their  best  customers,  the  people  of  the  United  States.  For  since 
the  products  of  the  northern  republic,  notably  grains,  were  subject 
to  differential  duties  upon  entering  Cuba,  the  obvious  return-blow 
was  the  imposition  of  differentials  upon  Cuban  sugar.  But  the 
United  States  formed  the  natural  market  for  this  sugar,  taking 
62  per  cent  of  it ;  and  England  bought  another  22  per  cent  as 
against  3  per  cent  taken  by  Spain.  Yet  upon  the  part  which 
entered  the  United  States  the  Cuban  planters  paid  about  two-thirds 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  255,  257-2 5.S;  Ciallenga,  pp.  109,  127;  for  the  place  of  the 
coolie  system  under  the  topic  of  tropical  labor,  cf.  p.  11,  above;  Keller,  Sociol. 
View,  etc. 


336  COLONIZATION 

of  the  selling  value.  "  Such  were  the  deplorable  results  of  a  colo- 
nial regime  which  the  metropolis,  far  from  amending,  rendered 
daily  more  rigorous  :  the  planters  had  to  pay  very  high  for  t.heir 
flour,  iron,  fabrics, — for  all  those  articles  which  were  useful  for 
existence  and  for  manufacture, — and  they  found  themselves  in 
respect  to  sales  in  the  great  market  of  America  inider  conditions 
far  worse  than  those  of  their  competitors  from  the  neighboring 
islands.  When  the  interests  of  colonists  are  thus  manifestly  in- 
jured, loyalism  does  not  delay  its  departure."  ^ 

Naturally,  as  had  been  the  case  in  the  now  revolted  colonies,  the 
Creoles  were  allowed  no  share  in  their  own  government,^  no  chance 
to  protest  officially  against  treating  Cuba  like  "  a  milch-cow  which  it 
[Spain]  seemed  to  wish  to  exhaust."  A  complicated  administrative 
mechanism  whose  various  arms  were  sinecures  with  full  lines  of 
perquisites  for  Spaniards,  and  whose  general  character  was  corrupt 
to  an  exceptional  degree,  was  saddled  upon  the  Cuban  producers. 
Captains-general  made  disgraceful  fortunes ;  high  functionaries 
levied  upon  the  people  for  their  daughters'  dowries  and  for  their 
infants'  baptismal  finery.  The  budget  augmented  to  the  enormous 
figure  of  $30,000,000,  covering  expenses  incurred  by  Spain  in 
ways  entirely  disconnected  with  Cuba,  and  yielding  a  yearly  profit 
of  about  $6,000,000  on  her  colonial  budget.  Cuban  finance  became 
disordered  and  the  result  was  a  forced  circulation.'' 

Insukrp:ction 

Cuba's  old  proverbial  loyalty  was  not  proof  against  all  this.  The 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  saw  the  inception  of  an  insurrec- 
tion, with  independence  as  its  aim,  and  numbering  among  its 
adherents  not  only  the  wealthy  Cubans,  planters,  industrials,  and 
merchants,  but  likewise  the  blacks.  For  the  insurgents,  taking 
advantage  of  the  well-known  willingness  of  the  proprietors  to  eman- 
cipate their  slaves,  proclaimed,  in  February,  1869,  the  immediate 
and  total  abolition  of  slavery.  Thus  the  negroes  also  came  to 
espouse  the  cause  of  their  liberators.  The  latent  rebellion  came 
to  a  head  with  the  revolution  of  1868  ir^Spain,  which  overthrew 

1  Leroy-Beaiilieu,  I,  255,  258-259;  cf.  Gallenga,  pp.42  ff. 

2  On  class-animosity  in  Cuba,  see  Gallenga,  pp.  39  ff.,  62-66;  cf.  p.  360  and 
note  3,  below. 

3  Leroy-Keaulieu,  I,  260;  Gallenga,  pp.  13,  66  ff.,  etc.  For  the  later  vicissitudes 
of  the  depreciated  currency,  see  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  262,  266;  Gallenga,  pp.  44  ff. 


SPANISH  AMERICA:    CUBA  AND  PUKR'l'O    RICO       337 

the  Spanish  queen ;  of  course  this  confusion  provided  only  "  the 
occasion,  not  the  cause,  for  a  conflagration  which  had  been  long 
smoldering  in  the  colony."  ^  \f^^' 

Spain's  treatment  of  the  insurgents  was  most  ill-advised  and 
tactless  :  all  their  claims  were  refused  ;  no  concessions  to  rebels 
were  to  be  made  by  Castilian  pride.  "On  March  21,  1869,  250 
Cubans,  selected  from  the  (^lite  of  Creole  society,  were  torn  from 
their  firesides  and  deported  to  Fernando  Po  and  Mahon.  The  in- 
dignation which  seized  the  whole  insular  population  at  the  spectacle 
of  this  unjustifiable  barbarity,  doubled  the  forces  of  the  insurrec- 
tion." The  struggle  was  long  and  characterized  by  great  atrocity  ; 
it  was  not  until  1878  that  the  vigilant  and  apparently  upright  Cam- 
pos managed  to  quell  it,  and  then  largely  through  buying  off  the  /^' 
insurgents.  He  is  said  to  have  paid,  as  a  result  of  his  agreement  -t^IaX 
\cojivcnio),  as  much  as  $8,500,000  ;  he  himself  admitted  such  an  ex- 
pense of  $850,000.^  Reforms  in  general  and  in  particular*^  were 
promised  the  Cubans,  and  overt  hostilities  were  suspended. 

The  years  of  the  insurrection  had  brought  Cuban  prosperity 
almost  to  ruin.  For  the  island  had  had  to  suffer,  not  only  the 
ravages  of  war,  but  also  the  insensate  exactions  of  a  suspicious 
and  fearful  government.  Sugar-production  was  reduced  by  half ; 
at  the  same  time,  however,  the  budget  rose  to  $40,000,000,  the 
equivalent  of  which  for  France,  according  to  Leroy-Beaulieu, 
would  be  $1,000,000,000.  Taxes  of  all  kinds  were  capricious  as 
well  as  heavy;  simple  merchants  paid  direct  taxes  of  $2550; 
planters  paid  up  to  $60,000.  Such  taxes  often  surpassed  income 
and  infringed  upon  capital.*  The  only  one  of  the  promises  wrung 
from  Spain  which  had  been  fulfilled  seventeen  years  later,  was 
that  which  had  to  do  with  the  slaves  ;  they  were  definitively  eman-  .^  i*  o  - 
cipated  in   1880.    The  budget  of   1884-188 5   was  certainly  over   cj^,_,,„„_^ 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  258.  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this  insurrection,  see 
Gallenga,  pp.  14-22,  chap,  iii ;  on  emancipation,  see  chap.  vi.  For  the  nineteenth- 
century  history  of  Spain,  see  Hume,  Modern  Spain,  or  Clarke,  Modern  Spain,  to 
which  text-allusions,  from  this  place  on,  r.efer.  Upon  topics  connected  with  slavery 
Aimes  is  the  latest  authority. 

■^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  261-262  ;  see  Gallenga  on  "  Pacification,"  chap.  vii. 

3  It  seems  unnecessary  to  rehearse  the  formal  demands  of  the  Cubans.  Fellow- 
sufferers  under  the  same  rigid  system  wanted  pretty  much  the  same  things.  The 
reader  is  referred  to  the  list  of  Filipino  demands  (p.  363,  below),  which  included  in 
general  what  they  thought  Cuba  had  gotten,  or  was  about  to  get.  Cf.  also  Zimmer- 
mann,  I,  500. 

*  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  262-263. 


2,2,^  COLON  I /.All  ON 

$32,000,000,  a  figure  which  woulci  rci)re.scnl  over  $21  per  capita  ;  ^ 
it  was  divided  as  follows  : 

Interest  and  liquidation  of  debt $10,000,000 

War-expenses 9,000,000 

Marine 2,204,000 

,^   ,.       ( (or den  publico) 700,000 

Police  ■{  ,  J-    /v 

1^  [i^iiardia  civil) 2,537,000 

Various  ( public  works, public  instruction,  administration,  etc.)        5,000,000 

Collection  and  financial  organization 2,000,000 

The  meager  provision  under  "  Various  "  needs  no  comment. 

"  These  charges  were  crushing.  They  came  from  a  much  too 
numerous  military  force,  and  from  an  administrative  waste  of  which 
the  figures  of  the  budget  scarcely  give  an  idea."  "  If  you  treat 
the  provinces  of  Cuba  as  enemies,"  said  an  orator  in  the  Spanish 
senate  in  1884,  "  24,000  men  are  not  sufficient  to  hold  them  under  ; 
it  would  be  necessary  to  send  100,000  men.  If  you  treat  them  as 
friends,  it  is  different."  And  this  senator  recalled  the  fact  that 
England  maintained  only  6,000  troopers  in  the  midst  of  4,000,000 
inhabitants  of  Canada.  "  Never  has  a  colony  been  so  pitilessly 
exploited  by  an  avaricious  and  improvident  mother  country."  '^ 

It  is  plain  that  Spain  had  learned  nothing  from  the  separation 
of  the  colonies  in  1825  nor  from  the  hardly  suppressed  insurrection 
of  the  seventies.  She  blundered  back  into  the  old  policy,  and  even 
accentuated  it.  It  is  a  wonder  that  the  final  insurrection  was  so 
long  delayed  ;  but  it  came  at  length  in^895_and  found  issue  in 
the  loss  of  what  was  left  to  Spain  in  America.  Once  again,  how- 
ever, Spain  was  destined  to  refer  the  collapse  of  her  system  and 
the  loss  of  her  colonies  to  the  accursed  foreigner.  It  seems  unlikely 
that  the  insurgents  could  have  realized  their  aims  within  any  cal- 
culable period  of  time,  had  it  not  been  for  aid  from  without.  In 
the  earlier  insurrection  the  "  patriots  "  were  as  little  able  to  take 
Havana  as  the  royal  forces  were  to  pacify  the  island  ;  and  the 
same  situation  recurred  in  the  later  revolution.  An  interminable 
vista  of  petty  guerrilla  strife  afforded  no  prospect  of  future  settle- 
ment and  peace,  while  the  economic  interests,  not  only  of  Cuba, 

1  A  Spanish  senator,  calling  attention  to  the  high  per  capita  tax,  gave  the  following 
comparative  average  rates  :  C^anada,  between  $6.20  and  #6.40  ;  Martinique  and  (luade- 
loupe,  $4  to  $5  ;  in  the  ensemble  of  the  English  colonies,  )i52.40  to  52.60.  "  No  coun- 
try in  the  world,"  he  said,  "  attained  to  such  a  quota  of  taxation,  not  even  France 
whose  ordinary  budget  represents  about  85  francs  per  French  taxpayer."  Leroy- 
Beaulieu,  T,  265. 

2  Leroy-Heaulieu,  I,  261-265,  266.  For  the  earlier  periods,  see  Humboldt,  Isla  de 
Cuba,  pp.  250  ff.,  chapter  entitled  "  Hacienda." 


SPANISH  AMP:RICA:    CUBA  AND   PUERTO   RICO        339 

but  of  all  the  world  that  had  to  do  with  her  commercially,  suffered 
intolerably.  And  because  the  interests  of  the  United  States  were 
so  extensive,  irritation  in  this  country  waxed  ever  greater,  and 
gradually  metamorphosed  itself  into  the  form  of  a  crusade  against 
misgovcrnment  and  oppression.  Thus  it  was  that,  whereas  the 
young  Republic  no  more  than  held  up  the  hands  of  England  in 
helping  on  the  emancipation  of  1825,  she  became  the  protagonist 
in  sweeping  Spain  finally  from  the  New  World. ^ 

Cuba's  Relations  with  the  United  States 

That  Cuba's  destiny  could  not  be  disassociated  from  that  of  the 
country  to  the  north  appeared  long  ago  to  both  practical  men 
and  to  philosophic  observers.  The  American  colonists  were  deeply 
interested  in  the  island,  and  there  have  been  throughout  later 
decades  many  occasions  when  half-stifled  desire  for  its  possession 
has  flashed  forth  in  plans  of  conquest.  Geographical  proximity  and 
geological  continuity  have  been  the  texts  of  those  who  professed 
a  less  material  view-point.  Of  course  the  fundamental  attraction 
was  the  complementary  nature  of  the  production  of  the  two  areas  ; 
as  Leroy-Beaulieu  asks,  "  Is  not  the  American  Union  the  natural 
market  of  Cuba.''"  Humboldt,  long  before,  had  answered  this 
rhetoricaT'query,  for  his  statistics  of  Cuban  commerce  speak  for 
the  growing  commercial  affiliation  of  the  two  regions ;  as  early  as 
£832^_the  flour  of  the  United  States,  though  severely  taxed,  could 
easily  endure  all  competition.^  The  modern  treatment  of  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  ^  leaves  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  the  essentiality  of  the 
economic  bond  in  question,  and  its  potentiality  in  the  creation  of 
much  closer  relations.  In  his  edition  of  1891  the  French  econo- 
mist, after  noting  the  agitation,  in  1884,  for  a  commercial  treaty 
between  Cuba  and  the  United  States,  adds^:  "Let  Spain  make 
haste.    If  she  does  not  profoundly  reform  the  economic  legislation 

1  Gallenga  (pp.  117-118),  writing  in  1873,  ^^Y^  ^^^^  Cuba,  by  reason  of  its  climate, 
would  be  "  at  all  times  an  unprofitable  possession"  for  the  United  States  ;  that  whites, 
"  especially  dram-drinking  Yankees,"  would  perish  there  like  flies.  Consequently  the 
Cubans  expect  no  overt  act  of  hostility  against  Cuba.  The  policy  of  the  United 
States,  he  says,  "is  simply,  by  worrying  the  Spanish  Government  —  which,  as  she 
well  knows,  is  here  utterly  powerless  — so  to  aggravate  the  evils  and  hasten  the 
disasters  of  the  Island  as  to  make  her  interference  at  some  future  period  a  matter  of 
necessity  for  the  Island  itself,  when  she  may  be  solicited  to  step  in  as  a  'saviour  of 
society.'  "  To  what  degree  this  passage  is  prophetic  and  to  what  degree  cynical  may 
be  judged  from  the  events  of  the  succeeding  decades.  ^  I,  259,  267-268. 

-  Humboldt,  Isla  de  Cuba,  pp.  221  fi.,  passhn  (231,  238,  241).     *  I,  268. 


340  COLONIZATION 

and  the  administrative  organization  of  Cuba,  soon  the  Queen  of  the 
Antilles  will  be  irrevocably  lost  to  her." 

The  issue  has  justified  the  monition.  For  decades  before  the 
Spanish-American  War  the  Cuban  bond  of  economic  and  other 
sympathy  with  the  United  States  had  been  viewed  with  hope  and 
delight  by  the  "  patriots  "  and  with  suspicion  and  hatred  by  the 
Spanish.  Americans  lent  furtive  or  even  overt  aid  to  the  former, 
and  in  a  few  conspicuous  instances  ^  suffered  the  penalty.  What- 
ever the  exact  truth  of  the  matter  may  be,  it  is  certain  that  the 
irritated  feelings  of  the  Americans  awaited  merely  some  such  shock 
as  they  received  in  order  to  break  forth  into  the  fury  of  war. 
There  could  be  but  one  result,  for,  while  there  had  been  an  exag- 
gerated notion  of  Spain's  strength  in  earlier  centuries,  there  was 
no  possibility  of  a  misconception  respecting  her  subsequent  decline 
and  weakness.  The  unmatched  struggle  was  carried  out  in  reckless 
and  holiday  spirit  by  the  Americans  ;  target-practice  upon  the  ill- 
kept  and  ill-manned  f^ect  of  Cervera  was  checked  up  with  a  view 
to  the  distribution  of  the  meed  of  praise,  as  if  the  running  fight  of 
July  3,  1898,  had  been  a  mere  tournament  or  diversion. 

Puerto  Rico 

Spain  lost,  along  with  Cuba,  not  only  the  Philippines,  of  which 
more  is  to  be  said  presently,  but  also  the  valuable  dependency  of 
Puerto  Rico.  The  history  of  the  latter  island  '^  offers  several  vari- 
ants upon  the  course  of  Spanish  colonial  policy,  together  with  an 
essential  regularity.  Up  to  the  emancipation-period  it  was  neglected 
or  used  as  a  place  of  exile  for  convicts  ;  it  profited  during  this 
period  as  an  apt  contraband  station,  and  later  its  temperate  climate 
and  abundance  of  fertile  soil  attracted  a  considerable  settlement  of 
whites.  Consequently  the  misfortune  of  absenteeism  was,  in  Puerto 
Rico,  reduced  to  a  minimum.  Merivale  ^  says  that  the  case  of 
l^uerto  Rico  is  sufficient  to  disprove  twoj.iniversal  and  inveterate 
prejudices  :  that  a  European  population  cannot  prosper  and  mul- 
tiply  freely  in  the  West  Indian  climate,  and  that  sugar  and  coffee 
cannot  be  produced  by  free  labor  and  yet  yield  ample  remuneration. 
Though  a  diversity  of  opinion  is  possible  as  to  whether  Merivale  is 

1  For  example,  the  Virgiiiius  case  ;  cf.  Ilalstead,  chap,  ii,  etc.,  for  the  popular  view 
of  this  episode  and  others;  and  Cabrera  as  an  appeal  to  American  sympathies. 

'■^  What  is  here  said  of  I'uerto  Rico  represents  for  the  most  part  a  summary  of 
Leroy-l'eaulieu,  I,  269-271. 

"  Quoted  in  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  270;  cf.  Iluniholdl,  Isla  de  Cuba,  pp.  26  ff.,  64  ff. 


THE  PHILIPPINES  34 1 

not  utilizing  an  exceptional  case  to  disprove  a  matter  of  common 
observation/  yet  the  very  exceptionality  of  the  case  would  afford 
strong  evidence  as  to  the  unusual  conditions  of  Puerto  Rican 
population. 

Puerto  Rico  profited  with  Cuba  from  the  reform  in  administra- 
tion of  the  early  years  of  the  century  ;  among  other  benefits  con- 
ferred was  the  avoidance  of  great  demesnes  by  the  fostering  of  the 
system  of  small  holdings.  Taxes  were  lowered  and  the  alcabala 
abandoned  ;  and  a  period  of  prosperity  like  that  of  Cuba  ensued. 
Toward  1835,  however,  these  enviable  conditions  began  to  change 
for  the  worse  :  estates  began  to  form ;  large  subject  populations, 
African  and  Asiatic,  had  to  be  dealt  with.  In  the  sixties  Puerto 
Rico  was  going  the  way  of  Cuba  and  might  have  duplicated  her 
history  had  she  possessed  the  same  attractiveness  for  the  cupidity 
of  the  mother-country.  However,  she  suffered  but  little  from  eman- 
cipation (1872)  since  it  came  about  so  easily.  "As  in  Barbados, 
the  smallness  of  the  territory,  the  rarity  of  free  and  uncultivated 
lands, 2  and  the  relatively  slight  number  of  slaves  occupied  upon 
the  plantations,  facilitated  the  passage  from  slavery  to  freedom." 

In  the  early  nineties  Puerto  Rico  was,  for  a  Spanish  colony, 
remarkably  prosperous.  It  is  noteworthy  that  her  trade-relations 
were,  like  Cuba's,  prevailingly  with  the  United  States,  and  second- 
arily with  Great  Britain  ;  Spain,  however,  had  a  modest  share. 
In  1 89 1  Leroy-Beaulieu  wrote  :  "  It  is  probable  that  Puerto  Rico 
may  remain  a  dependence  of  Spain,  if  the  metropolis  is  prudent 
and  liberal ;  it  will  be  perhaps  the  last  remnant  of  the  Spanish 
power  in  the  New  World."  But  the  destiny  of  the  island  w-as 
absorbed  in  that  of  Cuba,  in  that  it  passed  to  the  conqueror  as 
spoil  of  war.  And  there  seemed  to  be  no  serious  protest  anywhere 
against  the  final  exclusion  of  Spain  from  the  field  of  her  secular 
blundering  and  humiliation. 

THE   PHILIPPINES 

In  an  attempt  to  cover  the  important  sections  of  the  Spanish 
colonial  empire,  there  yet  remains  to  the  recounter  that  group  of 
trans-Pacific  islands,  discovered  by  Magellan  in  1521,  and  later 
named  Filipinas.  It  has  been  seen  ^  that  Cohmibus  and  the  earlier 
explorers  labored  in  the  hoj^e  that  they  would  presently  discover 

1  Cf.  p.  4  ff.,  above. 

2  The  population  of  Puerto  Kiro  was,  in  the  nineties,  six  times  that  of  Cuba 
(being  80  per  square  kilometer).  ^  I'p.  132,  177,  25S,  above. 


\4^ 


COLONIZATION 


some  passage  through  America  to  the  Orient,  and  that  in  this 
respect  they  encountered  only  disappointment.  When,  now,  the 
actual  experience  of  the  Portuguese  had  demonstrated  that  the 
Spice  Islands  lay  some  fifty  degrees  east  of  Calicut,  the  old  project 
of  reaching  them  by  sailing  westward  was  revived.  And  it  was 
shown  that  these  islands  must  lie  within  the  Spanish  hemisphere 
as  defined  by  an  extension  of  the  Demarcation  meridian  about  the 
globe. ^  In  pursuance  of  this  object,  and  through  the  indomitable 
energy  and  resolution  of  "  the  first  navigator  of  ancient  or  modern 
times,"  2  Spain  actually  reached,  at  last,  the  East,  the  final  objec- 
tive of  her  early  efforts,  the  source  of  the  coveted  gain  of  Venice 
and  of  Portugal.  Magellan  and  two-thirds  of  his  companions 
perished,  but  "  the  cargo  of  spices  brought  by  the  little  Victoria, 
consisting  principally  of  twenty-six  tons  of  cloves,  exceeded  in 
value  the  total  net  cost  of  the  expedition."  ^ 

But  the  East  that  she  found  could  scarcely  stand  to  Spain  in 
the  hoped-for  relation.  Portugal  was  on  the  ground,  and  was 
determined  ;  she  was  able  to  concentrate  resistance  to  encroach- 
ment upon  her  single  and  familiar,  if  widely  extended,  field  better 
than  Spain,  already  involved  in  America,  could  organize  assaults 
upon  a  second  and  more  than  doubly-distant  section  of  her  half- 
world.  Of  a  consequence,  Spanish  invasions  of  the  Malay  Archi- 
pelago were  insignificant  in  result ;  and  even  the  Moluccas,  the 
goal  of  desires,  were  speedily  freed  of  their  presence.  When 
Charles  V  sold  Spanish  rights  to  the  Moluccas  and  their  trade,  he 
also  accepted  a  new  north  and  south  Demarcation  Line  seventeen 
degrees  (297  leagues)  on  the  equator  east  of  the  Moluccas.  This 
renounced  in  reality  all  claim  to  the  Philippines,  but  in  practice  it 
meant  nothing  of  the  sort.  That  actual  conditions  of  possession 
and  ability  to  defend  formed  the  basis  of  the  settlement  respecting 
the  Moluccas  is  rendered  more  probable  by  the  fact  that  the 
Spaniards  retained  these  northern  islands  almost  unchallenged. 
"  As  they  did  not  produce  s])ices,  the  Portuguese  had  not  occupied 
them,  and  they  now  made  no  effectual  resistance  to  the  Spanish 

1  IJourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  24-25;  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.41,  115,  118-119;  on  the 
Hadajoz  Junta,  etc.,  see  p.  123,  above. 

2  Hourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  12S;  for  the  voyage  of  Magellan,  see  id.,  p]).  1 19-130; 
Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  9  ff.  For  the  e.xliihition  of  "  Spanish  gratitude"  in  Magellan's 
ca.se,  see  Foreman,  p.  28. 

*  Uoiirne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  129-130.  Cinnamon,  sandalwood,  etc.,  were  also 
represented  in  the  cargo.    Foreman,  p.  31. 


THE   PIIIMI'PINES  343 

conquest  of  the  islands.  The  union  of  Portugal  to  the  crown  of 
Spain  in  i  580  subsequently  removed  every  obstacle,  and  when  the 
Portuguese  crown  resumed  its  independence  in  1640,  the  Portu- 
guese had  been  driven  from  the  Spice  Islands  by  the  Dutch."  ^ 

The  destiny  of  the  Spanish  in  the  East  was  metamorphosed 
when  they  were  thus  turned  to  the  Philippines,  as  was  that  of  the 
British  when  forced  from  Java  to  the  mainland  of  India.  Again, 
as  in  the  case  of  America,  they  were  to  deal  with  uncivilized 
peoples,'-^  again  to  miss,  even  in  the  Orient,  the  Oriental  trade. 
Small  wonder,  then,  to  find  their  energy  directed  again  into  the 
primal  activities  of  conquest  and  conversion.  The  results  in  the 
Philippines  may  therefore  afford  some  idea  of  what  might  have 
occurred  in  America  without  the  mines. 

The  conqueror  of  the  Philippines  was  Miguel  Lopez  de  Legazpi, 
one  of  the  greatest  of  colonial  pioneers.  Starting  in  1564  with  four 
ships  and  400  soldiers,  and  with  a  reenforcement  of  200  in  1567 
and  of  small  contingents  at  irregular  intervals,  he  effected  results 
in  the  winning-over  of  the  natives  and  in  the  repelling  of  the 
Portuguese  which  outdid  in  enduring  quality  those  of  any  other 
Spanish  conqueror  except  Cortes.  In  this  he  was  much  aided  by 
the  monks,  but  as  representing  a  tactful,  resourceful,  and  coura- 
geous directing  spirit,  he  deserves  the  bulk  of  recognition.'^  The 
conquest  was  marked  by  none  of  the  disastrous  features  of  its 
American  prototypes  ;  Luzon  was  reduced  (in  1579  and  succeeding 
years  by  Salcedo)  rather  by  persuasion  and  peaceable  means  than 
by  force."*  There  was  no  pressing  need  of  unwilling  native  labor 
as  in  the  mines,  and  for  a  long  time  almost  no  plantation  develop- 
ment took  place  ;  thus  the  relations  with  the  natives  were  analogous 
to  those  which  obtained  in  the  early  days  of  Buenos  Ayres.^ 

1  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  32;  cf.  pp.  24-25,  29-30;  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  131-132; 
Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  6,  26  ff. 

2  For  a  brief  ethnography  of  the  Philippines,  see  Blumentritt,  pp.  6  ff. ;  for  the 
character  of  the  Filipino,  see  also  Scheidnagel,  p.  59 ;  Worcester,  pp.  476-482  ; 
Foreman,  chap,  xi,  et passim. 

3  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  32-33.  "  It  was  owing  to  his  heroism,  his  civic  virtues, 
his  superior  genius,  his  grand  patriotism  and  his  noble  disinterestedness  that  the 
Philippine  Islands  were  incorporated  quickly,  pacifically  and  justly  to  Spain."  Id., 
p.  43.    Cf.  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  35-43;  Foreman  pp.  33  ff. 

*  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  75-79;  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  3S-40.  Of  course  the 
Philippines  were  never  thoroughly  reduced,  even  excluding  the  Moro  islands. 
Foreman,  pp.  loi  ff. 

5  P.  317,  above. 


344  COLOXIZATION 

The  Moros 

However,  it  must  be  noted  that  these  early  operations  were 
directed  mainly  to  the  island  of  Luzon,  and  that  the  results  sig- 
nalized were  attained  among  Malays  whose  natural  development 
had  been  approximately  uninfluenced  from  without.  Farther  south, 
on  the  contrary,  the  Spanish  met  a  population  already  and  definitely 
under  the  sway  of  the  old  arch-enemy  Islam ;  for  the  Arabian 
influence  had  extended  eastward  through  the  preceding  centu- 
ries and  had  just  begun  to  make  itself  felt  in  the  southern  part 
of  Luzon  when  the  Spaniards  arrived.^  This  state  of  affairs  was 
recognized  by  the  latter  in  the  application  to  the  Malays  of  the 
southern  islands,  particularly  Mindanao  and  Jolo  (Sulu),  of  the 
generic  term  for  Mohammedan,  Aloro  or  Moor.  With  these  peoples 
the  relations  were  those  of  persistent  intermittent  warfare.  Los 
piratas  malayo-uiahomctanos,  as  they  were  designated,  descended 
periodically  upon  the  coasts  of  Luzon,  plundering  the  heretic  in 
genuine  Bedouin  style  ;  and  Filipinos  and  Spaniards  were  always 
at  one  in  their  fear  of  these  raids  and  in  their  determination  to 
resist.  For  three  centuries  the  chronicles  are  full  of  such  piratic 
descents,  and  although  Spanish  expeditions  took  occasional  nominal 
possession  of  Moro  towns,  destroyed  the  chiefs'  sepulchers  and  the 
like,  the  succeeding  repetition  of  attack  and  defense  shows  that 
such  demonstrations  were  of  small  effect.^    The  Moros,  with  their 

^  Peschel,  Races  of  Man,  pp.  306-307  ;  Blumentritt,  pp.  18  ff.  "The  religion  of 
the  prophet  had  penetrated  to  Malacca  in  1276,  had  reached  the  Moluccas  in  1465, 
and  thence  was  spreading  steadily  northward  to  Borneo'  and  the  Philippines.  Jolo 
(Sulu)  and  Mindanao  succumbed  in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  when  Legaspi  began 
the  concpiest  of  Luzon  in  1571,  he  found  many  Mohammedans  whose  settlement  or 
conversion  had  grown  out  of  the  trade  relations  with  Borneo.  As  the  old  Augustinian 
chronicler  Grijalva  remarks,  .  .  .  '  So  well  rooted  was  the  cancer  that  had  the  arrival 
of  the  Spaniards  been  delayed,  all  the  people  would  have  become  Moors,  as  are  all 
the  islanders  who  have  not  come  under  the  government  of  the  Philippines.'  "  Bourne, 
Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  34-35.  Montero  y  Vidal  (e.g.  I,  59-60)  adverts  to  this  view  from 
time  to  time. 

2  Raids  by  malayo-mahometanos  are  chronicled  by  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  115,  117, 
182,  201  ff.,  242  ff.,  273ff.,  434ff-,  482  ff.,  540,  579;  II,  344,  36Sff.,  4S3,  500 ff.,  559; 
III,  21,  87,  93  ff.,  183  ff.,  200  ff.,  220  ff.,  274  ff.,  417  ff.,  454. 

"The  year  1754  was  fatal  for  the  Philippine  provinces  by  reason  of  the  vandal 
attacks  of  the  Moro  Malays"  (I,  515).  There  follows  a  list  of  damages  for  the  year 
by  months.  "In  1789  the  governor  wrote  to  the  king  saying  that  the  constant  war 
with  the  malayo-mahometanos  was  an  '  evil  without  remedy  '  "  (II,  340).  "  According 
to  official  reports,  the  Moros  captured  per  year  over  500  persons,  destining  them  to 
the  fnost  painful  labor.    The  old,  as  of  less  value,  were  sold  to  the  inhabitants  of 


THE  PHILIPPINES  345 

lighter  craft,  regularly  rowed  into  the  eye  of  the  wind,  or  took 
refuge  in  shallow  waters,  or,  in  the  case  of  bombardment  of  their 
towns,  simply  evacuated  them  temporarily.  It  was  not  until  the 
introduction  of  the  steam-propelled  gun-boats,  about  1848,  and  the 
regular  maintenance  of  a  fleet  of  them  in  the  eastern  station  (after 
1 861)  that  the  seas  were  rid  of  the  spoiler,  and  the  course  of  com- 
merce and  travel  became  reasonably  secure.^  It  is  plain,  therefore, 
that  in  the  consideration  of  the  Spanish  system,  one  is  justified  in 
eliminating  the  Moros  with  slight  notice  as  a  people  nominally 
subject  but  not  actually  so  ;  indeed  it  may  be  said  that  the  same 
condition  of  affairs  has  persisted  to  a  considerable  degree  under 
the  more  masterful  and  vigilant  system  pursued  by  the  United 
States.^ 

Constituents  of  Population 

With  this  brief  notice  the  southern  part  of  the  archipelago  may 
be  dismissed  from  attention.  Returning,  now,  to  the  actually  sub- 
jected areas,  it  is  proposed  to  give  an  account  of  the  develop- 
ment of  Spanish  colonial  policy  in  this  new  and,  in  some  respects, 
very  different  field.  In  a  general  way,  this  policy  was  everywhere 
consistent  with  itself  ;  many  of  the  measures  applied  to  the  Philip- 
pines were  the  counterparts  of  those  whose  effects  in  Spanish 
America  have  just  been  reviewed.  But,  in  part  for  reasons  already 
suggested,  there  were  variations  in  the  East,  which  are  instructive 
and  significant  to  one  who  seeks  the  driving  motives  of  the  whole 
system. 

In  so  far  as  emigration  of  Spaniards  to  the  Philippines  is  con- 
cerned, it  was  almost  negligible,  being  totally  unsuited,  in  volume 

Saiidakan  [in  ISorneo],  who  sacrificed  them  to  the  manes  of  their  dead  relatives  or  of 
important  personages,  preserving  the  skulls  of  the  victims  in  proof  of  having  fulfilled 
this  barbarous  custom  "  (II,  369).  From  1778  to  1793,  aside  from  incalculable  losses 
in  other  ways,  the  expenses  of  pay  for  soldiers,  for  vessels,  expeditions,  etc.,  had 
amounted  to  1,519,209  pesos  fuertes  (II,  369).  The  pirates  were  the  "eternal 
question"  as  late  as  1826  (II,  500);  and  even  in  case  of  victory  the  Spanish  did 
not  know  how  to  handle  them  (III,  213  ff.).  See  also  a  special  work  by  Montero  y 
Vidal,  Historia  de  la  piraten'a  malayo-mahometana  en  Mindanao,  Jolo  y  Borneo, 
Madrid,  1888. 

1  Montero  y  Vidal,  III,  87,  135-136,  327  fi.,  417  ff. ;  Foreman,  p.  132.  For  the  mas- 
terful administration  of  Arolas  in  Jolo,  see  Worcester,  pp.  1 68-1 88. 

Jolo  was  the  most  constant  thorn  in  the  flesh.  "  Precisamente  es  esa  una  isla 
que  ha  causado  mas  males  al  comercio  asiatico  que  todas  las  demas  Filijjinas." 
Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  559,  note. 

2  On  the  Moros,  see,  besides  Montero  y  Vidal,  Foreman,  chap,  x  ;  Blumentritt,i8  ff. 


346  COLONIZATION 

and  quality,  not  only  to  constitute  a  new  Spanish  society,  but  even 
perceptibly  to  alter  the  ethnic  type  of  the  population.  It  was,  from 
the  first,  composed  almost  exclusively  of  males,  and  these  were 
practically  all  connected  with  military  or  religious  establishments. 
For  two  centuries  and  a  quarter  the  stock  exclusion-policy  of  Spain 
forbade  the  establishment  of  any  foreigner  in  the  islands.  About 
1820  the  ratio  of  whites  to  natives  was  about  as  one  to  1600,  and 
most  of  these  whites  lived  in  Manila.  "As  late  as  1864  the  total 
number  of  Spaniards  amounted  to  but  4,050,  of  whom  3,280  were 
government  officials,  etc.,  500  clergy,  200  landed  proprietors,  and 
70  merchants."  ^  During  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  Euroj^ean  Spaniards,  apart  from  these  functionaries,  consti- 
tuted scarcely  a  thousandth  of  the  population ;  and  the  native 
Spaniards,  or  Creoles,  were  about  three  in  ten  thousand  (.03  per 
cent).  Their  influence  upon  the  native  strain  was  but  slight  ;  of 
Spanish  mestizos  (vicst/sos  f^rivi/egiados)  there  were  less  than  two 
per  cent.  Plainly  the  case  is  one  quite  divergent  from  that  of 
America.  If  the  Chinese  be  reckoned  in  at  two  and  a  half  per  cent,^ 
and  the  Chinese  mestizos  {mestizos  dc  sanglcy)  at  two  per  cent, 
the  essential  predominance  of  the  native  Malay  stock  is  but  accen- 
tuated ;  ^  the  whites,  at  least,  have  been  but  transitory  in  the 
population.  This  is,  of  course,  natural  enough,  when  one  reflects 
upon  the  essentially  tropical  type  of  environment  represented  by 
the  Philii")pines ;  ■*  there  are  no  such  corrections  of  latitude  by 
altitude  in  the  archipelago  as  rendered  the  sojourn  of  the  Spaniards 
in  Mexico  and  Peru  more  endurable. 

1  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  59-60  ;  cf.  Foreman,  pp.  4,  355.  Filipino  names  are 
deceptive  a.s  a  distinction  of  race.  In  1S49  a  catalogue  of  Spanish  names  was  sent 
out  for  distribution  among  the  natives,  a  number  of  whom  bore  the  same  name,  with 
the  result  of  much  confusion.  Hence  many  Filipino  families  bear  illustrious  Spanish 
names.    Montero  y  Vidal,  III,  89. 

-  Foreman  (p.  iiS)  estimates  the  total  number  of  Chinese  in  the  islands  just 
before  the  last  insurrection  against  Spain  (1896)  as  100,000. 

^  Blumentritt,  pp.  32,  35.  Chinese  and  Spanish  mestizos  together  constitute 
3I  per  cent,  but  the  former  are  more  numerous. 

*  See  pp.  7  ff.,  above.  On  the  climate  and  diseases  of  the  islands,  see  Worcester, 
pp.  64,  67-68,  313,  362-363,  434;  Scheidnagel,  42  ff.,  loi  ff.,  149-156.  "It  is  unfor- 
tunately true,"  says  Worcester  (p.  67),  "  that  the  climate  of  the  Philippines  is  espe- 
cially severe  in  its  effect  on  women  and  children.  It  is  very  doubtful,  in  my  judg- 
ment, if  many  successive  generations  of  European  or  American  children  could  be 
reared  there."  Again  (p.  47S),  "  No  one  can  work  there  as  he  would  in  a  temperate 
climate  and  live." 


THE  PHILIPPINES  347 

Industrial  Organization 

Of  industry  there  was  but  little  in  the  islands  and  it  was  the 
result  largely  of  the  activity  of  the  friars.^  The  chief  products  for 
export  were  those  of  the  tropical  plantation :  sugar,  Manila  hemp, 
and  tobacco ;  anything  could  be  raised  there,  says  Blumentritt,^ 
which  could  be  raised  in  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  but  the  trouble 
lay  with  the  Spanish  system.  In  any  case,  plantation-agriculture 
never  attained  any  importance  in  Spanish  hands ;  and  the  same 
may  be  said  of  mining  and  manufacture.  Royal  projects  for  the 
stimulation  of  industry  and  production  were  of  no  avail.  The 
European  Spaniards  had  no  influence,  wealth,  or  education ;  what 
local  industry  there  was,  was  monopolized  by  the  Chinese  and  the 
Chinese  mestizos,  who  formed  a  noted  contrast  in  vigor  and  enter- 
prise with  the  Spaniards,  Creoles,  and  Spanish  half-breeds.  The 
Filipino  (Malay)  was  an  economic  factor  of  small  significance."^ 

The  one  economic  activity  of  the  Philippines,  or,  to  be  more 
exact,  of  Manila,  was  exchange  —  not  of  local  products,  but  of 
those  mainly  of  China  ;  and  it  was  naturally  upon  this  trade  that 
the  hand  of  the  regulator  descended.  From  about  1576  the 
archipelago  had  profited  by  the  visits  of  the  mainland-dwellers  ; 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Spanish  domination,  the  Filipinos  were 
trading  with  Japan,  Cambodia,  Siam,  the  Moluccas,  and  the  Malay 
Archipelago.  The  Spaniards  planned,  in  'the  absence  of  other 
means  of  accumulating  wealth,  to  make  of  Manila  the  intermediary 
depot  of  trade  between  China  and  the  Spanish  world  ;  and  in  this 
they  seemed  to  be  succeeding  with  some  rapidity  when  the  govern- 
ment, inspired  by  the  Seville  merchants,  began  to  fear  the  com- 
petition of  Chinese  silks  with  those  of  Spain  in  the  Lima  market 
and  a  resultant  movement  of  silver  toward  the  East ;  and  for  this 
and  other  reasons  began  to  introduce  restrictions.^  Whereas  for 
thirty  years  there  had  been  no  limitations  imposed,  now  came  pro- 
hibitions of  importation  of  Chinese  fabrics  from  Mexico  into  Peru 

1  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  107  ;  cf.  p.  351,  below. 

2  P.  6 ;  cf.  Worcester,  pp.  73  ff.,  503  ff.  Foreman  (pp.  269  ff .)  discusses  the  commer- 
cial products  in  some  detail. 

8  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  513-514;  Blumentritt,  pp.  32  ff.  ;  Scheidnagel,  pp.  70  ff. ; 
Foreman,  pp.  109  ff. ;  Worcester,  pp.  516-517.  Because  of  distance  the  home  govern- 
ment was  occasionally  unable  to  check  the  enlightened  policy  of  some  active  governor. 
One  of  these  said  of  the  government  veto  :  "  Afortunadamente  habia  llegado  tarde." 
Montero  y  Vidal,  11,  288. 

*  Colmeiro,  II,  405  ff. ;  Montero  y  Vidal,  1, 456 ;  Foreman,  chaps,  v,  viii,  pp.  247  ff. 


348  COLONIZATION 

(1587),  of  all  direct  trade  between  South  America  and  the  East 
(1591),  limitations  of  shipments  between  Mexico  and  the  Philip- 
pines (1593;  rigorously  enforced  1604),  and  restrictions  to  the 
Chinese  of  the  trade  between  the  islands  and  China.  Because 
Chinese  goods  were  smuggled  into  Lima,  trade  between  New  Spain 
and  Peru  was  interdicted  in  1636.^  Finally,  since  the  Philippines, 
as  an  appanage  of  New  Spain,  could  trade  with  it  only,  Acapulco 
became  a  Seville  for  the  Philippines  ;  and  the  flotas  were  repre- 
sented by  one  annual  ship,  —  the  nao. 

For  in  actuality  the  commerce  of  the  Philippines  was  crowded 
into  one  ship  a  year,  and,  thus  confined,  yielded  the  monopoly 
profits  characteristic  of  the  flotas.  "In  these  great  profits  every 
Spaniard  was  entitled  to  share  in  proportion  to  his  capital  or  stand- 
ing in  the  community."  The  capacity  of  the  nao  was  measured  in 
bales  of  about  seven  cubic  feet,  and  the  right  to  sliip  numbers  of 
such  bales  was  represented  by  bolctas,  or  tickets,  the  distribution 
of  which  was  determined  by  a  semi-political  board.  These  boletas 
were  worth  in  the  later  eighteenth  century,  in  time  of  peace,  from 
^80  to  $100  ;  and  in  war-time,  about  $300.  Speculators  bought  up 
the  tickets  of  poorer  holders,  borrowing  money  at  25  or  30  per 
cent  from  religious  corporations,  and  hoping  to  clear  150  to  200 
per  cent.  The  voyage  to  Acapulco  lasted  in  one  instance  204  days  ; 
the  ordinary  time  from  Acapulco  to  Manila  was  75  to  90  days.^ 
The  nao  thus  represented,  on  a  small  scale,  the  regular  Spanish 
system  as  developed  in  the  fleets  and  galleons,  and  with  the  same 
results.  Large  merchant-houses  controlled  the  terminals,  and  the 
people  at  large  profited  little  if  at  all  —  except  that  the  command 
of  the  ship  became  a  valuable  piece  of  political  patronage  and  that 
the  pilots,  mates,  and  even  sailors  made  great  gain  in  event  of  suc- 
cess. Individual  enterprise  was  discouraged  and  the  growth  of 
population  retarded  ;  "  the  Acapulco  ship  has  been  the  cause  for 
the  abandonment  by  the  Spaniards  of  the  natural  and  industrial 
resources  of  the  Islands."  ^ 

There  was  no  chance  under  such  a  system  for  the  development 
or  enrichment  of  a  class  of  genuine  merchants  ;  corruption  was 
invited.  The  old  industries  of  the  land  declined  ;  while  the  Dutch 
were  enriching  themselves  in  their  eastern  possessions,  the  Spanish 

*  Bourne,  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  2S9-290 ;   Ilist.  Introd.,  pp.  61-63,  ^'^'  "ote. 
2  Houine,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp- 63-65  ;    Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  289-290;    Reseller,  Sp.  Col. 
Sys.,  p.  35,  note  ;  Hiumentritt,  pp.  38  IT.;  Montero  y  Vidal,  1,455  if.;  Foreman,  pp.  243  ff. 
8  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  63,  and  notes. 


THE  PHILIPPINES  349 

and  natives  in  the  Philippines,  even  during  the  long  peace  succeed- 
ing 1648,  grew  poor  in  the  most  miserable  fashion.  Only  Manila 
enjoyed  spasmodic  prosperity  ;  in  fact,  all  the  Spaniards  but  the 
monks  and  the  province-governors  removed  thitherto  secure  a  share 
in  the  yearly  lottery.  The  other  settlements  declined  to  mere  vil- 
lages.^ And  not  only  this  :  the  nao,  like  the  fiotas,  tempted  the  for- 
eigner by  its  accumulation  of  valuables  ;  the  booty  taken  from  the 
Acapulco  galleon  in  1762,  by  the  English  admiral  Anson,  is  said  to 
have  amounted  to  3,000,000  piasters.^  This  system  could  not  sur- 
vive, of  course,  in  the  modern  period  ;  the  last  nao  sailed  from  Manila 
in  181 1,  making  the  final  return-voyage  in  1815.  Trade  then  fell 
into  private  hands,  and  a  port  each  in  Mexico,  Ecuador,  and  Peru 
was  opened  to  it.  Direct  trade  with  Spain  in  a  national  vessel  was 
allowed  after  1766,  the  Cadiz  ship  continuing  until  1783  ;  but  this 
system  was  replaced  by  a  privileged  company  {Real  CovipaTiia 
de  Filipinas)  in  1785.  The  latter  was  embarrassed  by  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  Manila  merchants,  who  resented  the  invasion  of  their 
monopoly  of  the  export  trade,  and  ceased  to  exist  in  1830.^ 

It  might  also  be  mentioned,  as  paralleling  the  conditions  in 
Spanish  America,  that  the  consistent  policy  was  to  keep  the  prov- 
inces apart ;  even  during  the  personal  union  with  Portugal,  the 
Portuguese  might  not  trade  from  the  Moluccas  with  the  Philippines. 
Of  the  China  trade  it  may  be  said  that  it  was  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  Chinese  and  mestizos,  and  that  if  it  prospered,  together  with 
trade  with  Japan,  Borneo,  Siam,  and  other  eastern  countries,  it 
was  due  in  no  respect  to  assistance  derived  from  the  Spanish 
system.*  In  short,  the  regular  policy  of  exclusion  of  foreigners 
obtained  in  full  in  the  Philippines  ;  that  it  entailed,  as  in  America, 
its  inevitable  results,  will  presently  appear. 

Clerical  Predominance 

But  the  economic  life  of  the  archipelago  was  at  most  a  secondary 
consideration  :  the  islands  were  too  far  away,  and  promised  too  little 
of  what  the  Spanish  desired,  as  compared  with  America  which  lay 

1  Blumentritt,  p.  38. 

2  Roscher,  Sp.  Col.  Sys.,  p.  35,  note  ;  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  456  ff.  After  the  capture 
of  the  nao  by  Anson,  the  king  ordered  that,  during  war  with  England,  no  more  ships 
should  sail  for  Acapulco.     Id.,  p.  481. 

•^  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  66-67  ;  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  122,  297  ff.,  446  ff.,  4S1, 
543  ;  III,  539  ff.;  Zimmermann,  I,  420-421  ;  Foreman,  chap.  xv. 
•*  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  40 ;  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  68,  note. 


350  COLONlZATlOiN 

between  ;  the  temptation  to  the  merchant,  especially  under  the 
restrictions  recounted,  was  not  large.  But  it  was  different  for  the 
votaries  of  the  Church  ;  and  so  the  history  of  the  Philippines  came 
to  be  more  purely  mission  history  than  was  that  of  any  other 
of  the  Spanish  provinces  except,  perhaps,  and  in  a  different  way, 
Paraguay.  "  From  the  beginning  the  Spanish  establishments  in  the 
Philippines  were  a  mission  and  not  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term 
a  colony.  They  were  founded  and  administered  in  the  interests  of 
religion  rather  than  of  commerce  or  industry."  Spain  knew  that 
"a  greater  development  of  trade  would  only  have  hampered  the 
progress  of  the  missionaries  and  enfeebled  the  power  of  the  con- 
vent." ^  In  other  words,  the  fathers  had  their  way  in  the  Philippines 
as  they  had  not  had  it  in  Spanish  or  Portuguese  America.  There 
was  no  planter-class  to  oppose  them.  Consequently  we  miss  in  the 
Philippines,  in  any  important  form, all  those  topics  of  the  encomienda- 
system,  the  decline  of  native  population,  the  introduction  of  a  sub- 
stitute labor  supply,  and  the  like.  Legazpi,  it  is  true,  followed  the 
orthodo.x  plan  of  apportioning  encomiendas,  but,  in  the  absence  of 
the  exploiting  class,  these  tended  to  become  rather  fields  for  the 
exercise  of  paternal  and  priestly  influence  than  for  the  derivation 
of  a  labor  force. ^  Laws  favoring  the  natives  were  promulgated,^ 
but  there  was  no  such  occasion  for  reaffirmation,  and  no  such  dis- 
putes over  enforcement,  as  in  America.  The  representatives  of 
the  "  practical,"  as  against  the  "  theoretical,"  were  not  in  the  field 
in  the  early  times.  Probably  the  treatment  which  the  Filipino 
received  would  have  appealed  to  Isabella  as  approaching  the  ideal ; 
certainly  the  unrivaled  feat  represented  by  the  wholesale  conver- 
sion of  the  Malays  *  would,  in  retrospect,  have  filled  her  pious  soul 
with  joy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  early  discovered  that  the 
natives  were  eager  to  accept  the  new  religion,  at  any  rate  in  form, 
being  impressed  by  its  spectacular  side.  And  so  the  friars,  through 
their  evangelistic  enterprises,  became  active  agents  in  the  pacifica- 
tion of  the  country,  religious  advisers  regularly  accompanying  the 
expeditions.^    The  extent  and  importance  of  their  services  cannot 

1  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  48-49,  70-71;  Leroy-Beaulieii,  I,  40.  For  "forced 
cultures  "  in  the  Philippines,  cf.  Day,  pp.  336-337. 

2  Cf.  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  42,  87  ff.,  380  ff. ;  Foreman,  pp.  38,  212. 

3  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  38off.;  II,  135  ff.,  353  ff. 

*  Cf.  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  37.  On  the  "  Domesticated  Natives,"  see  Foreman, 
chap.  xi.  Cf.  also,  on  the  treatment  of  the  natives,  Slosson,  The  Philippines  Two 
Hundred  Years  Ago.  ''  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  17,  286;  Foreman,  p.  199. 


THE  PHILIPPINES  351 

be  doubted,  for  during  many  decades  the  opinion  prevailed  that 
"  in  each  friar  in  the  Philippines  the  king  had  a  captain  general 
and  a  whole  army."  ^  Well  on  into  the  nineteenth  century,  in  more 
than  half  of  the  1200  villages  in  the  islands,  "there  was  no  other 
Spaniard,  no  other  national  authority,  nor  any  other  force  to  main- 
tain public  order  save  only  the  friars";  this  persuasion  lasted  as 
a  survival  practically  until  the  end  of  the  Spanish  domination.^  It 
was  true  enough  that  the  monks  knew  far  more  of  the  nature  of 
the  land  and  the  people  than  almost  any  one  else  ;  and  their  reputa- 
tion along  this  line  was  the  involuntary  recognition  on  the  part  of 
the  home  authorities,  to  whom,  in  the  impotence  of  their  real  con- 
trol, these  matters  were  as  a  sealed  book,  of  the  value  of  acquaint- 
ance with  a  lower  race's  manners  and  customs. 

The  mission  in  the  Philippines  was  on  the  plan  of  the  reduction 
in  America.  An  efficient  defense  was  organized  against  aggression, 
in  this  case  prevailingly  that  of  the  Moro  pirates  ;  not  a  few  of  the 
fathers  had  been  seasoned  soldiers,  and  rejoiced  in  the  resumption 
of  military  operations  which  bore  the  stamp  of  divine  approval.'^ 
They  likewise  supervised  the  tilling  of  the  soil  and  laid  the  usual 
stress  upon  the  development  of  a  higher  industrial  organization  ; 
beyond  this  they  afforded  the  simple  kind  of  education  which  they 
judged  suitable  for  the  natives.  Under  their  ministrations  their 
charges  appear,  as  elsewhere  in  the  absence  of  interference,  to 
have  been  comfortable  and  prosperous,  and  to  have  increased  in 
numbers.^  The  same  attempt  was  made  to  exclude  foreign  influ- 
ences ;  trade  with  neighboring  peoples,  notably  the  Chinese,  was 
discouraged,  and  a  European  layman  was  a  persona  non  grata  in 
the  villages.  The  influence  of  the  Church  was  so  constant  and 
strong  as  to  lead  the  more  energetic  governors  to  chafe  beneath  it. 
Collisions  between  the  secular  and  ecclesiastical  authorities  were 
recurrent.^ 

1  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  42  ;  Blumentritt,  p.  44. 

2  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  60;  Blumentritt,  pp.  44-45. 

3  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  242  et  passim  ;  Blumentritt,  p.  39. 

<  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  32-34,  41-42,  57,  81-84,  85-86.  Slavery  was  forbidden 
by  Philip  II;  it  lasted  nearly  up  to  the  twentieth  century,  however.  There  are  no 
slaves  now  except  among  the  Moros  and  wild  tribes.    Foreman,  p.  191. 

5  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  380,  382,  384  ff. ;  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  49,  58;  Blumen- 
tritt, p.  50;  Foreman,  pp.  51  ff.,  209-210.  The  latter  author  asserts  (p.  200)  that  up 
to  1896  the  monks  were  stronger  than  the  law. 


352  COLONIZATION 


Power  of  the  Church 


Thus  the  power  of  the  Church  became  established  in  the  islands, 
and  gained  an  inertia  against  which  the  political  power,  wherever 
it  undertook  to  resume  authority,  beat  in  vain.  Opposition  to  the 
monks  might  easily  cost  a  man  his  whole  career,  if  not  his  life. 
This  immunity  from  control  had,  again,  the  usual  effect  of  ren- 
dering the  ecclesiastical  authorities  haughty  and  intractable,  and 
finally  ambitious  and  extortionate.  Benefices  were  freely  accepted, 
solicited,  or  demanded  ;  church-revenues  were  very  large.  Taken  all 
in  all,  the  friars  have  never  possessed  a  more  favorable  large  field 
for  their  activity  than  they  had  in  the  Philippines.  Consequently, 
in  view  of  their  not  having  been  seriously  interfered  with,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  present  case  demonstrates  the  outcome  to  be 
expected  from  such  ecclesiastical  control.  Positively  it  may  be 
asserted  that  the  friars  performed  a  great  enterprise  in  converting 
oi  masse  so  large  a  body  of  heathen  ;  the  magnitude  of  the  exploit 
is  unquestioned,  however  the  term  "conversion"  be  taken.  But 
its  real  value  and  success  must  be  otherwise  measured,  if  at  all. 
It  is  no  particular  service  to  a  native  people  to  supply  them  with 
a  new  set  of  fetiches,  ceremonials,  and  so  on ;  and  wholesale 
baptisms  can  no  longer  be  looked  upon  as  guaranties  of  the  general 
establishment  of  a  new  and  improved  frame  of  mind.  The  real 
effectiveness  of  the  "conversion"  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  brought 
the  natives  into  permanent  and  friendly  contact  with  the  trained 
exponents  of  a  new  order  of  civilization.  It  is  equally  unscientific 
lo  hold  the  missions  in  contempt  for  the  skin-deep  Christianity 
wliich  resulled  from  their  ministrations,  and  to  laud  them  for 
attaining  at  a  blow,  through  modification  of  religious  belief,  what 
can  be  accomplished  only  through  long  and  steady  pressure 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  ensemble  of  economic,  social,  and  moral 
habitudes  and  customs. ^  The  careful  and  minute  discipline  of  the 
pious  brothers  undoubtedly  started  the  natives  in  the  direction  of 
European  civilization  and  its  standards,  but  it  never  went  very 
far  ;  it  could  train  to  a  certain  point  only.  "  To  prolong  it  beyond 
that  stage  would  be  to  prolong  carefully  nurtured  childhood  to 
the  grave,  never  allowing  it  to  be  displaced  by  self-reliant  manhood. 
The  legal  status  of  the  Indians  [Filipinos]  before  the  law  was  that 
of  minors,  and  no  provision  was  made  for  their  arriving  at  their 

1  ("f.  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  36-40,  45-46. 


THE   PHILIPPINES  353 

majority.  .  .  .  The  only  thought  was  to  make  Christians  and  never 
citizens."  ^  What  the  mission  did  was,  here  as  in  America,  to  ease 
the  first  relations  of  contact  between  a  backward  race  and  a  modern 
world-economy  ;  and  it  was  the  industrial  and  other  by-products  of 
their  instruction  that  weighed  infinitely 'over  mere  "conversion." 
The  great  speed  with  which  the  latter  was  carried  out  does  not, 
therefore,  form  any  measure  of  the  real  advance  in  civilization  of 
the  European  type  on  the  part  of  the  Filipinos  ;  it  simply  gave 
the  friars  a  better  chance. 

They  seem  not  to  have  improved  the  opportunity  to  promote 
civilization,  partly  because  of  the  natural  limitations  set  by  their 
system  of  native  education,  and  partly  because  they  themselves 
diverged  from  the  simple  and  unpretentious  programme  of  their 
earlier  years.  As  trade  gradually  opened  up  communication  and 
diffused  information,  their  pedagogic  system  was  felt  to  be  obsolete 
and  a  hindrance  to  advance ;  and  to  this  was  added  active  resent- 
ment of  their  encroachment  upon  the  property-rights  of  individuals 
and  of  the  community.  In  short,  they  became  haughty  and  extor- 
tionate, and  through  means  of  various  description  they  increased 
the  holdings  of  the  mortmain  until,  at  the  end  of  the  Spanish 
domination,  the  friars  held  seven-eighths  of  the  most  valuable  land 
in  Luzon. ^  Their  dispossessment  constituted  one  of  the  most 
serious  problems  of  the  American  rule,  and  caused  considerable 
embarrassment  for  the  Holy  See  itself. 

In  the  Phihppines,  as  elsewhere,  the  case  of  the  Jesuits  was  one, 
in  many  respects,  apart  from  that  of  the  other  religious  orders. 
As  usual,  they  had  been  the  most  energetic  and  enlightened  of 
the  brotherhoods,  but  had  exhibited  here  also  the  ambition  and 
other  qualities  which  rendered  them  universally  obnoxious  to  the 
political  powers.^  They  had  accumulated  properties  to  the  amount 
of  several  million  pesos  and  controlled  a  lucrative  industry  and 
commerce.  In  many  ways  they  displayed  their  usual  superiority  over 
rival  orders,  for  example,  in  education  and  culture.    The  natives 

1  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  76-77  ;  cf.  pp.  73-74  ;  Blumentritt  (p.  28)  says  bluntly : 
"  The  national  industry  of  the  Filipinos  at  the  time  of  the  Spanish  conquest  stood 
upon  a  higher  stage  than  it  does  now  [1900]."  On  instruction  in  the  Philippines, 
see  Montero  y  Vidal,  III,  536  ff. ;   Foreman,  pp.  192  ff. 

2  Cf.  Blumentritt,  pp.  26,  53  ff. ;  Worcester,  p.  31  5  ;  Foreman,  pp.  106-107  ;  Bourne, 
Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  73-74  ;    The  A'ation,  LXXII,  No.  1857,  pp.  82-83. 

3  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  141  ff.,  iSoff. ;  Foreman,  pp.  200  ff.  In  reading  Fore- 
man's account  of  the  friars  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  his  censure  is  not  that  of 
the  Protestant. 


354 


COLONIZATION 


were  under  their  influence,  and  they  displayed  the  regular  contempt 
for  royal  control ;  after  the  English  occupation  they  were  accused 
of  aidini;'  the  invasion.  When  their  expulsion,  for  reasons  already 
cited, ^  took  place  (1770),  all  their  estates  were  confiscated  and 
confided  to  the  administration  of  a  commission.'^ 

The  organization  of  the  clergy  was  not  so  systematic  as  in 
America.  Although  the  Archbishop  of  Manila  was  the  head  of 
the  system,  the  orders,  in  their  earlier  numerical  superiority,  were 
unwilling  to  acknowledge  subjection  of  any  kind,  and  many  sordid 
pages  of  the  Philippine  chronicles  arc  taken  up  with  accounts  of 
refusals  of  visitation  by  the  local  head  of  the  Church.  During  the 
last  two  centuries,  however,  the  number  of  the  secular  clergy  has 
increased.  Another  question  in  the  archipelago  was  that  of  the 
native  clergy,  who  were  forbidden  to  enter  the  orders.  It  was 
asserted  that  they  were  not  worthy  of  the  high  office  of  friar,  lack- 
ing as  they  did  both  personal  dignity  and  character,  and  being  in- 
clined to  relapse,  upon  taking  charge  of  a  parish,  into  the  indolent 
and  barbarous  habits  of  their  previous  years.'^  The  seculars  were 
also  ill  treated  and  repressed  in  all  ways  ;  they  were  given  the 
inferior  livings,  and  as  soon  as  a  parish  became  worth  anything,  it 
speedily  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  clerical  orders.  This  constituted 
a  distinct  political  error,  for  the  lower  classes  to  whom  the  seculars 
ministered  lost  all  sympathy  with  Spain.  As  will  later  be  seen, 
the  ill  feeling  thus  engendered  contributed  not  a  little  to  the  dis- 
integration of  the  Spanish  domination. 

Results  of  Clerical  Rule 

On  the  whole,  there  seems  to  be  little  doubt  that  the  experi- 
ment of  control  through  the  clergy  worked  out  in  a  thoroughly 
disastrous  way.  The  Inquisition  (introduced  in  1 569)  may  never 
have  gotten  a  strong  hold  upon  the  country  ;  there  were  doubt- 
less many  of  the  clergy,  the  keepers  of  the  Manila  observatory,  for 
example,  who  labored  conscientiously  and  well,  and  even  in  an  en- 
lightened and  scientific  way  ;  but  the  clerical  regime  by  its  intoler- 
ance and  system  of  isolation  certainly  j^revented  the  investment  of 
foreign  capital,  and  otherwise  injured  the  economic  and  commercial 

1.  Pp.  155  ff.,  above. 

2  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  36,  116,  141  ff.,  iSoff.  The  re-suppression  came  in  1835. 
Id.,  p.  552,  note.    On  the  conditions  of  their  return  in  1S59,  see  Foreman,  p.  206. 

3  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  57  ;  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  133-134,  3i>>  ff-,  362  ff.,  et 
passim  ;  Blumentritt,  pp.  46  ff. 


THE  PHILIPPINES  355 

prospects  of  the  islands.  And  there  is  no  doubt  that  there  was,  at 
least  in  more  recent  times,  a  liberal  sprinkling  of  the  low-natured, 
ignorant,  and  rapacious  among  the  ranks  of  the  clergy. ^ 

One  of  the  results  of  the  dual  activity  of  the  commercial  policy 
of  jealousy  and  exclusion,  and  of  religious  prejudice,  was  the  op- 
pression of  the  Chinese.  For  them  no  need  was  felt,  as  for  the 
negroes  in  America,  as  a  substitute  labor  force  ;  and  they  were 
cordially  hated  for  the  same  reasons  which  have  made  them  un- 
popular elsewhere  :  parsimony,  business  shrewdness,  clannishness, 
religious  differences,  asserted  immorality,  and  the  rest.  It  is  also 
noteworthy  that  the  Filipinos  and  even  the  Chinese  half-breeds 
(mestizos  de  sangley)  exhibited  this  hatred  in  as  bitter  a  form  as 
did  the  Spanish  themselves.^  At  the  time  of  the  discovery  it  was 
found  that  Chinese  merchants  visited  the  coasts  of  the  islands  ; 
and  much  damage  was  done  in  the  early  times  by  Chinese  pirates. 
But  the  commercial  relations  were  not  cultivated,  and  the  position 
of  the  Chinese  who  came  to  settle  in  the  islands  was  rendered 
very  dangerous  by  intermittent  murderous  outbreaks  against  them. 
In  1639  they  were  provoked  to  an  uprising  and  22,000  of  them 
are  said  to  have  perished  in  five  months  of  fighting.  Despite  pre- 
ceding bad  treatment,  however,  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century 
about  forty  junks  arrived  at  Manila  for  the  month  of  March,  in 
anticipation  of  the  sailing  of  the  nao  in  July.^  But  the  Chinese 
were  subject,  not  only  to  such  irregular  assaults,  but  also  to  the 
periodic  attention  of  the  government :  the  expulsion  of  the  "  in- 
fidel Chinese"  was  decreed  for  June  30,  1755,  and  it  was  again 
ordered  in  1769  and  in  part  was  realized.  They  were  allowed  to 
return  in  1778,  and  did  so  in  large  numbers.  These  periods  of 
resentment  of  their  presence,  and  of  realization  of  its  essential 
importance,  alternated  up  to  modern  times  ;  but  in  the  attempi  to 
tax  and  otherwise  discriminate  against  them,  there  was  a  steady 
consistency.  Indeed,  it  was  invited  by  the  success  with  which 
they   monopolized   most  branches  of  paying  business ;  '^    and   the 

1  Cf.  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  6i  ;  Foreman  (pp.  202  ff.)  devotes  considerable  space 
to  their  rascality.  Cf.  also  Worcester,  pp.  340  ff. ;  Scheidnagel,  p.  62 ;  Leroy,  Phil. 
Life,  chap.  v.  2  Blumentritt,  pp- 33-35;  cf.  Scheidnagel,  p.  199. 

3  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  24,  71-79,  144-147,  256-257,  461  ff.  On  early  attempts  at 
conquest  by  the  Chinese,  see  Foreman,  pp.  47  ff. 

*  Montero  y  Vidal,  L  532;  II,  139,  289,  323  ff.,  576  ff. ;  IH,  150-152,  160.  171; 
Blumentritt,  p.  33;  Zimmermann,  L  4i(J.  482,  485;  Foreman,  pp.  109  ff.  The  latter 
author  notes  the  several  massacres  of  the  Chinese  in  his  general  chronological  table, 
pp.651  ff. 


356  COLONIZATION 

inveterate  feeling  of  hostility  to  possible  infringement  which  was 
involved  in  the  monopoly  and  exclusion  system  lent  energy  to  the 
movement. 

Administration 

But,  before  entering  further  upon  the  policy  of  cxxlusion,  and 
the  irruption  of  foreigners,  it  is  in  place  to  review  the  main  lines 
of  government  policy  in  administration.  In  accordance  with  the 
Spanish  theory  whereby  the  king  of  Spain  was  also  the  sovereign 
of  the  external  dominions,  and  was  to  rule  them  in  consonance 
with  the  Peninsular  system,  the  Philippine  Islands  became  a  king- 
dom under  the  charge  of  a  governor  and  captain-general.  They 
thus  fell,  for  the  most  part,  under  the  rule  of  military  men,  remain- 
ing, until  1 8 19,  a  dependency  of  Mexico.  As  in  America,  the  local 
executives  were  balanced  and  restrained  by  an  audiencia  and  ac- 
countable through  a'residencia.^  A  local  administration  made  con- 
nection with  the  subject  races  ;  the  islands  were  divided  into  prov- 
inces under  sub-governors  {alcaldes  mayores),  the  provinces  into 
pueblos  under  an  annually  elected  native  or  mestizo  gobernadorcillo, 
and  the  pueblos  into  tributary  groups  {barangay)  each  under  its 
head-man  {cabeza  de  barangay)."^  Thus  the  type  of  administration 
was  not  in  form  essentially  different  from  that  of  America ;  nor 
was  the  general  attitude  of  suspicion,  secrecy,  and  distrust  any 
the  less  marked.  The  king  suspected  governors  who  showed  initia- 
tive;^ short-term  functi(maries  rapidly  succeeded  each  other.  The 
same  kind  of  spying  upon  the  same  kind  of  corruj^tion  took  place; 
the   same   race-hatred   separated  classes  ;  ■*    the   ignorance  of  the 

1  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  49-50 ;  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  323  ff.;  Foreman, 
chap,  xiii,  211  ff.,  pp.  306  ff.,  above.  The  salary  of  the  governor-general  was  $Soooa 
year, with  perquisites.  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  50;  cf.  salary-lists  in  Foreman,  pp.214  ff. 

2  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  53-56  ;  Worcester,  pp.  132  ff. ;  Scheidnagel,  jip.  51-54  ; 
Foreman,  chap.  .xiii. 

3  Foreman,  p.  78.  The  following  quotation  (Foreman,  p.  4)  will  recall  conditions 
sufficiently  treated  under  Spanish  America,  and  will  support  the  stundpoiiit  there 
occupied  (e.g.  p.  274,  above)  regarding  the  efficiency  of  benevolent  legislation. 

"  The  fundamental  laws,  considered  as  a  whole,  were  the  wisest  desirable  to  suit 
the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  Colony;  but  whilst  many  of  them  were  disregarded 
or  treated  as  a  dead  letter,  so  many  loop-holes  were  invented  by  the  dispensers  of 
those  in  operation  as  to  render  the  whole  system  a  wearisome,  dilatory  process.  Up 
to  the  last,  every  possible  imjDediment  was  placed  iii  the  way  of  trade  expansion." 

*  Montero  y  Vidal  (III,  566-567)  says  that  the  leaders  in  insurrections  were  mainly 
Creoles;  De  Lanessan  (p.  27)  says  the  insurgents  in  both  Cuba  and  the  l'hili])pines 
were  mostly  mestizos. 


THE   PHILIPPINES  357 

Spaniards  regarding  the  islands  was  profound.^  The  main  differ- 
ences between  Philippine  and  other  colonial  conditions  were  those  of 
degree,  such  as  became  well-nigh  inevitable  in  view  of  the  greater 
remoteness  of  the  islands  from  the  center  of  rule,  and  the  conse- 
quent augmented  influence  of  the  clerical  orders.  The  isolation  of 
the  islands  and  the  vexations  of  the  residencia  made  it  j^articularly 
difficult  to  get  good  officials  ;  the  friars  were  always  ready  to  pur- 
sue a  governor  who  crossed  their  desires,  both  during  and  after 
his  term  ;  and  their  opposition  was  a  serious  matter.  Even  after 
the  regular  residencia  had  become  obsolescent,  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  they  still  exercised  a  significant  influence. ^ 
•  In  the  Philippines  the  government  had  no  such  revenue-produc- 
ing occupation  to  levy  upon  as  it  possessed  in  the  mining-operations 
of  America.  It  can  scarcely  be  maintained  that  the  government 
itself  in  earlier  times  oppressed  the  natives  with  taxes  ;  if  they 
were  imposed  upon,  it  was  rather  by  the  clergy.  A  certain  revenue 
was  raised  by  the  taxation  of  the  barangay  through  its  head,  who 
was  held  responsible  ;  but  the  islands  depended  for  the  most  part 
upon  the  regular  subsidy  from  Mexico,  which  was,  in  a  sense,  the 
mother-country  of  the  Philippines.^  Up  to  1884  all  subdued  tribes 
paid  tribute,  the  sum  varying ;  at  the  date  mentioned  the  tax  was 
$4.25  per  year,  $3  of  which  were  remitted  in  return  for  40  days' 
work  rendered  the  government.  There  was  also  the  system  of  the 
cMida  personal,  or  personal  certificate  ;  every  one  over  18  years  of 
age  must  possess  one  and  pay  for  it  from  50  cents  to  25  dollars. 
Licenses  of  all  kinds  were  purchasable  at  prices  which  were  high 
in  proportion  to  the  wage,  five  to  ten  cents  a  day,  received  for 
labor.  In  later  times,  between  the  government  and  the  priests, 
the  natives  were  often  involved  in  a  life-long  fruitless  attempt  to 
meet  these  obligations.  And  when  it  is  realized  that  the  govern- 
ment assured  them  of  but  few  of  the  advantages  for  which  taxes 
are  paid — protection,  education,  harbor-works,  roads  and  commu- 
nications,  sewers,  etc. — the  severity  of  the    levies  appears  still 

1  Cf.  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  305.  Scheidnagel's  book  is  largely  a  7<ade  meciim  for 
the  newly  appointed  official.  He  prefaces  his  treatise  with  a  disquisition  upon  prev- 
alent Spanish  ignorance  of  the  islands  (p.  204) :  "  j  Cuantas  veces  he  oido  decir  a 
muchos  de  mis  compaiieros  destinados  a  tal  6  cual  punto  del  Archipielago,  i  pero 
donde  esta  eso  ?  i  por  donde  he  de  ir  ?  i  Como  se  hace  el  viaje .'  i  No  habra  quien 
me  de  noticias  de  aquello  ?  etc.  etc. !  " 

2  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  p.  52  ;   Worcester,  pp.  338,  340,  468,  471. 

3  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  84-85  ;  Sp.  in  Amer.,  p.  31 5 ;  see  note,  p.  315,  above. 


358  COLONIZATION 

greater.^  Again  the  government  held  monopoHes,  particularly  of 
tobacco,  and  regularly  collected  taxes  whose  operation  was  in 
restraint  of  trade.'-^  Worcester^  mentions  a  case  in  the  island  of 
Negros  where  it  took  a  proprietor  six  years  to  get  permission  to 
build  a  tiny  railroad  and  get  his  apparatus  and  materials  through 
the  custom-house.  What  little  the  rare  efficient  governor  could  do 
to  assist  industry  and  trade  was  before  long  upset  by  his  succes- 
sors.* As  Scheidnagel  ^  says,  somewhat  bitterly,  a  few  Spaniards, 
in  avast  territory,  without  prestige,  protected  even  less  by  common 
law  than  the  natives,  often  failing  of  aid  from  the  local  authorities, 
often  subjected  to  the  natives  themselves,  have  been  unable  to 
execute  any  enterprises  worth  mentioning. 

In  short,  for  decades  before  the  end  of  Spanish  domination,  the 
government  was  plainly  and  sordidly  mercenary,  corrupt,**  and  ineffi- 
cient, and  it  takes  an  extremely  benevolent  observer  to  detect  any 
more  than  ephemeral  and  accidental  superiorities  in  its  operations, 
from  the  period  immediately  succeeding  the  conquest  up  to  1898. 
It  may  have  been  relatively  no  worse  at  the  outset  than  many  of 
its  contemporaries,  but  it  showed  no  tendency  to  adapt  itself  to 
new  conditions  and  thus  incurred  the  reprehension  and  contempt 
of  those  nations  which  at  least  professed  more  modern  ideals. 

Foreign  Aggression  and  Popular  Discontent 

Enough  has  perhaps  been  said  to  demonstrate  the  fact  that  the 
Spanish  system  in  the  Philippines  was  not  essentially  dissimilar, 
granted  the  changed  conditions  and  their  effects,  to  that  applied 
in  America.    But  the  case  of  the  Philippines,  like  that  of  Cuba, 

1  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  432-434  ;  Foreman,  chap,  xiii ;  Worcester,  pp.  93,  235-237  ; 
Scheidnagel,  pp.  5J-52,  195;  Zimmermann,  I,  478  ff.,  486;  Ililder,  "The  Present  and 
Future  of  the  Philippines";  cf.  Bourne,  Hist.  Introd.,  pp.  42-43;  Sp.  in  Amer.,  pp.  3I4- 
3I  5.  In  regard  to  the  roads,  Scheidnagel  (p.  55)  passes  severe  judgment :  "  The  system 
in  vogue  in  the  archipelago  for  so  many  years  respecting  this  most  important  matter 
is  undoubtedly  the  worst ;  for  it  depends  purely  upon  the  will,  favorable  or  unfavor- 
able, of  the  authorities  and  pueblos,  without  direct  responsibility  of  any  kind.  The 
result  is  that  commerce  does  not  advance,  wealth  is  not  developed  or  augmented,  and, 
as  a  last  effect,  civilization  cannot  be  extended;  innumerable  and  wide  districts,  as 
well  as  their  inhabitants,  remain  in  a  completely  wild  state."  On  justice  in  the  islands, 
see  Scheidnagel,  pp.  195-198;   Foreman,  pp.  239  ff. 

2  Cf.  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  294-296,  et  passim  ;  Zimmermann,  I,  484  ;  Foreman, 
pp.  293  ff.  8  P.  259. 

*  Cf.  the  case  of  Pasco  y  Vargas:  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  2S6  ff.,  315;  III,  157; 
Worcester,  pp.  168-188.  ^  P.  195. 

•^  On  Spanish  Phili])]5ine  finances,  salary-lists,  etc.,  see  Foreman,  chap,  xiv,  p]).  2 1 4  ff. 


THE  PHILIPPINES  359 

affords  the  student  a  view  of  the  working-out  of  this  system  in  the 
nineteenth  century;  for  after  1825  Spain  had  more  attention  to 
give  to  her  remaining  colonies.  One  of  the  important  consistencies 
in  the  history  of  all  the  main  Spanish  possessions  lies  in  the  fact 
that,  while  separation  came  as  the  direct  result  of  foreign  aggres- 
sion, yet  its  essential  and  most  significant  antecedent  was  popular 
discontent  in  the  colonies.  Indeed,  as  respects  the  Philippines,  it 
might  be  said  that  the  aggression  of  the  United  States  was  almost 
fortuitous,  being  but  part  of  a  series  of  war-operations  which  had 
their  storm-center  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Spanish  control  over 
the  Philippines,  as  over  Cuba,  was  almost  illusory  when  the  final 
shock  with  the  foreigner  precipitated  the  end. 

The  Portuguese  caused  Spain  som€  uneasiness  in  regard  to  the 
archipelago  in  the  early  years  of  its  domination  ;  and  the  Dutch 
descended  occasionally  and  at  times  in  some  force.  Having  seized 
Malacca  in  1641,  they  moved  on  to  the  north  the  next  year  and 
took  Formosa.  But  there  existed  a  sentiment  of  loyalty  to  Spain 
which  awoke  to  repel  such  invasion. ^  This  was  particularly  evident 
during  the  English  occupation,  which  began  with  Draper's  sudden 
capture  of  utterly  unwarned  and  unprepared  Manila  in  1762.  The 
judge  Anda  y  Salazar  maintained  a  guerrilla  warfare  against  which 
the  English  were  unable  to  make  headway,  and  they  were  glad  to 
abandon  the  task  after  about  sixteen  months  of  precarious  tenure 
of  Manila  and  its  immediate  environs.^  No  other  serious  aggression 
is  to  be  recorded  until  the  arrival  of  the  American  squadron  and 
the  one-sided  battle  of  May  i,  1898. 

The  real  disaffection  was  internal,  and  was  the  direct  outcome 
of  the  clerical  encroachments  and  the  governmental  inefficiency  and 
corruption  of  which  an  account  has  been  given.  And  the  positive 
and  vital  issue  in  the  disaffection  lay  in  the  outcome  of  that  monk- 
ish domination  under  which  the  islands  fell,  as  has  been  seen,  chiefly 
because  of  their  geographical  isolation.  However,  in  the  order  of 
time,  the  first  serious  trouble  arose  in  the  Philippines  as  a  sequel  of 
the  Napoleonic  enterprises  in  Spain ;  the  upheavals  in  the  metrop- 
oHs  had  their  after-effects  in  the  remotest  of  the  colonies,  in  the 
form  of  uprisings.    The  natives  thought  the  proclamation  of  the 

1  Montero  y  Vidal,  I,  I58ff. ;  II,  261,  276ff.,  346  ff.  ;  Foreman,  chap,  vi ;  Zimmer- 
mann,  I,  41 1-412. 

2  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  13  ff.,  382  ff. ;  cf.  Ill,  347  ff. ;  Blumentritt,  p.  41  ;  Foreman, 
chap.  vii. 


360  COLON  iz.vriON 

political  dogmas  and  constitution  of  18 12  meant  exemption  from 
tribute  and  public  services,  and  were  convinced  that  the  measures 
of  Ferdinand  VII,  after  the  restoration,  emanated  from  oj^pressors 
in  Manila.^  The  motives  of  unrest  are  implicit  in  the  following 
proposals  of  the  islanders,  made  at  the  time  :  they  wished  the 
suppression  of  the  Acapulco  nao  ;  the  extension  of  the  amounts 
of  goods  allowed  to  be  exported  ;  the  opening  of  Callao  and  Guay- 
aquil to  Philippine  commerce  ;  concessions  as  to  trade  in  national 
ships  to  the  coasts  of  north-west  California ;  the  amplification  of 
permission  regarding  return-cargoes ;  and,  finally,  freedom  from 
duties  of  all  products  of  the  Philippines  carried  in  national  ships, 
in  all  parts  of  the  monarchy,  for  a  period  of  ten  years.^  These 
proposals  hinge  chiefly,  it  will  be  observed,  about  the  lightening 
of  governmental  interference  with  exchange.  There  was  also,  early 
in  the  nineteenth  century,  considerable  trouble  in  the  Philippine 
army,  owing  to  the  familiar  Spanish  policy  of  excluding  the  natives 
from  positions  of  pride  and  influence ;  almost  all  the  officers  were 
American  Spanish.  And  there  was  exhibited  a  most  bitter  hatred 
between  the  Philippine  Spaniards  and  the  Peninsulars.^ 

Such  conditions  will  be  easily  understood  by  one  who  has  the 
driving  principles  of  the  Spanish  system  in  mind.  And  when  the 
sentiments  were  those  of  such  discontent  and  bitterness,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  every  occasion  of  political  overturning  in  Spain  was 
seized  upon  to  lend  justification  or  to  afford  a  chance  for  insurrec- 
tion. Thus,  in  1823,  the  announcement  of  the  abolition  of  consti- 
tutional government  was  followed  by  strife;  and  when,  in  1868, 
Isabella  II  was  dethroned,  and  the  colonial  personnel  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  we  are  already  on  the  threshold  of  the  insurrection 
of  Cavit6.  The  ensuing  attempted  introduction  of  "democracy," 
or  what  was  vaguely  but  enthusiastically  denominated  such  by  La 
Torre,  was  a  move  which  revealed  a  palpably  mistaken  idea  of  the 

1  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  421-426. 

2  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  429-430;  the  last  proposal  was  virtually  granted  in  1S20; 
id.,  p.  444. 

^  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  466  ff.;  Ill,  566  ff.  The  author  referred  to  declares  that 
from  the  very  outset  the  Peninsulars  regarded  the  Filipinos  with  great  respect  and 
that  all  the  laws  favored  them.  They  could  aspire  to  the  highest  places  in  the  army, 
church,  law,  and  civil  administration.  "  Desde  la  llegada  de  los  espanoles,  losfilipinos 
han  tenido  el  derecho  de  ocupar  puestos  en  todos  los  ordenes  administrativos,  religi- 
osos  y  militares,  y  los  han  ocupado,  incluso  la  jefetura  del  Archipielago,  cosa  que  no 
sucede  en  ninguna  otra  colonia  del  mundo."  Ill,  566,  601  (quotation).  In  any  case, 
however,  class  hatred  was  present  and  wrought  its  inevitable  results. 


THE  PHILIPPINES  361 

East  and  its  prepossessions.  In  his  role  of  plain  democrat  the 
governor,  La  Torre,  was  censured  and  ridiculed  ;  to  those  who  asso- 
ciated authority  with  magnificence  and  distance,  the  representative 
of  Spain  was  a  living  confession  of  weakness.^  And  the  uncer- 
tain and  vacillating  legislation  based  upon  such  inapt  and  veering 
idealism  but  strengthened  the  impression.^ 

Anti-Clericalism  :  Revolt 

Returning  now  to  the  expressed  opinion  that  it  was  ultimately 
the  reaction  against  clerical  invasions  and  aggressions  which  broke 
the  bonds  of  the  Filipinos  with  Spain,  it  is  to  be  understood  that 
this  reaction  began  only  in  the  nineteenth  century.*^  As  in  America 
the  upheavals  in  economic  and  political  theories  which  marked  the 
close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  together  with  a  greater  dissemi- 
nation of  intelligence,  led  to  a  revolt  mainly  against  commercial 
restriction,  so  in  the  relatively  non-commercial  Philippines  they  led, 
after  18 12,  to  a  restiveness  beneath  the  local  form  of  oppression  — 
the  sacerdotal.  But,  in  one  case  as  in  the  other,  the  direct  counter- 
blow was  launched  against  the  political  system  which  allowed  the 
tyranny.'* 

The  monks  were  always  against  reforms,  for  their  monopoly  and 
power  were  threatened  by  them,  and  speedily  took  up  the  trail  of 
any  publications  which  fostered  agitation.  Thus  in  1871  they  pur- 
sued and  discovered  a  secret  society  of  reformers,  and  were,  by  a 
piece  of  fortune,  able  to  charge  its  members  with  overt  acts  of 

1  Montero  y  Vidal,  II,  47S  ff. ;  III,  4S7  ff.,  557  ;  Foreman,  pp.  362  ff. 

2  Montero  y  Vidal,  III,  530  ff.  He  quotes  (p.  530)  "El  infierno  esta  empedrado 
de  buenas  intenciones." 

3  Foreman  remarks  (p.  205),  after  describing  the  character  and  actions  of  the 
friars  :  "  From  the  foregoing  it  may  be  readily  understood  how  the  conduct  of  the 
regular  clergy  was  the  primary  cause  of  the  Rebellion  of  1896;  it  was  not  the  monks' 
immorality  which  disturbed  the  mind  of  the  native,  but  their  Caesarism  which  raised 
his  ire.  The  ground  of  discord  was  always  infinitely  more  material  than  sentimental." 
But  this  author  asserts  elsewhere  (p.  362)  that  there  was  really  no  friar  question 
in  the  Philippines  before  181 2.  Indeed,  so  far  as  his  list  of  incipient  insurrections 
goes  (pp.  104-106),  that  of  Cavite  (1872)  was  the  first  serious  anti-ecclesiastical 
demonstration. 

^  "  Their  [the  Filipinos']  protest  was  not  so  much  against  the  government  of  Spain 
as  against  the  dominant  influence  of  the  obnoxious  friars  in  the  processes  of  that 
government.  Even  in  their  latest  rebellion,  that  of  1896,  the  cry  of  the  Filipino 
soldiery  was, 'Viva  Espafia!  Abajo  los  frailes  ! '  "  Robinson,  pp.  19-20.  Thisauthor's 
earlier  chapters,  containing  the  hastily  assembled  impressions  of  a  clever  staff  corre- 
spondent on  the  spot,  throw  much  light  upon  the  last  phases  of  Spanish  rule. 


362  COLONIZATION 

sedition  (Insurrection  of  Cavitc).'  They  pursued  their  victims 
throui;h  the  medium  of  the  lay  authorities,  secured  the  execution 
of  their  leaders,  and  followed  it  up  with  other  acts  of  veni;eance 
upon  the  less  deeply  incriminated  ;  many  members  of  wealthy  and 
influential  families  were  thus  banished  to  the  Ladrone  Islands. 
"  There  was,  however,  no  open  trial  from  which  the  public  could 
form  an  opinion  of  the  merits  of  the  case,  and  the  idea  of  subvert- 
in*^  the  Spanish  government  would  appear  to  have  been  a  fantastic 
concoction  for  the  purposes  stated.  But  from  that  date  there  never 
ceased  to  exist  a  secret  revolutionary  agitation  which  culminated  in 
the  events  of  1898."  ^  The  reader  is  now  in  possession  of  sufificient 
preliminary  and  detail  to  pass  on  at  once  to  the  last  revolt  against 
the  "  official  sacerdotal  tyranny."  ^  The  friars,  in  a  sort  of  confu- 
sion of  bigotry  and  ignorance,  had  come  to  consider  the  native 
secret  societies  of  reform  or  dissatisfaction  as  a  local  manifestation 
of  "  freemasonry.",'^  They  pursued  them  on  this  account  the  more 
systematically  and  relentlessly,  and  thus  helped  to  secure  the  coher- 
ence, under  pressure,  of  segregated  societies  into  the  so-called 
Katipunan  ("  League  ").^  This  society,  driven  beyond  endurance, 
first  i)rayed  the  Mikado  of  Japan  to  annex  the  archipelago;  and 
then,  upon  the  transmission  by  him  of  their  petition,  signed  by 
5000  disaffected  persons,  to  the  Spanish  government,  they  planned 
for  open  rebellion.  The  latter  project  was  prematurely  discovered 
upon  August  20,  1896,  and  military  activities  were  at  once  initiated. 
Seizures  of  the  richest  and  most  prominent  natives  in  Manila  were 
not  delayed. 

The  monks  had  learned  nothing  by  the  experience  of  preceding 
years  ;  they  held  tenaciously  to  their  old  privileges  and  clamored 
against  the  humane  and  careful  governor  Blanco  until  they  secured 
his  recall  in  December,  1896.  The  few  and  not  inexcusable  execu- 
tions sanctioned  by  him  were  now  followed  by  acts  of  ferocity  on 
the  part  of  his  monk-chosen  successor  Polavieja.  During  Polavieja's 
incumbency  there  occurred  one  of  those  acts  of  impolitic  injus- 
tice which  take  hold  upon  the  sentiment  and  imagination  of  an  in- 
flamed ])C()])lc  :  the  execution  of  the  brilliant  surgeon,  artist,  j^oet, 
and  novelist,  Jose  Rizal.    Rizal  was  a  man  who  had  something  of 

1  Cf.  Montero  y  Vidal,  III,  566  ff. 

2  Foreman,  pp.  106-107,  loS  (quoted),  363.  The  following  sketch  of  the  Tagalog 
Rebellion  is  mainly  a  condensation  of  Foreman,  pp.  363  ff.  ^  Foreman,  p.  364. 

*  The  sympathy  of  republicans  and  freemasons  in  Spain  really  damaged  the 
Philippine  cause.    I?lumentritt,  p.  52.  ''  Cf.  Hlumentritt,  pp.  53  ff. 


THE  PHILIPPINES  363 

a  European  reputation,  and  who  had  conspicuously  assailed  the 
monks  in  two  novels,  published  in  Germany  and  Holland  respec- 
tively, and  widely  read  in  the  Philippines  :  Noli  Me  Tangcre,  and  El 
Filibustcrismo.  The  islanders  were  proud  of  Rizal,  and  his  harrow- 
ing and  romantic  end  stirred  them  to  infuriation.^  And  in  addition 
to  their  other  motives  for  continued  resistance  they  now  began  to 
realize  the  state  of  affairs  in  Cuba,  and  to  profit  by  her  example 
and  by  the  necessary  concentration  in  America  of  the  Spanish 
forces. 

In  the  spring  of  1897  Polavieja  was  succeeded  by  Primo  de 
Rivera,  a  former  governor-general,  who,  it  was  hoped,  would  repair 
the  damage  done  by  his  predecessor ;  he  issued  a  proclamation  of 
amnesty  which  was,  however,  only  partially  effective.  The  insur- 
gents in  the  field,  here  as  in  Cuba,  were  as  safe  from  a  definitive 
defeat  as  the  Spanish  were  in  the  cities.  Their  demands,  if  one 
realizes  that  economic  oppression  in  America  had  as  its  counter- 
part sacerdotal  oppression  in  the  East,  read  not  unlike  those  of 
Spain's  insurrectos  of  earlier  years.  The  champions  of  reform, 
including  the  most  notable  men  in  the  islands,  called  themselves 
Asiniilistas  or  Assimilists,  a  name  which  is  explained  by  the 
character  of  their  demands ;  they  rebelled  against  unfavorable 
discrimination,  especially  as  respects  Cuba.  First  and  foremost, 
the  friars  were  to  be  expelled,  their  appropriations  of  land  restored, 
and  their  incumbencies  divided  between  the  Peninsular  and  insu- 
lar seculars.  Parliamentary  representation  like  Cuba's ;  freedom 
of  the  press  ;  toleration  of  all  religious  sects ;  laws  common  with 
Cuba's,  and  administrative  and  economic  autonomy  ;  equality  in 
treatment  and  remuneration  of  "Peninsular  and  insular  civil  servants  ; 
abolition  of  governmental  authority  to  banish  citizens,  as  well  as  all 
other-unjust  measures  against  Filipinos  ;  legal  equality  of  all  per- 
sons. Peninsular  or  insular,  under  the  civil  as  well  as  the  penal  code, 

1  Foreman  (pp.  381  ff.)  sketches  the  life  of  Rizal.  Several  detailed  biographies  are 
now  in  print;  the  latest  and  perhaps  most  authoritative  is  Retana's  Vida  y  Escritos. 
Cf.  Blumentritt,  pp.  51,  57-58.  In  his  first  work,  the  one  which  really  drew  the  ven- 
omous attention  of  the  monks  to  him,  Rizal  attacks  religion,  showing  the  folly  of  the 
doctrine  of  Purgatory,  charges  the  priests  with  atrocities,  such  as  digging  up  the  bodies 
of  their  enemies  to  insult  them,  and  shows  the  fate  of  all  who  assault  their  power  or 
even  oppose  them.  He  exhibits  the  guardia  civil  as  their  agent,  and  as  a  factor  mak- 
ing for  terrorism  rather  than  order.  But  the  tragedy  of  the  book  is  really  the  hope- 
lessness of  a  state  of  affairs  where  the  persecuted,  because  of  lifelong  training  and 
ancestral  tradition,  still  stand  up  for  their  persecutors  and  assert  that  the  presence  of 
the  monks  is  indispensable. 


364  COLONIZATION 

—  these  represent  demands  which  the  reader  has  met  with  before. 
But  the  background  of  all  reform  could  be  nothing  less  than  the 
cessation  of  this  "official  sacerdotal  tyranny,"  the  root  and  stock 
of  all  Philippine  woes. 

In  December,  1897,  De  Rivera  negotiated  the  peace  of  Biac-na- 
bato,  in  connection  with  which  he  is  said  to  have  agreed  to  reforms 
and  conditions  "  almost  amounting  to  a  total  compliance  with  the 
demands  of  the  rebels."  An  indemnity  of  1,700,000  pesos  was 
agreed  upon,  of  which  800,000  were  to  be  paid  to  Aguinaldo,  the 
insurgent  chief,  under  certain  conditions.^  But  the  reforms,  together 
with  a  considerable  portion  of  the  indemnity,  were  not  forthcoming, 
and  the  expatriated  insurgent  leaders,  forming  La  Junta  Patriot  tea 
at  Hong-Kong,  together  with  their  friends  in  the  islands,  were 
filled  with  suspicion.  Again  hostilities  began  to  break  out ;  they 
were  followed  by  savage  reprisals  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish,  and 
soon  in  the  provinces  north  of  Manila  the  rebellion  was  once  more 
in  full  vigor.  In  April,  1898,  De  Rivera  was  recalled  and  Augusti 
succeeded  him  ;  but  the  reforms  which  he  wished  to  introduce 
were  too  late.  Petty  warfare  might  have  continued  for  an  indefinite 
period,  for  the  prospect  of  settlement,  now  that  the  reliance  upon 
Spain's  good  faith  was  gone,  was  slighter  than  before.  The  out- 
look was  not  hopeful  for  foreign  intervention,  as  in  Cuba,  and  but 
little  secret  aid  was  afforded  by  coveters  of  the  islands.  However, 
as  has  been  explained,  the  exigencies  of  a  war  begun  halfway  around 
the  globe  led  to  the  seizure  by  the  American  fleet  of  the  enemy's 
eastern  stations,  and  in  the  succeeding  treaty  of  peace  they  were 
not  restored.  The  United  States  paid  Sj^ain  some  $20,000,000 
for  such  claims  to  the  islands  as  were  not  annulled  by  the  counter- 
claim of  conquest,  and  the  Philippines  became  a  dependency  of 
the  Republic. 

It  can  scarcely  be  maintained  that  the  islands  ever  constituted 
a  Spanish  colony ;  as  F'oreman  says  in  the  first  sentence  of  his 
book  :  "  During  the  three  centuries  and  a  quarter  of  more  or  less 
effective  Spanish  dominion,  this  Archipelago  never  ranked  above 
the  most  primitive  of  colonial  possessions."  But  its  colonial  his- 
tory certainly  furnishes  the  student  of  human  society  with  a  strik- 
ing example  of  the  phenomenon  of  the  contact  of  races  where 
such  contact  is  controlled  in  its  own  way,  with  scarcely  a  trace 
of  let  or  hindrance,  by  an  organized  priesthood. 

1  Cf.  Blumentritt,  pp.  59-60. 


SPANISH  AFRICA  365 

SPANISH  AFRICA 

A  few  words  will  suffice  to  indicate  the  present  status  of  the 
once  world-wide  colonial  empire  of  the  Spanish.  First  of  all,  after 
the  loss  of  the  Philippines,  Spain  sold  the  part  of  the  Micronesian 
archipelago  which  she  still  held  (Caroline  and  Ladrone  groups)  to 
Germany  ( 1 899)  and  disposed  of  Guam  and  several  other  fragments 
to  the  United  States,  thus  withdrawing  finally  from  the  Pacific.-' 
The  external  possessions  still  remaining  to  her  are  several  forts  in 
Morocco,  a  section  of  desert  sand  upon  the  west  coast  of  Africa 
(Rio  de  Oro  and  Adrar),  and  the  islands  (ceded  by  Portugal  in 
1778)  Fernando  Po  and  Annobom.  They  are  practically  value- 
less to  Spain,  and  might  well  be  disposed  of.  Spain  has  likewise, 
until  recently,  cherished  a  shadowy  claim,  in  event  of  partition, 
to  Morocco;  but  the  Anglo-French  agreement  of  1904,  and  the 
ensuing  negotiations  of  the  Algeciras  Conference  of  1906,  leave 
her  with  but  slight  hope  of  its  realization. ^ 

In  short,  Spain  is,  at  the  present  day,  practically  bereft  of 
colonies ;  ^  she  has  attained  this  position  by  four  centuries  of 
descent  from  the  exalted  station  of  a  holder  of  half  the  world. 
And  that  her  lesser  and  present  condition  is  not  fortuitous  is 
indicated  by  the  rather  wide-spread  persuasion  that  she  is  better 
off  now  than  she  was  in  1898. 

1  Cf.  Foreman,  chap.  iii. 

2  Keltic,  Africa,  pp.  247-248. 

"  The  Canary  Islands  are,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  part  of  Spain. 


CHAPTER  X 

COLONIZATION  OF  THE  NETHERLANDERS  :   BEGINNINGS, 
SETTING,  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  COMPANIES 

Having  sketched  the  history  of  the  Iberian  colonial  empires  to 
their  latter  days  or  to  their  extinction,  the  narrative  now  returns 
to  the  story  of  their  rivals  of  earlier  times.  Foremost  of  these, 
both  in  time  and  in  importance,  were  the  Netherlanders.  It  was 
in  the  order  of  events  that  they  should  next  appear  upon  the  field 
of  commerce  and  colonization ;  the  introduction  of  the  northern 
European  countries  to  the  products  of  the  warmer  zones  had  taken 
place,  in  good  part,  via  the  Low  Countries.^  Even  the  Phoenicians 
penetrated  the  North  Sea  ;  and  in  much  later  times  Flanders  had 
been  the  objective  of  a  regular  Venetian  fleet.  When,  now,  the 
monopoly  of  Venice  had  passed  westward  to  Portugal,  and  the 
routes  of  the  Oriental  trade  had  shifted  to  the  Atlantic,  the  share 
of  this  exchange  which  fell  ultimately  t<j  the  region  of  the  lower 
Rhine  became  proportionately  greater.  And  the  Netherlanders, 
being  not  unschooled  in  what  had  to  do  with  the  Orient,  were 
enabled  speedily  to  profit  by  all  that  changing  conditions  threw 
in  their  way.  It  may  be  noted,  preliminarily,  that  the  very  policy 
of  the  Portuguese  monopoly-holders  operated  as  an  active  encourage- 
ment to  the  development  of  the  Dutch  into  the  position  of  rivals 
and,  finally,  of  successors.  It  will  be  recalled  '^  that  the  Portuguese, 
in  the  consciousness  and  pride  of  their  monoj^oly,  and  in  order  to 
discourage  the  idea  of  direct  approach  to  the  East,  practically 
renounced  the  European  coastwise  trade,  preferring  to  gratify  their 
sense  of  power  and  importance  by  forcing  the  ships  of  the  northern 

1  The  most  useful  survey  of  Dutch  colonization  is,  in  the  present  writer's  opinion, 
that  of  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  book  i,  chap,  iii ;  book  ii,  chap.  iv).  The  topic,  covering 
as  it  does  mainly  questions  of  commercial  and  financial  organization,  is  singularly 
adapted  to  the  genius  of  this  noted  economist.  Few  detailed  references  are  given  to 
Leroy-Heaulieu  in  the  following  chapters,  but  his  general  ideas  will  frequently  receive 
expression  in  the  text.  The  teacher  will  find  his  pages  full  of  suggestions  and  of 
facts  useful  in  the  elaboration  of  what  follows.  Zimmermann  (Vol.  V)  presents  a 
useful  but  rather  unsystematic  and  rambling  account  of  Dutch  colonization,  full  of 
facts,  but  lacking  in  perspective.  -  Cf.  p.  124,  above. 

366 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE   INDIA  COMPANIES      367 

countries,  and,  above  all,  of  the  Netherlands,  to  come  to  Lisbon 
for  the  Eastern  wares.  The  desire  for  these  products  of  the  tropic 
lands  was  too  strong  to  abide  renunciation ;  and  thus  the  Portu- 
guese policy  operated  as  a  sort  of  process  of  pressure  or  forcing 
which  hastened  the  pace  of  the  growth  of  Dutch  shipping  and 
nautical  knowledge,  and  overcame  any  reluctance  which  existed 
toward  the  navigation  of  the  ocean.  Since,  also,  the  navigation 
of  the  Atlantic  between  the  Low  Countries  and  the  Peninsula 
demanded  a  more  than  ordinary  courage  and  skill,  at  that  stage 
of  the  arts  of  seamanship,  the  momentum  of  advance  to  overcome 
a  sturdier  resistance  was  necessarily  increased.  Thus  it  came 
about  that  the  conditions  of  the  time  provided  a  hard  but  effect- 
ive school  for  the  beginnings  of  the  Dutch  commercial  power. 

But,  before  entering  into  any  further  consideration  of  these 
conditions,  it  is  in  place,  in  accordance  with  our  method  of  treat- 
ment, to  review  the  political,  economic,  and  other  conditions 
amidst  which  the  internal  impulsion  toward  a  colonial  destiny 
arose. 

Unification 

Politically,  the  Low  Countries  exhibit  a  gradually  increasing  de- 
gree of  integration  through  the  centuries  succeeding  the  Crusades. 
With  the  advance  of  civilization  and  the  emergence  from  mediae- 
val conditions,  the  formerly  segregated  communities  began  to  settle 
down  under  stronger  local  government  and  to  learn  something  of 
each  other.  The  towns  began  to  wax  in  importance  and  the  gilds 
and  other  forms  of  economic  organization  to  make  their  influence 
felt  as  against  the  military  and  atomistic  forms  of  the  Middle  Ages  ; 
"the  future  belonged  to  the  burgher."  Local  merchant-leagues, 
and  finally  the  Hanse,  stood  as  manifestations  of  the  changes  of 
the  center  of  gravity  of  society.-'  Thus  the  modifications  of  eco- 
nomic conditions  impinged  upon  the  political.  But  the  actual 
political  bonds  whose  formation  meant  that  there  should  at  length 
be  a  single  state,  where  formerly  there  had  existed  isolated  com- 
munities, were  those  created  by  the  extension  of  the  Burgundian 
power.  Starting  from  Flanders,  the  princes  of  this  line  gradually 
added  to  their  dominions  the  greater  part  of  the  Low  Countries, 
until,  in  the  time  of  Charles  V,  when  the  house  of  Austria  suc- 
ceeded to  them,  "  the  unity  of  the  Burgundian  states  seemed  to 

1  Blok,  I,  263  ff.,  233  ff->  353;  IT,  29-30,  64  ff . ;   Pringsheim,  p.  i. 


368  COLONIZATION 

be  permanently  established."  ^  It  docs  not  conduce  to  our  purposes 
to  pursue  the  details  of  the  Burgundian  policy,  or  of  its  results  ;  ^ 
it  is  enough  to  say  that  a  certain  degree  of  centralization  was 
effected  which  had  in  it  the  possibilities  of  continuous  and  rapid 
growth.  Local  prejudices  had  not  been  aroused  to  an  extent  which 
precluded  the  sinking  of  local  differences  in  a  common  cause  ;  the 
several  districts  had  been  made  to  see  the  advantages  of  closer 
political  union,  and  were  well  on  the  way  toward  state-formation. 
This  is  a  condition  which  we  have  learned  to  know  as  an  indis- 
pensable preliminary  to  any  such  exterior  activity  as  colonization. 
Taking  these  general  results  of  the  Burgundian  period  as  a  basis, 
we  are  now  briefly  to  follow  the  succeeding  phases  of  the  political 
drawing-together  of  the  Netherlands. 

It  must  not  be  understood  that  imposition  of  a  common  admin- 
istration from  without  is  enough  to  evoke  a  state  from  a  number 
of  scattered  communities,  with  local  ends  and  methods  of  attaining 
them.  When,  in  15 15,  Charles  V  took  over  the  Netherlands,  it 
rested  largely  with  the  character  of  his  rule  whether  the  promising 
movement  toward  union  should  continue.  From  what  has  already 
been  said  ^  of  the  emperor  it  is  clear  that  he  was  entirely  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  Netherlanders  ;  in  fact,  he  was  by  birth  and  rear- 
ing, if  not  by  ancestry,  their  fellow-countryman.  lie  understood, 
and  was  understood  by  them ;  the  very  cjualities  which  made 
him  unpopular  in  Spain  conspired  to  render  him  acceptable  to 
the  Netherlanders.  Realizing  the  strength  of  local  traditions  and 
l)rejudices,  he  not  only  proceeded  cautiously  with  his  projects  of 
centralization,  but,  to  a  certain  degree,  modified  his  own  Catholic 
zeal  in  his  treatment  of  the  great  religious  problem  of  the  day. 
The  Low  Countries  formed,  in  his  view,  an  integral  part  of  his 
empire,  and  their  interests  were  subordinate  to  those  of  the  empire 
alone.  He  was  cordially  liked  by  the  people,  and  his  retirement 
took  place  amid  scenes  of  profound  feeling  and  regret.  His  reign 
tended,  therefore,  considerably  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of  grow- 
ing nationality  ;  in  spite  of  subsequent  happenings,  the  provinces 
were  never  again  to  manifest  a  distinct  separatist  tendency.* 

Nevertheless,  Charles  did  not  feel  secure  as  to  the  future  of  the 
provinces  after  his  death.    He  had  forebodings  of  disintegrating 

1  l'>lok,  II,  1  14  ff. ;  cf.  pp.  159,  204,  237,  292  ff.,  316. 

'■^  Blok,  I],  259  ff.,  400  ff.,  505  ff.  •''  1*.  181  ct passim. 

*  Blok,  II,  305  ff.,  317-319;  Armstrong,  Emperor  Charles  V,  passim. 


THE  ORGANIZATION   OF  THE   INDIA  COMPANIES      369 

strifes  of  succession,  and  endeavored  to  anticipate  such  misfortunes 
by  securing  from  the  provinces  a  "pragmatic  sanction,"  binding 
them  to  the  Hapsburg  succession.  The  readiness  with  which  they 
accepted  this  arrangement  shows  their  appreciation  of  the  advan- 
tages of  centraHzation  and  peace  ;  it  affords  "  strong  evidence  for 
the  conviction  that  the  feeling  of  mutual  coherence,  of  common 
needs,  was  at  length  fixed  in  the  inhabitants  of  these  regions.  .  .  . 
Above  all,  in  the  protracted  war  against  France,  people  had  learned 
to  appreciate  the  advantage  of  the  coherence  of  all  the  Nether- 
lands." ^  And  this  conviction  was  not  to  be  entirely  lost,  but  rather 
strengthened  by  the  events  which  were  to  follow.  Philip  was  no 
such  man  as  his  father  ;  even  during  the  short  progress  through  the 
Netherlands  which,  as  a  young  man,  he  undertook  at  the  emperor's 
command,  he  made  a  distinctly  bad  impression  upon  the  people. 
He  was  stiff  and  formal  and  could  not  assume  such  affection  for 
the  country  as  his  father  had  cherished.  He  was  a  Spaniard  of 
the  Spaniards  ;  and  in  contradistinction  to  Charles,  was  unpopular 
in  the  Netherlands  by  reason  of  the  very  qualities  which  endeared 
him  to  Spain.  As  king,  he  ignored  or  crossed  local  privileges  and 
traditions,  and  in  no  way  masked  his  abhorrence  of  the  form  of 
religion  which  was  now  making  its  way  in  the  provinces.  Moreover, 
while  to  Charles  the  Netherlands  had  constituted  an  integral  sec- 
tion of  his  empire,  to  Philip,  who  was  simply  king  of  Spain,  they 
were  no  more  than  an  appanage  of  that  country,  not  to  be  con- 
sidered where  Spain's  advantage  forbade,  and  distinctly  subsidiary 
in  importance  to  Naples  and  other  objective  points  in  the  south. 
"  There  was  no  independent  Netherland  state  ;  there  was  a  con- 
geries of  Netherland  states  and  statelets,  dependent  upon  Spain." 
That  this  was  Philip's  view  became  increasingly  evident  after  1562, 
when  his  hopes  of  becoming  emperor  had  collapsed.^ 

The  possibility  of  further  unification  of  the  Netherlands  under 
Bourbon  or  Hapsburg  rule  was  thus  eliminated  ;  it  was  to  take 
place,  as  the  fates  decreed,  not  under,  but  in  resistance  to  Charles's 
successor.  This  resistance  was  bred  of  anger  which  was  roused 
against  Philip  mainly  for  two  general  reasons  :  because  he  hampered 
the  economic  development  of  the  provinces  ;  and  because  he  op- 
posed in  so  inexorable,  tactless,  and  ruthless  a  manner  the  spread 
of  the  Protestant  movement.  For  one  who  is  familiar  with  the 
economic  policy  of  Philip  in  Spain  a  guess  as  to  its  aspect  in  the 
1  Blok,  II,  316.  2  Blok,  II,  319  ff.,  325. 


370 


COLONIZATION 


despised  Netherlands  is  attended  with  little  hazard  ;  and  it  is 
even  easier  to  lnia<;ine  what  the  gloomy,  religious  monomaniac 
would  try  to  do  to  heretics  for  whom  he  had  not  even  the  sym- 
pathy of  nationality.  In  either  case  Philip  treated  the  Nether- 
landers  as  foreigners  who  sought  to  injure  Spain.  He  rendered  the 
sojourn  of  the  Dutch  merchants  in  Spain  at  least  as  unpleasant  as 
that  of  other  foreigners ;  and  at  home  he  subjected  them  to  the 
heavy  taxation  and  other  discouragement  of  which,  as  applied  in 
Spain,  much  has  already  been  said.  He  created  in  the  Nether- 
lands a  state  of  uncertainty,  as  well  as  an  atmosphere  of  oppres- 
sion, which  struck  at  the  heart  of  material  development ;  and  then, 
deaf  to  remonstrances,  he  visited  manifestations  of  a  rebellious 
spirit  with  arbitrary  restrictions  of  customary  privilege  and  with 
curtailment  of  political  power. 

The  Struggle  for  Freedom  of  Faith 

Of  this  attitude  toward  material  development,  and  its  results, 
more  will  presently  appear.  It  was  chiefly,  however,  Philip's  policy 
of  religious  intolerance  which  ultimately  brought  about  rebellion 
accompanied  by  a  burning  hatred  which  material  oppression  could 
hardly  engender.  And  it  was  his  savage  repression  of  a  growing 
religious  persuasion,  common  especially  to  the  northern  provinces, 
which  finally  welded  the  latter  together  into  a  strong  resisting  con- 
federation. In  earlier  times  the  Netherlands,  with  the  rest  of  ac- 
cessible Europe,  had  been  inundated  by  the  clergy.  In  Flanders, 
toward  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century,  there  were  forty-six 
cloisters,  more  than  thirty  associations  of  regular  and  lay  preben- 
daries, and  thirteen  convents.  The  incomes  of  such  religious  estab- 
lishments were  very  large.  A  growing  indifference  to  the  Church 
was  manifested,  however,  as  early  as  the  twelfth  century,  and  in 
succeeding  time  resentment  against  the  clergy,  on  the  part  of  princes 
and  people,  gained  strength.  Toward  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury, Gansfoort  and  Erasmus  won  a  number  of  adherents  among 
the  higher  classes  ;  but  it  was  Luther  who  brought  the  unlettered 
into  definite  resistance  against  the  Roman  Church.  The  economic 
development  of  the  provinces  had  tended  to  render  the  claims  of 
the  clergy  anachronistic  and  exasperating,  and  the  common  people 
were  angered  at  the  gross  abuses  which  they  witnessed.  A  com- 
munity with  its  face  set  toward  economic  progress  and  commercial 


THE   ORGANIZATION   OK  Till':    INDIA   COMl'ANIKS      371 

development  could  not  longer  endure  restriction  which  had  been 
scarcely  sensed  in  the  mediaeval  period.^ 

Luther's  ideas  were  introduced  into  the  Low  Countries  about 
1520;  and  Calvinism  spread  from  Flanders  and  Henegouwen  to 
Holland,  Zeeland,  and  Utrecht  shortly  after  the  middle  of  the  cen- 
tury. Lutheranism  was  met  with  determined  opposition  by  Charles, 
for  however  much  he  loved  the  Netherlands  and  desired  their  pros- 
perity, he  could  not,  as  a  fervent  Catholic,  connive  at  the  spread 
of  heresy.  The  lay  authorities  succeeded  to  the  religious  orders, 
chiefly  the  Dominicans,  as  chastisers  and  inquisitors  of  the  heretics  ; 
and  after  1525  there  was  a  systematic  pursuit  of  the  unfaithful, 
most  of  whose  leaders  were  put  to  death,  imprisoned,  or  banished,  by 
1530.  Doubtless  the  number  of  executions  has  been  grossly  exag- 
gerated ;  perhaps  a  thousand  met  death  at  the  stake  or  otherwise. 
But  many  thousands  were  harassed  and  interfered  with  in  the  pur- 
suit of  their  livelihoods.  This  persecution  took  place  with  especial 
thoroughness  in  the  north,  chiefly  in  Holland ;  and  one  of  the 
results  was  a  considerable  emigration  to  hospitable  England  of 
valuable  elements  of  the  population.  Thus,  even  in  the  time  of 
Charles,  discontent  was  strong  enough  to  overcome  the  love 
of  home  and  the  inertia  which  opposes  movement  to  alien  lands. 

But  such  persecution  had  but  small  effect  in  retarding  a  develop- 
ment called  for  by  the  spirit  of  the  age  and  the  people  ;  it  opposed, 
rather,  a  barrier  which  challenged  and  thus  united  the  rising  floods 
of  opinion  and  resentment.  This  appeared  almost  immediately  after 
the  accession  of  Philip,  being  reenforced  by  the  popular  discon- 
tent which,  as  has  been  seen,  his  personality  and  economic  policy 
called  forth. 2  Philip  was,  of  course,  more  severe  than  Charles,  and 
speedily  transformed  the  latent  hostility  of  the  Netherlanders  into 
open  resistance.  Thus  he  united  against  himself,  as  king  and  as 
champion  of  the  Church,  a  complex  passion  of  hatred  with  a  footing 
in  both  economic  and  religious  discontent ;  and  his  subjects  of  the 
scattered  provinces  were  forced  to  cohere  as  never  before  in  com- 
mon armed  resistance  to  a  common  oppressor.^  Or,  envisaging  the 
situation  from  the  other  side,  we  have  now  a  series  of  formerly  iso- 
lated communities,  here  forced  into  close  cooperation  in  the  mutual 

1  Blok,  I,  277  ff. ;  II,  458  ff.  2  Blok,  II,  46S-4S2. 

3  It  was  really  under  the  stern  hand  of  Alva  that  local  differences  between  sections 
of  the  Netherlands  were  reconciled.  He  thus  realized,  in  an  unforeseen  way,  the 
policy  of  the  I5urgundians.    Blok,  II,  413. 


372  COLONIZATION 

defense  of  cherished  habits  and  institutions.  Material  interest  and 
religious  sentiment  were  fused  into  a  common  group-feeling,  for 
which  patriotism  is  scarcely  too  strong  a  term  ;  like  the  Spanish 
before  them,  the  Dutch  arrived  at  a  certain  sense  of  nationality  in 
the  process  of  defending  themselves  from  alien  aggressors  on  their 
own  soil.  And  by  reason  of  this  strengthened  habit  of  cooperation, 
they  were  the  better  prepared  to  develop  into  a  state,  and  as  such 
to  form  the  center  and  directing  power  of  an  e.xtended  commer- 
cial and  colonial  empire. 

Economic  Strength 

The  other  conditioning  factor  for  such  a  destiny,  for  which  we 
have  come  to  look,  is  economic  strength  ;  for  it  is  in  proportion 
primarily  to  the  degree  of  its  political  homogeneity  and  unity,  and 
to  the  strength  of  its  economic  organization,  that  a  state  is  likely 
to  succeed  or  fail  in  the  colonial  field. ^  The  Low  Countries,  with 
the  rest  of  western  Europe,  were  awakened  by  the  Crusades  to  the 
extent  of  the  outside  world  and  to  the  variety  and  desirability  of 
its  products.  They  suffered  with  the  rest  the  loss  of  population 
and  destruction  of  labor  forces  consequent  upon  the  enterprises  in 
the  Holy  Land,  but  at  the  same  time  gained  a  conception  of  the 
value  of  trade,  and  a  desire  for  gain  and  adventure.^ 

Agriculture  in  the  Low  Countries  was  favored  by  natural  condi- 
tions, and  early  attained  a  respectable  development.  The  local  place- 
names  of  the  Dutch  indicate  that  they  early  concentrated  attention 
upon  the  physical  characteristics  of  the  land  ;  and  it  was,  again, 
their  natural  environment  which  led  to  intensive  methods  of  agri- 
culture, forced  the  extended  application  of  labor  to  land,  and,  among 
other  things,  made  of  the  Netherlanders  specialists  in  the  treatment 
of  marshy  soils. '^  The  proverbial  industry  and  economy  of  the  Dutch 
and  Belgians  testify  to  their  earlier  development  along  this  line. 
When  the  towns  began  to  form,  the  kernel  of  their  i:)oi)ulation  was 
composed  of  men  trained  in  the  school  of  careful  and  economical 

1  Blok  (II,  4S2),  while  admitting  and  empliasi/.ing  the  great  political  import  to  the 
Netherlands  of  unification  under  one  ruler,  thinks  that  their  jjrominent  role  in  the 
world-history  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  fell  to  them  rather  more  by 
reason  of  their  develojiment  of  industry  and  trade,  that  is,  of  economic  strength. 

2  Blok,  I,  1S3-184,  295. 

^  Many  local  names  end  in  loo,  boscli,  /tout,  ivoiid,  moer^poel.  Blok,  I,  302,  305. 
Credit  should  be  given  to  the  monks  for  their  early  activities  in  diking,  draining,  etc. 


THE  ORGANIZATION   OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES      373 

intensive  cultivation.  This  production  of  local  food-supplies  was  a 
distinct  element  of  national  strength  in  the  sixteenth  century  ;  and 
to  such  agricultural  interests  there  was  added  a  considerable  de- 
velopment of  sheep-raising,  especially  in  Zeeland. 

But  agriculture  could  not  keep  pace,  in  such  a  country,  with 
manufacture,  especially  after  the  development  of  a  lively  exchange. 
Towns  formed  early  and  became  centers  of  gilds  of  artisans  of  all 
kinds.  Especially  in  Flanders  was  there  a  strong  development  of 
manufactures,  chiefly  of  fabrics  ;  that  province,  alone  of  Europe, 
could  vie  with  Spain  during  the  period  of  prosperity  of  the  Spanish 
textile  industries  ;  and  it  was  the  forced  emigration  of  Flemish 
and  other  weavers  that  taught  England  much  to  her  economic 
advantage.  The  forces  of  wind  and  water  lent  power  to  the  manu- 
facturers. As  early  as  the  fourteenth  century,  despite  famines, 
wars,  oscillations  of  prices,  bad  hygienic  conditions,  and  the  like, 
the  position  of  the  Flemish  artisan  was  very  strong ;  and  the  same 
thing  may  be  asserted,  in  less  degree,  of  artisans  elsewhere  in  the 
Netherlands. 1  Even  in  the  fourteenth  century  these  industrial 
classes  were  prone  to  display  their  strength  and  independence  in 
various  uprisings  and  disorder  which  could  not  well  be  repressed. 
The  type  of  the  region  was  prevailingly  industrial  and  commercial, 
and  it  became  increasingly  more  marked,  until,  with  the  decadence 
of  Venice  and  Spain,  the  Low  Countries  became  industrially 
superior  to  all  the  rest  of  Europe.  Thus  at  the  outset  of  their 
colonial  career  the  Netherlands  added  industrial  solidity  and  force 
to  their  other  elements  of  strength.  Many  of  the  details  of  their 
economic  organization  will  appear  in  what  follows. 

Growth  of  Trade 

Despite,  however,  the  advancement  of  production  and  of  indus- 
try, the  Netherlands  found  their  supreme  advantage  in  commerce ; 
and  thus  pursued  exchange  with  a  fervor,  skill,  and  success  un- 
equaled  before  in  the  history  of  Europe.  To  "  beat  the  Dutch  "  in 
trade  became  the  high,  but  almost  hopeless  aim  of  their  rivals  of 
later  centuries.  The  geographical  and  physiographical  advantages 
of  the  Netherlands  for  the  development  of  commerce  have  been 
touched  upon  before  :  they  provided  not  only  the  point  of  outlet 
for  central  and  northern  Europe,  but  the  convenient  point  of  inlet 

1  Blok,  I.  333  ff. ;  IT,  3  ff.,  64  ff.,  483  ff.,  495- 


374  COLONIZATION 

of  sea-borne  wares  from  the  south.  They  were  physically  consti- 
tuted to  develop  a  people  of  middlemen.  The  Low  Countries  sur- 
rounded the  mouths  of  the  largest  rivers  of  western  Europe,  the 
Rhine,  Maas,  and  Schelde,  thus  securing  easy  communication  with 
the  inland.  And  on  the  sea  they  were  only  five  or  six  days'  sail 
from  Denmark  and  somewhat  less  from  Norway  ;  six  to  fifteen  days 
distant  from  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  harbors  ;  and  only  a  few 
hours  from  the  French  and  English  coasts.^  Combined  with  this 
advantage  of  position  they  possessed  others  of  a  more  local  nature 
which  conspired  to  train  their  population  for  its  commercial  destiny. 
The  flatness  of  the  country  ;  the  navigability  of  the  rivers ;  the  ease 
of  canalization  ;  the  archipelago-like  coast,  especially  in  the  north  ; 
the  location  and  good  quality  of  the  harbors  ;  the  prevailing  winds  ; 
the  nearness,  not  to  say  imminence,  of  the  sea  —  these  are  broad 
environmental  influences  which  nurture  up  sailors  and  fishermen 
through  the  various  stages  of  nautical  skill  and  daring  until  they 
venture  upon  the  ocean.  The  Dutch  early  took  to  the  sea  and  be- 
came daring  skippers,  so  that  other  nations  came  to  seek  the  services 
of  their  ships  and  sailors  ;  and  this  natural  movement  was  fostered 
under  the  Burgundians.'^^  The  immediate  cause  of  the  rapid  develop- 
ment of  trade  lay,  however,  as  has  been  intimated,  in  the  fact  that 
the  Netherlands  formed  the  objective  of  the  annual  Venetian  fleets, 
and  that  the  Dutch  were  thereby  constituted  a  group  of  middle- 
men. As  early  as  the  thirteenth  century  these  favorable  conditions 
were  showing  their  effect  in  the  concentration  of  population ;  and 
the  development  of  towns  was  reacting  as  a  great  stimulus  upon 
that  of  trade.  Population  increased  rapidly,  so  that  there  were  by 
1500  a  number  of  towns  of  20,000  inhabitants,  and  many  of  half 
that  number.  The  total  population  of  the  Low  Countries  at  this 
time  is  estimated  at  3,000,000  ;  that  of  Holland  (15 14),  at  400,000. 
And  together  with  this  increase  of  numbers  there  went  a  develop- 
ment of  municipal  life  and  institutions,  of  schools  and  the  like,  and 
a  consequent  evolution  of  a  personal  freedom  which  was  to  con- 
stitute the  mainspring  of  reaction  against  an  earlier  and  more  cramp- 
ing system.  The  Burgundian  rule  had  proved  a  blessing  for  the 
land  ;  agriculture,  cattle-raising,  manufacture,  and  trade  had  been 
encouraged  and  the  Netherlands  were  rapidly  coming  to  be  the 
"  finest  jewel  "  among  Spain's  possessions.'*^ 

1  Hlok,  II,  ^83.  2  Van  Kees,  II,  i  ff. ;  Rlok.  IT,  417. 

8  Blok,  II,  pj).  505-522  ;  cf.  pp.  522  ff. ;  Pringsheim,  p.  i. 


THE  ORGANIZATION   OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES      375 

Recurring  specifically  to  trade,  it  is  seen  that  local  "  hanses  " 
began  to  take  form  in  the  thirteenth  century,  later  to  be  absorbed 
into  larger  aggregations.  Distributing  activity  began  to  extend 
from  rivers  to  sea,  and  gradually  strengthened  until  important 
commercial  privileges  were  gained  from  neighboring  states.  The 
rulers  of  England,  France,  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark,  and  Russia 
granted  the  Netherlanders  exemptions  from  taxation,  right  of  staple, 
use  of  their  own  laws  and  magistrates,  and  the  like  ;  and  to  please 
them  the  strand-law  was  abolished  in  a  number  of  regions. ^ 

Commercial  Predominance  of  the  North 

Thus  far  the  Low  Countries  have  been  considered  as  a  whole  ; 
it  is  now  in  place  to  indicate  the  local  shifting  of  the  centers  of 
trade  which  effected  the  dominance  of  the  northern  provinces,  and 
which  contributed  in  large  part  to  assure  to  them  alone  the  com- 
mercial and  colonial  career.  In  the  twelfth,  thirteenth,  and  four- 
teenth centuries  Flanders  and  Brabant  were  far  superior  to  their 
fellow-provinces.  The  Hanseatic  League  had  a  strong  station  at 
Brugge,  which  thus  became  the  staple  for  all  the  river  trade  ;  it  was 
through  Brugge  that  Lubeck  and  Hamburg  made  trade-connection 
with  Italy  ;  through  it  passed  the  Oriental  products  from  the  south 
and  east,  French  wines,  grain  from  France  and  the  Baltic  region,  Rus- 
sian furs,  Scandinavian  woods,  Spanish  iron,  and  Italian  silks.  Natu- 
rally a  considerable  development  of  the  machinery  of  exchange,  of 
credit-instruments,  etc.,  accompanied  that  of  trade. ^  About  1400, 
however,  the  sanding-up  of  Brugge's  sea-approach  caused  the  diver- 
sion of  the  trade-routes,  and  they  passed,  from  that  period  on,  over 
Antwerp;  the  latter  had  become,  by  15 50,  the  richest  merchant 
city  of  Europe,  with  a  steady  population  of  100,000  and  a  float- 
ing one  of  50,000.  Daily  500  ships  entered  and  cleared  from  its 
harbor,  and  on  occasions  2500  might  be  seen  at  one  time  on 
the  Schelde  ;  5000  merchants  were  day  by  day  on  'change,  and 
the  European  money  market  was  centered  here.  The  amount 
of  Antwerp's  trade  is  estimated  as  having  been  one  and  a  half 
milliards  (about  ^600,000,000)  annually.^ 

But  Brabant  as  well  as  Flanders  was  falling  upon  evil  days  ; 
jealousies  and  factions,  civil  wars,  the  competition  of  the  English, 

1  Blok,  I,  350  ff. ;   II,  148-149.  2  Blok,  II,  483-485. 

^  Blok,  II,  29-30,  486-487.  For  the  development  of  the  Dutch  cities  and  trade, 
see  also  Wappaus,  I,  328  ff. 


376  COLONIZATION 

and  the  difficulties  in  getting  supplies  of  raw  materials,  caused 
chiefly  by  these  same  rivals,  all  conspired  to  check  the  develop- 
ment of  the  southern  provinces.  And  a  sturdier  commercial  power 
was  rising  in  the  north.  Hollanders  and  Zeelanders  were  sea-faring 
as  Flemish  and  Brabanters  had  never  been;  from  1400  on  their 
herring-trade  had  been  of  great  importance,  constituting  the  chief 
means  of  livelihood  of  the  coast  districts.  Of  the  700  herring-craft 
in  1562,  the  Flemish  owned  100,  while  Zeeland  came  in  for  200  and 
Holland  for  400,  including  the  largest  and  best.  The  superior 
aggressiveness  of  the  northerners  in  the  sea-trade  is  indicated  by 
the  fact  that  while  Brugge  and  Antwerp  had  been  mere  stations  of 
the  Hanseatics,  the  Hollanders  and  Zeelanders  had  been  Hanseatics 
themselves.  Thus  they  were  not  merely  purveyors  of  their  own 
products,  or  mere  brokers  ;  they  were  active  transporters  of  mer- 
chandise from  north  to  south.  In  the  fifteenth  century  they  had 
more  trade  in  the  Hanse  towns  than  the  Hanseatics  in  Brugge. 
By  I  5  10  Holland  and  Zeeland  were  the  great  carriers  between  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Baltic  ;  they  sailed  even  to  the  polar  seas  ; 
and  in  1528  reached  the  Cape  Verde  Islands.  From  the  middle  of 
the  fourteenth  century  they  pressed  Flanders  and  Brabant ;  and 
by  1560  Amsterdam  had  distanced  the  rest  of  the  northern  towns 
and  was  second  only  to  Antwerp  :  in  the  si.xteenth  century  it  was 
the  "Venice  of  the  North."  Holland  particularly  rejoiced  in  its 
fine  situation,  excellent  and  well-kept  waterways  and  harbors, 
numerous  and  enterprising  population,  splendid  cities,  and  rich 
lands.  Combined  with  the  poorer,  ruder,  but  energetic  sea-folk 
of  Zeeland,  the  Hollanders  were  fitted  to  play  a  great  role  in  the 
economic  development  of  the  world. ^  Money-conditions  were  com- 
ing to  be  better  understood,  and  Charles  V  by  his  liberal  policy 
contributed  to  this  end  ;  banking  houses  were  established,  and  the 
mechanism  of  exchange  became  steadier  and  more  secure  ;  even  life- 
insurance  was  developed.  This  was  a  situation  which  was  forming 
during  the  time  of  Venetian  trade-supremacy;  and  the  extent  and 
importance  of  Dutch  commercial  operations  were  only  augmented 
after  the  discovery  of  the  Cape  route  to  the  East,  and  of  America. 
The  Netherlands  were  much  nearer  now  to  the  main  ways  of  the 
Orient  trade  ;  and  since  the  Venetians  were  still,  and  long  remained, 
strong  enough  to  block  the  free  entrance  of  the  Portuguese  into  the 
Mediterranean,  the  stream  of  tropical  wares  destined  for  central  and 

1  Blok,  II,  4S9-500. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES      377 

western  Europe,  which  naturally  ching  to  the  waterways,  tended  to 
flow  almost  undivided  toward  the  north.  Likewise  the  Hollanders 
gained  control  of  practically  the  whole  carrying-trade  of  Spain.^ 
This  meant  that  the  Low  Countries  were  to  enjoy  a  still  more  ex- 
tensive intermediary  function,  with  its  correspondingly  increased 
profits.  And  when  the  policy  of  the  Portuguese  caused  them,  as 
has  been  seen,  to  renounce  the  coasting-trade,  it  further  meant  that 
the  Dutch  were  to  be  obliged  to  develop  a  larger  quantity  and  a 
better  quality  of  merchant  shipping,  and  to  increase  their  nautical 
skill  and  confidence  by  regularly  venturing  across  the  stormy  waters 
of  the  Bay  of  Biscay.  They  did  this  successfully,  and  their  conse- 
quent wider  activity  in  the  field  of  commerce  operated  to  accumu- 
late opportunities  for  the  exercise  of  a  constantly  increasing  power 
to  meet  and  utilize  them.  Development  of  trade  toward  the  north 
was  more  difficult.  The  Hanse  had  to  be  met  and  overcome,  and 
the  taxes  levied  by  the  Danes  paid  or  evaded.  But  by  the  end  of 
the  fourteenth  century  the  Hanse  was  rapidly  declining,  and  some 
alleviation  from  the  Sound-tolls  was  secured.  In  any  case  there 
was  peace  in  the  north,  for  the  most  part,  even  if  the  heavy  dues 
could  not  be  evaded.^  Relations  with  England,  at  first  easy  and 
free,  became  gradually  more  difficult  and  ominous.  From  1430  on 
there  arose  contentions  and  competitions  which  could  only  issue  in 
an  ultimate  struggle  for  trade-dominance  ;  but  for  many  decades 
the  Dutch  retained  an  unquestioned  supremacy.  In  short,  by  the 
end  of  the  reign  of  Charles  V  the  Dutch  constituted  potentially,  if 
not  yet  actually,  the  strongest  commercial  power  in  the  West ;  the 
Netherlands  had  become  "a  member  of  great  significance  in  the 
body  of  Europe."  The  population  continued  to  increase  rapidly 
and  to  display  an  energy  and  development  superior  to  that  of  sur- 
rounding peoples;  and  in  Charles  V  the  country  was  governed  by 
a  powerful  prince  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  neglect  the  freedom- 
loving  traditions  of  the  subject  nor  yet  to  sacrifice  the  power  of 
the  central  rule.^ 

Resistance  to  Spanish  Policy 

A  people  thus  prosperous  in  material  ways,  and  so  independent 
of  mind,  had  no  grace  to  submit  to  the  narrow  and  mediaeval 
policy  of  Philip  II.     What  the  Prince  of  Orange  and  others,  as 

1  Blok,  II,  500. 

2  Blok,  II,  491-494,  500-504  ;   Pringslieim,  pp.  20  ff.  ^  Blok,  II,  436-437. 


378  COLONIZATION 

representatives  especially  of  the  malcontents  of  the  northern  prov- 
inces, complained  of  was  the  political  and  religious  absolutism  of 
that  policy  ;  in  particular,  they  resented  the  injury  to  trade  which 
Philip's  attitude  toward  Denmark  and  England  was  sure  to  bring. 
"  In  short,  they  wanted  a  government  in  a  Dutch,  not  in  a  Catholic 
or  Spanish-Hapsburg  sense  ;  they  did  not  want  to  see  the  Nether- 
lands sacrificed  to  the  king's  religious  and  political  purposes,  which 
were  not  their  own."  ^  In  other  words,  a  progressive,  enterprising 
people,  alive  to  the  conditions  of  national  wealth,  success,  and 
growth,  and  not  benumbed  by  a  rigid  subordination  to  an  obsolete 
fetichism  of  King  and  Church,  were  ready  to  react  violently  against 
the  same  measures  which  Philip  imposed  upon  the  Peninsula  to 
the  ruin  of  all,  and  yet  to  the  satisfaction  also  of  all  except  a  small 
and  pow^erless  minority.  And  as  concurrence  with  Philip's  mediae- 
val policies  led  inevitably,  as  has  been  seen,  to  national  degeneracy 
and  final  elimination  from  the  concourse  of  the  powers,  so  resist- 
ance thereto,  representing  as  it  did  the  awakening  of  the  genius 
of  a  new  age,  elevated  its  exponents  into  a  dominant  i:)osition  in 
the  world.  The  Dutch  exhibited  the  characteristics  of  an  adapt- 
able, and  so  viable,  human  society  ;  they  sensed  the  conditions  of 
national  existence  and  prosperity  and  attacked  with  resolution 
every  artificial  obstruction  calculated  to  prevent  or  hinder  speedy 
conformity  with  them. 

What  the  provinces  wanted  was,  above  all,  freedom  from  con- 
nection with  that  for  which  Philip  so  preeminently  stood  :  regula- 
tion. And  because  the  king  was  so  much  more  obstinate  and 
inexorable  in  the  imposition  of  religious  conformity  than  else- 
where, it  was  over  this  question  that  the  storm-center  so  consist- 
ently hovered.  At  his  accession  the  Protestants  were  not  very 
numerous,  especially  in  the  south  ;  but  his  measures  against  them 
were  so  severe  that  even  the  Catholics  objected  ;  and  the  reaction 
against  his  policy  simply  served  to  increase  the  rebellious  element. 
The  regime  of  Alva  (i 566-1  573),  including  the  execution  of  the 
popular  counts  Egmont  and  Ploorn,  drove  the  country  into  the 
arms  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  and  brought  on  open  war.  Hatred 
of  the  grasping  and  overbearing  clergy  increased  ,•  and  all  through 
the  long  ensuing  conflict  other  issues  were  in  the  background  as 
compared  with  that  of  religion.  Occasional  savage  outbreaks  such 
as  the  "  Spanish  Fury"  (1576)  left  Catholic  as  well  as  Protestant 

1  Blok,  III,  II. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANn<:S      379 

in  terror  of  indiscriminate  slaughter  and  devastation.  The  insist- 
ence especially  of  the  Hollanders  and  Zeelanders  upon  religious 
freedom  blocked  many  peace-negotiations,  for  Philip  remained 
bigoted  and  inexorable  to  the  end  ;  but  it  was  incorporated  after 
his  death  among  the  conditions  of  peace  (1609).^ 

Thus  it  might  be  said  that  the  struggle  of  the  Netherlanders 
was  very  largely  for  religious  liberty,  or,  more  exactly,  for  freedom 
of  thought.  And  it  is  unquestionably  true  that  whatever  aid  was 
lent  in  the  war  by  other  Protestant  states,  was  to  a  varying  de- 
gree motived  by  sympathy  for  the  struggle  of  Protestant  against 
Catholic.  Doubtless  this  consideration  bulked  largely  in  the  minds 
of  the  common  people  of  England,  and  certainly  among  the  Hugue- 
not sympathizers.  In  a  certain  sense,  Philip's  Catholic  bigotry,  his 
station  as  champion  of  the  Faith,  united  against  him  all  the  most  pro- 
gressive elements  of  western  Europe  ;  and  they  all  later  advanced 
together  by  reason  of  the  stimulus  and  inertia  of  their  reaction 
against  his  attacks.  The  other  motives  which  impelled  especially 
England  to  lend  aid  to  the  struggling  northern  provinces  will 
presently  become  more  clear ;  recurring  to  these  provinces  them- 
selves, it  is  evident  that  a  war  waged  so  largely  for  religious 
liberty  could  not  but  effect  a  consolidation  of  interests  calculated 
to  weld  the  participants  into  a  more  coherent  national  form. 

Movements  tov^^ard  Independence 

The  resistance  encountered  by  Philip  was,  however,  based  to 
a  large  degree  upon  economic  considerations.  Nothing  could  blind 
the  Netherlanders  to  the  chance  of  national  gain  or  loss,  and  they 
foresaw  little  but  calamity  from  the  application  of  Philip's  system. 
The  correctness  of  this  view  was  abundantly  demonstrated  to  the 
northern  provinces  through  the  fate  of  the  southern ;  for  these  fell 
rapidly  from  their  high  estate  with  the  strengthening  of  Spanish 
control,  and  in  consequence  of  the  war  which  the  attempted  further 
extension  of  that  control  brought  on.  The  Dutch,  for  example, 
resisted  taxation  for  Spanish  purposes :  the  attempt  of  Philip, 
during  the  early  days  of  Alva's  rule  (1569),  to  introduce  the 
alcabala  as  a  regular  tax  encountered  first  active  opposition,  and 
then,  when  this  was  quelled  by  stern  means,  a  complex  of  evasion 
and  silent  resistance.    Yet  the  people  had  paid  the  "  tenth  penny  " 

1  Blok,  III,  15-23,  25-27,  37-48,  59-70,  89,  204-209,  258,  262,  313,  520  ff. 


3S0  COLONIZATION 

{tiendc  penning)  on  several  separate  occasions,  where  apparently 
its  payment  was  without  prejudice  to  their  jealously  cherished 
privileges.  Again,  in  1571,  the  attempt  to  impose  this  tax  led  to 
protests,  —  of  which  even  Alva  realized  the  justice,  —  that  by  this 
move  the  lower  classes  would  suffer  and  trade  be  ruined  ;  the 
opposition  this  time  gave  origin  to  an  actual  uprising  and  lent 
strength  to  the  Prince  of  Orange.  In, all  this  period  Holland  had 
been  particularly  unmanageable  ;  and  that  province  remained  under 
arms  when  the  uprising  had  been  elsewhere  repressed.^  Apart, 
also,  from  the  direct  injuries  wrought  by  Spanish  fiscal  and  other 
regulations,  the  provinces  suffered  greatly  in  the  loss  of  valuable 
constituents  of  their  population.  Every  striking  exhibition  of  re- 
pressive action,  especially  in  the  line  of  religious  intolerance,  was 
followed  by  copious  emigration  of  superior  elements  of  the  popu- 
lation, largely  to  England,  or,  during  Spanish  domination  of  the 
southern  provinces,  from  that  region  to  the  resisting  north.  This 
movement  meant  likewise  the  emigration  of  considerable  capital 
in  the  narrower  sense. ^  And  if  war  and  its  effects  be  reckoned 
in  as  sequels  of  Spanish  policy,  the  economic  consequences  were 
of  the  most  far-reaching  upon  the  status  and  destiny  of  the 
provinces. 

The  aspect  of  this  last  assertion  which  bears  most  vitally  upon 
our  subject  is  the  development  of  a  separate  destiny  for  the  north- 
ern provinces  as  distinguished  from  those  in  the  south  which  re- 
mained Spanish.  It  has  been  shown  how  Holland  and  Zeeland,  as 
the  most  important  of  the  northern  provinces,  had  been  gradually 
developing  to  succeed  Flanders  and  Brabant  as  commercial  centers  ; 
and  it  has  been  noted  that,  while  not  prevailingly  Protestant,  they 
were  yet  the  strongholds  of  the  reformed  faith.  Here  it  was  that 
Spanish  fiscal  and  religious  oppression  encountered  the  most  deter- 
mined resistance  on  the  part  of  a  population  representing  in  excep- 
tional degree  the  qualities  and  policies  of  a  coming  age ;  and  it 
was  hither  that  the  resisting  spirits  of  subdued  regions  fled,  to 
further  resist.  The  great  contest  lay  between  Spain  and  this  kind 
of  antagonism  —  that  of  a  small  l)ut  strong  j^opulation,  favored  in 
its  struggle  by  the  lie  of  the  land,  led  by  an  extraordinary  captain, 
itself  of  stubborn  character,  insistent  upon  its  rights,  and,  in  this 

1  Blok,  III,  83  ff.,  101  ff. 

-  Hlok,  III,  59-60.  He  estimates  the  emigration  from  the  Low  Countries  as 
400,000  in  30  or  40  years.    Cf.  also  III,  66,  89,  309,  etc. 


THE  OR(>ANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES      381 

case,  spurred  lo  desperate  endeavor  by  the  savagery  of  repression. 
Of  this  people  the  determining  factor  was  a  minority  ready  to  die 
for  its  beUefs  and  freedom,  prepared  to  go  into  exile  rather  than 
submit  to  what  it  regarded  as  tyranny.  Compared  with  such  a 
nation,  says  Blok,^  Spain  was  the  earthen  vessel  contending  with 
the  iron,  a  colossus  with  feet  of  clay. 

These  northern  districts  increased  in  industrial  and  commercial 
importance  with  the  decline  of  the  south  under  Spanish  rule,  and 
especially  under  the  blight  of  war  waged  largely  within  the  same 
stricken  region.  After  Alva's  departure  Antwerp  was  practically 
ruined,  and  the  events  culminating  in  the  Spanish  Fury  of  1576 
rendered  prostration  complete.  At  this  time  the  southern  prov- 
inces seemed  about  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  Orange  and  the 
northern  districts  ;  the  Ghent  Pacificatic  of  1576  seemed  to  herald 
a  complete  union  of  all  the  Netherlands.  But  the  opposition  of 
the  Catholic  south  to  the  increasingly  Protestant  north  rendered 
the  union  of  little  permanent  effect.^  The  north  then  united  within 
itself  in  the  Unic  of  Utrecht  (1579),  a  defensive  and  offensive 
alliance  ;  ^  and  the  two  unions  came  to  stand  for  diverse  purposes  : 
the  Pacificatie  for  reconciliation  with  Philip,  and  the  Unie  for 
wholehearted  support  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  and  resistance  to 
the  end.  Hence  the  south  became  virtually  the  supporter  of 
Philip's  great  general  Farnese  (Duke  of  Parma)  and  the  reaction 
in  Holland  and  Zeeland  took  form  in  the  practical  abolition  of 
Catholicism  (1580).  And  so  the  final  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  un- 
locked for  outcome  was  that  it  was  the  northern  provinces  alone, 
and  chiefly  Holland  and  Zeeland,  which  finally  resisted  Spain  and 
thus  came  into  the  heritage  of  nationality  and  material  prosperity 
which  followed  upon  the  successful  defense  of  commonly  cherished 
religious  and  economic  ends.  The  conflict  of  thirty  years,  waged 
only  in  small  part  in  the  north,  encompassed  the  complete  ruin  of 
the  south,  while  Holland  and  the  other  northern  provinces  made 
such  gain  from  it  as  scarcely  to  welcome  for  themselves  conditions 
of  peace.* 

If  this  contrast  has  been  drawn  with  sufficient  clearness,  it 
is  now  possible  to  eliminate  the  southern  provinces  from  further 

,1  III,  134-135;  cf.  p.  173.  2  Blok,  III,  127,  170-175,  196,  204-207. 

^  The  uniting  provinces,  later  the  Dutch  Republic,  were  Holland,  Zeeland,  Utrecht, 
Gelderland",  Overijssel,  Groningen,  and  Friesland. 

4  Blok,  III,  22S-234,  262,  297-305,  309,  400,  410,  448-449.  536-537- 


382  COLONIZATION 

consideration,  and  to  concentrate  attention  upon  Holland,  Zceland, 
and  the  other  districts  which  cooperated  in  the  formation  of  a 
commercial  and  colonial  empire.  Henceforth  in  this  book  the 
unmodified  term  "  Netherlands  "  is  taken  to  include  them  alone. 

The  Revolt 

It  seems  unnecessary  to  follow  in  any  detail  the  story  of  the  war 
with  Spain.  The  Spanish  commanders  were  consistently  handi- 
capped by  lack  of  funds,  by  the  half-confidence,  suspicion,  and 
dilatoriness  ^  of  Philip,  and  by  the  rooted  distrust  of  Spanish  good 
faith. ^  The  Dutch,  on  the  other  hand,  persisted  under  all  circum- 
stances in  the  most  stubborn  manner,  gradually  developed  a  respect 
little  short  of  worship  for  the  great  statesman  who  led  them,  sup- 
plied funds  collected  in  copious  streams  ^  mainly  from  duties  upon 
a  constantly  growing  trade,  received  considerable  countenance  and 
but  small  actual  aid  from  England  and  France,'*  and  so  labored  on 
through  reverses  and  successes,  with  steadfast  purpose,  inundat- 
ing the  country  in  the  darkest  hour,  until  their  independence  was 
finally  wrung  from  Spain  in  1609.  After  the  defeat  of  the  Invin- 
cible Armada  in  1588,  the  hollowness  of  Spain's  reputation  became 
speedily  apparent,  and  1590  made  a  decided  change  in  the  char- 
acter of  the  war ;  it  ceased  to  be  almost  purely  defensive,  and 
the  consummate  soldier  Maurits  of  Nassau  began  those  offensive 
military  operations  whose  extraordinary  success  soon  filled  his 
camp  with  young  military  men  sent  from  many  of  the  states  of 
Europe  to  learn  the  art  of  war.^  And,  besides  all  their  successes 
on  land,  the  Dutch,  in  company  with  the  English,  began  to  harry 
the  Peninsula  with  naval  forays  of  greater  or  less  vigor,  thus 
terrorizing  the  coast  towns,  and  not  seldom  garnering  large  booty  ; 
a  little  later  they  even  overcame  the  garrison  and  seized  the  African 
island  of  Princip6.^ 

1  One  high  Spanish  functionary  in  Italy  is  said  to  have  remarked :  "  If  death  had 
to  come  from  Spain,  we  should  he  certain  of  a  long  life."    Blok,  III,  i6o. 

2  Blok,  III,  89,  135,  187,  2S2.  The  unpaid  Spanish  troops  plundered  right  and 
left,  exasperating  the  Netherlanders,  and  rendering  the  task  of  the  Spanish  governor 
doubly  difficult  (III,  209). 

•'  Holland  paid  for  some  time  60  per  cent  of  the  war-costs.  These  were  very  high, 
and  were  used  to  support  100  ships  of  war,  150  companies  of  infantry,  and  58  troops 
of  cavalry.     I51ok,  III,  424-425. 

*  Blok,  III,  79,  97-98,  1-05,  122,  249,  280,  324,  334  ff.  (Leicester),  383,  386,  428. 

^  Blok,  111,  258,  348,  401  ff.  (Armada),  414-416,  420  ff.,  466,  504-505. 

"  Blok,  III,  437,  451,  457,  466-46S,  504-505. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANn<:S      383 

To  the  development  of  trade  during  the  war  time  attention  will 
presently  be  given.  But  one  consideration,  as  bearing  upon  the 
development  of  national  strength,  yet  awaits  mention.  Not  only 
were  the  members  of  the  resisting  confederation  bound  by  this 
protracted  war  into  a  more  coherent  whole,  but  there  was  likewise 
developed  within  the  local  and  confederated  governments  a  power 
of  corporate  action  which  made  the  Republic  of  the  United  Nether- 
lands (recognized  in  1648)  something  more  than  a  name.  During 
the  early  years  of  the  war,  in  their  more  or  less  disunited  condition, 
the  provinces  looked  to  the  Prince  of  Orange  as  the  father  and 
savior  of  the  country.  Nevertheless  the  local  parliaments  main- 
tained a  locally  uncontrolled  function,  and  the  States-General 
exercised  considerable  power  despite  a  prevailing  deference  to  the 
Prince.  The  result  of  this  was  that  when  the  long-feared  and 
finally  encompassed  assassination  of  the  latter  came,  the  States- 
General  were  able,  after  a  new  outburst  of  grief  and  rage  against 
Spanish  perfidy,  to  take  the  destiny  of  the  United  Netherlands 
into  their  own  hands.  Even  during  the  life  of  Maurits,  the  bulk 
of  real  authority  lay  in  the  hands  of  Qldenbarnevelt,  the  State- 
Advocate  of  Holland,  in  his  capacity  as  a  leader  of  a  parliamentary 
body.i  So  that  we  see  here  the  partial  explanation  of  the  contrast 
soon  to  be  drawn  between  Dutch  colonial  enterprise  and  that  of 
the  Portuguese  and  Spanish,  namely,  that  the  predominant  factor 
in  this  movement  is  no  longer  royal  initiative  and  support,  but 
individual  and  above  all  corporate  activity. 

Development  of.  Trade  :  Earlier  Voyages 

We  recur  now  to  the  succession  by  the  Netherlanders  to  the 
trade-monopoly  of  their  Portuguese  predecessors.  It  is  natural  that 
mere  freight-carrying  between  the  Peninsular  ports  and  the  north 
should  not  long  have  contented  so  energetic  a  sea-faring  people  ; 
at  first,  however,  attention  turned  to  the  north  and  east.  The  year 
1577  marks  a  voyage  to  the  White  Sea,  and  1584  the  establish- 
ment of  a  factory  at  Archangel ;  after  the  defeat  of  the  Armada, 
however,  vessels  began  to  penetrate  to  Venice  (1590)  and  soon 
visited  Alexandria  and  Constantinople.  They  also  frequented  from 
that  period  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  at  first  for  salt,  and  the  coasts 
and  rivers  of  Guinea.    Moreover,  in  the  earlier  years  Dutch  sailors 

1  Blok,  III,  264-265,  289-293,  321,  387-396,  475,  500  ff. 


3cS4  COLONIZATION 

were  employed  by  the  southern  nations  ;  and  Portugal  and  Spain 
even  sent  Dutch  ships  laden  with  northern  merchandise  on  to 
Brazil  and  to  other  parts  of  America  instead  of  unloading  and 
reshipping  their  cargoes.^  How  dependent  Spain  speedily  became 
upon  the  ships  of  foreign  nations  has  already  been  pointed  out.^ 

But  for  a  considerable  period  the  Dutch  clung  to  their  old  routes 
and  were  seemingly  unmoved  by  the  report  of  Portuguese  dis- 
covery and  adventure.  First  of  all  there  was  no  imperative  need 
of  change  :  wares  could  always  be  gotten  on  the  Lisbon  market, 
and  thus  the  long,  unknown  voyage  was  obviated.  The  mistaken 
policy  of  the  Portuguese  in  surrendering  the  European  coastwise 
traffic  was  partially  designed  to  preserve  and  confirm  these  condi- 
tions ;  when  they  forbade  the  exportation  of  India  goods  from 
Portugal  in  Portuguese  ships  it  was  largely  with  the  idea  of  remov- 
ing any  stimulus  toward  undertaking  the  India  voyage.  And,  for 
a  time,  the  rest  of  Europe  was  quite  willing  to  leave  it  to  them. 
Moreover,  the  Netherlander  received  important  commercial  favors 
from  Spain  and  Portugal  in  their  rivalry  for  his  trade.  To  encour- 
age the  visits  and  sojourn  of  the  Dutch,  Portugal  conceded  them, 
for  example,  security  of  person  and  goods,  religious  freedom,  and 
judges  of  their  own  nationality,  all  on  condition  of  agreement  to 
trade  with  Portugal  and  not  with  Spain. ^  The  value  of  this  trade 
to  both  parties  was  such  that  even  national  hostilities  could  not 
quell  it :  Portuguese  and  even  Spanish  officials  connived,  and  the 
Dutch  held  resolutely  to  it,  in  greater  or  less  degree  and  against 
the  representations  of  powerful  allies,  almost  up  lo  the  peace 
of  1609.  The  grains  of  the  north  were  so  essential  to  the  im- 
poverished Peninsula  that  sudden  stoppage  meant  little  less  than 
famine  ;  while  the  Dutch  j^'actically  jiaid  their  war-expenses  out 
of  their  profits.  Their  claim  to  continuance  during  hostilities  was 
that  if  they  did  not  supply  the  grain,  the  Hanseatics  and  north- 
erners would,  and  thus  they  could  neither  accumulate  gain  nor  carry 
on  war.*  How  much  of  speciousness  this  plea  embodied  let  one 
familiar  with  commercial  argumentation  say. 

P'urther  hindrance  to  the  attempt  to  reach  India  lay  in  the  lack 
of  proper  ships,  of  capital,  and  of  knowledge.  European  coasting 
vessels  were  thought  unfit  for  such  extended  voyaging  ;  and  capital 
had  not  yet  assembled  into  units  large  enough  to  finance  heavy 

^  Blok,  III,  452-453  ;  Van  Rees,  II,  2  ff.  ^  y^j,^  (jg^  Chys,  pp.  1-2. 

2  I'p.  254  ff.,  above.  ■•  Blok,  III,  305,  307-308,  440. 


THE  ORGANIZATION   OF  THE   INDIA   COMPANIES      385 

and  protracted  hazards.  It  was  not  until  the  fall  of  Antwerp  in 
1585  that  large  capitalists  began  to  settle  in  the  northern  provinces. 
The  ocean  and  its  routes  were  little  known  before  the  publication, 
in  1595,  of  Linschoten's  Itiiicrarinni  ofte  ScJiipvaert  nacr  Oost 
ofte  Portugacls  Indioi,  the  first  treatise  on  the  subject  in  the 
Dutch  language.  Sporadic  voyages  to  the  East  by  Netherlanders 
had  yielded  as  yet  but  little  satisfaction  ;  for  it  should  be  recalled 
that  the  Portuguese  were  strictly  forbidden  to  give  information 
which  would  tend  to  lift  the  veil  of  ominous  secrecy  with  which 
they  masked  their  operations  in  the  East.  It  need  hardly  be  said 
that  they  fashioned  a  series  of  "commercial  myths,"  like  the 
Phoenicians  of  old,  which  were  calculated  to  play  upon  the  super- 
stitious ignorance  of  the  age  ;  these  ranging  from  fairly  accurate 
tales  of  strange  winds  and  reefs,  and  of  the  deadly  calms  of  the 
African  coast,  to  the  wildest  flights  which  an  unsophisticated 
credulity  would  tolerate.  And  even  if  information  had  been  at 
hand,  experience  was  lacking.  Hence  the  "sure-going"  Dutch 
were  impelied  by  a  complex  of  motives  to  cling  to  the  humbler 
function  of  simple  intermediaries.  In  addition  to  these  natural 
hindrances  two  other  inhibitions  rested  upon  them  :  that  of  the 
Portuguese  king,  who  threatened  with  death  and  confiscation  of 
goods  any  one  who  should  sail  in  Portuguese  seas  without  royal 
permission ;  and  that  of  the  Pope,  several  times  alluded  to,  which 
added  religious  sanction  to  the  secular  menaces  of  the  lay  author- 
ities. It  is  understood  that,  prior  to  the  accession  of  Philip  to 
the  Portuguese  throne  in  1580,  Portugal  was,  nominally  at  least, 
a  friendly  power,  in  common  cause  with  the  enemies  of  Spain. 
Hence  any  attempt  of  the  Dutch  to  evade  the  license-regulations 
would  have  been  an  unfriendly  act  toward  a  strong  ally.  But  the 
Portuguese  king  in  principle  granted  no  licenses  to  foreigners  ;  in 
short,  it  was  made  as  hard  to  go  beyond  Lisbon  as  it  was  easy  to 
come  to  that  port.  The  same  conditions  long  obtained  in  respect 
of  voyages  to  America ;  these  were  undertaken  but  rarely  by  the 
Dutch  before  the  last  years  of  the  sixteenth  century.^ 

What  finally  enabled  the  Netherlanders  to  overcome  all  these 
obstacles  was  nothing  less  than  the  jeopardy  of  all  their  trade. 
In  1580  Philip  II  became  king  of  Portugal,  and  at  once  manifested 
an  intention  of  assailing  the  Dutch  carrying-trade   in  toto.    The 

1  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  3-1 1  ;  Blok,  III,  453-454;  Rosclier,  p.  258.  On  the  earliest 
voyages  to  the  East  see  art.  "Tochten"  in  Encyl.  Ned.  Ind. 


386  COLONIZATION 

Dutch  in  Portuguese  harbors  now  ran  the  risk  of  seizure  and 
"examination"  by  the  Inquisition,  and  although  they  did  not  give 
up  their  trade,  but  pursued  it  under  a  connivance  which  repre- 
sented its  real  value  to  the  Peninsulars,  yet  the  state  of  insecurity 
engendered  by  the  new  conditions  produced  a  restlessness  and  a 
close  examination  of  all  alternatives.  Matters  came  violently  to  a 
head  in  1595,  when  Philip  seized  such  vessels  of  the  Hollanders 
and  Zeelanders  as  were  then  in  Spanish  and  Portuguese  harbors ; 
these  were  400  or  500  in  number,  manned  by  5000  to  6000  sailors, 
and  constituted  about  two-fifths  of  the  whole  merchant  fleet  of  the 
northern  Netherlands.  Such  a  severe  blow,  threatening  as  it  did 
the  solvency  of  their  large  merchant  houses,  awoke  the  Dutch  to 
the  perils  of  the  situation  and  the  futility  of  their  dreams  of  its 
betterment.^ 

One  other  alternative  to  the  Cape  voyage,  it  should  be  noted, 
had  been  attempted  with  ill  success  ^—  that  of  the  north-east  pas- 
sage. As  early  as  1580  adventurers  had  requested  aid  of  the  state 
in  an  attempt  to  discover  this  route  to  the  Indies.  It  was  reck- 
oned that  it  would  be  shorter  by  2000  miles,  would  avoid  the  loss 
of  life  attendant  upon  tropical  voyages,  and  would  be  pursued 
without  molestation  of  any  kind.  But  it  was  not  until  1594  that 
a  beginning  was  made  ;  in  that  year  one  Moucheron  discovered 
what  he  supposed  was  a  passage,  and  a  second  expedition  was  at 
once  prepared  and  fitted  out  for  the  China  trade  ;  it  is  noteworthy 
that  the  policy  of  exclusion  of  other  nations  from  this  commercial 
bonanza  was  at  once  adopted.  But  the  expedition  of  1595  ended 
in  no  more  than  a  small  and  but  slightly  edifying  extension  of 
geographical  knowledge  concerning  the  region  of  Spitzbergen  and 
Nova  Zembla.  Hopes  were  not  given  up,  however,  until  160 1,  by 
which  date  Houtman's  voyage  by  way  of  the  Cape  had  been  made, 
and  interest  diverted  permanently  toward  the  southern  route.'^ 

The  Voyage  to  India 

By  1585  improvement  had  been  made  in  ships  and  methods  of 
navigation,  and  a  flow  of  capital  had  set  in  toward  Amsterdam. 
Linschoten  returned  in  1592;  and  as  far  back  as  1579  and  1587 
Drake  and  Cavendish  had  reached  resj)ectively  the  Moluccas  and 
Java,  thus  providing  examples  of  contempt   for  the  Portuguese, 

1  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  13-14;  Van  Rees,  IT,  4;   Blok,  III,  436,  45S;  De  Reus,  p.  xi. 

2  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  16-51 ;  Blok,  III,  454-455. 


THE  ORCIANI/ATION   OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES      387 

Spanish,  and  the  Popc.^  The  reformed  religion,  together  with  op- 
position to  Catholicism  as  almost  personified  in  its  royal  cham- 
pion, had  freed  the  Dutch  from  any  strong  religious  scruple  in 
the  matter  of  infringement  of  the  Church-sanctioned  monopoly 
now  held  by  Philip  ;  and  it  was  at  this  favorable  juncture  that  the 
inevitable  individual  who  was  destined  to  precipitate  the  situation 
came  into  prominence.  This  was  Cornells  Houtman,  a  man  who 
seems  to  have  had  long  experience  in  Portugal  and  Spain,  and 
whose  consequent  influence  was  considerable.  A  company  of  nine 
merchants  was  organized  and  there  were  laid  the  keels  of  four 
ships  to  be  built  on  the  English  plan,  small  but  manageable ;  they 
carried  over  100  cannon  and  248  men,  their  entire  cost  reaching 
290,000  florins.^  The  undertaking  was  of  something  more  than  a 
priv^ate  character  ;  the  cannon  were  borrowed  from  the  government, 
under  security  for  their  return,  this  being  in  the  nature  of  a  sub- 
sidy which  should  not  weigh  upon  the  general  population  ;  there 
were  likewise  furnished  from  the  government  stores  powder,  guns, 
spears,  etc.  Further,  exemption  was  extended  from  licenses  and 
taxes,  it  being  understood  that  no  goods  were  to  be  taken  in 
or  unloaded  west  of  the  Cape.  The  commander  carried  letters  of 
introduction  from  Prince  Mauritsand  from  him  received  injunctions 
not  to  attack  any  one,  but  to  defend  only  at  need  ;  to  accomplish 
his  ends  through  friendly  means,  realizing  that  his  mission  was 
mercantile,  not  military ;  to  strike  his  flags  when  suspected  ships 
approached ;  to  make  a  treaty  of  peace  at  Bantam  ;  and  so  on.  . 
All  these  considerations  lend  to  the  operations  of  the  nine  mer- 
chant-adventurers a  certain  political  status  ;  in  these  negotiations 
little  mention  is  made,  however,  of  the  States-General.  At  the 
advice  of  Linschoten,  Java  was  selected  as  the  objective,  much  to 
the  future  advantage  of  the  Dutch  in  the  extension  of  their  power 
over  the  Archipelago.^ 

Houtman  sailed  April  2,  1595,  arriving  in  Bantam  June  22,  1596, 
and  returning  home  in  July,  1597.  He  brought  back  with  him 
three  of  the  four  ships,  but  only  a  third  of  his  men,  and  a  very 
small  cargo;  lack  of  knowledge  and  divisions  of  opinion  had  length- 
ened the  voyage  and  perturbed  its  course,  while  a  parsimonious 
trade-policy  had   lent  confirmation  to  the  representations  of  the 

1  Van  der  Chys,  p.  15. 

2  Van  der  Chys  (p.  31)  reckons  this  sum  as  equivalent  to  362,000  florins  of 
modern  money.  3  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  28-37 ;  Van  Rees,  II,  6-7. 


388  COLONIZATION 

Portuguese  and  enabled  them  to  convince  the  Javanese  that  the 
Dutch  were  simply  pirates,  with  no  real  desire  to  trade.  Neverthe- 
less a  conception  had  been  gained  of  the  lucrativeness  of  the  direct 
trade ;  another  company  was  at  once  founded  in  Amsterdam,  and 
two  in  Zeeland,and  in  1598  twenty-two  vessels  sailed  for  the  East 
Indies.  By  July,  1599,  of  nine  ships  in  one  of  these  fleets  four  had 
returned  richly  laden,  the  voyage  having  covered  the  incredibly 
short  time  of  fifteen  months.^  By  the  end  of  1601  fifteen  fleets, 
comprising  si.xty-five  ships,  had  sailed,  some  by  way  of  the  Cape 
and  a  few  through  the  Straits  of  Magellan,  and  had  returned  with 
cargoes  of  great  value.  In  some  cases  they  not  only  made  treaties 
with  native  princes  but  expelled  the  Portuguese  and  built  Dutch 
strongholds.  A  passion  for  the  India  trade,  long  regarded  as  a 
hopeless  dream,  piled  capital  on  capital  for  its  prosecution  ;  and 
to  these  new  enterprises  the  government  was  persuaded,  chiefly 
by  Oldenbarnevelt,  to  lend  some  such  assistance  as  it  had  granted 
the  first.  Before  the  end  of  the  century  the  loss  of  the  trade  with 
Spain  and  Portugal  was  no  longer  regretted  ;  direct  connection 
with  the  East  was  far  more  profitable,  and  the  old  routes  to  the 
Peninsula  were  deserted.  Great  misery  ensued  for  Portugal  and 
Spain,  thus  robbed  of  an  almost  indispensable  supply  of  food-prod- 
ucts;  it  began  to  be  seen  even  more  clearly  that  the  new  venture 
was  a  deadly  blow  at  an  old  enemy,  and  the  government  granted 
aid  the  more  gladly  to  an  enterprise  of  national  importance.  Sailors 
were  put  under  oath  of  service  and  the  force  of  law  was  lent  to 
punishments  of  their  misdeeds.  The  state  did  not  yet  grant  com- 
missions as  against  Spain,  but  great  changes  had  nevertheless 
occurred  since  the  time  of  Houtman's  instructions.^  It  is  certain 
that  neither  government  nor  people  intended  to  yield  the  great 
prospects  opening  up  in  the  direct  eastern  trade  ;  they  were  inured 
to  war,  which  had  become  an  almost  normal  condition,  especially 
for  Holland  and  Zeeland,  the  leaders  of  the  Unie.  Hence  they 
resolutely  refused  any  peace  which  did  not  leave  them  free  to  trade 

1  It  was  joyfully  exclaimed  that  never  had  such  richly  laden  ships  returned  since 
Holland  had  been  Holland.  Bells  were  rung  and  great  excitement  prevailed.  The 
Portuguese  in  Amsterdam  said  that  the  fleet  could  not  have  visited  India  in  so  short 
a  space  of  time,  and  must  have  looted  the  cargoes  at  some  intermediate  station. 
These  cargoes  included,  as  most  important  constituents,  600,000  pounds  of  pepper, 
250,000  of  cloves,  20,000  of  nutmegs,  200  of  mace,  and  100  of  long  peppers.  "The 
merchants  admitted  to  have  made  easily  two  penninck  on  one."  Van  der  Cliys,  p.  74  ; 
cf.  Roscher,  p.  262  and  note.  -  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  64-69;    lilok,  II  I,  457-.15S. 


THE  ORGANIZATION   OK  THE   INDIA  COMPANIES      389 

in  the  East,  and  they  won  their  point  in  the  negotiations  preceding 
the  cessation  of  war  in  1609;  negotiations  which  led  to  a  settle- 
ment modeled  all  along  the  line  upon  the  principle  of  uti  posside- 
tis} a  practical  acceptation  of  the  actual  status  in  the  last  years  of 
the  war. 

We  may  pause  here  to  indicate  the  effects  of  this  long-delayed 
peace  upon  the  fortunes  of  the  northern  Netherlands.  Danger 
of  sudden  attack  disappeared  ;  the  perennial  strain  upon  finance 
ceased  ;  the  number  of  troops  might  be  diminished  ;  e.xtraordinary 
protection  was  no  longer  needed  by  merchant  vessels  ;  internal 
disorder  could  be  sternly  suppressed  ;  credit  could  be  restored  ; 
the  public  debt,  reaching  12,000,000  guilders,  and  which  carried 
up  to  10  and  14  per  cent  interest,  could  be  diminished  ;  arrange- 
ments might  now  be  made  with  England  and  France  regarding  ad- 
vances which  amounted  to  14,000,000  or  15,000,000  in  the  case 
of  the  latter,  and  over  8,000,000  for  the  former ;  the  peace  was 
sure  to  redound  to  the  ultimate  advantage  of  industry  and  trade. ^ 
Such  considerations  more  than  outweighed  the  gains  incident  to  a 
state  of  war,  especially  since  the  peace-settlement  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  holding  what  was  held  in  1609  assured  the  Netherlanders 
of  practically  all  the  advantage  which  the  successful  last  years  of 
the  war  had  gained  for  them.  They  were  now  recognized  partici- 
pants in  the  trade  with  the  Orient  and  the  directors  of  their  own 
fortunes  in  both  economic  and  religious  lines,  which  were  the  main 
points  of  issue  all  through  the  conflict.  And  this  conflict  had  con- 
solidated them  in  such  fashion  that,  despite  sectional  bickerings, 
the  United  Provinces  now  constituted  a  new  state  and  nation.'^ 


Foundation  of  the  East  India  Company 

As  early  as  1598  it  was  seen  that  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
East  India  enterprises  a  coalition  of  all  participators  was  neces- 
sary ;  and  the  rapid  formation  of  local  companies  "*  ensuing  upon 
the  return  of  Houtman  rendered  cooperation  the  issue  of  the  day. 
There  were  at  the  end  of  the  century  four  companies  in  Amsterdam 

^  Blok,  III,  520-525,  534-536;  cf.  p.  436  (return  of  the  seized  ships). 
2  Blok,  III,  536. 

*  The  provinces  which  formed  the  I'ereenigde  A^ederlanden  are  named  in  note  3, 
p.  381,  above. 

*  The  companies  grew,  says  De  Reus  (p.  xii),"wie  die  Pilze  aus  der  Erde";  they 
"sailed  the  money  out  of  each  other's  purses  and  the  shoes  off  each  other's  feet." 


390  COLONIZATION 

alone,  two  in  Rotterdam,  one  in  Delft,  one  in  Hoorn  and  Enk- 
huizen.  In  a  short  time  the  mischief  of  competition,  which  had 
been  dimly  foreseen,  began  to  work  concrete  effects  ;  despite  the 
warnings  of  the  States-General  the  companies,  having  only  gain  as 
their  object,  commenced  to  work  against  each  other  both  at  home 
and  abroad.  In  the  East  Indies  the  ships  were  loaded  as  quickly 
as  possible  at  the  cost  of  a  general  deviation,  under  competition 
of  buyers,  of  the  local  prices  ;  and  so  the  Dutch  merchants  came  to 
be  at  the  mercy  of  the  greed  of  native  chiefs.  And  in  Holland  the 
competition  of  sellers  caused  a  great  decline  of  j^riccs.  Thus  the 
diversity  of  the  conjuncture,  so  profitable  in  the  frontier-trade,  was 
being  reduced  at  both  ends  toward  a  mediocrity  of  profit.  The 
companies  went  so  far  as  even  to  seek  a  monoj^oly  of  the  best  cap- 
tains, each  striving  to  pledge  them  to  itself.  On  March  20,  1602, 
a  resolution  was  passed  in  the  legislative  assembly  of  Holland 
denouncing  the  contemporary  conditions  of  the  East  Indian  trade 
as  a  harm  and  a  shame  to  the  United  Provinces.^ 

The  difficulty  experienced,  in  such  a  condition  of  affairs,  and  the 
valuable  time  wasted  in  efforts  to  effect  a  union  of  the  several  com- 
panies, is  evidence  for  the  persistence,  even  after  years  of  coerced 
common  defense,  of  local  interests  and  narrow  selfishness.  Despite 
the  pressure  of  the  powerful  Oldenbarnevelt  it  was  not  until  Sep- 
tember, 1600,  that  an  actual  movement  toward  union  was  set  on 
foot.  Nothing  but  failure  and  a  redoubled  bitterness  of  competi- 
tion resulted.  In  December,  1601,  the  representatives  of  the  sev- 
eral companies  were  finally  assembled  and  induced  to  submit  in 
writing  proposals  for  the  establishment  of  union  ;  but  Holland  op- 
posed the  union  as  under  the  protection  of  the  States-General,  and 
Zceland  and  other  districts  feared  the  richer  and  more  powerful 
Holland.  No  terms  could  be  agreed  u|)()n.  Finally,  in  the  last 
days  of  1601,  the  delegates  were  again  summoned  by  the  States- 
General,  and  listened  to  a  crafty  exhortation  from  Oldenbarnevelt 
wherein  the  weight  of  argument  for  union  was  shifted  to  the  polit- 
ical field.  The  king  of  Spain  was  hoping,  it  was  stated,  for  just  such 
quarrels  and  disagreements  in  the  Netherlands ;  he  was  always 
eager  to  see  his  purposes  furthered  by  disintegration  of  the  pro- 
vincial Union.  Combination  must  be  made  against  the  ancient 
enemy,  and  would  issue  in  an  aggravation  of  his  already  deej)  hu- 
miliation.    By  union  and  agreement  the  maritime  interests  of  the 

'  Vail  der  f'liys,  pp.  70-71,  75,  130-131  ;   \'an  Rees,  II,  9-1 1  ;   lllok.  III,  4SS-4S9. 


Till':  ORGANIZATION   OF  THK    INDIA   COMPANlP:S      391 

Netherlands  would  be  strongly  furthered  and  damage  consistently 
done  to  Spain  without  cost  to  the  country.  Resistance  was  weakened 
by  this  appeal,  but  the  towns  still  stood  to  their  rights,  clamor- 
ing against  the  proportion  of  their  proposed  representation  on  the 
board  of  directors.  As  a  last  resort  the  authority  of  Prince  Mau- 
rits,  the  Stadhouder,  was  called  in  ;  pressure  was  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  most  stubborn,  and  at  length,  on  March  29,  1602,  the 
union  was  pushed  through  and  the  companies  coalesced  into  one 
grand  organization,  chartered  for  twenty-one  years,  the  East  India 
Company.^  For  many  decades  the  history  of  the  commerce  and 
colonization  of  the  Dutch  is  the  history  of  this  chartered  corpora- 
tion and  of  its  offshoot,  the  West  India  Company. 

The  Charter 

This  being  the  case,  when  once  the  driving  motives  of  their 
activity  are  known,  the  results  attained  appear,  in  many  ways,  sin- 
gularly consistent  and  inevitable.  The  character  and  policy  of  the 
East  India  Company,  of  which  the  West  India  was  but  an  after- 
type,  come  out  clearly  in  the  provisions  of  its  charter.  This  instru- 
ment is  both  historically  significant  and  remarkable  of  its  kind  ;  it 
constituted  one  of  the  first  weighty  experiments  in  the  definition 
of  the  powers  and  obligations  of  a  large  corporate  body.  It  is  the 
more  important,  likewise,  to  attend  to  the  provisions  of  this  charter 
inasmuch  as  they  continued  for  nearly  two  centuries  to  form  the 
recognized  expression  of  a  set  of  principles  upon  which  the  Com- 
pany's policy  was  consistently  based.  These  gradually  took  on  the 
force  of  a  stereotyped  commercial  creed,  resisting  modification  and 
steadily  thwarting  projects  of  adaptation  to  altering  conditions.^ 

It  is  not  probable  that  the  charter  borrowed  anything  from  that 
of  the  English  East  India  Company,  formulated  two  years  before. 
Movements  in  England  toward  establishing  a  company  may  have 
exercised  some  general  influence  in  the  Netherlands  ;  ^  but  any 
alignment  of  the  two  organizations  has  the  value  of  a  comparative 
study  of  the  simultaneous  reactions  of  two  similarly  minded  peoples 

1  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  76-97  ;  Van  Rees,  II,  12  ;  Blok,  III,  488-490  ;  Day,  pp.  40  ff. ; 
cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  453. 

2  Cf.  De  Reus,  p.  i  ;  this  author  says  (p.  vii)  that  the  Company  had  no  history,  no 
development  in  organization  or  policy.  Changes  occurred  in  the  extent  of  its  opera- 
tions, its  financial  status,  etc.,  but  its  principles  remained  the  same-    Cf.  Day,  p.  39. 

3  Van  Rees,  II,  19;  Van  der  Chys,  p.  129. 


392  COLONIZATION 

upon  similar  conditions,  rather  than  that  of  an  exercise  in  the  detec- 
tion of  mutual  borrowings. 

The  charter,  excluding  the  preamble  which  recites  the  reasons 
for  the  Company's  formation,  and  the  last  article  (46),  which  com- 
mands all  good  subjects,  under  pain  of  severe  punishment,  to  re- 
spect the  charter-provisions,  and  enjoins  upon  all  officials  to  let 
the  Directors  benefit  without  molestation  from  the  fruits  of  their 
activities,  falls  roughly  under  seven  main  heads  or  topics  :  the 
organization  of  the  Company  (§§  1-6);  participation  (§§  7-1  i)  ; 
inlerreUuion  of  the  Chambers  {§§  12-14);  relations  with  share- 
holders (§§  14-17);  the  Directors  (§§  18-33);  grants  of  monop- 
oly (§§  34-35);  relation  to  the  state  (§§  36-45).!  The  history 
of  the  Company,  as  it  functioned  in  the  metropolis,  may  well  be 
assembled  about  the  explanation  and  further  development  of  these 
topics,  taken  in  such  order  as  to  insure  clearness  and  sequence 
of  narrative. 

The  Monopoly 

First,  thert,  as  to  the  crucial  feature  of  the  charter,  the  granting 
of  a  monopoly.  Why  were  exclusive  rights  of  any  kind  conferred, 
and  why  did  the  state  create  within  its  own  body  an  ivipcrinvi  in 
ivipcno  which  was  able,  within  a  comparatively  few  years,  to  bid 
it  defiance  .-^  That  this  was  done  is  the  more  remarkable  as  the 
Dutch  harbored  a  positive  distaste  for  monopolies,  and  ran  all  to 
individualistic  enterprise.-  It  has  been  shown  in  what  precedes 
that  the  formation  of  a  comi)any  was  not  easy  ;  that  it  recjuired, 
indeed,  strenuous  governmental  pressure  to  bring  the  several  jeal- 
ous companies  into  union,  and  this  too,  although  they  all  realized 
that  they  were  dragging  each  other  down  to  ruin.  Left  to  them- 
selves it  is  difficult  to  see  how  unification  could  have  come  about 
within  any  definable  period;  it  was,  indeed,  the  very  hoj)elessness 
of  the  situation  that  overcame  prejudices  against  the  erection  of  a 
monopoly  as  the  least  of  several  alternative  evils.  In  view  of  the 
total  disorder  in  East  Indian  affairs  it  was  at  first  proposed  that 
the  state  should  send  a  fleet  to  occupy  certain  stations,  afford  j)ro- 
tection,   and   kee]5  order  ;   but,   involved  as  it  was  in  a  desperate 

*  The  charter  is  rei)roduced  by  Van  der  Chys  (pp.  9S-115),  and  translated,  largely 
literally,  into  German,  by  l)e  Reus  (])p.  5-12).  Van  Rees  (II,  23  ff.)  and  Van  der  Chy.s 
(pp.  116  IT.),  as  well  as  De  Reus,  give  an  extended  discussion  of  the  organization. 
Cf.  Day,  pp.  82  ff.  2  Van  Rees,  II,  13-15  ;  Van  der  Chys,  p.  1 17. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE   INDIA   COMPANIES      393 

struggle  for  independence,  it  could  not  spare  the  necessary  forces. 
Again  the  possibility  was  considered  of  establishing  something  on 
the  order  of  the  Portuguese  Casa  da  India,  which  should  regulate 
colonial  affairs  from  home  ;  but  this  meant  that  the  government 
was  to  function  as  did  the  Portuguese  king,  owning  all  the  ships 
and  working  through  its  own  agents  ;  and,  in  addition  to  the  fact 
of  the  government's  preoccupation  with  Spain,  the  Dutch  were  un- 
willing to  concede  it  such  power.  The  government  distrusted  itself; 
it  was  only  newly  and  provisionally  a  centralized  one,  and  it  felt  its 
own  ignorance  and  incompetence  to  manage  the  affairs  of  the  East 
Indies,  at  that  time  so  strange  and  distant.  The  only  other  practi- 
cable alternative  was  to  leave  the  enterprise  in  the  hands  which  had 
shown  so  much  zeal  in  opening  up  the  East  and  had  secured  such 
important  national  advantages  through  their  activities.  The  Nether- 
lander salved  his  prejudice  against  monopolies  with  the  reflection 
that  the  States-General  could  keep  an  eye  upon  the  running  of  this 
one,  which  would,  moreover,  proceed  to  discomfit  Spain  without  it 
costing  the  state  anything.^  The  public  felt  the  safer  inasmuch  as 
the  charter  was  to  run  only  twenty-one  years, — a  provision  designed 
to  render  the  Company  powerless  at  the  end  of  that  period,  —  and 
so  acquiesced  with  small  objection  in  the  monopoly.  Thus  it  was 
enacted  that  for  twenty-one  years  no  Dutch  competitor  was  to  sail 
east  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  or  through  the  Straits  of  Magellan, 
under  the  penalty  of  confiscation  of  ship  and  cargo,  the  clause  as 
to  the  Straits-voyage  becoming  null  if  the  Company  did  not  utilize 
its  privileges  in  that  section  inside  of  four  years  (§  34).  Within 
the  area  of  its  monopoly,  moreover,  the  Company  was  granted 
practical  sovereignty  :  power  to  make  treaties  with  native  rulers 
in  the  name  of'  the  States-General,  to  build  strongholds,  appoint 
governors  and  military  and  judicial  functionaries  ;  in  short,  to  take 
all  measures  called  for  in  the  interest  of  trade,  and  looking  to  the 
maintenance  of  order,  government,  and  justice.^  That  the  States- 
General  strove  to  retain  a  voice  in  the  destiny  of  the  functionaries, 
who  were  required,  moreover,  to  swear  their  oaths  of  allegiance  be- 
fore the  States-General  previous  to  doing  the  same  before  the  Com- 
pany (§  35),  is,  as  will  be  seen,  interesting  as  theory  rather  than  as 
practice.     As  to  India,  the  Directors  could  really  do  anything  they 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  17-22;  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  118-119;   De  Reus,  pp.  2-5;  Roscher, 
pp.  257-258. 

2  Cf.  Van  der  Chys,  p.  no  ;   De  Reus,  p.  10  ;  Colmeiro,  II,  453-454.* 


594 


COLONIZATION 


chose  except  establish  a  government  wholly  apart  from  that  of  the 
Netherlands  ;  their  oath  of  allegiance  prevented  this.^ 

But  around  the  scheme  of  the  monopoly  here  granted  there  arise 
certain  other  considerations  of  especial  interest  from  the  compara- 
tive view-point.  Unlike  the  monopolies  that  went  before,  that  of 
the  Dutch  was  to  be  enforced  regarding  only  a  portion  of  the  seas  ; 
and  not  against  the  world,  nor  against  the  adherents  of  another 
religion,  nor  even  against  any  special  foreign  nation,  but  against 
fellow-countrymen  as  potential  competitors.  This  consideration, 
sometimes  taken  ^  to  show  the  changed  attitude  of  the  Dutch  with 
respect  to  the  "free  sea,"  witnesses  rather  to  the  essentially  local 
character  of  the  charter  as  a  document  calculated  to  obviate  only 
intra-national  competition.  Spanish  and  Portuguese  alike  were 
enemies,  and  the  plain  intention,  however  much  disowned  in 
earlier  times  of  weakness  and  when  the  Dutch  were  novices,  was 
to  smite  them  anywhere  and  everywhere,  including  of  course  the 
eastern  seas  ;  and  the  subsequent  temper  of  the  Dutch  toward 
English,  and  other  interlopers,^  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  their  working 
theories.  Since,  however,  the  Dutch  were  too  sensible  to  go  on 
record  with  any  such  impossible  project  as  general  exclusion,  they 
have  had  far  less  word-swallowing  to  do  than  had  their  immediate 
predecessors  in  the  field.  The  idea  of  a  generally  exclusive  monop- 
oly was  just  as  attractive  as  it  had  been  to  the  Venetians,  but  the 
Dutch  had  emerged  far  enough  from  mediaeval  ignorance  and  pro- 
vinciality to  perceive  its  impracticability  in  the  world  as  it  was 
coming  to  be.  Their  efforts  to  realize  as  much  of  monopoly  as 
possible  will  appear  through  subsequent  pages. 

Relations  of  Company  and  State 

Much  in  the  foregoing  has  already  suggested  the  close  relation- 
ship of  the  Company  with  the  state ;  formed  under  political  pres- 
sure, it  acted  as  a  substitute  for  the  direct  extension  of  the  state's 
control,  and  stood  forth  to  fight  its  battles  for  it.  It  is  doubtful  if 
unification  of  the  companies  could  so  soon  have  been  brought  about 
if  the  argument  for  a  company  as  an  arm  of  war  had  not  proved  so 
compelling ;  again,  as  has  been  noted,  the  state  was  expected,  by 
constant  control  of  the  Company,  to  guard  against  the  foreseen  evils 
of  a  monopoly.  Aside  from  the  national  and  inevitable  predominance 

'  Van  def  Chys,  p.  126.  "^  Id.,  p.  121.  ^  Pp.  41S  If.,  492  ff.,  below. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE   INDIA  COMPANIES 


395 


of  the  creator  over  its  creature,  the  States-General  are  represented 
once  and  again  in  the  charter  as  the  arbiter  of  the  Company: 
for  example,  if  the  Directors  fail  of  agreement,  the  States-General 
will  decide  (§  6);  if  the  Company  incurs  losses,  it  can  appeal  to 
the  States-General  (§  36).  Other  articles  define  more  exhaustively 
the  Company's  relation  to  the  government ;  the  state  is  to  receive 
twenty  per  cent  of  the  gain  from  seizure  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
ships  (§  37) ;  likewise  it  holds  receivable  from  the  Company  25,000 
guilders  with  which  it  is  credited  on  the  Company's  books,  in  order 
to  share  gains  with  the  rest  (§  44) ;  it  levies  export  and  import 
duties  on  existing  lines  upon  the  Company's  goods,  and  it  will  allow 
certain  irregularities  (§§  38,  41)  ;^  it  will  not  take  away  the  Com- 
pany's artillery,  ammunition,  etc.,  without  its  consent  (§  39) ;  it 
enforces  a  common  system  of  weights  and  measures  (§  40) ;  it  will 
not  allow  the  seizure  of  the  person  or  goods  of  a  Director,  but  will 
assure  him  a  hearing  before  a  regular  judge  (§  42)  ;  it  delegates 
the  Company  a  certain  police  power  in  apprehending  its  sailors  in 
Dutch  ports,  but  with  proper  deference  to  local  officers  (§  43) ;  it 
requires  of  commanders  of  fleets  or  ships  a  full  report  of  the  condi- 
tions in  India,  and  of  the  voyage,  before  the  States-General  (§  45). 
Several  of  these  provisions  are  scarcely  more  than  the  assertion  of 
the  ordinary  rights  of  a  government  ;  others  convey  favors  or  ex- 
emptions ;  but  a  warning  that  control  is  to  be  exercised  inheres 
throughout. 

This  topic  of  state-control  may  here  be  pursued  into  its  subse- 
quent and  virtually  typical  and  final  stage.  The  founders  meant 
well,  but  they  could  not  reckon  with  the  forces  of  avarice  and  cor- 
ruption which  were  prompted  by  the  prospect  of  enormous  gain. 
Instead  of  the  govefnment  controlling  the  Company  irom  without, 
in  the  interests  of  the  shareholders,  governmental  officials  came  to 
control  it  from  within  for  the  benefit  of  their  own  class,  the  politi- 
cal and  commercial  aristocracy.  The  directors  of  the  state  and  of 
the  Company  became  almost  identical  in  personnel,  and  nearly  all 
of  the  popular  attempts  to  control  the  latter  were  foiled  by  the 
States-General.  All  objections  were  evaded  by  adducing  reasons 
of  state  :  the  Company  constituted  the  safety  of  the  nation  against 
Spanish  aggression,  and  must  not  be  subject  to  let  or  hindrance. 
Such  willful  abdication  or  abuse  of  the  controlling  function  on  the 

1  Freedom  from  taxes,  licenses,  etc.,  had  likewise  been  granted  to  the  earlier 
separate  companies.    Cf.  Van  Rees,  II,  15-16. 


396  COLONIZATION 

part  of  the  state  left  the  Company  all  but  independent  ;  in  fact 
the  Directors,  upon  the  occasion  of  their  opposition  to  the  found- 
ing of  the  West  India  Company,  stated  bluntly  that  the  Company's 
East  India  possessions  were  theirs  and  could  be  sold  to  the  king  of 
Spain  if  they  so  desired.  It  took  the  state  two  centuries,  and  end- 
less effort  and  trouble,  to  lay  hands  upon  the  directive  povver.^ 

Interrelation  of  the  Chambers 

Another  significant  aspect  of  the  situation  out  of  which  the  uni- 
fication of  the  companies  grew,  is  to  be  found  in  the  provisions 
dealing  with  the  interrelations  of  the  Chambers,  that  is,  the  local 
bodies  representative  of  the  formerly  independent  trading  centers. 
These  retained  such  independence  that  they  could  at  any  time  have 
gone  on  by  themselves  as  separate  organizations  had  The  Seven- 
teen, the  visible  bond  of  their  union,  been  done  away  with  ;  ^  hence 
they  were  not  willing  to  merge  their  identity  in  the  union,  and  their 
jealousies  and  strivings  with  each  other,  which  meant  generally 
the  opposition  of  province  to  province,  betray  the  newness  and 
instability  of  the  "  United  Netherlands  "  This  separatist  tendency 
comes  out  plainly  in  the  charter,  which  both  recognizes  it  and  seeks 
to  minimize  its  effect.  The  general  board  of  Directors  ("  The 
Seventeen  ")  was  granted  the  widest  of  powers  and  affiliated  with 
the  States-General ;  ^  the  Chambers  were  to  keep  each  other  fully 
informed  as  to  business  done  and  projected  (§  14),  and  those  whose 
ventures  came  out  well  were  even  to  provide  their  unlucky  fellows 
with  spices  and  other  eastern  wares  in  event  of  uneven  fortune 
attending  their  respective  enterprises  (§  13).  Such  provisions  were 
designed  to  increase  solidarity;  nevertheless  the  separate  Chambers 
practically  controlled  themselves.  A  ship  was  to  return  to  its 
port  of  departure  if  possible;  and  if  it  was  obliged  to  enter  another 
Dutch  harbor,  the  Chamber  which  fitted  it  out  was  to  send  Direc- 
tors to  attend  to  all  the  details  of  its  homecoming,  unless  it  seemed 
advisable  to  delegate  this  business  to  the  local  Chamber  (§  12). 
Again,  if  a  Director  became  bankrupt,  his  own  Chamber  had  to 
shoulder  the  losses  incident,  not  the  general  treasury  (§  32)  ;  and 

1  Van  der  Chys,  pp.  116,  tic;,  note  ;   Day,  pp.  86-88. 

2  Van  der  Chys,  p.  128.  "So  war  auch  die  Comp.  nichts  anderes  als  eine  kiinsl- 
liche  Vereinigung  von  verschiedenen  llandelsge-sellschaften  welche  unter  den  Namen 
'  Kammern  '  selljst.standig  bestelien  blieben."    De  Reu.';,  p.  19  ;  cf.  pp.  20-22. 

•^  Of.  p.  398,  below. 


Tlir;   ORGANI/ATION   OF  '1111-:   INDIA   COMPANIES      397 

such  cmj)l()yces  as  bookkeepers  were  to  be  paid  by  the  Directors 
of  the  several  Chambers,  their  maintenance  not  coming  from  the 
body  of  shareholders  (§31).  All  such  provisions  clearly  indicate 
the  rudimentary  nature  of  the  union  and  a  reluctance  to  accept  the 
full  consequences  of  centralization  ;  and  this  not  only  in  the  case 
of  the  companies  but  also  of  the  provinces  which  they  represented. 
Such  a  condition  of  affairs  is  perfectly  normal,  as  is  shown  for 
example  by  the  history  of  the  confederation  of  the  American  col- 
onies; that  the  initial  advances  toward  nationality  are  imperfect 
and  slowly  traversed  does  not  impair  the  general  consec^uences  of 
such  development. 

The  Chamber  of  Chambers  was  constituted  by  The  Seventeen, 
a  body  which  united  the  constituent  companies  as  the  States-Gen- 
eral united  the  Provinces,^  and  whose  constitution  and  function 
^    will  presently  be  explained. 

Internal  Organization 

Having  cleared  away  the  more  general  aspects  of  the  charter, 
we  now  turn  to  the  actual  organization  of  the  Company  and  to 
its  relations  with  the  public  who  took  up  its  shares.  The  basis  of 
organization  was,  of  course,  the  constituent  companies,  operating 
in  the  several  chief  cities  of  the  Republic.  These  were  grouped 
according  to  location  and  came  under  the  administration  of  local 
directors  whose  appointment  was  assigned  to  the  "  States "  or 
parliaments  of  the  several  provinces.  The  body  of  local  directors 
thus  constituted  was  called  a  Chamber,  and  represented  the  inter- 
ests of  what  had  been  the  companies  of  its  district.  Naturally, 
then,  the  size  of  the  local  Chamber  was  proportional  to  the  com- 
mercial strength  of  its  district,  as  represented  by  the  antecedent 
formation  of  companies  :  Amsterdam  had  23  Directors,  Zeeland 
14,  Delft  12,  Rotterdam  9,  Hoorn  4,  and  Enkhuizen  1 1  (§§  18-23). 
This  made  a  total  of  73,  which  was  later  to  be  reduced  to  60,  of 
which  Amsterdam  was  to  have  20,  Zeeland  12,  and  the  rest  7 
apiece.  When  it  came  to  equipping  fleets,  etc.,  a  similar  proportion 
of  contribution  was  fixed,  namely  :  Amsterdam  one-half,  Zeeland 

i"Ebenso  wie  in  dem  Niederlandischen  Staate  die  sieben  fast  unabhangigen 
Provinzen  in  der  Versammlung  der  Generalstaaten  zu  eiiier  Republik  verbunden  wur- 
den,  ebenso  wurden  auch  die  sechs  selbststandigen  Kammein  durch  die  Versammlung 
der  Siebzehner  zu  einer  Compagnie  vereinigt."    De  Reus,  p.  39. 


398  COLONIZATION 

one-quarter,  and  the  rest  one-sixteenth  each  (§  i).^  Thus  else- 
where the  proportion  is  maintained  (cf.  §  29).  The  extent  of  the 
powers  of  these  local  Chambers  and  their  relation  to  each  other 
have  been  already  indicated. 

When  the  companies  merged,  a  general  directorate  was  created 
which  was  called  The  Seventeen,  or,  for  brevity's  sake.  The  XVII ; 
of  these  the  Chamber  of  Amsterdam  appointed  8,  that  of  Zee- 
land  4,  those  of  the  rest  one  each,  while  the  seventeenth  was  to 
be  elected  from  the  Chambers  of  Zeeland,  of  the  Maas  region 
(Rotterdam  and  Delft),  and  of  the  "North-Quarter"  (Hoorn  and 
Enkhuizen)  in  turn.^  To  The  Seventeen  was  comprehensively  dele- 
gated the  management  "of  all  affairs  touching  these  united  com- 
panies "  (§  2).  It  decided  the  times  and  destinations  of  voyages, 
the  number  of  ships  to  be  sent,  and,  in  general,  was  sovereign  of 
the  East  Indian  trade  (§  3).  Its  sessions  were  regularly  fixed  in 
Amsterdam  for  a  term  of  six  years,  then  in  Zeeland  for  two,  and 
so  on  in  alternation  (§  4) ;  but  irregularities  occurred,  especially 
when  it  was  deemed  needful  to  engage  in  political  activities  at 
the  capital.  The  several  functions  of  The  Seventeen  will  appear 
throughout  the  ensuing  narrative  ;  in  general,  this  body  sui)ervised 
the  trade  as  a  whole,  the  carrying-out  of  its  policy  being  left  to 
the  local  Chambers ;  it  was  administrative  in  its  activity,  not 
judicial.^ 

It  is  unnecessary  here  to  pursue  the  organization  of  the  Com- 
pany into  its  finer  ramifications.^  But  a  word  may  be  given  to  the 
chief  director  by  way  of  further  clarification  of  the  relation  of  the 
Company  to  the  state.  The  Stadhouder  Maurits  van  Nassau  had, 
as  has  been  seen,  considerable  influence  in  effecting  the  coalition 
of  the  companies,  and  both  he  and  his  successors  exerted  a  certain 
important  influence,  as  in  some  sort  heads  of  the  government,  upon 
the  Company  as  a  state-organ;  but  it  was  not  until  1674  that  the 
Princes  came  into  permanent  office  in  the  Company,  drawing  divi- 
dends from  it.  Willem  III  was  at  that  time  formally  constituted 
Chief  Director  and  was  to  receive  one-thirty-third  of  the  total  divi- 
dends declared.  This  move,  however,  though  it  indicates  the  grow- 
ing political  trend  of  the  Company,  had  no  essential  significance, 
says  De  Reus,''  for  its  internal  prosperity  or  external  reputation ; 

1  De  Reus,  pp.  8,  5.  ^  cf.  De  Reus,  pp.  5-6.  "  De  Reus,  pp.  19,  44. 

*  De  Reus  (pp.  51  ff.)  treats  of  the  Bookkeeper  and  other  more  special  functionaries. 
6  P.  69 ;  cf.  pp.  59-67. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE   INDIA  COMPANIES      399 

the  Prince  was  simply  the  nominal  head  of  the  Directorate,  but 
without  special  powers. 

In  fact,  there  were  no  essential  changes  in  the  Company's  home 
organization  until  the  years  of  its  downfall,  toward  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century.^ 

Before  coming  to  the  conditions  covering  general  participation 
in  the  Company,  it  remains  to  summarize  the  provisions  of  the 
charter  which  were  designed  to  control  the  local  Directors,  the 
active  agents  in  carrying  on  the  actual  operation  of  trade.  These 
were,  of  course,  the  managers  of  the  constituent  companies.  The 
names  of  the  73  are  given  (§§  18-23)  ^^^  ^^^  immediately  followed 
by  the  provision  that  vacancies  are  not  to  be  filled  (§  24)  until 
the  total  number  is  brought  down  to  60,  apportioned  as  explained 
above  (§  25) ;  after  that  time  vacancies  are  to  be  supplied  through 
selection  by  the  local  legislatures  of  one  name  out  of  three  pre- 
sented by  the  Company  (§  26).  It  may  here  be  remarked  that  with 
the  growth  of  political  influence  this  selection  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  burgomasters,  who  were  supposed  to  possess  a  more 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  candidates  and  their  qualifications;  they 
did  possess  such  knowledge,  at  least  so  far  as  they  and  their  polit- 
ical friends  were  concerned,  and  so  the  local  Directors,  and  conse- 
quently The  Seventeen,  came  presently  to  be  the  political  leaders 
of  the  cities  and  state,  and  were  able  as  officers  to  guard  them- 
selves as  Directors  from  many  unpleasant  consequences.'^  Neverthe- 
less it  was  intended  to  control  the  Directors  and  so  avoid  the  bad 
effects  of  monopoly ;  they  had  to  take  a  solemn  and  pious  oath  to 
act  honorably,  render  honest  accounts,  and  not  to  prefer  one  share- 
holder over  another  (§  27).  They  must  be  interested  in  the  enter- 
prises which  they  managed,  to  a  certain  amount  varying  with  the 
importance  of  the  trade  of  their  local  Chambers  (§  29).  They  could 
not  make  free  with  the  Company's  money  in  any  way  (§  30)  nor 
shift  expenses  upon  the  shareholders  (§  31) ;  they  were  responsible 
for  the  administration  of  their  several  treasuries  (§  33).  How  effect- 
ive these  safeguards  were  to  be  will  shortly  appear.  They  were 
paid  on  the  basis  of  one  per  cent  on  the  outfit  of  the  fleets  and  on 
the  return-cargoes,  apportionment  of  such  profits  to  be  on  the  lines 
already  cited  :  the  Amsterdam  Chamber  receiving  one-half,  that  of 
Zeeland  one-quarter,  and  the  rest  one-sixteenth  each  (§  29).  Thus 
a  careful  attempt  was  made  to  guard  against  the  weakness  of  human 

1  Alterations  are  discussed  by  De  Reus,  pp.  12  fi.        '^  De  Reus,  pp.  26-30,  37. 


400  COLONIZATION 

nature  and  to  obviate  what  the  slang  of  the  i:)resent  age  terms 
"graft  ";  even  private  correspondence  was  forbidden,  in  later  times, 
between  a  Director  and  any  one  in  India.'  If  the  Directors  had 
lived  up  to  the  spirit  of  the  charter  j^rovisions,  no  such  tale  would 
follow  as  that  which  is  to  tell  ;  but  they  were  practically  irrespon- 
sible and  their  actions  do  not  belie  the  fact. 

Rights  of  Shareholders 

The  definition  of  shareholders'  rights  as  against  the  Directors' 
really  amounts  to  further  restrictions  and  control  over  the  latter. 
It  was  provided  that  at  the  end  of  ten  years  a  general  [public  ac- 
counting should  be  held  in  the  presence  of  the  shareholders  (§  14) ; 
and,  further,  that  local  provinces  or  cities  interested  to  the  extent 
of  50,000  florins  could  demand  an  accounting,  even  of  incoming 
cargoes  (§  15),  and  that  several  provinces  together  could  appcnnt 
an  agent  who  should  have  the  right  of  thorough  examination  (§  16). 
It  was  also  provided  that  dividends  should  not  be  held  back  ;  they 
should  be  declared  when  five  per  cent  profit  lay  in  the  treasury 
(§  17).  These  provisions  of  restraint  fall  in  with  the  ones  just  con- 
sidered, and  their  evasion  or  nullification  forms  part  of  the  same 
mournful  and  sordid  tale.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  there  was  no  way 
provided  for  deposing  a  Director.^ 

Participation 

The  provisions  respecting  participation  in  the  Company  remain ; 
and  the  most  general  of  these  was  that  any  citizens  of  the  United 
Netherlands  could  invest  in  shares,  with  sums  small  or  great. 
Smaller  investments  were  encouraged  ;  for  it  was  provided  that  if 
the  shares  were  over-subscribed,  the  larger  investors  should  yield 
to  the  smaller  (§  10).  Certain  generous  and  fair-appearing  articles 
were  added,  allowing  any  shareholder  to  withdraw  his  money  at 
the  end  of  the  first  decade  when  the  first  general  accounting  was 
to  take  place  (§  7) ;  similarly  any  one  dissatisfied  with  the  early 
ventures  was  to  be  permitted  to  withdraw,  receiving  back  his  in- 
vestment with  seven  and  one-half  per  cent  (or  more)  interest  for 

1  De  Reus,  p.  24.  The  Chambers  were  not  to  receive  presents  (p.  24)  ;  cf.  Day, 
pp.  84-86,  88-91. 

2  Van  der  Chys,  p.  125.  This  author  thinks  (p.  12S)  tliat  the  defective  provisions 
respecting  the  shareholders  resulted  from  there  being  no  shareholders  at  the  time  of 
the  foundation  to  develop  this  side  of  the  charter. 


THE  0R(;ANIZATI0N   of  THK    INDIA  COMl'ANlIsS      401 

the  period  of  investment  (§  9).  Provision  was  made  in  apparently 
perfect  fairness  for  the  subsequent  entrance  of  new  participants 
(§  11);  and  there  seemed  to  be  foresight  and  conservatism  in  the 
arrangement  whereby  the  naturally  larger  outlays  of  the  first  decade 
were  to  go  over,  to  the  extent  of  "half  or  less,"  upon  the  partici- 
pants of  the  second  ten-year  period  (§  8).  It  is  noteworthy  here,  as 
bearing  upon  the  attitude  of  the  Dutch  toward  a  national  monopoly, 
that  only  Netherlanders  might  hold  shares  ;  in  fact  it  was  likewise 
enacted  that  prospective  Directors  should  declare  under  oath  their 
entire  disassociation  with  any  competing  foreign  company.^ 

Conflicts  between  Directors  and  Shareholders 

Of  the  topics  based  upon  charter-provisions  and  now  before  us, 
the  one  about  which  most  of  the  history  of  the  Company,  at  the 
European  end,  was  made,  was  that  of  the  relations  between  Direc- 
tors and  shareholders  ;  and  it  is  to  the  phases  of  this  relationship 
that  return  will  constantly  be  made. 

The  reputation  of  the  Company  was  so  high  that  shortly  after 
subscription  to  its  shares  was  opened,  6,450,000  florins  had  been 
brought  together,  Amsterdam  alone  furnishing  something  over 
half  of  this  sum.  A  few  days  after  the  Company's  establishment 
seventeen  vessels  sailed  for  the  East,  the  last  of  them  returning 
richly  laden  in  1607.  The  new  organization  seemed  to  justify  all 
the  high  expectations  of  the  country  :  in  1605  it  returned  divi- 
dends of  fifteen  per  cent,  in  1606  seventy-five  per  cent,  and  in  the 
following  four  years  forty,  twenty,  twenty-five,  and  fifty  per  cent 
respectively  —  a  total  of  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  per  cent  in 
eight  years.  But  this  tremendous  showing  was  evidently  decep- 
tive, for  the  shares,  having  risen  to  140  in  1605,  fell  to  80  in 
1607.2  And  it  was  not  long  before  voices  of  protest  against  the 
Directors  were  heard.  The  latter  had  already  found  that  their  task 
was  not  entirely  simple.  In  the  effort  to  keep  up  the  Company's 
early   reputation  they  had  been   lavish   in   dividends ;   they  were 

1  De  Reus,  p.  34. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  22-23,  27;  De  Reus,  pp.  175-179;  Blok,  III,  492,  495-496,  498; 
Roscher,  p.  277,  note  4.  De  Reus  (p.  17S)  shows  that  the  older  writers  were  incor- 
rect in  believing  that  these  dividends  came  out  of  the  Company's  earnings  subsequent 
to  its  formation.  The  accounts  of  The  Seventeen  give  1609  as  the  date  of  the  first 
real  Company  payments.  But  whatever  the  source  of  the  dividends,  the  Company 
could  scarcely  fail  to  get  the  credit  for  them,  especially  among  the  uninstructed.  For 
the  reputation  of  the  Company,  see  Colmeiro,  II,  453-454. 


402 


COLOXI/ATION 


moxcd  by  considerations  of  immediate  gain,  and  paid  little  atten- 
tion to  the  preservation  of  their  capital  and  to  the  meeting  of  their 
debts.  They  became  unscrupuhnis  as  to  the  source  of  the  divi- 
dends, and  began  to  borrow  money  at  high  rates  of  interest  in 
order  to  be  able  to  declare  them.  The  expenses  of  the  Company 
as  a  militant  organization  encroached  deeply  upon  their  funds  and 
left  them  ill  prepared  to  take  advantage  of  commercial  oi)p()rtu- 
nity  ;  for  example,  the  dispatch  of  two  large  war-vessels  to  conquer 
the  Moluccas  cost  them  150,000  guilders.  They  commenced  to 
fear  competition,  and,  asserting  that  the  government  did  not  afford 
them  security  in  this  respect,  they  began  impudently  to  refuse 
payment  of  money  which,  according  to  the  grant,  they  owed  to 
the  state. ^  The  sort  of  procedure  of  which  these  are  specimens 
could  not  have  failed  to  arouse  suspicion  and  distrust  in  a  people 
who  had  embarked  on  the  way  of  monopoly  with  misgivings. 

Hostility  to  the  Company 

The  critical  attitude  toward  the  Company  was  exemplified  in 
Le  Maire.  Le  Maire  had  been  elected  a  Director,  but  had  quarreled 
with  his  colleagues  and  resigned,  a  move  which  frightened  them 
more  than  it  should  have  done  had  their  operations  been  irre- 
proachable. They  feared  that  he  would  use  his  inside  information 
to  aid  others,  or  against  the  Company,  and  they  placed  him  under 
a  penalty  if  he  should  so  do.  It  can  be  seen  that  Le  Maire  was  an 
excellent  authority  upon  any  point  of  the  Company's  policy  about 
which  he  cared  to  speak.  But  he  was  far  more  than  a  scandal- 
monger ;  he  was  an  independent-spirited  man  and  a  farsighted 
merchant.  He  complained  of  the  narrowness  of  the  Company's 
policy,  directed  as  it  was  toward  the  exploitation  of  the  proximate 
source  of  gain,  the  spice-trade,  alone  ;  it  was  interested,  he  said, 
only  in  Bantam  and  the  Moluccas  ;  the  east  coast  of  Africa  had 
not  been  approached,  and  the  Japanese  trade  was  left  to  the  Portu- 
guese. The  Company,  moreover,  was  not  truly  loyal ;  warfare  was 
with  it  merely  a  means  to  get  gain ;  it  did  nothing  from  love  of 
the  fatherland  ;  it  managed  its  great  monopoly  without  conscience, 
appealing  to  its  charter  to  exclude  all  better-minded  people.  From 
having  been  one  of  its  Directors,  Le  Maire  emerged  as  a  deter- 
mined enemy  of  its   monopoly.     He   was  even  in  communication 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  28,  31. 


THE  ORGANIZATION   OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES     403 

with  Henry  IV  of  France  in  regard  to  a  French  company  when 
the  latter  suddenly  died,  in  May,  16 10,  and  the  plans  broke  up.^ 

The  Company  being  in  such  bad  repute,  there  were  not  a  few 
who,  though  they  saw  in  the  prosi^ective  peace  with  Spain  the 
probable  dissolution  of  the  Company,  were  yet  quite  ready  to  con- 
sent to  its  sacrifice.  But  the  government,  now  largely  involved  in 
the  organization,  —  for,  as  has  been  seen,  the  political  oligarchy 
had  gradually  filled  the  Directorate,  or  translated  the  Directors 
into  its  own  ranks,  —  had  no  such  purpose  ;  and  the  Company  was 
well  assured  of  this  fact.  But  there  was  no  certainty  that  the  latter 
could  keep  up  in  any  case  :  if  there  should  be  peace  with  the  grant 
of  access  to  the  East,  other  European  nations  would  press  in  whose 
competition  was  already  a  menace  ;  and  if  war  continued,  its  ex- 
penses would  only  increase.  In  any  event,  now  that  France  and 
England  had  made  peace  with  her,  Spain  was  free  to  cause  the 
more  trouble  and  cost.  Again,  were  the  state  obliged  to  send 
warships  and  defend  the  Indies,  it  would  attain  a  power  of  super- 
vision not  to  the  liking  of  the  Directors;  if  the  people  as  tax-payers 
had  to  carry  on  the  operations  in  the  East,  there  would  be  an 
accounting  despite  all  political  quietism.  Hence  the  Directors  felt 
that  to  keep  the  monopoly  they  must  themselves  hold  to  the  East 
Indies,  pay  high  dividends,  and  pose  the  Company  as  an  institution 
too  valuable  to  sacrifice.^ 

But  peace  was  made  in  1609  and  the  Company  did  not  cease  to 
be.  However,  it  was  in  wretched  shape  and  was,  moreover,  face  to 
face  with  the  approaching  decennial  report  and  accounting  due  in 
1612.  Conscious  of  its  desperate  condition,  and  fearing  withdrawal 
of  capital  if  anything  approaching  the  truth  should  get  out,  it  em- 
ployed the  subterfuge  of  asking  for  an  extension  of  time,  so  that 
it  might  make  its  reckoning  of  161 2  along  with  that  of  the  second 
decade,  in  1622.  This  request  was  clothed  with  a  show  of  reason- 
ableness and  with  an  appeal  to  loyalty  by  the  explanation  that 
the  expenses  of  the  first  decade  had  naturally  been  heavier,  and  the 
gains  less,  than  were  to  be  expected  from  the  second  ;  and  by  the 
warning  that  unless  all  the  capital  could  be  held  together,  success- 
ful opposition  to  Spain  in  the  East  Indies  would  be  impossible. 
This  request  provoked  a  storm  of  hostility  :  Le  Maire,  for  exam- 
ple, declared  it  to  be  "  out  and  out  absurd  and  impertinent."  As 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  33-37,  45  ff. ;   De  Reus,  pp.  67  ff. ;   Blok,  III,  496-497. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  38-40. 


404  COLONIZATION 

spokesman  of  many  others,  he  denounced  retention  of  shareholders' 
capital,  under  such  pretexts,  as  tyranny  ;  and  when  the  Directors 
suggested  that  shares  were  marketable  for  any  who  did  not  wish  to 
retain  them,^  he  retorted  that  the  right  to  sell  them  was  valueless, 
as  they  would  at  once  fall  if  the  Company  attained  its  demands. 
Despite  all  opposition,  however,  the  States-General  indorsed  the 
proposition  of  the  Directors ;  they  were  not  yet  able  to  send  a 
fleet  to  the  Indies,  and  judged  the  aid  of  the  Company  to  be  indis- 
pensable in  harming  the  Spaniards  and  preserving  trade  for  the 
Republic.  An  assault  upon  the  Company  was  construed  to  be  an 
attack  on  the  state.  Also,  as  must  constantly  be  borne  in  mind,  the 
legislators  were  themselves  largely  interested  in  the  destiny  of  the 
Company.^ 

This  proceeding  was  not  calculated  to  allay  the  suspicions  and 
discontent  of  the  shareholders,  now  virtually  constrained  to  remain 
in  a  questionable  venture.  The  revelations  of  the  fearless  governor- 
general  of  the  Indies,  Coen,^  but  confirmed  their  fears,  as  did  the 
eccentric  succession  of  dividends.  These  were,  in  1611,  50;  in 
1612,   25;  in    1613,    12;  and  in   1614,   3  per  cent.     Then  up  to 

1 6 19  no  more  were  paid,  though  several  high  percentages  were 
declared  and  interest  upon  them  promised.  Thus  it  appears  "  that 
the  wrong  principle  of  declaring  dividends,  even  if  there  were  no 
profit,  is  almost  as  old  as  the  Company  itself."     The  dividend  for 

1620  was  37|  per  cent.  The  charter  had  required  a  declaration 
of  dividends  whenever  there  should  be  five  per  cent  profit  in  the 
treasury,  though  it  had  unfortunately  neglected  to  determine  the 
maximum  percentage  to  be  paid.'*  This  fluctuation  of  returns  re- 
acted upon  the  value  of  the  shares,  causing  great  instability,  a  con- 
dition aggravated  by  the  actions  of  Le  Maire  and  others,  who  in 
disgust  and  anger  threw  their  shares  on  the  market,  causing  great 
decline  in  quotations.  The  Directors  asked  the  help  of  the  govern- 
ment to  stop  this  panic  and  the  latter  responded  by  forbidding  the 
sales  of  futures  in  shares  and  by  other  measures,  and  thus  further 
aroused  the  ire  of  those  who  asserted  that  freedom  in  buying  and 
selling  was  the  great  privilege  of  the  country.    Le  Maire  was  so 

1  Cf.  also  De  Reus,  p.  72.  The  Company's  policy  was  to  make  the  transference  of 
shares  difficult.     Id.,  p.  176. 

2  Van  Rees,  IT,  47-48.  Holland  especially  supported  the  Company.  De  Reus, 
pp.  69,  74.  ''  Cf.  p.  423,  below. 

*  Van  der  Chys,  p.  127;  De  Reus,  pp.  178-179.  For  an  excellent  brief  sketch  of 
the  Company's  finances,  see  Day,  pp.  70  ff. 


THJ<:  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE   INDIA  COMPANIES     405 

hounded  by  legal  persecution  that  he  had  to  leave  Amsterdam. 
But  instability  of  the  shares  continued  ;  the  renewal  of  dividend- 
payment  in  1620,  together  with  the  influence  of  an  agreement  with 
the  English,^  brought  quotations  from  166  to  250,  but  for  the  next 
two  years,  under  non-payment  of  dividends,  they  fell  to  165.  The 
conviction  gained  strength  that  the  Directors  were  utilizing  their 
inside  information  regarding  the  issue  of  dividends  in  shameless 
speculation;  that  they  were  acting  "neither  trustworthily  nor 
prudently."  During  the  second  decade  also  the  Company  had 
been  led  to  invest  a  million  toward  the  proposed  West  India  Com- 
pany, and  this  without  reference  to  the  shareholders  at  all ;  it  was 
correctly  objected  that  the  charter  contemplated  no  such  use  of 
funds. ^ 

Hence  all  the  malcontents  and  any  neutrals  among  the  share- 
holders were  very  anxious  to  see  the  double  decennial  report  of 

1622.  But  there  was  no  intention  of  making  any  such  accounting. 
The  Directors  had  by  this  time  attained  a  position  of  equanimity 
respecting  state  supervision  which  measured  their  real  identity  with 
the  government ;  and  when  the  participants  went  to  them  to  get 
information,  they  were  snubbed  right  royally  as  "  shameless  men 
who  wanted  to  mix  in  everything  and  were  presumptuous  enough 
to  call  to  account  their-  own  lords  and  masters."  They  were  in- 
formed that  if  they  did  not  compose  themselves  they  would  get  no 
dividends  for  seven  years.  Memorials  to  the  Directors  and  repre- 
sentations to  the  States-General  were  of  no  avail ;  the  petitioners 
were  denounced  as  Flemings  and  Brabanters,  ungrateful  for  the 
hospitality  they  enjoyed,  or  even  as  friends  of  Spain  who  were  try- 
ing to  destroy  the  agency  that  did  Spain  so  much  damage.  Hope 
was  held  out,  however,  that  after  the  extension  of  the  charter,  from 

1623,  attention  would  be  given  to  grievances  of  the  shareholders. 
This  was  small  satisfaction,  especially  when  it  leaked  out  that  the 
Directors  wanted  the  charter  extended  for  fifty  years,  and  that  they 
all  should  retain  their  offices.  An  appeal  was  made,  in  the  fashion 
of  the  time,  to  public  opinion ;  pamphlets  were  printed  and  circu- 
lated broadcast,  showing  how  the  Directors  had  taken  advantage 
of  their  position.  Vacancies  had  not  been  filled,  in  order  that  the 
survivors  might  divide  the  Directors'  percentage  among  fewer 
claimants  ;  this  percentage  had  been  raised  through  extravagant 
outlays  and  purchases  ;  more  Eastern  wares  also  had  been  bought 

1  Cf.  p.  419,  below.  ~  Van  Rees,  II,  65-67,  145-147  ;  De  Reus,  p.  177. 


4o6  COLONIZATION 

than  could  be  sold  with  advantai^c  in  Europe.  The  Company  was 
known  to  be  in  considerable  debt,  and  the  million  advanced  to  the 
West  India  Company  was  supposed  to  be  merely  a  way  of  securing 
to  the  Directors  a  good  share  of  the  latter's  profits.  In  any  case, 
many  of  the  Directors  became  suddenly  and  inexplicably  rich,  some 
were  known  to  have  done  private  business  in  the  Company's  ships, 
and  others  to  have  been  "  shamelessly  solicited  with  gifts  and 
presents."  They  had  failed  to  observe  the  articles  of  the  charter 
dealing  with  accounting,  declaration  of  dividends,  etc. ;  and  they 
had  proved  untrue  to  their  oath  of  office.^  They  were  plainly  escaping 
more  and  more  from  the  choice  and  oversight  of  the  shareholders.^ 

The  answers  of  the  Directors  to  all  this  were  specious  :  they 
harped  on  the  fact  that  the  Company's  records  were  "material  of 
state";  that  the  hcav^y  expenses  had  been  incurred  in  waging  the 
country's  wars,  latterly  against  the  English  ;  that  their  borrowings 
really  advantaged  the  country,  affording  as  they  did  ■  such  excel- 
lent investments  ;  that  the  decline  of  the  shares  was  really  due  to 
speculation,  crushed  in  1610  by  the  state,  but  rife  again  in  1621. 
They  also  resorted  to  bluster,  branding  some  of  the  strongest  pam- 
phlets as  seditious  and  disorderly  libels,  and  offering  rewards  for 
the  discovery  of  author  or  printer.  The  state  seconded  these  meas- 
ures ;  in  Holland  the  courts  were  even  forbidden  to  take  cognizance 
of  complaints  regarding  the  extension  of  the  charter  and  allied 
subjects.  These  gag-measures,  however,  did  not  frighten  the  peo- 
ple, who  were  coming  to  perceive  the  true  inconsistency  of  the 
Company's  existence  ;  they  did  not  demand  its  dissolution,  but  the 
separation  of  politics  and  trade  ;  they  were  willing  to  leave  their 
money  in  the  Company,  but  they  wanted  the  Directors  to  be  re- 
sponsible. Let  the  state  do  the  war-making,  if  need  be  (ran  the 
plea),  for  it  could  do  that  better  than  the  merchants  ;  and  let  the 
latter  run  the  business,  which  they  could  do  much  better  than 
the  state.- 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  Company  was  in  good  part  a  vic- 
tim to  experimentation  in  a  new  field  of  economic  organization,  or, 
i:)erhaps  more  exactly,  to  experimentation  upon  a  much  larger  scale 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  147-151  ;  De  Reus,  pp.  70  ff. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  1 57-161.  This  seems  to  have  Ijeen  prophetic.  "  The  fiscal  history 
of  the  Company  can  be  roughly  summarized  by  saying  that  in  its  early  period,  when 
il  was  more  trader  than  ruler,  it  made  money  on  the  whole;  that  in  its  later  ])eriod, 
when  it  was  more  ruler  than  trader,  it  lost."  Uay,  p.  73;  cf.  Koscher,  p.  2S6; 
p.  560,  below. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES     407 

in  an  old  field.  The  Company  was  always  serving  two  masters  : 
the  shareholders  and  the  state.  The  returning  fleets  had  been 
obliged  by  the  charter  to  report  to  the  States-General,  and  gradu- 
ally the  Directors  fell  into  the  discussion  of  war-policy  with  the 
authorities.  Thus  the  Company's  archives  came  really  to  be  state- 
documents  ;  and  its  credit  and  strength  were  synonymous  with  those 
of  the  United  Provinces.  And  with  the  increasing  degree  of  iden- 
tity between  the  controllers  of  the  state  and  of  the  Company,  al- 
ready noted,  this  inherent  condition  became  the  more  pronounced.^ 

Renewals  of  the  Charter  ;  Decline 

But  the  state  was  not  willing  to  resolve  this  union  of  inconsist- 
ent functions  by  itself  taking  up  the  war-making  in  the  East ;  there 
was  no  doubt  that  the  charter  would  be  renewed  and  the  Directors 
continued.  But  when,  in  December,  1622,  the  renewal  for  twenty 
years  was  made,  public  opinion  was  recognized  in  the  attachment 
of  certain  conditions  having  to  do  with  the  relation  of  the  Com- 
pany to  its  participants.  The  Directors  were  to  present  to  certain 
chief  shareholders,  within  six  months,  a  general  reckoning  "  accord- 
ing to  the  style  and  fitting  form,  as  it  is  wont  to  be  done  among 
merchants  ";  this  was  to  be  public,  and  was  to  be  repeated  every 
ten  years.  Again,  the  Directors  were  to  retire  according  to  sched- 
ule, becoming  eligible  again  after  three  years,  and  their  selection 
was  to  fall  slightly  more  into  the  shareholders'  hands.  They  should 
not  be  preferred  purchasers  from  the  Company.  Also  the  chief 
shareholders  should  choose  nine  out  of  their  number  to  supervise 
the  annual  accounts  of  their  Chamber,  while  The  Seventeen  should 
ask  their  advice  concerning  sales  and  other  important  matters.^ 

The  shareholders  had  to  acquiesce  in  the  charter-extension,  and 
made  the  best  of  the  new  conditions,  electing  the  inspectors  of  ac- 
counts and  sending  them  to  Amsterdam  in  1623.  But  the  Direct- 
ors would  give  them  only  the  most  general  of  the  records,  refusing 
the  detailed  India  accounts,  letters,  etc.  An  appeal  to  the  States- 
General  brought  a  command  to  turn  the  latter  over  (April,  1624) ; 
but  on  the  return  to  Amsterdam  all  these  documents  were  gone 
and  effort  to  find  them  was  vain.    The  searchers  were  informed 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  155-156.  The  state  assisted  the  Company  in  diplomatic  ways 
also ;  and  when  it  was  feared  that  sailors  would  go  into  foreign  service,  it  forbade 
experienced  mariners  to  take  service  in  other  lands.  Yet  the  policy  of  the  Company 
really  drove  talent  out  of  its  serv'ice.    Id.,  pp.  28-32,  37.         2  Van  Rees,  II,  161 -164. 


4o8  COLONIZATION 

that  they  would  not  be  able  to  satisfy  their  curiosity  that  time,  nor 
earn  big  vacation  pay  ;  the  accounting  did  not  take  place.  A  simi- 
lar fate  awaited  the  nine  auditors  of  annual  accounts.  The  Direct- 
ors tried  to  use  undue  influence  in  their  choice  and  insisted  that 
they  should  have  at  least  a  thousand  Flemish  pounds^  invested  in 
the  Company  ;  they  received  in  their  resistance  and  obstruction 
such  political  support,  especially  from  Holland,  that  the  partici- 
pants had  finally  to  give  it  up.  Thus  the  struggle  for  the  renewal 
of  the  charter  left  the  Company  still  more  free  from  the  duty  of 
responsibility  to  shareholders,  and  the  Directors  practically  per- 
manent and  unimpeachable.''^ 

Each  succeeding  extension  of  charter  found  the  Directors  ever 
farther  advanced  upon  the  way  they  had  taken,  and  the  resistance 
encountered  by  them  ever  more  languid.  The  Company  itself  got 
into  worse  straits  financially,  declaring  dividends  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  century  in  question  when  there  was  nothing  to  declare  them 
with  except  a  debt;  they  gave  the  shareholders,  to  quiet  them, 
interest-bearing  obligations  on  the  Company  (at  four  per  cent)  in 
1679,  1680,  1 68 1,  1682,  1697,  1698.  The  speculation  in  shares, 
which  began  early  in  the  history  of  the  Company  and  was  graphic- 
ally described  as  a  "  Windhandel,"  went  on  through  all  the  later 
periods.  Quotations  were  up  to  400  in  the  middle  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  and  rose  at  times,  after  a  succession  of  dividends, 
to  1080  and  even  1720.  Again,  after  bad  news  from  the  East, 
they  fell  to  60  and  48  ;  1730  was  a  "  dark  time  "  for  the  Comjiany. 
But  as  late  as  1720  shares  reached  1260,  and  in  such  unfortunate 
years  as  1672  and  1781  they  were  quoted  at  250  and  215  respec- 
tively. During  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  they  rose 
as  high  as  750.  It  is  clear  that  these  were  thoroughly  fictitious 
values. 

The  last  dividend  was  ]x\k]  in  1782.  During  the  198  years  of 
the  Company's  existence  the  sum  total  paid  to  shareholders  is  fig- 
ured at  3600 .'5  per  cent,  or  an  average  of  18  per  cent  a  year.  This 
seems  very  high  ;  but  it  must  be  realized  that  the  Company  con- 
stantly operated  with  a  capital  in  excess  of  the  par  value  of  its 
shares,  and  that  the  state  of  mind  of  the  shareholders  was  one  of 
constant  insecurity.  No  one  knew  where  the  dividends  came  from 
and  they  lent  no  solid  value  to  the  shares. '"^    In  its  latter  years,  the 

'  About  52400;  cf.  De  Reus,  p.  20,  note  2.  -  Van  Rees,  IT,  165-169. 

■*  De  Reus,  pp.  xxxiixxxiii,  175-180;  Van  Rees,  II,  294;  lilok,  III,  495-499. 


THE  COLONIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES     409 

only  ones  beside  the  Directors  who  seem  to  have  drawn  steady 
profit  from  the  Company  were  the  members  of  a  commission  of 
the  States-General,  who  received  generous  gifts  of  money,  spices, 
and  the  like,  for  an  indulgent  examination  and  certification  of  shaky 
accounts.  The  charter  was  extended  from  period  to  period  with- 
out any  strife,  on  condition  at  times  of  a  goodly  contribution  to 
the  state  or  an  addition  to  the  fleet.  From  1782  to  1794  the 
debts  increased  nearly  8,000,000  florins,  amounting  to  a  grand 
total  of  74,000,000  in  1789,  and  the  aid  of  the  government  was 
asked,  in  humility,  over  and  over.  But  the  Directors  would  not 
renounce  their  petty  perquisites,^  caring  little  really  for  the  Com- 
pany ;  after  1790  the  latter  was  entirely  dependent  on  the  state. 
Thus  it  continued  to  lead  a  dishonorable  and  sordid  existence, 
growing  steadily  weaker  until  the  war  with  England  in  1781  re- 
vealed its  true  condition,  and  the  events  culminating  in  the  fall  of 
the  state  before  the  French  power,  in  1795,  swept  it  away.^ 

Foundation  of  the  West  India  Company 

We  have  thus  far  observed  the  Company's  operations  and  policy 
in  Europe,  and  have  yet  to  exhibit  its  other  and  even  more  char- 
acteristic aspects,  or  phases  of  the  same  aspect,  in  its  Eastern 
dominion.  But,  by  way  of  throwing  similar  topics  into  proximity, 
it  seems  advisable  first  to  consider  the  formation  and,  in  many 
respects,  parallel  organization  and  career  in  Europe  of  the  West 
India  Company. 

Although  the  older  Company  had  made  little  or  no  use  of  its 
monopoly  of  the  Magellan  Straits  passage,  it  had  consistently 
resisted  all  efforts  to  utilize  this  route  of  approach  to  the  East. 
The  most  serious  of  such  attempts  had  been  made  by  the  arch- 
enemy, Le  Maire,  who,  smarting  under  his  persecutions,  conceived 
the  idea  of  hunting  for  a  passage  to  the  Pacific  farther  to  the 
south.  He  attained  from  the  state  assurances  of  rights  in  any 
passage  he  might  open  up,  and  an  expedition  was  fitted  out  which 
discovered  the  Straits  of  Le  Maire  (January  24,  16 16)  and  later 
the  passage  around  the  Cape.  A  ship  was  now  dispatched  to  the 
Moluccas  by  the  new  route,  but  upon  arrival  its  papers  were  seized 
by  the  Dutch  governor-general  and  the  crew  shipped  home.    A 

^  Their  "  Zuckerbrot,"  as  De  Reus  (p.  31)  calls  it. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  171-172,210,217;  De  Reus,  pp.  xlvi,  27-33  ;  Fortanier,  pp.  39  ff. ; 
Day,  pp.  73  ff. 


4IO  COLONIZATION 

protest  from  Le  Maire  before  the  States-General  secured  restitu- 
tion and  damages  ;  but  the  whole  incident  made  it  clear  that  the 
Company  would  brook  no  competition,  that  it  was  ready  to  do  the 
same  thing  over  again.  About  a  century  later  a  second  attempt 
with  a  similar  history  took  place,  after  which  there  was  no  further 
competition  on  the  part  of  Dutchmen  while  the  Company  lasted.^ 
With  regard  to  America  itself,  however,  in  so  far  as  enterprises 
thither  directed  did  not  threaten  the  East,  the  Company  was  far 
more  indifferent.  This  appeared  in  its  half-contemptuous  attitude 
toward  the  agitation  preceding  the  West  India  Company's  formation. 

WiLLEM    USSELINCX 

The  man  above  all  others  who  kept  the  project  of  an  American 
company  before  the  Dutch  public  was  Willem  Usselinc.x,^  an  enthu- 
siast, in  many  respects  far  in  advance  of  his  age,  and  who  ])ursued 
a  plan  of  his  youth  varying  only  in  its  details,  through  a  long  life. 
"  This  plan  was  in  the  main  very  simple,  and  consisted  in  the 
founding  of  settlements  without  slaves  in  America,  not  in  order  to 
seek  gold  and  silver  there,  but  to  establish  a  profitable  reciprocal 
exchange  of  manufactures  for  raw  goods  between  mother-country 
and  colony."  He  likewise  hoped  thus  to  transfer  the  field  of  strife 
between  the  Netherlands  and  S))ain  to  a  distance,  and  to  under- 
mine the  power  of  the  enemy  by  cutting  off  the  sources  of  his 
strength.  Thus  he  thought  to  benefit  the  Netherlands  in  a  positive 
way,  and  also  to  honor  God  by  spreading  the  holy  evangel ;  and 
since  segregated  traders  could  do  little,  he  proposed  a  great  West 
India  Company.  These  ideas  were  presented  to  the  public  as  early 
as  I  591,  and  in  1600  there  seemed  to  be  some  likelihood  of  their 
realization,  though  the  tendency  was  always  toward  organization 
on  the  lines  of  the  East  India  Company,  a  fact  which  gave  Usse- 
lincx  great  anxiety.  For  this  man  was  in  several  respects  like  Le 
Maire,  and  was  dominated  by  a  similar  hatred  of  the  older  organiza- 
tion. 1  lowever,  the  question  of  war  or  peace  with  Spain  was  to  the 
fore  in  the  first  decade  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and  the  foun- 
dation of  a  new  Company  was  made  to  await  its  issue.  The  war- 
party,  realizing  that  such  a  move  would  destroy  all  hope  of  j^cace, 
favored  the  project,  but  the  peace-party,  headed  by  Oldenbarne- 
velt,  was  unwilling  to  organize  such  an  expensive  war-machine, 
'  Van  Rees,  II,  67-72.  ^  q,^  ti^g  ]jfe  Qf  Usselincx,  see  Jameson. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES     411 

which,  besides,  offered  no  prospect  of  gain.  The  temper  of  the 
country  decided  for  peace  and  it  was  concluded  in  1609  with 
Httle  attention  to   Ussehncx  or  his  partisans.^ 

However,  what  with  the  growth  of  confidence  as  against  Spain 
and  the  widening  conception  of  commercial  possibility,  the  idea  of 
the  Company  was  not  allowed  to  drop.  The  state  toyed  with  the 
project,  and  asked  a  good  deal  of  advice  from  Usselincx,  who  seems 
to  have  possessed  a  wide  practical  knowledge  of  the  Indies,  both 
East  and  West.  Thus  matters  developed  until  1621,  when  the 
Company  was  actually  founded.  Its  charter,  following  closely  that 
of  the  East  India  Company,  realized  the  worst  apprehensions  of 
Usselincx,  who  had  been  a  severe  critic  of  the  older  Company  and 
who  believed  that  "  merchants  have  gain  for  a  pole-star  and  greed 
for  a  compass,  and  are  unfit  to  rule."  It  is  of  little  utility  to 
follow  his  criticisms  of  the  charter,  for  they  were  of  no  av^ail ;  it 
may  simply  be  said  that  his  views  were  of  a  distinctly  modern 
type,  and  so,  to  his  own  age,  visionary  and  in  many  respects  really 
impracticable.  To  get  booty,  to  found  strongholds,  and  to  conquer, 
were  the  colonial  goals  set  before  the  peoples  of  that  age  ;  the 
slow,  costly,  and  laborious  foundings  of  true  settlement  colonies 
presented  no  attraction  at  all.  Again,  when  the  power  of  Holland 
among  the  Provinces  is  realized,  and  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  the 
most  influential  Hollanders  were  also  Directors  of  the  East  India 
Company,  it  is  little  wonder  that  such  innovations  in  policy  were 
promptly  rejected.  Thus  Usselincx's  advice  and  warnings  went 
for  naught ;  they  even  called  him  a  friend  of  Spain,  which  hurt 
him  more  than  all  else.  He  suffered  the  fate  of  a  man  who  is  in 
advance  of  his  time  ;  he  became  bitter  in  his  disappointment,  fell 
into  debt,  drifted  into  the  service  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  of  Sweden, 
and  assisted  him  in  his  schemes  for  a  South  Sea  Company  until 
the  death  of  the  monarch  put  an  end  to  this  also.  He  came  to 
regard  himself  as  a  martyr,  speaking  continually  of  his  unpaid 
services,  but  gradually  dropped  out  of  sight,  and  died,  probably  in 
1647,  at  the  age  of  eighty. ^ 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  72-96. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  98-103,  112-122,  129-132,  134-142.  Jameson's  monograph  on 
Usselincx  covers  many  details  of  the  founding  of  the  West  India  Company,  as  well 
as  of  that  of  the  Swedish  company.  Into  the  story  of  the  latter,  because  it  possesses 
curious  interest  rather  than  importance  to  the  general  student  of  colonization,  it  has 
seemed  unnecessary  to  go.    In  all  essentials  Jameson  supports  Van  Rees. 


412 


COLONIZATION 


Organization  of  the  West  India  Company 


The  monopoly  granted  to  the  West  India  Company  in  162 1  was 
for  twenty-four  years  ;  it  covered  most  of  the  west  coast  of  Africa, 
all  of  the  east  coast  of  America  from  Newfoundland  to  Cape  Horn, 
and  a  large  part  of  the  west  coast  of  South  America,  as  well  as 
all  Atlantic  islands  included  within  these  boundaries  and  all  "  south- 
ern lands"  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  westward  to  New  Guinea. 
There  were  constituted  five  Chambers  which  met  at  Amsterdam 
and  Middleburg  (Zceland),  and  a  directorial  college,  "The  Nine- 
teen." Reports  were  due  every  si.x  years.  The  state  by  virtue  of 
subsidies  given  was  to  have  a  large  share  in  the  gain  to  be  gotten, 
and  was  to  insure  the  safety  of  the  Company  with  sixteen  large 
and  four  small  war-vessels.  The  Company  was  essentially  a  fighting 
organization,  with  sinister  designs  upon  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
America. 1  In  view  of  the  prospective  expense  of  this  military 
function,  and  because  there  was  no  immediate  promise  of  gain,  as 
in  the  spice-trade,  the  subscriptions  for  shares  came  in  very  slowly  ; 
people  had  taken  warning  from  the  East  India  Company  and  feared 
to  invest.  But  the  government  granted  the  new  Company  the 
monopoly  of  West  India  salt  (1622) ;  state-officials  subscribed  and 
urged  the  richest  citizens  to  do  so.  The  East  India  Company  was 
forced  to  put  a  million  into  its  younger  contemporary,  and  sub- 
scriptions were  solicited  in  foreign  countries.  Despite  all  this 
pressure,  however,  the  subscription-list  stayed  open  until  Septem- 
ber, 1623  ;  finally  there  were  gotten  together  7,108,106  florins,  of 
which  half  came  from  Amsterdam,  and  in  November  the  new  Com- 
pany had  fifteen  ships  at  sea.^ 

The  history  of  the  West  India  Company  is  in  one  distinctive 
respect  different  from  that  of  its  East  India  contemporary :  of 
the  two  inconsistent  functions  of  trade  and  war,  it  accentuated  the 
latter,  while  the  East  India  Company,  despite  all  its  talk  of 
patriotism,  was  above  all  a  trade-organization.  Hence  the  West 
India  Company  assisted  the  state  against  Spain  to  a  greater 
extent,  and  more  as  a  matter  of  avowed  policy,  and  thus  debated 
its  operations  with  the  government  and  was  supported  by  national 
ships-of-war  and  troops.  It  was  thus  far  less  indei:)cndcnt  than  the 
East  India  Company,  which,  after  the  early  strifes  over  the  charter 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  1 10-112,  121  ;  Roscher,  pp.  270  ff. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  125-128,  133-134. 


THE  0R(;AN1ZATI0N   of  the   INDIA   C;OMPANH^:S     413 

had  practically  gone  its  own  way.  Nor  was  the  monopoly  of  the 
western  Company  so  complete ;  there  was  from  the  outset  a  great 
deal  of  illicit  trade  in  America  which  the  extent  of  coast-line  and 
the  absence  of  any  natural  point  of  supervision  made  it  impossible 
to  prevent.  As  early  as  1631  certain  rights  of  voyage  were  allowed 
to  private  persons  under  provision  that  they  should  use  only  well- 
armed  ships  and  should  pay  a  recognition  of  20  per  cent  to  the 
Company;  and  in  1634  the  whole  of  Brazil,  with  a  few  reserva- 
tions, was  opened  under  like  conditions.  The  gain  to  these  private 
traders  was  so  great  that  by  1636  The  Nineteen  considered  limi- 
tation of  freedom,  but  the  Amsterdam  Directors  opposed  this, 
and  won  their  point;  in  1638  the  Directors,  in  conjunction  with 
the  States-General,  left  commerce  free  to  the  Dutch  and  the 
inhabitants  of  Brazil  under  payment  of  10  per  cent  for  European 
and  30  per  cent  for  American  wares.  But  one  trip  a  year  was 
allowed  to  each  vessel  ;  and  the  Company  reserved  for  itself  the 
trade  in  slaves.  Brazil-wood,  and  necessities  of  war.^ 

Maladministration  and  Decline 

The  Company  had  attained  a  strong  footing  in  Brazil  during  the 
early  years  of  its  existence,  but  was  unable,  largely  for  lack  of 
funds,  to  hold  it.^  Reckoning  on  state-subsidies  it  had  expended 
nearly  all  it  possessed  in  dividends,  and  so  ran  out  of  money  just 
at  a  time  when  new  enterprises  and  war  demanded  large  outlays. 
In  1629,  after  the  capture  of  the  Spanish  silver  fleet,  dividends 
had  reached  50  and  25  per  cent;  but  already  in  163 1  aid  was  of 
necessity  sought  from  the  state.  It  was  given  in  the  form  of  a 
loan  of  700,000  guilders  and  later  repeated.  But  after  a  time  the 
subsidies  began  to  fail  and  to  be  replaced  by  bad  debts.  In  1629 
the  Company  had  stood  by  the  state,  furnishing  ships  and  men, 
and  contributing,  besides  other  aid,  600,000  guilders  ;  in  163 1  the 
States-General  were  in  debt  to  the  Company  1,250,000  guilders 
for  money  advanced.  Holland  alone  had  been  prompt  in  payments, 
but,  when  the  rest  had  fallen  behind,  refused  to  pay  till  they  did  ; 
in  1638  Holland  alone  owed  over  a  million.  By  1636  the  Company, 
having  been  forced  to  borrow,  was  in  debt  18,000,000  guilders, 
and  by  1640  the  case  was  hopeless.  There  was  too  little  unity  of 
purpose  in  the  States-General ;  the  several  Provinces  were  always 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  179-180,  1S3-188.  ^  cf.  pp.  146  ff.,  above,  and  453  ff.,  below. 


414 


COLONIZATION 


pursuing  their  selfish  interests,  and  set  them  aside  only  in  times  of 
the  utmost  need.  As  long  as  the  war  with  Spain  was  located 
within  its  district  the  Company  was  favored  ;  now  hostilities  were 
on  the  southern  boundaries  of  the  Republic  and  its  services  were 
no  longer  needed.^  In  1644  the  charters  of  both  companies  came 
to  an  end,  and  a  union  was  proposed.  Strong  objection  immedi- 
ately developed  on  the  part  of  the  East  India  Company,  which 
declared  that  it  could  not  go  in  for  the  war-projects  of  its  fellow, 
and  asserted  its  absolute  rights  in  the  East  Indies.  The  West 
India  Company  recalled  other  combinations,  among  them  that  by 
which  the  East  India  organization  had  itself  been  formed  ;  and  it 
called  to  mind  its  own  services.  From  1623  to  1636  it  had  fitted 
out  over  800  ships,  with  67,000  men,  and  had  maintained  24,000 
men  in  service  at  a  cost  of  45,000,000  guilders.  It  had  captured 
or  destroyed  over  600  Spanish  ships,  98  of  which  were  "  famous 
galleons,"  and  had  brought  the  king  of  Spain  75,000,000  guilders' 
worth  of  trouble.  The  winnings  of  the  Company  from  ships  cap- 
tured and  from  booty  had  been  about  37,000,000  guilders  from 
1623  to  1636.  These  operations  had  aided  the  East  India  Com- 
pany, also,  by  diverting  Spain's  attention  from  the  East  ;  and  now 
that  the  king  of  Spain  had  heard  of  the  proposed  union  of  the  two 
companies  he  was  the  more  eager  for  peace.  The  conqueror  of 
Brazil,  Count  Nassau,  was  convinced  that  Spain  could  not  stand 
against  the  two  in  union,  but  would  lose  all  she  had  in  the  New 
World.  The  pamphlets  of  the  time  appear  to  have  favored  the  West 
India  Company,^  and  men  like  Usselincx  opposed  the  union  on  the 
ground  that  thereby  all  the  trade  would  fall  into  dishonest  and 
disreputable  hands.  The  older  Company  had  involved  the  coun- 
try with  the  English  and  was  out  of  favor ;  it  was  even  seen  that 
the  West  India  Company's  trade  in  raw  goods  and  manufactures 
was  more  solid  and  valuable  than  that  in  the  spices  of  the  East.^ 

During  this  discussion  the  charters  were  periodically  renewed 
for  brief  terms,  until  finally  decision  was  made  against  union 
(March,  1647).  The  charter  of  the  East  India  Company  was 
then  extended  for  twenty-five  years,  but  it  was  to  pay  a  million 
and  a  half  guilders  to   the  West    India  Company.      In  July  the 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  180  ff.,  190-193;  Roscher,  p.  272. 

2  The  king  of  Spain  regarded  the  West  India  realm  as  his  "true  spouse,"  while 
that  of  the  East  Indies  was  only  his  "  mistress."  Hence  the  greater  damage  wrought 
against  him  by  the  West  India  Company.    Van  Rees,  II,  202. 

^  Van  Rees,  II,  193-205;  Watson,  II,  21. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIA  COMPANIES     415 

latter's  charter  was  extended,  also  for  twenty-five  years,  although 
its  shares  were  down  to  30  and  the  state  of  affairs  in  Brazil  was 
lamentable,  the  families  of  the  Dutch  functionaries  actually  suffer- 
ing from  hunger.  This  situation  was  charged  up  to  extravagance 
and  questionable  practices  adopted  after  the  example  of  the  East 
India  Company  ;  but  it  was  against  the  constitution  of  the  Repub- 
lic and  the  spirit  of  the  time  for  the  state  to  take  over  colonies, 
however  wretched,  so  it  merely  propped  up  the  old  organization. 
Creditors  began  to  make  trouble  in  1655,  ^I'^cl  in  1667  sale  of  the 
charter  to  the  highest  bidder  was  considered  ;  in  1674  the  state 
of  the  Company  was  so  bad  that  it  was  decided  to  give  it  up.  A 
new  one  was  then  erected,  with  certain  provisions  regarding  triennial 
accounting  and  the  separation  of  war  and  trade  ;  commerce  was 
to  be  open  to  all  on  condition  of  a  recognition  to  the  Company,  thus 
become  a  mere  incubus  upon  private  trade.  In  1730  further  limi- 
tation of  the  monopoly  took  place.  Shares  had  sunk  from  92  in 
1723  to  35,  and  the  dividends  between  1730  and  1780  averaged 
about  one  and  one-half  per  cent ;  the  Company  was  living  upon 
the  dues  paid  by  private  traders,  and  the  opinion  was  growing  that 
it  was  useless.  In  1 791,  when  the  question  of  charter-renewal  came 
up,  it  was  disbanded  ;  the  council  of  the  Company  was  succeeded 
by  a  Council  of  the  Colonies,  and  the  shares  at  30  were  converted 
into  three-per-cent  obligations  of  the  state. ^ 

The  story  of  these  companies  seems  a  sorry  enough  affair ;  yet 
the  Dutch  rather  unanimously  regarded  them  as  "  the  two  pillars 
upon  which  the  status  of  these  lands  rests."  They  appeared  to 
constitute  a  necessary  part  of  a  government  unable  to  attend  to 
distant  possessions  and  interests.  "  During  the  second  half  of  the 
seventeenth  and  almost  the  whole  of  the  eighteenth  century  no  one 
doubted  that  the  possession  of  the  East  India  trade  was  dependent 
upon  the  existence  of  the  great  Company."  ^  But  before  attempt- 
ing any  more  general  estimate  of  these  chartered  monopohes,  or 
trying  to  arrive  at  a  conception  of  their  influence  upon  the  life  of 
the  metropolis,  it  still  remains  to  treat  of  their  activity  within  the 
regions  assigned  to  their  control. 

1  Van  Rees,  11,  209-211,  213,  218-223. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  213,  216;  cf.  Colmeiro,  II,  453-454. 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE   COMPANIES   IN    THEIR  FIELDS 

Immediately  after  the  formation  of  the  East  India  Company,  as 
has  been  seen,  a  fleet  of  seventeen  vessels  sailed  for  the  East ; 
these  were  followed  in  1603  by  one  of  thirteen,  well-armed  ;  and  in 
1606  by  a  third.  The  first  established  a  factory  at  Bantam,  where 
a  head-merchant  and  sub-officials  were  left.  Thence  ships  plied 
in  all  directions,  to  Banda,  Atjeh,  Borneo,  Siam,  and  China.  The 
second  visited  Goa  and  Calicut,  concluding  a  treaty  with  the 
Zamorin  of  the  latter  district ;  went  to  the  Moluccas,  where  con- 
quests were  made  and  a  governor  left ;  founded  a  factory  at  Banda 
and  penetrated  as  far  as  New  Guinea.  The  third,  under  Matelief, 
defeated  the  Portuguese  near  Malacca  but  could  not  take  the  place, 
and  thence  pushed  on  as  far  as  Tidore,  Ternatc,  and  even  Macao. 
In  1607  a  stronger  fleet,  under  an  admiral,  departed  to  fight  the 
Portuguese  in  Malacca  and  the  Moluccas ;  it  visited  and  made 
treaties  in  Mozambique  and  Farther  India,  seized  many  Portuguese 
ships,  and  was  just  ready  to  assault  Malacca  when  the  peace  of 
1609  was  announced.^  Matelief's  idea  in  attacking  Malacca  had 
been  to  close  the  Straits  of  Singapore  to  rivals,  Portuguese  above 
all  ;  but  he  intended  to  shut  out  both  Arabs  and  Chinese  as  well, 
and  then  to  drive  the  Spanish  from  the  Philippines.  Coen  elabo- 
rated the  same  idea  in  his  plan  of  forcing  the  Chinese  to  allow  free 
trade  along  their  coast  and  to  keep  out  of  the  archipelago  except 
in  so  far  as  they  came  to  Batavia  to  trade  with  the  Dutch.  This 
project,  it  may  be  added,  was  partially  realized  ;  in  1624  the  Dutch 
occupied  Formosa  and  a  lively  trade  with  the  Chinese  ensued  ;  but 
the  arrogance  and  greed  of  the  Dutch  disgusted  the  Orientals,  and 
after  1661,  when  the  Chinese  private  Coxinga  seized  F'ormosa,  the 
Chinese  trade  was  confined  to  the  taking  of  tea  to  Batavia.  How- 
ever, there  was  no  more  serious  competition  from  east  and  south 
Asia  and,  after  the  conquest  of  Malacca  (1641),  the  straits  remained 
closed. 

1  Ulok.  111,493-495  ;  Van  Rees,  II,  226-228. 
416 


THE  COMPANIES   IN  THEIR   FIELDS 


Centralization  of  Administration 


417 


All  through  this  early  period  the  Company  proceeded  upon  the 
regular  mercantile  programme  of  making  treaties  and  founding 
factories  on  an  extensive  scale.  Gradually,  however,  these  estab- 
lishments began  to  display  a  lack  of  unity  of  purpose,  heads  of 
factories  acting  independently  of  each  other  as  far  as  their  instruc- 
tions permitted.  Local  management  was  proved  a  failure  and  the 
need  of  centralization  shown  ;  it  was  likewise  desirable  to  present 
a  strong  front  to  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese,  and,  as  the  latter 
had  done,  to  impress  the  natives  by  a  magnificent  court.  Thus,  in 
1609,  a  governor-general,  Pieter  Both,  was  appointed,  who  arrived 
in  Bantam  and  began  actual  Dutch  rule  in  the  Indies  on  December 
19,  1 6 10.  From  this  time  on,  the  ofifice  thus  created  was  almost 
that  of  a  monarch.  The  governor  was  expected  to  follow  the 
orders  of  The  Seventeen,  and  there  was  attached  to  him,  as  a 
sort  of  check,  a  council  {Raad  van  Indie)  of  five  men,  later  (16 17) 
increased  to  nine.^  In  general,  however,  The  Seventeen  were  too 
far  away,  especially  since  the  imperfection  of  means  of  communica- 
tion as  compared  with  those  of  to-day  multiplied  distances  as  now 
reckoned,  to  dictate  more  than  general  policies.  In  the  seventeenth 
century  it  was  ordinarily  more  than  a  year  before  a  governor  could 
get  an  answer  from  home,  and  even  as  late  as  1769  a  prize  of  1200 
guilders  was  offered  by  The  Seventeen  for  the  skipper  who  should 
reach  Batavia  within  six  months  ;  as  for  the  Raad,  only  five  mem- 
bers were  stationed  at  Batavia,  the  other  four  being  governors  of 
districts  outside  of  Java,  and  so  too  far  away  to  do  much.  And 
the  governor  had  his  own  ways  of  evading  their  control.  At  first 
he  was  to  confer  with  the  Raad  when  there  was  no  special  instruc- 
tion from  The  Seventeen  ;  later  he  was  merely  its  president,  with 
casting  vote.  But  as  head  of  fleet  and  army  he  far  outdid  his  ad- 
visers in  importance  ;  and  he  could  easily  get  the  upper  hand  by 
reference  to  secret  advices  of  The  Seventeen,  or  on  the  pretext 
of  awaiting  instructions.  The  Seventeen  were  willing  to  grant  large 
powers,  thinking  that  thus  only  could  unity  be  secured  ;  and  realiz- 
ing their  own  ignorance  of  local  Indian  affairs,  they  were  glad  to 

1  This  was  called :  "  Het  Collegie  van  regeering  over  alle  actien  en  zaken  van 
gansch  Indie,  de  Nederlandsche  Compagnie  betreffende."  De  Reus,  p.  83  ;  cf.  Day, 
pp.  42-43,  91-94.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  Gouverneurer-generaal,"  "Raad  van 
Nederlandsch-Indie." 


4i8  COLONIZATION 

depend  upon  the  man  on  the  spot.^    Thus  the  history  of  adminis- 
tration in  the  East  is  largely  a  record  of  the  governors-general. 


The  Crushing  of  Competition 

One  of  the  first  duties  that  fell  to  the  governors  was  the  crush- 
ing of  all  competition  within  the  areas  of  spice-production.  The 
States-General  held  strongly  to  the  idea  that  the  Company  was  the 
proper  organ  with  which  to  keep  up  trouble  with  Spain,  and  so  gave 
it  large  power  against  the  enemy ;  a  discretion  which  it  used  so 
energetically  as  to  foil  all  hostile  projects  and  to  establish  itself 
strongly  in  factories  and  forts.  The  status  of  the  Portuguese 
power  in  the  latter  half  of  the  sixteenth  century  was,  as  has  been 
shown,^  deplorable  ;  in  particular  the  natives,  in  their  hatred  of 
their  oppressors,  were  all  ready  to  go  over  to  the  Dutch  or  any  one 
else  hostile  to  the  Portuguese.  The  whole  structure  of  the  empire 
was  ready  to  collapse  at  a  slight  shock ;  and  the  Portuguese  them- 
selves were  the  more  apathetic  inasmuch  as  the  Indies  now  belonged 
to  Philip  II  as  king  of  Portugal.  The  Dutch  captured  Malacca  in 
1 64 1,  and  were  thereafter  masters  of  the  archipelago,  possessing 
its  keys  in  the  straits  of  Malacca  and  Sunda  ;  the  Portuguese  con- 
tinued to  hold  Timor  only,  and  the  Spanish  soon  (1663)  turned 
their  faces  east  from  the  Philippines  to  Mexico,  both  alike  fearing 
and  avoiding  the  Dutch.  But  the  latter  were  not  content  with  any- 
thing short  of  a  closed  monopoly,  and  determined  to  expel  friendly 
nations  also.  The  French  possessed  small  capacity  and  little  capi- 
tal, and  their  East  India  Company,  founded  in  1C04,  rapidly  de- 
clined. The  Company  did  not  balk  at  the  use  of  force,  although  it 
was  willing  to  pay  damages  after  the  object  had  been  gained.  After 
1682  the  French  kept  out  of  the  archipelago,  and  the  Danes  con- 
(ined  themselves  to  the  mainland.''^  With  the  English  the  struggle 
was  sharper,  not  only  because  they  were  stronger,  but  because 
England  had  been  and  was  the  traditional  friend  of  the  Netherlands. 
But  this  consideration  was  not  allowed  to  weigh  overmuch  ;  and 
in  any  case  strife  between  their  "colonies  "  was  not   pvooi  of  the 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  48-50;  De  Reus,  pp.  xiii-xiv,  80-85;  Day,  pp.  88-91. 

^  I'p.  115  ff.,  above. 

''  Van  Rees,  II,  51-52,  63  ;  cf.  Danvers,  II,  105  ff.  For  more  detailed  accounts  of 
these  various  nations  in  the  East,  see  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  De  Denen,"  "  De 
Engelschen,"  "De  Eranschen,"  "  De  I'ortugeezen,"  "  De  Spanjaarden  in  den  Ma- 
leischen  Archipel." 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  419 

enmity  of  two  nations  ;  the  English  did  not  hesitate  to  provoke  or 
even  aid  the  natives  of  the  Mokiccas  against  the  Dutch.  They 
hesitated  to  consider  combination  with  the  latter,  fearing  that  the 
Netherlanders'  superior  energy  and  capacity  would  come  more  and 
more  to  limit  the  number  of  English  participants.  But  some  such 
pooling  of  interests  was  being  brought  to  definite  form  in  1619, 
and  was  favored  by  the  Dutch  Company  in  the  hope  of  thus  secur- 
ing extra  insurance  against  mishaps  due  in  a  few  years,  when  war 
broke  out  in  the  East  Indies.  The  Dutch  then  determined  upon 
the  expulsion  at  all  hazards  of  their  rivals  from  the  Moluccas  ;  and 
in  16 19  the  governor-general,  Coen,  was  instructed  to  attack  them 
at  all  points.  He  treated  the  English  as  a  sort  of  subject  nation  ; 
and  early  in  1623,  on  the  occasion  of  a  conspiracy  of  English 
agents  in  Amboina,  he  openly  broke  with  them.  The  conspirators 
were  executed  ("  Amboina  Massacre  ")  and  the  English  forced  to 
leave  the  Moluccas,  and  also,  in  1624,  Batavia.  From  this  time  on 
the  policy  was  one  of  absolute  exclusion  ;  the  Dutch,  despite  all 
efforts  of  their  enemies,  remained  in  full  possession,  and  in  1667 
(Peace  of  Breda)  the  English  gave  up  their  last  hold  in  the  Moluc- 
cas and  upon  the  spice-trade;  in  1683  they  surrendered  Bantam 
and  their  exclusion  from  the  East  Indies  was  complete.  There 
were  no  other  foreign  rivals. 

The  Dutch  had  started  out,  as  novices,  with  Hugo  de  Groot's 
theory  of  freedom  of  the  sea,  which  conveniently  demonstrated 
their  own  right  to  approach  and  trade  in  the  Indies.  But  the 
situation  appeared  so  altered  when  viewed  from  the  inside  that 
they  ended  by  giving  the  world  an  exemplar  of  the  old  exclusion 
policy  carried  out  in  truly  orthodox  form.  Having  come  to  occupy 
the  situation  and  to  be  appealed  to  by  the  conditions  of  the  Span- 
ish and  Portuguese,  they  speedily  reacted  in  a  fashion  identical  with 
theirs,  but  with  an  energy  and  thoroughness  that  realized  what  had 
been  the  dreams  rather  than  the  hopes  of  the  Iberians.  And  this 
was  after  all  but  the  local  application  of  the  principle  of  exclusion 
universally  applied  by  the  Dutch  ;  in  the  trade-history  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  century  "  the  fundamental  starting-point  for 
our  merchants  is  simply  this  :  for  us  the  greatest  possible  freedom, 
for  our  competitors  the  greatest  possible  obstruction,  here  and  else- 
where.. To  this  end  our  trade-legislation  and  trade-policy  were 
directed."  ^ 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  53-63  ;  Blok,II,504  (quoted) ;  cf.  346-349,  502-504;  Day, pp.  51-55. 


420  COLONIZATION 

Monopoly  Policy  ;  Oppression  of  the  Natives 

In  their  increasing  freedom  from  interference  on  the  part  of 
the  outside  world,  The  Seventeen  and  their  governors-general  were 
enabled  to  turn  more  attention  to  the  objects,  or  rather  the 
object,  for  which  they  labored.  This  was  commercial  gain,  con- 
ceived to  be  derivable  first  and  foremost,  and  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  else,  from  the  spice-trade.  Like  the  Portuguese  the  Dutch  were 
determined  to  get  the  spices  at  a  low  price,  and  thus  their  policy 
was  to  cajole  or  coerce  the  natives,  through  treaties  or  by  war, 
to  sell  their  products  to  them  at  a  fi.xed  price  and  to  have  no 
trade-relations  with  other  nations.  With  Ternate,  one  of  the  few 
centers  of  clovc-production,  a  treaty  was  made  to  the  effect  that 
the  cost  of  expelling  the  Spaniards  was  to  be  borne  by  the  natives 
and  that  they  were  then  to  sell  to  the  Company  at  prices  arranged 
between  the  States-General  and  the  local  king.  Strongholds  were 
to  be  erected  to  keep  the  natives  in  order  and  to  repel  the  foreigner. 
This  arrangement  was  on  the  whole  a  peaceable  one,  but  usually 
violence  was  not  long  restrained.  The  Bandanese,  who  displayed 
a  greater  sense  of  freedom  and  more  energy  than  is  usual  with 
Easterners,  and  had  even  developed  to  the  extent  of  holding  folk- 
assemblies  to  consider  policy,  had  agreed  in  1602  to  sell  all  nut- 
megs and  mace  to  the  Dutch,  but  with  no  special  condition  as  to 
price.  They  had  likewise  stipulated  for  the  right  of  trade  in  their 
junks  wherever  they  wished.  But  they  speedily  discovered  that 
the  Company  could  force  them  to  take  low  prices  by  refusing  to 
buy  at  higher  figures  ;  and  they  came  to  make  more  and  more  use 
of  their  stipulation,  trading  with  the  English  and  Portuguese,  and 
even  receiving  aid  from  the  former  against  the  Dutch  assertion  of 
monopoly.  The  governor-general,  Coen,  put  an  end  to  all  this  in- 
subordination ;  in  1 62 1  he  assembled  a  large  force  and  made  him- 
self master  of  the  Banda  Islands,  and  then  proceeded  to  depopulate 
them  with  relentless  cruelty.  Those  of  the  Bandanese  who  remained 
in  the  islands  were  obliged  to  live  on  the  coast,  where  it  was  imjios- 
sible  to  keep  up  their  agriculture  ;  others  were  removed  to  Java 
and  located  near  Batavia,  to  cultivate  rice.  Some  escaped  to  other 
islands  and  stirred  up  hatred  against  the  Dutch,  and  some  fled  to 
the  bush  in  their  own  islands  and  died  of  hunger.  The  Directors 
approved  entirely  of  these  measures.  The  sequel  of  the  tale  like- 
wise throws  its  light  upon  Dutch  trade  and  native  policy.    Coen 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  421 

tried  to  populate  the  islands  again,  and  sent  there  four  hundred 
men  and  women,  mostly  whites,  a  number  which  increased  in  ten 
years  to  one  thousand.  The  Company  was  to  furnish  them  slaves 
to  till  the  soil  and  sell  them  rice  and  cloth  at  cost  price ;  they,  for 
their  part,  were  to  sell  nutmegs  and  mace  for  a  fixed  price  to  the 
Company.  But  the  latter  could  not  see  enough  in  the  rice-trade  to 
continue  it,  and  so  decided,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  that  the  slaves  would  have  to  live  on  sago  and  fish,  which 
the  islanders  could  procure  for  themselves  from  the  Moluccas. 
This  food  was  insufficient,  the  slaves  died  in  great  numbers,  and 
the  consequent  rise  of  their  price  gave  impetus  to  the  slave-trade. 
Meanwhile  the  sago  and  fish  gatherers  had  utilized  their  opportu- 
nities to  engage  in  illicit  traffic  and  were  getting  rich.  This  trade 
was  discovered  in  the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth  century  and 
crushed  by  force. ^ 

In  some  such  way  the  whole  archipelago  was  rendered  subser- 
vient ^  to  the  paramount  consideration,  and,  at  least  at  first,  the 
gains  were  very  large.  The  Dutch  bought  nutmegs  at  a  stiver  and 
a  half  and  less  per  pound  in  the  Indies,  and  sold  them  in  Holland 
and  Zeeland  for  three  guilders  and  a  quarter,  making  in  some  cases 
up  to  five  thousand  per  cent.  The  clov^es  also  of  Amboina  and 
Ternate  yielded  heavy  profit ;  a  half  million  pounds,  purchased  at 
four  stivers,  sold  at  four  guilders,  and  even  in  the  early  part  of  the 
eighteenth  century  the  Company  still  got  the  cloves  for  six  stivers 
a  pound  and  sold  them  for  almost  four  guilders.  But  in  the  case 
of  the  cloves  also  the  contraband  traffic  naturally  arose,  for  the 
clove  was  a  favorite  spice  in  the  East  itself  ;  and  since  smuggling 
was  carried  on  by  native  skippers  in  their  elusive  small-craft,  it  was 
difficult  to  check  by  ordinary  means.  Hence  arose  the  Company 
policy  of  uprooting  the  trees  wherever  its  mastery  was  not  com- 
plete, on  the  pretext  that  the  natives  had  not  kept  to  their  agree- 
ments with  the  Dutch.  A  sort  of  annual  voyage  of  as  many  as 
sixty-four  vessels  was  organized  and  natives  were  taken  along  to 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  229-232. 

2  The  ease  with  which  the  Dutch  appear  to  have  extended  their  power  recalls  the 
experience  of  the  Portuguese,  detailed  above  (pp.  107  ff.).  According  to  Day  (p.  10), 
who  makes  a  survey  of  the  native  organization  a  prime  factor  in  his  argument,  the 
native  institutions  in  Java  were  "  not  fresh  and  in  a  course  of  vigorous  development, 
but  old  and  worn,  going  through  their  cycles  of  change  only  to  return  to  the  starting- 
point.  Nothing  else  would  explain  the  ease  with  which  the  Dutch  conquered  and 
ruled  the  island." 


42  2  COLONIZATION 

destroy  trees  ;  if  these  were  found  where  they  were  unauthorized, 
the  adjacent  towns  were  burned.  When,  for  a  certain  year,  the 
Company  had  need  of  more  cloves,  there  was  cither  no  round  made 
or  a  short  one  ;  if  the  spice  was  in  plenty,  a  long  one.  The  Amboi- 
nese  natives  on  occasion  of  the  long  voyage  were  unable  to  return 
in  time  to  sell  their  own  spice  and  so  suffered  want.  This  extirpa- 
tion was  in  general  the  destruction  of  livelihood  itself,  for  the  trees 
had  need  of  years  of  careful  tending  before  they  bore.^  The  bitter- 
ness that  such  inhuman  greed  had  caused  aided  the  illicit  traffic, 
a  result  which  the  Company  met  with  new  severity ;  the  seven- 
teenth-century history  of  the  Indies  is  that  of  brave  but  hopeless 
defense  of  liberty  on  the  part  of  the  Malays  against  the  cupidity 
of  the  Dutch.  The  latter  did  not  stop  with  severity  but  employed 
deceit  and  treachery  to  effect  their  ends.  Coen  brought  fulfillment 
of  the  monopoly  policy  ;  nutmegs  were  thereafter  raised  on  the 
Banda  Islands  alone  and  cloves  in  Amboina.  In  Ternate  the  extir- 
pation found  less  resistance  because  of  the  local  interest  in  tobacco, 
but  in  1680  the  people,  discouraged  by  the  collapse  of  their  trade, 
took  up  arms.  After  they  had  been  quelled  in  blood,  prosperity 
never  returned  to  the  island  ;  it  remained  a  costly  Company  post, 
maintained  for  reasons  of  monopoly  and  war.  In  Amboina,  after 
some  strife,  the  Company  had  its  way,  uprooted  such  trees  as  it 
chose,  and  forced  the  inhabitants  to  live  under  the  guns  of  the 
forts ;  from  being  a  fairly  civilized,  energetic,  brave  people,  they 
were  reduced  to  a  poverty-stricken  group  of  slaves.  By  these 
varied  means  the  production  of  cloves  was  reduced  to  one-fourth 
of  what  it  had  been.  Then  ensued  a  direful  policy  of  vacillation  : 
first  the  Dutch  had  misgivings  as  to  there  being  enough  trees,  and 
encouraged  the  natives  of  Amboina  to  plant  more,  and  then  the 
fear  of  low  prices  caused  them  to  force  submission  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  young  trees;  and  "so  it  went  on  through  the  whole  of 
the  eighteenth  century."  ^ 

Policy  toward  Private  Trade 

But  it  was  not  enough  to  destroy  the  trees  —  the  native  mer- 
chant shipping  must  also  be  annihilated,  if  the  raisoii  d'etre  of  the 
Company  was  to  be  vindicated.     At  the  period  of  the  arrival  of  the 

'  Van  Kees,  IT,  232-234,  238-239.  For  details  of  the  spice-trade  see  Encyol.  Ned. 
Ind.,  arts.  "Amboina,"  "  Notenmiiskaat,"  "  I'eper,"  "  Kaneel,"  "  Nagelen  (Kniid  )," 
"Ternate,"  etc.  ^  Van  Kees,  II,  234-235. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  423 

Dutch  in  the  East  they  had  found  a  prosperous  merchant  shipping 
in  the  hands  chiefly  of  Javanese  and  Macassars.  This  had  not  been 
disturbed  by  the  Portuguese  because  of  their  dependence  upon  it 
for  the  assembUng  of  their  cargoes  ;  but  the  Dutch  felt  no  such 
need.  The  Javanese  were  rather  easily  disposed  of;  in  1646  a 
treaty  with  the  sultan  of  Mataram  forbade  his  subjects  from  going 
to  the  Moluccas.  Passes  from  Batavia  were  demanded  as  a  condi- 
tion of  passing  Malacca ;  and  it  was  finally  ordered  that  the  Java- 
nese should  follow  the  coasting-trade  only,  their  ships  and  cargoes 
to  be  confiscated  if  they  were  found  more  than  five  miles  from  the 
shore.  The  Macassars  of  southern  Celebes  were  more  stubborn ; 
their  praus  visited  the  whole  archipelago,  and  in  vain  did  the 
governor,  De  Vlaming,  threaten  intercourse  with  the  Moluccas  with 
hard  labor  for  life.  But  by  1667,  through  sowing  disaffection,  the 
Company  reduced  the  strong  Macassar  state,  and  thereafter,  since 
all  trade  had  to  be  done  under  a  pass,  the  Moluccas  were  secure.^ 
This  determined  policy  toward  foreigners  and  natives  assumed 
a  form  scarcely  less  truculent  and  inexorable  as  against  the  private 
trade  of  the  Netherlanders  in  the  archipelago.  The  trade-areas  of 
the  East  were  roughly  divided  into  two  classes  :  the  region  actually 
held  by  or  treaty-bound  to  the  Company,  and  the  outlying  districts. 
For  the  first  class,  Company  functionaries  could  be  used,  but  for 
the  second  they  were  less  valuable  since  they  lacked  the  spirit  of 
individual  enterprise.  Hence  there  was  in  the  latter  case  something 
less  of  opposition  to  private  traders;  Coen,  in  1623,  attempted 
to  demonstrate  to  The  Seventeen  that  such  exchange  was  better 
intrusted  to  individual  enterprise  under  a  recognition-fee  to  the 
Company.  India  must  maintain  and  feed  itself,  his  argument  runs, 
and  so  men,  ships,  and  capital  must  be  attracted  to  India  and  put 
in  a  position  to  help  themselves  and  the  Company  through  free 
trade.  Coen  partially  won  over  The  Seventeen  and  the  Chambers, 
but  illness  delayed  him  from  setting  his  own  hand  to  the  work, 
and  the  complaisant  attitude  of  the  Directors  suffered  speedy  alter- 
ation. The  reaction  in  163  i  was  signalized  by  a  determined  assault 
on  freedom  of  trade,  and  another  period  of  generosity  in  1662  was 
again  followed  by  a  tightening  of  restriction.  The  Company  grad- 
ually strengthened  prohibitive  ordinances  until  the  years  1771  ^o 
1774,  when  a  good  deal  of  relaxation  took  place  ;  but  it  was  then 
too  late.  The  Directors  seemed  to  miss  the  significance  of  the 
1  Van  Rees,  II,  236-238. 


424  COLONIZATION 

fact  that  even  a  delegate  from  their  own  body,  when  sent  to  the 
Indies  as  governor  to  effect  measures  of  restriction,  was  shortly 
made  over,  once  in  touch  with  local  conditions,  into  an  advocate 
of  freedom.^  The  results  of  their  consistent  narrow-mindedness 
will  appear  the  more  clearly  when  actual  attempts  at  colonization 
under  the  Company  are  considered.^ 

Limitation  of  Production 

Thus  far  the  activity  of  the  Company  in  doing  away  with  rivals 
of  all  kinds  has  received  the  bulk  of  attention,  although  inciden- 
tally some  idea  has  been  given  of  the  processes  by  which  the  natives 
were  reduced  and  of  the  profits  subsequently  secured.  We  now 
turn  to  the  business  policy  of  the  Company  in  the  regions  which 
it  had  cleared  of  all  resistance.  The  keynote  of  this  policy,  struck 
almost  at  the  beginning,  was  the  counterpart  of  that  which  domi- 
nated at  the  European  end  ;  and  its  underlying  motive  was  the 
preservation  of  diversity  of  conjunctures.  The  supply  of  spices 
was  kept  down  on  the  European  market  in  order  to  realize  high 
returns,  this  procedure  extending  to  the  actual  destruction  of  crops 
and  even  to  the  burying  and  burning  of  large  quantities  of  spice ;  ^ 
and  in  the  East  the  theory  always  prevailed  of  purchase  at  the 
lowest  prices  and  sale  of  the  Company's  goods  to  the  natives  or 
resident  Dutch  at  the  highest.  The  old  ideal  of  large  percentages 
of  gain  on  a  small  movement  of  trade  still  persisted,  and  had  been 
strengthened  by  the  happenings  of  the  first  few  years  when,  in 
consequence  of  the  competitive  activity  of  the  disunited  companies, 
the  price  of  pepper  had  been  brought  low  in  Europe* 

What  has  been  said  as  to  the  clove-production  and  its  limita- 
tion a}:)plies  in  general  to  all  the  products  in  whicti  the  Company 
conceived  it  worth  while  to  trade.  The  raising  of  pepper  was 
forbidden  elsewhere  than  under  Company  control ;  and  since  the 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  246-247;  De  Reus,  pp.  246-249,  259-261.  -  P.  433,  below. 

3  "  Some  years  .  .  .  many  hundred  pounds  of  cloves  are  openly  buried,  and  in  part, 
also,  burned."  Valentijn  (IV,  251)  in  Van  Rees,  II,  285;  cf.  Roscher,  pp.  280-281. 
l.eroy-l?eaulieu  exhibits  the  folly  of  staking  everytliing  on  the  sj^ice-trade ;  its  great 
profits  were  illusory.  In  1840,  he  says  (I,  275),  the  spice-trade  was  insignificant.  The  use 
of  substitutes  for  the  monopolized  articles  cut  deeply  into  profits.    Van  Rees,  II,  286. 

*  Van  Rees,  II,  283  ff. ;  De  Reus,  p.  xxi ;  Blok,  III,  496 ;  Day,  p.  62.  In  1623  the 
shareholders  complained  that  the  Directors  asked  such  high  prices  that  much  of  their 
goods  remained  in  the  warehouses,  the  capital  invested  lying  idle  in  the  meantime. 
But  price-regulation  was  a  cardinal  tenet,  and  elevation  of  prices  was  a  popular  expe- 
dient for  covering  losses.    Van  Rees,  II,  285-286. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  425 

plants  grew  slowly  and  could  not  quickly  respond  to  the  mood  of 
the  Directors,  determined  as  this  was  by  the  momentary  ups  and 
downs  of  European  demand,  the  culture  was  gradually  given  up 
and  after  the  dissolution  of  the  Company  practically  ceased.  CofTee 
was  earlier  procured  in  Mocha,  but  when  the  price  rose  and  the 
Arab  government  made  some  trouble,  it  was  introduced  (about 
1700)  into  Java.  To  incite  its  culture  the  Company  paid  at  first 
ten  stivers  a  pound  ;  but  it  speedily  got  down  to  six,  and  then  set 
out  to  eliminate  individuals  from  the  production.  Thus  arose  the 
regular  monopoly ;  but,  since  coffee  could  be  bought  cheaper  in 
Ceylon,  it  was  necessary  now  to  reduce  the  purchase  price  to  two 
stivers.  Further,  in  order  to  prevent  the  inevitable  resistance  here 
encountered,  the  Directors  proceeded  now  to  limit  production  to 
the  region  of  Batavia,  where  control  was  easy  ;  elsewhere  the  plants 
were  to  be  uprooted.  Thus  through  meddling  and  oscillation  of 
policy  the  industry  was  destroyed  in  Javanese  districts.  Indigo, 
again,  had  been  a  successful  product  of  the  Javanese  before  the 
Dutch  arrived,  and  trade  in  it  quickly  arose  ;  but  the  prices  the 
Dutch  were  willing  to  pay  were  too  low  and  the  forcing  system 
came  again  into  operation.  Sugar-production  suffered  in  the  same 
manner.  The  Company  held  also  the  monopoly  of  the  opium  and 
salt  industries,  which  were  let  out  at  handsome  sums  to  the 
Chinese.^  Plainly  there  was  little  economic  chance  for  the  natives 
under  such  a  system. 

What  prices  the  Company  paid  in  the  East  were  largely  in 
money.  This  was  theoretically  unfortunate  ;  the  Dutch  thought  to 
make  double  gain  if  they  could  barter  linen  and  other  textiles  and 
manufactures  for  the  spices.  But  the  Easterners  had  little  need  of 
food  ;  and  their  clothing  was  made  so  well  and  cheaply  at  home  as 
to  render  European  competition,  in  these  centuries  that  preceded 
the  use  of  steam-driven  machinery,  impossible.  Nor  must  it  ever 
be  lost  sight  of  that,  especially  in  its  later  period,  a  very  large  pro- 
portion of  the  Company's  wares  "  came  to  it  in  a  political  rather 
than  an  economic  way,  as  tribute  and  not  by  exchange."  ^  Thus 
the  exports  of  the  Company  to  the  Indies  were  mainly  the  necessi- 
ties of  life  for  the  Europeans,  a  few  cloths,  and  some  gold  and 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  279-282;  Day,  pp.  65-70.  See  Encyl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "Indigo," 
"  Koffie,"  "  Tabak,"  "  Rijst,"  "  Suiker,"  "  Opium,"  "  Zout." 

2  Day,  p.  63.  The  "  contingents  "  and  "  forced  deliveries  "  are  regarded  by  this 
author  (pp.  63-64)  as  essentially  the  same. 


426  COLONIZATION 

silver  articles  that  pleased  the  natives  ;  upon  these  goods  the  Com- 
pany forced  the  payment  of  high  prices,  not  only  from  the  natives, 
but  also,  where  it  could,  from  the  Europeans.  These  imports  to 
the  colonies  were  not  of  very  great  volume,  never  exceeding,  ap- 
parently ,  a  value  of  3,000,000  guilders  a  year.  Payment  for  the 
spices  was  largely  in  gold  and  silver  ;  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  a  value  of  4,000,000  to  6,000,000  guilders  was  sent 
yearly  to  the  East,  and  as  high  as  450,000  at  a  voyage.  In  accord- 
ance with  the  prevailing  mercantilism  of  the  day,  this  export  f)f 
metal  from  the  Netherlands  was  looked  upon  with  a  misgiving, 
which  but  reenforced  the  tendency  to  make  a  little  of  it  go  a 
great  way.  Later  it  seemed  the  part  of  policy  to  jwy  in  copper 
duits,  which  were  worth  in  the  East  twice  as  much  as  in  Europe  ; 
between  1771  and  1780  over  100,000,000  of  these  were  sent  to 
the  Indies.^ 

Corruption  of  the  Service 

Such  a  penurious,  catch-penny  policy  could  not  but  have  its 
effects  upon  the  morale  of  the  Company  service. ^  The  functiona- 
ries were,  first  of  all,  very  poorly  paid  ;  the  principle  here  was  to 
exact  the  maximum  of  service  for  the  minimum  of  actual  outlay. 
The  local  agents  lived  not  infrequently  in  a  condition  of  real 
misery ;  and  gradually  their  quality  deteriorated,  not  only  because 
good  men  would  not  come  but  because  they  did  not  remain  honest 
when  they  did  come.  There  was  a  provision  that  no  one  could 
enter  the  Indian  service  who  had  failed  or  committed  crime  at 
home,  or  who  had  once  been  sent  back  from  the  Indies  ;  but  such 
criteria  were  not  maintained.  Ofificers  cashiered  for  incompetence 
were  given  refuge  in  the  Indies,  and  no  evidence  was  demanded  as 
to  the  quality  of  the  immigrant  or  sojourner  except  that  he  nnist 
not  be  French,  Scotch,  or  English.  Here  the  policy  of  the  Dutch 
must  be  compared,  to  its  plain  disadvantage,  with  that  of  the 
Spanish.  Wonderment  is  with  reason  expressed  that  so  much  as 
the  Dutch  did  could  have  been  accomplished  with  the  human 
agencies  they  emi)loyed.  Rut  whatever  the  quality  of  the  func- 
tionary, he  was  practically  forced,  in  order  to  exist,  to  prove  false 

1  Van  Ree.s,  IT,  245,  283-285;  Van  der  Chy.s,  p.  79  and  note;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind., 
art.  "  Scheepvaart  en  Mandel." 

2  For  a  list  of  the  Company  officials  in  India,  see  De  Reus,  pp.  97  If. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR   FIELDS  427 

to  his  boundcn  duty  ;  and  this  was  to  some  degree  recognized  by 
his  employers.  The  functionaries  took  to  dishonest  methods,  espe- 
cially to  illicit  trade  ;  and  they  had  no  scruples  as  time  went  on 
about  oppressing  the  natives.  Officers  both  high  and  low  engaged 
in  contraband  traffic  even  in  the  ships  of  the  Company ;  clergymen 
were  often  deeply  involved,  and  both  they  and  their  wives  could 
give  instruction  in  method  to  expert  merchants.  The  Company's 
agents  w^ere  too  few  and  were  too  widely  separated  to  be  under 
much  control,  and  the  evil  became  so  all-pervasive  that  it  was  prac- 
tically impossible  to  identify  and  punish  the  guilty ;  as  the  years 
went  on  the  honest  man  became  more  rare.  All  this  was  seen  to 
harm  the  Company,  but  the  latter  reasoned  that  the  evil  would  be 
the  worse  if  the  waters  were  opened  for  freedom  of  trade. ^  Thus 
the  policy  deliberately  adopted  was  one  calculated  thoroughly  to 
demoralize  the  local  agents. 

The  damage  thus  done  extended  to  the  personnel  of  the  army 
and  the  merchant  marine.  The  military  force,  which  was  under 
the  civil  power,  was  kept  small  through  the  parsimony  of  the  Com- 
pany ;  the  whole  army  was  not  over  10,000,  and  of  these  but  few 
were  Europeans.  Its  quality  was  lower  still,  for  the  idea  seems  to 
have  been  to  get  certain  numbers  of  men  into  uniform,  with  no 
respect  to  their  race  or  character ;  the  European  contingent  was 
composed  largely  of  those  who  for  various  reasons  found  life  in 
Europe  impossible.  Wages  were  extremely  low  and  prices  of  sup- 
plies purchasable  by  the  soldiers  high  ;  clothing  cost  enough  to 
allow  the  Company  alone  to  make  upon  it  seventy-five  per  cent 
gain.  The  men  were  systematically  cheated.  The  navy  was  much 
better  in  all  ways,  for  a  good  marine,  here  as  at  home,  was  a  strict 
necessity  ;  yet  conservatism  entered  to  undermine  its  effectiveness. 
For  one  thing,  the  routes  of  the  ships  were  strictly  prescribed,  and, 
despite  all  protests,  they  were  obliged  by  the  Directors  to  sail 
around  Scotland  on  their  home  voyages.  The  ships  were  too  large 
and  unwieldy,  though  too  few  in  number.  The  quality  of  the  cap- 
tains speedily  declined  and  numerous  complaints  were  raised  against 
them  on  the  score  of  their  ignorance,  uselessness,  and  infidelity  to 
trust.  The  increase  of  illicit  traffic  testifies  to  the  justice  of  the 
latter  charge ;  but  rascals  consistently  got  off  with  impunity.  The 
sailors  were  in  a  condition  similar  to  that  of  the  soldiers  ;  their 

*  Van  Rees,  II,  248-249  and  note,  293;  De  Reus,  pp.  24-25,  94-95  ;  Day,  pp.  89- 
91,  93-106;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "Opleiding  van  Indische  Ambtenaaren." 


428  COLONIZATION 

numbers  were  larger,  running  up  to  4000  sailing  to  the  East 
yearly,  but  their  position  was  wretched,  whether  they  voyaged 
between  East  and  West,  or  remained  in  the  Indies. ^ 

Hence  the  natural  tendency  of  the  European  sojourner  in  trop- 
ical countries  —  to  accumulate  with  speed  and  ruthlessness,  in 
order  presently  to  return  homc'^ — was  strongly  accentuated  by 
the  characteristic  policy  of  the  Company,  itself  animated  by  like 
desires. 

Native  Policy 

To  one  who  has  gotten  before  his  mind  a  clear  conception  of 
the  aims  of  the  East  India  Company,  the  inevitable  destiny  of  the 
native  can  scarcely  come  as  a  surprise.  Indeed  it  has  already  been 
seen  how  native  life  was  subjected  to  all  sorts  of  economic  shock  ; 
how  native  industry  was  cynically  cramped  or  crushed  in  order  to 
assure  the  profit  of  a  closed  monopoly.  The  Dutch  came,  without 
question,  to  regard  the  native  as  simply  one  of  the  factors  entering 
into  the  making  of  money,  a  factor  to  be  treated  in  the  same  objec- 
tive way  as  water,  soil,  or  any  other  non-sentient  or  inanimate  ele- 
ment. To  find  the  Company  harboring  any  idea  of  benefiting  the 
native  peoples  is  to  surprise  it  acting  out  of  character ;  and  yet 
some  such  benevolent  intent  existed,  at  least  in  theory,  at  the  out- 
set of  its  career.  There  was  no  lack  of  instructions  from  home  to 
treat  the  natives  well  and  kindly,  these  being  dictated  by  politi- 
cal as  well  as  humanitarian  considerations.  In  respect  of  religion 
in  particular  it  was  desirable  "  to  enlighten  the  poor,  blind  heathen, 
eager  to  learn,  through  the  grace  of  God,  and  to  bring  them  out 
of  blind  darkness  into  the  knowledge  of  the  holy  evangel."  The 
Dutch  had  scarcely  finished  a  struggle  in  which  religious  ardor  was 
a  driving  factor ;  and  national  honor,  if  no  more,  demanded  that 
they  do  no  less  than  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese.  The  Seventeen 
accordingly  began  to  bestir  themselves  that  the  natives  might, 
through  spread  of  the  Holy  Scripture,  be  defended  against  the 
superstitions  of  Moors,  atheists,  and  their  kind. 

1  De  Reus,  pp.  108-117,  120-124;  T^ay,  pp.  107-10S;  Roscher,  p.  286.  For  the 
carrying-trade  of  the  Company,  see  Day,  pp.  61  ff .  For  the  early  instructions  to  sailors, 
and  the  rules  governing  life  on  ship-board,  see  Van  der  Chys,  IJijlagen,  I,  II,  and  III. 
Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  Kaarte,"  "  I^ger,"  "  Scheepvaart  en  Handel,"  "  Trian- 
gulatie,"  "  Verdediging,"  "Zeekarten,"  "  Zeemacht."  The  mortality  in  the  crowded 
ships  was  very  high.     Roscher,  p.  275. 

2  See  p.  II,  above. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS 


429 


There  had  been  an  eye  to  business  in  all  this.  The  Company 
thought  to  bind  the  natives  to  itself  through  a  common  religion  and 
thus  enforce  in  them  the  moral  obligation  to  fulfill  contracts.  It 
was  found,  however,  that,  after  the  pious  exploits  of  the  Portu- 
guese, religious  instruction  was  regarded  with  hostility  and  fear ; 
that  the  surest  way  toward  confidence  and  good  will  was  to  inter- 
fere as  little  as  possible  with  religion  or  government,  and  to  confine 
efforts  purely  to  trade.  This  was  a  comfortable  conclusion,  and 
instructions  came  to  convey  the  praiseworthy  maxim  of  non-inter- 
ference. When,  now,  the  question  arose  as  to  whether  the  church 
or  the  Company  should  take  the  superintendence  of  religious  instruc- 
tion, the  latter  felt  that  one  might  go  further  in  religious  fervor 
than  the  aims  of  trade  would  justify ;  where  the  people  were  abso- 
lutely subject  little  harm  could  be  done,  but  elsewhere  Mohamme- 
dans and  others  might  become  distrustful.  Nothing  could  be  lost 
by  intrusting  such  matters  to  the  discreet  and  practical.  Finally 
the  Company  had  its  way  ;  general  instructions  to  the  functionaries 
provided  that  they  should  see  that  the  Christian  religion  was  spread 
abroad,  good  schools  founded,  and  so  on.  The  results  were  slight, 
for,  except  in  Ceylon,  the  Moluccas,  and  Formosa,  where  there 
were  preachers,  the  natives  were  left  pretty  much  to  themselves. 
Discontent  arose  among  the  pious  at  home,  and  in  1645  it  was  pro- 
posed not  to  renew  the  Company's  charter  until  it  had  had  the  Bible 
translated  into  the  native  languages.  But  the  government  refused 
to  bind  the  Company.  Thus  all  preachers  and  schoolmasters  came 
to  be  Company  dependents,  and  were  even  thus  few  in  number, 
owing  to  the  indisposition  of  the  Directors  to  assume  the  cost 
and  trouble  incident  to  energetic  missionary  endeavor.^  What  the 
Company  did  for  religion  and  education  in  the  East  was  therefore 
practically  nothing.  All  such  activities  were  calculated  to  detract 
from  the  commercial  well-being  of  the  organization.  If  they  had 
hoped  by  religious  means  to  influence  the  natives  to  keep  their 
low-priced  contracts,  the  Dutch  were  in  this  disappointed  ;  it  was 
found  that  complete  conquest  alone  could  make  the  natives  fulfill 
their  obligations  as  interpreted  by  the  Dutch.  This  had  not  been 
the  attitude  at  the  outset ;  there  was  then  no  desire  to  get  ground 
except  for  factories,  for  it  was  proposed  to  proceed  through  trea- 
ties and  contracts.    But  the  Orientals,  perceiving  the  over-reaching 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  239-244  ;  Van  der  Chys,  p.  62  ;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "Christenen," 
"  Eeredienst,"  "  Evangelisatie,"  "  Zending." 


430  COLONIZATION 

which  lay  in  the  essence  of  these  agreements,  were  brought  to  a 
deceit  and  enmity  that  could  be  quelled  through  conquest  alone. ^ 
Constant  reference  of  all  projects  back  to  the  dominant  trade  idea 
thus  choked  the  develoi)ment  of  generous  imi)ulses  and  high  mo- 
tives, and  reduced  the  relation  with  subject  peoples  to  one  of  sor- 
did exploitation,  pure  and  simple. 

Conquests  ;    Nativk  Services 

Through  the  seventeenth  century  the  Dutch  became  ever  clearer 
upon  the  subject  of  acquiring  territory.  They  found  the  factory 
insecure  without  a  fort,  the  fort  imperiled  without  mastery  of  the 
surrounding  district.  Native  princes  paid  the  costs  of  war  on  the 
Company  by  the  cession  of  domain,  or  of  income  of  the  same  ; 
petty  tribal  wars  where  the  foreigner  was  haled  in  as  an  ally  yielded 
a  like  return.  Thus  in  1677  the  Company  forced  entry  into  Mata- 
ram  through  special  privileges  accorded,  becoming  the  only  seller 
of  opium,  sugar,  and  linen  in  that  region.  Later  (1743)  the  Dutch 
gained  such  control  that  the  native  officials  swore  allegiance  to 
them  rather  than  to  their  own  rulers  ;  the  people  were  to  cultivate 
what  the  Company  wished,  and  sell  or  give  their  j^roducts  to  it. 
A  succeeding  uprising  played  further  into  Dutch  hands.  Similarly 
in  l^antam  and  Cheribon  :  a  foothold  was  gained  in  the  former, 
securing  trade  advantages  ;  and  this  was  later  followed  by  conquest. 
The  sultan  then  received  back  his  lands  in  fief,  under  the  promise 
to  sell  to  the  Company  at  low  prices  all  the  i)epper  that  should  be 
raised.  Thus  the  Company  came  to  impinge  upon  the  masses  of 
the  Javanese  natives  through  their  princes,  who  were  to  have  rice, 
and,  above  all,  coffee,  pepper,  indigo,  sugar,  turmeric,  etc.,  raised 
and  sold  to  the  Dutch  at  a  figure  yielding  the  latter  a  large  profit. ^ 

The  native  princes  turned  out  to  be  la.x  in  their  duties,  knavish 
and  oppressive  to  the  people  ;  hence  the  Company  came  to  prefer 
land  sales  to  more  responsible  parties  ;  and,  together  with  the  soil, 
the  natives  were  passed  over  to  private  supervision.  But  they  were 
nf)t  thereby  released  from  service  to  the  Company  ;  all  the  natives 
in  the  region  of  Batavia  were  obliged  to  perform  certain  tasks  on 
its  account,  such  as  attending  to  roads  and  bridges  and  transport- 
ing persons  and  goods.  Beyond  this  they  had  to  give  a  part,  usu- 
ally a  tenth,  of  their  products  to  their  landlords,  and  work  one  day 

^  Van  Kees,  II,  240,  271. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  271-276  ;  Day,  pp.  43-50;  cf.  p.  43,  note  3. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  431 

in  the  week  for  them ;  otherwise  they  labored  for  wages,  with  the 
Chinese  and  slaves.  They  were  not  bound  to  the  soil  but  could  go 
and  settle  where  they  would.  The  status  thus  defined  does  not 
look  so  bad  on  the  face  of  it  ;  but  it  was  hard  to  keep  track  of  the 
landlords  and  much  oppression  occurred.  More  service  and  higher 
contributions  were  exacted  than  was  lawful,  this  being  done  through 
native  chiefs  who  received  a  commission  on  the  business  ;  and  army 
service  was  often  required.  Thus  the  natives  labored  under  a  three- 
fold yoke,  and  the  authorities  were  always  averse  to  supporting 
them  against  their  landlords.^ 

In  the  actual  domain  of  the  Company  the  Javanese  were  left 
under  their  own  chiefs,  as  that  plan  was  found  to  be  cheaper ;  and 
certain  conditions  as  to  the  sale  to  the  Company  of  specified  prod- 
ucts at  low  prices  were  imposed.  The  chiefs  were  bound  to  call 
the  people  to  war  when  the  Company  wished  it.  These  local  rulers 
were  not  paid  by  the  Dutch  ;  indeed  they  had  to  bid  for  the  tenure 
of  their  position  through  gifts  to  the  governors.  Son  usually  suc- 
ceeded father,  but  the  succession  might  be  perverted  if  another 
party  offered  more.  Naturally  all  the  expenses  of  the  chiefs,  legiti- 
mate and  illegitimate,  had  to  come  out  of  the  people,  through  ways 
direct  or  devious.  Here  the  latter  had  really  two  masters  to  serve. 
They  got  little  or  nothing  for  their  goods  or  services  from  the  Com- 
pany ;  where  by  exception  a  decent  price  was  paid,  it  emerged 
from  the  hands  of  the  functionaries  reduced  beyond  recognition. 
The  Company  paid  little  attention  to  the  needs  of  the  natives,  in- 
terfering only  in  cases  of  crying  injustice  on  the  part  of  the  chiefs, 
or,  more  commonly,  when  the  contingents  failed  or  when  scarcity 
and  dearness  of  products  indicated  some  per\^ersity  to  be  corrected. 
As  for  the  dishonest  functionaries,  it  was  more  profitable  to  con- 
nive at  their  rascality  —  such  as  demanding  more  of  the  people 
than  the  Company  itself,  and  appropriating  the  differences  —  and 
then  tax  them  for  it.^ 

•  Although  the  average  status  of  the  natives  appears  to  have  been 
that  of  an  abject  servitude,  nothing  has  hitherto  been  considered 
which  bears  the  actual  designation  of  slavery.  But  there  were,  in 
the  Indies,  up  to  January  i,  i860,  what  were  called  house-slaves 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  277-278.  For  a  closer  examination  of  the  Company's  administra- 
tion, see  Day,  pp.  108-121  ;  this  author  regards  the  activities  of  the  Dutch  as  on  the 
whole  beneficial  to  the  natives.    Cf.  pp.  36-37,  121  ff. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  278-279;  Day,  pp.  108-121. 


432  COLONIZATION 

and  Company-slaves.  They  were  held  at  first  in  default  of  other 
means  of  securing  service,  and  were  reckoned  in  with  the  "dead 
effects,"  such  as  gold  and  silver,  food,  ammunition,  houses,  furni- 
ture, etc.  In  September,  1694,  the  Company  had  1273  slaves,  men, 
women,  and  children,  and  certain  private  persons  possessed  a  great 
many.  Strange  to  say,  as  regards  these  slaves,  the  Company  seems 
to  have  suppressed  its  characteristic  greed  ;  they  were  treated  on 
the  whole  very  humanely,  were  paid  for  service,  and  allowed  to  ac- 
cumulate funds  to  buy  their  freedom.  They  were  really  better  off 
than  free  people  under  their  regents.  Slaves  who  turned  Christian 
must  be  sold  to  Christians,  and  a  freed  man  could  even  demand 
aid  of  his  old  master ;  slaves,  however,  could  not  make  wills,  and, 
among  other  minor  disabilities,  might  not  wear  a  hat  unless  they 
could  speak  Dutch.  They  did  the  rougher  work,  especially  of  agri- 
culture ;  it  was  largely  the  cost  of  providing  them  for  the  prospec- 
tive colonists,  who  had  been  proved  incapable  of  performing  such 
heavy  tasks  in  the  hot  regions,  that  made  the  parsimonious  Seven- 
teen oppose  colonization  as  a  policy.  There  was  no  feeling  whatso- 
ever against  the  institution  ;  use  of  slaves  was  allowed  in  the  Old 
Testament  and  was  not  forbidden  in  the  New ;  and  the  imperial 
Roman  law  recognized  it.  Moreover  the  slaves  could,  here  as  in 
America,  be  converted  and  no  longer  remain  "  slaves  of  the  devil." 
The  system  was  indorsed  by  such  jurists  as  De  Groot.  And,  above 
all,  it  was  demanded  by  economic  necessity,  however  this  might  be 
veiled,  just  as  it  had  been  in  the  case  of  the  Portuguese  and  Span- 
ish. Nevertheless,  owing  chiefly  to  the  slight  development  of  plan- 
tation agriculture  and  industry  under  the  direction  of  actual  Dutch 
settlers,  the  extent  of  what  went  by  the  acknowledged  name  of 
slavery  was  never  great  in  the  Indies.^ 

Enough  has  been  said  to  demonstrate  the  deplorable  situation 
of  the  native  peoples ;  it  could  not  have  been  otherwise  under  the 
control  of  a  corporation  governed  by  motives  both  sordid  and  self- 
ish. ,The  account  of  the  further  fortunes  of  the  natives  under  the 
later  "  culture  system  "  ^  will  serve  to  reflect  additional  light  upon 
their  previous  status  as  here  indicated  in  its  general  outlines. 

1  De  Reus,  pp.  127-131,  2S9;   Van  Kees,  II,  321-322  ;  cf.  pp.  25.S  ff.,  above. 
^  ''P-  473  ff->  below. 


THI<:  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR   FIELDS  433 

Policy  toward  Colonization 

A  single  phase  of  the  Company's  activity  in  the  East  remains 
to  be  noticed  :  its  relation  toward  actual  settlement  and  coloniza- 
tion in  the  stricter  sense. ^  In  the  charter  there  was  no  idea  what- 
soever of  settlement ;  naturally,  however,  the  ordinary  factories 
demanded  for  their  support  a  certain  number  of  Dutch  residents  ; 
and  the  larger  the  factory  became  the  greater  was  the  number  of 
Europeans  who  were  required  in  order  to  provide  stores  and  lad- 
ing for  outgoing  vessels  and  to  receive  those  that  arrived.  Thus 
a  certain  amount  of  population,  however  shifting  as  respects  its 
units,  was  rendered  inevitable.  Some  one  of  these  factories  was 
bound  to  gain  an  ascendency  over  the  rest,  and  this  mainly  because 
of  its  favorable  location.  The  Dutch  with  unerring  skill  picked 
the  straits  as  the  dominant  situations  and  at  first  cast  their  eyes 
on  Malacca,  which  had  been  under  the  Portuguese  the  chief  entre- 
pot of  the  East.  There  were  at  first  and  for  some  decades  great 
difficulties  in  seizing  Malacca,  and  attention  turned  toward  the 
Sunda  straits,  where  it  was  hoped  to  build  a  fort  "  serving  as  a 
rendezvous  of  the  whole  Indies  navigation."  In  1619  Coen  con- 
cjuered  the  whole  province  of  Jacatra  and  the  local  fort  took  the 
name  of  Batavia,  becoming  the  great  deposit-station  for  all  Com- 
pany funds  and  goods,  and  the  residence  of  the  governor-general. 
At  first  its  site  lay  in  a  waste,  for  all  the  natives  had  been  swept 
away,  and  the  Dutch  were  confronted  with  the  need  of  population. 
This  they  recruited  largely  from  the  Chinese  by  securing  them 
preferential  rights,  and  gradually,  as  the  factory-interests  grew, 
both  other  Orientals  and  Dutch  functionaries  became  relatively  nu- 
merous. To  attract  the  Dutch,  private  trade  was  allowed  by  Coen 
even  to  the  west  of  the  Straits  of  Malacca ;  and  the  Netherlanders 
thus  and  otherwise  attracted  were  the  first  free  citizens  of  Batavia.^ 

The  projects  of  Coen^  deserve  to  be  dwelt  upon  with  brevity, 
even  though  they  came  to  little  more  than  naught,  for  this  gover- 
nor-general, standing  at  the  parting  of  the  ways,  cruel  and  ruth- 
less though  he  was,  was  a  man  of  great  keenness,  and  probably 

1  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Kolonisatie." 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  252-255,  304;  De  Reus,  pp.  276-277;  Day,  pp.  56-61.  In  1632 
Batavia  had  8058  inhabitants,  including  the  garrison,  etc. ;  of  these  the  number  of 
Dutch  in  the  service  of  the  Company,  with  wives  and  children,  was  191 2  ;  the  number 
of  burghers,  with  wives,  children,  and  slaves,  1372.    De  Reus,  p.  251,  note. 

^  For  the  life  of  Coen,  see  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Coen." 


^34  coi.OM/.vnON 

the  best  informed  of  his  generation.  lie  is  found  to  have  been  the 
advocate  of  settlement,  and,  by  way  of  promoting  and  supporting 
the  latter,  of  freedom  of  trade.  The  Directors  had  sent  only  men, 
and  of  these  but  a  few  ;  and  both  the  men  and  women  whom  they 
finally  forwarded  at  his  solicitation  were,  in  Coen's  judgment,  the 
"scum  of  all  nations."  They  were  too  lazy,  he  protested,  to  put 
food  in  their  mouths,  or  even,  when  it  was  once  there,  to  chew  it. 
He  wanted  several  hundred  boys  and  girls  from  cHarity-houses 
who  should  grow  up  to  regard  Java  as  their  fatherland  ;  he  rebelled 
against  the  sole  dominant  idea,  to  return  home  with  full  pockets. 
Believing  that  labor  could  do  little  without  capital,  and  that  con- 
sequently the  entrepreneur  was  a  necessity  to  economic  develop- 
ment, Coen  urged  also  that  peoples  of  the  leisure  classes  should 
be  induced  to  go  to  the  Indies.  In  other  words,  he  seems  at  first 
sight  to  have  risen  in  opposition  against  some  of  the  normal  char- 
acteristics of  the  tropical  colony.^  In  so  far  as  he  desired  to  see  a 
transplantation  of  the  European  race  it  is  probable  that  his  views, 
despite  the  favorable  island-position  of  Java,  were  visionary.  Prob- 
ably the  Directors  had  some  reason  in  their  refusal  to  send  Euro- 
pean women  "  from  whom  no  permanent  and  healthy  offspring 
arise  in  India."  It  was  not  denied,  in  somewhat  later  time,  that 
"  hitherto  Dutch  children  born  in  India,  especially  the  half-breeds, 
have  been  accustomed  to  lead  a  somewhat  dissolute  and  disorderly 
existence";  and  very  likely  the  Company  may  be  excused  for  not 
standing  the  cost  of  the  great  number  of  slaves  needful  for  planta- 
tion agriculture  and  cattle-raising.  But  Coen  did  not  base  his  whole 
argument,  nor  any  essential  part  of  it,  upon  premises  thus  easily 
and  rationally  swept  aside.  He  understood  that  tlie  immediate 
source  of  livelihood  for  Dutch  settlers  must  lie  in  exchange,  and 
it  was  a  freedom  of  trade  adequate  to  meet  these  needs  for  which 
he  contended.  He  wished  trade  to  be  free  to  his  settlers  even  from 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  to  Japan.^ 

But  such  a  suggestion  could  meet  with  no  lasting  accord  on  the 
part  of  the  Directors  ;  nor  were  the  costs  of  real  colonization  such 
as  they  could  contemplate  without  aversion.  Hence,  as  has  been 
seen,  the  policy  of  trade-restriction  speedily  came  to  its  own,  to  be 
modified  only  at  rare  intervals  and  for  brief  periods.'^    It  is  during 

1  Cf.  pp.  4  ff.,  above. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  255-256  and  notes,  258-260  and  notes,  307  ;   De  Reus,  pp.  277-278. 
8  Van  Rees,  11,306-315;  cf.  p.  423,  above. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  435 

these  sporadic  periods  only  that  any  movements  of  settlement  took 
place.  Dutch  colonization  under  the  Company  may  then  be  divided 
roughly  into  three  periods:  that  of  1618-1630,  including  Coen's 
activities;  that  of  1662-1700;  and  that  of  1742-1752,  covering 
mainly  the  term  of  Van  Imhoff.  When  the  settlers  of  the  first 
period  had  come  to  realize  that  they  could  not  cultivate  without 
capital,  nor  compete  in  the  industries  with  the  Chinese,  and  were 
not  to  be  allowed  to  trade,  they  migrated  back  to  the  Netherlands ; 
colonial  enterprises  remained  in  abeyance  for  a  generation  or  more, 
and  then  were  resurrected  to  a  hopeful  though  short-lived  popular- 
ity. In  1662  the  Chamber  of  Amsterdam  offered  free  transport 
to  prospective  settlers  in  the  Indies,  and  assured  them,  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  of  freedom  of  trade  ;  in  1669  action  still  more  favor- 
able was  taken  respecting  settlement  in  Ceylon,  Mauritius,  at  the 
Cape,  and  elsewhere.  The  effects  of  this  policy  at  the  Cape  are 
yet  to  be  recounted  ;  but  in  the  tropics  success  could  not  be  at- 
tained. The  Dutch  suspected  any  favors  ;  if  any  one  sought  for- 
tune in  the  Indies  it  was  as  a  Company  agent,  not  as  a  freeholder 
subject  to  the  caprices  of  officials.  By  1684  Ceylon  presented  the 
regulation  picture  of  misery ;  the  Company  would  not  transport 
the  locally  grown  tobacco  for  fear  of  encouraging  contraband  traf- 
fic, and  would  not  allow  the  producers  to  seek  their  own  markets. 
Even  where  trade  was  ostensibly  free,  passes  were  refused,  or 
granted  only  in  cases  where  the  profit  could  not  be  large.  Trade 
was  left  free  in  those  articles  only  which  the  Company  could  not 
hope  to  monopolize  ;  and  if  an  article  not  proscribed,  like  sugar, 
became  important,  the  Company  had  a  way  of  interfering  and  de- 
stroying all  opportunities.  Insecurity  thus  engendered  paralyzed 
the  little  enterprise  that  remained  ;  toward  the  end  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  all  effort  of  the  Company  directed  toward  coloniza- 
tion had  been  proved  an  entire  and  dismal  failure.  During  the 
general  misrule  of  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  no  further 
action  was  taken.  Then  under  Van  Imhoff  transportation  and  some 
actual  aid  in  securing  a  start  ^were  offered,  which  were  the  basis 
of  later  settlement  in  Java ;  but  after  the  death  of  the  governor, 
in  1750,  there  was  no  great  advance.  Robber-raids  from  Bantam, 
motived  by  local  dissatisfaction  under  Company  rule,  destroyed 
what  little  had  been  done  and  the  government  abandoned  the  colo- 
nies.^    In  1778  Batavia  had  a  population  of  110,816,  but  of  these 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  261-264 ;  De  Reus,  pp.  282-285. 


436  COLONIZATION 

only  468  were  free  citizens  ;  33,408  were  Javanese,  and  of  the 
remaining  76,940,  all  Orientals,  20,072  were  slaves  and  23,309 
Chinese.  Outside  of  Batavia  there  was,  of  course,  an  overwhelm- 
ing preponderance  of  the  native  element.^ 

It  is  unnecessary  to  pursue  such  melancholy  attempts  into  their 
details,  for  these  amount,  as  has  been  seen  from  examples  given, 
to  little  more  than  a  catalogue  of  instances  of  ineptitude,  selfish- 
ness, and  greed  on  the  part  of  the  Company.  There  was  bound  to 
be  no  society  of  a  pure  European  type  in  the  Indies,  for,  besides 
the  very  grave  menace  of  the  physical  environment,^  the  Company 
constantly  threw  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  emigration  of  women 
from  the  Netherlands.  This  being  the  case,  the  only  alternative, 
if  the  agent  or  settler  were  to  have  a  home,  was  to  marry  a  native 
woman  ;  but  to  this  procedure  also  discouragement  was  opposed, 
for  the  native  wife  could  not  go  back  to  Holland  with  her  husband. 
In  the  case  of  the  higher  functionaries,  moreover,  those  who 
contracted  marriage  had  to  bind  themselves  to  twice  the  regular 
length  of  service.^  It  is,  therefore,  not  at  all  strange  that  inter- 
race  marriages  did  not  take  place  with  any  frequency.  Miscegena- 
tion on  a  large  scale  was  nowhere  present,  and  half-breeds  born 
of  unions  legitimate  or  otherwise  played  no  such  prominent  part 
in  the  destiny  of  the  Dutch  Indies  as  in  that,  for  example,  of 
Spanish  America. 

From  what  has  been  said  of  the  destiny  of  private  trade  and 
of  settlement,  it  is  clear  that  the  only  real  administration  in  the 
Indies  was  the  imposition  of  the  Company's  will.  The  burghers, 
such  as  they  were,  had  no  share  worth  mentioning  in  the  govern- 
ment, which  was,  in  last  analysis,  the  governor-general  alone.  In 
general  the  colonization  was  not  a  state  enterprise  at  all.  Pam- 
phlets speak  of  necessities  for  emigration  rooting  in  over-population 
and  poverty  at  home,  and  they  discuss  the  various  problems  con- 
nected with  state-favored  colonization  ;   but  the  state  turned  over 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  264-265,  268-270;  I)e  Reus,  pp.  285-2S9.  Even  in  1892  the  Euro- 
peans were  a  vanishing  quantity  outside  of  tl>e  main  centers.  In  Atjeh,  for  example, 
there  were  in  that  year  252  Europeans  as  against  525,579  natives  and  3159  Chinese. 
Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Atjeh." 

2  De  Reus,  who  was  j^erhaps  anxious  to  write  what  the  German  colonial  societies 
would  like  to  hear  (cf.  his  introduction),  states  (p.  290)  that  the  experience  of  the 
Dutch  proves  nothing  as  to  the  possibility  of  European  colonization  of  the  tropical 
highlands.  Cf.  Van  Rees,  II,  258,  note  4  ;  De  Lanessan,  p.  34 ;  Bordier,  Col.,  p.  47; 
Engler,  p.  154,  note;  Van  der  Aa,  Dc  Git/s,  i860,  I,  837. 

8  Van  Rees,  II,  265. 


THK  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  P^IELDS  437 

the  direction  of  the  movement  in  all  its  details  to  the  Company, 
with  results  recounted,  as  to  their  main  lines,  in  what  precedes.^ 


The  Chinese 

But  if  the  colonization  of  Europeans  was  almost  steadily  dis- 
couraged, the  same  cannot  be  said  of  settlement  by  the  Chinese, 
at  least  in  the  earlier  periods.  By  16 17  instructions  to  the  gov- 
ernor not  only  permitted  their  presence  in  the  Moluccas,  but 
urged  that  they  should  be  attracted,  as  being  industrious  and 
peaceable  ;  in  1632  it  was  the  policy  to  draw  their  trade,  so  far  as 
possible,  to  Batavia.  Coen  said,  "  There  is  no  people  in  the  world 
that  serve  us  better  than  the  Chinese " ;  and  asserted  that  too 
many  could  not  be  attracted  to  Batavia.  They  were  of  benefit  to 
agriculture  and  the  mechanic  arts,  and  could  be  ruled  the  more 
easily  as  they  would  not  appeal  to  their  own  country.  The  Chinese 
came  then  to  function  as  the  local  transporters  and  middlemen  of 
the  Dutch  possessions,  and  in  time  became  owners  of  large  sugar- 
plantations  and  refineries,  etc.,  chiefly  in  the  region  of  Batavia. 
But  the  Company  could  not  renounce  the  opportunity  of  preying 
upon  them,  and  they  were  taxed  if  poor,  and  ruthlessly  blackmailed 
if  wealthy  ;  then  came  the  Company's  agents,  each  with  itching 
palm.  The  success  of  the  Chinese  was  their  undoing  ;  embittered, 
they  finally  rebelled  (1740)  against  this  oppression,  and  united 
many  Javanese  to  their  cause.  The  governor,  Valckenier,  broke 
their  resistance,  and  for  two  days  Batavia  was  a  scene  of  blood 
and  death  ;  even  the  prisoners  and  those  sick  in  the  hospitals  were 
put  to  death.  The  Chinese  quarter  was  plundered  and  burned  ; 
600  dwellings  were  destroyed  and  10,000  defenseless  Chinese  were 
killed.  Similar  exhibitions  of  inhuman  ferocity  elsewhere  in  Java 
have  left  a  lasting  disgrace  upon  the  name  of  Valckenier.^  By 
1743,  however,  the  Chinese  and  their  allies  were  reduced  to  sub- 
jection ;  the  former  returned  to  Batavia,  for  they  could  not  be 
spared,  and  later  spread  over  all  Java.  They  lent  money  to  the 
improvident  natives  and  gained  great  profit ;  they  lived  under 
their  own  rules  and  customs,  in  separate  quarters,  and  almost  the 
whole  of  the  interior  and  coast  trade  drifted  into  their  hands. 
Indeed,  in  both  earlier  and  later  times,  the  commercial  privileges 
accorded  them  by  the  Company,  which  represented  its  estimate  of 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  305,  30S.  ^  cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Valckenier." 


438  COLONIZATION 

their  indispcnsability,  are  contrasted  with  the  much  sHghtcr  favors 
extended  to  individual  Dutch  traders.  Of  the  later  fortunes  of  the 
Chinese  the  main  outlines  will  appear  in  subsequent  pages. ^ 

FoREioN  Aggressions 

Certainly  the  Company  had  had  its  way  ;  it  had  been  allowed 
to  develop  a  great  predatory  activity,  varied  by  but  few  impulses 
of  a  more  generous  nature,  within  the  range  of  its  monopoly. 
Government  by  a  body  of  merchants  had  been  permitted  to  pro- 
ceed in  its  extremest  form.  Something  of  its  influence  upon  the 
destiny  of  the  human  life  beneath  its  control  may  have  appeared 
in  the  foregoing ;  it  seems  to  have  desired  to  subserve  no  interests 
save  its  own.  The  question  as  to  whether  it  realized  its  own  aims, 
however  the  latter  may  present  themselves  to  later  ages  as  respects 
worthiness  or  unworthiness,  may  now  engage  attention.  These 
aims  may  be  summed  up  conveniently  under  two  heads  :  mainte- 
nance of  monopoly,  and  so  realization  of  profits  ;  and  —  for  it  must 
not  be  lost  to  view  that  the  Company  was  in  one  of  its  most  signifi- 
cant aspects  a  political  agency  —  support  of  the  state. 

After  the  expulsion  of  the  English  from  Batavia,  in  1624,  the 
Company  was  not  seriously  annoyed  by  foreign  competition  for  a 
century  and  a  quarter,  and  after  the  Peace  of  Breda  (1667)  the 
Netherlanders  were  practically  alone  in  the  Indies  for  well-nigh  a 
hundred  years.  The  time  of  Van  Diemen  {i 636-1645)  represents 
the  first  period  of  expansion  and  the  disclosure  of  new  sources  of 
profit.  The  rest  of  the  century  saw  the  extension  of  the  Company's 
power  from  Ceylon  to  New  Guinea,  and  of  its  influence  and  trade 
from  Persia  to  Japan.  But  the  eighteenth  century  brought  a 
reversal  of  destiny,  for  reasons  presently  to  appear,  although  the 
vertex  of  the  prosperity-curve  was  not  sharp.  The  French,  Eng- 
lish, and  Danes  began  to  pluck  up  courage  again  and  to  invade  the 
Dutch  seas.  In  consideration  of  international  rights  and  courtesy, 
their  vessels  could  not  be  refused  the  privilege  of  making  repairs 
and  laying  in  provisions  in  Dutch  harbors,  and  thus,  under  revela- 
tion of  the  richness  of  the  Company's  monopoly,  was  offered  the 
temptation  to  illicit  trade.  The  real  impotence  of  the  Company 
was  likewise  discovered,  and  its  existence  was  not  long  allowed  to 
remain  as  a  merely  curious  or  astounding  academic  consideration ; 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  265-267;  De  Reus,  pp.  xxxiv-xx.xvi,  250-251,  281-282;  Encycl. 
Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Chineezen  ";  cf.  p.  488  ff.,  below. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  439 

from  1750  on  the  Company  was  forced  to  meet  an  aggression  to 
which  it  could  offer  no  adequate  resistance.  The  war  between  the 
Netherlands  and  England  in  1781  was  the  beginning  of  the  end; 
Dutch  stations  fell  without  a  blow,  and  the  English  came  to  con- 
trol the  Coromandel  coast  and  Ceylon.  The  events  that  followed 
the  French  Revolution,  whereby  the  Netherlands  were  made  over 
into  the  Batavian  Republic  (1795),  completed  the  dissolution.  The 
Stadhouder  Willem  V,  exiled  to  England,  urged  that  the  colonies 
be  placed  under  the  protection  of  that  country;  and  this  was  a  sig- 
nal for  a  weak  yielding  of  most  of  the  Indies.  In  1795  Malacca 
and  other  posts  in  Farther  India  were  lost;  in  1796  Ceylon,  Am- 
boina,  Banda,  and  other  stations.  Ternate  and  Timor  alone  of  the 
islands  were  defended,  and  Van  Overstraten  struggled  on  in  Jav-a ; 
but  the  monopoly  was  gone  and  the  course  of  the  Company's 
history  as  a  controller  of  vast  territories  was  run.^ 

Bankruptcy  and  Ruin 

Such  an  exhibition  of  weakness  argues  internal  deterioration  and 
a  prostration  of  finances.  Enough  has  been  heard  of  the  "hook- 
handed  "  functionaries  of  the  Company  and  of  its  generally  costly, 
ineffectual,  and  disreputable  internal  organization  and  personnel ; 
so  that  a  realization  of  these  elements  of  weakness  may  be  assumed. 
Aside  from  the  incessant  drain  of  peculation  and  embezzlement  of 
funds,  however,  the  Company  had  found  that  the  very  attainment 
and  preservation  of  monopoly  constantly  defeated  its  end  ;  before 
they  knew  it  the  Directors  were  led  into  a  costly  conquest-policy 
that  ate  up  profits  with  awe-inspiring  celerity.  Wars  in  Europe 
likewise  obliged  the  Company  to  come  to  the  state's  aid.  With 
the  later  growth  of  competition,  prices  in  Europe  were  brought 
down,  and  in  the  East  even  the  Arabs  and  Chinese  dared  again  to 
take  advantage  of  the  Company.  By  1676  there  existed  a  large 
unfavorable  balance  in  Batavia,  yet  the  Directors  learned  nothing 
and  proceeded  with  even  increased  severity  against  the  private 
trade  of  the  Dutch  settlers,  imposing  penalties  in  the  way  of 
heavy  fines,  public  whipping,  exile,  and  even  death,  to  stop  it. 
At  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  Directors  were  pursu- 
ing the  "  ostrich-policy  "  of  suppressing  unfavorable  reports,  and 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  2S8-291  ;  De  Reus,  pp.  xvi-xxviii,  x.\xix-xlvi ;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind., 
arts.  "  Verdediging,"  "  Verovering  van  Java  door  de  Engelschen  in  1811," 


440  COLONIZATION 

the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  saw  the  golden  age  of  illicit  traffic.^ 
When  the  competition  of  other  nations  had  at  length  become  con- 
fident and  strong,  the  expenses  of  maintaining  the  monopoly  became 
naturall)'  heavier  ;  according  to  Van  Imhoff  tliey  rose  from  680,- 
000  guilders  in  17  15  to  990,000  in  1739,  and  ye't  prices  were  con- 
stantly sinking  in  Europe.  The  French  and  English  left  the  local 
trade  of  the  East  free  under  a  recognition-duty,  and  the  Dutch 
could  not  combat  this  kind  of  competition,  backed  by  the  zeal, 
daring,  and  knowledge  of  the  private  adventurer;  for  because  such 
trade  had  no  rules  of  prescribed  action  it  could  adapt  itself  to  new 
or  altering  circumstances  as  the  Company  could  never  do.  The 
Dutch  even  emulated  the  Portuguese  in  forming  (of  Batavia)  a 
staple  where  all  returning  ships  must  report ;  thus  their  cargoes 
suffered  from  deterioration,  their  tea,  for  instance,  coming  upon 
the  European  markets  several  years  later  than  that  brought  direct 
from  China  by  the  Danes. ^  Deficits  accumulated  :  the  credit 
balance  of  40,000,000  of  1693  was  all  gone  by  1724,  after  which 
time  the  course  was  steadily  toward  bankruptcy.  From  1750  to 
1760  the  income  gotten  from  the  Indies  was  750,000  guilders; 
from  1760  to  1770,  680,000;  and  although  it  was  500,000  for  the 
next  five-year  period,  debts  were  always  mounting,  for  the  Direc- 
tors kept  paying  out  dividends  of  12J  to  20  per  cent  through 
the  whole  second  half  of  the  century.  By  1779  the  Company 
owed  85,000,000,  and  the  war  with  England  brought  it  in  1782  to 
ask  aid  of  the  state.  It  received  loans  from  this  source,  for  its 
reputation  was  still  great  as  the  essential  factor  in  preserving  the 
East  Indian  trade.  After  1790  it  was  entirely  dependent  upon 
the  government;  in  1795  its  debt  was  112,000,000  guilders.  War 
had  cut  communications  with  Holland  and  all  profits  disappeared  ; 
even  interest  on  debt  could  not  be  paid.  The  Company  ships 
became  antiquated  and  were  sold  ;  at  the  end  of  the  century 
scarcely  any  of  them  were  usable,  and  Dutch  ships  and  products 
ceased  to  arrive  from  the  East.  The  last  sale  of  East  Indian  wares 
took  place  in  1797.  There  was  even  talk  of  reforming  the  Com- 
l)any,  semi-defunct  as  it  was  ;  but,  as  has  been  seen,  its  end  was 
nigh,  for  the  conviction  was  becoming  confirmed  that  war  and 
trade  were  inconsistent  functicjns.''^ 

1  De  Reus,  pp.  253-257  ;   Day,  pp.  73  ff.  "^  Van  Rees,  IT,  28S-2S9. 

"  Van   Rees,   II,  294-297;    He  Reus,  p.  xlvi.    On  the  income  of  the  (Company  in 
India,  see  De  Reus,  pp.  202-232. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  441 

One  of  the  reasons  why  the  essential  weakness  of  the  Company 
was  not  earHer  discovered  at  home  lay  in  its  system  of  secrecy, 
especially  in  regard  to  its  finances.  We  have  already  viewed  the 
twistings  and  turnings  of  the  Directors  and  how  they  were  able 
^bluntly  to  defy  public  scrutiny.  The  utmost  secrecy  was  main- 
tained regarding  especially  the  income  and  outgo  in  the  Indies  ; 
the  very  accounts  of  the  Company  were  merely  unrelated  expenses, 
orders,  etc.,  and  such  announcements  as  were  made  were  issued 
with  a  purpose.  The  functionaries  were  forbidden  to  keep  with 
them  maps,  journals,  and  the  like  ;  all  such  documents  were  to  be 
deposited  where  the  governors-general  or  the  Chambers  could 
guard  them  well.  It  was  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century 
before  regular  news  was  sent  from  the  East,  and  the  medium,  a 
newspaper,  was  suppressed  in  1746  after  running  a  year.  The 
people  at  home  had  their  curiosity  satisfied,  if  at  all,  with  respect 
only  to  the  flora,  fauna,  and  inhabitants  of  the  East  ;  this  diverted 
them  from  more  intimate  topics.  Thus  almost  to  the  end  the  finan- 
cial situation  remained  unknown  to  the  body  of  the  Dutch  people, 
and  the  Directors  had  free  hand  in  their  sinuous  operations.^ 

The  profits  went  largely  to  individuals,  who,  in  their  dual  capac- 
ity of  controllers  and  controlled,  saw  to  it  that  investigation  re- 
mained irrelevant  and  innocuous.  Yet  even  they  could  not  have 
so  often  adduced  reasons  of  state  to  prevent  examinations,  if  there 
had  been  no  political  services  of  the  Company  with  which  to  weight 
the  argument ;  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  the  Company  did 
confer  tangible  and  concrete  benefits  upon  the  fatherland.  The 
Netherlands  were  made  the  staple  of  the  Indies  trade,  with  all 
that  implied  of  economic  importance  and  opportunities  for  the  in- 
crease of  public  wealth.  In  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century 
the  servants  of  the  Company  brought  into  the  country  each  year 
2,500,000  guilders  in  addition  to  the  dividends  of  1,300,000  guilders 
dispensed  annually.  That  the  spesding  of  such  sums  or  their  in- 
vestment in  Holland  conferred  an  economic  benefit  upon  the  nation 
at  large  seems  never  to  have  been  seriously  doubted  ;^  all  such 
services  of  the  Company  were  highly  rated.  But  there  were  rela- 
tions between  it  and  the  state  of  a  still  more  intimate  character, 
for,  during  the  seventeenth  century,  the  latter  was  often  directly 
assisted  in  its  straits  by  the  former.    It  was  said  that  the  state, 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  297-300. 

2  But  cf.  p.  460,  below. 


442 


COLONIZATION 


by  way  of  revenue,  received  three  times  the  gain  from  the  Com- 
pany that  the  participants  had  derived.  The  whole  matter  of  the 
Company's  finances  is  a  troubled  question,  but  if  these  general 
statements  are  accepted,  it  becomes  clearer  why  the  government 
was  willing  to  extend  for  period  upon  period  the  monopolistic  cor- 
poration whose  collapse,  with  all  it  revealed,  became  then  a  dis- 
grace even  to  the  state  itself.^ 

But  before  attempting  any  further  summary  of  the  Company's 
characteristics,  and  of  its  reflex  influence  upon  the  life  of  the 
metropolis,  two  topics  should  engage  attention  :  first,  that  of  the 
settlement  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope ;  and,  second,  the  history  of 
the  West  India  Company  within  its  monopoly-area.  The  alignment 
of  the  West  India  Company  beside  the  elder  organization  is  of 
especial  imj^ortance,  for  not  only  do  the  two  show  a  strong  similar- 
ity in  essential  points,  but  they  also  exhibit  a  significant  diversity 
resulting  from  their  disparate  conditions.  From  a  composite  set 
of  impressions  taking  in  both  organizations,  a  clearer  idea  can  be 
formed  of  the  politico-commercial  corporation  of  the  centuries 
under  review. 

The  Cape  Settlements 

In  any  topical  treatment  of  the  activities  of  the  East  India 
Company,  what  it  did  at  the  Cape  would  fall  under  its  function 
as  a  colonizing  agency.  For  there  were  in  the  Cape  region  none 
of  those  products  from  which  it  thought  to  derive  large  profit.  In 
fact,  for  the  dominant  commercial  purpose  the  Cape  was  worth 
nothing  except  as  a  way-station  upon  the  predestined  route  of 
trade  ;  and  the  same  may  be  said  of  Mauritius  and  other  points 
in  the  Indian  Ocean.  For  this  liurjwse  the  Dutch  appropriated 
the  Cape  region  from  the  enfeebled  Portuguese  in  1652.^  At 
first  there  was  no  intention  of  founding  a  settlement  or  colony; 
it  was  simply  a  secure  port  of  call  that  the  needs  of  trade  seemed 
to  demand.  But  quarrels  with  the  Hottentots,  followed  by  a  war 
(1659),  left  the  Dutch  the  possessors  of  territory  which  they  must 
needs  defend  against  both  natives  and  Europeans.  In  the  early 
years  of  possession  an  attempt  to  raise  grain  and  vines  met  with 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  286-287  ;  De  Reus,  pp.  275-276. 

^  The  Portuguese  in  reality  never  made  any  use  of  Table  Bay ;  South  Africa 
offered  them  no  inducements.  15ut  after  16 16  tlie  Dutch  ]iut  in  at  the  Cape  nearly 
every  season.    Theal,  I,  13,  30,40. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  443 

little  success,  for  the  labor  supply  was  unsatisfactory  and  the  Com- 
pany's policy  toward  colonization  was  discouraging ;  later  negro 
slaves  were  introduced  in  considerable  numbers,  and,  as  in  the 
East,  humanely  treated.  After  thirty  years  the  colony  showed 
a  total  of  663  Dutch  settlers;  and  the  fact  that  of  these  162  were 
children  witnesses  for  climatic  and  other  environmental  conditions 
far  more  favorable  than  those  of  the  Indies.  Relatively  little,  how- 
ever, in  the  way  of  settlement  was  projected  or  encouraged  until 
the  "  second  period  "  of  attention  to  colonization.  Then  the  oppor- 
tunities offered  to  prospective  settlers  ^  chanced  to  coincide  with 
the  sudden  increase  of  human  material  in  Europe.  After  the  Revo- 
cation of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  in  1685,  numerous  Huguenots  had 
fled  to  the  Netherlands,  and  these,  with  certain  Piedmontese  peas- 
ants and  vine-growers,  seized  the  favorable  chance  to  begin  life 
over  again;  by  1689  nearly  200  French  emigrants  had  settled  at 
the  Cape.  In  1687,  likewise,  in  response  to  an  appeal  to  the  Direct- 
ors, many  of  the  free  burghers  had  been  furnished  with  wives  ; 
and  they  and  their  families  numbered  nearly  600,  in  addition  to 
439  other  Europeans,  mainly  Company  employees.  The  success 
of  the  new  cultivators  was  marked  ;  by  1690  they  could  ship  wine 
to  the  Netherlands.  "  If  the  Company  had  gone  on  in  the  same 
way  the  Cape  would  undoubtedly  have  become  one  of  the  most 
beautiful  and  rich  of  the  Dutch  possessions."  ^ 

But  as  soon  as  the  Company  had  secured  a  good  harborage  for 
its  ships,  it  ceased  to  have  any  interest  in  colonization,  and  speedily 
slipped  back  into  the  typical  attitude  of  exploitation.  Land  was 
assigned  more  sparingly  and  the  grants  were  to  be  separated  from 
one  another  by  a  clear  space  of  three  miles.  Then  the  Company 
began  to  enforce  its  rights  as  the  only  trading  agency  ;  the  settlers 
were  obliged  not  only  to  sell  it  their  products  at  a  low  price,  but 
to  buy  from  it  at  rising  prices.  Since  it  was  found  profitable  to 
barter  with  the  natives  toys  and  trinkets  for  cattle,  the  colonists 
were  prohibited  from  this  source  of  gain  under  pain  of  whipping 
and  branding.  Freedom  from  taxes,  assured  at  first,  gave  way  to 
high  taxation ;  all  goods  had  to  be  painfully  transported  to  Cape 
Town  to  sell,  hand  over  to  the  Company,  or  pay  taxes  upon.    And 

^  P.  435,  above. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  261-262,  375-376  ;  De  Reus,  pp.  282-283;  Johnston,  pp.  67-72; 
Theal,  I,  82,  88  ff.,  337  ff.,  358  ff.  For  the  population  in  1672,  1691,  etc.,  see  Theal, 
I.  221,  335,  370,  etc. 


^_^^  COLONIZATION 

since  this  provision  applied  chiefly  to  grain,  agriculture  was  con- 
fined within  the  narrow  limits  defined  by  the  crudeness  and  slow- 
ness of  means  of  communication. ^  Naturally  the  temptation  to 
evade  such  restrictions  soon  led  to  a  development  of  illicit  traffic. 
That  the  people  should  have  any  share  in  the  government  lay  in 
the  plan  of  the  Company  as  little  here  as  elsewhere  ;  gradually 
almost  all  the  conditions  necessary  to  the  prosperity  of  a  colony, 
even  where  these  had  once  existed,  were  withdrawn,  and  the  Cape 
ceased  to  attract  any  movement  of  colonization.  Yet  the  Company, 
despite  all  its  restrictive  and  oppressive  measures,  could  not  bring 
the  local  revenue  to  balance  expenditure.^ 

The  settlers  already  established  in  South  Africa,  who,  with  the 
absorption  of  the  Huguenot  strain,  were  prevailingly  Dutch,  could 
not  endure  the  exactions  of  the  Company  and  gradually  "  trekked  " 
away  from  the  coast.  For  a  certain  distance  the  officials  followed 
and  sought  to  prey  upon  them,  but  they  gradually  escaped  surveil- 
lance of  any  kind.  In  1 788  the  boundary  of  the  colony  was  extended 
to  the  Great  Fish  River.  It  was  during  this  movement  toward 
the  interior  that  the  settlers  came  first  into  direct  contact  with  the 
Bantus  who  were  migrating  from  the  north-east,  and  who  from  that 
time  on  have  formed  an  important  factor  in  the  history  of  South 
Africa.  The  Company,  naturally  enough,  provided  no  protection 
for  the  farmer-settlers  (Boers);  and  owing  to  the  relatively  small 
numbers  of  the  latter,  in  comparison  with  the  Kaffir  invaders,  the 
native  situation  was  a  constant  peril.  The  Dutch  appear  to  have 
practiced  miscegenation  with  little  or  no  repugnance,  both  with  the 
Hottentots  of  the  Cape  and  the  Bantus  ;  the  result  being  in  the 
first  case  the  so-called  Bastaards,  of  whom  there  are  at  present  some 
tens  of  thousands.^  But  the  bulk  of  this  race-mixture,  which  befits 
the  tropical  rather  than  the  temperate  colony,  is  probably  assignable 
to  the  absence  of  European  women;  for  the  latter  were  not  likely  to 
come  of  their  own  accord  to  so  uncertain  and  hazardous  a  frontier, 

1  Communication  by  sea  was  also  very  slow ;  up  to  1 750  a  voyage  from  the  Nether- 
lands to  South  Africa  which  consumed  less  than  120  days  was  regarded  as  a  fortunate 
one.    Theal,  I,  40. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  375-37S;  Johnston,  pp.  73,  75  ;  Theal,  I,  1S8,  276  ff.,  322  ff.  ;  II, 
I  ff.,  41-43.  71  ff-,  121,  155,  231  ff.,  2S4  ff.,  299  ff.,  332  ff. 

3  Keane  (Africa,  II,  187)  reports  1000  Bastaards  for  German  Southwest  Africa, 
and  says  (II,  238)  respecting  the  ('ape  Colony  region  that  it  contains  not  greatly  over 
180,000  Hottentots  pure  and  mixed,  but  that  of  these  the  mongrels  and  half-castes 
form  the  immense  majority.  Cf.  Schmidt,  II,  233-234  ;  Letourneau,  Guerre,  p.  59  ; 
Ratzel,  Hist,  of  Mankind,  II,  295. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  445 

and  the  Company  was  not  willing,  and,  later,  was  unable  to  undertake 
the  cost  of  their  transportation.  In  actual  results  the  Company- 
had  little  to  show  when,  in  1790,  it  became  practically  a  financial 
ruin.  There  was  at  that  time  a  population  of  14,600  Europeans 
owning  17,000  slaves,  but  it  was  not  ready  to  support  its  rulers. 
Indeed  the  Boers  of  the  interior  expelled  their  magistrates  and  pro- 
ceeded to  govern  themselves  in  a  rude  fashion ;  and  the  people  of 
the  Cape,  while  they  joined  with  the  Company  agents  in  an  attempt 
to  beat  off  the  covetous  British,  were  really  half-hearted  and  quickly 
yielded.  For  in  1795,  as  a  sequel  of  European  upturnings  and 
political  readjustments,  the  Netherlands  had  come  to  be  the  enemy 
of  England,  and  the  latter  had  at  once  set  out  to  seize  the  Cape. 
The  West  African  stations  were  passed  over  as  being  relatively 
worthless  since  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade.  The  Cape  was 
taken  with  little  effort,  and,  except  for  three  years  (1803- 1806), 
when  it  was,  by  a  short-lived  agreement,  restored  to  Holland,  it 
has  remained  British  ever  since. ^ 


The  Boers  as  a  Product  of  Company  Rule 

The  history  of  the  burghers  who  had  isolated  themselves  in  the 
interior  in  consequence  of  Company  oppression  presents  a  socio- 
logical phenomenon  in  many  respects  unique.  Here  is  a  case, 
namely,  of  a  strong  European  stock  suffering  degeneracy  in  a 
temperate  colony.  It  may  seem  fanciful  to  refer  phenomena  so 
far  subsequent  in  time  to  the  policy  of  the  long-extinct  Com- 
pany;  but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  the  Boers  of  1900  pre- 
sented in  no  visionary  sense  the  logical  and  finished  product  of 
the  system  imposed  so  strictly  by  the  Company.  They  were  the 
products  of  the  isolation  and  attendant  influences  forced  upon  their 
ancestors  as  recalcitrants  against  the  policy  of  greed  and  exploita- 
tion. For  these  progenitors  had  been  led  to  plunge  "  ever  more 
deeply  into  a  rude  and  harsh  natural  environment,  wherein  they 
came  into  contact  with  a  grade  of  civilization,  or  non-civilization, 
much  cruder  and  coarser  than  their  own.  Like  all  frontier  societies 
placed  in  similar  conditions  and  almost  wholly  segregated  from  the 
outside  world,  they  sunk  in  large  degree  to  the  level  of  their  sur- 
roundings."    And  they  did  not  then  progress.    "  In  1880  the  bulk 

1  Fortanier,  pp.  69-70;  Johnston,  pp.72,  74-80  ;  Keltic,  p.  79  ;  Theal,  IT,  359; 
III,  I  ff.,  96-97. 


446  COLONIZATION 

of  the  Boers  of  the  Republics  were,  to  most  intents  and  purposes, 
of  a  pronounced  seventeenth-century  type  of  civilization ;  indeed, 
in  many  cases  they  were  inferior  in  education,  general  culture,  etc., 
to  the  Hollanders,  and  especially  to  the  Huguenots,  from  whom 
they  derived  their  descent."  Thus  they  were  primitive  in  their 
industrial  organization,  in  their  manners  and  customs,  religion  and 
morals,  law  and  government.^  Whatever  the  merits  of  the  recent 
struggle  between  these  backward  peoples  and  England,  it  cannot 
but  be  admitted  that  they  stocKl  for  the  narrowness  and  ignorance 
of  the  past,  even  though  their  antagonist  seemed  often  to  be 
championing  the  ruthless  aggressions  of  modern  capitalism  rather 
than  the  greater  blessings  of  a  later  and  higher  stage  of  human 
culture.  In  any  case  the  trend  of  the  age  is  sure  to  sweep  away 
what  the  Boer  stood  for,  and  the  Boer  himself,  if  he  proves  unadapt- 
able. The  conflict  was  one  of  civilizations,  not  races,  except  as 
they  represented  different  ideals  of  civilization.  Mad  the  Cape  been 
colonized  upon  liberal  lines  of  policy,  with  a  slowly  advancing  fron- 
tier closely  connected  with  and  so  supported  by  a  freely  increasing 
settled  population,  there  could  have  been  no  such  isolation,  with  its 
attendant  results  of  ignorance,  bigotry,  and  general  maladaptation 
to  the  altering  conditions  of  life.  In  South  Africa  the  Company 
had  a  chance  to  work  out  its  colonial  policy  for  over  a  century 
almost  undisturbed  ;  and  it  has  left  to  the  student  of  societies 
its  human  "  results  "  sealed  in  an  isolation  virtually  unpenetrated 
until  the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  Transvaal  toward  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

It  is  no  wonder,  therefore,  that  under  Dutch  rule  South  Africa 
gave  little  promise  of  what  it  was  to  be.  The  old  type  of  policy, 
continued  through  the  eighteenth  century,  with  brief  respites 
that  served  only  to  increase  uncertainty,  allowed  of  no  natural 
development.  Details  are  scarcely  necessary,  after  what  has  been 
said  of  colonization  in  Java  and  elsewhere,  and  in  view  of  what  is 
to  come  respecting  the  West  India  Company's  policy  in  the  New 

1  Keltic,  Africa  (chapter  by  the  editor,  on  "  Africa  since  1895"),  pp.  275-276.  "  Der 
Boer  ist  ein  StockhoHander,  der  um  zwei  Jahrhunderte  hinter  der  Ciiltur  zuriickgeblie- 
ben  ist,  und  einen  Ueigeschniack  von  Kafferthum  angenommen  hat.  .  .  .  Herr  von 
Weber  riihmt  ihm  zwar  nach,  dass  er  die  Biljel  stets  auf  dem  runden  Tische  liegen 
hat  und  sein  Tagewerk  mit  einer  Ilymne  beginnt,  aljer  neben  seiner  Frommigkeit 
trachtet  er  danacli  die  Schwarzen  mit  Scorpionen  zu  ziichtigen,  und  seine  Bibelfestig- 
keit  aussert  sich  meist  in  alt-testamentarischen  Citaten  iiber  die  Vertilgung  der 
Heiden,  d.  h.der  Kaffem."  Phihppson,  p.  35. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  447 

World.  One  important  consideration  must,  however,  be  noted, 
namely,  that  inasmuch  as  South  Africa  has  later  been  proved 
colonizable,  it  is  not  possible  to  minimize  the  Company's  responsi- 
biUty  in  any  degree,  as  was  done  in  the  case  of  Java,  by  reference 
to  unfavorable  natural  conditions.  Rather  does  the  case  of  South 
Africa  demonstrate  the  truth  of  what  De  Reus  has  been  cjuoted  as 
asserting, 1  that  the  experience  of  the  Dutch  proves  nothing  as  to 
the  possibility  of  colonization  of  such  regions  as  Java.  The  Com- 
pany's policy  was  a  sufficient  cause  for  ill-success  in  the  Indies,  as 
it  was  the  sole  cause  for  the  same  at  the  Cape. 

The  narrative  turns  now  to  the  operations  of  the  West  India 
Company  within  the  field  of  its  monopoly,  and  may  be  the  more 
condensed  in  that  points  of  general  similarity  between  the  policies 
and  enterprises  of  the  two  companies  need  little  more  than  a 
recordinsf  allusion. 


Policy  of  the  West  India  Company  in  New  Netherlands 

The  younger  Company,  having  been  organized  in  the  manner 
described,^  began  to  survey  its  field  in  order  to  locate  promising 
sources  of  gain  and  possible  points  of  attack  upon  the  arch-enemy 
whom  it  was  designed  to  discomfit ;  it  turned  its  attention  first  of 
all  to  the  northern  continent.  The  East  India  Company,  with  the 
purpose  of  rendering  its  monopoly  perfectly  secure,  had  sent  out 
Hendrik  Hudson  (1607)  to  discover  a  north-west  passage  to  the 
Orient ;  and  this  unfortunate  explorer  had  opened  up  the  waters 
that  bear  his  name.  Then,  in  16 14,  the  district  of  the  New  Nether- 
lands, between  the  fortieth  and  fiftieth  parallels  of  north  latitude, 
had  been  granted  to  certain  shipowners  of  Amsterdam  and  Hoorn 
for  purposes  of  discovery  and  trade.  In  1621  the  newly  formed 
West  India  Company  took  over  the  station  that  had  been  located 
upon  Manhattan  Island,  as  well  as  certain  smaller  ones  farther  up 
the  Hudson  River.  The  Director  Minnewit  purchased  the  island 
from  the  natives  and  founded  New  Amsterdam  (1626).^ 

But  the  new  Company,  like  that  of  the  East  Indies,  was  entirely 
given  over  to  commerce,  and  proposed  to  make  of  the  fur-trade 
an  analogue  to  the  spice-trade  of  the  East.  The  early  years  were 
promising:  in  1624  there  were  exported  27,000  guilders'  worth  of 

1  P.  436,  note  2,  above.  ^  pp  412  ff.,  above.  ^  Van  Rees,  II,  42-43,  332. 


448  COLONIZATION 

beaver-skins,  and  in  1627  twice  that  value.  This,  however,  did  not 
pay  the  costs  of  the  settlement,  and  the  Company  began  to  seek 
some  way  to  avoid  such  burden  without  losing  hold  of  the  fur- 
trade.  It  seemed  clear  that  the  colonists  must  be  put  in  the  way 
of  self-support  through  agriculture,  and  the  Company  aimed  to 
encompass  this  end  while  leaving  the  costs  of  colonization  to  indi- 
viduals. In  1629  it  was  enacted  that  any  shareholder  who,  within 
four  years  after  announcing  his  purpose,  should  found  a  colony  of 
fifty  persons  over  fifteen  years  of  age,  bound  to  temporary  serv- 
ice, should  receive  the  title  of  patroon  over  the  land  thus  settled. 
Such  an  estate  might  front  for  four  miles  on  the  coast,  or  two 
miles  on  a  navigable  river,  with  no  limits  set  toward  the  interior ; 
the  land  must  be  purchased  from  the  natives,  and  was  then  to  be 
governed  by  the  patroon  under  the  Company.  Free  colonists  who 
were  able  to  come  to  America  could  have  all  the  land  they  could 
cultivate,  and  were  to  be  immune  from  taxation  for  ten  years. ^ 
These  terms  appear  very  favorable  for  colonization ;  but  the  trade 
policy  and  monopoly  were  yet  to  be  attended  to.  Both  the  colonist 
and  the  patroon  were  forbidden  to  engage  in  the  fur-trade,  except 
where  the  Company  had  no  station;  and  even  in  the  latter  case  all 
pelts  had  to  be  brought  to  Fort  Amsterdam  and  taxed  a  guilder 
apiece  before  they  could  be  taken  to  the  metropolis.  All  exported 
wares,  likewise,  had  to  be  taken  to  the  same  point  of  departure  and 
loaded  upon  Company  ships.  The  patroons  might  trade  along  the 
coast  from  Florida  to  Newfoundland,  but  must  at  every  turn  put  in 
at  Fort  Amsterdam  and  pay  a  duty  of  five  per  cent.  As  for  the  im- 
port trade,  the  Company  reserved  that  for  itself  ;  it  engaged  to  bring 
necessities  from  home  at  a  reasonable  price,  and  any  patroons  who 
wished  to  do  this  were  obliged  to  pay  large  recognition-dues.  The 
colonists  must  not  trade  in  this  way  at  all ;  nor  could  they  weave  or 
otherwise  compete  with  home-production,  on  pain  of  penalties  that 
went  as  far  as  banishment.  In  the  colonists'  trade  with  the  natives 
and  in  the  disposal  of  their  own  products  they  were  consistently 
obstructed.  It  is  plain  that  the  Company  was  out  for  gain,  and  cared 
for  colonization  only  as  it  was  conceived  to  conduce  to  that  end.^ 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  332-333. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  333-334.  It  is  noteworthy  tliat  the  West  India  Company,  owing 
to  the  length  and  accessibility  of  the  American  coast-line,  always  suffered  more  from 
the  competition  of  illicit  traders  than  did  the  East  India  Company.  Van  Rees,  II, 
12.S;  Roscher,  pp.  273,  note  3,  274. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN    1  HEIR  FIELDS 


Administration  :  the  Patroons 


449 


The  government  of  the  new  stations  was  a  purely  Company  affair; 
there  was  no  thought  of  civil  freedom.  A  council,  or  Raad,  com- 
posed of  the  director-general  and  five  members  chosen  by  him  from 
the  most  important  Company  agents,  wielded  all  power,  legislative, 
executive,  or  judicial ;  the  lives,  property,  honor,  and  freedom  of 
the  colonists  were  surrendered  unconditionally  into  such  partisan 
hands.  The  director-general,  or  governor,  was  really  all-powerful, 
for  the  men  he  selected  could  not  oppose  his  will.  Despite  this  cen- 
tralization of  power,  however,  and  the  fact  that  the  patroons  were 
simply  vassals,  the  latter  had  sufBcient  opportunity,  in  so  unsettled 
a  country,  to  dupe  the  Company  and  escape  its  oversight ;  for  they 
had  no  schemes  of  colonization  at  heart,  but  intended  merely  to  bar- 
ter with  the  natives  under  the  loop-hole  conditions  of  the  decree. 
Some  even  of  the  Directors  of  the  Company  had  bought  through 
agents  the  best  places  along  the  Delaware  and  Hudson  rivers,  an 
underhand  policy  which  deterred  better  men  from  settlement  or  in- 
vestment. The  patroons  got  presently  a  great  deal  of  the  native 
trade  and  simply  refused  to  fulfill  the  conditions  attendant.  But  the 
Company  resisted  such  an  invasion  of  its  monopoly  and  took  meas- 
ures, under  the  administration  of  the  weak  Van  Twiller  (1633-1637), 
which  so  incensed  the  patroons  that  they  came  to  resist  even  the 
conditions  with  which  they  had  formerly  complied.  Both  parties 
appealed  to  the  States-General.^ 

The  actions  of  the  patroons  and  the  Company  seem  to  have 
convinced  the  colonists  that  there  was  something  in  the  fur-trade 
for  them  too  ;  thus  agriculture  was  deserted  in  favor  of  barter  with 
the  Indians.  Colonization  was  neglected,  even  the  patroons,  in 
disgust,  selling  their  rights  back  to  the  Company.  Restrictions 
of  industry  and  trade,  and  interference  with  the  colonist's  choice 
of  a  means  of  livelihood  and  with  his  power  of  disposal  of  the 
products  of  his  own  toil,  led  to  general  discouragement  and  im- 
patience. In  1638,  after  fifteen  years  of  Company  rule,  the  New 
Netherlands  showed  few  traces  of  cultivation.  And  what  incensed 
the  settlers  the  more  was  that,  while  the  Company,  intent  on  gain 
alone,  could  do  nothing  for  agriculture  in  its  own  colony,  it  was 
importing  oxen,  horses,  and  sheep  into  the  near-by  settlements  of 
the  English.  But  about  all  that  could  be  at  once  accomplished 
1  Van  Rees,  II,  335-337. 


450  COLONIZATION 

was  the  recall  of  Van  Twiller  ;  ^  any  alleralion  of  policy  took  more 
time,  and  it  was  not  until  1640  that  substantial  chan[;es  were 
effected.  Then  the  coast  trade  was  made  free  from  Newfoundland 
to  Florida  and  the  fur-monopoly  was  given  up,  the  Company  retain- 
ing as  in  1629  the  practical  control  of  exchange  with  the  mother- 
country.  The  States-General  insisted  also  that  the  patroons  should 
not  be  exclusively  shareholders  in  the  Company,  but  that  any 
citizen  of  the  land  could  make  use  of  the  same  privileges  under 
similar  conditions.  The  rights  of  individuals  to  pass  in  their  own 
ships  between  metropolis  and  colony  were  widened,  and  to  any  one 
who  should  take  over  five  persons  besides  himself  there  were 
assured  not  only  200  acres  of  land,  but  even  the  right  to  hunt  and 
fish.  The  prohibition  upon  the  manufacture  of  fabrics  and  other 
articles  was  removed.  It  looked  as  if  the  Company  had  at  last 
become  a  sponsor  of  colonization  ;  it  even  agreed  to  provide  free 
passage,  tools,  cattle,  and  the  like,  for  a  yearly  payment  of  100 
guilders  and  80  pounds  of  butter,  the  Company  to  take  back  the 
number  of  cattle  given  after  six  years  ;  it  even  suggested  advances 
to  the  settlers  of  money  and  necessities  on  credit.  Results  began 
at  once  to  appear :  first  of  all  the  Company  agents,  who  had  regu- 
larly gone  home  at  the  end  of  their  service,  took  advantage  of  the 
new  liberality  and  set  about  raising  corn  and  tobacco,  or  building 
ships  to  trade  with  New  England  and  Virginia  ;  population  like- 
wise increased  through  immigration  from  New  England  caused 
by  religious  intolerance  in  Massachusetts.  Everywhere  land  was 
cleared  and  farming  begun. '^  But  the  Company  had  yielded  only 
to  need  and  the  demands  of  the  States-General,  and  as  soon  as 
the  attention  of  the  authorities  was  relaxed  it  returned  stealthily 
to  its  old  policy  ;  it  saw  in  every  settler  a  competitor  and  pro- 
ceeded against  him  as  of  old.  The  documents  conferring  rights 
to  land  were  given  under  conditions  of  submission  to  exactions 
and  dues ;  they  were  recalled  under  pretense  of  errors  in  form, 
and  when  returned  were  altered  to  suit  the  Company.  Churches, 
schools,  and  courts  of  justice  that  had  been  promised  were  with- 
held ;  and  a  general  colonization  was  effectually  opposed,  for  none 
would  venture  to  settle  under  such  a  system.  Then  the  Company 
set  to  work  to  regain  the  export  trade  :  the  1640  duties  of  ten  per 
cent  on  pelts  and  five  per  cent  on   other. wares  were  gradually 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  337-338. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  339-341. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  451 

raised,  the  latter  to  sixteen  per  cent ;  and  the  regulations  were 
strongly  enforced  under  penalty  of  confiscation  of  ship  and  cargo. ^ 
The  cruelty  and  injustice  to  the  Indians  of  Kieft,  a  bankrupt 
and  evil  man  who  succeeded  Van  Twiller,  brought  on  a  destructive 
war  from  1641  to  1645,  wherein  the  farmers'  establishments  were 
ruined  and  the  population  reduced  from  3000  to  1000.  There 
resulted  a  bitter  strife  between  the  governor  and  his  council,  upon 
whom  he  had  to  depend  for  aid,  but  whom  he  treacherously  dis- 
missed when  trouble  seemed  to  be  over.  English  soldiers  nvere 
hired  to  defend  the  colonists  and  were  to  be  paid  by  Kieft  through 
the  imposition  of  a  tax  on  beer.  In  1645  the  government  called 
the  Company  to  account  and  found  its  condition  miserable  ;  for, 
despite  its  oppressive  policy,  it  had  suffered  heavy  losses.  The 
debit-balance  of  the  period  1626  to  1645  was  500,000  guilders. 
It  was  a  question  whether  the  New  Netherlands  should  not  be 
given  up ;  but  a  further  effort  was  decided  upon.  Trade  was 
opened  generally  to  private  persons,  and  colonization  was  to  be 
encouraged  ;  Stuyvesant,  a  more  intelligent  and  energetic  man, 
was  sent  out  as  director-general.  But  the  latter,  being  of  extreme 
obstinacy,  and  opposed  to  civil  freedom  in  principle,  began  by 
simply  repeating  in  slightly  different  form  the  oppressive  measures 
of  his  predecessors.  Representations  to  the  States-General  again 
secured  (1652)  better  conditions  for  the  colony,  and,  as  usual,  the 
removal  of  pressure  was  followed  by  a  relatively  large  natural 
inflow  of  population.  Manufactories  started  up;  in  1659  trade 
with  France,  Spain,  Italy,  and  the  Caribbean  islands  was  made 
free,  though,  as  a  survival  of  the  old  monopoly  policy,  beaver-skins 
had  to  be  taken  direct  to  Amsterdam. ^  • 

Belated  Reform 

Prosperity  redoubled  the  desire  of  the  colonists  for  autonomy ; 
they  wished,  as  the  price  of  their  endurance  in  creating  a  colony 
from  which  the  metropolis  derived  great  benefit,  to  possess  the 
same  rights  as  their  fellows  who  stayed  at  home.  Seizing  an  occa- 
sion when  Stuyvesant  needed  support  in  war,  they  presented  a 
memorandum  of  demands  and  comments  which  shows  the  whole 
story  of  their  grievances.  They  asserted  that  it  was  not  right  that 
the  people's  lives,  property,  and  all  the  rest  should  be  in  the  power 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  341-343.  -  Van  Rees,  II,  344-353. 


452  COLOM/.VnON 

of  one  man  or  several  who  would  act  with  caprice  or  with  little 
understanding ;  they  complained  that  the  Company  left  them  with- 
out protection  from  their  enemies ;  they  demanded  that  each 
locality  should  have  its  own  local  government  ;  they  asserted  that, 
since  obsolete  laws  and  enactments  were  not  expunged,  they  knew 
neither  their  own  rights  nor  duties  ;  and  they  charged  the  colonial 
government  with  caprice  and  favoritism  in  its  land  grants.  Despite 
the  ire  of  Stuyvesant,  who  declared  these  representations  to  be 
seditious,  there  resulted  some  betterment  from  their  publication.^ 

But  that  which  infused  a  belated  haste  into  reforms  was  the 
imminence  of  the  English,  who  had  moved  down  the  Connecticut 
River,  driving  the  Dutch  outposts  before  them,  and  were  already 
strong  on  Long  Island.  When  it  dawned  at  last  upon  the  Dutch 
government  that  the  English  colonists  were  eager  to  seize  Dutch 
territory,  and  that  the  British  government  was  a  party  to  their  en- 
deavors, nothing  was  omitted  which  might  incite  the  settlement  of 
defenders.  The  Directors  saw  that  a  mistake  had  been  made,  and 
that  their  possessions  with  few  inhabitants  lay  open  to  encroach- 
ment. Huguenots,  Waldenses,  and  Germans,  who  were  present  at 
this  time  in  great  numbers  in  Holland,  were  shipped  over  by  hun- 
dreds ;  religious  freedom  became  the  policy.  The  population  of 
the  New  Amsterdam  region  increased  under  Stuyvesant  (1647— 
1664)  from  2000  to  10,000. 

But  a  change  of  heart  at  the  eleventh  hour,  after  fifty  years  of 
selfish  neglect,  was  in  this  case  unavailing.  The  Connecticut  colony 
was  laying  a  strong  hold  upon  Long  Island  when,  in  1664,  the 
English  king,  Charles  IT,  gave  the  whole  of  the  New  Netherlands 
to  his  brother,  the  Duke  of  York.  Stuyvesant  was  luiable  to  pro- 
tect Long  Island  even  against  the  Connecticut  colony,  and  when 
the  duke  had  sent  without  delay  four  ships-of-war  to  assume  pos- 
session of  New  Amsterdam,  there  was  no  defense  ;  it  was  given 
over  under  a  treaty.^ 

Such,  in  brief,  are  the  salient  features  of  the  Company  coloniza- 
tion in  the  New  Netherlands.  Analogies  with  the  colonization  of 
Java  and  South  Africa  under  the  East  India  Company  crop  out 
at  every  turn ;  they  display  the  same  policy  based  upon  the  same 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  354-355-  It  was  during  the  administration  of  Stuyvesant  (1655) 
that  tiie  Dutch  took  possessif)n  of  the  colony  of  New  Sweden.  P'or  an  account  of 
this  colony,  see  Acrelius  and  Caniiianius. 

2  Van  Rees,  11,355-357. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  453 

motives,  in  a  slightly  different  setting.  The  present  case  demon- 
strates, says  Van  Rees,^  that  the  Dutch  lacked  neither  the  will  nor 
the  skill  to  found  colonies.  Religious  or  political  persecution  was 
not  necessary  to  drive  them  to  it ;  as  soon  as  it  was  known  that 
labor  and  capital  might  make  great  gain  across  the  ocean,  many 
were  ready  to  go.  The  less  rich  were  content  to  settle  if  they 
received  free  passage  and  reasonable  assistance  in  overcoming  the 
early  obstacles  ;  the  wealthy  were  ready  to  invest  if  they  were  as- 
sured the  rights  they  had  at  home.  But  the  Company  was  not  in 
a  state  of  mind  to  grant  either  of  these  essentials.  Whether  this 
argumentation  absolves  the  Dutch  from  the  charge  of  being  unable 
to  colonize  successfully,  may  be  susceptible  of  doubt ;  certainly  the 
rank  and  file  were  bent  on  "great  gain"  as  the  most  successful 
colonizing  peoples  have  not  been.  It  is  doubtful  if  they  could  ever 
have  withstood  the  racial  elements  that  surrounded  them  and  have 
founded  a  new  Dutch  nation.  But  it  is  at  least  true  that,  both 
here  and  in  Africa  and  in  Brazil,  the  Dutch  labored  under  an  in- 
cubus, in  the  shape  of  the  two  India  Companies,  with  which  few 
other  colonizing  peoples  have  had  to  contend. 

The  Company  in  Brazil  and  Surinam 

The  case  of  the  Dutch  in  Brazil  provides  almost  a  surfeit  of 
demonstration  along  this  line.  Since,  also,  the  story  of  their  at- 
tempted settlement  in  that  country  has  been  told  already,  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  Portuguese  defenders,^  it  may  be  dismissed 
in  a  few  words,  the  only  attempt  being  to  fit  this  exhibition  of 
Company  policy  in  with  the  rest  of  its  class. 

One  of  the  strong  motives,  if  not  the  strongest,  in  the  founding 
of  the  West  India  Company  had  been  to  do  damage  to  the  king  of 
Spain ;  and  since  he  was,  from  1580  to  1640,  king  also  of  Portugal, 
the  Portuguese  colonies  were  as  desirable  points  of  attack  as  any 
others.  During  the  first  years  of  its  existence  the  Company  had 
made  an  attempt  to  get  footing  upon  the  coast  of  Brazil ;  and  its 
activities  were  encouraged  in  1629  by  the  capture  of  the  Spanish 
silver  fleet.  In  1636  the  determination  to  conquer  Brazil  was  so 
strong  that  the  Count  of  Nassau-Siegen,  Joan  Maur[ts,_wasL^sent 
for  its  prosecution.  His  successes  have  been  elsewhere  noted  ;  by 
1640  the  West  India  Company  held  the  best  six  provinces  of  Brazil, 

1  II,  357-35S.  2  Pj).  146  ff.,  aljove. 


454 


COLONIZATION 


extending  from  Sergipc  in  tiie  south  to  Ceara  in  the  north,  Recife 
(Pernambuco)  being  the  seat  of  its  government  and  commerce.^ 
The  need  of  colonists  at  once  appeared,  and  the  usual  policy  of 
opening  up  trade  under  dues  to  the  Company,  and  under  reserva- 
tion of  certain  profitable  articles,  was  evolved.  As  noted  above, 
Dutch  and  Brazilians  could  make  one  voyage  per  year,  paying  ten 
per  cent  on  European  and  thirty  per  cent  on  American  wares,  but 
were  to  let  the  trade  in  slaves.  Brazil-wood,  and  war  articles  severely 
alone.  The  Count  of  Nassau  established  order  and  discipline  and 
attended  to  school-facilities  and  the  like.  Brazil  began  to  be  pros- 
perous ;  the  revenues,  chiefiy  from  a  thirty  per  cent  tax  on  the 
product  of  the  sugar-mills,  paid  nearly  all  the  expenses  of  the  war. 

But  this  could  not  long  satisfy  the  Company.  Nassau's  religious 
tolerance,  in  consequence  of  which  numerous  Jews  had  flocked  to 
Brazil,  was  not  to  the  taste  of  the  Directors,  and  they  began  to 
throw  obstacles  before  him.  The  prices  of  the  necessities  of  life 
were  kept  high  ;  the  military  force  of  about  6000,  employed  mainly 
in  garrison-duty,  was  reduced,  and  the  pay  and  even  the  food- 
supplies  for  the  army  were  held  back.  In  a  country  whose  culti- 
vators had  been  largely  driven  away  and  which  was  dependent 
upon  supplies  from  Europe,  the  results  of  this  exhibition  of  cramp- 
ing avarice  were  fatal.  Nassau  returned  discouraged  to  the  Neth- 
erlands in  1644;  then  the  troops,  no  longer  restrained  by  his 
presence,  fell  to  plundering  and  abusing  the  Portuguese,  who 
had  come  to  regard  Nassau  as  their  protector,  with  the  result  of 
a  revolution  and  the  loss  of  the  colony,  as  detailed  in  a  former 
chapter.^ 

In  the  same  year  that  the  Dutch  lost  the  New  Netherlands,  they 
lost  also  Cayenne  to  the  French,  after  holding  it  since  1656;  but 
in  1667  this  was  made  up  for  by  the  Zeelanders'  conquest  of  the 
Enghsh  province  of  Surinam.  In  the  administration  of  tliis  new 
possession  the  Dutch  seem  to  have  tried  to  keep  in  mind  the  les- 
sons they  had  just  been  obliged  to  learn.  But  naturally  conditions 
were  far  less  favorable  here  than  in  Java  or  the  New  Netherlands, 
and  reversions  to  the  old  policy  were  sure  to  occur. 

In  1682  the  West  India  C()mi)any  took  over  Surinam  from  Zee- 
land,  paying  for  its  rights  the  sum  of  260,000  guilders.    To  attract 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  180-182;  Watson,  II,  1-2,  21,  28-29. 

-  Van  Rees,  II,  182,  186-190;  Wat.son,  II,  28-35,  43,  46-48,  74-75,  1 18;  Zimmer- 
mann,  pp.  142-152. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN    THEIR  ElELDS 


455 


colonists  the  Company  granted  generous  terms  on  the  analogy  o-f 
those  temporarily  and  successfully  employed  elsewhere  ;  taxes  and 
dues  were  to  be  kept  down  in  the  early  years,  free  trade  encouraged, 
and  rights  similar  to  those  enjoyed  under  the  English  were  decreed. 
But  the  Company  recoiled  before  the  costs  attendant  upon  this 
system,  and  had,  by  1683,  sold  two-thirds  of  its  rights  to  the  city 
of  Amsterdam  and  one  Cornells  van  Aerssen.  The  new  controlling 
body  was  called  the  Chartered  Society  of  Surinam,  and  Van  Aers- 
sen became  governor.  He  was  an  able,  energetic,  and  good  man, 
and  his  policy  of  stimulating  emigration  was  effective  in  promoting 
the  settlement  especially  of  foreigners  temporarily  located  as  reli- 
gious refugees  in  the  Netherlands.  Plantations  speedily  increased 
in  number  from  50  to  200.  The  special  skill  of  the  Dutch  in  deal- 
ing with  wet  and  swampy  regions  stood  them  in  satisfactory  stead, 
and  the  sugar-plantations  and  mills  began  to  put  out  a  good  prod- 
uct.^ But  the  new  Society,  whatever  its  intentions,  soon  fell  heir 
to  the  reputation  of  Dutch  colonial  governments,  and  was  believed 
to  be  working  for  the  maximum  income.  The  citizens  thought  they 
had  too  little  share  in  governing  themselves,  and  they  knew  they 
were  insufficiently  protected.  In  17 12,  when  the  French  undertook 
to  reduce  Surinam,  the  burghers  were  obliged  to  buy  them  off  at 
a  cost  of  700,000  guilders,  which  the  Society  refused  to  refund. 
It  also  afforded  little  protection  against  escaped  slaves,  the  so-called 
bush-negroes,  who  fell  upon  their  old  masters  at  every  opportu- 
nity ;  and  the  peace  concluded  with  these  outlaws  in  1761-1762 
was  regarded  as  ineffective,  besides  being  dishonorable. 

All  this  might  have  been  endured  if  the  conditions  of  production 
had  remained  favorable.  In  the  tropical  region,  here  as  elsewhere, 
the  indispensable  factor  in  production  was  the  acclimatized  laborer, 
the  negro.  There  was  no  opposition  to  slavery  as  a  system ;  in 
fact  the  complaint  was  that  there  were  not  enough  slaves.^  The 
West  India  Company  had  reserved  the  slave-trade  for  itself,  agree- 
ing to  supply  enough  negroes  —  at  least  2500  yearly.  But  the 
Company  could  not  renounce  the  old  policy  of  raising  prices  by 
limiting'  the  supply,  and  in  some  of  the  years  imported  no  slaves 
at   all ;    and   when,   later,   the   captured  African   posts   had   been 

1  Van  Rees,  II,  361-367  ;  Fermin,  I,  3  ff.  For  a  brief  treatment  of  the  Dutch  in 
Guiana,  see  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  299-302. 

2  Van  Rees,  II,  319-324.  "On  the  whole,  colonization  is  not  possible  in  Surinam 
with  Europeans  alone,  in  the  absence  of  an  intermediate  negro  population."  Host- 
mann,  I,  257. 


456  COLONIZATION 

lost,^  it  was  unable  to  keep  its  word  if  it  had  so  willed.  Thus  the 
only  labor  force  was  lacking,  although  the  prevalence  of  slavery  in- 
jured the  position  of  the  free  laborer.  In  addition  to  this  trouble 
with  labor,  the  absenteeism  of  proprietors,  in  the  latter  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  began  to  produce  its  regular  effects.  Bad  local 
management  then  induced  the  owners  to  sell ;  debts  increased,  and 
misery  resulted  in  the  colony. ^  While  Surinam  was  at  times  rated 
as  superior  to  the  East  Indies,  it  steadily  declined  under  the  stock 
policy  of  shortsighted  greed  and  exploitation  so  characteristic  of 
tropical  establishments.  Its  history  came  to  afford  only  another 
variation  upon  the  stock  destiny  of  the  Dutch  colony."^ 

Aspects  of  the  Chartered  Company 

The  general  aspects  of  the  chartered  company,  as  they  appeared 
in  the  Netherlands  and  in  the  over-sea  possessions,  tempt  one  to 
digression  from  the  main  subject  of  colonization.  Considered,  how- 
ever, as  expedients  for  the  furthering  of  colonial  enterprise,  the 
story  of  the  companies  affords  reason  for  several  broad  observa- 
tions upon  a  phase  of  colonial  endeavor. 

In  a  country  whose  people  were  averse  in  principle  to  monopoly, 
there  arose  in  these  companies  one  of  the  most  striking  cases  of 
monopoly  in  history.  And  this  development  was,  so  far  as  can  be 
seen,  inevitable  in  the  conditions  of  the  age.  For,  first,  there  ap- 
peared in  the  decades  succeeding  the  Discoveries  a  need  of  accu- 
mulation and  concentration  of  capital  such  as  had  never  before 
been  experienced.  This  necessity  led,  in  the  case  of  Spain  and 
Portugal,  to  a  monopoly  lodged  in  the  hands  of  the  only  master  of 

^  Cf.  p.  127,  above  :  1 5,000  slaves  brought  an  annual  profit  to  the  Company  of  2,000,- 
000  guilders  ;  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  yearly  demand  called  for 
about  8000  slaves.  Van  Rees,  II,  325.  Fermin  (pp.  120  ff.)  says  that  in  1762  there 
were  425  plantations  in  all  in  Surinam,  and  that  each  of  these  contained  at  least  180 
slaves.  The  whole  number  of  blacks,  including  escaped  slaves  {iiiari-oiis),  was  about 
109,500.  Cf.  chaps,  xi  ff.  Hostmann  discusses  the  question  of  emancipation  in  a 
rather  impassioned  manner.  He  treats  of  the  details  of  the  ordering  of  the  slave's 
existence  (I,  212  ff.),  of  the  missions  (I,  197  ff.) ;  discusses  the  bush-negroes  quite  at 
length  (I,  240  ff.) ;  and  gives  a  list  of  the  chief  negro  stocks  imi^orted  into  Surinam 
(II,  247ff.). 

2  On  climatic  and  vital  (and  moral)  conditions,  see  Fermin,  chap,  iii,  and  especially 
Hostmann,  II,  228,  and  chap.  xii.  15olh  Fermin  and  Hostmann  were  physicians.  On 
the  government,  see  Fermin,  pp.  30  ff. ;  Hostmann,  II,  433.  Of  the  policy  of  confin- 
ing production  to  one  staple  crop  (sugar)  Hostmann  has  many  bitter  criticisms  (II, 
255;  chap.  xiii).    For  a  general  treatment,  see  Zimmermann,  V,  148-168,  267-286. 

3  Van  Rees,  II,  368-375  ;  cf.  pp.  314-324. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS 


457 


sufficient  capital,  the  king.  But  in  the  Netherlands  there  was  none 
such.  Hence  the  function  of  financing  the  new  and  ha/^ardous  ven- 
tures descended  upon  individual  initiative,  and  could  be  discharged 
only  through  some  form,  at  first  local,  of  incorporation  of  capital. 
But  the  competition  of  these  local  capitals  which  speedily  ensued, 
enforced  a  larger  consolidation,  and  finally,  as  a  means  of  protec- 
tion to  those  who  were  discharging  what  was  conceived  to  be 
a  weighty  public  and  patriotic  function,  a  grant  of  absolute  mo- 
nopoly. There  was  no  other  expedient  at  hand,  and  theories  and 
prejudices  bent  before  inexorable  concrete  fact.  That  such  monop- 
oly was  now  used  in  a  way  ill-befitting,  lay  also  in  the  conditions 
of  the  time,  as  well  as  in  human  nature.  For  by  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  the  companies  there  could  be  but  one  object  before  them, 
and  that  was  present  gain ;  and  because  of  the  height  of  popular 
expectation,  the  need  of  self-justification  in  a  new  and  suspected 
enterprise  required  that  profits  must  be  large.  All  the  urge  and 
stress  of  the  situation  tended  in  this  direction  ;  returns  must  be 
immediate  and  high,  and  so  policies  in  any  case  quick-acting,  if 
the  investing  participants  were  to  be  satisfied.  The  latter  were 
in  the  organization,  not  for  theoretical  or  humanitarian  aims,  not 
for  the  benefit  of  posterity  or  the  heathen,  but  for  material  return. 
Even  the  patriotic  desire  to  injure  Spain  was  not  without  its  back- 
ground of  visions  of  treasure-ships  and  of  seas  free  to  trade.  Natu- 
rally the  situation  was  too  much  for  the  as  yet  unformulated  ethics 
of  corporate  management,  and  there  ensued  the  often  crude  and 
sometimes  singularly  modern  spectacle  of  wholesale  rascality  and 
general  corruption. 

If  such  a  system  existed  in  the  metropolis,  nothing  more  en- 
lightened could  be  expected  in  the  distant  possessions.  The  com- 
panies could  not  pursue  farsighted  policies,  as  a  state  of  modern 
times  is  thought  to  do,  awaiting  slowly-maturing  results,  or  even 
renouncing  actual  returns  in  the  pursuit  of  cosmopolitan,  not  to 
say  cosmic,  ends.  And  so  the  companies'  history  shows  little  at- 
tempt to  better  the  natives,  to  colonize  in  the  stricter  sense  —  in 
a  word,  to  lay  strong  foundations  for  future  political,  social,  or  even 
commercial  structures.  They  not  only  neglected  such  matters,  but, 
under  the  increasing  stress  of  yielding  constant  and  high  dividends 
while  confronting  and  somehow  solving  problems  in  transporta- 
tion, administration,  race-contact,  and  the  like,  but  newly  presented 
to  man  (and  many  of  them  still  unresolved),  they  fell  back  upon 


458  COLONIZATION 

expedients  hurtful  to  the  ruled  as  well  as  destructive  of  the  perma- 
nency of  empire.  Thus  it  came  about  that  they  challenged  the 
well-known  comment  of  Adam  Smith,  that  "of  all  the  expedients 
that  can  well  be  contrived  to  stunt  the  natural  growth  of  a  new 
colony,  that  of  an  exclusive  company,  is  undoubtedly  the  most 
effectual."  ^  This  author,  writing  at  a  time  slightly  preceding  the 
total  collapse  of  the  East  India  Company,  clearly  perceives  the  in- 
consistency of  its  double  role  of  ruler  and  merchant.  "  It  is  in  the 
interest  of  the  East  India  Company,  considered  as  sovereigns,  that 
the  European  goods  which  are  carried  to  the  Indian  dominions, 
should  be  sold  there  as  cheap  as  possible  ;  and  that  the  Indian 
goods  which  are  brought  from  thence,  should  bring  there  as  good 
a  price,  or  should  be  sold  there  as  dear  as  possible.  But  the  re- 
verse of  this  is  their  interest  as  merchants.  As  sovereigns,  their 
interest  is  exactly  the  same  with  that  of  the  country  which  they 
govern.  As  merchants,  their  interest  is  directly  opposite  to  that 
interest."  He  then  goes  on  to  show  how  the  administration  in 
India  must  pursue  the  same  ends  as  the  direction  in  Europe,  and 
how  it  is  vain  to  prohibit  the  functionaries  from  trading  on  their 
own  account.  "  The  regulations  .  .  .  which  have  been  sent  out 
from  Europe,  though  they  have  been  frequently  weak,  have  upon 
most  occasions  been  well-meaning.  More  intelligence,  and  perhaps 
less  good  meaning,  has  sometimes  appeared  .  .  [in]  those  established 
by  the  servants  in  India.  It  is  a  very  singular  government  in  which 
every  member  of  the  administration  wishes  to  get  out  of  the  coun- 
try, and  consequently  to  have  done  with  the  government  as  soon 
as  he  can,  and  to  whose  interest,  the  day  after  he  has  left  it  and 
carried  his  whole  fortune  with  him,  it  is  perfectly  indifferent  though 
the  whole  country  was  swallowed  up  by  an  earthquake."^ 

Influence  of  Dutch  Colonization 

These  reflections  may  reveal  the  character  of  the  companies  in 
its  broader  and  most  general  lines.  It  is  clear  that  the  trade-motive 
was  the  dominant  and  almost  the  sole  consideration,  the  function 
of  government  being  exercised  as  an  "appendix"'^  to  the  prime 
activity  of  commercial  enterprise.     Here  again,  then,  is  found  the 

1  Book  IV,  chap,  vii,  part  ii  (II,  77  of  Cannan's  ed.) ;  cf.  De  Reus,  pp.  292-310. 

2  Book  IV,  chap,  vii,  part  iii  (II,  137,  139-140,  of  Cannan'.s  ed.). 

^  Smith,  Book  IV,  chap,  vii,  part  iii  (II,  136  of  Cannan's  ed.).  "  Als  .souverein,  niet 
als  koopman,  is  de  Compagnie  te  kort  gekomen."  R.  Friiin,  "  Nederlands  Rechten 
en  Veqilichtingen  ten  oijzichte  van  Indie."    /)c-  (Jitfs,  1865,  II,  45. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  459 

isolation  of  the  motive  of  material  self-interest,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Phoenicians  of  old.  But  the  effects  are  certainly  not  to  be  compared 
with  those  wrought  by  the  ancients.  There  are  several  changed 
factors  in  the  situation  which  preclude  the  attainment  of  like  re- 
sults. It  will  be  recalled^  that  the  chief  point  of  difference  between 
the  colonial  enterprises  preceding  the  Discoveries  period  and  those 
subsec|ucnt  to  it,  was  that  the  former  were  not  called  upon  to  meet 
any  of  the  conditions  of  tropical  colonization,  while  the  latter  en- 
countered new  and  strange  environmental  exigencies  at  every  turn. 
There  appeared  not  alone  the  need  of  acclimatization,  and  its  at- 
tendant evils,  but  also  the  baffling  question  of  relationship  with 
strange,  uncongenial,  and  largely  Mohammedan  native  races.  The 
equation  was  set  in  odd  and  difficult  terms  and  with  a  number  of 
unknown  quantities  ;  it  was  no  longer  one  Mediterranean  people 
dealing  with  another.  The  possibilities  of  such  a  situation  in  en- 
gendering mutual  misunderstanding,  contempt,  and  hostility,  and 
so  in  undermining  that  attitude  of  tolerance  which  conduces  to  the 
growth  of  trade-relations,  need  no  development  in  this  place.  Yet, 
even  so,  it  is  probable  that,  if  the  Dutch  had  confined  themselves  to 
exchange  and  had  exhibited  a  tithe  of  the  adaptability  of  the  Phoeni- 
cians and  their  successors,  they  might  have  left  some  such  record 
of  culture-dissemination  as  that  of  the  Mediterranean  merchants 
and  colonists.  Where  they  were  unable  to  conquer,  they  applied 
their  undoubted  business  sagacity  with  results  more  favorable  to 
the  spread  of  civilization  than  in  their  immediate  domain.  That 
the  people  of  the  East  were,  after  all,  receptive  of  the  germs  of  a 
higher  culture  as  implanted  in  their  economic  life  is  proved  by  the 
widespread  peaceful  influence  of  the  Chinese,  the  "  Phoenicians 
of  the  East,"  throughout  what  became  Netherlands-India.  But, 
although  the  idea  of  the  Dutch  was  gain  pure  and  simple,  as  has 
been  seen,  the  methods  which  they  employed  were  those  of  force  ; 
in  this  respect  they  followed  the  Portuguese,  whose  notorious  ill- 
success  where  conquest  and  conversion  were  added  to  the  motive 
of  trade-exploitation  has  furnished  the  subject  of  previous  pages. 
And  when  the  consideration  is  included  that  the  Malays  were  a 
tropical  people,  with  all  that  that  means  of  divergence  from  the 
European  races  upon  which  the  ancients  exerted  influence,  the 
comparative  inefficiency  of  the  trade-motive  as  a  civilizing  factor 
in  the  East  becomes  immediately  explicable. 

^  Cf.  pp.  74  ff.,  above. 


46o  COLONIZATION 


Influence  of  the  Companies  upon  the  Metropolis 

One  further  consideration  respecting  the  companies  remains  : 
their  reflex  influence  upon  the  hfe  of  the  metropolis  ;  and  the  first 
and  main  reflection  to  be  made  is  an  obvious  one.  By  the  intro- 
duction into  the  hfe  of  the  nation  of  a  large  element  of  uncertainty 
and  hazard,  their  tendency  was  to  divert  the  economic  habitudes 
of  the  country  into  forms  less  solid  and  sure.  The  speculation  to 
which  they  gave  an  unheard-of  impetus,  and  the  corruption  into 
which  Directors  and  government  fell,  could  not  but  react  unfavor- 
ably upon  industry  of  all  kinds,  and  make  for  inefliciency  where 
preceding  conditions  had  called  for  courage,  initiative,  skill,  and 
strength.  Even  maritime  enterprise  was  on  the  wane  ;  it  w^as  too 
far  to  the  Indies  and  the  voyage  demanded  too  much  capital  for 
the  individual  to  undertake  it.  Freight-carrying  along  the  coast  of 
Europe  gave  quicker  returns  and  aj^pcared  more  profitable  ;  this 
was  the  reaction  after  the  fevered  excitement  of  earlier  years.  The 
case  is,  mutatis  mutandis,  that  of  the  Portuguese  and  Spaniards 
over  again,  except  that  it  is  the  more  clearly  marked  because  the 
Dutch  were  so  far  superior  to  their  predecessors  in  industry  and 
trade,  and  in  the  qualities  that  lay  behind  them.  Wealth  became 
unequally  divided ;  and  where  there  had  been  practically  no  de- 
pendent class  there  was  nurtured  up  a  horde  of  hangers-on  of  the 
wealthy.  Every  one  who  had  power  used  it  ruthlessly,  and  internal 
dissension,  political  and  industrial,  was  already  common  after  1650. 
In  other  words,  there  ensued  upon  the  activity  of  the  companies 
a  significant  change  for  the  worse  in  the  economic  and  moral  char- 
acter of  the  nation.^ 

How  far  the  persistence  of  the  companies  was  effective  in  re- 
tarding consolidation  of  the  provinces  and  government  it  may  be 
hard  to  say,  but  it  certainly  contributed  to  foster  local  attach- 
ments which  were  detrimental  to  national  development.  One  writer 
asserts  that  "before  1795  the  Netherlander  knew  no  father-land', 
but  merely  a  father-city."  ^  If  this  is  fhe^case,  and  if  it  took  the 
French  Revolution  to  make  over  the  Netherlands  from  a  city-econ- 
omy into  a  modern  state,  certainly  the  companies  can  be  said  to 

'  Cf.  Pringsheim,  ])p.  59-70;  Van  Rees,  II,  213-214. 

2  Blok,  Eene  hoUandsche  stad  in  de  middeleeuwen,  1SS3;  quoted  in  Pringsheim, 
p.  2,  note  5. 


THE  COMPANIES  IN  THEIR  FIELDS  461 

have  failed  after  what  looked  like  a  splendid  start  toward  promot- 
ing national  unification.^ 

But  the  final  ills  that  reduced  the  Netherlands  from  a  position 
of  preeminence  were  directly  connected  with  the  attempts  of  the 
companies,  especially  that  of  the  East  Indies,  to  maintain  their 
exclusive  monopolies.  The  great  period  of  Dutch  commercial 
power  came  early  in  the  seventeenth  century ;  then  began  the 
attacks  of  rivals,  especially  England,  whose  Navigation  Acts,  com- 
bined with  the  operations  of  Colbert  (1664  and  1667),  struck  a 
blow  from  which,  under  the  conditions  indicated,  there  was  only 
partial  and  intermittent  recovery.  For  the  old  monopoly  ideas 
were  not  abandoned  in  the  face  of  competition,  and  so  the  process 
of  sinking  into  the  commercial  background  went  on  apace.  Had 
the  colonial  raw  products  entered  the  Netherlands  in  any  suffi- 
ciency, the  Dutch  industries  could  have  better  weathered  the 
rising  competition  ;  but  as  it  was,  the  height  of  prices  and  of  taxes 
made  it  impossible  f6r  them  to  keep  their  place  in  the  world.  The 
India  trade  was  really  of  inferior  importance,  never  being  over 
11,000,000  guilders'  worth  of  importation  per  year;  and  the  total 
export  of  Holland  to  the  West  Indies  for  the  period  1623  to  1636 
was  worth  somewhat  less  than  7,000,000  guilders.  But  the  trade 
of  the  Indies  was  a  sort  of  fetich  and  the  monopoly  principle  a 
dogma ;  and  so  the  Dutch  went  on  in  the  now  traditional  system 
until  war  with  England  in  1780  completed  their  humiliation,  and 
rendered  the  company-system  moribund. ^ 

Collapse  of  the  Monopoly 

Thus  is  added  yet  another  case  to  those  which  demonstrate 
the  inevitable  outcome  of  the  monopoly  system.  The  closer  the 
monopoly,  and  the  more  successful  it  is  in  securing  the  elevation 
of  prices  for  which  it  aims,  the  greater  is  the  temptation  to  its 
infringement ;  but  because  of  the  waste  and  costliness  of  the  sys- 
tem, such  infringement  means  ruin.    Thus,  toward  the  end  of  the 

^  Cf.  Pringsheim,  pp.  2-9 ;  De  Reus,  p.  292.  "  The  condition  of  this  Company  in 
India  was  the  thermometer  of  the  poHtical  life  of  the  Netherlands,  exactly  as  this 
political  life  can  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the  conditions  of  the  Company  with 
which  it  kept  pace."  De  Reus,  p.  310.  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  79)  remarks:  "  Ce  n'est 
jamais  impunement  qu'un  peuple  commet  des  fautes  nombreuses  et  persistantes  dans 
une  des  branches  principales  de  son  activite :  toute  la  vie  economique  et  politique 
d'une  nation  s'en  ressent  a  la  longue." 

■-  Pringsheim,  pp.  11-15,  3^-39'  De  Reus,  pp.  290-293. 


462  COLONIZATION 

eighteenth  century,  the  course  of  the  Dutch  as  a  colonial  power 
seems  to  have  been  run.  That  they  did  not  lose  all  their  external 
possessions  shortly  thereafter,  and  relapse  into  the  status  of  Por- 
tugal and  Spain  after  their  monopolies  were  broken,  was  due  in 
part  to  the  real  superiority  of  their  economic  and  social  organiza- 
tion over  that  of  the  Peninsular  countries,  and  also  to  the  newer 
and  larger  outlook  ujjon  the  relations  of  nations  which  was  gradu- 
ally replacing  the  narrow  purview  of  earlier  centuries.  The  world 
was  opening  up  under  the  influence  of  developed  means  of  com- 
munication, and  other  broadening  factors  ;  and  the  old  fetich  of 
monoj^oly  was  being  shattered  thereby,  and  through  the  growing 
prevalence  of  ideals  reflecting  the  changed  material  conditions. 

But  the  commercial  and  maritime  preeminence  of  the  Dutch 
was  as  irrevocably  gone  as  was  that  of  their  predecessors.  It 
remained  for  them  to  try  in  what  was  left  of  their  colonial  empire 
to  work  out  some  system  that  should  be  in  closer  harmony  with 
the  spirit  of  modern  times.  Such  a  system  became  then  as  inevi- 
table in  its  time  as  the  monopoly  regime  had  been  in  its  own  day 
and  generation,  although  the  new  long  retained  traces  of  derivative 
relationship  with  the  old. 


CHAPTER   XII 

DUTCH  COLONIZATION  IN  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY 

The  attempts  of  commissions  to  probe  into  the  abuses  of  the 
East  India  Company  during  the  last  years  of  its  existence  met 
such  opposition  as  totally  to  defeat  their  purpose.  The  charter's 
last  extension  came  to  an  end  on  December  31,  1798  ;  and  in  the 
following  year  there  was  formed  a  Council  of  the  Asiatic  Posses- 
sions, responsible  to  the  government  of  the  now  Batavian  Republic. 
But  upon  the  accession  of  the  Napoleonic  dynasty  (1806)  what 
was  left  of  the  Eastern  possessions  was  practically  turned  over 
to  a  local  autocrat  in  the  person  of  Governor-General  Daendels. 
During  the  period  of  French  predominance,  as  has  been  seen,  cer- 
tain parts  only  of  the  Dutch  possessions  resisted  the  encroaching 
English,  and  presently  Java  alone  remained.^  It  is  chiefly  with 
this  island  that  the  colonial  activity  of  the  Dutch  in  the  last  cen- 
tury was  concerned. 

Reorganization  :    Daendels 

The  period  from  1807  to  1830  engages  attention  chiefly  as  one 
of  reaction  away  from  the  company-system,  followed  by  a  grad- 
ual resumption,  in  changed  form,  of  what  was  essentially  the  old 
exploitation  based  upon  the  dominant  consideration  of  commercial 
gain.  This  troubled  period  would  be  of  less  importance  to  the 
subject  were  it  not  that  subsequent  counter-movements  tended  to 
return  in  some  degree  to  the  theories  and  methods  essayed  at  this 
time.  But  it  is  necessary  to  realize,  first  of  all,  that  in  a  vexed 
and  hurried  period  of  reorganization  attention  must  still  be  pre- 
occupied with  the  same  subjects  which  engaged  the  Company  to 
the  exclusion  of  all  others,  namely,  commerce  and  administration. 
The  spirit  of  the  reaction  against  Company-policy  lies  in  the  fact 
that  emphasis  was  shifted  from  one  of  these  purposes  to  the  other, 
so  that  whereas  a  company  of  individuals  had  been  pursuing  gain 
and  keeping  up  a  semblance  of  government,  a  state,  partly  under 

1  P.  439,  above  ;  cf.  Fortanier,  pp.  40-46,  65-70. 
46.5 


464  COLONIZATION 

the  stress  of  need  of  defense,  now  set  about  the  reorganization  of 
government  while  striving  still  to  gather  revenue  to  support  its 
own  existence  and  to  favor  the  life  of  trade.  At  first  the  Dutch 
state  was  substituted  for  the  Company,  then  for  five  years  (181 1- 
18 16)  the  island  was  ruled  as  a  dependency  of  British  India,  and 
finally  (1816-1830),  "during  the  first  period  of  the  Dutch  restora- 
tion, Java  was  managed  on  a  mixed  system  in  which  the  traditional 
methods  of  the  East  India  Company  were  employed  to  exploit  it 
for  the  benefit  of  the  crown. ^  This  explains  why  the  narrative  of 
Dutch  colonial  policy  during  the  period  preceding  1830  is  so 
largely  one  of  administrative  changes  and  development,  however 
much  these  were  based  upon  commercial  and  fiscal  considerations. 
Other  aims  than  these  were  excluded,  not  only  because  necessity 
demanded  concentration  upon  immediately  vital  issues,  but  also 
because  the  frame  of  mind  of  the  Dutch  still  for  decades  led  them 
to  hold  that  "  colonies  exist  for  the  mother-country,  and  not  the 
mother-country  for  the  colonies."  ^ 

The  first  move  toward  administrative  betterment  was  the  dis- 
patch of  Daendels  by  King  Louis,  who  had  dissolved  the  Council 
of  the  Asiatic  Possessions,  substituting  a  minister  of  his  own, 
and  thus  centralizing  the  whole  matter  of  colonial  administration. 
Daendels  was  no  colonial  expert,  but  a  man  of  energy  and  independ- 
ence of  mind,  who  had  seen  military  and  political  service  under  the 
French  in  the  Netherlands  ;  he  was  bound  by  no  traditions,  and, 
because  of  the  belated  and  defective  character  of  his  instructions, 
was  practically  uncontrolled.  His  methods  were  direct  and  were 
designed  for  the  securing  of  immediate  results  ;  he  "  saw  many 
things  going  wrong,  and  set  about  in  a  rough-and-ready  fashion 
to  right  them."  ^ 

The  first  and  most  evident  evil  was  the  inefficiency  and  corrup- 
tion of  the  colonial  service.  Both  men  and  methods  were  of  poor 
quality ;  there  was  no  intelligent  division  of  function,  nor  was 
there   cooperation  between   officers   and   departments.     Into   this 

1  Day,  p.  128. 

2  From  a  State  Commission's  report  of  1 803,  quoted  in  Pierson,  p.  8.  Day  (pp.  1 29- 
146)  gives  a  number  of  carefully  written  pages  to  the  analysis  of  the  opinions  of  the 
period  respecting  reform  and  the  lines  upon  which  it  should  be  pursued.  He  sum- 
marizes the  charter  of  1803,  and  assigns  it  great  weight  in  the  history  of  Java  in  that 
"  it  outlines  with  substantial  correctness  the  Dutch  policy  and  the  ideals  of  the  Dutch 
government  in  the  following  period,  while  its  accompanying  report  gives  an  insight 
into  the  reasons  that  determined  the  decisions  "  (p.  146). 

^  Day,  pp.  148-149. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH  COLONIZATION  465 

chaos  Daendels  introduced  system  and  centralization,  considerably 
extending  the  power  of  the  governor-general  through  his  prefects. 
Payments  and  promotions  were  so  altered  as  to  make  the  colonial 
career  a  field  for  an  honest  man ;  and  the  corrupt  were  resolutely 
pursued.  Daendels  had  no  fleet,  and  his  army  was  treacherous  ; 
but  although  he  could  do  little  to  better  the  former,  he  whipped 
the  latter  into  a  passable  shape.  He  also  made  of  Batavia  a  rela- 
tively wholesome  place  for  Europeans,  and  developed,  too  often 
regardless  of  the  means  employed,  facilities  for  internal  communi- 
cation. ^  The  courts  and  justice  were  placed  upon  a  trustworthy 
footing  for  the  first  time.  Upon  the  native  organization  likewise 
the  influence  of  Daendels  was  strongly  exerted,  though  with  less 
beneficent  result.  "  Regents  were  henceforth  to  hold  the  position, 
not  of  protected  rulers,  but  of  government  officials,  bearing  the 
honorable  title  of  'the  king's  servants';  they  were  to  stand  no 
longer  in  the  relations  of  contract  with  the  government  but  subject 
to  it."  The  will  was  present  to  curb  their  oppression  of  the  people, 
but  seems  not  to  have  been  realized.  As  for  the  fiscal  system,  it 
went  back  to  the  traditional  expedient  of  contingents,  for  Daendels 
saw  no  practicability  in  a  system  of  taxation ;  he  was  advanced  in 
many  of  his  measures,  but  in  the  most  vital  ones  touching  produc- 
tion, he  could  do  little  better  than  persist  in  the  controlling  and 
forcing  system.  Again,  though  he  protected  the  natives  against 
the  Dutch,  he  laid  upon  the  regents  many  heavy  burdens  which 
were  then  shifted  over  upon  the  people  he  tried  to  aid  ;  the  latter 
were  overwhelmed  with  forced  services  and  were  miserable.  Daen- 
dels gained  the  name  of  "the  tyrant  of  the  East";  his  system 
was  described  as  "  the  most  vigorous  attempt  ever  made,  at  least 
in  Dutch  India,  to  get  from  a  people  by  force  and  by  forced  labor 
all  that  can  be  demanded  not  alone  for  commerce  but  for  public 
works,  for  a  strong  defense,  for  ample  payment  of  officials,  and 
for  the  unhampered  establishment  of  all  departments  and  branches 
of  administration."  ^  Nevertheless,  in  view  of  the  unsettled  times 
and  the  absence  of,  as  well  as  the  danger  to  carriers  of  the  revenue- 
bringing  products,  Daendels  was  always  in  straits  financially,  while 
facing  the  menace  of  a  British  attack  which  he  saw  to  be  inevitable. 
Thus  he  resorted  to  loans  and  confiscations,  depreciation  of  the 
currency,  sale  of  government  rights  in  land,  and  the  like,  and  was 

1  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  Daendels,"  "  Wegen." 

2  Muntinghe,  in  Day.  p.  160.  • 


466  COLONIZATION 

naturally   none   too   tender   toward    the   natives   when   it   came   to 
raising  revenue. 

"  He  shows  throughout  the  brief  period  of  his  rule  tlie  methods 
of  a  politician  rather  than  of  a  statesman,  making  his  decisions 
suit  the  needs  of  the  moment  with  little  regard  for  the  future." 
Thus,  though  he  really  reorganized  the  administration,  was  con- 
scious of  abuses  and  inclined  to  work  for  their  rectification  where 
heavy  necessity  did  not  oblige  him  to  renounce  wise  and  farsighted 
plans,  yet  he  reverted  in  many  cases  toward  the  old  exploitation 
policy  of  the  Company,  in  some  cases  even  exaggerating  it,  and 
finally  left  the  island,  so  far  as  economic  and  social  status  go, 
pretty  much  as  he  found  it.^  His  administration  possesses  for  our 
subject,  then,  the  importance  of  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  break 
with  the  past ;  and  the  details  of  these  years  that  might  be  gi\en 
are  of  less  significance  inasmuch  as  they  do  not  contribute  in  any 
constructive  way  to  the  evolution  of  later  stages  of  colonial  theory 
and  policy. 

British  Dominance  :  Raffles 

The  first  sharp  break  with  the  past  was  made  under  British 
dominance  through  the  undaunted  energy  and  persistence  of 
Stamford  Raffles.''^  Daendels  had  been  the  object  of  much  com- 
plaint to  Napoleon  and  had  asked  for  and  finally  obtained  honor- 
able release  from  his  post  in  1811.  Later  in  the  same  year  the 
British  conquest  of  the  island  took  j^lace  with  ridiculous  ease,^ 
and  Raffles  became  lieutenant-governor ;  this  position  conferred 
virtually  absolute  power,  for  although  he  was  nominally  subor- 
dinate to  the  governor-general  in  Calcutta,  in  practice  he  was  a 
local  autocrat.  He  himself  was  the  government,  and  his  period  of 
rule  was  marked  by  varied  expressions  of  his  personality.  This 
was  in  general  an  intelligent  and  forceful  one,  and  his  personal 
qualities  were  supi)orted  by  an  extended  experience  and  by  scien- 
tific and  linguistic  attainments  of  a  high  order.  What  makes  him 
of  such  marked  significance  as  a  factor  in  the  destiny  of  Java  was 
rather  the  ])r()jection  of  this  personality  than  the  definite  results 

1  For  the  administration  of  Daendels,  see  Day,  pp.  148-163;  cf.  Fortanier,  pp. 
71-76. 

2  On  Raffles's  administration,  see  Pierson,  chap,  i ;  Day,  chap,  v  ;  cf.  Fortanier, 
pp.  77-S,S  ;   Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  277-278. 

^  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  Verdediging,"  "  Verovering  van  Java  door  de 
Engelschen." 


LATER   PHASES  OF   DUTCH   COLONIZATION  467 

for  which  he  was  responsible.  "  His  efforts  should  be  judged  .  .  . 
by  direction  as  well  as  distance.  Raffles  was  great,  not  in  the 
results  which  he  achieved,  but  in  the  ideals  that  he  established, 
which  have  been  a  power  in  all  later  reforms.  He  tried  to  do 
alone,  in  a  few  years,  and  with  the  uncertainty  of  his  position 
constantly  before  him,  what  generations  of  later  workers  have 
accomplished."  It  was  doubtless  his  eagerness  to  see  these  re- 
forms through  before  the  restoration  of  the  island  to  the  Dutch, 
that  led  him  into  a  course  somewhat  headlong,  with  results  some- 
times bearing  the  marks  of  his  want  of  time  for  mature  delibera- 
tion. "Viewed  in  the  light  of  the  difficulties  under  which  he 
worked,  the  faults  of  Raffles's  career  as  Lieutenant-Governor  grow 
smaller,  and  his  failure  appears  only  as  a  deferred  success."  ^ 

Raffles's  Revenue  System 

The  most  significant  change  upon  which  Raffles  was  bent  was 
an  alteration  of  the  government's  fiscal  policy  toward  the  natives. 
He  felt  that  there  must  be  public  loss  through  the  delivery  of 
produce,  for  it  entailed  unavoidable  waste  and  expense,  and  yet 
there  was  no  certainty  of  sale  ;  he  saw  that  the  revenue  must 
suffer  during  its  passage  through  a  number  of  intermediate  hands, 
just  because  it  was  likely  to  produce  the  further  evil  of  irregularity 
and  corruption ;  and  he  was  concerned  not  only  that  there  was  no 
security  for  the  people  against  the  oppression  of  the  regents,  but 
that  incitement  to  industry  must  be  absent.  Hence  he  planned  the 
establishment  of  perfect  freedom  in  cultivation  and  trade,  —  this 
to  entail  the  abolition  of  forced  deliveries  at  inadequate  rates,  and 
of  feudal  services  ;  the  assumption  by  the  government  of  the  super- 
intendence of  lands  together  with  their  revenues  and  rents,  —  this 
to  do  away  with  the  intervention  of  the  regents  who  should  be  re- 
stricted to  public  duties  ;  and  the  renting  out  of  such  lands  in  large 
or  small  parcels  on  moderate-term  leases.  The  many  chances  for 
petty  oppression  which  occurred  along  the  tortuous  ways  of  native 
procedure  in  these  matters  were  to  disappear  under  the  European 
system  of  dues  proportioned  to  the  rental  value  of  the  lands.  More- 
over, indirect  taxation  was  to  be  reformed  in  the  interest  of  free 
industry  and  trade  ;  internal  tolls  were  to  be  abolished,  customs 
duties  regulated  by  the  government,  and  the  salt  tax  no  longer 
farmed  out.    The  "  whole  process  of  assessment  and  collection  was 

1  Day,  pp.  169,  170. 


46S  COT.ONIZATION 

to  be  brought  under  the  control  of  European  ideas  of  honesty, 
economy,  and  justice,"^  this  being  effected  by  direct  contact  of  the 
government,  to  the  exclusion  of  more  or  less  independent  native 
officials,  with  the  people. 

"  The  central  part  of  Raffles's  system  was  the  land-tax,  which 
was  to  absorb  all  the  multiform  dues  and  services  paid  by  the 
people  under  native  rule,  and  was  to  be,  as  it  has  been  in  British 
India,  the  mainstay  of  the  government  treasury."  ^  Into  the  details 
of  the  collection  of  this  tax  it  is  not  necessary  to  go.  Its  applica- 
tion was  a  failure,  not  only  because  it  had  certain  faults  that  only 
experience  could  mend,  but  because  of  Raffles's  own  limitations  in 
the  matter  of  time  and  resources.  Geographical  and  ethnological 
conditions  were  insufficiently  known,  and  any  logical  application 
of  the  system  was  locally  thwarted  by  the  emergence  of  number- 
less obstacles,  small  though  some  of  them  may  seem  to  have  been. 
The  tax-collectors,  confused  before  the  difficulties  of  the  new  sys- 
tem, fell  back  upon  the  principle  that  it  is  better  to  get,  in  any 
case,  and  presently  the  inequities  of  the  old  regime  were  again  in 
almost  full  swing.  And  the  whole  situation  was  perturbed  inas- 
much as  Raffles  could  not  cut  loose  absolutely  from  the  old  prac- 
tices, such  as  the  contingents,  until  the  tax  had  begun  to  yield. 
This  did  not  take  place  in  any  degree  sufficient  to  cover  expendi- 
tures. Hence  with  all  his  good  intent  Raffles  really  contributed 
to  make  "  the  reversion  to  the  Company's  policy  much  more  easy 
and  natural  in  the  time  of  the  culture  system  by  preserving  the 
most  important  cultures  to  that  time."^ 

Here  is  where  the  British  governor  was  forced,  in  a  sense,  to  a 
better  appreciation  of  the  Company's  situation,  although  the  con- 
ditions he  faced  were  largely  created  by  the  misbehavior  of  the 
Company  in  its  straits.  Raffles  had  no  clamoring  shareholders  to 
satisfy,  and  yet,  if  the  natives  were  to  be  treated  rightly,  he  could 
not  balance  his  budget.  How  the  Javanese  must  have  been  exploited 
before  and  after  his  time  may  be  left  to  the  imagination. 

Raffles's  Administrative  System 

The  fiscal  phase  of  Raffles's  activity  may  be  taken  to  corre- 
spond to  the  commercial  preoccupations  of  the  Company ;  but  the 
Englishman  also  governed,  as  the  Company  did  not,  and  mainly  in 

1  Day,  p.  i8i.  2  jj^  p   ,7^  3  ij.,  p.  190. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH  COLONIZATION  469 

an  -enlightened  and  beneficent  manner.  He  proceeded  directly  to 
the  strengthening  of  the  position  of  European  officials,  who  were, 
of  course,  largely  Netherlanders  ;  he  nearly  doubled  the  number 
of  residents,  and  informed  them  so  well  as  to  their  powers  and 
duties  that  his  instructions  were  retained  entire  after  the  Dutch 
restoration.  Among  the  first  of  the  prescribed  duties  was  the 
making  of  periodic  journeys  and  reports ;  at  last  the  residents 
were  to  know  their  districts.  Again,  Raffles  greatly  bettered  the 
administration  of  justice,  establishing  "  the  principles  upon  which 
the  judicial  relations  of  the  natives  were  afterward  developed."  ^ 
With  his  attempted  reorganization  of  the  native  government 
Raffles  was  decades  in  advance  of  his  time,  and  succeeded  only 
in  leaving  a  series  of  vigorous  and  pregnant  suggestions  for  later 
reflection  and  action.  Briefly  speaking,  he  meant  to  relieve  the 
regents  ^  of  functions  and  privileges  which  had  been  oppressively 
employed,  making  them  government  officials  with  carefully  defined 
powers  and  duties.  They  were  to  profit  in  a  material  way  by  rea- 
son of  such  renunciation,  but  through  a  definite  grant  or  salary ; 
they  were  no  longer  to  help  themselves  from  the  property  of  the 
people.  But  here  again  resources  to  carry  the  new  system  failed  ; 
native  officials  soon  renewed  their  relations  with  the  cultivators, 
and  the  old  exactions  continued  as  before.  Thus  it  was  likewise 
in  the  less  sweeping  aspects  of  Raffles's  reorganization. 

If  the  English  governor  had  had  the  maximum  of  extraneous  aids 
in  his  work,  and  could  have  possessed  a  secure  tenure  of  several 
times  five  years,  it  is  yet  entirely  unlikely  that  posterity  would 
have  been  robbed  of  the  privilege  of  finally  realizing  some  of  his  ad- 
vanced ideas.  Under  such  favoring  circumstances  he  might,  indeed, 
have  made  some  impression  upon  the  Company  system,  with  but 
two  centuries  of  time  and  a  correspondingly  and  relatively  slight 
inertia  behind  it ;  but  the  attempt  vitally  to  alter  the  native  organi- 
zation, especially  in  the  matter  of  its  traditional  habitudes,  its  mores, 
given  both  time  and  other  resources,  rests  yet  upon  a  forlorn  hope. 
It  is  sanguine  to  expect  to  modify  the  industrial  organization  except 
over  a  long  period;  and  to  look  for  anything  of  the  kind  in  the  sec- 
ondary social  forms  within  a  brief  five  years  is  rather  ridiculous 
than  visionary.    If  Raffles  knew  as  much  of  the  East  as  he  is  given 

1  Day,  p.  195;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Rechtswezen." 

2  The  regents  were  the  old  native  authorities.  The  need  of  curbing  such  super- 
seded chiefs  was  felt  also  by  the  Spanish  in  America.    Cf.  p.  283,  above. 


470  COLON  iz.vriON 

credit  for,  he  could  not  have  been  much  depressed  by  what  looks 
in  cold  type  like  failure  almost  all  along  the  line.  What  he  did  was 
to  dischar^^e  the  function  of  the  strong,  clear-seeing,  independent 
man  :  he  caused  the  customary  discomfort  and  upheaval  produced 
by  the  application  of  candid  rationality  to  that  which  is  growing 
obsolete  and  anachronistic.  That  the  movement  was  one  of  the 
man  and  not  of  the  time,  place,  and  people,  is  shown  by  the^speedy 
settling-down  of  the  situation  into  old  lines  as  soon  as  this  per- 
turbing personality  was  removed. 

The  Commission  of  i8i6 

In  1815,  according  to  antecedent  agreement,  the  Dutch  East 
Indies,  and,  chief  among  them,  Java,  were  restored  to  their  former 
owners ;  ^  and  in  18 16  officials  were  sent  out  to  resume  possession. 
These  men  had  behind  them  a  colonial  constitution  which  was  to 
serve  them  as  a  guide  in  the  reestablishment  of  Dutch  rule,  a 
document  which  went  back  to  the  more  liberal  principles  that 
succeeded,  in  the  early  years  of  the  century,  those  of  the  Com- 
pany ;  it  allowed  free  cultivation  except  of  spices  and  opium,  re- 
serving the  question  of  the  forced  deliveries  as  maintained  under 
Raffles  for  future  attention.  The  implication  was  that  the  land- 
ta.x  was  to  cover  most  of  the  fiscal  relations  with  the  natives.  Now 
these  Commissioners  fell  upon  an  evil  situation,  succeeding  as  they 
did  to  the  half-completed  and  confused  application  of  the  English 
reformer's  work,  and  unable  as  they  were  to  retain  his  English 
agents.    The  treasury  was  empty  and  the  deficit  constant. 

The  first  question  which  arose  was  whether  labor  should  be 
compulsory  or  free  ;  that  is,  whether  the  land-tax  principle  should 
be  rejected  or  retained  ;  the  Commissioners  decided  for  its  reten- 
tion, though  planning  improvement  of  its  administration.  The 
laws  of  18 18  and  18 19,  which  were  based  upon  the  Commission's 
reports,  continued  to  regulate  the  land-tax  until  1872  and  after. 
The  chief  alterations  made  in  Rafiles's  ])!an  were  :  the  im])()sition 
of  the  tax  upon  village -groujis  rather  than  upon  individuals  ;  assess- 
ment not  upon  a  fixed  i)rinci])le,  but  in  accordance  with  local  con- 
ditions ;  and  the  allowance  of  jxiyment  in  money  or  in  kind.  These 
relaxations  from  a  rigid  system  naturally  eased  the  conditions  of 

1  For  the  period  of  the  Dutch  restoration  the  jiresent  treatment  follows  Day, 
chap,  vi,  and  I'ierson,  chaps,  ii  and  iii.     Cf.  Fortanier,  pp.  90  ff. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DU'I'CH   COLONIZATION  471 

the  natives  who  were  in  a  position  to  suffer  from  any  rigorous 
appHcation  of  pure  theory.  At  the  same  time  the  Commissioners 
"  stood  squarely  on  the  ground  that  the  home  country  had  full 
right  to  all  returns  that  could  be  got  from  the  natives  without 
infringing  their  claims  to  liberty  and  protection."  ^  And,  like 
Raffles,  they  were  obliged  to  retain  the  system  of  forced  service 
in  a  number  of  cases  until  the  land-tax  should  have  demonstrated 
its  fiscal  utility.  In  the  matter  of  administration  the  system  and 
ideas  of  Raffles  were  pretty  generally  followed  ;  in  particular  the 
Commission  insisted  upon  better  quality  and  training  in  the  colonial 
service.  The  attitude  of  the  government  toward  native  offlcials 
was  developed  into  more  definite  form,  and  in  1820  found  expres- 
sion in  the  following  paragraph,  conceived  in  part,  as  will  be  seen, 
in  apt  native  terminology  :  "In  matters  concerning  the  government 
of  the  natives  the  regents  are  the  confidential  advisers  of  the  resi- 
dent, and  he  shall  treat  them  as  his  younger  brothers."^  How  far 
this  attitude  allowed  the  regents  power  and  the  abuse  of  it  will 
appear  when  the  culture  system  is  considered.  Certainly  the  at- 
tempt was  made  to  introduce  the  salary  regime  so  far  as  practi- 
cable ;  payments  through  grants  of  land  were  abolished  in  18 19, 
and  the  regents  were  forbidden  to  engage  in  trade  or  otherwise  to 
use  their  positions  to  get  irregular  gain  from  the  people. 

Reversion  to  Company  Policy 

The  Commissioners  held  office  for  three  years  (until  18 19),  and 
naturally  saw  during  their  term  but  few  positive  results,  in  vindi- 
cation or  otherwise,  of  their  policy.  The  yield  of  the  land-tax  in- 
creased from  3,259,933  guilders  in  1818  to  3,876,221  in  1819,  and 
then  rather  steadily  to  almost  6,000,000  in  1829;  but  any  general 
justification  of  measures  was  long  delayed,  not  only  through  the 
natural  inertia  of  things,  but  because  the  years  1820  to  1830  saw 
what  might  be  taken  as  a  slowing-up,  if  not  a  partial  reversal,  of 
the  process  of  development  of  the  preceding  decade.  "In  the  period 
after  the  departure  of  the  Commissioners  in  18 19  there  is  observ- 
able a  tendency  in  India  to  gravitate  back  to  the  Company's  policy, 
though  it  was  never  strong  enough  to  lead  to  the  open  sacrifice  of 
the  tax  system  to  that  policy,  and  would  not  have  led  to  the  cul- 
ture system  except  for  the  influence  of  the  home  government."  ^ 

1  Day,  p.  213.  2  Quoted  in  Day,  p.  219.  3  Day,  p.  226. 


472  COLONIZATION 

The  tendency  to  reversion  lay  not  onl)-  in  the  withdrawal  of  the 
influence  of  the  English,  but  in  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  officials 
had  somewhat  resented  their  inmixture  in  affairs  and  felt  it  more 
patriotic,  especially  when  they  found  it  easier  and  more  profitable, 
to  return  to  the  system  under  which  they  had  been  trained. 

This  spirit  seems  to  have  been  embodied  in  Van  der  Capellen, 
the  governor-general  who  succeeded  the  Commission,  who  "  in  the 
seven  years  of  his  rule  entirely  ignored  the  principles  that  had  been 
established  for  his  guidance  and  reverted  step  by  step  to  the  old 
system."  ^  Among  other  things  he  did  not  favor  the  tendency 
toward  the  settlement  of  Europeans,  and  the  promising  beginnings 
of  organized  industry  and  private  trade.  "The  government  had 
returned  to  the  jealous  attitude  of  the  East  India  Company,  and 
could  tolerate  no  industry,  however  much  it  might  conduce  to  the 
welfare  of  the  people,  so  long  as  it  seemed  likely  to  affect  the 
immediate  interests  of  the  treasury."^  And  as  for  foreigners, 
the  imposition  of  relatively  heavy  differential  duties,  although  they 
did  not  restore  to  the  Dutch  any  great  share  in  the  trade  of  the 
island,  yet  betrayed  the  survival  of  the  old  exclusion  policy,  and 
deprived  the  colony  of  the  higher  degree  of  material  prosperity  to 
which  it  seemed  ready  and  able  to  attain. 

In  fact  a  return  to  the  company  system  took  place,  not  only  in 
essence  but  likewise  in  name.  Although  trade  after  1816  was  for 
a  time  left  in  private  hands,  the  old  conviction  of  the  superiority 
of  the  corporation  remained  and  regained  strength;  thus  in  1824 
the  Dutch  Trading  Company  i^NederlandscJic  Handclsmaatschappij) 
was  founded  to  further  "  the  national  trade,  navigation,  ship-build- 
ing, fisheries,  agriculture,  manufactures  and  business."  "^  The  king 
took  one-third  of  the  stock  originally  designed  to  be  issued  and 
guaranteed  the  other  stockholders  a  return  of  four  and  one-half 
per  cent ;  and  such  was  the  po]:)ularity  of  the  C(mipany  that  "  the 
public  over-subscribed  to  the  remainder  of  the  slot'k  nearly  nine- 
fold on  the  first  day  that  it  was  offered  to  them,  and  the  capital 
was  greatly  increased  to  meet  their  demand."  It  is  to  be  noted, 
however,  that  the  Company  was  to  be  denied  full  nionojioly  and 
was  to  possess  no  sovereign  power  such  as  the  East  India  Com- 
pany had  held.  It  could  not  imj^jose  forced  cultures  nor  own  its 
own  vessels;  the  latter  must  be  chartered  and  its  prolits  were  to 
be  those  gained  as  an  ordinary  trader.  "  The  main  advantage  that 
1  Day,  p.  233,  2  id.^  p_  2j(3_  3  Quoted  in  Day,  p.  241. 


LATER  PHASES  OP^  DUTCH  COLONIZATION  473 

the  articles  of  agreement  promised  it  was  the  chance  to  contract 
for  government  business,  and  until  the  culture  system  built  up  this 
business  the  Company's  books  showed  an  unprofitable  balance."  ^ 


The  Culture  System 

Attention  now  turns  to  this  new  method,  or  rather  modification 
of  an  old  method  of  securing  to  the  mother-country  a  favorable 
balance  from  its  colony ;  for  the  Dutch  continued  to  regard  Java 
and  the  rest  of  their  East  Indies  from  the  standpoint  of  what  is 
in  essence  almost  unmixed  national  egoism.  Hence  it  is  that  the 
narrative  of  Dutch  colonization  seems  so  barren  and  sordid,  so 
unrelieved  by  the  dramatic  or  romantic,  almost  empty  of  the  play 
of  passion,  of  personal  highmindedness  and  renunciation  in  the  pur- 
suit of  perhaps  unwise  ideals  ;  for  it  is  almost  exclusively  a  record 
of  accountings  and  cheatings,  a  tale  of  consistent  exploitation.  Thus 
the  topics  to  be  considered  as  period  follows  period  are  variations 
upon  the  same  monotonous  theme:  commercial  policy.  Even  where 
the  subject  of  administration  enters  it  is  generally  an  account  of 
the  maintenance  or  alteration  of  conditions  as  they  directly  or  in- 
directly affect  the  batig  slot,  the  favorable  balance,  the  desirable 
plus  quantity  in  the  national  ledger. 

Such  another  expedient  was  the  cnltinir  stchel,  or  culture  system, 
once  from  insufficient  and  unreliable  evidence  adjudged  the  philos- 
opher's stone  of  colonial  policy,  not  only  because  it  yielded  mate- 
rial gold,  but  because  it  was  likewise  thought  to  embody  all  other 
desiderata  in  a  colonial  policy  such  as,  in  particular,  the  assur- 
ance of  native  welfare  and  happiness  and  the  spread  of  civilization. 
Because,  however,  of  the  recent  publication  in  English  ^  of  the 
truth  in  regard  to  this  system,  together  with  an  abundance  of  con- 
vincing detail,  it  is  possible  for  the  present  treatment  to  confine 
itself  largely  to  generalities  now  demonstrated.  The  attempt  will  be 
made  to  throw  the  salient  features  of  the  system  into  line  with  the 
general  aspects  of  colonization  as  heretofore  developed. 

Md.,  pp.  241-242;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Handelsmaatschappij,  De  Neder- 
landsche." 

2  Day,  The  Dutch  in  Java,  1904,  especially  chaps,  vii-xii.  This  is  evidently  a  very 
careful  and  able  treatise  ;  in  addition  it  possesses  the  special  confidence  of  the  present 
writer  because  of  his  personal  knowledge  of  the  author  and  of  his  scholarly  tempera- 
ment and  methods  and  sound  judgment.  Pierson,  Koloniale  Politiek,  chaps,  iv-x, 
covers  the  same  period,  for  a  reader  of  Dutch,  in  a  most  enlightening  manner. 


474  COLONIZATION 

The  reasons  which  lay  at  the  bottom  of  the  reaction  toward 
Company  poHcy  represented  by  the  culture  system  were  of  a  pre- 
dominantly fiscal  nature.  The  land-tax  had  nearly  doubled  its  re- 
turn in  the  period  1818  to  1829,  it  is  true;  but  its  satisfactory 
condition  was  not  duplicated  elsewhere  on  the  credit  side  of  the 
budget.  And  the  expenses  of  an  imprudent  administration  and,  in 
particular,  the  cost  of  the  liative  war  in  central  Java  which  broke 
out  in  1825,  overbalanced  any  increase  of  income  to  such  an  extent 
that  by  1830  the  Indian  government  was  over  30,000,000  guilders 
in  debt.  But  the  sentiment  in  the  Netherlands  was  for  immediate 
and  constant  gain,  not  loss  ;  and  impatience  with  the  situation  and 
fear  of  having  a  weak  dependency  saddled  upon  the  country  led 
to  a  policy  of  decisive  interference  on  the  part  of  the  metropolis. 
Thus  it  hajjpened  that  General  Van  den  Bosch,  an  official  who 
recognized  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  and  was  ])repared  to 
meet  them  in  what  looked  like,  and  jiroved  to  be  from  the  fiscal 
standjioint,  an  effective  way,  was  left  in  virtually  undisturbed  con- 
trol of  the  East  from  1830  to  1839;  and  was  then  succeeded  by  a 
man  of  like  mind.  Baud,  who  maintained  the  system  of  Van  den 
Bosch  until  1848. 

Plan  of  the  Culture  Svstem 

"  The  plan  of  the  culture  system,  as  proposed  by  Van  den  Bosch 
in  1829,  was  in  brief  as  follows:  Instead  of  paying  to  the  govern- 
ment a  certain  proportion  of  their  crops,  the  natives  were  to  put 
at  its  disposal  a  certain  proportion  of  their  land  and  labor-time. 
The  revenue  would  then  consist  not  in  rice,  which  was  almost  uni- 
versally cultivated  and  which  was  of  comparatively  little  value  to 
the  government,  but  in  export  products  grown  under  the  direction 
of  government  contractors  on  the  land  set  free  by  the  remission 
of  the  former  tax.  According  to  the  estimate,  the  natives  would 
give  up  only  one-fifth  of  their  time  in  place  of  two-fifths  of  their 
main  crop.  The  government  proposed  to  bear  the  loss  from  failure 
of  crops  if  this  was  not  directly  due  to  the  fault  of  the  cultivators, 
and  moreover  promised  to  pay  the  natives  a  certain  small  price  for 
such  amounts  as  they  furnished.  The  government  proposed  in  this 
way  to  secure  products  suited  for  export  to  the  European  market, 
on  which  it  expected  to  realize  profits  largely  in  excess  of  the  prices 
paid  to  natives  and  contractors,  and  of  the  costs  of  administration. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH  COLONIZATION  475 

To  the  natives  it  promised  increased  prosperity  and  a  lighter  bur- 
den of  taxation,  as  a  result  of  the  fuller  utilization  of  their  chances 
under  the  far-sighted  management  of  Europeans.  The  labor  that 
before  through  carelessness  and  ignorance  would  have  been  wasted 
in  idleness  or  in  the  cultivation  of  some  cheap  and  superfluous  crop 
was  to  supply  a  product  of  great  value  in  the  world  market,  and 
the  natives  were  to  share  in  the  resulting  profits.  Van  den  Bosch 
justified  his  proposal  not  only  by  the  benefits  it  would  heap  upon 
all  parties,  but  by  reference  to  previous  history  and  the  character 
of  native  institutions  which  made  it  seem  not  only  impolitic  but 
unjust  to  cling  longer  to  the  land-tax  as  the  basis  of  government 
revenue."  ^ 

Real  Character  of  the  System 

Because  of  the  great  renown  of  the  culture  system  ^  as  a  sort 
of  miracle  in  colonial  history  this  summary  of  its  character  as  pro- 
posed is  set  before  the  reader.  Not  that  any  such  programme  may 
be  taken  as  a  basis  for  the  attempt  to  figure  the  plan  in  action ;  it 
merely  throws  light  upon  the  motives  of  the  system's  adoption  or 
of  the  support  accorded  it  by  people  who  knew  it  only  from  its 
prospectus.  It  looks  philanthropic,  but  was  in  reality  mercenary  ; 
in  its  application  all  the  features  that  interfered  with  revenue 
speedily  dropped  away.  For  example,  the  fifth  of  the  people's  work- 
ing-time which  was  put  under  requisition  lengthened  out  indefi- 
nitely, and  they  often  bore  the  land-tax  besides,  from  which  the 
system  was  supposed  to  free  them.  Moreover  the  government 
evaded  shouldering  the  losses  both  by  a  specious  use  of  the  proviso 
attached  and  otherwise  ;  and  paid  the  natives,  if  at  all,  in  the  scant- 
iest and  stingiest  manner.  The  system  was  unworkable  in  any  way 
profitable  to  all  parties  because  of  general  ignorance  of  conditions, 
poor  organization  of  labor,  injudicious  selection  of  locations,  and 
lack  of  roads  and  vehicles  sufficient  in  quantity  and  adequate  in 
quality  to  meet  the  needs  of  transportation.^ 

It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  the  system  was  universal  in  its 
application  either  to  products  or  in  places.  After  experimentation 
and  exclusion  of  the  least  profitable  cultures  the  government  settled 
down  mainly  to  coffee,  sugar,  and  indigo.    The  system  was  applied 

1  Day,  pp.  249-250. 

2  Cf.  Brunialti,  pp.  161-162  ;  and  Keltic,  p.  452,  as  examples  of  the  prevalent  view. 
**  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "Nijverheid,"  "Wegen,"  etc. 


476  COLONIZATION 

chiefly  in  Java,  but  even  here  only  partially  ;  and  it  never  affected 
all  the  population  where  it  was  introduced.  "  In  1845  the  cultures 
occupied  about  5.5%  of  the  total  cleared  land  .  .  .  ,  in  1854-57 
about  3.2%  of  the  total  agricultural  land  of  the  native  population."  ^ 
Something  more  than  one-half  of  the  population  in  the  districts  of 
its  introduction  came  beneath  the  system.  Elsewhere  some  close 
approximation  to  the  centuries-old  arrangements  persisted. 

Even  the  selected  products  failed  to  pay  except  as  the  system 
was  turned  into  one  of  virtual  enslavement  of  the  natives  ;  to  yield 
profit  the  products  had  to  be  gotten  for  nothing  or  next  to  it.  It 
was  really  worse  than  this,  for  the  actual  damage  done  the  natives 
converted  the  fictitious  or  meager  payment  into  a  minus  quantity, 
and  one  of  certainly  great  magnitude  even  though,  like  all  such 
social  loss,  it  could  not  be  measured  in  money.  For  the  native 
habits  of  steadiness  and  industry,  such  as  they  were,  were  demoral- 
ized by  insecurity  and  always  imminent  interference  ;  and  the  very 
life  of  the  people  was  imperiled  by  the  failure  of  such  crops  as 
sugar  and  indigo  which  had  been  made  to  replace  native  food-prod- 
ucts.^ Moreover,  the  system  worked  out  into  an  inequality  of  bur- 
dens, despite  the  ostensible  fairness  of  its  principles  ;  some  cultures 
were  more  onerous  than  others  and  the  same  culture  would  vary 
in  its  weight  on  the  native  with  the  ty]ie  of  the  official  who  imposed 
it.  Again  the  native  was  required  to  api:)ly  labor  or  to  deliver  prod- 
ucts in  places  appointed  by  the  government,  a  demand  which  could 
not  but  impose  great  hardship.  The  result  of  all  this  was  that  the 
native  in  his  unenviable  position  lost  all  stimulus  to  industry  ;  he 
gave  his  labor  grudgingly  and  made  no  attempt  to  acquire  skill  or 
check  waste.  These  are  characteristics  of  slave-labor  ;  the  returns 
of  the  government  cultures  were  notably  less  than  those  of  free 
industry.  Products  also  suffered  deterioration  in  the  factories,  for 
under  governmental  monopoly  there  was  no  competition  and  the 
output  was  of  inferior  quality. 

All  this  is  the  old  policy  of  exploitation  under  a  new  form.  A 
further  ear-mark  of  the  old  system  is  to  be  found  in  the  treatment 
accorded  to  private  trade  and  production,  which  resembles  that 
beneath  which  they  languished  under  the  Company.  Natives  were 
discouraged  from  the  production  of  articles  that  might  compete 
with  the  government  moncjpoly,  and  were  hampered  in  the  disposal 

'  Day,  p.  259,  note  i.  ' 

2  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  Nijverheid,"  "  Koffie,"  "  Indigo,"  "  Suiker,"  etc. 


I-ATI'IK   PHASES  OF   DUTCH   COLONIZATION  477 

of  what  did  not  thus  compete.  The  same  kind  (jf  ()l)struction  was 
offered  to  the  European  planter,  with  the  result  that  the  Dutch 
who  supported  themselves  in  entire  independence  of  the  govern- 
ment were  very  few  in  number;  in  1856  in  all  Java  and  Madura 
these  numbered  only  608  out  of  a  total  Dutch  population,  exclusive 
of  soldiers,  of  about  20,000 ;  foreign  Europeans  engaged  in  gainful 
occupations  numbered  in  the  same  year  less  than  a  hundred.  With- 
out entering  further  into  detail  it  may  be  said  that  the  incentive 
to  the  development  of  individual  enterprise  and  of  actual  settlement 
in  the  colony  was  about  as  small  under  the  government  as  it  had 
been  under  the  Company. 

A  further  evidence  of  the  similarity  of  old  and  new  systems  was 
the  ease  with  which  the  Dutch  Trading  Company  slipped  into  the 
position  of  the  old  Company  when  once  the  culture  system  was 
well  started.  Before  that  time  it  had  languished  ;  now  it  became 
the  sole  agent  of  the  monopoly -holding  government,  transporting 
its  products  to  the  Netherlands  and  selling  them  there  on  the  ac- 
count of  its  principal.  Great  gains  were  thus  made,  as  in  former 
days,  at  the  expense  of  private  enterprise  and  public  interest. 

Oppression  and  Corruption 

It  is  plain  from  the  above  that  the  Dutch  were  still  endeavoring 
to  reconcile  the  two  historically  inconsistent  functions  of  trade  and 
government.  In  its  original  programme  the  culture  system  bore 
the  aspect  of  a  benevolent  attempt  to  secure  a  good  return  to  the 
government  through  assuring  the  natives  a  life  of  opportunity  and 
advance.  It  was  the  very  betterment  of  the  natives  which  was  to 
place  their  relation  with  their  rulers  upon  such  a  plane  as  to  render 
the  new  system  profitable  to  the  latter.  The  whole  scheme  was  a 
"  prosperity-policy  "  which,  with  the  minimum  of  pain,  was  to  secure 
general  satisfaction  for  all  parties.  But  the  nature  of  human  life 
is  such  that  losses  and  gains  are  balanced,  and  that  the  strong 
inevitably  utilize  their  power  to  seize  the  latter  and  shift  off  the 
former,  even  though  this  may  mean,  in  the  end,  losses  for  both 
sides.  And  since  the  advantages  which  the  Dutch  were  contem- 
plating in  their  relations  with  the  Javanese  were  still  pecuniary, 
and  not  composed  to  any  extent  of  pleasurable  sensations  to  be 
experienced  in  the  discharge  of  a  civilizing  and  humanitarian  func- 
tion, their  governing  activity  was  regularly  subordinated  to  the 


478  COLONIZATION 

commercial.  Hence  the  relative  unimportance  of  Dutch  "  colonial 
administration"  during  the  period  under  survey. 

The  land-tax  was  continued  as  a  source  of  revenue,  and  was  im- 
posed not  only  upon  the  districts  where  the  culture  system  had 
been  introduced,  but  also  upon  the  natives  who,  by  coming  under 
the  system,  had  in  form  released  themselves  from  the  land-tax.  "  It 
is  certain  that  many,  probably  most,  of  the  natives  bore  the  double 
burden  of  culture  services  and  taxes  too."  ^  Outside  the  region  of 
the  cultures  the  land-tax  continued  in  the  old  way,  meeting  the 
passive  resistance  of  the  natives  and  growing  in  its  yield  at  about 
the  same  rate  as  formerly.  Its  collection  was  mostly  in  the  hands 
of  natives,  for  the  government's  attention  was  for  the  time  concen- 
trated upon  the  system  newly  introduced,  and  was  haphazard  and 
irregular.  The  most  important  change  for  the  natives  not  under 
the  culture  system  was  the  increased  demand  for  labor  services 
which  they  had  to  meet.  The  government  spent  ready  money  with 
chagrin  and  found  it  much  cheaper  to  pay  nominal  wages  for  re- 
quired native  labor  ;  and  officials  wasted  a  great  amount  of  such 
labor  in  the  effort  to  exhibit  zeal  before  their  superiors.  One  esti- 
mate reckons  the  time  of  the  natives  which  was  taken  up  in  services 
as  at  least  a  cjuarter  of  their  working  hours.  And  the  waste  was 
the  greater  for  utter  lack  of  organization,  and  for  general  capri- 
ciousness,  inefficiency,  and  lack  of  good  will  on  the  part  of  the 
directors  of  labor. 

The  system  of  administration  was  thoroughly  bad,  as  it  had  been 
before  ;  greed  and  parsimony  vied  with  inefficiency  and  infidelity 
to  trust.  The  welfare  of  the  natives,  so  speciously  proclaimed  as 
the  real  object  of  the  culture  system  and  so  thoroughly  advertised, 
especially  among  foreigners,  as  being  a  result  of  it,  formed  no  part 
of  the  working  programme  of  the  system.  Practically  nothing  was 
done  for  the  natives.  In  general  the  whole  preoccupation  of  the 
government  was  commercial,  not  administrative  ;  it  was  willing  to 
multiply  functionaries  in  the  revenue  service,  but  would  make  no 
extension  of  the  purely  governmental  departments.  "  Officials  soon 
learned  that  their  careers  depended  on  the  fiscal  showing  their  dis- 
tricts could  make  ;  they  attended  to  the  business  of  raising  revenue, 
and  did  not  worry  the  government  overmuch  with  accounts  of  the 
sacrifices  of  the  natives."  ^  The  fact  that  a  percentage  upon  the 
product  of  a  district  was  divided  among  the  directing  officials, 
1  Day,  p.  281.  2  Id.,  p.  293. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH   COLONIZATION  479 

tended  to  focus  the  att  }ntion  of  all  upon  the  yield  of  the  govern- 
ment cultures  ;  purely  administrative  duties  became  flat  and  irk- 
some, and  the  function  of  government  constantly  dwindled  as  its 
parallel  and  inconsistent  function  of  trade  increased.  "  Neither  in 
the  training  of  officials  nor  in  the  regulation  of  their  careers  by 
promotion  did  the  government  take  any  measures  sufficient  to 
counteract  the  bad  influence  of  its  fiscal  policy  upon  them.  In 
character  and  abilities  they  were  below  standard."  ^  Favoritism 
played  a  great  role  in  their  selection  and  location ;  they  were  de- 
moralized by  the  presence  of  many  sources  of  illicit  gain,  as  well 
as  by  the  culture-percentages.  All  this  could  not  have  failed  to 
exercise  a  malign  influence  upon  the  native  officials,  who,  in  gen- 
eral, were  apter  to  acquire  the  vices  than  the  virtues  of  their  Euro- 
pean superiors.  To  these  regents,  besides,  the  system  of  Van  den 
Bosch  had  restored  a  considerable  portion  of  the  power  which 
Raffles  and  his  immediate  successors  had  desired  to  take  from 
them  ;  they  gradually  acquired  land-grants  in  return  for  services 
to  a  government  always  reluctant  to  pay  in  cash,  and,  since  the 
grants  carried  rights  of  taxation  over  the  natives  that  lived  upon 
them,  the  people  were  thus  turned  over  again  to  the  mercies  of 
their  own  chiefs  under  the  old  native  customs.  The  main  differ- 
ence between  the  conditions  of  this  restoration  as  compared  with 
the  old  aboriginal  status  was  that  the  chiefs  had  taken  during  their 
period  of  eclip.se  a  course  in  luxury,  greed,  and  dishonesty  on  the 
European  model.  And  the  subordinate  native  officials,  who  had 
always  been  poorly  paid,  were  not  behind  in  practicing  on  the  petty 
scale  what  their  superiors  did  on  the  large.  Every  demand  of  the 
European  government  increased  as  it  passed  through  native  hands. 
"  They  multiplied  tenfold  and  more  the  demands  which  the  govern- 
ment in  theory  allowed  them  to  make  on  the  labor  services  of  the 
population ;"  2  and  the  Dutch  officials,  though  on  oath  to  protect 
the  natives  against  their  chiefs,  could  do  little,  even  when  they 
willed,  in  the  face  of  governmental  greed  and  apathy.^  All  this 
demoralization  had  its  effect  upon  the  village  government  and  thus 
penetrated  still  more  intimately  into  native  life.    Up  to  1840  the 

1  Day,  p.  294;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Opleiding  van  Indische  .Ambtenaaren." 

2  Day,  p.  300. 

3  Cf.  the  career  of  Max  Havelaar  in  the  story  of  that  title,  by  Edouard  Douwes 
Dekker.  For  a  picture  of  the  dissoluteness  of  the  Dutch  and  native  officials,  and  the 
suffering  of  Europeans  as  well  as  of  the  Javanese  in  consequence  of  it,  see  Van 
Wijk's  story,  De  Goeie  Jo. 


4<So  COLONIZATION 

villages  had  chosen  their  own  head-men,  but  after  that  time  deposi- 
tion was  utilized  as  a  punishment  for  non-extortion  of  what  the 
government  wished,  and  election  became  a  mere  form.  Tools  of 
the  Dutch  were  instated  as  village-chiefs,  and  were  protected  in 
all  sorts  of  wrong-doing,  or  at  most  subjected  to  slight  or  formal 
punishments  for  superlative  rascality. 

Condition  of  the  Natives 

The  situation  of  the  Javanese  native  under  all  this  oppression 
was  pathetic,  but  after  a  realization  of  the  uselessness  of  complaint 
or  resistance,  he  settled  down  to  a  fatalistic  endurance  of  his  lot. 
The  Dutch,  wanting  money,  transmitted  pressure  through  their 
officials,  and  it  finally  impinged,  far  down  in  the  lower  strata  :)f  the 
social  structure,  upon  the  unknown  and  for  the  most  part  unseen 
wretch  whose  life  on  earth  was  thereby  rendered  the  more  onerous 
and  unhuman.  "  It  is  probable,  from  what  is  known  of  the  nature 
of  village  governments,  that  the  cases  of  injustice  and  oppression 
in  the  workings  of  the  culture  system  that  were  brought  to  the 
notice  of  the  Dutch  and  put  on  record  were  as  nothing  compared 
with  tyrannies  and  extortions  by  petty  officials,  by  the  compara- 
tively well-to-do,  by  village  cliques,  wrought  inside  the  villages 
and  never  known  to  the  outside  world.  '  The  little  man  never 
makes  open  complaint,'  said  a  native  witness  at  an  investigation 
in  1850,  when  asked  why  the  gross  abuses  discovered  had  not 
sooner  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  government."  The 
native  bore  his  sufferings  in  silence,  and  it  was  mainly  through 
unconscious  manifestations  of  his  distress,  such  as  apjieared  in 
famme  and  pestilence  and  in  his  fiight  from  the  land,  that  the 
government  came  in  time  to  realize  the  faults  of  the  system.  ^ 

In  other  words,  the  pressure  of  the  struggle  for  existence  had 
to  be  deduced  for  the  native  as  it  is  deduced  for  the  dumb  animal 
or  plant,  from  the  observed  consequences  of  his  presence  in  an 
unendurable  environment.  That  the  native  had  been  treated  for 
the  most  part  with  the  same  detached  egoism  with  which  man 
aj:)proaches  the  lower  organisms  has  been  sufficiently  demonstrated. 
This  is  the  keynote  of  the  Dutch  system,  taken  as  a  whole,  in  its 
relation  with  the  natives  :  they  were  exploited  like  the  coffee-trees 

1  Day,  p.  307. 


LATKR    PHASES   OF   DUTCH   COLONIZATION  48 1 

or  the  carabaos,  as  soulless  organisms  designed  to  minister  to  the 
well-being  of  a  dominant  species.  There  were  absent,  for  the  most 
part,  in  their  treatment,  those  elements  of  sympathy  and  humanity 
by  which  the  struggle  for  existence  between  men  has  come  through 
ages  to  some  amelioration.  The  Spanish  and  Portuguese  may  have 
proceeded  in  many  cases  with  a  more  conscious  ruthlessness,  but 
no  one  can  deny  the  essential  highmindedness  and  self-sacrifice  for 
immaterial  ends  exhibited  by  certain  of  their  men  and  measures. 
The  Dutch,  on  the  contrary,  uninspired  by  any  ideal  considera- 
tions, in  the  prevailing  materialism  of  their  aims  substituted  for 
positive  action  of  any  kind  an  immense  indifference  and  detach- 
ment as  regards  the  fate  of  their  native  subjects.  There  is  perhaps 
in  theory  some  room  for  argument  as  to  which  course  is  ultimately 
best  for  humanity  :  to  allow  full  swing  to  the  natural  conflict  of 
races,  or  to  alter  and  mollify  the  struggle  to  the  advantage  of  the 
weaker  race,  this  meaning  naturally  the  material  disadvantage  of 
the  stronger.  But,  taking  a  narrower  purview  and  confining  our- 
selves to  the  four  centuries  since  the  first  meeting  on  the  large 
scale  of  races  of  different  grades  of  civilization,  the  Dutch  appear 
to  have  carried  out  in  the  East,  under  the  Company  and  the 
culture  system,  a  distinctly  low  and  unprogressive  development  of 
native  policy.  Out  of  a  promising  native  population  they  had 
made  nothing  except  sordid  profit.  The  fact  th!it  their  system  was 
not  worthy  of  a  modern  age,  that  it  did  not  suit  the  mores  of  a 
later  day,  was  recognized  by  the  Dutch  themselves  in  their  efforts 
to  reform  the  culture  system,  which  began  about  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

Reputation  of  the  Culture  System 

One  of  the  reasons  why  the  Dutch  were  so  long  regarded  as 
masters  in  colonial  practice  was  because  they  proved  an  exception 
to  that  regular  rule  that,  in  modern  days,  states  suffer  fiscal  loss 
from  their  colonies.  Other  governments  were  always  balancing 
colonial  budgets  through  substantial  subventions  ;  but  here  were 
the  Dutch,  under,  apparently,  a  thoroughly  modern  system,  receiv- 
ing a  yearly  dividend  from  their  colony.  No  wonder  the  culture 
system  received  reverential  handling  from  Germans  and  English. 
The  system  did  return,  in  fact,  a  regular  net  profit  {batig-  slot)  of 
22,333,003  guilders  a  year  from   1840  to   1874,  or,  all  together, 


482  COLONIZATION 

781,000,000  guilders  for  the  period.^  Of  this  amount  639,000,000 
came  from  coffee,  and  115,000,000  from  sugar.  Other  cultures 
brought  loss  or  slight  gain  ;  and  it  is  shown  by  Day  that  the  profit 
on  coffee  was  due  largely  to  price-conditions  in  Europe  upon  which 
the  culture  system  could  have  had  no  influence.  Nevertheless  the 
regular  annual  j^rofit  was  not  the  object  of  analysis  either  by  the 
Dutch  or  their  admiring  competitors  ;  it  stood  for  success,  and  for 
the  success  of  a  modern  and  enlightened  policy.  How  far  from  the 
truth  this  last  conviction  was,  has  been  sufficiently  explained. 

Nor  was  it  the  foreigners  alone  who  were  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
real  results  of  the  culture  system.  The  Dutch  knew  practically 
nothing  of  conditions  in  Java,  for  the  policy  of  secrecy  of  the  Com- 
pany had  been  succeeded  by  a  similar  governmental  reticence. 
The  Dutch  may  have  known  the  favorable-appearing  fact  that 
population  was  increasing  in  Java  at  about  the  regular  old  rate, 
but  they  did  not  know  of  the  flight  of  population  from  the  culture- 
districts,  nor  of  the  recurring  and  severe  famines  and  pestilences 
due  to  a  diminished  food-supply.  For  the  natives  could  get  neither 
time  nor  land  for  raising  food,  nor  were  they  given  wages  to  buy 
it.  The  very  absence  of  armed  revolts  might  have  been  construed 
as  an  evidence  of  prosperity  and  contentment,  whereas  it  was  d.ue 
to  habits  of  obedience  and  subjection,  and,  perhaps,  to  weakness 
as  well.  That  revolts  occurred  elsewhere  with  regularity  ^  was 
plausible  proof  of  the  excellence  of  the  system  in  Java.  The  fact 
of  it  was  that  the  people  of  the  Netherlands  were  not  supposed  to 
know  anything  about  the  colonies ;  they  were  under  the  sole  con- 
trol of  the  king.  Even  the  government  was  but  slightly  informed, 
for  "  practically  no  one  outside  the  colonial  office  had  any  knowl- 
edge or  interest  concerning  colonial  affairs."  Europeans  who  did 
not  hold  office  were  not  welcomed  in  Java,  and  the  news  from  the 
East  was  carefully  touched  up  before  being  published.  The  press 
was  not  allowed  to  agitate  questions  that  might  embarrass  the 
government ;  in  fact  the  censor  was  so  active  in  the  East  that  the 
newspapers  could  get  no  facts  had  they  desired  to  agitate.  One 
writer  exclaims  that  "  the  Dutch,  unlike  the  English,  had  neither 

1  According  to  an  estimate  of  Pierson,  p.  148.  This  is  quoted,  with  additional 
matter,  in  Day,  pp.  309-310.  Leroy-Beaulieu  (I,  292)  remarks :  "  Jusqu'  a  des  temps 
assez  proches  de  nous,  Java  avait  etc  pour  la  mere  patrie  une  vache  a  lait  dont  le 
gouvernement  hollandais  pressait  soigneusement  les  mamelles.  C'etait,  avec  Cuba,  la 
seule  colonic  qui  fut  productrice  d'un  gros  revenu  pour  la  mctropole." 

2  See  pp.  493  a.,  below. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH  COLONIZATION  483 

the  desire  to  make  known  the  facts  about  their  Eastern  possessions, 
nor  even  the  desire  to  know  themselves."  Thus  it  came  about, 
says  Day,  that  "  no  government  industry  was  ever  so  free  from 
the  supervision  of  the  general  public,  or  so  unchecked  by  the 
public  criticism  that  keeps  governments  in  the  right  track,  as  was 
the  culture  system."  ^  If  some  exception  be  taken  to  the  compre- 
hensiveness of  this  assertion,  with  the  cases  of  the  earlier  coloniz- 
ing powers  in  mind,  it  must  yet  be  admitted  that,  in  the  nineteenth 
century  at  least,  any  such  system  of  secrecy,  supported  by  any 
such  incurious  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  public,  is  unique. 

Reform  :    Methods  of  Indirection 

The  way  in  which  the  colonial  skeleton  was  extracted  from  its 
closet  was  an  involved  one,  and  started  with  an  upheaval  in  home 
politics  by  which  the  States-General  attained  to  a  more  important 
function  than  it  had  held  ;  it  laid  hand  at  last  upon  the  colonial 
budget.  But  even  then  there  was  no  direct  penetration  beyond  the 
fact  of  the  batig  slot;  "  it  was  generally  assumed  that  the  increased 
revenues  from  the  East  were  due  to  the  prosperity  of  the  natives, 
and  that  the  culture  system  was  conferring  on  them  all  the  bene- 
fits that  its  founder  had  promised."  ^  What  the  liberal  party  was 
contending  against  was  not  the  colonial  policy  but  the  lodgment 
of  all  governmental  functions  in  the  king.  By  1848  the  point 
was  being  carried  against  the  king ;  but  even  after  constitutional 
changes  had  occurred  there  was  really  no  colonial  policy.  Igno- 
rance of  conditions  still  ruled  ;  what  had  been  done  had  been  the 
preparation  of  the  legislative  body,  through  the  introduction  of 
modern  men  into  its  halls,  to  cope  with  modern  questions,  and, 
among  them,  with  colonial  problems.  Then  followed  (1854)  the 
relaxation  of  press-regulations,  the  abolition  of  slavery,  projects  of 
native  education  and  of  regulation  of  services  and  land-tax.  The 
legislators  struggled  between  the  desire  for  the  net  yearly  profit 
on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  the  wish  to  extend  opportu- 
nities to  European  planters,  and  to  protect  the  natives  from  an 
oppression  they  were  gradually  coming  to  realize. 

A  paragraph  was  introduced  into  the  colonial  constitution  of 
1854  which  provided  (i)  that  the  cultures  should  not  interfere  with 

1  The  preceding  quotations  are  from  Day,  pp.  319,  318,  and  316  respectively. 

2  Day,  p.  322. 


484  COLONIZATION 

the  production  of  sufficient  means  of  subsistence  ;  (2)  that  lands 
cleared  by  natives  for  their  use  and  then  occupied  by  cultures 
should  be  disposed  of  with  justice  and  with  respect  for  existing 
rights  and  customs  ;  (3)  that  in  the  assignment  of  labor  the  same 
rules  should  hold  ;  (4)  that  in  general  the  pay  of  the  natives  should 
be  such  that  the  government  cultures  should  return  them  with 
the  same  labor  at  least  the  same  advantages  as  free  cultivation  ; 
(5)  that  oppressions  of  the  cultures  discovered  by  a  careful  investi- 
gation, be,  so  far  as  practicable,  remedied  ;  (6)  that  a  regulation  be 
then  prepared,  based  on  voluntary  agreements  with  thti  communi- 
ties and  individuals  concerned,  as  a  transition  to  a  condition  where 
government  intervention  may  be  dispensed  with.^  The  carrying  out 
of  such  ideas  meant  the  realization  of  Van  den  Bosch's  promises ; 
but  it  likewise  meant  the  abolition  of  the  system.  For,  as  has 
been  seen,  the  system  had  nothing  to  give  apart  from  the  exploita- 
tion of  the  natives  ;  it  could  not  assure  them  fair  play  and  still 
live.  "  The  Dutch  must  choose  between  making  money  by  the 
sacrifice  of  the  natives  and  protecting  natives  at  the  sacrifice  of 
fiscal  interests.  .  .  .  Little  by  little  Dutch  legislators  perceived 
this,  and  began  to  range  themselves  in  parties  sharply  defined 
on  the  question  of  the  maintenance  or  abolition  of  the  culture 
system."  ^ 

"Max  Havelaar":  Decline  of  the  System 

Some  of  the  more  flagrant  abuses  had  been  corrected  between 
1845  '^'"''^l  185  I  ;  and  this  1854  constitution  set  a  new  and  higher 
standard  for  continued  reform.  But,  as  is  so  often  the  case,  an 
appeal  to  popular  emotion  was  necessary  in  order  to  accelerate 
the  more  deliberate  development  of  rational  conviction  and  to  cut 
t?ie  entanglement  produced  by  a  conflict  of  interests  and  ojiinions, 
candid  or  otherwise.  This  appeal  came  in  i860  with  the  publica- 
tion of  "  Max  Havelaar,  or  The  Coffee  Auctions  of  the  Dutch 
Trading  Company,"  by  Edf)uard  Douwes  Dekker,  writing  under 
the  significant  pseudonym  of  "  Multatuli.''^ "  It  is  the  story  of  a 
young  Dutch  colonial  official  to  whom  the  abuses  of  the  culture 
system  became  intolerable,  and  who  then,  owing  to  the  impolitic 

^  Translation  in  Day,  p.  328. 
2  Day,  p.  329. 

^  Translation  by  Nahuijs  (Edinburgh,  186S) ;  selections  in  Warner's  Library,  VIII, 
4513-4520. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH   COLONIZATION  485 

expression  of  his  views,  fell  out  with  the  colonial  administration 
and  suffered  in  consequence  all  the  persecution,  petty  and  other, 
that  falls  to  the  share  of  the  isolated  and  indiscreet  reformer.  As 
a  piece  of  literature  it  is  of  little  value,  being  repetitious,  fantastic, 
and  surcharged  with  the  weakly  emotional ;  but  in  these  respects 
it  is  not  unlike  the  performances  of  many  enthusiasts  whose  influ- 
ence upon  their  time  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  have  made  exagger- 
ated appeals  to  men's  feelings,  consciously  or  unconsciously  acting 
upon  the  principle  that  in  these  rather  than  in  the  intellect  are  to 
be  found  the  springs  of  human  action.  Dekker  is  in  this  respect 
classifiable  with  the  authoress  of  "  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,"  and  other 
such  purveyors  of  real  kernels  of  wheat  in  bushels  of  chaff,  rather 
than  with  the  more  rational  protestants  against  local  or  general 
conditions.  "  Dekker  took  sides  neither  with  the  conservatives  for 
forced  labor,  nor  with  the  liberals  for  free  labor ;  he  had  but  one 
refrain  —  the  Javanese  is  given  over  to  the  oppression  of  his  chiefs 
and  they  abuse  him  in  the  name  of  the  King."  ^  The  very  earnest- 
ness of  the  author,  coupled  with  the  evident  fact  that  he  spoke  from 
bitter  personal  experience,  lent  force  to  his  appeal,  for,  as  has  been 
seen,  the  time  was  ripe  for  the  rejection  of  the  existing  system.^ 

The  colonial  question  remained  well  to  the  fore  during  the  dec- 
ade i860  to  1870,  and  at  its  end  the  liberals  had  carried  the  day 
and  the  culture  system  was  formally  superseded  by  that  of  "free 
labor."  In  18 18  the  slave-trade  had  been  forbidden  ;  slavery  was 
abolished,  with  reimbursement  of  loss  to  applying  owners,  in  i860, 
after  which  time  it  existed,  except  in  disguised  form,  only  in  New 
Guinea.^  Between  i860  and  1865  the  less  important  government 
cultures  (tea,  tobacco,  indigo,  pepper,  cinnamon)  were  given  up  ;  the 
sugar-culture  alone  remained  to  occupy  arable  land  of  the  natives, 
for  coffee  was  grown  on  the  waste  areas.  Natives  were  freed  from 
the  passport-system  which'  impeded  easy  movement  of  labor,  and 

1  Day,  p.  333. 

2  For  a  contemporary  estimate  of  Max  Havelaar  by  a  thoroughly  competent 
authority  see  P.  J.  Veth,  "  Multatuli  vs.  Droogstoppel,"  etc.,  De  Gids,  i860,  II,  65  ff., 
233  ff.  Vetli  says  the  eccentricity  of  the  work  is  against  it  among  cool,  calm  Holland- 
ers ;  that  it  is  a  little  wild;  that  the  story  "  w'at  verdichtsel  is  in  het  bijzonder,  waar- 
heid  is  in  het  algemeen."  Other  utterances  regarding  the  culture  system,  by  this 
excellent  authority,  are  to  be  found  under  the  review-heading:  "  Nieuwste  Literatuur 
over  Nederlandsch-Indie,"  in  De  Gids,  1862,  II,  841  ;  1863,  I,  19;  1864,  III,  150; 
1865,  IV,  385,  et  al.  Cf.  R.  Fruin,  "  Nederlands  Rechten  en  Verplichtingen  ten 
opzichte  van  Indie,"  De  Gids,  1865,  II,  28. 

^  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  Slavernij,"  "  Temate,"  "  Nieuw-Guinea." 


486  COLONIZATION 

were  protected  against  excessive  demands  for  their  services  ;  the 
culture -percentages  were  abolished,  the  payment  of  native  officials 
in  land  restricted,  and  the  village  heads  restored  to  their  old  posi- 
tion.^ And  it  was  of  still  greater  importance  that  the  system  of 
official  secrecy  weakened  as  there  was  less  need  for  concealment. 
Naturally  enough  parts  and  survivals  of  the  culture  system  have 
lasted  on  in  dwindling  or  altered  form  to  the  present  day. 

With  the  decline  of  the  culture  system  yet  another,  and  this 
time  much-heralded,  expedient  for  the  development  of  the  tropics 
is  proved,  at  least  under  modern  theories  of  justice  and  ethics,  in- 
adequate. All  such  expedients  that  have  any  chance  at  all  repre- 
sent compulsion  in  some  form  ;  but  compulsion  is,  for  reasons  of 
humanity,  morality,  and  the  like,  disallowed.  Hence  as  system 
after  system  passes,  return  is  made  to  the  original  dilemma,  and 
a  new  way  must  be  evolved  of  securing  a  tropical  labor  force 
otherwise  than  through  unsensed  economic  stimulation  or  forbid- 
den physical  coercion.^ 

"  Free  Labor" 

It  is  perhaps  as  well  to  continue  this  topic  up  to  recent  years  ^ 
before  attempting  to  go  back  and  gather  up  for  brief  mention  cer- 
tain other  lines  of  Dutch  colonial  development  hitherto  thrust  one 
side  by  reason  of  preoccupation  with  relatively  far  more  important 
issues  in  Java.  The  "free  labor"  system  which  succeeded  the  cul- 
ture system  has  not  escaped  the  inevitable  tendency  to  revert  to 
a  mitigated  form  of  compulsion ;  it  is  really  credit-bondage,  volun- 
tarily or  unwittingly  entered  by  the  natives,  and  is  not  at  that 
very  successful.  For  the  Dutch  had  not  trained  the  native  to  labor 
for  the  purpose  of  getting  something  he  wanted,  but  rather  did  he 
toil  to  avoid  that  which  he  did  not  want,  namely,  punishment  or 
other  discomfort.  It  was  found  to  be  a  long  swing  of  the  pendu- 
lum from  this  extreme  of  the  negative  through  the  traditional  posi- 
tion of  rest  across  to  the  positive.    The  most  that  could  be  done 

1  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "Amboina,"  "  Nijveiheid,"  "  Heerendiensten,"  "  In- 
digo," "  Koffie,"  "  Rijst,"  "  Suiker,"  etc.  In  an  utterance  in  the  States-Cieneral  during 
this  period  two  principles  were  set  down  as  "  the  two  corner-stones  of  the  colonial 
structure  —  respect  for  the  institutions  and  customs  of  the  people  under  our  rule,  and 
the  maintenance  of  the  prestige  (<itnizie>i)  of  their  princes  and  chiefs."  Van  der  Aa, 
"  Koloniale  Politiek,"  De  Gids,  i860,  I,  461.  2  cf   Keller,  Sociol.  View,  etc. 

^  For  the  recent  system  of  the  Dutch  in  Java,  Day  (chaps,  x-xii)  remains  the  chief 
authority ;  cf.  also  Id.,  pp.  1-4. 


LATKR   PHASES  OF   DUTCH    COLONIZATION  487 

was  to  set  over  against  the  vaguely  perceived  discomforts  of  future 
labor  the  present  lure  of  immediate  material  benefits,  and  when 
the  bait  had  been  unintelligently  but  voluntarily  taken,  to  insist 
upon  the  fulfillment  of  the  contract ;  as  high  as  three  years'  wages 
were  thus  advanced  against  future  services,  which  then  became 
compulsory.  In  form,  of  course,  this  is  merely  a  subterfuge  ;  and 
doubtless  it  often  proved  so  to  be  in  reality,  despite  the  provi- 
sions as  to  limitation  and  recording  of  contracts  and  the  like.  Such 
provisions  were  in  force  in  the  coolie-system, ^  but  they  did  not 
prevent  abuses  sufficient  to  cause  the  Chinese  and  British  authori- 
ties, and  those  of  the  Dutch  themselves  to  repudiate  it,  at  least 
so  far  as  allowing  their  subjects  to  serve  in  colonies  of  foreign 
powers  was  concerned.  The  system  was  in  reality  one  of  debt- 
slavery,  and  as  such  was  perfectly  comprehensible  to  the  native, 
who  had  known  it  under  what  the  Dutch  called  pandclingscJiap  '^  for 
many  preceding  periods  of  his  history.  Debt-slavery  to  one's  chiefs 
is  common  enough  among  uncivilized  peoples,  but  is  generally 
mitigated  by  the  irregularity  or  mildness  of  the  service  imposed  ; 
Europeans,  with  a  different  and  more  energetic  temperament,  and 
intent  on  speedy  gain,  are  likely  to  insist  upon  a  strenuosity  and 
accountability  which  effect  a  total  metamorphosis  of  the  institution. 
But  reiterated  complaints  as  to  the  capricious  breaking  of  contracts 
by  natives  leave  us  to  understand  that  in  Java  the  compulsion  was 
not  rigorous  enough  for  the  system  still  to  deserve  the  name  of 
slavery  ;  indeed  the  very  lamentations  that  denote  the  absence  of 
coercion  indicate  a  return  to  the  original  dilemma  of  tropical  pro- 
duction. The  problem  of  tropical  labor  seems  still  to  be  set  for 
the  Dutch  in  its  original  terms  —  terms  which  are,  indeed,  more 
unfavorable  if  anything  than  at  first,  because  of  the  results  of  sev- 
eral centuries  of  crude  and  inapt  manipulation. 

Yet,  despite  all  theory,  in  practice  a  good  deal  of  compulsion 
along  old  lines  is  exercised  over  the  natives  to  bring  them  as  pro- 
ducers under  the  modern  economic  system.  For  though  the  gov- 
ernment allows  to  the  landed  proprietor  no  such  powers  utilizable 
for  oppression  as  he  formerly  possessed,  yet  he  still  holds  "  a  semi-, 
public  position  ;  he  exacts  dues  in  labor  and  in  kind  from  the  na- 
tives, and,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  State,  he  appoints  and 
pays  the  head-men  who  exercise  the  most  important  function  of 

1  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Koelie." 

2  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Pandelingschap." 


488  COLONIZATION 

communal  government."  ^  Abuses  must  arise  under  these  condi- 
tions ;  the  government  plainly  recognizes  their  existence,  though 
it  has  as  yet  devised  no  means  for  their  eradication. 

The  Chinese 

The  most  effective  and  natural  agency  for  the  economic  educa- 
tion of  the  natives,  in  Java  and  elsewhere,  is  formed  by  the  Chinese. 
It  has  been  shown  ^  that  Coen  and  others  early  recognized  their 
importance  and  favored  their  immigration ;  and  then  how  they  be- 
came hated  and  were  subjected  to  persecution.  Their  peculiar  value 
as  educators  of  less-developed  races  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  are 
culturally  near  enough  to  them  to  understand  that  in  their  lives 
which  is  a  closed  book  to  the  European.  They  are  natural  media- 
tors between  two  diverse  types  of  civilization.^  A  Javanese  could 
hope  and  desire  to  attain  to  what  of  superiority  the  Chinese  has, 
while  he  could  not  even  regard  as  desirable  or  superior  much  of 
that  for  which  the  European  strives.  Moreover,  the  Chinese  were 
long  experienced  over  all  the  East  before  the  European  arrived. 
Their  intelligence,  industry,  and  reliability  led  to  the  delegation  to 
them  of  functions  like  that  of  the  tax  farmer,  where  they  were  op- 
pressive indeed,  under  a  conniving  government,  but  effective  for 
its  purposes.  "  Even  in  the  eighteenth  century  they  were  recog- 
nized as  indispensable  in  their  capacity  of  manufacturers,  traders, 
and  money-lenders  ;  they  alone  showed  the  ability  to  stimulate  pro- 
duction, not  by  political  pressure,  but  by  economic  means  such  as 
characterize  the  modern  system  of  labor. 

"  In  modern  times  the  Chinese  have  lost  much  of  their  impor- 
tance as  tax  farmers,  but  their  place  in  the  commercial  organiza- 
tion is  secure."^  Thus  they  continue  to  come  into  constant  and 
close  contact  with  the  natives  ;  they  are  the  peddlers,  the  small- 
scale  suppliers  who  depend  for  their  existence  upon  the  stimulation 
of  those  petty  demands  which  precede  others  and  larger.  Their 
work  is  in  many  striking  respects  a  counterpart  of  that  of  the 
Phoenicians  or  the  mediaeval  Jews  ;  they  are  similarly  hated,  bear- 
ing as  they  do  a  like  reputation.  But  these  "  Phoenicians  of  the 
East "  are  exerting  an  analogous  influence  because  their  point  of 
attack  is,  like  that  of  their  prototypes,  the  only  logical  one ;  it  is 

1  Day,  p.  368.  2  I'p.  437  ff.,  above. 

8  Cf.  Keller,  Sociol.  View,  etc. ;  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Chineezen." 

*  Day,  p.  362. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH   COLONIZATION  489 

the  industrial  organization  alone  that  they  influence,  and  that  in 
simple,  understandable  ways,  and  holding  out  benefits  which,  though 
dearly  purchased,  seem  worth  the  price.  The  Chinese  really  extract 
products  from  the  natives  ;  "  the  petty  trader  should  have  the  credit 
for  the  total  amount  produced  for  export  by  the  industrial  natives, 
and  for  a  large  proportion  of  that  which  is  produced  by  natives 
under  European  direction."  ^  Thus  are  the  natives  being  gradually 
drawn  into  the  outskirts  of  the  world-market  and  afforded  some 
hope  of  such  adaptation  to  modern  conditions  as  will  allow  them  a 
modest  share  in  its  system  and  perhaps  ultimately  save  them  from 
the  extinction  that  follows  failure  to  conform. 

In  this  process  the  Dutch  have  had  little  share  ;  nevertheless 
their  recent  efforts  to  improve  the  native's  position,  whatever  the 
results,  must  not  be  overlooked.  The  general  easing-up  on  services, 
and  other  measures  dating  from  about  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  were  followed  by  attempts  to  better  the  education  not 
only  of  the  colonial  service  but  of  the  natives  as  well.  Likewise 
an  increased  attention  was  given  to  religious  matters,  although 
"  among  the  Javanese  the  opinion  is  dominant  that  the  government 
does  not  wish  a  chief  {hoofd)  to  become  a  Christian."  In  1770 
there  were  500,000  native  Christians  in  the  domain  of  the  Com- 
pany, and  at  its  fall  70,000  within  the  area  of  the  present  Nether- 
lands-India. In  1903  there  were  445,950  native  Christians  in  the 
same  region,  of  whom  28,368  were  Catholic.  Naturally  the  Dutch 
have  steadily  opposed  the  extension  of  the  Roman  faith  from  the 
time  they  succeeded  to  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish.^ 

Recent  Fiscal  and  Other  Conditions 

If  the  government  intended  to  see  the  natives  rightly  treated 
according  to  modern  criteria,  it  could  not  hope  for  the  old  fiscal 
returns.  But  it  was  unwilling,  naturally  enough,  to  surrender 
these;  after  1864  the  home  government  fixed  the  Indian  budget, 
and  for  some  years  the  contributions  ranged  between  10,000,000 
and  40,000,000  guilders  a  year.    But,  in  consequence  of  the  Atjeh 

1  Day,  p.  365.  The  total  number  of  Chinese  in  Netherlands-India  is  given  (for 
1893)  as  443,945,  of  whom  290,449  are  males.    Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Chineezen." 

2  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "  Christenen  " ;  cf.  arts.  "  Onderwijs,"  "  Opleiding  van 
Indische  Ambtenaaren,"  "  Heerendiensten,"  "  Eeredienst,"  "  Evangelisatie,"  "Zen- 
ding."  For  the  character  of  training  for  the  colonial  service,  see  Lowell,  chap,  ii,  113  ff., 
and  Bourne,  Col.  Civ.  Serv. 


490  COLONIZATION 

War  which  broke  out  in  1873,  this  Indian  surplus  decHned  and,  in 
1878,  had  disappeared.  Later  schemes  regarding  the  budget  "  have 
had  in  common  the  idea  that  the  Indies  should  be  held  to  contrib- 
ute each  year  a  fixed  sum  which  should  recompense  the  home 
government  for  its  expenditures  on  colonial  account,  while  any 
surplus  above  that  should  be  appropriated  by  the  States  General 
to  objects  of  direct  interest  to  the  i^eoj^lc  in  the  East."  ^  Recent 
budgets  seem  to  indicate  a  considerably  increased  attention  to  the 
formerly  neglected  public  works,  local  administration,  native  wel- 
fare, and  the  like. 

In  considering  the  source  of  the  government  revenues,  return 
is  made  from  another  standpoint  to  the  modification  of  the  culture 
system.  After  the  less  important  cultures  were  abolished  those 
of  sugar  and  coffee  alone  remained.  In  the  case  of  the  former 
a  gradual  transition  from  forced-  to  wage-labor  was  begun  in  1870, 
and  by  1890  the  transition  was  fully  effected.  The  taxes  levied 
from  the  planters  were  sufficient  for  some  years  to  cause  the 
government  but  slight  loss  ;  but  misfortunes,  entirely  apart  from 
the  change  of  system,  which  overtook  the  industry  toward  the  end  • 
of  the  century  brought  heavy  loss  to  the  planters  and  led  to  the 
abolition  of  the  sugar-tax,  after  some  years  of  suspension,  in  1898. 
The  coffee-culture  is  still  continued  ;  to  it  the  government  held 
because  of  its  productiveness,  striving  to  remedy  abuses  and  in- 
crease efficiency  by  changes  of  detail.  It  was  seen  that,  since  the 
industry  was,  unlike  that  of  sugar,  almost  entirely  in  native  hands, 
there  would  be  little  production  for  export  under  a  free  system  ; 
the  European  entrepreneur  was  lacking  and  so  could  not  be  made 
responsible  or  taxed.  Culture-percentages  for  European  officials 
were  abolished,  however,  in  1865,  although  those  for  native  super- 
visors were  continued.  But  the  industry  is  rather  feebly  carried 
on ;  fall  of  coffee-prices  leaves  the  culture  less  desirable  and  des- 
tined to  pass  away.  The  coffee-culture,  like  all  the  rest,  could  have 
been  abolished  any  time  the  government  chose  to  forego  the  revenue 
derived  from  it. 

Thus  far  little  has  been  said  of  mining ;  but  although  it  formed 
no  very  considerable  part  of  the  interests  of  the  Dutch  up  to  1867, 
and  contributed  therefore  but  slightly  to  the  labor  question,  it  de- 
serves some  reference  in  view  of  present-day  conditions.  In  early 
times  Java  had  the  reputation  of  a  "gold  and  silver  island,"  and 

1  Day,  p.  384. 


LATER   PHASES  OF  DUTCH  COLONIZATION 


491 


the  precious  metals  were  a  sort  of  vague  secondary  lure  to  the 
European  discoverers ;  but  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  found 
little  to  attract  them,  and  the  East  India  Company,  after  some 
experimentation,  allowed  such  enterprise  to  drop.  In  the  course 
of  time,  however,  the  extension  of  information  about  the  Dutch 
possessions  recalled  attention  to  their  metal  wealth  ;  for,  in  accord 
with  more  modern  ideas,  it  was  now  possible  to  conceive  of  such 
resources  as  consisting  of  something  besides  gold  and  silver.  There 
is  gold  in  Netherlands-India,  but  the  metallic  attraction  has  come 
to  be  the  more  useful  ores,  and,  above  all,  tin  ;  to  have  tin  mines 
in  their  colonies  is  for  the  Dutch  a  rather  unique  distinction,  and 
a  profitable  one.  This  ore  occurs  chiefly  in  the  islands  of  Banka 
and  Billiton,  and  is  mined  through  the  agency,  under  the  resident 
of  Banka,  of  Chinese  resident  communities  {kotig-si)}  Concessions 
for  mining  have  been  granted  in  considerable  numbers  since  1873, 
but  only  to  Netherlanders  or  subject  natives  or  to  companies  formed 
in  the  Netherlands  or  in  the  Dutch  islands.  The  exigencies  of  steam- 
navigation  have  lent  importance  to  the  mining  of  coal  ;  and  iron 
and  petroleum  seem  to  promise  well.  Thus  in  the  field  of  the  ex- 
tractive industries,  as  of  the  productive,  the  center  of  gravity  is 
moving  away  from  the  costly  and  luxurious  toward  the  cheap  and 
practical. 2  In  any  case  mining  in  Netherlands-India  has  never  cost 
the  native,  in  loss  of  vitality  and  in  misery,  what  it  wrung  from  the 
Indians  in  America. 

With  the  decline  of  forced  services  ^  of  all  kinds  the  Dutch  have 
come  to  look  to  taxes  on  the  European  model  as  sources  of  rev- 
enue. The  land-tax  was  the  chief  of  these,  and  it  has  remained 
in  approximately  its  old  form,  although  growth  of  population  and 
strengthening  of  the  administration  have  contributed  to  make  it 
more  endurable.  The  Dutch  are  now  engaged  upon  an  investiga- 
tion of  the  whole  tax  system,  which  will  probably  end  by  sweep- 
ing away  the  greater  part  of  the  survivals  of  antique  and  poorly 

1  Cf.  p.  25,  above. 

2  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "  Mijnbouw,"  "  Billiton-maatschappij,"  "  Petroleum," 
"  Steenkolen,"  "  Tin,"    "  Ijzer,"  etc. 

^  Another  species  of  service  demanded  by  the  government  as  a  sort  of  commuted 
tax  was  that  which  included  labor  on  public  works,  maintenance  of  order,  labor  for 
the  personal  enterprises  of  native  government  i^pantjen  services)  and  village  officials. 
These  services  were  wasteful  and  ineffective,  as  they  were  given  grudgingly  and 
directed  inefficiently.  From  1864  to  1890  they  were  progressively  restricted;  then  it 
was  realized  that  general  regulation  was  ineffective,  and  since  1890  forced  services 
have  been  prescribed  according  to  the  local  conditions  of  the  various  residencies. 


492 


COLONIZATION 


adapted  measures.  It  would  appear  from  all  this  that  they  have 
finally  decided  for  the  formerly  neglected  alternative  in  the  dual 
policy  of  trade  and  government ;  they  have  certainly  moved  in 
that  direction  since  the  days  of  the  Company.  Yet  there  are 
those  who  assert  that  the  Dutch  policy  is  still  that  of  greed  and 
gain.  It  is  stated,  for  example,  with  a  good  deal  of  evidence, 
that  the  government  is  actively  fostering  the  greatest  curse  of 
the  East,  the  opium-traffic,  and  that,  though  the  form  of  the 
drug's  disposal  has  been  changed  from  time  to  time,  it  is  being 
offered  to,  or  rather  forced  upon,  an  increasing  number  of  East 
Indian  districts. ^  It  would  be  strange  indeed  if  some  such  ugly 
aftermath  of  the  old  mercenary  policy  did  not  persist.  No  one 
believes  all  the  protestations  of  parliamentary  speeches,  least  of 
all  those  of  defenders  of  their  own  policy.  But  for  the  present  it 
is  safe  to  say  that  in  recent  years  the  colonial  policy  in  Java  has 
certainly  more  closely  approached  the  modern  type,  where  meas- 
ures are,  openly  at  least,  based  less  upon  considerations  of  gain. 

In  pursuance  of  the  early  policy  of  exploitation  one  of  the 
strongest  persuasions  of  the  Dutch  was  that  foreigners  should 
be  rigidly  excluded  from  the  entire  archipelago ;  and  it  has  been 
seen  how  they  forced  an  entry  and  finally  for  a  time  held  almost 
the  whole  of  the  Dutch  possessions.  Of  course  the  modern  ideas, 
based  upon  the  working  of  a  modern  system  with  its  developed 
communication  and  transportation,  no  longer  allow  of  a  closed 
monopoly  or  an  attempt  at  one.  Nevertheless  the  Dutch  are  yet 
strict  in  such  measures  as  are  calculated  to  discourage  foreign 
enterprise  in  their  own  territories,  or,  what  is  much  the  same 
thing,  to  restrict  the  relations  between  foreigners,  European  and 
Oriental,  and  their  native  subjects.  "According  to  a  formula 
which  has  been  framed  to  describe  the  policy  of  the  Dutch,  the 
native  is  major  in  his  relations  to  the  other  natives  ;  he  is  a  minor 
in  his  relations  to  the  rest  of  the  world."  ^  For  example,  there  can 
be  no  valid  sale  of  land-rights  from  a  native  to  a  foreign  Oriental 
or  European  ;  ,the  most  the  alien  can  hope  to  get,  on  land  culti- 
vated by  natives,  is  a  short-term  lease,  and  this  is  hedged  about 
with  varied  restrictions.  The  theory  of  the  relations  of  natives  to 
foreigners  is  that  the  former  are  not  yet  able  to  hold  their  own  in 
bargaining  with  Chinese  or  Europeans  ;   hence  government  activity 

1  J.  F.  Scheltema,  in  Aiiter.Jr.  of  Sociology  ;  cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  art.  "Opium." 

2  Day,  pp.  372-373. 


LATER  PHASES  OF  DUTCH  COLONIZA'IION  493 

in  keeping  the  foreigner  at  his  distance  is  viewed  as  an  expression 
of  benevolent  paternalism. 

As  regards  their  Malay  possessions,  and  chiefly  Java,  the  Dutch 
have  in  later  years  developed  a  far  more  intelligent  and  modern 
view-point  in  respect  to  the  improvement  of  means  of  defense,  com- 
munication, and  the  like.  One  of  the  great  evils  which  they  had 
to  combat  was  the  prevalent  piracy  of  the  Malays  ;  in  fact  they 
were  obliged,  like  the  Spanish,  to  increase  their  local  navy,  and,  in 
particular,  to  introduce  steam-boats  (1835),  in  order  to  put  an  end 
to  this  menace  of  trade.  The  Spanish  efforts  against  J0I6  (Sulu) 
had  by  1876  afforded  considerable  relief  to  the  Dutch,  and  since 
1888  the  pirates  have  been  practically  suppressed.  Moreover,  to 
aid  navigation  the  Dutch  have  directed  attention  to  the  charting 
of  sea-ways  and  the  erection  of  lighthouses  ;  and  by  the,  lowering 
of  duties  and  the  establishment  of  free  harbors  they  have  done 
commerce  a  service  scarcely  inferior.  Posts  and  telegraphs  have 
been  multiplied.  The  organization  of  scientific  expeditions  and 
the  establishment  of  many  journals  and  newspapers  dealing  with 
Netherlands-India  have  all  contributed  to  a  better  knowledge  of 
the  country  and  to  the  extension  of  scientific  information  along 
various  lines. ^ 

The  East  Indies  other  than  Java  ;  the  Atjeh  War 

Apart  from  Java,  which,  as  the  center  of  activity  and  interest, 
has  claimed  so  large  a  share  of  the  foregoing,  the  history  of  the 
Dutch  possessions  in  the  nineteenth  century  is  relatively  unimpor- 
tant. But  the  narrative  returns  to  them  briefly  in  order  to  gather 
up  a  few  of  the  aspects  of  Dutch  colonization  as  exhibited  outside 
of  Java.  After  the  Napoleonic  wars  practically  all  the  Dutch  East 
Indies  were  restored  ;  but  in  the  exhaustion  of  the  Netherlands 
little  effort  could  be  expended  where  it  did  not  return  or  promise 
the  maximum  of  result.  Elsewhere  than  in  the  region  of  appHca- 
tion  of  the  culture  system  an  ineffective  extension  of  trade  and 
administration  after  the  eighteenth-century  model  persisted.  In 
the  perpetuation  of  the  trade-motive  there  had  been  but  little 
interest  taken  in  those  regions  whose  productions  did  not  figure 

1  Cf.  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "Kaarte,"  "  Kaartebeschriving,"  "  Stoomvaart," 
"Scheepvaart  en  Handel,"  "Post  en  Telegraafdienst,"  "  Rechten  (In-,  uit-  en 
doorvoer-),"  "  Sumatra-E.xpeditie,"  "Triangulatie,"  "  Tijdschriften,"  "  Vrijhavens," 
"  Wegen,"  "  Zeekarten,"  "Zeemacht,"  "Zeeroof." 


494  COLONIZATION 

profitably  in  the  world-market.  Thus  a  good  deal  of  attention  had 
been  accorded  the  Spice  Islands,  much  to  their  detriment.  The 
Dutch  never  penetrated  very  deeply  into  Borneo,  Celebes,  and  the 
islands  to  the  eastward,  but  exercised  over  their  local  chiefs  a 
species  of  protectorate,  exacting  a  certain  tribute  in  the  form 
chiefly  of  contributions  in  products.  Treaties  were  made  from 
time  to  time  and  formed  the  basis  of  a  loose  relationship  between 
Dutch  and  natives.  Naturally  uprisings  were  frequent  and,  though 
often  brief  of  duration,  cut  deeply  into  the  income  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  most  disastrous  of  these  was  the  war  with  Atjeh, 
which  began  in  1873  and  whose  history  is  a  tyj)e  on  a  larger  scale 
of  many  of  the  conflicts  that  took  place  in  the  "Outer  Possessions."  ^ 
At  all  times  the  Dutch,  and  the  Portuguese  before  them,  had 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  this  relatively  strong  native  state.  They 
had  proceeded  on  the  plan  of  treaties  and  agreements  which  the 
native  princes  promptly  broke  when  it  seemed  to  their  advantage; 
Dutch  relations  with  Atjeh  were  in  many  respects,  and  for  similar 
reasons,  like  those  of  the  Spanish  with  the  Moros."  Under  the 
Company,  Sumatra  was  but  little  regarded,  and  it  was  not  until 
1824  that  Van  den  Bosch  developed  the  idea  of  reducing  the  whole 
island.  This  project  was  realized  in  but  slight  degree,  but  the 
faltering  efforts  put  forth  did  not  add  to  the  good  feeling  of  the 
natives.  When  now,  with  the  development  of  trade,  the  piratic 
propensities  of  the  people  of  Atjeh  had  come  to  be  a  distinct 
menace  to  all  nations  alike,  it  became  necessary  for  the  Dutch  to 
put  an  end  to  their  depredations  unless  they  wished  some  other 
powers,  by  doing  so,  to  gain  claims  to  indemnity  and  so  to  ter- 
ritory. It  was  plain  that  the  sultan,  even  if  he  so  desired,  was 
unable  to  check  his  subjects  in  their  deeds  of  violence  ;  despite 
the  treaty  of  1857  covering  these  matters,  they  continued  to  prey 
upon  peaceful  traders  and  to  keep  up  a  constant  turmoil  among 
the  native  adjacent  states.  It  was  also  clear  that  there  was  double- 
dealing  on  the  part  of  the  native  government ;  in  1868,  for  example, 
it  tried  to  yield  its  allegiance  to  the  sultan  of  Turkey,  and  later, 
while  negotiating  with  the  resident  of  Riouw  over  a  new  treaty,  it 
was  secretly  dealing  with  the  agents  of  foreign  powers  at  Singapore. 
In  consequence  of  these  and  other  reasons  war  broke  out  with  the 
sullan  in  1873  ;   and  the  Dutch,  wlio  had  miscalculated  the  strength 

'  Cf.  Vetli,  Atchin  ;  in  particular  the  chapter  on  the  causes  of  the  war  (pp.  104  ff.) ; 
Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.,  arts.  "Atjeh,"  "Sumatra."  ■^  Cf.  pp.  344-345,  above. 


LATER  PHASES  OF   DUTCH  COLONIZATION  495 

of  the  natives,  suffered  immediate  and  costly  reverses,  which  have 
been  repeated  at  intervals  up  to  the  present  day.  The  effect  of 
all  this  upon  the  Netherlands-India  budget  has  been  alluded  to  ; 
war  expenditures,  chiefly  with  Atjeh,  have  been  the  significant 
item  for  many  years.  But  the  Dutch,  like  so  many  other  colonial 
powers,  have  comforted  themselves  with  the  reflection  that  they 
are  fighting  the  battles  of  civilization  and  humanity  against  barbar- 
ism and  savagery,  and  continue  to  spend  money  and  lives  with  but 
slight  prospect  of  securing  a  decisive  and  enduring  result. 

With  this  sort  of  thing  the  student  of  modern  colonization  is 
sufificiently  familiar.  The  Dutch  present  other  instances  on  a 
smaller  scale. ^  In  general  the  history  of  the  Dutch  in  their  "  Outer 
Possessions  "  is  fragmentary  and  unessential.  It  cannot  be  summed 
up  except  in  the  statement  that  it  has  varied  with  different  locali- 
ties ;  a  description  even  of  administration  and  regulation  must  go 
into  endless  detail  if  it  is  not  to  misrepresent.^ 

In  short,  the  Dutch  tropical  lands  are,  like  those  of  other  nations, 
practically  undeveloped  ;  and  that  by  reason  at  bottom  of  the  same 
deterring  element  —  climate  —  which  has  prevented  other  nations 
from  such  consummation.  For,  as  has  been  shown,  ^  the  climatic 
conditions  draw  others  in  their  train  which  effectually,  as  yet,  check 
the  activity  of  the  dominant  races  from  attaining  in  the  tropics 
anything  comparable  to  its  results  in  the  cooler  zones.  Doubtless 
the  shortsightedness  and  selfish  preoccupations  of  the  Nether- 
landers  have  cost  them  much.  But  even  these  were  natural  in  their 
time  ;  and  the  more  enlightened  policies  of  other  nations  have  not 
brought  them  appreciably  nearer  the  common  goal,  namely,  the 
inclusion  of  the  tropics  within  the  world-market. 

1  See  Knoop,  W.  J.,  "  Bijdrage  tot  de  Kennis  der  Indische  Krijgszaken,"Z>^  Gids, 
1S49,  II,  245  ff.;  "Indische  Krijgsgeschiedenis,"  Id.,  i860,  II,  189  ff.;  arts.  "Bali," 
"  Borneo,"  "  Nieuw-Guinea,"  etc.,  in  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind.  New  Guinea  is  now  divided 
between  Dutch,  Germans,  and  British,  in  the  percentages  48.6,  28.3,  and  23.1 
respectively. 

2  De  Louter,  pp.  355-366;  cf.  pp.  220,  433,  477,  etc. 

3  Cf.  pp.  4  ff.,  above. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS 

The  colonial  history  of  the  Norwegians  and  Danes,  unimportant 
though  it  is  from  most  standpoints,  yet  possesses,  a  peculiar  inter- 
est to  one  who  would  understand  colonization  as  the  process  of 
founding  new  human  societies.  For  here  again  he  has  an  experi- 
ment performed  for  him,  —  the  old  problem  set  in  different  terms. 
I  litherto  the  colonizing  peoples  have  been  prevailingly  southern  Eu- 
ropeans, and  their  colonizing  enterprises  have  been  directed  mainly 
along  their  own  lines  of  latitude  or  toward  the  south.  In  the  case 
of  the  Scandinavians,  however,  we  have,  first,  attempts  at  tropical 
colonization  on  the  part  of  northern  Euroi)eans ;  and  then  the 
striking  case  of  colonization  in  polar  regions.  Therefore,  although 
historical  data  be  meager  and  somewhat  vague,  it  is  with  a  peculiar 
interest  that  one  turns  to  the  Danish  West  Indies  and  to  Danish 
Iceland  and  Greenland. 

The  Danish  East  India  Company 

The  Danes  early  entered  the  competition  for  the  trade  of  the  East, 
and  a  word  upon  their  East  India  Company  may  serve  to  align  their 
enterprises  with  those  of  the  peoples  whose  colonial  history  has 
been  sketched.  This  organization  {Dansk-Ostindiske  Compagni)  was 
chartered  in  1616,  and  in  161 8  the  India  voyage  was  attempted  on 
its  account.  Seafaring  folk  that  they  .were,  the  Danes  were  not 
without  some  experience  even  in  the  remote  East ;  but  as  ft)r  the 
Company,  many  of  its  functionaries  and  servants  were  Dutch.  In 
1620  the  fort  of  Dansborg  was  founded  on  the  Coromandel  coast; 
in  1625  a  rather  important  station  was  established  in  Macassar; 
in  1633  a  factory  in  Atjeh.  Other  stations  were  located  here  and 
there  in  the  archipelago.  The  Danish  programme  was  trade  pure 
and  simple  ;  it  included  no  political  aims  of  any  kind.  A  certain 
amount  of  gain  was  made,  much  of  it  in  smuggling  and  in  other 
ways  detestable  to  the  Dutch  East  India  Comj)any.  And  since  the 
Danish  Company  received  at  most  lukewarm  support  from  home, 

496 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS-  497 

it  was  entirely  unable  to  withstand  the  pressure  of  the  Dutch. 
Thus  the  Danes  were  gradually  crowded  out  and  by  1682  were 
virtually  excluded  from  the  archipelago  and  the  East.^  The  last 
Danish  possessions  in  the  East  were  transferred  in  1845  to  the 
English  East  India  Company.  At  its  dissolution  in  1634  the  first 
Danish  Company  was  just  able  to  pay  its  debts  ;  but  a  second  was 
organized  at  once,  a  third  in  1686,  and  a  fourth,  with  extraordinary 
privileges,  in  1732.  In  general,  the  Danes  prospered  when  stronger 
rivals  were  at  war;  thus  Company  shares  issued  at  500  rose  in 
1782  to  1800  and  1900,  to  descend,  by  1790,  to  420.  Both  Danes 
and  Swedes  held  certain  isolated  way-stations  on  the  west  coast  of 
Africa,  as  their  predecessors  and  models  had  done  ;  the  Danish 
forts  in  this  region  were  sold  to  England  in  1850  for  ^50,000.^ 

THE  DANISH   WEST  INDIES 

The  operations  of  the  Danes  in  the  eastern  tropics  were  thus  in- 
cidental and  short-lived,  never  advancing  far  toward  the  deserving 
of  the  name  colonization.  In  the  West  Indies,  however,  they  did 
create  a  miniature  "empire,"  which  they  hold  at  the  present  time. 
And  because  of  the  fact  that,  though  it  is  a  miniature  empire,  it 
yet  reflects  in  perhaps  the  more  striking"  simplicity  some  of  the 
fundamental  phases  of  tropical  colonization,  and  because,  likewise, 
its  history  is  especially  difficult  of  access,  the  present  treatment 
enters  into  somewhat  more  of  detail  than  is  usual,  and  allots  a  dis- 
proportionate amount  of  space  to  a  relatively  insignificant  subject.^ 

There  was  no  pressing  reason  for  Denmark's  colonial  activity  in 
the  seventeenth  century.  No  overplus  of  population  or  capital  de- 
manded new  fields  into  which  to  expand  ;  no  religious  or  political 
strifes  existed  in  the  home-land,  to  create  a  body  of  exiles  to  foreign 
parts.    Commerce  was  not  such  as  to  rec[uire  new  regions  of  supply 

1  0verland,  IV,  786  ff.,  800  ff. ;  also  sub  "  Ostindien"  in  indexes  ;  art.  "  De  Denen 
in  den  Maleischen  Archipel,"  in  Encycl.  Ned.  Ind. ;  p.  418,  above. 

2  Keltie,  pp.  68,  77  ;  cf.  also  Lind.say,  I,  345-347,  on  the  shipping  of  the  Danes. 
A  Swedish  company  formed  in  this  period  (cf.  p.  411,  above)  was  dissolved  in  1671 
with  a  considerable  deficit.    Roscher,  p.  278;   Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  182-1S4. 

The  most  recent  book  upon  the  Danes  in  the  East  —  inaccessible  to  the  author 
at  the  time  of  writing  —  is  that  of  Larsen. 

■''  The  following  matter  on  the  Danish  West  Indies  is  from  an  article  by  the  author, 
entitled  "  Notes  on  the  Danish  West  Indies."  This  study  has  been  checked  and  supple- 
mented by  an  examination  of  an  unpublished  (Yale)  thesis  of  Dr.  H.  J.  Thorstenberg, 
and  of  the  treatise  of  Knox.  The  bibliography  of  the  original  article,  with  some  addi- 
tions, will  be  found  in  the  general  bibliography.    Cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  182-185. 


498  •  COLONIZATION 

and  demand.  The  acquisition  of  the  islands  St.  Thomas  and  St. 
John,  and  later,  St.  Croi.x,  was  due  very  largely  to  a  desire  to  imi- 
tate the  activities  of  Holland  and  England,  and  to  reap,  if  possible, 
the  direct  and  indirect  results  of  such  a  policy.  The  movement  is 
an  artificial  one,  therefore,  at  the  very  outset  ;  as  far  as  Danish 
trade  with  the  tropics  was  concerned,  it  could  hope  for  little  ad- 
vance of  jM-ofit  under  the  new  conditions. 

St.  Croix,  the  largest  of  the  islands,  was  occupied  by  the  Danes 
in  1733  ;  already  it  had  been  successively  in  Dutch,  English,  Span- 
ish, and  French  hands.  Under  Colbert  a  company,  invested  with 
the  usual  trade-monopol)',  was  formed,  which,  however,  had  been 
compelled  to  turn  to  the  king  for  aid  ;  and  the  island  had  been 
deserted  (1695)  by  the  147  whites  and  623  slaves  who  had  in- 
habited it.  For  thirty-eight  years  it  had  been  neglected  and  mas- 
terless.  St. Thomas,  the  second  in  size  of  the  Danish  islands,  was 
seized  in  1667  by  the  English,  and  its  few  Dutch  colonists  were 
forced  to  depart ;  e.xcept  for  the  visits  of  pirates,  the  island  was 
then  deserted  until  167 1.  In  that  year  there  was  formed  the  Dansk 
Guineisk-Vestindiske  Compagni,  under  whose  auspices  St. Thomas 
was  at  once  occupied  by  the  Danes,  in  spite  of  England's  protest. 
This  Danish  Company  was  managed  by  six  directors,  who  were 
required  to  invest  two  thousand  rigsdaler  ^  in  the  enterprise  ;  shares 
were  sold  at  one  hundred  rigsdaler.  The  first  governor,  Iversen, 
reached  the  island  in  1672.  His  earliest  proclamation  dealt,  in  its 
first  articles,  with  religious  matters:  fines  were  fixed  for  non- 
attendance  at  divine  service,  for  Sunday  labor,  and  the  like.  There 
follow  strict  prescriptions  as  to  drill  and  use  of  arms  in  defense.  All 
persons  were  forbidden  to  leave  the  island,  or  take  anything  away 
from  the  island  without  the  governor's  permission.  Heavy  fines  ^ 
were  to  be  exacted  for  attempts  to  entice  away  another's  indentured 
servants,  i.e.  whites  who  had  sold  their  liberty  for  passage.  Negroes 
were  not  allowed  to  leave  a  plantation  after  dark  ;  if  a  strange 
negro  was  found  on  a  plantation  at  night,  he  was  to  be  arrested, 
taken  to  the  fort,  and  punished.  Other  injunctions  calculated  to 
insure  internal  cohesion  and  order,  and  an  efficient  defense,  were 
published.  The  necessity  of  such  defense  was  made  apparent  by 
the  robberies  of  the  Spanish  from  Puerto  Rico,  and  by  the  pres- 
ence of  French  and  English  buccaneers  on  the  island  of  Tortuga. 

1  The  specie  rigsdaler  was  worth,  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century,  about 
J^i.02.  It  rose  a  few  cents  in  value  during  the  ensuing  period  and  was  worth,  in  1844, 
$\.\\.        2  All  fines  were  payable  in  tobacco,  the  natural  currency  of  the  colony. 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  499 

Early  Conditions  :  the  West  India  Company 

To  tlic  Danes,  now  in  possession  of  their  tropical  islands,  the 
familiar  difficulty  of  tropical  colonization  —  lack  of  an  adequate 
labor  su]ii)ly  —  began  to  make  itself  felt  as  early  as  1679.  Com- 
plaint was  made  to  King  Christian  V,  who  promptly  established 
slave-stations  on  the  Gold  Coast,  and  under  pressure  increased  the 
number  of  shareholders  of  the  Company  in  Copenhagen  ;  a  tax  was 
levied  on  coaches,  for  example,  when  the  owners  could  not  show 
certificates  of  participation  to  a  certain  figure  in  the  Company.  Natu- 
rally enough,  the  importation  of  slaves  into  the  islands  increased 
perceptibly  and  with  it  the  prosperity  of  the  plantations.  The 
slaves  came,  however,  of  restless  and  unruly  stocks,  and  in  an  ex- 
ceptionally short  time  the  Danish  islanders  are  found  to  be  in  terror 
of  revolts  and  deeds  of  violence  ;  laws  were  enacted  which  could 
not  have  been  enforced,  else  all  the  slaves  would  have  perished 
by  the  halter.  The  evil,  because  of  the  essential  weakness  of  the 
Danish  Company,  was  not  at  this  time  of  such  proportions  as  it 
later  displayed.  Possessing  meager  capital,  the  Company  could 
send  but  one  ship  a  year  to  the  African  coast ;  this  vessel  trans- 
ported slaves  to  St.  Thomas  and  then  loaded  with  colonial  wares 
for  Denmark.  For  the  purpose  of  increasing  trade  and  also  to  en- 
courage the  settlement  of  the  colony,  a  thirty-year  treaty  was  con- 
cluded with  the  duchy  of  Brandenburg,  in  accordance  with  which 
a  trading-company  of  Germans,  most  of  whose  shares,  however, 
were  in  Dutch  hands,  was  to  undertake  settlement.  The  immediate 
result  of  this  movement  was  the  appearance  of  fifty  workmen  in 
the  islands  and  of  five  ships,  sailing  on  the  Company's  account.  This 
company  suffered  much  from  French  pirates  shortly  after  its  erec- 
tion, but  made  such  large  gains  as  to  excite  the  envy  of  the  Danes, 
to  whom  small  consideration  was  shown.  Its  privilege  ran  out  in 
171 5  and  was  not  renewed  ;  members  of  the  Company  who  desired 
to  stay  were  required  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance. 

After  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  (1685)  the  islands 
were  fortunate  enough  to  receive  as  settlers  a  number  of  Hugue- 
not fugitives  from  St.  Christopher ;  these  were  noted,  as  usual, 
for  frugality,  industry,  and  fear  of  God.  In  general  during  all  this 
period  efforts  were  being  made  to  attract  a  larger  immigration  ; 
at  one  time  young  unmarried  women  were  forbidden  to  leave  the 
colony  without  special  permission.    A  number  of  privileges  were 


500  COLONIZATION 

guaranteed  to  settlers,  including  religious  tolerance,  freedom  from 
taxes  for  eight  years,  grants  of  as  much  land  as  could  be  put  under 
cultivation,  needed  aid  in  agriculture,  etc.  Imported  and  exported 
products  were. to  be  free  of  customs  for  eight  years.  The  policy  was 
liberal  and  the  results  were  good;  in  1688  St.  Thomas  numbered 
ninety  plantations,  with  317  whites  and  422  slaves.  To  show  the 
ethnic  mixture  in  the  population,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  of  the 
white  families,  nineteen  were  Danish,  sixty-three  Dutch,  thirty 
English,  seventeen  French,  three  Swedish,  two  German,  and  one 
Portuguese  ;  this  diversification  was  maintained  into  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  was  plainly  evident  to  an  observer  in  the  forties.^ 
Many  local  names  on  the  island  recall  to  mind  the  varied  nationality 
of  its  early  settlers. 

The  monopolistic  trading  Company,  as  time  went  on,  did  not 
fail  to  prove  its  kinship  with  its  prototypes  ;  it  ran  the  usual  course 
of  inglorious  inefficiency.  In  1692,  as  a  relief  measure,  the  island 
of  St.  Thomas  was  leased  to  a  merchant,  Thormohlen  by  name, 
for  ten  years  ;  the  lessee  was  to  maintain  a  garrison  and  was  to  have 
full  control  of  all  the  island's  affairs  and  income.  The  character- 
istic independence  of  the  colonial  society  was  here  witnessed,  for 
the  colonists  resolutely  refused  to  pay  taxes  to  Thormohlen,  whose 
activity  was  not  prolonged  beyond  the  original  period  of  lease. 
After  the  disappearance  of  this  adventurer,  the  Company  led  a 
humdrum  existence  for  some  years.  In  1736  it  was  found  that, 
to  keep  itself  above  water,  it  had  in  the  matter  of  trade  consist- 
ently favored  the  Dutch  and  excluded  its  own  countrymen ;  eight 
Dutch  ships  were  engaged  in  the  trade  to  one  Danish.  A  counter- 
movement  of  merchants  in  Copenhagen  succeeded  in  forcing  an 
entrance  into  the  West  India  Company  and  the  Dutch  were  in 
turn  excluded.  But  the  Company  was  nearing  its  end.  The  burdens 
which  its  manipulations  had  laid  upon  the  colonists  were  intoler- 
able, and  frequent  complaints  were  lodged  with  the  king.  The 
Company  had  secured  a  thorough-going  monopoly  of  raw  sugar 
in  Denmark  and,  by  opening  a  refinery  there,  virtually  commanded 
the  market ;  prices  were  driven  very  high  and  sugar  became  a 
luxury  no  longer  in  common  use.  The  shortsightedness  and  greed 
of  this  policy  impressed  themselves  upon  the  government  and  in 
1755  King  Frederik  V  bought  out  the  Company's  entire  jilant, 
including  the  islands,  the  ecjuipment,  and  the  Copenhagen  refinery. 

^  iMindringt-r,  otc.,  \^.  150. 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  501 

The  price  paid  (1,418,000  rigsdaler)  was  entirely  incf)mmensurate 
with  the  good  effects  that  appeared  at  once,  and  with  the  general 
gratitude  of  the  oppressed  colonists. 

Purchase  by  the  King 

One  of  the  chief  causes  of  rejoicing  to  the  planters  was  the 
removal  of  the  restrictions  laid  by  the  Company  on  the  importation 
of  slaves.  Slaves  were  a  necessary  evil,  and  one  with  which  the 
colonists  played  as  with  fire.  Early  in  the  eighteenth  century  and 
before,  precautions  had  regularly  to  be  taken  regarding  runaways 
and  fear  of  uprisings  was  constantly  displayed.  All  the  boats,  for 
instance,  were  drawn  up  at  night  under  the  guns  of  the  fort.  The 
Spanish  of  Puerto  Rico  enticed  the  runaways  and  hypocritically 
explained,  in  answer  to  complaint,  that  the  slaves  had  come  "  to  be 
baptized."  The  fear  of  the  blacks  had  grown  until  the  colonists 
had  become  panicky,  and  consequently  needlessly  cruel  and  arbi- 
trary. In  1733  an  edict  appeared  which  betrayed  this  terror; 
such  punishments  as  branding,  loss  of  limbs,  hanging,  and  break- 
ing on  the  wheel  were  threatened  for  what  appear  to  us  to  be  com- 
paratively trivial  offenses.  By  this  cruelty  an  uprising  was  brought 
about  late  in  1733  on  the  island  of  St.  John,  for  the  suppression 
of  which  it  was  found  necessary  to  call  in  the  French  from  Mar- 
tinique. The  desperation  of  the  negroes  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
they  preferred  death  to  capture ;  a  body  of  three  hundred,  finally 
shut  in  and  sure  to  be  taken,  deliberately  shot  each  other,  so  that 
the  victors  found  their  dead  bodies  lying  in  a  circle  about  their 
last  camp.  The  suppression  of  this  revolution  cost  7900  rigsdaler, 
besides  costly  gifts  to  the  French  officers.  But  the  St.  John 
planters  refused  to  bear  a  share  in  the  expense,  asserting,  among 
other  things,  that  the  fort  was  poorly  prepared  for  resistance. 

When  the  king  had  taken  over  the  powers  of  the  Company  and 
slaves  began  to  come  in  with  greater  rapidity,  the  native  question 
became  still  more  threatening.  Partially  in  consequence  of  this  the 
slave-trade  was  declared  illegal  (1792).  Thus  the  Danes  became 
the  forerunners  of  the  great  philanthropic  movement  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century ;  the  slave-trade  went  on,  none  the  less,  with 
the  connivance  of  the  authorities,  for  half  a  century.^    Finally,  on 

1  After  1792  slaves  were  continually  imported,  and  premiums  were  paid  for  strong 
and  healthy  ones.    Burt,  En  Stemme,  etc. 


502  COLONIZATION 

the  queen's  birthday,  June  28,  1847,  '^'l  children  born  of  slaves 
were  declared  to  be  free  ;  the  whole  slave  system  was  to  be  abol- 
ished in  twelve  years.  But  this  move  failed  to  win  the  confidence 
of  the  slaves,  who  were  suspicious  of  the  twelve-year  term.  Indi- 
cations of  a  conspiracy  appeared  in  1848  and  an  incipient  and 
dangerous  revolt  in  St.  Croix,  in  July  of  that  year,  encouraged  by 
English  sailors,  forced  an  immediate  emancipation;  1892  whites 
were  opposed  to  22,000  negroes  in  desperate  mood,  who  carried 
the  English  flag  as  a  symbol  of  freedom. 

Administration  ;  Social  Conditions 

We  have  here,  then,  with  unimportant  variations,  the  stock 
history  of  tropical  labor  up  to  emancipation ;  the  measures  that 
followed  were  likewise  of  a  familiar  general  type.  Contracts  for 
paid  labor  were  to  date  from  October  i  of  each  year,  and  would 
be  renewed  only  at  that  time  ;  notice  of  such  intention  was  to  be 
given  in  August.  No  discharge  was  to  be  without  ground,  and  no 
strikes  were  to  be  allowed  ;  work  was  to  last  from  sunrise  till  sun- 
set, as  a  rule,  and  for  only  five  days  in  the  week,  liberal  allowance 
of  time  for  meals  (three  hours)  being  granted.  The  laborer  was 
given  a  small  plot  of  ground  and  was  to  be  paid  per  day  fifteen, 
ten,  or  five  cents  according  as  he  belonged  to  the  first,  second,  or 
third  grade  of  workmen.  Extra  labor  during  harvest  was  to  be 
compensated,  and  no  one  was  to  be  forced  to  work  on  Saturday  ; 
a  maximum  wage  of  twenty,  thirteen,  or  seven  cents  was  to  be 
paid  for  voluntary  Saturday  labor.  Fines,  levied  in  labor,  for 
absence  and  tardiness,  were  designed  to  oppose  the  tendency  to 
vagabondage.  Women  were  to  be  excused  from  work  for  seven 
weeks  after  confinement.  Other  provisions  dealt  with  the  treat- 
ment of  the  sick  and  weak,  and  with  the  punishment  of  those  who 
incited  a  stoppage  of  labor.  Certainly  these  St.  Croix  provisions 
were  mild  ones  as  they  appear  on  the  statute  books.  It  is  likely 
that  they  represent  the  actual  treatment  of  the  freedmen  with 
approximate  correctness.  The  conditions  of  forced  labor  of  all 
kinds  have  been  regularly  harder  on  islands  than  upon  the  main- 
land where  escape  was  easier  ;  but,  inasmuch  as  the  position  of  the 
Danish  islands  favored  evasion,  it  is  likely  that  the  planters,  priz- 
ing their  comparatively  few  laborers  higher,  took  pains  to  retain 
them.    The  absence  of   the  coolie  system  is  scarcely  remarkable, 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  503 

when  one  realizes  the  poverty  of  Denmark  and  the  generally  dis- 
couraging attitude  of  the  British,  Dutch,  and  Chinese  governments 
toward  this  form  of  semi-slavery. 

In  spite  of  the  laws,  vagabondage,  and  with  it  crime,  increased 
notably,  especially  in  the  towns  of  St.  Thomas.  In  the  country, 
master  and  former  slave  often  worked  side  by  side,  winning  a  pre- 
carious existence  under  a  somewhat  disjointed  system.  For  a  long 
time  no  indemnity  to  former  slave-owners  was  granted,  owing  to 
embarrassments  of  the  home-country  during  the  Slesvig-Holstein 
war.i  In  1855  the  working  classes  of  St.  Thomas  were  earning 
from  five  to  twenty  dollars  per  month.  Many  of  them  were  great 
bunglers  ;  few  felt  much  obligation  or  displayed  much  fidelity  to 
their  masters.  The  regular  effects  of  emancipation  upon  the  char- 
actor  of  the  negro  did  not  fail  to  appear ;  work  was  felt  to  be 
lowering ;  the  negroes  held  the  conviction  that  to  be  a  "  gentle- 
man "  one  must  command  others  and  exact  obedience.  Domestic 
tyranny  and  cruelty  resulted  when  this  wish  could  not  be  grati- 
fied otherwise.  Shameless  begging  was  preferred  to  labor,  and 
no  attempt  was  made  to  provide  for  old  age  ;  alms  of  less  than  a 
dollar  were  regarded  as  petty,  and  the  donor  was  despised.  Aid 
was  asked  by  able-bodied  men  as  a  matter  of  course.  Vanity  was 
a  characteristic  all  too  common  ;  servants  would  not  appear  on 
errands  until  time  had  been  taken  to  append  to  the  person  all  the 
finery  the  individual  in  question  possessed.  Marriage  was  most  lax, 
among  the  higher  as  well  as  the  lower  classes,  and  three-quarters 
of  the  children  born  on  the  island  were  illegitimate.    The  sentiment 

1  Under  date  of  August  24,  1852,  we  have  a  letter  of  considerable  interest,  written 
by  a  St.  Croix  planter  to  the  Danish  Parliament  (J.  H.  Burt,  Jr.,  En  Stemme,  etc.). 
The  author,  after  recalling  the  prosperity  of  the  islands  during  the  European  wars, 
states  that  they  are  now  struggling  for  existence :  labor  is  insecure,  insufficient,  and 
costly ;  production  is  declining,  and  prices  are  low.  He  regards  the  labor  regulations 
mentioned  above  as  wise  and  beneficial,  but  explains  that  the  planters  could  not 
have  carried  out  the  provisions  demanded  of  them  unless  the  labor  supply  had  been 
made  steady  and  secure.  The  main  contention  of  the  letter  is  that  the  Danish 
government  should  not  so  far  prove  false  to  its  honor  as  to  refuse  indemnification  to 
slave-owners  after  emancipation.  The  planters  had  been  to  considerable  expense  in 
the  erection  of  schools,  etc.,  for  the  betterment  of  the  negroes,  and  yet  it  was  pro- 
posed by  some  that  they  should  in  addition  bear  the  entire  amount  of  the  loss  inci- 
dent to  the  freeing  of  the  slaves.  Any  distinction  between  Danish  and  foreign 
planters  in  the  matter  of  indemnification,  such  as  seems  to  have  been  proposed,  was 
doubly  dishonorable.  Other  grievances  of  the  colonies  are  touched  upon,  the  letter 
concluding  with  the  following  paragraph  :  "  A  just  indemnification,  a  sufficient  immi- 
gration of  free  labor,  an  influential  Colonialraad,  and  a  strong  government  av^  the 
fundamental  points  upon  which  the  future  well-being  of  the  colonists  rests." 


504  COLONIZATION 

of  the  Danes  seems  to  have  been  decidedly  against  formal  mar- 
riages with  blacks  or  mulattoes.^ 

The  government  of  the  islands  after  the  fall  of  the  Company 
appears  to  have  been  of  a  careful  and  reasonable  type.  Desire 
for  an  expansion  of  territorial  possessions  and  a  wish  to  aid  the 
Company  had  led  Christian  VI  to  purchase  St.  Croix  (1733)  from 
the  French.  The  price  paid  was  750,000  livres.^  The  miserable 
administration  of  the  Company  on  this  island  conspired  with  the 
rest  to  bring  about  the  purchase  of  its  rights  by  Frederik  V.  In 
the  negro  troubles  that  followed,  the  government  seems  to  have 
displayed  clemency  and  thereby  to  have  saved  itself  much  expense 
and  its  island-citizens  much  loss  of  life  and  property.  Complaints 
were  not  lacking,  however,  and  the  government  became  passive, 
rather  than  active,  in  later  times.  No  successful  effort  was  made 
to  further  education  in  the  colonies,  nor  to  establish  adequate  sea- 
connections.  The  school-fund  was  used  up  in  St.  Croix,  and  Sun- 
day schools,  maintained  by  private  persons,  formed  almost  the  sole 
educational  agency  in  the  other  two  islands.  Postal  arrangements 
were  particularly  inadequate  ;  letters  were  left  at  the  nearest  store 
and  often  lay  there  for  long  periods,  until  the  recipient  happened 
to  be  apprised  of  their  presence.  Many  were  lost ;  how  letters 
from  North  America,  coming  always  via  Havana,  managed  to 
reach  their  destination  has  remained  something  of  a  mystery  to 
the  islanders  themselves.  Other  details  of  administration  were 
better  managed.  Tolls,  harbor  dues,  etc.,  seem  rarely  to  have  been 
excessive  under  the  royal  government.  The  first  Colonialraad 
was  formed  in  1852,  under  the  governor  as  presiding  officer.  Its 
members  were  twenty  in  number,  four  from  the  king's  selection 
and  sixteen  elective  in  the  islands.  Municipal  affairs  were  in  the 
hands  of  a  council  of  five  citizens,  who  received  no  remuneration 
save  honor,  and  were  not  responsible  to  any  one  ;  they  were  regu- 
larly selected  from  the  best  men  of  the  islands  and  seem  to  have 
served  with  fidelity  and  economy,  although  they  held  no  open 
session,  but  simjjly  submitted  an  annual  report.  The  governor 
received  under  the  Company  a  very  small  salary,  but  his  position 
carried  with  it,  of  course,  a  number  of  fees  and  perquisites.  In 
spite  of  economy,  however,  the  royal  budget  of  the  islands  shows 
for  1850-185  I  a  deficit  of  $48, 662. ^ 

1  Krindringer,  etc.,  pp.  1 14  ff.     ^  xhe  livre  of  Uie  period  was  worth  .iboiit  19.^  cents. 
3  p'yr  njodern  administrative  and  fiscal  conditions,  see  Tooke. 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  505 

The  climate  of  these  islands  is  well  known.  Its  baleful  effect 
upon  the  morals,  and  so  the  health,  of  the  Danish  cf)lonists,  was 
pronounced.  Intemperance  of  all  kinds  was  prevalent,  and  gam- 
bling for  high  stakes  aided  in  the  general  demoralization.  Of  the 
diseases  noted  by  the  Danes,  malaria,  yellow-fever,  influenza,  and 
small-pox  were  the  most  serious,  fatalities  occurring  chiefly  among 
the  lower  classes  of  the  population.  Tables  of  mortality  for  the 
years  183 5-1 8 50  inclusive  show  an  average  yearly  death-rate  of 
about  38  per  thousand,  or  416  in  an  average  population  of  1 1,000. 
Earthquakes  are  frequent,  though  hitherto  harmless  ;  but  hurricanes 
are  prevalent  (127  in  the  352  years  from  1494  to  1846),  and  very 
destructive  ;  the  islands  are  in  the  direct  track  of  these  storms. 

Trade-Conditions 

The  trade-history  of  St.  Thomas,  which  stands  as  a  fair  type  for 
the  other  colonies,  exhibits  certain  characteristics  incident  to  its 
geographical  location  and  political  history.  It  is  to  be  noted,  first 
of  all,  that  the  harbor  of  St.  Thomas  formed  an  admirable  haven, 
entirely  adapted  to  the  safe  concealment  that  was  so  often  a  desid- 
eratum in  the  days  of  privateering  and  contraband  traffic.  This 
harbor  was  situated  at  the  cross-ways  of  the  trade-routes  of  that 
day.  To  these  natural  advantages  were  added  others  of  a  political 
nature  :  an  almost  constant  neutrality  and  a  free-haven  status. 
The  abbe  Labat,  writing  in  1701,  notices  these  favorable  conditions, 
and  states  that  the  Danes  derived  great  profits  from  the  constant 
European  wars,  as  prizes  of  both  sides,  and  of  freebooters,  were 
brought  in  to  be  sold  ;  the  island  also  enjoyed  benefits  from  the 
silver-trade  with  South  America.  St.  Thomas  was,  in  a  word,  a 
West  Indian  market-place  of  the  first  rank.  The  production  of  the 
island,  with  its  light  soil,  was  small,  and  prices  were  regularly 
high  ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  acquisition  of  wealth  was  easy  and 
many  resident  foreigners  had  already  grown  rich.  Though  St. 
Thomas's  harbor  was  declared  a  free  haven  for  the  first  time  in 
1724,  it  had  been  so  in  reality  for  years. 

The  Company's  influence  upon  the  island's  prosperity  has  been 
noted  ;  an  indirect  evil  result  was  seen,  when,  at  the  demise  of  this 
organization,  Danish  merchants  were  for  some  years  too  timid  to 
seize  upon  the  palpable  advantages  of  the  trade  ;  during  1756  not 
one  Danish  ship  entered  the  harbor.  In  fact,  a  number  of  mer- 
chants left  the  island,  and  circulating  currency  became  so  scarce  as 


5o6  COLONIZATION 

to  lead  to  an  issue  of  paper  money  for  which  the  authorities  were 
responsible.  Depopulation  was  so  much  feared  that  a  law  was  pub- 
lished according  to  which  any  one  who  left  the  island  must  surren- 
der to  the  government  2~  per  cent  of  his  income  and  real  ])roperty. 
In  1773  St.  Thomas  had  39  sugar  and  43  cotton  plantations,  and 
4233  inhabitants  ;  of  these  265  whites,  336  colored,  and  1067  slaves 
lived  in  the  town.  St.  John  boasted  104  whites  and  2330  slaves. 
Expenses  slightly  exceeded  income;  from  1755  to  1792  trade 
amounted  to  little.  In  1 792,  however,  a  great  change  occurred,  coin- 
cidently  with  European  w^ars  ;  trade  rose  to  unhoped-for  heights,  and 
between  1792  and  1801,  1569  foreigners  were  naturalized  in  the 
island.  A  number  of  fugitives  likewise  came  from  San  Uomingo, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  century  the  population  numbered  about  7000. 
But  between  1801  and  18 15  the  advantageous  neutrality  of  the 
Danes  w-as  broken  by  forces  which  they  could  not  control ;  from 
April,  1801,  to  February,  1802,  St.  Thomas  was  in  British  hands, 
and  though  trade  revived  again  promptly  after  the  restitution,  a 
second  violent  break  came  in  1807.  The  Danes  having  refused 
England's  proffered  defensive  alliance,  the  islands  were  seized  and 
held  until  181  5.  That  some,  at  least,  of  the  Danes  valued  their  pos- 
sessions highly  in  1801  is  shown  by  contemporary  authority;  ^  the 
feeling  against  England  was  exceedingly  bitter.  During  the  English 
occupation,  English  merchantmen  alone  were  to  be  seen  in  the  har- 
bor and  trade  was  very  small.  American  products  Were  diverted  and 
passed  over  St.  Bartholomew,^  which  at  this  time  enjoyed  an  ephem- 
eral importance  ;  St.  Thomas  retained  the  direct  trade  of  British 
North  America  alone. 

Decline  of  the  Islands 

After  181 5  events  again  conspired  to  render  St.  Thomas  prosper- 
ous.    During  the  wars  of  emancipation  of  the  Spanish  continental 

1  Werfel,  for  example.  Oxholm  gives  considerable  detail  as  to  the  condition  of 
the  islands  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Mis  book  is  an  answer  to  certain 
"  Breve  fra  St.  Croix"  containing  articles  upon  the  management  of  the  islands. 

2  This  diminutive  island  was  the  one  venture  of  Sweden  in  tropical  colonization. 
Cf.  Euphrasen  and  Dahlman  for  some  details  of  its  conditions  and  history.  The 
latter  author  is  hopeful  that  the  Swedish  island  may  yet  emulate  the  at  his  time 
enviable  position  of  St. Thomas.  For  "The  Swedish  Legend  in  (niiana,"  see  Edmund- 
son  under  that  title.  There  were  some  Swedish  stations  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa, 
and  several  Swedish  settlements  in  Delaware  and  New  Jersey.  The  latter  were  taken 
by  the  Dutch  in  1655,  the  African  stations  declined,  and  St.  Bartholomew  was  ceded 
back  to  France  in  1878.    See  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  182-185. 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  507 

colonies,  many  native  Spaniards  emigrated  to  the  island,  and  the 
harbor  was  a  resort  of  freebooters  flying  the  flags  of  Buenos 
Ayres  and  Colombia;  the  year  1824  has  been  regarded  by  some 
as  the  culminating  pojnt  of  St.  Thomas's  prosperity.  But  the  con- 
ditions which  created  this  status  were  short-lived.  The  evil  day 
was  delayed  for  some  years  by  the  opportunities  afforded  for  trade 
with  the  neighboring  Puerto  Rico  and  for  the  financing  of  its  early 
development ;  many  sugar-raisers  in  Puerto  Rico  could  not  have 
begun  or  prosecuted  their  industry  without  the  credit  afforded 
from  St.  Thomas.  But  as  soon  as  this  aid  was  no  longer  indispen- 
sable it  was  rudely  put  aside  by  the  levying  of  heavy  import-dues 
against  the  Danish  island,  and  otherwise.  In  1855  imports  to 
St.  Thomas  (half  from  Europe  and  half  from  America)  were  valued 
at  $5,000,000;  St. Thomas  merchants  still  continued  to  finance 
Puerto  Rico  to  some  extent,  but  the  Danish  island  was  evidently 
and  surely  on  the  decline.  Denmark  has  been  willing  to  part  with 
her  colonial  possessions  for  a  sufficient  consideration  several  times 
since  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  ;  later  years  have  wit- 
nessed no  revival  of  trade.  And  this  appears  only  natural  when 
one  reflects  on  the  conditions  which  lent  the  former  prosperity. 
The  rise  of  modern  transportation  facilities,  and  the  substantial 
peace  of  the  world,  implying  as  they  do  the  passing  of  the  narrower 
system  of  the  former  centuries,  render  a  free,  neutral  harbor,  and 
even  a  harbor  of  such  central  position  as  that  of  St.  Thomas,  of 
comparatively  less  importance.  Way-stations  and  hiding-places  are 
less  in  demand.  Even  the  piercing  of  a  waterway  between  the 
continents  does  not  promise  much  for  the  future  of  these  islands. 
As  the  city  of  small  harbors  has  given  way  to  the  port  like  New 
York,  which  possesses,  virtually,  no  harbor  in  the  old  sense  of  the 
term,  so  the  small  and  local  way-station  has  fallen  away  in  a  com- 
merce on  a  grand  scale  in  world-wide  markets.  True  colonization 
in  the  West  Indies  was  clearly  beyond  the  strength  of  Denmark, 
as  it  was  beyond  the  strength  of  the  Portuguese  in  India.  The 
mother-country  was  too  remote  and  too  small,  the  competition  of 
greater  peoples  was  too  strong.  A  decision  to  part  with  the  islands 
would  seem  to  be  the  conclusion  of  wisdom,  and  considerations  of 
national  pride  alone  can  oppose  it. 

This  exceptional  experiment  in  tropical  colonization  by  a  Scan- 
dinavian people  runs,  therefore,  through  most  of  the  characteristic 
phases  to  which  the  student  of  colonies  is  used.    In  so  far,  it  goes 


5o8  COLONIZATION 

to  show  that  the  general  course  of  events  has  followed  the  order  of 
a  natural  and  inevitable  evolution.  No  particular  virtue  in  avoiding 
stock  errors,  nor  vice  in  committing  peculiar  and  unusual  mistakes 
is  to  be  found  in  the  Danes  above  other  nations ;  economic  evolu- 
tion runs  its  course  for  them  all  alike,  and  they  submit,  each  in 
his  own  way,  to  inevitable  conditions  and  movements.  In  isolated 
cases,  such  as  that  of  the  Danes,  though  the  local  setting  of  the 
experiment  is  of  curious  rather  than  of  vital  interest,  essential 
economic  and  political  truths  are  not  unlikely  to  emerge  with 
especial  simplicity  and  dcfiniteness. 

POLAR  COLONIES   OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS 

The  history  of  the  Danish  colonies  of  Iceland  and  Greenland 
affords  what  is  in  some  respects  a  distinct  anomaly  in  colonization  ; 
and  so,  though  of  little  practical  importance,  these  dependencies 
may  deserve  some  notice.  Colonization  toward  the  far  north  is  an 
unprecedented  enterprise  and  its  annals  cast  a  certain  side-light 
upon  the  general  process  of  the  movement  and  re -formation  of 
human  societies. 

Population  and  Life-Conditions  of  Iceland 

Strictly  speaking,  the  first  settlement  of  Iceland  ^  was  the  result 
of  emigration  rather  than  of  colonization.  Discovered  toward  the 
end  of  the  eighth  century,  about  seventy  years  passed  before  it 
began  to  receive  attention  on  the  part  of  the  Norse  (860-870  a.d.); 
but  within  the  subsequent  si.xty  years,  in  consequence  of  a  mass- 
emigration  of  political  malcontents,  the  island  had  its  full  quota  of 
population,  that  is,  all  that  it  could  support  upon  that  stage  of  the 
arts  of  life.  This  settlement  was  due  largely  to  the  movement 
toward  state-integration  in  Norway  by  which  losing  factions  were 
forced  into  exile  ;  the  settlers  were  prevailingly  Norwegians.  But 
owing  to  the  very  exigencies  of  the  situation  the  emigrants  recog- 
nized no  bond  of  dependency,  and,  because  of  the  natural  isolation 
of  Iceland,  imposition  of  rule  was  all  but  impossible.  Hence  a 
rude  and  hardy  race,  schooled  to  courage  and  independence  by  the 
severity  of  the  struggle  for  existence,  at  home  as  well  as  in  the  new 
land,  took  its  fate  into  its  own  hands  and  formed  a  republic  which 

^  On  ancient  Iceland  the  authorities  here  used  are  Maurer  and  Sars ;  for  more 
modern  conditions  they  are  Otte  and  0verland  (passages  referred  to  under  "  Island" 
in  the  indexes). 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  509 

remained  independent  up  to  the  year  1262.  During  the  early  part 
of  this  period  the  Norwegian  kings  had  made  several  ineffectual 
attempts  to  persuade  the  Icelanders  to  acknowledge  their  sway ; 
their  purpose  was  resisted,  but,  by  setting  leader  against  leader, 
and  through  the  partisanship  of  the  clergy,  they  had  gradually 
gained  an  ever  greater  influence.  The  internal  government  of  the 
island  was  by  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century  in  a  state  of  de- 
moralization, and  the  various  districts  yielded  one  by  one  until, 
between  1262  and  1264,  a  general  fealty  was  sworn  to  the  Norwe- 
gian King  Haakon.  1 

It  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  present  book  to  describe 
the  organization  of  the  republic  which  the  Icelanders  created  out 
of  the  confusion  of  their  beginnings  ;  ^  it  is  enough  to  say  that  the 
type  of  the  society  was  Norse  and  that  political  coalescence  with 
the  land  of  origin  was  in  the  order  of  events.  "  Such  a  conformity 
cannot  have  been  a  chance  one  ;  it  goes  to  show  that  the  two 
societies,  of  which  the  one  proceeded  out  of  the  other,  .  .  .  con- 
tinued to  belong  together  ;  that  their  public  life  was  nurtured  from 
the  same  source,  and  rested  essentially  upon  the  same  foundation  ; 
that  antitheses  between  republican  Iceland  and  monarchical  Nor- 
way were  more  seeming  than  real ;  and  that  the  aristocracy  of 
birth  .  .  .  continued  to  be,  in  later  times  as  well  as  in  earlier,  in 
Norway  as  in  Iceland,  the  actual  support  of  the  life  of  the  state 
and  society."  ^  Here  then  we  have  in  Norway  a  metropolis  which 
has  attained  the  political  integration  and  the  influence  necessary 
to  take  to  itself  independent  settlements  of  its  own  emigrants.  Ice- 
land was  now  a  true  Norwegian  colony,  and  it  so  remained  until 
1380  ;  thereafter  it  became  a  Danish  possession  and  was  destined 
so  to  remain  when  Norway  had  become  united  with  Sweden  and 
finally  had  attained  independence.^ 

The  interest  of  the  student  of  colonization  leads  him  to  con- 
sider first  of  all  the  life-conditions  of  such  a  colony  and  to  seek  the 

1  Cf  Overland,  III,  421  ff. 

2  Details  of  the  organization  of  the  republic  and  its  decline  are  to  be  found  in 
Maurer  and  in  Sars,  I,  chap.  vii. 

3  Sars,  I,  196.  "The  colonial  character  of  the  Icelandic  society  —  the  whole  un- 
broken spiritual  cohesion  in  which  it  remained  with  the  rest  of  the  Norwegians  — 
appears  most  clearly  in  the  way  in  which  Icelanders  write  Norway's  history.  For  it 
is  seen  that  they  never  regard  her  history  otherwise  than  as  their  own,  that  they  have 
conceived  the  whole  in  the  same  manner  as  do  all  other  Norwegians,  and  have  fully 
shared  the  sentiments  and  opinions  that  prevail  in  Norway."    Sars,  II,  325. 

*  Sars,  II,  chap.  vi.    Danish  rule  was  rather  easily  established.    0verland,  IV,  440. 


^lo  COLONIZATION 

motives  which  lay  behind  the  policy  of  the  mother-country  toward 
it.  The  population  of  Iceland  was  small  in  earlier  times  and  has 
so  remained  ;  as  late  as  1870  its  40,000  square  miles  supported  not 
quite  70,000  souls  ;  and  in  1890  there  were  but  a  thousand  more. 
The  island  is  one-quarter  desert  and  only  a  third  of  it  can  support 
sheep  even  in  the  summer  ;  two-fifths  arc  of  better  quality,  but  the 
cultivation  of  even  the  hardiest  grains  is  precarious  ;  all  bread- 
stuffs  are  still  imported. ^  In  1853,  a  year  nearly  normal,  there 
were  in  Iceland  23,663  horned  cattle',  40,485  horses,  and  516,853 
sheep.  Fishing  is  one  of  the  most  profitable  occupations  ;  in  1853 
the  islanders  owned  3506  boats.  Other  food-supply  than  flesh  and 
fish  is  of  a  primitive  character ;  the  eggs  of  sea-birds  may  be  mcn- 
tioned.2  jhe  isolation  of  the  country  militates  against  trade  :  com- 
munication has  been  of  so  faulty  a  character  that  the  shortest  and 
cheapest  route  between  certain  parts  of  the  island  has  been  via 
Copenhagen ;  in  the  favorable  season  sailing-vessels  take  six  to 
eight  weeks  to  reach  Iceland,  and  in  winter  it  is  practically  cut 
off  from  the  world.^ 

Evidently  the  Norwegian  colonists  were  an  industrious  people, 
and  chiefly  sheep-raisers,  desiring  above  all,  from  the  government 
to  which  they  had  sworn  allegiance,  conditions  of  peace  and  order. 
In  type  the  settlements  represented  the  "farm  colony";  *  there  were 
no  precious  metals,  no  native-question,  no  large  staple  products; 
the  emigrants  were  of  both  sexes  and  in  general  had  come  to  found 
homes  ;  in  the  absence  of  natives  the  society  fostered  no  half-breed 
stock.  Naturally,  however,  environing  conditions  precluded  any 
development  of  numbers ;  hardships  had  their  inevitable  effect  in 
keeping  down  the  standard  of  living ;  and  other  local  factors  con- 
spired to  render  the  society  but  a  feeble  representative  of  the  flour- 
ishing farm  colony.  Indeed,  the  absence  of  agriculture  itself  makes 
the  term  "  farm  colony,"  except  as  it  connotes  a  type  of  social 
organization,  a  misnomer.  There  has  been  a  possibility  of  but 
little  favorable  change  in  the  economic  life  of  Iceland  up  to  the 

1  Otte  (p.  203)  says  nine-tenths  of  Iceland  are  unfit  for  human  habitation. 

2  Maurer,  pp.  i-i  i,  16-19  ;  Otte,  pp.  203  ff.  The  Statesman's  Year-Book  (for  1906  ; 
sub  "  Denmark  ")  gives  the  proportion  of  the  population  in  1S50  which  was  depend- 
ent upon  cattle-raising  and  fishing  as  82  per  cent  and  17  per  cent  respectively;  in 
1890  these  had  changed  to  64  jier  cent  and  18  per  cent. 

"  The  death  of  Frederik  VII  (November  15,  1863)  was  reported  in  Iceland  upon 
April  4,  1864;  meanwhile  the  late  king's  island-subjects  had  been  praying  all  winter 
in  orthodo.x  fashion  for  his  health.    Maurer,  p.  t,2>- 

*  Cf.  pp.  4  ff.,  above;  0verland,  III,  504. 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  511 

present  time  ;  indeed,  there  has  been  in  several  periods  a  distinct 
retrogression.  Iceland  has  been  frequently  visited  by  famines  and 
pestilences,  those  scourges  of  a  population  pressing  overhard  upon 
land  ;  and  volcanic  outbursts  followed  by  copious  lava-flows  have 
destroyed  large  sections  of  habitable  country.  In  1786  the  deser- 
tion of  the  island  was  seriously  considered.^  Few  resources  have 
been  added  to  elevate  the  standard  of  living.  The  salting  of  meat 
and  of  salmon  has  provided  some  extra  employment  and  gain,  and 
certain  sulphur-deposits  have  been  worked.  The  latter,  however, 
were  leased  to  an  English  company  in  1872  for  fifty  years.  Since 
the  early  seventies  there  has  been  a  relatively  large  emigration  from 
Iceland  to  Canada,  especially  to  the  province  of  Manitoba ;  mean- 
while the  population  (1901)  had  increased  to  nearly  78,500,  a  con- 
junction of  facts  calculated  to  show  the  society  able  to  more  than 
reproduce  itself. 

Government 

When  Iceland  came  under  Norwegian  rule  there  was  made  a  pro- 
viso— -whose  terms  bespeak  the  severity  of  life-conditions  —  that 
the  new  king  should  send  at  least  six  ships  every  year  with  meal  and 
like  necessities.  It  was  partly  by  reason  of  this  condition  that  the 
later  Norwegian  rulers,  and,  after  the  personal  union  with  Den- 
mark (Kalmar-union,^  I397),  the  Danish  sovereigns,  came  to  regard 
the  trade  with  Iceland  as  their  own  prerogative  and  sold  or  leased 
it  at  will.  Until  the  fourteenth  century  the  trade  of  the  island 
had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  Icelanders  and  Norse  ;  during  the 
fifteenth  the  English  and  during  the  sixteenth  the  Hanseatics  had 
secured  a  large  proportion  of  it.  But  it  had  been  subject  to  little 
restriction,  and  the  royal  monopoly  came  gradually  to  press  hard 
upon  the  struggling  islanders. 

To  follow  the  history  of  Iceland  during  the  centuries  of  its  sub- 
jection to  Norway  and  Denmark  is  a  rather  profitless  task.  Nor- 
wegian rule  seems  to  have  brought  a  period  of  decline  which 
is  not  all  referable  to  plagues  and  other  such  calamities.^  The 
impression  gained  from   reading  scattered  notices  of   Iceland  in 

^  In  1783  occurred  an  eruption  of  the  Skaptar  Jokull,  which  over%vhelmed  plains 
and  inhabited  villages  and  caused  the  death  of  9500  out  of  50,000  inhabitants.  Barney, 
p.  38,  note.  The  second  eruption  of  the  same  volcano,  in  1873,  ^^'^^  ^"^  °^  ^^^  prin- 
cipal causes  for  the  ensuing  emigration.  2  Sars,  III,  chap.  ii. 

^  0verland,  III,  716  ff.  For  a  list  of  plagues,  volcanic  eruptions,  etc.,  between  1284 
and  1390,  see  id.,  p.  507. 


5 1 2  COLONIZATION 

histories  of  Norway  is  that  the  island  was  treated  with  indifference 
except  in  so  far  as  it  might  provide  a  small  increment  to  the  royal 
revenues.  Later  times  have  seen  the  development  of  a  more  liberal 
policy;  in  1854  the  trade-monopoly  was  renounced  and  commerce 
was  made  free.  In  1874  Iceland  was  restored  to  virtual  inde- 
pendence and  remains  locally  republican  in  its  government,  though 
nominally  ruled  by  the  king  in  conjunction  with  a  legislative  as- 
sembly. It  is  designated  as  an  inalienable  part  of  the  Danish 
monarchy  and  its  legal  system  is  mainly  Danish.  The  Icelanders 
have  endured  much  from  their  rulers  in  the  past,  but  have  insisted 
upon  their  rights  with  the  characteristic  steadiness  and  firmness, 
yet  with  the  same  remarkable  self-restraint  exhibited  by  the  Scan- 
dinavian peoples  on  the  occasion  of  the  recent  separation  of  Nor- 
way and  Sweden.  Iceland  is  civilly  and  nationally  independent  in 
all  but  form,  and  constitutes  a  strong  if  small  society,  singularly 
free  from  crime  and  intensely  attached  to  its  inhospitable  island- 
home.  The  religion  has  been  of  the  reformed  type  since  the  early 
part  of  the  sixteenth  century. ^  Denmark  gets  no  gain  from  her 
Norwegian-founded  colony  :  the  average  annual  revenue  is  200,000 
kroner  and  the  expenditure  188,000;  in  the  former  item  was  reck- 
oned for  many  years  a  Danish  subsidy  of  60,000  kroner.  Imports 
for  1904  were  valued  at  2,466,000  kroner  and  exports  at  3,417,000. 
It  would  be  an  evidence  of  narrow  interest  on  the  part  of  any 
narrator  of  Icelandic  affairs  to  neglect  to  mention  the  astonishing 
intellectual  and  especially  literary  productiveness  of  these  northern 
islanders.  An  antique  tongue  has  been  safeguarded  by  them  and 
they  have  originated  or  preserved  ancient  sagas  that  are  a  heritage  of 
the  race.  They  are  more  Norse  than  the  Norse.  In  modern  times 
they  have  furnished  their  full  share  of  men  superior  in  learning  and 
otherwise.  Taking  into  consideration  the  drawbacks  of  environment 
and  the  necessary  depression  of  the  standard  of  living,  Iceland's 
contribution  to  the  world  ranks  with  the  most  notable. 

COI.ONIZATION    AND    LiFE-CONDlTIONS    OF    GREENLAND 

Greenland  '^  presents  another  instance  of  polar  colonization  by  the 
Norwegians  whose  fruits,  such  as  they  are,  have  fallen  to  the  Danes. 

1  For  the  Reformation  in  Iceland,  cf.  0verland,  IV,  422  ff. 

2  The  chief  authority  for  the  history  of  (Greenland  is  Kink.  Some  use  has  lieen 
made  of  Crantz,  Gravier,  Peyr^re,  Wilhelmi,  Olte,  and  0verland  (references  si/f> 
•'Gr0nland"  in  indexes).    For  more  modern  conditions  Nansen  has  been  followed. 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  513 

The  only  striking  point  of  difference  between  the  case  of  Greenland 
and  that  of  Iceland  is  that  in  the  former  colony  there  have  existed 
conditions  of  race-contact  and  mixture.  The  discovery  of  Green- 
land goes  back  probably  into  the  eighth  century,  and  was  made  from 
Iceland,  according  to  old  chronicles,  by  Eric  the  Red  ;  it  then  served 
as  an  intermediary  station  for  the  attainment  of  America.  Chris- 
tianity was  introduced  about  the  year  1000  and  in  1023  the  coun- 
try was  tributary  to  Norway;  an  attempt  at  revolt  (1256)  led  to 
its  full  subjection  with  the  aid  of  the  Danish  king,  in  1261.  After 
this  time  but  Httle  attention  seems  to  have  been  accorded  to  Green- 
land, and  concern  in  Europe  over  the  ravages  of  the  Black  Death 
(i  347-1 351)  reduced  that  little  to  nothing  ;  decades  of  virtual  obliv- 
ion followed.  It  was  only  with  the  discoveries  of  Columbus  that 
interest  was  reawakened  in  possible  lands  or  passages  toward  the 
west.  Succeeding  Frobisher  (1578)  and  Davis  (1585),  the  Danes 
—  for  Norway  was  now  under  Danish  rule  —  made  some  ineffectual 
attempts  to  reach  the  old  settlements ;  a  Greenland  Company  was 
formed  in  1636  and  dispatched  vessels.  But  what  little  hold  the 
Norwegians  had  possessed  was  now  lost :  the  Eskimo,  and  even 
Atlantic  pirates,  had  done  their  share  to  effect  general  ruin.^  And 
it  appears  that  during  the  long  period  of  neglect  the  royal  power, 
jealous  of  even  its  well-nigh  valueless  monopoly  of  the  Greenland 
trade  in  oil,  ivory,  and  furs,  had  prohibited  the  approach  of  private 
adventurers  to  the  region.^ 

The  re-colonization  of  Greenland  took  place  largely  as  a  result 
of  the  activities  of  a  clergyman,  Egede,  who  had  been  for  years 
agitated  over  the  fate  of  the  Norwegians  and  their  descendants 
left  in  the  old  settlements.  In  1721  Frederik  IV  was  led  to 
found  Godthaab  (Good  Hope)  and  Egede  began  his  religious 
labors  in  Greenland.  Since  that  time  the  natives  have  had  Chris- 
tianity preached  to  them,  often  not  wisely  but  too  well;  in  1733 
the  Moravian  Brothers  took  up  Egede's  work.^ 

1  Nansen  (pp.  1 1-12)  does  not  believe  that  the  Eskimo  waged  a  war  of  annihilation 
against  the  early  settlers. 

2  "  All  these  details  are  confused  and  contradictory.  But  there  emerges,  never- 
theless, one  fact :  the  pirates  made  common  cause  with  the  cold,  the  Eskimo,  the 
pest,  and  the  lawyers  of  Margaret  [of  Denmark]  in  ruining  the  colonies  founded  by 
the  Scandinavians  on  the  coasts  of  America  and  of  Greenland."  Gravier,  p.  223. 
Cf.  Rink,  pp.  20  ff.,  29  ff. 

3  Crantz's  book  is  mainly  a  chronicle  of  the  Moravians'  religious  work.  From  the 
time  he  reaches  this  topic  (I,  315)  his  book  loses  all  interest  for  the  scientist  or  his- 
torian.   The  missionaries  spent  a  deal  of  misdirected  2eal  in  "  correcting "  native 


514  COLONIZATION 

The  life-conditions  in  Greenland  are  an  extreme  variation  upon 
the  Icelandic  type  ;  even  the  hardy  vegetables  fail  to  thrive,  and 
the  dog  is  the  only  domestic  animal  of  any  value. ^  Europeans  are 
interested  only  in  trade  or  in  the  mission  ;  the  former  yields  a 
"trifling  but  sure  profit."  Under  the  royal  monopoly,  dating 
from  1774,  prices  have  been  fixed,  the  Danes  paying  to  the 
Greenlanders  about  22  per  cent  of  the  value  of  their  products 
(train-oil,  whale-bone,  pelts,  etc.)  in  the  European  market  ;  it  is 
said  that  the  gain  on  goods  sold  to  the  Eskimo  is  not  exorbitant, 
reaching  only  20  per  cent  as  a  maximum.  Erom  1870  to  1874  the 
mean  annual  value  of  products  received  from  Greenland  was  about 
$228,000  ;  that  of  cargoes  destined  for  Greenland,  about  $120,000. 
The  representatives  of  Denmark  are  mainly  factors  whose  duty  lies 
in  the  drumming-up  of  trade;  there  were  in  1877  eleven  agents 
and  eighteen  clerks.  The  net  revenue  of  the  Greenland  trade  for 
the  period  1853-1874  was  about  $705,000,  the  cryolite  tax  for  the 
same  years  amounting  to  $295,000.  "The  whole  amount  of  net 
revenues  from  the  present  Trade  during  the  period  from  1790  to 
1875,  the  interest  of  the  capital  as  well  as  the  income  from  the 
cryolite  being  subtracted,  has  been  estimated  at  about  160,000  1."  ^ 


Race-Contact 

There  have  never  been  many  Scandinavians  in  Greenland.  In 
early  times  some  criminals  were  deported  there,  and  later  orphan 
boys  were  sent  out  to  become  teachers  or  to  recruit  the  inferior 
clergy.  But  as  late  as  1881  there  were  only  200  Danes  among  a 
native  population  of  some  10,000;  in  1870  there  were  237  Euro- 
peans, of  whom  95  were  traders,  19  missionaries,  and  38  employed 
in  the  cryolite  mines.  Until  the  time  of  the  missions  there  were 
practically  no  white  women  in  Greenland,  and  there  have  been 
very  few  since  ;  thus  Greenland  has  never  become  a  settlement- 
colony  like  Iceland.     In  fact,  the  p()i)ulation-conditions  more  closely 

habits  which  really  represented  a  natural  adaptation  to  the  local  environment ;  they 
tried,  for  instance,  to  render  the  Eskimo  sedentary  and  to  force  them  to  wear  cloth- 
ing in  their  ii^loos  or  huts.  They  ruthlessly  annihilated  the  often  harmless  or  even 
beneficent  influence  and  the  respectability  of  the  aii,::^(ikoks  or  medicine-men.  Cf. 
Rink  and  Nansen, /r/j.f/w,  and  Rink,  p.  143. 

1  There  were  in  Greenland,  in  1855,  30  to  40  horned  cattle,  100  goats,  and  20  sheep. 
Rink,  p.  97. 

2  Rink,  pp.  138,  280-282,  312,  313  (quoted). 


THE  COLONIES  OF  THE  SCANDINAVIANS  515 

resemble  those  of  the  tropical  colony:  the  natives  are  indispensable 
to  the  whites  and  if  they  died  out,  Greenland  would  become  unin- 
habited. Here  likewise  is  found  a  wholesale  miscegenation ;  it  is 
difficult  to  find  a  pure-blooded  Eskimo  on  the  west  coast.  Half- 
breeds  were  reckoned  as  constituting  14  per  cent  of  the  population 
in  1820,  and  30  per  cent  in  1855  ;  the  blending  has  now  become 
imperceptible.  The  native  women  prefer  the  worse  Dane  to  the 
best  Greenlander  and  the  half-breeds  are  the  more  eligible  for 
their  strain  of  white  blood  ;  illicit  relations  with  white  men  are 
rather  a  glory  than  a  disgrace.^  The  Danish  government  favors 
the  race-mixture  ;  even  at  the  present  time  officials  are  not  dis- 
couraged from  marrying  Eskimo  women,  although  upon  return  to 
Denmark  under  pension  they  must  leave  wife  and  children  behind. 
The  mongrels  resulting  from  these  mixed  unions  appear  to  form 
no  very  great  improvement  upon  the  native  stock. 

Relations  between  the  two  races,  aside  from  intermarriage,  be- 
gan with  the  absurd  and  often  cruel  interference  of  the  mission- 
aries ;  but  they  have  been  on  the  whole  so  friendly  as  to  be  almost 
unique.  Doubtless  this  was  due  in  part  to  the  kindly  temperament 
of  the  natives,  and  also  to  a  realization  often  brought  home  to  the 
Europeans,  of  their  dependence  upon  a  clever  and  generous  people. 
Nevertheless,  despite  such  friendliness,  the  Eskimo  have  declined 
in  number  and  degenerated  in  their  habits  of  life.  Egede  reckoned 
30,000  as  the  number  of  natives  ;  allowing  a  large  discount  for 
ecclesiastical  mendacity,  the  decline  is  evident  and  rapid.  Both  Rink 
and  Nansen  advert  repeatedly  to  the  feeling  of  superiority  of  the 
European  toward  the  native  as  in  some  sense  a  key  to  the  situation, 
and  both  refer  to  the  missions  in  sHghting  terms.  It  is  shown, 
especially  by  Nansen,  how  the  very  gifts  of  the  white  men  have 
occasioned  a  decline  in  native  prowess,  inventiveness,  and  the  like  ; 
the  rifle,  for  example,  is  a  curse  in  that  it  renders  possible  a  reck- 
less slaughter  of  wild  animals  for  purposes  of  momentary  gain. 
Also,  although  the  Danish  government  prohibits  the  sale  of  brandy 
to  the  natives,  other  European  products,  notably  coffee,  have  pro- 
duced ill  effects.  The  increase  of  native  population  in  late  years  is 
said  to  be  illusory,  and  the  Greenland  Eskimo  appear  to  be  on  the 
highroad  to  extinction,  at  least  as  a  pure  race.^ 

1  Rink,  pp.  166,  169,  175,  162,  296  ff.,  163,  151  ;  Nansen,  pp.  12,  20,  165. 
^  Rink,  pp.  145  ff.,  15S  ff.,  168,  227-228,  283,  286;  Nansen.  pp.  88,  97,  105  ff.,  166, 
307-308;  chap.  XV ;  pp.  313,  328  ff.,  342  ff. 


5l6  COLONIZATION 

The  natives  are  all  nominally  Christians  ;  they  are  by  nature 
happy  and  contented,  peaceable  and  harmless,  and  thus  tractable 
in  an  extraordinary  degree.  Owing  to  the  efforts  of  Rink  they 
have  some  voice  through  their  local  councils  in  the  administration 
of  their  villages.^  Admirably  adapted  as  they  have  become,  through 
centuries  of  vicissitudes,  to  a  difificult  environment,  their  continu- 
ance, or  at  least  the  retarding  of  their  disappearance,  seems  to  hang 
upon  their  power  to  exist  and  propagate  where  the  dominant  race 
cannot.  The  purity  of  their  blood  may  be  threatened  or  sacrificed, 
but  for  the  present  their  manner  of  life  and  other  tribal  character- 
istics seem  likely  to  persist  for  an  indefinite  period  to  come. 

1  Nansen,  pp.  321-322. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

MODERN  ITALIAN  AND  GERMAN  COLONIZATION 

ITALIAN   COLONIZATION 

The  history  of  the  colonial  ventures  of  modern  Italy  is  brief  and 
inglorious  ;  at  the  present  time,  after  much  bloodshed  and  expense, 
it  can  hardly  be  said  that  Italy  possesses  any  real  colonies  from 
whose  administration  and  development  an  economic  or  political 
lesson  or  warning  can  be  gained.  And  yet  the  struggles  of  Italy, 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  to  found  a  colonial 
empire  after  the  manner  of  other  European  states  possess  a  pecul- 
iar interest  for  the  student  of  colonization  ;  for  she  seems  to  have 
approached  the  self-appointed  task  in  a  novel,  and,  as  the  result 
proved,  a  disastrous  way.  Italy  is  a  nation  which  hoped,  by  taking 
thought,  to  add  unto  her  stature.  Granted  that  England's  greatness 
is  emphasized  and  augmented  by  her  colonial  possessions,  it  is  at 
best  a  logical  non  scquitur  to  conclude  that  Italy,  by  acquiring 
colonies  and  possessions,  will  thereby  take  her  place  among  the 
Powers.  And  yet  the  Italians  seem  to  have  believed  it  possible  to 
substitute  for  the  long  and  toilsome  road  from  cause  to  effect  a 
convenient  short-cut  from  effect  to  cause.  Colonies  were  not  only 
to  increase  Italy's  political  importance  ;  they  were  also  to  build 
up  her  trade,  develop  her  merchant  marine,  and  make  her  rich. 
Thus  the  normal  order  of  evolution  was  reversed  in  this  suddenly 
evoked  colonial  policy,  and  the  consequences,  in  this  case  little 
ameliorated  by  circumstances,  ran  out  into  the  usual  misery  of 
confusion  and  humiliation. 

Disqualifications  of  Italy 

This  is  the  fundamental  judgment  to  be  passed  upon  the  Italian 
so-called  colonization.  Italy  was  not  prepared  to  take  her  place 
among  colonizing  states  ;  she  lacked  the  internal  cohesion  and 
organization  necessary  to  the  political  unit  that  turns  its  arms 
against  the  outside  world.    On  the  eve  of  her  colonial  efforts  the 

517 


5l8  COLONIZATION 

nation  was  united  in  no  such  way  as  were  England,  France,  the 
Netherlands,  Spain,  and  Portugal,  just  before  their  colonial  expan- 
sion. Italy  lacked  capital  and,  in  a  certain  sense,  superfluous  popu- 
lation for  external  colonization  ;  what  forces  she  had  could  better 
have  been  used  for  internal  development,  which,  in  turn,  would 
have  aided  national  organization  and  prosperity.  She  lacked  the 
objective  knowledge  of  lands,  peoples,  and  processes  which  most 
of  the  great  colonizing  nations  had  attained  from  the  actual  experi- 
ence of  their  traders  and  navigators  before  their  colonial  empires 
were  even  begun.  She  was  unfit  for  colonization  because  she  was 
without  those  things  which  she  hoped  the  possession  of  colonies 
would  bring  her. 

One  more  disqualification  must  be  noticed  in  order  to  get  a  per- 
spective of  the  short  and  disastrous  history  of  Italian  expansion  : 
the  Italians,  together  with  the  other  Latin  nations,  suffer  from  a 
race-temperament  unfortunate  in  colonizers.  They  are  generally 
dominated  too  much  by  feeling  and  too  little  by  judgment ;  they 
are  attracted  too  much  by  abstract  theory,  military  glory,  and  all 
that  which  caters  to  national  vanity  ;  they  cannot  accept  defeat 
with  dignity,  renounce  a  high-sounding  ideal,  and  bide  their  time 
in  patience.  They  have  shown  themselves  incapable  of  such  steadi- 
ness and  foresight  as,  for  instance,  was  exhibited  in  the  withdrawal, 
quiet  preparation,  and  final  overwhelming  return  of  England  in  the 
Egyptian  Sudan. ^  Italy's  colonial  development,  however,  retarded 
by  so  many  wars,  has  not  as  yet  reached  that  stage  of  civil  admin- 
istration where  the  characteristic  defects  of  Latin  policy  are  wont 
to  appear ;  judging  from  the  organization  of  the  Red  Sea  posses- 
sions during  a  short  period  of  peace  and  security,  the  Italians 
might  have  been  expected  to  adopt  a  somewhat  better  adapted 
policy  than  did  Spain,  Portugal,  or  France. 

Motives  of  Expansion 

It  is  significant  that  poverty,  rather  than  overflowing  wealth, 
first  caused  United  Italy  to  desire  a  colony.  The  individual  emi- 
grated because  of  poverty  and  misery  ;  the  state  sought  a  penal 
colony  because  of  poverty  and  social  disorder.  On  March  i  3,  1865, 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  abolished  the  capital  penalty,  and  a  sub- 
stitute was  at  once  considered.    The  example  of  England  was  cited 

1  Cf.  De  Saussure,  chap,  xi,  p.  208,  etc. 


MODERN   ITALIAN   COLONIZATION  519 

in  support  of  adopting  deportation,  and  the  position  of  those  who 
favored  this  substitute  was  strengthened  by  the  grave  condition 
of  pubHc  security  in  the  sixties  and  seventies.  Prison  population 
grew  by  more  than  1500  annually,  and  increased  from  52,000  in 
1862  to  67,000  in  1870,  averaging  104  per  100,000  population. 
Prisons  were  insufficient  in  number  and  all  in  wretched  state  ;  it 
was  estimated  that  100,000,000  lire  and  twenty  years'  time  would 
be  necessary  to  construct  new  edifices.  Deportation  seemed  .an 
anchor  of  safety.  A  hot  controversy  was  waged  over  the  employ- 
ment of  this  penalty,  and  for  a  long  time  desire  for  such  a  place 
of  e.xile  formed  the  chief  motive  for  acquisition  of  external  posses- 
sions. A  government  agent  tried  to  get  possession  of  locations  in 
the  Far  East  suitable  for  penal  establishments,  and  other  private 
or  semi-official  travelers  reported  on  the  same  project.  But  in  1874 
the  enemies  of  deportation  had  increased  in  number,  and  conditions 
in  Italy  were  ameliorated;  discussion  lasted  on  till  1888,  when  it 
was  dropped.^  The  question  of  deportation  was  therefore  a  tem- 
porary one,  not  connected  with  later  developments,  except  as  it 
directed  the  attention  of  the  Italians  to  conditions  without ;  depor- 
tation was  never  popular.  Prospecting  for  a  commercial  or  naval 
station,  which  to  a  certain  extent  accompanied  the  search  for  a 
penal  colony,  was  even  more  feeble,  vague,  and  unproductive.  Up 
to  1880  expansionists  talked  to  the  empty  air.  Even  the  opening 
of  the  Suez  Canal  (November,  1869)  effected  little,  though  through 
the  urgency  of  a  small  party,  who  insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  a 
station  on  the  new  Indies  route,  the  government  half-heartedly  ac- 
quiesced in  the  purchase  of  Assab,  a  sterile  tract  on  the  Red  Sea 
coast. ^ 

"The  search  for  colonies,  therefore,"  Brunialti  says,  "had  con- 
ducted to  no  serious  conclusion";  further  efforts  were  made  to 
arouse  interest,  but  "we  sang  to  the  deaf."  After  1873  there  was 
no  more  talk  of  colonies  and  even  Assab  fell  into  oblivion  ;  in  1882 


1  Brunialti,  pp.  271  ff.,  527  ff.  Brunialti's  book  affords,  besides  a  sketcii,  chiefly  his- 
torical and  pohtical,  of  the  colonies  of  modern  Italy,  also  a  history  of  the  medieval 
Venetian  and  Genoese  trading-colonies  and  an  account  of  the  great  Italian  navigators 
of  the  period  of  Discoveries.  The  author  treats  the  modem  possessions  from  an 
authoritative  position,  inasmuch  as  he  was  personally  involved  in  the  discussions  and 
projects  which  preceded  and  accompanied  the  late  colonial  policy. 

2  Through  the  agency  of  the  Rubattino  Steamship  Company  for  15,000  Maria- 
Theresa  dollars  (about  ^16,000),  with  some  extra  fees  and  payments  to  recalcitrant 
sheiks.    Brunialti,  pp.  324,  532. 


520  COLONIZATION 

Italy  refused  an  advantageous  opportunity  to  cooperate  with  Eng- 
land in  reducing  Egypt,  explained  her  acticMi  to  Europe  with  vir- 
tuous self-complacency,  and  wished  to  have  nothing  to  do  with 
Africa.^ 

Suddenly,  in  Eebruary,  1885,  in  consequence  of  the  massacre  of 
the  Italian  scientific  party  of  Bianchi,  the  government  at  Rome 
roused  itself  and  occupied  the  port  of  Massowah.  The  effect  upon 
the  national  mind  was  unexpected  and  astonishing,  affording  a 
marked  illustration  of  the  changefulness  of  public  opinion.  Before 
the  occupation,  "the  less  enthusiastic  were  precisely  those  who  had 
a  more  exact  idea  of  colonial  policy  and  its  exigencies,  who  feared 
that  public  opinion  would  cast  itself  upon  this  acquisition,  increase 
its  importance,  and  make  an  unique  objective  of  what  ought  to  be 
a  small  episode  and  nothing  else."  This  fear  was  realized,  for  the 
country  faced  about  from  indifference  to  military  ambition,  parlia- 
mentary calculation,  and  political  delirium  ;  there  resulted  "  a  whole 
artificial  elaboration  of  public  opinion,  such  as  would  scarcely  be 
believed  possible  in  a  free  and  civilized  modern  state."  ^  These 
are  the  symptoms  of  "  colonial  fever,"  which  was  not  slow  to  dis- 
cover itself  in  pronounced  form  ;  nor  was  the  country,  smitten 
with  the  passion  for  expansion,  tardy  in  presenting  reasons  to  jus- 
tify the  satisfaction  of  that  passion.  Were  not  the  Romans  the 
first  of  colonizers  }  Could  the  Italians  acknowledge  themselves  de- 
generate sons  of  those  hardy  Venetians,  Genoese,  and  Pisans  who 
were  the  mediaeval  lords  of  trade  and  of  commercial  factories  } 
This  pride  of  ancestry  was  united  with  what  Laveleye  and  others 
call  "  megalomania,"  as  the  main  motive  forces  in  a  disastrous  ex- 
pansion.^ With  the  eye  ever  upon  England  and  the  Netherlands, 
the  endeavor  was  made  to  construct  a  Greater  Italy.  To  these  high 
ambitions,  however,  were  joined  the  most  absurd  fears,  an  unsettled 
j)olicy,  and  general  weakness  and  indecision  —  qualities  seldom  ex- 
hibited in  any  degree  by  a  people  ripe  for  colonization.'* 

Attention,  it  has  been  said,  turned  to  emigration,  the  merchant 
marine,  and  national  production.  As  for  the  first  of  these,  a  brief 
study  of  Italian  emigration  suffices  to  show  it  an  unstable  founda- 
tion upon  which  to  build  a  colonial  edifice.  During  the  early  days 
of  the  colonial  agitation,  the  Italian  consul  at  Nice,  one  of  those 

1  Brunialti,  pp.  323-326,  422  ff.  2  jj.,  pp.  15  ff.,  433. 

8  Cf.  the  articles  of  Laveleye,  Nash,  Mezzacapo,  and  Pitt;ihiga. 

*  Brunialti,  pp.  228  ff.,  261-297. 


MODERN   ITALIAN  COLONIZATION  521 

whose  opinion  concerning  the  new  policy  was  officially  asked,  op- 
posed such  a  movement,  saying  that  for  colonization,  capital,  heads, 
and  hands  were  needful,  but  that  Italy  possessed  only  the  last 
of  these  requirements.^  This  concisely  expresses  the  character  of 
Italian  emigration  ;  only  the  poverty-stricken  and  the  ignorant  emi- 
grated, and  their  exodus  was  a  species  of  flight.  It  may  be  true 
that  unprincipled  agents  worked  upon  the  credulity  of  the  over- 
taxed and  underpaid  contadmi  and  often  allured  them  to  a  fate  even 
more  wretched  than  that  of  remaining  in  Italy ;  but  it  is  signifi- 
cant that  whole  villages  were  ready  to  emigrate,  with  their  parish 
priests  at  the  head,  while  acres  of  productive  ground  were  falling 
into  waste  in  the  home-land.  This  emigration  of  Italian  labor  can- 
not be  regarded  as  a  natural  and  inevitable  flow,  due  to  purely 
natural  conditions  of  population  and  land  ;  private  initiative  counted 
for  little ;  the  emigrant  would  in  most  cases  have  stayed  at  home 
if,  after  paying  his  heavy  dues,  he  had  had  enough  to  eat.^ 

Not  until  1884  was  the  Italian  marine  able  to  provide  proper 
postal  facilities  for  the  settlements  along  the  Red  Sea ;  its  condi- 
tion, then,  can  be  imagined,  during  those  years  when  the  govern- 
ment was  vaguely  seeking,  even  from  Denmark  in  Greenland,  and 
from  Russia  in  Behring  Straits,  those  colonies  which  should  by 
some  magic  set  commerce  upon  its  feet.  The  Italians  awakened 
to  find  their  wooden  sailing-ships  contending  in  a  losing  competi- 
tion with  modern  vessels  of  iron,  propelled  by  steam.  Italy  had 
at  her  disposal  neither  coal  nor  iron,  neither  mechanics  nor  engi- 
neers. To  wait  for  trade  to  develop  its  carriers  was  too  slow  a 
process ;  the  marine  called  for  colonies,  which  would  then  call  for 
a  marine  ;  and  the  government  began  to  spend  large  sums  in  sub- 
ventions and  other  aid.^ 

The  remaining  reason  for  Italian  expansion  was  economic  ;  the 
growth  of  protection  in  Europe  and  America  seriously  threatened 
Italy's  trade,  and  colonies  were  sought  as  outlets  and  markets. 
The  government  was  also  in  the  search  for  stations  in  the  Far 
East  in  order  to  profit  by  treaties  concluded  in  the  sixties  with 
China,  Japan,  and  Siam.*  This  was,  perhaps,  the  most  rational  of 
the  reasons  assigned  for  the  development  of  the  colonial  policy. 

1  Brunialti,  pp.  231,  note,  289.  ^  jj^  pp  261  ff. ;  Laveleye. 

^  Brunialti,  pp.  283  ff. ;  "The  Merchant  Marine  of  Italy,"  The  Nation,  August  31, 
1882,  XXXV,  171. 
^  Brunialti,  p.  524. 


52  2  COLONIZATION 

At  all  events,  Italy  became  aware  in  1SS5  of  the  fact  that  she 
had  lost  Tunis  to  the  French,  after  most  favorable  beginnings,  had 
childishly  refused  England's  offer,  fraught  with  possibility,  of  a 
dual  campaign  in  Egypt,  and  had  sacrificed  numerous  possible  pos- 
sessions in  the  Far  East.  She  fixed  her  eyes  on  Tripoli  and  gave 
more  attention  to  the  flourishing  natural  colonies  in  the  Plata  region 
of  South  America  ;  though,  sad  to  say,  she  allowed  these  districts 
to  take  an  entirely  secondary  place  in  relation  to  the  new  acquisi- 
tions in  eastern  Africa.^ 

I 

The  African  Acquisitions 

Real  expansion,  then,  began  with  the  occupation  of  Massowah. 
Assab  had  cost  in  all  about  two-thirds  of  a  million  lire,  the  terri- 
tory extending  thirty-six  miles  along  the  coast  and  having  an  area 
of  about  two  hundred  and  forty  square  miles.  But  after  Massowah 
had  been  occupied  by  force,  the  method  of  purchase  lost  all  popu- 
larity ;  the  way  of  conquest  was  more  "  essential  to  our  position 
as  a  Great  Power  "  —  it  was  more  theatrical.^  Little  attention  was 
paid  to  the  safeguarding  of  an  indispensable  friendship  with  the 
Negus,  or  King  of  Kings,  of  Abyssinia.  There  followed  in  rapid 
succession  the  occupation  by  force  of  Ilabab  and  Beni-Amer  (1887), 
Cheren  and  Asmara  (1S89),  Cassala,  Coatit,  and  Senafe  (1894), 
and  Tigre  (1895),  until  the  Italian  possessions  comprised  about 
96,000  square  miles,  with  200,000  native  and  3500  European  in- 
habitants.''^ In  1889  a  protectorate  was  assumed  over  the  sultans 
of  Obbiaand  Migertini ;  and  by  the  treaty  of  Ucciali  (May  2,  1889) 
the  whole  kingdom  of  Abyssinia  came  under  Italian  influence.  A 
protectorate  was  officially  recognized  in  Europe,  and,  to  a  certain 
extent,  by  the  Negus  ;*  later,  however,  the  latter  repudiated  the 
article  of  the  treaty  upon  which  Italy  based  her  claim  to  a  protect- 
orate, alleging  misrepresentation  and  fraud.  Under  such  strains, 
and  because  the  Abyssinians  were  incensed  at  the  occupation  of 
their  ancient  capital,  Adowa,  in  the  holy  country  of  Tigre,  war 
speedily  broke  out;  and  on  March  i,  1896,  Italian  expansion  was 
brought  to  a  sudden  close  in  the  battle  of  Abba  Garima,  where 

^  T?runialti,  chap,  xi ;  pp.  298  ff.,  422.  2  j^^  pp    ,f,^  ^09,  430. 

^  Id.,  p.  466;   Ap])leton'.s  Ann.  Cyc,  1895,  •f'"'' "Abyssinia." 

*  This  made  the  total  area  under  Italian  influence  about  550,000  square  miles,  with 
more  than  6,000,000  inhabitants.  Cf.  Statesman's  Vear-Book,  1S91  ;  Appleton's  Ann. 
Cyc,  as  above. 


MODERN   ITALIAN   COLONIZATION  523 

12,000  Italians  rashly  attacked  the  Abyssinian  army  of  80,000  and 
were  almost  annihilated.^  In  the  treaty  that  followed,  the  protect- 
orate over  Abyssinia  was  given  up,  Cassala  was  ceded  to  Egypt, 
the  Abyssinian  territory  which  had  been  occupied  was  evacuated, 
and  Italy  paid  a  heavy  indemnity  for  the  maintenance  and  return 
of  prisoners.  This  decisive  check  may  be  considered  as  bringing 
the  ten  years'  period  of  Italian  expansion  to  a  close,  for  since  1896 
no  further  move  toward  aggrandizement  in  Africa  has  been  at- 
tempted. Indeed,  it  is  said  that  the  tenure  of  Italian  Somaliland, 
in  view  of  the  attitude  of  Menelek,  is  precarious. 

From  the  military  and  political  standpoints,  therefore,  Italian 
expansion  was  a  failure.  Results  also  failed  to  meet  the  expecta- 
tions of  those  who  were  looking  for  a  more  profitable  regulation 
of  emigration,  a  development  of  commerce  and  of  the  marine,  and 
a  notable  spread  of  civilization.  Here  one  must  do  justice  to  the 
small  minority  of  clear-headed  statesmen  who  constantly  opposed 
the  current  of  popular  folly,  or  with  it  were  unwillingly  and  resist- 
ingly  borne  along.  It  was  in  vain  that  they  reiterated  objections 
against  the  popular  projects  —  objections  since  proved  only  too 
valid.  In  fact,  as  was  at  the  time  pointed  out,  only  those  parts  of 
Africa  were  allotted  to  Italy  which  fall  to  the  weak  late-comer ; 
while  England,  the  generous  giver,  drew  considerable  advantages 
from  occupation  by  a  friendly  nation.  These  possessions,  which 
from  Crispi  received  the  pompous  collective  name  of  Eritrea,  were 
entirely  unsuitable  for  agricultural  or  plantation  colonies.  The  soil 
is,  in  general,  arid,  sandy,  and  unproductive  ;  rain  is  infrequent ; 
even  drinking-water  is  extremely  scarce  and  brackish.  The  climate, 
especially  near  the  coast,  is  almost  insupportable  for  Europeans  ; 
the  Italian  army  was  forced  by  the  heat  to  take  refuge  upon  the 
interior  plateaus.    The  sharp  contrast  of  temperature  between  night 

1  This  battle  and  other  reverses  were  due  largely  to  the  ambition  of  the  Crispi  and 
preceding  ministries,  which  needed  victories  to  hold  their  place ;  it  was  also  due  to 
gross  geographical  and  ethnographical  ignorance  and  insufficient  preparation.  Brunialti 
says  the  Italian  statesmen  had  "a  sacred  horror  of  geography,"  and  that  one  of  the 
most  responsible  could  not  "read  a  geographical  chart  in  the  proper  manner."  Upon 
Crispi,  however,  falls  the  heaviest  weight  of  indignation  and  contempt:  he  called  the 
war  "  my  war,"  and,  according  to  Brunialti,  his  chief  reason  for  desiring  it  was  that 
his  "  personal  necessities  .  .  .  impelled  him  to  hide  too  many  things,  and  himself  as 
well,  behind  a  series  of  victories."  The  war  was  very  unpopular  in  its  later  stages ; 
protests  came  in  from  the  women  of  Pavia  and  other  cities ;  troops  were  transported 
in  secret,  "  in  the  dead  of  night,  through  a  window  or  down  an  exterior  stair,"  and  "  de- 
spatched hurriedly  by  goods-trains  to  Naples  for  embarcation."  Brunialti,  pp.  435, 
497,  506  ff. ;  art.  by  "  Ouida." 


524  COLONIZATION 

and  day  affects  cattle  disastrously.  The  flora  is  meager,  consist- 
ing mostly  of  acacias  and  the  like,  and  the  better  parts  of  the 
country  are  infested  by  destructive  and  dangerous  wild  beasts.^ 
Yet  even  these  unalluring  prospects  were  less  discouraging  than 
the  ethnic  environment.  The  Italians  found  themselves  face  to 
face  with  the  only  strong  and  organized  African  state  —  a  state 
whose  warlike  population  prided  itself  upon  its  independence  and 
its  successes  against  invaders  ;  the  Italians,  however,  looked  upon 
the  Abyssinian  army  as  a  "  horde,"  an  easy  prey  for  five  hundred 
Italians  with  a  little  artillery.  They  found  it  armed  with  rapid-fire 
guns  and  drilled  by  French  tacticians.'^ 

Policy  and  Administration 

In  such  a  state  of  affairs  the  security  necessary  for  the  develop- 
ment of  permanent  agricultural  settlements  was  never  attained. 
All  experiments  resulted  in  dismal  failure  ;  emigration  could  not 
be  attracted  from  America.  Under  the  best  conditions  of  peace, 
with  gratuitous  concessions  of  land,  subsidies  in  nwncy,  intelligent 
direction  and  disinterested  counsels  from  men  who  knew  the  Italian 
peasants  well,  all  attempts  to  settle  them  in  Eritrea  came  to  naught. 
Harvests  failed  to  meet  expectations  and  life  in  Africa  could  de- 
velop no  alluring  features  ;  the  contadini  could  exist  there,  as  in 
Italy,  and  no  better.  There  was  no  prospect  of  making  one's 
fortune,  that  chance  which  prompts  one  to  choose  a  dangerous  pos- 
sibility in  place  of  a  tame  certainty,  and  which  has  regularly  led 
Italians  to  brave  the  unknown  in  America.  "  Therefore  the  coloni- 
zation of  Eritrea  was  ever  an  official  project,  a  work  of  beneficence, 
and  as  such  could  yield  no  serious  and  important  result,  even  though 
the  fortune  of  arms  had  been  quite  different."  The  case  was  worse 
than  a  negative  one  ;  destitute  emigrants  were  sent  out,  on  the 
verge  of  the  great  disasters,  to  "  do  homage  to  the  ideas  of  the 
government  regarding  the  future  of  the  Eritrean  colony,  to  make 
believe  that  Africa,  through  so  many  years  ignored  and  feared, 
had  become  all  at  once  the  land  of  Bengodi."  ^ 

But  if  a  producing  colony,  receptive  of  a  large  and  successful 
emigration,  was  impossible,  there  still  remained  the  alternative  of 
developing  a  trading-settlement.     Even  if   this  aided  emigration 

1  Arts,  by  Rossi,  Edwards,  and  Capucci.  ^  Brunialti,  p.  449;   Frassati. 

2  Brunialti,  p.  472  ;   Rossi. 


MODERN  ITALIAN   COLONIZATION  525 

little,  it  would  yet  assist  the  home-country's  commerce  and  marine. 
It  was  claimed  by  the  sponsors  of  Eritrean  expansion  that  Assab, 
and  to  a  greater  extent  Massovvah  and  Cassala,  were  the  keys  to 
the  trade  of  the  eastern  Sudan,  Abyssinia,  and  central  Africa;  it 
was  expected  that  carav^ans  would  make  an  easier  passage  to  these 
stations  than  to  others,  and  it  was  proposed  to  afford  facilities  in 
the  shape  of  roads,  magazines,  etc.,  and  to  remove  hindering  trade- 
restrictions.^  To  a  certain  degree  this  more  modest  purpose  suc- 
ceeded, though,  of  course,  trade  never  attained  the  proportions 
expected.  Assab  and  Massowah  are  good  harbors,  protected  from 
the  prevailing  monsoons  ;  the  commerce  of  Assab  rose  from  nil  in 
1880  to  some  525  each  of  arrivals  and  clearances  in  1883  ;  as  for 
Massowah,  the  value  of  its  imports  fell  from  1887  to  1893,  then  to 
rise  with  some  rapidity.  The  figure  for  1896  is  the  largest,  show- 
ing an  increase  of  more  than  100  per  cent  over  1895.^  Some  valua- 
ble roads  were  opened,  and  a  salt  industry,  founded  at  Assab,  was 
very  important  as  looking  toward  trade  with  the  interior.  Had 
peace  prevailed  and  security  been  permanently  maintained,  it  seems 
likely  that  Italy  would  have  gotten  a  modest  share  in  the  interior 
trade.  But  capital  refused  to  emigrate;  in  1887  Massowah  had 
not  a  single  merchant  house.  Many  were  afraid  of  finding  in  Masso- 
wah a  "new  Tonkin";  it  had  "all  the  disadvantages  and  none  of 
the  advantages  of  a  territorial  colony."  ^  It  is  evident  that  Italians 
at  the  present  time  cherish  no  enthusiasm  for  the  Eritrean  trade, 
and  that  the  powerful  neighbors  of  Eritrea  fear  and  envy  its  com- 
merce but  little.  The  development  of  the  marine  and  of  home  pro- 
duction would  seem  not  to  have  been  greatly  stimulated  as  a  result 
of  the  African  colonial  career.* 

The  brighter  pages  of  the  history  of  Eritrea  are  those  which 
deal  with  the  organization  and  incipient  administration  of  the 
colony,  especially  under  General  Baratieri.  The  Italians  were  a 
bit  theoretical  withal,  but  set  out  to  avoid  "  Spanish  formalism, 
Dutch  egoism,  French  concentration,  and  the  too  diverse  conditions 

1  Brunialti,  pp.  409  ff.,  416,  430  ff. 

2  Brunialti,  pp.  4i4ff.;  Statesman's  Year-Book,  1890  and  following  years  ;  Alma- 
nack de  Gotha,  18S9  and  following.  3  Brunialti,  pp.  446-44S  ;  Rossi. 

*  From  1884  to  1896  the  total  tonnage  of  Italian  seagoing  vessels  slowly  declined; 
but  during  the  same  period  the  tonnage  of  Italian  steamships  rose  from  107,542  to 
220,508.  Something  over  one-half  of  the  vessels  entering  and  clearing  from  Mas- 
sowah were  under  the  Italian  flag.  Entries  to  Italian  ports  increased  slowly  during 
the  period.    Statesman's  Year-Book,  18S5-1896;  Almanach  de  Gotha,  same  years. 


526  COLONIZATION 

of  English  colonization."  They  regarded  the  first  need  of  a  coun- 
try barely  out  of  savagery  as  that  of  a  simple  justice,  with  rapid 
and  economic  procedure,  without  distinction  of  legal  qualifica- 
tion and  backed  up  by  a  prompt  and  vigorous  execution.  They 
intended  to  respect  religion,  family  relations,  etc.,  where  not  irrec- 
oncilable with  morale  universale,  and  to  maintain  a  full  and  severe 
custody  of  public  order  ;  they  hoped  to  become  non  dominatori, 
non  tiitori,  non  iunovatori,  via  aviici  ed  aiiitatori,  guiding  new 
fellow-citizens  toward  a  betterment  that  was  comprehended  and 
desired.  Certain  high-sounding  phrases  about  making  the  Italian 
name  a  synonym  for  honesty  and  loyalty,  concerning  Italian  sym- 
pathy with  others'  patriotism,  and  so  cm,  were  declaimed  ;  but 
they  were  mere  words,  most  clearly  set  at  naught  in  the  dealings 
with  the  Negus.  For  "  the  Italian  government  always  proceeded 
towards  Abyssinia  as  toward  a  people  ignorant  and  barbarous, 
whom  they  thought  it  not  only  allowable,  but  easy  to  deceive."  ^ 

Before  1892  the  colonial  government  was  rather  chaotic;  a 
municipal  and  military  ta.x  imposed  in  1888  by  the  military  gover- 
nor was  stoutly  resisted.  The  military  was  rei)laced  by  a  civil 
government  in  1890,  troops  were  withdrawn,  and  an  attempt  was 
made  to  organize  commerce  and  profitable  cultivation  ;  the  condi- 
tion of  the  colony  was  far  from  satisfactory,  however,  and  in  1891 
the  minister,  Di  Rudini,  initiated  the  non-extension  policy  and  sent 
a  commission  to  examine  matters  in  Eritrea.  On  February  8,  1892, 
General  Baratieri  was  appointed  civil  governor  of  the  province. 
The  condition  of  the  colony  changed  at  once  for  the  better.  Bara- 
tieri was  well  fitted  for  the  ofifice  conferred  upon  him,  being  famil- 
iar with  the  region  and  well  versed  in  the  duties  required.  He 
appointed  picked  men  as  the  leaders  of  native  troops,  established 
friendly  relations  with  the  Negus  Menelek  and  all  the  chiefs  who 
proffered  friendship,  and  he  incited  Italian  residents  to  a  sharp 
watch  over  all  "  protected  "  territories.  He  established  within  a 
short  time  stations  of  carabinieri  with  natives  under  them,  dis- 
pelled all  fear  of  raids,  set  about  making  roads,  and,  the  oppor- 
tunity presenting  itself,  dealt  the  slave-trade  a  crushing  blow. 
"  The  colony  was  divided  into  the  district  of  Massowah,  where  the 
administration,  judicial,  social,  and  political,  is  carried  on  as  in 
Italy,  and  into  dependent  territories,  where  the  native  laws  and 
usages  are  respected  and  a])plicd  as  far  as  possible  ;   tribunals  of 

J  Brunialli,  pp.  409-412,  448. 


MODERN   ITALIAN  COLONIZATION  527 

arbitration  were  set  up  at  Cheren  and  Asmara,  judges  of  the  peace 
in  the  villages,  and  everywhere  residential  officials  bound  to  keep 
the  governor  '  up  to  date  '  on  all  military  and  local  matters."  The 
roads  were  made  chiefly  by  native  labor,  and  artesian  wells  were 
driven  and  lighthouses  erected  by  the  same  means.  Hygiene  was 
attended  to ;  water  was  analyzed  and  food  inspected.  Cisterns 
were  built  to  preserve  the  scanty  rains  and  in  house-building  stone 
succeeded  straw.  Schools  were  established  for  girls  and  boys, 
teaching  Italian,  Arabic,  arithmetic,  hygiene,  and  gymnastics.  The 
division  of  lands  was  commenced,  defining  tribal  and  ecclesiastical 
property,  and  marking  out  such  parts  as  the  state  could  take  pos- 
session of  and  distribute  to  the  natives  and  to  Italian  emigrants. 
The  entire  military  department  was  reorganized  ;  Baratieri  insisted 
that  if  Italy  were  to  succeed  in  Africa,  it  must  be  with  native  troops 
under  Italian  officers.  The  governor  did  not  stay  in  Massowah  ;  he 
lived  with  his  soldiers  ;  he  had  a  strong  influence  over  the  natives, 
and  suffered  no  defections  of  the  indigenous  forces  in  battle.^ 

Creditable  Success 

The  right  man  in  the  right  place,  evidently  ;  in  November,  1892, 
the  crown  expressed  itself  as  well  pleased  that  the  colony  had 
been  entirely  pacified  and  was  ceasing  to  be  a  drain  on  the  finances 
of  the  mother-country.  Baratieri  had  aided  agriculture  and  com- 
merce and  systematized  the  public  service  ;  it  was  hoped  that 
the  time  was  not  far  off  when  the  costs  of  civil  management  in  the 
colony  would  be  paid  with  the  colony's  own  products.  The  influence 
of  the  Italians  was  extending  peacefully,  and  the  neighboring  tribes 
were  attracted  to  them  by  gifts,  by  the  surety  of  order  and  peace 
and  of  impartial  and  prompt  justice.  Brunialti  ^  calls  this  a  modest 
but  true  success,  without  exaggeration,  uncertainty,  or  weakness. 
A  special  budget  was  instituted  for  the  colony  and  attached  to 
that  of  Foreign  Affairs.  On  December  8,  1892,  the  powers  exer- 
cised by  the  minister  of  the  marine  over  civil  services  in  Eritrea 
were  withdrawn  and  the  corresponding  funds  inscribed  in  the 
colonial  budget.  Gradually  there  were  added  to  this  budget  other 
expenses  formerly  charged  under  the  heads  of  finance,  treasury, 
posts  and  telegraph,  public  works,  etc.  In  consequence,  an  ex- 
penditure of  8,000,000  lire  was  recognized  as  necessary  for  all  the 

^  Brunialti,  pp.  464  ff .,  473  ff. ;  "  Italy  in  Africa,"  The  A^ation,  March  7,  1 895,  LX,  1 79. 
2  Pp.  474,  480. 


528  COLONIZATION 

services  for  which  provision  had  at  first  been  made  fragmcntarily, 
and  which  finally  were  to  come  under  the  oversight  and  responsi- 
bility of  the  governor.  A  distinction  was  made  between  civil  and 
military  expenses,  by  which  ministerial  control  and  responsibility 
to  parliament  were  made  less  difficult.  Attention  was  directed  to 
tax  and  customs  reforms,  security  and  justice  were  more  firmly 
established,  and  public  instruction  made  an  advance,  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  both  Italians  and  natives.  The  Massowah  Chamber  of 
Commerce  heartily  cooperated,  suggesting  plans  for  the  develop- 
ment of  local  trade  and  industry  for  the  benefit  of  Italy.  More 
roads,  commercial  as  well  as  strategic,  were  laid  out ;  a  bank  of 
credit  was  founded  at  Massowah ;  construction  of  markets,  maga- 
zines, and  better  facilities  for  ships  were  regarded  as  paramount 
objects.  The  abolition  of  customs  dues  ;  more  frequent  postal  and 
caravan  communication  between  Italy  and  Massowah,  Massowah 
and  the  principal  centers  of  Abyssinia ;  the  protection  of  interests, 
which  was  always  efficacious  —  all  these  advantages  worked  toward 
civilization  and  success.  The  population  seemed  to  have  perfect 
faith  in  the  government  and  a  beginning  of  agriculture  was  made, 
even  among  the  native  nomads.  The  suggestions  of  the  governor 
to  the  ministry  show  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  situation  and 
its  needs.  Among  other  desiderata  he  wished  the  lands  to  be 
studied  so  that  the  most  successful  methods  of  working  them  might 
be  developed  ;  he  also  insisted  that  holdings,  assigned  by  choice 
or  l(jt  to  Italians,  individual  or  in  common,  should  be  guaranteed 
against  the  evils  of  speculation.  Anticipations  of  money  without 
interest,  a  regulated  water  supply,  paternal  care  of  Italian  settlers, 
including  religious  and  medical  attention  —  these  were  among  the 
suggestions  of  the  governor,  and  many  of  them  were  promptly 
adopted.  By  1894  the  Eritrean  administration  was  autonomous 
and  the  management  of  its  finances  independent.  The  imperial 
government  was  represented  only  by  the  civil  governor  and  three 
counselors,  all  royally  appointed.  Military  and  naval  commanders 
were,  of  course,  under  direction  from  the  Italian  ministry.^ 

Considering  the  ground  she  had  to  work  on,  Italy  had  certainly 
made  a  creditable  showing.  But  it  must  not  be  imagined  that  this 
liberal  administration  cost  nothing  ;  deficits  appeared  annually  in  the 
colonial  budget  and  the  lower  ones  of  prosperous  years  were  inade- 
quate to  keep  down  a  very  high  average  when  the  whole  period 

^  Brunialti,  pp.  472  ff.,  480-484;  Statesman's  Year-Book,  1894,  etc. 


MODERN   ITALIAN   COLONIZATION  529 

of  colonial  possession  is  considered.  There  have  been  repeated 
struggles  to  reduce  the  yearly  expenses  of  the  colony  to  9,000,000 
or  8,000,000  lire  ;  no  such  scheme  seems  to  have  succeeded.  The 
deficit  has  averaged  considerably  more  than  this  figure  ;  during 
the  whole  period  of  colonial  expansion  up  to  1896,  losses  are  esti- 
mated by  Brunialti  ^  as  10,000  men  and  500,000,000  lire.  For  a 
country  whose  debt  was  in  the  thousand  millions,  which,  out  of  every 
hundred  lire  expended,  paid  thirty-three  lire  interest  on  debt  and 
thirty-three  lire  for  the  maintenance  of  army  and  navy,  this  colonial 
policy  was  certainly  what  one  of  its  opponents  called  it,  nne  poli- 
tique de  luxe?'  For  a  rich  nation  to  expend  great  sums  in  the  work 
of  civilization  or  extermination  may  be  wastefulness  ;  for  a  poverty- 
stricken,  debt-burdened  nation,  full  of  internal  strife  and  uproar, 
it  is  almost  suicide.  If  the  disaster  inflicted  by  Menelek  has  taught 
this  lesson,  perhaps  the  experience  was  not  too  dearly  bought. 

"  Megalomania,"  however,  was  not  yet  cured  ;  the  incident  of 
San  Mun  Bay,  where  Italy  thought  of  taking  another  useless  burden 
upon  her  shoulders,  in  order  to  prove  herself  a  Power,  is  a  happen- 
ing of  the  more  recent  past.^  In  this  case,  however,  right  counsels 
prevailed,  and  perhaps  the  fever  has  abated.  As  for  Eritrea,  little 
enthusiasm  is  expressed  regarding  it ;  since  the  shock  of  1896  the 
colony  has  come  under  discussion  from  time  to  time,  and  if  it  is 
not  restricted  to  narrower  boundaries  or  quite  abandoned,  it  is 
largely  because  of  national  pride.  In  1897  an  attempt  was  made 
to  take  up  again  the  organization  of  the  district  and  the  stimulation 
of  industry,  but  the  colony  has  never  fully  recovered  ;  it  is  accepted 
as  an  inevitable  burden  which  some  would  gladly  exchange  for  a 
share  in  the  nearer  and  more  congenial  Tripoli. "^    Whether  Eritrea 

1  P.  519;  it  is  elsewhere  stated  that  about  125,000,000  lire  were  spent  in  the  mili- 
tary operations  of  1895-1896.    The  budget  for  1895-1896  is  given  as  follows  (in  lire): 

Receipts:  from  colonies,  1,700,000;  from  state,  10,000,000. 
Expenses:  colonial  troops,  9,351,000  ;  other  expenses,  2,349,000. 

It  is  difficult  to  get  exact  information  on  these  particulars,  but  the  above  figures  show 
general  conditions.  Even  with  elimination  of  the  heavy  military  expense,  the  colony 
is  far  from  paying  its  own  way.  See  Statesman's  Year-Book  and  Almanach  de  Gotha, 
1897,  etc.;  Appleton's  Ann.  Cyc,  1898. 

2  "  The  Financial  Condition  of  Italy,"  The  iVation,  October  i,  1891,  LIII,  255;  arts. 
by  "An  Observer,"  "Ouida,"  Geffcken,  and  Rossi. 

3  See  Lombroso,  art.  in  the  Ntiova  Antologia,  as  well  as  various  other  articles  and 
editorial  comment  in  the  earlier  issues  of  this  publication  for  1899. 

*  "  Rassegna  Politica,"  in  Ntiova  Antologia  during  1897;  little  interest  in  Eritrea 
has  been  exhibited  since  that  year;  Brunialti,  pp.  516  ff. ;  Traversi,  Primerano,  Rossi, 
and  Capucci. 


530 


COT.ONI/ATIOX 


is  in  the  future  even  to  pay  for  itself,  remains  to  be  seen  ;   it  is 
hoped  rather  than  expected. 

Italy's   "  Natural  "   Colonies 

If  Italy  were  intent  upon  the  essence  of  colonization  rather  than 
the  name,  her  field  of  action  would  not  be  far  to  seek  ;  she  has  a 
series  of  natural  colonies  in  America,  surrounding  the  lower  course 
of  the  Plata  River,  which  evince  a  vigor  of  growth  and  a  prosperity 
that  ought  to  have  been  the  pride  of  the  mother-country  while  she 
was  squandering  resources  on  the  sand-dunes  of  the  Red  Sea  coast. 
The  essence  of  the  mutual  sympathy  of  two  countries  lies,  not  in 
political  union,  but  in  those  racial  affiliations  of  blood,  language, 
religion,  customs,  and  manners,  the  mutual  possession  of  which 
renders  intercourse  between  groups  of  men  easy  and  enjoyable. 
After  the  Revolution  the  American  republic  turned,  not  to 
France,  but  to  England  with  her  favors  of  trade  and  intercourse. 
So  the  Plata  settlements,  with  no  serious  encouragement,  and  with 
memories  not  the  most  pleasant  of  the  native  land  and  its  extor- 
tions, have  nevertheless  benefited  Italy  commercially  to  an  infinitely 
higher  degree  than  did  Eritrea  at  its  best.  As  an  illustration  of 
the  normal  growth  of  national  offspring,  the  development  of  these 
perhaps  happily  neglected  settlements  deserves  a  paragraph  of  com- 
parison with  the  above-described  "colony  for  a  purpose."  First 
and  most  important,  the  Italians  have  succeeded  there,  and  that 
without  aid,  as  nowhere  else  in  the  workl.  They  were  the  first  to 
own  inns,  cafes,  boats,  etc.,  and  have  kept  industrially  in  advance 
of  a  people  inferior  to  themselves  in  culture.  Italians  have  founded 
and  operated  banks,  and  in  Buenos  Ayres  they  owned  in  the  nineties 
62  per  cent  of  the  businesses.  The  Italian  language  is  spreading, 
and  Spanish  is  supreme  only  in  jjublic  administration  ;  ])robably  one- 
fourth  (4,000,000)  of  the  po})ulation  of  Argentina  have  Italian  blood 
in  their  veins.  The  current  of  emigration  to  these  regions  is  grow- 
ing ever  stronger,  and  in  its  wake  are  following  advantages  to  Ital- 
ian trade  and  industry;  in  1889  the  importation  from  Italy  to  the 
Argentine  Rei)ublic  represented  5  per  cent  of  the  total;  in  1894, 
9  per  cent.  In  later  years  of  crisis  (i 889-1 894)  Italian  trade  suf- 
fered less  than  that  of  any  other  nation.  And  it  is  seen  that  the 
Italian  emigrants,  who  are  largely  from  the  north  of  Italy,  do  not 
lose  their  native  good  qualities  in  the  new  country,  but  transmit 


MOni':RN  CU'^RMAN  COT.ONJZA'I  ION 


531 


them,  along  with  Italian  ideas  and  tastes,  to  a  peo])le  who  need 
them  and  are  able  and  often  willing;  to  profit  by  them.^ 

It  is  toward  this  Plata  region  that  some  of  Italy's  more  responsible 
advisers  have  long  been  attempting  to  direct  her  attention,  not  with 
a  view  to  the  extension  of  imperial  power  —  for  sufificient  barriers 
exist,  fortunately  for  the  colonies,  to  restrain  any  such  interference 
— but  in  the  hope  of  developing,  without  expense  or  bloodshed,  close 
commercial  and  industrial  relations  and  a  national  sympathy  which 
may  some  day  assist  in  assuring  existence  to  that  which  is  Italian. 
The  Italians,  like  other  Latin  peoples,  feel  a  sense  of  weakness 
before  the  tremendous  energy  and  the  power  of  expansion  and 
of  assimilation  displayed  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  To  the  end  of 
establishing  these  desired  relations,  a  more  strict  supervision 
of  emigration  and  a  more  developed  consular  service  are  advo- 
cated ;  the  ideal  is  that  the  South  American  colonies  shall  stand 
to  Italy  as  the  United  States  to  England.  At  present,  and  neg- 
lecting the  crying  necessity  for  the  internal  reorganization  of  Italy, 
this  idea  seems  by  far  the  most  practical  and  realizable  of  Italian 
colonial  projects. 

GERMAN    COLONIZATION 

Among  German  writers  on  colonization  there  has  existed  a  con- 
sensus of  opinion  as  to  the  tardiness  of  Germany's  entrance  upon 
the  colonial  field.  The  common  cry  of  "  Too  late  !  "  has  been  voiced 
in  all  accents,  from  those  of  the  reproachful  complainer  to  those  of 
the  belligerent  partisan  and  agitator.  Among  certain  of  these  par- 
ties there  has  been  manifested  a  disposition  to  hold  some  person 
or  policy  responsible  for  such  national  backwardness  ;  others  have 
disdained  to  assail  the  past,  have  accepted  the  situation  as  inevi- 
table, and  have  directed  their  thoughts  and  efforts  toward  the  future. 
Upon  reflection  it  is  seen  that  Germany's  past  indifference  toward 
organized  expansion  and  colonization  has  been  perfectly  natural, 
and  could  hardly  have  been  otherwise.  During  the  last  few  cen- 
turies and  up  to  the  borders  of  our  own  generation  Germany  has 
been  in  no  position  to  devote  attention  and  effort  to  matters  of  this 

1  Brunialti,  chap.  x.  The  official  figures  of  the  commissioners  of  immigration  for 
1857-1889  give  for  the  number  of  Italiaji  immigrants  646,086  as  against  144,654  for 
the  Spanish  and  91,719  for  the  French.  The  Italians  have  regularly  maintained  the 
lead  in  numbers,  and  have  figured  for  70  per  cent  of  the  total.  Daireaux,  I,  45-46 ; 
II,  chaps,  i  and  ii ;  especially  y).  11. 


532  COLONIZATION 

kind  ;  internal  conditions  and  external  relations  have  alike  impeded 
the  development  of  colonial  activity  in  distant  lands.  Periodically 
through  the  earlier  centuries  and  during  part  of  the  nineteenth,  fre- 
quent, long-continued,  and  devastating  wars  reduced  the  population 
and  destroyed  accumulated  wealth  ;  industrial  development  was  in- 
definitely postponed  ;  political  centralization  and  national  iniity  were 
rendered  impossible  in  a  continuous  strife  of  petty  local  interests. 
External  relations  were  such  as  to  discourage  and  cripple  the  trade 
of  a  country  whose  geographical  position  was  and  is  most  unfavorable 
to  the  development  of  shipping  and  trans-oceanic  commerce.  Every- 
thing was  narrow,  local,  and  self -centered  ;  horizons  were  limited, 
and  ignorance  of  the  external  world  was  dense.  Whatever  may 
have  been  the  intellectual  life  of  the  higher  classes  as  exemplified 
in  Humboldt,  Goethe,  and  others,  the  masses  of  the  people  had 
acquired  no  such  cosmopolitan  freedom  of  outlook,  nor  such  enter- 
prise and  experience  of  the  outside  world  as  distinguished  the  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  population  of  England  and  Holland  during 
the  same  periods.^  Germany  was  looked  down  upon  by  many  of 
her  own  greatest  men  as  irretrievably  provincial  and  uncultured. 

Earlier  Colonial  Projects 

The  impracticability,  in  the  earlier  periods,  of  German  colonial 
ventures  across  the  seas  is  shown  by  the  history  of  an  actual  at- 
tempt at  colonization  dating  from  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury.2  Frederick  William,  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg,  a  man  of 
theories,  who  had  picked  up  many  foreign  ideas  during  a  period  of 
study  in  Holland,  conceived  the  scheme  of  making  Prussia  pros- 
perous by  creating  colonies  after  the  manner  of  the  Dutch.  He 
maintained  a  fleet  under  the  command  of  a  Dutch  pirate,  Raule, 
in  order  to  secure  his  prospective  commerce  from  the  depreda- 
tions and  tyranny  of  the  Swedes  and  Danes.  After  the  peace  of 
St.  Germain  (1679),  finding  his  hands  free  from  war,  he  turned  his 
whole  attention  to  colonization ;  the  Guinea  coast  of  Africa  was 

1  This  condition  lasted  far  down  into  the  nineteenth  century.  See  Wohltmann  in 
the  Indisclie  Gids,  1897,  II,  1387. 

2  Germans  like  to  recall  also  the  memory  of  how  the  famous  Augsburg  Welser 
undertook  to  develop  and  colonize  Venezuela.  This  was  a  sort  of  miniature  aui</iiista 
after  the  Spanish  model,  depending  upon  warlike  methods  "without  any  serious  pros- 
pects of  commercial  advantage."  It  took  jjlace  about  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  and  suffered  continually  from  the  enmity  of  the  Si)aniards.  Ehrenberg, 
I,  200;  cf.  pp.  242  ff.,  above. 


MODERN  GERMAN   COLONIZATION  533 

his  immediate  objective,  and  there  he  hoisted  his  flag  in  1683.  An 
African  Company  with  a  trade-monopoly  had  been  founded  in  1682, 
which  for  a  time  made  considerable  profit  by  a  vigorous  participa- 
tion in  the  slave-trade.  Negotiations  were  made  with  the  Danes 
for  the  establishment  of  a  slave-station  or  mart  on  the  island  of 
St.  Thomas  in  the  West  Indies,  and  a  small  island  between  St. 
Thomas  and  Puerto  Rico  was  actually  seized.  For  the  direction 
and  prosecution  of  his  project  Frederick  was  obliged  to  have  re- 
course to  foreign  agents.  This  was  disastrous,  for  the  numerous 
Dutchmen  in  his  service  seem  to  have  jeopardized  his  undertaking 
about  as  much  as  their  professedly  hostile  countrymen  did.  The 
local  African  management  was  incompetent  and  dishonest,  and  the 
settlement  became  a  refuge  for  smugglers,  broken  men,  and  outlaws. 
The  Company  was  always  hovering  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy,  and 
the  Elector  confessed  that  every  new  ducat  of  Guinea  gold  cost  him 
double  its  value.  In  the  midst  of  complications  with  Holland  the 
prince  died  ;  his  successor  had  little  sympathy  with  colonial  pro- 
jects, and  after  some  half-hearted  attempts  to  revive  the  Africa 
Company,  the  heavily  involved  colony  was  sold  to  the  Dutch 
West  India  Company  in  1720.  The  West  India  settlements  were 
abandoned. 

This  ill-starred  exploit  was  a  private  project,  attracting  at  its 
best  but  few  supporters  ;  its  collapse  "was  the  failure  of  a  strong 
personal  initiative  to  overcome  the  tastes  and  prejudices  of  a  whole 
people."  ^  It  is  in  no  way  to  be  reckoned  as  a  display  of  collective 
activity,  but  demonstrates  rather  the  utter  hopelessness  of  trying  to 
force  a  people  out  of  its  natural  course  of  development.  The  Ger- 
man people,  as  a  whole,  were  under  the  domination  of  social  forces 
which  were  acting  along  lines  of  least  resistance,  and  were  impelling 
them,  as  it  were  instinctively,  in  the  earlier  period  toward  the  east, 
and  from  the  time  of  Louis  XIV  toward  America.  Historically  the 
eastern  movement  goes  back  to  the  exploits  of  the  Teutonic  Knights 
(thirteenth  century),  and  needs  little  mention  here  except  as  it 
throws  light  upon  the  sometimes'  questioned  capacities  of  the  Ger- 
man people  in  the  field  of  colonial  expansion.  It  was  steady  and 
strong,  causing  the  Slav  much  apprehension ;  Russian  and  Polish 
novelists  have  shown  how  formidable  it  appeared  to  their  country- 
men, even  in  recent  decades.    It  would  have  been  strange,  then  as 

^  Meinecke,pp.  1-3;  Perry, "Traditions,"  etc.;  Keltic,  PP.6.S-69.  Details  in  Schmidt, 
I,  x-xxi.    The  first  experience  of  the  Germans  with  African  fever  was  most  disastrous. 


534  COLONIZATION 

now,  if  this  people  had  neglected  what  was  at  its  very  doors  in  order 
to  acquire  unknown  possessions  beyond  the  seas.  In  the  nature 
of  the  case  it  little  mattered  to  the  average  German  that  fellow- 
countrymen  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  globe  were  compelled  to 
seek  protection  beneath  the  British  fiag,  because  the  fatherland  pos- 
sessed neither  colonies,  consuls,  nor  navy  ;  the  fact  that  counted 
was  that  gradual  expansion  into  Poland  and  Lithuania  demanded 
little  outfit,  mental  or  material,  and  little  adaptation  of  any  kind. 

As  for  America,  emigration  was  less  easy  :  conditions  were  less 
familiar,  some  capital  was  almost  indispensable,  and  a  greater  effort 
and  decision  were  demanded.  But  positive  benefits  were  such  as 
to  attract  a  people  noted  for  its  expansive  force  and  not  unready  to 
quit  its  native  soil  in  order  to  better  its  conditions  of  life.  In  Amer- 
ica, especially  in  the  English  colonies,  later  the  United  States,  one 
could  live  in  a  congenial  climate,  acquire  land  in  certain  tenure,  and 
pursue  his  labors  with  the  assurance  of  a  livelihood  and  more.  The 
vexatious  and  oppressive  European  system,  with  its  crystallized 
distinctions  and  exactions,  could  not  exist  where  land  was  plenty, 
conditions  primitive,  and  cultivators  few.  In  the  new  states  that 
were  rising,  an  individual  might  cut  loose  from  his  past  history 
and  start  anew  under  conditimis  of  virtual  equality  of  opportunity  ; 
he  might  hope  to  realize,  at  least  for  the  generations  to  come,  ad- 
vantages of  wealth  and  position  which  it  had  been  impossible  for 
preceding  generations  to  secure  for  him  in  Europe.  This  was  felt, 
at  first  more  or  less  vaguely  ;  evidence  was  soon  accumulated  from 
instances  of  the  phenomenal  successes  of  the  first  bolder  adven- 
turers. However  much  conditions  have  changed  in  America,  this 
primal  impulse  toward  self -betterment  is  as  ever  a  most  powerful 
element  and  has  regularly  neutralized  efforts  to  divert  the  stream  of 
German  emigration.  The  immense  importance  to  both  Americas 
of  this  desirable  inflow  is  well  known. 

Unification  of  Germany 

No  other  enterprises  like  Frederick's  occurred  to  interrupt  the 
normal  course  of  events.  Prussia  remained  innocent  of  any  serious 
maritime  or  colonial  policy  from  the  time  of  the  Brandenl)urg  epi- 
sode till  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.^  The  factors 
which  make  for  industrial  devel()j)ment  continued  to  be  but  feebly 

1  Perry,  "  Traditions,"  etc. 


MODERN   GERMAN  COLONIZATION  535 

represented  ;  wars  of  all  kinds  and  finally  the  crushing  blows  of 
Napoleon  I  kept  the  Continent  in  a  state  of  insecurity,  ferment, 
and  demoralization,  and  allowed  England  and  America  to  monopo- 
lize commercial  and  industrial  progress.  Germany  suffered  with  the 
rest  under  the  blight  of  war,  but  when  at  last  the  upheavals  were 
over,  it  was  seen  that  a  powerful  country  and  people  were  emerg- 
ing ;  the  narrowness  of  the  past  was  disappearing,  and,  under  the 
regime  of  peace,  population,  capital,  and  industrial  and  commercial 
activity  were  advancing  at  an  accelerated  speed.  With  the  expan- 
sion of  national  interests  came  a  widening  of  popular  horizons,  and 
Germany  of  the  sixties  displayed  almost  all  the  characteristics  usu- 
ally associated  with  a  "  colonizing  nation."  A  series  of  judiciously 
managed  wars  under  the  guidance  of  a  great  statesman  created  the 
indispensable  element  of  national  unity,  and  the  state,  coherent 
within,  was  ready  to  try  its  arms  in  more  distant  fields  and  to 
enter  upon  a  world-activity  which  should  in  time  include  the  exten- 
sion of  control  over  distant  territory.^  During  the  period  preced- 
ing the  culmination  of  Bismarck's  policy  of  unification,  noteworthy 
omens  for  the  future  began  to  appear  in  the  form  of  unofficial 
foreign  undertakings  in  the  commercial,  missionary,  and  scientific 
fields.  The  German  trader  and  missionary  became  ubiquitous,  and 
the  Hamburg  and  Bremen  merchant-houses  extended  their  activity 
to  South  America,  Africa,  and  Australasia.  Emigration  of  men  and 
capital  went  along  with  the  growth  of  a  merchant  marine  and  the 
formation  of  wide  interests  in  foreign  parts.  Treaties  were  made 
with  eastern  nations.  German  explorers  and  scientific  travelers 
commenced  to  publish  results  of  investigations  pursued  with  a 
method  and  thoroughness  to  which  the  world  was  not  used. 
Prussian  men-of-war  began  to  multiply  and  to  appear  on  cruises 
of  discovery  and  survey.^ 

Agitation  for  Colonies 

After  the  war  with  France  had  welded  the  German  nation  into 
a  still  more  coherent  whole  and  had  inspired  it  with  the  elation  of 
victory  and  the  sense  of  important  individuality,  voices  began  to  be 

^  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  307. 

2  Der  Deutsche  Export,  pp.  i  ff. ;  Meinecke,  pp.  4-5  ;  Blum,  pp.  8  ff. ;  Pfeil,  Studien, 
pp.  10  ff.;  Johnston,  pp.  206  ff. ;  Keltie,  pp.  167  ff.;  Philippson,  pp.  61  ff.  "Colonies 
are  in  our  present  development  a  natural  and  inevitable  consequence  of  a  vigorous 
trade  across  the  seas."    T.  Fabri,  p.  10. 


536  COLONIZATION 

heard  which  demanded  the  official  extension  of  German  control  over 
external  territory.  These  views  were  opposed  from  many  jMudent 
sources,  and  a  controversy  arose,  where,  as  usual,  enthusiasm  scored 
heavily  against  foresight  —  if  one  is  to  judge  by  the  sequence  of 
events.  A  couple  of  pamphlets,  published  late  in  the  seventies,^ 
initiated  the  awakening  of  popular  enthusiasm.  The  arguments  of 
the  colonial  agitators  centered  about  the  questions  of  emigration, 
extension  of  markets,  protection  of  trade-interests,  development 
and  use  of  a  marine,  and  establishment  of  penal  colonies.''^  These 
were  varied  by  the  arguvioitimt  ad  hoinincni  and  the  heated  appeal 
to  patriotism  and  popular  passions.  Too  often  efforts  were  made 
to  enlist  the  emotions  rather  than  the  intellect;  the  spirit  of  '71 
ran  riot,  and  much  was  heard  of  '■'■das  kanoiicnfcstc  DciitscJiland^' 
of  Germany's  "  Wcltberuf^'  and  so  on.  The  political  symbol  or 
catchword  was  ardently  reiterated,  and  other  concomitants  of  polit- 
ical hysteria  were  in  evidence.^ 

Of  arguments  that  pretended  to  a  rational  basis,  that  which  had 
to  do  with  over-population  and  emigration  was  most  often  heard. 
The  stock  form  of  statement  was  to  the  effect  that  Germany  lost 
every  year  the  equivalent  of  a  large  army,  fully  equipped,  inasmuch 
as  those  young,  able-bodied  emigrants  who  regularly  quitted  the 
fatherland,  each  with  his  $100  or  so,  ceased  forever  to  be  Germans, 
and  devoted  their  strength  and  capital  to  the  augmentation  of  a 
ruinous  competition  with  their  former  fellow-countrymen.^  The  net 
loss  in  labor  power  and  capital  was  variously  footed  uj),  but  always 
reached   a  very  high   figure.^    Fabri   and   Weber   raised   a  great 

1  F.  Fabri,  Bedarf  Deutschland  der  Colonien  ?  Eine  politisch-okonomische 
Betrachtung,  Gotha,  1879 ;  E.  von  Weber,  Die  Erweiterung  des  deutschen  Wirt- 
schaftsgebietes  und  die  Grundlegung  zii  iiberseeischen  deutschen  Staaten,  Leipzig, 
1879.     I'liilippson  (pp.  6  ff.)  states  the  arguments  of  these  writers  and  answers  them. 

2  Wohhmann,  Indische  Gids,  1897,  II,  1387  ;   Philippson,  pp.  7  ff. 

^  Engler,pp.77, 133;  T.Fabri,pp.8,i2,etc.;  Oberliinder,  pp.i67ff.;  cf.  Philippson, p.83. 

*  Considerable  complaint  is  made  of  the  speedy  amalgamation  of  German  emi- 
grants with  their  new  fellow-countrymen.  Engler,  p.  114,  note;  Philippson,  p.  6. 
Bismarck  himself  frequently  expressed  his  contempt  for  Germans  who  could  shake 
the  dust  of  the  fatherland  thus  indifferently  from  their  feet.  Cf.  Poschinger,  p.  237. 
P^migration  to  the  all-assimilating  United  States  has  naturally  been  the  most  dispirit- 
ing feature  of  the  question.  Between  1S70  and  1890  the  emigration  to  the  United 
States  was  never  under  90  per  cent  of  the  total.  Geffcken,  in  T/ie  Foriiiit,  XIII,  200; 
cf.  Der  Deutsche  Export,  etc.,  p.  2. 

^  T.  Fabri,  p.  22;  Philippson,  p.  25.  Geffcken  (in  llie  Foriivi)  estimates  the  total 
emigration  from  1820  to  1888  as  6,000,000;  if  each  emigrant  carried  off  an  average  of 
$100,  the  loss  of  actual  money  Was  very  great,  not  to  mention  that  incurred  in  the 
education  of  the  departing  citizens,  and  othei^wise. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  537 

outcry  over  this  and  predicted  rise  in  prices,  decline  in  wages, 
over-importation,  and  aggravation  of  pauperism,  social  need,  and 
socialism.  They  thought  to  cure  all  this  evil  by  directing  German 
emigration  to  German  colonies.  Here  it  was  proposed  to  create  a 
field  for  the  youthful  professional  men,  technicians,  and  others, 
who  found  their  chances  narrowed  in  the  overstocked  market  of  the 
home-land.  These  colonies  need  not  be  joined  politically  with  the 
metropolis,  but  should  constitute  essentially  German  communities, 
preserving  the  national  language  and  traits  in  foreign  lands. ^ 

Other  arguments  were  brought  forward  on  the  ground  of  trade- 
interests.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Germans,  as  a  rule,  put  forth 
such  pleas  on  their  own  merits  ;  there  was  little  attempt  to  cloak 
them  in  the  hypocritical  garb  of  humanitarianism  and  disinterested- 
ness. The  penetration  of  foreign,  especially  tropical,  products  into 
Germany  turned  the  attention  of  certain  classes  to  the  need  of  a 
direct  relation  of  the  empire  with  its  supply  region ;  at  the  same 
time  the  rapid  development  of  home  industries  and  shipping 
seemed  to  demand  the  widening  of  existing  markets.  It  was  felt 
that  Germans  must  try  to  insure  themselves  against  the  hostility 
of  tariffs  and  other  trade-regulations  by  creating  colonies  which 
should  act  as  a  unit  with  the  mother-country,  supplying  her  with 
raw  materials  and  increasing  the  demand  for  her  manufactured 
products.  It  was  also  asserted  that  German  trade-interests  in  dis- 
tant lands  needed  the  protection  and  standing  which  it  was  thought 
a  possessor  of  colonies  was  peculiarly  fitted  to  give.^  This,  of 
course,  easily  passed  over  into  jingoism  and  megalomania  ;  "  the 
victors  of  Koniggratz  and  Sedan  "  could  not  disavow  their  manifest 
destiny.  Agitators  spent  much  of  their  time  railing  against  the 
provincial  small-mindedness  of  a  people  which,  even  in  the  midst 
of  victories,  could  not  perceive  its  "mission."^ 

The  navy  was  anxious,  of  course,  for  the  addition  to  its  growing 
importance  which  the  supervision  of  trading-posts  and  colonies 
would  afford  ;  numerous  shipping  interests  hungered  for  subsidies 
and  other  favors  ;  there  were  those  who  complained  that  the  navy 
had  not  enough  to  do,  though  objections  to  the  increase  of  naval 
expenditures  were  stifled.    But,  in  general,  there  was  no  inverse 

1  Oberliinder,  p.  170  ;  Philippson,  pp.  13  ff. ;  T.  Fabri,  pp.  20  ff. 

2  Jannasch,  pp.  423  ff. ;  Oberlander,  p.  168;  Philippson,  pp.  7  ff.,  61  ff. 

3  "  In  der  That,  wer  in  aller  Welt  soil  es  denn  wagen,  ohne  Scheu  vor  fremdem 
Neid  Thaten  zu  thun,  wenn  nicht  der  Sieger  von  Koniggratz  und  Sedan  .''  "  T.  Fabri, 
p.  17. 


538  COLONIZATION 

process  contemplated  ;  colonics  were  not  expected  to  create  trade 
and  a  merchant  marine,  but  were  rather  to  represent  the  flower 
and  culmination  of  the  growth  of  foreign  trade  and  other  interests. 
This  attitude  may  have  been  due  to  the  strong  common  sense  of 
Bismarck,  which  so  often  held  in  check  the  extravagances  of  the 
multitude;  at  any  rate,  it  was  impressed  upon  the  state  policy. 
Arguments  in  favor  of  penal  colonies,  based  upon  exaggerated 
estimates  of  criminality  and  the  dangers  of  socialism,  were  also  to 
be  heard  in  pre-expansion  days.^ 

It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  many  and  worthy  names  were 
to  be  found  in  the  anti-expansionist  ranks.  In  the  period  of  popu- 
lar agitation  there  were  those  who  withstood  the  current,  pleaded 
for  deliberation,  and  brought  counter-arguments  to  meet  the  asser- 
tions of  the  dominant  faction.  It  was  shown  that  Germany  was 
far  from  over-populated  ;  that  emigration  took  place  from  the  com- 
paratively under-populated  rural  districts  ;  that  the  trend  of  prices, 
taking  a  reasonably  extended  period,  was  downward,  while  that  of 
wages  was  upward  ;  that  rise  of  the  standard  of  living  and  growth 
of  new  needs  explained  much  of  the  increasing  importation  ;  that 
the  departure  of  the  farmers  was  due  chiefly  to  an  oppressive 
military  service  and  difficulties  in  acquiring  holdings  of  land  ;  that 
painful  reminiscences  were  at  the  bottom  of  the  Germans'  speedy 
forgetfulness  of  the  fatherland  under  the  more  enlightened  system 
of  other  nations,  and  especially  of  the  United  States.  The  self- 
contradiction  of  those  who  decried  emigration  and  yet  complained 
of  over-population  was  exposed.  The  folly  of  schemes  looking  to 
the  regulation  of  the  German  population  resident  under  a  foreign 
flag  was  held  up  to  ridicule,  and  the  flimsiness  of  a  mere  political 
tie  was  shown  from  the  experience  of  England,  the  very  country 
whose  example  had  been  most  frequently  invoked  by  the  colonial 
agitators.  The  weakness  of  Germany's  geographical  position,  the 
dangers  of  European  complications,  the  inexperience  of  the  Ger- 
mans in  governing  external  territory,  the  expense  of  such  govern- 
ment with  no  experienced  colonial  soldiers  and  functionaries  to 
back  it,  its  trials  and  disillusionments,  were  not  hidden  from  the 
eyes  of  the  historian  and  social  philosopher.  Such  critics  urged 
the  necessity  of  reform  at  home  and  of  development  of  those  arts 
of  life  which  make  possible  the  maintenance  of  a  larger  population 
on  the  same  soil.    This  would  effectually  dispose  of  the  emigration 

1  I'hilippson,  pp.  50  ff. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  539 

and  penal  colony  arguments.^  They  urged  the  nation  not  to  accept 
the  propositions  of  hot-brained  young  enthusiasts  whose  ardor 
scorned  to  discriminate  between  the  possible  and  the  utterly  illu- 
sory.^ If  argument  or  biting  satire  had  counted  for  anything,  the 
Germans  would  have  been  deterred  from  their  precipitate  rush 
into  the  colonial  field.^ 

Policy  of  Bismarck 

They  had  little  or  no  effect  ;  apparently  Germany  had  become 
already  a  "colonizing  nation."  There  was  no  thought  of  pause 
or  deliberation  in  the  ranks  of  the  Kolonialmenschen ;  they  organ- 
ized themselves  into  colonial  societies  (1882-1884),  and  began  to 
besiege  the  government  with  demands  for  action.*  That  attention 
was  called  more  sharply  to  the  regulation  of  emigration  and  the 
development  of  the  consular  service,  was  apparently  a  real  benefit 
to  the  country.^  In  despair  of  acquiring  unoccupied  lands  fit  for 
colonies  of  settlement,  the  furtherers  of  the  colonial  movement 
directed  attention  to  Brazil,  Argentina,  Paraguay,  and  other  parts 
of  South  America,  already  more  or  less  under  German  influence ; 
they  were  willing  to  fight  the  United  States,  if  necessary,  over  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  or  to  insist  upon  England's  allowing  an  essen- 
tially German  settlement  in  Australia.  Some  bluster  was  heard 
regarding  the  seizure  of  French  colonies,  particularly  Pondichery, 
together  with  twenty  ironclads,  as  indemnity  of  the  Franco-Prussian 
war  ;  this  project  shipwrecked  against  the  imperturbable  opposition 

1  "  Jeder  Schritt,  den  wir  zur  Aufklarung  des  Volkes,  zum  Ausbaii  der  Freiheit 
und  zur  Versohnung  der  socialen  Gegensiitze  thun,  wird  unsern  Staat  und  unsere 
Gesellschaft  mehr  4vraftigen,  als  das  Schfeckmittel  der  Strafcolonien."  Philippson, 
p.  60. 

2  Weber  even  suggested  artificial  restriction  of  the  growth  of  cities.  PhiUppson, 
p.  29. 

^  Jannasch,  pp.  378-399,  403  (Roscheron  German  emigration,  same  volume,  327  ff.); 
Philippson,  pp.  7  ff.,  25  ff.,  38  ff.,  61  ff. 

*  Schmidt,  Deutschlands  Kolonien,  I,  1-2.  This  work  is  the  most  comprehensive  of 
those  cited  in  the  present  chapter.  It  is  written  by  a  soldier  and  exhibits  the  virtues 
and  defects  incident  to  its  authorship.  The  first  volume  is  on  East  Africa,  where  the 
author's  own  experience  enables  him  to  go  into  considerable  detail ;  the  second  is  a 
compilation  from  reliable  and  important  original  sources.  The  work  impresses  the 
reader  as  a  trustworthy  and  honest  production. 

5  Jannasch  (pp.  452  ff.)  asserts  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  consular  service  ;  he  says 
the  selection  of  the  consuls  was  most  vicious —  if  a  man  had  squandered  one  estate, 
he  was  fit  to  be  consul ;  if  three,  to  be  consul  general.  Merit  received  little  reward 
beyond  cheap  medals  and  the  like,  and  the  best  men  kept  out  of  the  service. 


540  COLONIZATION 

of  Bismarck.  The  colonial  societies  were  very  much  in  earnest  and 
were  even  willing  to  put  their  hands  into  their  pockets,  if  neces- 
sary ;  their  influence  was  powerful  and  became  an  important  factor 
in  the  development  of  the  imperial  foreign  and  colonial  policy.^ 
The  government,  however,  was  too  deliberate  to  meet  their  wishes  ; 
statesmanship  and  its  requirements  did  not  enter  into  their  stock 
of  ideas.  The  government  was,  of  course,  Bismarck,  and  the 
Chancellor's  tardiness  came  in  for  many  recriminations  and  caused 
much  disillusionment ;  criticism  of  the  government  took  on  a  per- 
sonal tinge.  Whatever  may  have  been  his  later  views,  for  years 
Bismarck  certainly  presented  the  figure  of  a  reluctant,  hardly  per- 
suaded adherent  of  a  colonization  policy.  That  his  finger  was 
ever  on  the  pulse  of  Germany  goes  without  saying,  and  it  is  cer- 
tain that  he  saw  fit  to  yield,  willingly  or  regretfully  at  the  outset, 
to  the  swelling  sentiment  of  the  empire.  But  however  much  his 
original  attitude  may  have  changed,  there  is  little  cause  to  wonder 
that  the  brakes  were  put  on  with  a  firm  hand  and  kept  on  until 
the  farsighted  statesman  could  more  confidently  reckon  with  the 
national  future.  A  young  nation,  scarcely  yet  united,  was  eager 
to  enter  a  field  where  shocks  and  strains  were  in  the  order  of 
events,  and  where  inexperience  was  likely  to  feel  their  force  with 
peculiar  intensity.  Collision  with  nations  whose  friendship  was  all 
but  indispensable  was  more  than  a  possibility.  It  is  scarcely  sur- 
prising if  the  prudence  of  age  hesitated  to  expose  an  unseasoned 
people  to  all  these  chances  and  trials.  And  the  conservatism  of 
the  Chancellor  was  radicalism  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Reichs- 
tag. This  body  consistently  opposed  all  colonial  schemes  and 
naturally  became  a  mark  for  incessant  abuse  and  complaints  of 
narrow-mindedness.  Even  after  Bismarck  began  to  advocate  the 
acquisition  of  colonies,  the  Reichstag  was  not  won  over,  but  con- 
tinued to  offer  hateful  obstruction  to  the  wide-reaching  plans  of 
the  expansionists.  There  was  besides  a  large  indifferent  element 
among  the  people  to  provoke  these  "patriots";  the  peasant 
stolidly  emigrated  as  before,  and  the  general  populace  needed 
many  a  warm  and  specious  appeal  before  it  swung  into  line  with 
the  agitators  and  the  interested  merchant  circles.  It  was  danger 
to  the  interests  of  the  latter  class  which  most  directly  stimulated 
governmental  activity. 

1  Lowe,  II,  203  ;  Philippson,  pp.  38  ff. ;  Jannasch,  pp.  399  ff. ;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre, 
etc.,  p.  135. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  541 

Bismarck  seems  to  have  foreseen  the  ultimate  colonial  destiny 
of  his  country,  but  to  have  regarded  the  first  projects  as  ill-timed. 
To  the  earliest  approaches  of  colonial  partisans  he  gave  no  satis- 
faction.^  In  his  opinion  the  merchant  should  precede  the  official, 
whose  entrance  upon  the  function  of  administering  young  socie- 
ties should  take  place  relatively  late.  Colonies  without  a  fleet  he 
regarded  as  so  many  vulnerable  and  undefended  points.^  But  he 
was  always  open  to  all  suggestions  looking  to  the  development  of 
trade.  Trade  was  an  immediate  advantage  ;  whether  it  would  lead 
in  time  to  the  official  occupation  of  colonies  was  a  question  for  the 
future  to  decide.  Bismarck  sounded  the  public  mind  in  regard  to 
trade  with  considerable  regularity.  In  1883  he  put  forth  a  request 
to  merchant  societies  for  reports  and  recommendations  on  the 
attitude  to  be  taken  by  the  government  toward  German  commer- 
cial interests  in  foreign  parts ;  some  of  the  reports  submitted 
urged  vigorous  action,  but  no  action  resulted.  In  1880,  with  the 
failure  of  the  old  Godeffroy  house,  the  time  seemed  ripe  for  more 
positive  measures ;  the  extinction  of  German  trade  in  Polynesia, 
where  it  was  predominant,  was  threatened,  unless  a  substitute 
for  this  well-known  house  could  be  maintained.  Bismarck  accord- 
ingly asked  the  Reichstag  to  guarantee  the  dividends  of  a  new 
South  Sea  Company  by  a  maximum  annual  grant  of  300,000 
marks,  for  twenty  years.  The  demand  was  refused  by  a  small 
majority.  Evidently  the  time  was  not  yet ;  but  Bismarck's  change 
of  attitude  was  attested  by  his  bitter  complaints  of  this  lack  of 
support  "even  in  the  beginnings  of  colonization";  he  felt  that 
the  time  for  action  had  almost  come.  The  next  move  was  the 
proposal  of  a  mail-steamer  subsidy  bill ;  this  was  rejected  by  the 
Reichstag,  but  warmly  applauded  by  the  country  at  large. ^  At 
this  juncture,  feeling  sure  of  popular  support,  but  desiring  to 
stimulate  it  to  the  pitch  of  blind  partisanship,  and  thus  once 
for  all  decide  the  issue,  Bismarck  deftly  smote  that  one  of  the 

1  To  those  who  wished  to  relieve  France  of  colonies  and  battleships,  he  said :  "  I 
want  no  colonies.  They  are  good  for  nothing  but  supply-stations.  For  us  in  Germany, 
this  colonial  business  would  be  just  like  the  silken  sables  in  the  noble  families  of 
Poland,  who  have  no  shirts  to  their  backs."  Lowe,  II,  203.  In  the  Reichstag  (Jan- 
uary 22,  1889)  he  announced,  "  Ich  war  von  Haus  aus  kein  Kolonialmensch."  Andler, 
p.  270;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  Vorwort.  He  was  studying  the  subject  of 
colonization,  however,  as  early  as  1876.    Lowe,  II,  210. 

-  The  phenomenal  growth  of  the  German  navy  (1871-1885)  seems  to  have  done 
away  in  part  with  this  objection.    Lowe,  II,  203. 

3  It  was  passed  in  the  next  (18S4-1SS5)  session. 


542  COLON  IZA'llON 

national  heart-strings  which  vibrates  to  national  vanity.  Me  de- 
parted from  his  avowed  custom  and  published  a  White  Book 
(1884)  detailing  with  gross  one-sidedness  his  grievances  and  mal- 
treatment at  the  hands  of  the  English  diplomatic  office,  in  connec- 
tion with  questions  of  trade-interests  and  protection  in  Southwest 
Africa.  These  virtuous  plaints  gained  him  the  sympathy  not  only 
of  his  own  countrymen,  but  that  of  English  circles  as  well.  In 
Germany  the  opponents  of  colonial  expansion  were  no  longer 
heeded  ;  a  force  stronger  than  reason  had  been  in\-oked  and  the 
path  was  cleared  for  the  realization  of  what  had  become  one  of 
Bismarck's  chief  aims.^ 

This  Southwest  Africa  incident  was  the  crisis  in  Germany's 
development  of  a  colonial  policy.  It  was  not  approached  by  the 
government  precipitately ;  numerous  petitions  of  missionaries  and 
traders  in  those  parts  for  protection  had  been  pigeon-holed  before 
the  pressing  appeals  in  the  early  eighties.  These  and  the  uncer- 
tain position  of  Liideritz  ^  virtually  forced  representations  to  be 
made  to  England.  Her  shuffling  and  evasive  answers  and  her 
dilatory  conduct  in  response  to  straightforward  inquiries  concern- 
ing English  intentions  in  the  country  about  Angra  Pequena  seem 
finally  to  have  e.xhausted  Bismarck's  patience.  He  had  spent  fruit- 
less months  in  polite  negotiations  whose  net  result  was  practically 
nil,  and  though  evidently  appreciating  to  the  full  the  value  of  Eng- 
land's friendship,  he  at  last  suddenly  and  peremptorily  declared  a 
protectorate  over  the  Liideritz  possessions  of  Southwest  Africa.^ 
All  intentions  of  conquest  were  disclaimed.  After  this  step  it  seems 
that  the  Rubicon  had  been  crossed.  England  protested,  but  finally 
acquiesced  as  gracefully  as  possible  under  awkward  circumstances, 

1  Lowe,  II,  211  ff. ;  Meinecke,  p.  17;  Philippson,  pp.  66  ff . ;  F.  Fabri,  pp.  15-16; 
Keltic,  chap,  xii ;  Andler,  p.  272;  Geffcken,  in  The  Forum,  XIII,  200. 

-  Liideritz  was  a  Bremen  merchant  who  acquired  in  1883  by  purchase  from  native 
chiefs  about  215  scjuare  miles  of  land  on  the  bay  of  Angra  Pequena,  with  all  rights 
of  supremacy.  Mis  osten.sible  purpose  was  to  found  a  trading-station,  but  there  is 
little  question  that  he  was  inspired  by  the  inner  circles  of  the  colonial  societies. 
lie  was  soon  beyond  his  depth  in  this  undertaking  —  this  necessitating  the  formation 
of  a  company  for  Southwest  Africa.  The  extreme  caution  and  the  noncommittal 
character  of  the  government's  attitude  toward  Liideritz  are  especially  to  be  noted. 
Schmidt,  II,  257  ff. ;  Keltie,  chap,  xii,  178  ff.;  Oberliinder,  pp.  14S  IT.;  lUittner.  pp.  1 15- 
116;   F.  Fabri,  F"unf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  3ff. 

"  He  instructed  the  German  consul  at  Cape  Town  (April  24,  18S4)  to  declare 
oflficially  that  Liideritz  and  his  settlements  were  under  the  protection  of  the  German 
Empire.  A  naval  officer  hoisted  the  imperial  flag  over  Angra  Peejuena  August  7,  1884. 
Schmidt,  II,  261  ;   Keltie,  chap,  xii ;  Johnston,  pp.  249  ff. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  543 

and  the  colonial  party  at  home  in  Germany  forgot  its  grievances 
and  demonstrated  vigorously. 

But  Bismarck  still  clung  to  his  enunciated  policy  ;  he  announced 
that  Germany  was  not  going  colony-hunting  :  "  German  colonies 
would,  like  the  English,  have  to  trust  to  individual  effort  and 
natural  growth,  not,  like  the  French,  to  artificial  forcing  and  state 
patronage."  ^  This  common-sense  doctrine  was  characteristic  of 
Bismarck's  whole  colonial  activity  ;  he  departed  from  it  only  under 
the  strongest  pressure.  When  he  is  found  favoring  projects  of 
expansion,  one  may  be  sure  there  is  some  preexisting  commercial 
interest  to  be  safeguarded  ;  he  never  believed  in  colonies  for  the 
sake  of  colonies.  Throughout  his  period  of  power  he  seems  con- 
sistently to  have  kept  the  history  of  England  and  her  example 
before  his  eye.  Though  a  man  of  quick  decision  and  daring  action, 
self-confident  as  few  statesmen  have  the  right  to  be,  he  prepared 
for  entrance  upon  the  untried  colonial  field  modestly  and  as  a 
student.^  To  him  statesmanship  meant  wise  direction  of  popular 
impulse ;  he  risked  and  lost  much  popularity  because  he  kept  his 
head  cool  and  his  hand  firm,  and  insisted  upon  postponing  colo- 
nization until  the  time  was  ripe. 

Colonial  Acquisitions 

When,  in  1884,  the  reins  were  slackened  and  the  colonial  move- 
ment had  been  concentrated  and  directed  toward  an  immediate  suc- 
cess through  the  enlistment  of  popular  prejudice  and  self-esteem, 
further  developments  were  not  slow  to  manifest  themselves.  The 
latent  and  gathering  forces  of  the  preceding  period  were  trans- 
formed into  actual  energy  and  momentum,  and  within  four  months 
of  the  establishment  of  a  protectorate  over  Southwest  Africa  the 
clamor  of  trade-interests  in  West  Africa  had  brought  about  the 
official  occupation  of  Togo  (July  5,  1884)  and  Kamerun  (July  14, 
1884),  and  the  representations  of  South  Sea  merchants^  had  led 

1  Perry,  "  Traditions,"  etc. ;  F.  Fabri,  p.  100;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  307  ;  Lowe,  II,  213. 

2  Lowe,  II,  210. 

3  Complaints  were  made  of  an  imminent  English  and  Australian  expansion  over 
German  trade-districts.  Bismarck,  at  the  same  time,  had  become  distrustful  of  the 
sincerity  and  value  of  British  protection  of  German  interests  and  felt  that  the  situa- 
tion called  for  speedy  action  in  the  establishment  of  a  German  foothold  in  the 
threatened  region.  The  South  Sea  projects  were  furthered  through  the  influence 
of  Ilansemann  and  other  important  financiers.  Lowe,  II,  231;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre, 
etc.,  p.  9  ;  Andler,  p.  273  ;  Schmidt,  II,  292  ff. 


544  COLONIZATION 

to  the  virtual  seizure  of  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland  and  the  Bismarck 
Archipelago  (August  20,  1884).  Here,  as  in  Southwest  Africa,  the 
missionaries  had  played  their  part.^  In  these  cases  it  may  be  said 
that  the  Chancellor's  policy  of  trader  first,  government  afterward, 
was  carried  out ;  but  a  wide  deviation  from  this  system  was  yet 
to  come.  On  October  i,  1884,  three  young  adventurers,  under 
assumed  names  and  disguised  as  laborers,  undertook  for  the  Gcscll- 
scJiaft  fiir  deiitscJie  Kolonisation  the  seizure  of  what  is  now  German 
East  Africa.  No  German  interests  worth  mentioning  existed  in 
this  part  of  the  earth.  The  objects  of  this  expedition  were  attained 
with  extraordinary  celerity  ;  so-called  treaties  were  made  with  a 
number  of  native  princes,  who  were  cajoled  into  agreements  which 
they  understood  very  imperfectly,  if  at  all,  and  concessions  of  land 
and  administrative  privileges  were  obtained  to  which  imperial  pro- 
tection was  extended  through  charter,  February  27,  1885.^ 

In  the  middle  of  1884  Germany  had  had  no  possessions  beyond 
the  seas;  early  in  1885  she  found  herself  a  great  colonial  power, 
possessing  an  external  empire  of  over  1,000,000  square  miles  and 
exercising  dominion  over  more  than  10,000,000  subjects,  mostly 
of  lower  races. ^  The  tide  had  been  taken  at  its  full,  and  the 
nation  had  been  guided  through  a  dangerous  passage  without  war 
and  without  loss  of  prestige  or  dignity.  The  issue  once  joined, 
Bismarck's  policy  had  been  of  a  daring  and  decisive  nature  ;  he  had 
handled  the  English  with  scant  respect,  in  marked  contrast  with 
his  former  courtesy  and  patience,  and  had  resorted  to  stratagems, 
ambiguities,  and  evasions  which  had  been  completely  successful  in 
throwing  the  unsuspecting  and  self-satisfied  British  government  off 
the  track  until  it  was  too  late.  The  German  commissioner,  Nach- 
tigal,  had  snatched  Togo  and  Kamerun  from  under  the  very  nose 
of  the  English  commissioner,  and  no  apologies  were  made  for  the 
seizure  of  East  African  districts  which  Great  Britain  had  long 
regarded  as   prospectively   her  own.     It   is   noteworthy   that   the 

1  Schmidt,  II,  51  ff.,  173  ff.,  292  ff. ;  Von  Stengel,  pp.  10  ff.;  Keltie,  chap,  xiii ;  F. 
Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  gff. ;  Johnston,  pp.  249ff. ;  Oberlander,  p.  156;  Miiller,  pp.2ff. 
Buttner  (p.  68)  says  the  missionaries  had  commenced  their  activity  in  Southwest  Africa 
as  early  as  1864. 

2  Schmidt,  I,  1-18,  28-29,43;  Keltie,  chap,  xv ;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  7  ff. 
Two  of  the  young  men  in  question  were  Karl  Peters  and  Graf  Pfeil. 

8  Statesman's  Year-Book,  1897  (estimates  of  1S96) ;  these  figures  are,  of  course, 
only  approximate.  Estimates  for  1899,  subtracting  areas  and  population  acquired  since 
1886,  give  the  total  area  of  possessions  as  1,025,1 10  square  miles  ;  the  total  population 
as  14,556,000.     Statesman's  N'earBook,  1900. 


,  MUliKRN   GERMAN   COLONIZATION  545 

attitude  maintained  toward  France  and  French  colonial  suscepti- 
bilities during  this  period  was  markedly  conciliatory  and  courteous. ^ 

The  Chartered  Companies 

Such  progress  in  expansion  as  has  been  described  ought,  one 
would  think,  to  have  satisfied  colonial  partisans  and  given  them 
faith  in  the  government  as  represented  by  Bismarck.  Perhaps 
their  appetites  had  been  whetted  too  long  ;  at  any  rate  they  grum- 
bled still.  The  Chancellor  was  too  conservative  for  them  ;  they 
chafed  under  his  guidance  and  were  unable  to  forgive  him  his  lack 
of  warmth  and  energy.  They  hailed  his  retirement  with  undis- 
guised joy  and  welcomed  the  advent  of  the  young  emperor  into 
sole  power  with  high  hopes.  They  greeted  the  perpetrators  of  un- 
speakable horrors  in  the  new  possessions  as  heroes,  and  knew  no 
measure  in  their  loves  and  hatreds.^  Nevertheless,  the  Reichstag 
refused  to  be  fired  by  their  excitement  ;  the  proposals  of  Prince 
Bismarck  looking  to  the  direct  management  of  the  protectorates 
by  the  imperial  government  were  rejected.  The  public  purse  was 
not  to  be  opened,  and  of  necessity  recourse  was  had  to  the  old 
expedient  of  monopolistic  companies  of  trade  and  exploitation. 
These  companies  undertook  severally  the  management  of  East  and 
Southwest  Africa,  the  New  Guinea  region  (including  Bismarck 
Archipelago  and  the  Solomon  Islands),  and  the  Marshall  Islands, 
under  the  protection  of  and  under  responsibility  to  the  German 
Chancellor.^ 

These  sudden  and  successful  moves  of  Germany  initiated  a  wild 
scramble  for  what  was  left  of  Africa,  and,  indeed,  of  the  world  at 
large  —  a  contest  ended  for  Africa  with  the  Berlin  Conference  of 
1884,  in  which  the  respective  spheres  of  influence  of  the  nations 

1  Bismarck  seems  to  have  become  so  impatient  with  England  as  to  have  contem- 
plated a  rapprochement  with  France.  He  could  not  afford  to  antagonize  both  at  once. 
Lowe,  II,  169,  244;  Keltic,  pp.  202,  206.  Keltic  (pp.  1 91-192)  says, "The  contemptuous 
dog-inthe-manger  policy  of  the  Cape  authorities  did  much  to  arouse  the  wrath  of 
Prince  Bismarck  and  the  German  people  and  to  strengthen  the  resolve  of  the  former 
to  throw  himself  heart  and  soul  into  the  Colonial  movement."  Bismarck  thought 
that  if  the  dog  would  n't  get  out  of  the  manger,  he  must  be  pelted  out     Lowe,  II,  219. 

2  Wilhelm  II  in  his  youth  is  said  to  have  been  fired  with  zeal  for  colonial  ex- 
pansion by  the  example  of  his  distant  predecessor,  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg. 
Cf.  Spectator,  LXXXI,  481;  Perry,  "Traditions,"  etc. 

2  Togo  and  Kamerun  were  taken  directly  under  imperial  rule.  On  the  companies, 
see  pp.  555  ff-,  below.  The  Marshall  Islands  were  occupied  in  1886.  Von  Stengel, 
p.  17. 


546  c:OI.()\IZATION  ♦ 

were  delimited  and  the  opportunity  for  further  exploits  and  adven- 
tures in  land-grabbing-  reduced  practically  to  nil.^  With  the  seizure 
of  New  Guinea  and  adjacent  islands,  the  occupation  of  "unoccu- 
pied "  lands  has  virtually  come  to  an  end  on  earth.  Germany,  after 
centuries  of  indifference,  has  completed  the  race  among  the  very 
first ;  in  extent  her  colonial  empire  is  inferior  only  to  those  of  Eng- 
land and  France  ;  but  its  quality  is  that  which  usually  marks  the 
portion  of  the  late-comer. 

Character  of  the  Colonies 

Preceding  their  official  occupation,  all  of  these  colonies  ^  except 
East  Africa  had  been  more  or  less  familiar  to  the  German  mis- 
sionary and  trader.  Substantial  commercial  interests  existed,  in 
Kamerun  and  Togo ;  the  missionaries  of  Southwest  Africa  were 
predominantly  Germans  ;  and  beginnings  of  both  trade  and  mis- 
sions had  been  made  in  the  South  Sea  possessions.  Upon  the  con- 
tinent of  Africa,  Germans  had  been  famous  for  many  years  as 
explorers  and  pioneers,  while  German  missionaries  had  dared  and 
suffered  in  the  very  centers  of  savagery.  The  extension  of  protec- 
tion to  German  interests  was  real  in  West  Africa  and  plausible  in 
Southwest  Africa  and  New  Guinea  ;  asserted  in  regard  to  East 
Africa,  it  was  a  mere  pretense.  The  major  possessions  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  may  be  roughly  divided  according  to  latitude  into  two 
classes,  the  tropical  and  the  sub-tropical ;  all  belong  to  the  first 
class  except  Southwest  Africa.  Of  the  conditions  of  these  colonies 
dependent  on  latitude,  climate'^  is  the  most  decisive  and  the  most 
unfortunate  ;  the  climate  of  all  the  colonies  in  low  latitudes  is  typ- 
ically tropical,  with  the  exception  of  alleged  sanatoria  in  the  moun- 
tains of  Kamerun  and  New  Guinea,  and  of  the  Kilima  Njaro  slope 
in  East  Africa,  where  altitude  corrects  latitude  to  some  extent.* 
All  these  tropical  colonies  are  abodes  of  fever  and  malaria  ;  Kam- 
erun and  Togo  have  an  especially  evil  reputation  for  the  worst 

1  Von  Stengel,  pp.  lo  ff. ;  Keltic,  chap.  xiv. 

2  Strictly  speaking,  the  German  possession.s  are  neither  colonies  nor  protectorates. 
They  have  as  yet  too  few  settlers  to  deserve  the  name  of  colonies ;  and,  in  reality, 
there  were  no  reasonably  stable  native  governments  to  protect.   Von  Stengel,  pp.  3,  20. 

8  For  climatic  conditions,  flora  and  fauna  of  the  German  colonies,  see  Schmidt, 
passim;  Meinecke, /<w.r/w  ;  Keane,  Africa,  W,  passi)ii\  Keltic,  chaps,  xii,  xiii,  xv, 
xvii,  xxii.  The  following  treat  separate  colonics  more  in  detail :  Blum,  pp.  84  ff.,  104  ; 
lioshart,  pp.  161  ff.,  225  ff. ;  liiittner,  pp.  10  ff.;  Hagen,  pp.  13  ff.;  Hermann,  pp.  66, 
94;    Globus,  I-XXIX,  3  (January  17,  1901). 

<  Schmidt  (I,  148)  says  that  heights  of  1000  meters  protect  in  no  way. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  547 

forms  of  African  fever.  Dysentery  abounds  throughout  the  trop- 
ical possessions.  Acclimatization  is  an  illusion  —  all  suffer  from 
the  tropical  diseases,  even  natives  and  animals. ^  Aside  from  the 
fever,  the  moist  heat,  the  inevitable  hardships  and  coarse  food,  not 
to  mention  loneliness  and  homesickness,  induce  nervous  disorders, 
melancholia,  and  insanity.  In  short,  the  regular  characteristics  and 
influences  of  the  genuine  tropical  climate  are  everywhere  in  evi- 
dence, and  we  shall  sec  that  the  Germans  have  been  as  little  able 
as  any  other  people  to  treat  their  physical  environment  with  indif- 
ference. The  soil  of  the  tropical  possessions,  excepting  East  Africa, 
likewise  presents  slight  variation  from  the  type.  Rainfall  is  heavy 
and  vegetation  luxuriant,  especially  in  Togo  and  Kamerun.  Valu- 
able woods  are  common.  Palms,  rubber  trees,  bananas,  yams,  taro, 
etc.,  are  everywhere  at  hand,  and  coffee,  tea,  tobacco,  and  cotton 
will,  as  a  rule,  flourish  and  yield  abundantly.^  East  Africa  is  much 
less  favored  in  the  matter  of  soil  and  rainfall.  Wissmann  said  that 
four-fifths  of  the  country  was  barren  waste,  and  of  the  remaining 
fifth  not  all  was  available  for  plantations.  Dry  seasons  occur  and 
are  severe.  The  savanna  is  characteristic.  In  the  German  tropical 
colonies,  as  in  all  others,  genuine  agriculture  after  the  fashion  of 
the  temperate  zone  is  impossible,  but  the  plantation  system  is  said 
to  promise  much  with  good  management  and  persistence. 

The  climate  of  the  sub-tropical  colony,  Southwest  Africa,  is  re- 
ported to  be  very  wholesome  and  invigorating,  especially  in  the 
southern  part.  In  spite  of  the  extreme  dryness,  however,  it  is  ac- 
knowledged that  fever  in  a  milder  form  is  very  common.^  To  neu- 
tralize this  relative  advantage  of  climate,  there  is  an  almost  entire 
absence  of  rainfall,  especially  near  the  coast,  and  the  soil  is  of  such 
porous  quality  as  rapidly  to  absorb  the  water  from  occasional  cloud- 
bursts and  showers.  Of  a  consequence,  the  country  is  largely  desert, 
in  many  places  more  arid  and  desolate  than  the  Sahara,  and  for 
miles  inland  no  water  or  vegetation  of  any  kind  appears.*^    At  best 

1  Boshart,  pp.  229  ff.  This  author  is  convinced  by  long  experience  that  animals' 
deaths  are  more  often  caused  by  malaria  than  by  the  dreaded  tsetse  fly.  His  treatment  of 
tropical  diseases  and  hygiene  is  quite  full  and  satisfactory.  It  should  be  supplemented 
with  the  very  valuable  treatise  of  Hagen,  an  experienced  physician  of  the  tropics. 

2  Schmidt  (II,  328)  and  Blum  (p.  93)  think  that  northern  New  Guinea  bids  fair  to 
rival  Java  in  the  raising  of  tropical  products. 

^  In  the  recent  military  operations  in  Southwest  Africa,  the  mortality  due  to  fever 
is  reported  to  have  been  high. 

*  Biittner  (pp.  12  ff.),  a  veteran  missionary,  describes  the  southern  part  of  the  coast 
of  Southwest  Africa  as  practically  bereft  of  rain.    At  a  distance  of  50  km.  from  the 


548  COLONIZATION 

the  flora  is  limited  to  sparse  grass-tufts  and  dwarfed  trees  except 
in  a  few  more  favored  localities.  Anything  approaching  a  system- 
atic development  of  agriculture  would  demand  stupendous  expense 
and  labor  in  irrigation  and  otherwise.  Cattle-raising,  however,  is 
said  to  flourish  in  the  inner  districts  ;  it  is  necessarily  of  a  nomadic 
order.  Unfortunately  pulmonary  disease  is  rife,  and  as  yet  unyield- 
ing to  treatment  or  inoculation  with  germ-cultures.^ 

In  the  matter  of  fauna,  the  African  possessions  may  be  considered 
together.  *The  most  important  beast,  the  elephant,  is  being  rapidly 
exterminated  wherever  it  is  found  ;  the  ostrich,  too,  has  been  ruth- 
lessly hunted  down  in  Southwest  Africa,  so  that  it  has  withdrawn 
to  relatively  inaccessible  retreats  and  even  there  often  refuses  to 
brood.  Dangerous  and  predatory  animals  are  being  rapidly  done 
away  with  ;  other  species  whose  influence  on  man's  life  is  of  any  sig- 
nificance are  common  enough,  though  on  the  decline  before  civiliza- 
tion. New  Guinea  shares  the  commercially  unimportant  fauna  of 
its  part  of  the  world.  Fish  are  plentiful  off  the  coasts  of  Kamerun, 
Southwest  Africa,  and  New  Guinea.^ 

From  the  standpoint  of  commercial  geography,  the  line  of  dis- 
tinction is  between  African  possessions  and  others.  The  African 
continent,  with  its  unindented  coast-line  and  table-land  formation, 
offers  few  harbors  and  still  fewer  rivers  with  uninterrupted  course. 
Other  factors  enter  to  make  the  case  still  more  unfortunate.  In 
Kamerun  large  estuaries  offer  harborage,  but  the  surf  runs  so  high 
along  the  whole  of  the  gulf  coast  that  ships  are  exposed  to  great 
danger  in  landing.  Off  Togo  they  are  frequently  forced  to  anchor 
in  open  sea  and  depend  on  native  skill  to  land  the  cargoes  piece- 
meal. Southwest  Africa  has  one  good  harbor,  Walfisch  Bay,  but 
it  is  in  British  hands  ;  Swakopmund  is  said,  however,  to  offer  good 
prospects  with  skillful  engineering.^  East  African  harbors  are  not 
suitable  for  large  commerce ;  Dar-es-Salaam,  for  instance,  though 

coast  it  may  rain  once  a  year;  at  loo  km.  twice  or  three  times;  at  200  km.  seven  or 
eight  times.  lie  says  the  eastern  slope  of  the  country  sheds  ruin  like  a  tile  roof. 
He  knows  of  no  water  supply  at  Walfisch  Bay  nor  within  a  considerable  distance  of  it. 
According  to  Schmidt  (II,  213),  the  first  grass  for  cattle  appears  50  km.  from  the 
coast  in  Damaraland.  In  view  of  such  conditions,  difficulties  in  the  way  of  opening 
up  the  country  are  self-evident. 

1  Hermann,  pp.  25  ff. ;  Biittner,  p.  45.  Parts  of  East  and  Southwest  Africa  also 
come  within  the  habitat  of  the  tsetse  fly.    Oberlander,  p.  155  ;   Pfeil,  Vorschlage,  p.  15. 

-  Reichenow,  p.  6 ;   Biittner,  p.  10;  Schmidt,  II,  332;   Boshart,  p.  176. 

■'  Schmidt  (II,  201)  says  that  Swakopmund  will  succeed  Walfisch  Bay  as  the  chief 
harbor  of  the  district,  as  the  latter  is  filling  rapidly  with  sand. 


MODERN  GERMAN   COLONIZATION  549 

it  possesses  a  deep  basin,  is  reached  only  through  a  narrow,  tortu- 
ous channel.  Other  "  harbors  "  are  largely  beaching-places  for  Arab 
dlioxvs}  The  rivers  of  the  African  protectorates  are  almost  all  broken 
by  falls  not  far  from  their  mouths.  In  Togo  the  best  river-courses 
are  under  French  or  British  supervision  ;  in  Southwest  Africa  there 
are  no  rivers  :  the  courses  of  occasional  torrents,  coming  after  rain 
in  the  back-country,  are  marked  by  dry  beds  of  sand.  The  rivers 
of  East  Africa  and  Kamerun  are  comparatively  insignificant.  In 
Africa  there  are  no  natural  communications  with  the  interior,  no 
arteries  of  trade ;  the  native  caravan  roads  are  mere  paths  a  few 
feet  wide. 

In  the  South  Sea  region,  chances  for  trade-development  are  a 
little  better  ;  good  harbors  are  to  be  found,  and  one  or  two  large 
streams  are  navigable  far  into  the  interior.^  Penetration  by  land 
is  unfortunately  most  difficult  throughout  New  Guinea  and  the 
other  larger  islands  ;  the  mountain  ranges  are  much  broken,  and 
deep  chasms  impede  advance.  Reefs  and  soundings  along  the  coast 
have  been  insufficiently  marked  as  yet ;  when  reliable  charts  have 
been  made.  New  Guinea  will  hold  a  respectable  chance  in  the  trade 
of  its  region  ;  but  extreme  remoteness  from  Europe  and  from  estab- 
lished Oriental  trade-routes  will  interfere  seriously  with  its  com- 
mercial development  for  years  and  decades  to  come.^ 

From  time  to  time  reports  of  the  discovery  of  gold  in  this  or 
that  colony  are  noised  abroad  ;  a  little  has  been  found  here  and 
there,  but  as  yet  the  longed-for  stimulus  of  the  yellow  metal  fails 
the  German  possessions.  Copper  has  been  mined  in  some  quan- 
tities in  Southwest  Africa  and  iron  ore  of  a  high  quality  is  not  un- 
common, but  the  nature  of  the  country  prevents  much  progress. 
Ambitious  attempts  in  the  mining  of  copper  have  failed  signally, 
and  systematic  development  of  the  mines  will  become  possible  only 
when  better  means  of  transportation  shall  have  been  introduced.^ 

The  native  population  of  the  German  possessions,  taken  as  a 
whole,  is  sparse  and  of  a  distinctly  inferior  stamp.    Hottentots  and 

1  On  Dares-Salaam,  see  Davis,  in  Scrihner'' s  \  Pfeil,  Vorschlage,  p.  50. 

2  The  Kaiserin  Augusta  River,  in  New  Guinea,  is  navigable  to  a  point  distant  about 
180  miles  (as  the  bird  flies)  from  the  coast.    Schmidt,  II,  316. 

8  On  the  commercial  geography  of  the  German  colonies,  see  Schmidt,  T,  134  ff.; 
II,  2  ff.,  156  ff.,  198  ff.,  302  ff. ;  Keltie,  chap,  xxii ;  Keane,  Africa,  II,  3  ff.,  189  ff.,  522  ; 
Blum,  pp.  102,  186  ff. ;  Pfeil,  Studien,  pp.  3  ff. ;  Vorschlage,  pp.  6-7  ;  Finsch,  Samoa- 
fahrten,  p.  132. 

*  Keane,  Africa,  II,  175;  Biittner,  pp.  43  ff. 


550  COLONIZATION 

Bushmen  in  Southwest  Africa,  and  Papuans  in  New  Guinea  repre- 
sent some  of  the  least  developed  races  on  the  globe.  The  Bantu 
peoples  of  East  and  Southwest  Africa  and  Kamerun  are  of  a  higher 
order,  as  are  the  natives  of  Togo  and  the  Sudanese  of  Kamerun ; 
the  Bismarck  and  Solomon  Islanders  are  peoples  upon  whom  some 
hopes  are  based.  Where  the  tribes  are  not  unspeakably  stupid  and 
lazy,  they  are  generally  warlike  and  far  from  docile  :  the  Somali 
and  Galla,  who  border  East  Africa,  are  in  constant  feud  and  render 
the  northern  districts  of  this  protectorate  extremely  dangerous  to 
life  and  property;  in  New  Guinea  there  is  constant  fighting  between 
the  coast  population  and  the  mountaineers  ;  likewise  in  Southwest 
Africa  the  Herero  and  Hottentots  have  struggled  for  generations, 
pausing  now  and  then,  but  only  long  enough  to  get  breath  and 
recruit  strength.  The  Solomon  Islanders  are  extremely  hostile  to 
all  Europeans;  their  archipelago  has  regularly  been  the  scene  of 
savage  outbreaks  and  massacres.  In  native  Africa  there  is  little 
settled  rule  ;  in  Togo  and  Kamerun  alone  is  there  to  be  found  any- 
thing approaching  a  native  government,  and  even  this  is  of  no 
advantage  to  the  Germans,  as  both  rulers  and  ruled  are  devout 
Mohammedans,  with  all  that  implies  of  hostility  to  European  cul- 
ture. The  further  difficulties  of  the  native  question  will  appear  in 
later  pages,  but  enough  has  been  said  to  characterize  the  native 
situation  as  most  unfortunate.^ 


Summary  of  the  Beginnings 

Taking  a  general  view,  then,  of  the  Germans  and  their  colonies, 
we  find  a  people  as  fully  equipped  as  any  other  in  the  matter  of 
national  character,  numbers,  and  culture,  and  superior  to  all  but 
the  most  advanced  in  commercial  and  industrial  enterprise  and 
in  accumulated  wealth.  National  unity  is  recent  but  strong,  and 
national  discipline  is  without  its  European  equal.  For  colonial  un- 
dertakings the  Germans  seem  to  lack  only  experience  with  its  accu- 
mulated precepts  of  practical  wisdom.^    The  strength  of  Germany 

'  For  the  natives  of  the  various  cf)lonies,  see  Ratzel,  Hist,  of  Mankind,  chiefly  I 
and  11,  fiassim  \  Schmidt,  I,  i6off. ;  II,  13  ff.,  162  ff.,  221  ff.,  334  ff.;  Keane,  Africa, 
II,  passim;  Meinecke,  fxissim;  Reichenow,  pp.  25  ff. ;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  'Jahre,  etc., 
pp.  33  ff. ;  Engler,  p.  135  ;   Finsch,  Kth.  Krfahrungen,  f<(jsshn\  cf.  pp.  573  ff.,  below. 

^  "  The  German  settler  has  all  the  qualities  which  distinguish  the  F.nglishman  with 
somewhat  less  initiative,  whilst  he  is  less  inclined  to  adventures.  He  is  calm,  sober, 
economical,  striving  less  to  become  quickly  rich,  and  better  educated.    After  all,  the 


MODERN  GERMAN   COLONIZATION  551 

as  a  young  colonial  power  can  best  be  seen  by  a  comparison  with 
the  weakness  of  Italy,  whose  modern  colonial  activity  began  but 
slightly  before  that  of  the  more  northern  people,  and  whose  tenta- 
tives  and  early  colonial  development  remind  one  in  many  ways  of 
the  German  beginnings  sketched  above.  Often  such  comparison 
is  suggested  by  the  almost  absolute  contrasts  involved.  Other 
interesting  resemblances  and  differences  might  be  discovered  if  one 
were  to  compare  German  colonization  with  the  recent  artificial 
expansion  of  the  United  States.  As  for  the  colonies  themselves, 
which  this  new  nation  was  to  try  to  develop  and  make  profitable, 
they  were  among  the  most  difficult  to  deal  with  in  the  whole  world. 
Nowhere  was  there  a  refuge  for  pilgrims  from  the  fatherland  ;  the 
questions  of  over-population  and  emigration  had  been  settled  in  no 
respect.  The  current  of  emigration  did  not  swerve  from  its  old 
course.  Natural  difficulties  stood  in  the  way  of  hoped-for  trade 
advantages  and  there  was  practically  no  native  population  to  depend 
upon  for  cooperation  in  economic  development.  To  be  sure,  the 
"patriotic"  and  "liberal"  spirit  had  been  somewhat  appeased  — 
a  great  demonstration  had  been  made  and  England  had  been  over- 
reached and  snubbed  into  the  bargain.  This  was  undoubtedly 
something ;  it  was  as  balm  to  the  souls  of  certain  of  the  colonial 
following.  But  the  more  rational  could  not  but  see  that  their 
efforts  had  brought  them  little  nearer  than  before  to  the  substan- 
tial results  for  which  they  had  hoped  ;  among  such  men  there  were 
grave  misgivings  as  to  the  outcome.  Whatever  else  may  be  said, 
Germany's  colonial  future  was  exceedingly  problematic  in  1885, 
when  the  last  great  possessions  had  been  appropriated.  It  de- 
volved upon  the  nation  to  demonstrate  its  capacities  in  the  new 
and  strange  field. 

General  Character  of  the  Colonial  Policy 

The  responsible  directors  of  Germany's  early  colonial  policy 
labored  under  no  illusion  regarding  the  grave  difficulties  of  the 
task  set  before  them.    Their  view  of  the  colonies  was  anything 

German  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  emigrants  are  of  the  same  value.  All  unbiassed  observ- 
ers pronounce  them  to  be  pares  inter  iiatioiies.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  the 
most  important  branch,  agriculture  —  the  German  and  the  Scotch  are  considered  the 
best  farmers."  Geffcken,  in  The  Forum,  XIII,  p.  204,  note;  Philippson,  p.  5;  Der 
Deutsche  E.xport,  p.  8.  Cf.  also  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p  13;  Jannasch,  p.  368 ; 
[Bastian],  Einiges,  etc.,  p.  59. 


552  COLONIZATION 

but  sanguine  ;  they  were  oppressed,  rather,  by  a  sense  of  respon- 
sibility for  the  outcome  of  an  extremely  hazardous  scries  of  under- 
takings, initiated  under  unfavorable  conditions  in  an  unknown  field. 
When  the  wave  of  national  excitement  had  subsided,  ccnmsels  of 
caution  were  heard,  even  from  the  mouths  of  erstwhile  agitators.^ 
Problems  that  went  unheeded  in  the  ardor  of  conquest  now  re- 
appeared and  demanded  a  practical  solution,  in  cold  blood  ;  it  was 
only  the  least  rational  of  the  KolonialmcnscJicii  who  refused  to 
profit  by  the  study  of  other  nations'  experiences,  and  who  clamored 
for  the  development  of  a  distinctly  "German  policy."  ^  It  is  not 
always  easy  to  specify  exactly  what  a  party  means  when  it  calls 
for  a  genuinely  "  national  "  policy.  There  is  an  element  of  sym- 
bolism about  the  term  which  baffles  definition.  In  the  present  case 
—  one  not  without  its  parallels  —  a  national  policy  was  invoked  as 
a  convenient  short-cut  to  avoid  all  the  uninteresting  and  unpleasant 
exigencies  which  had  marked  the  history  of  other  peoples'  colonial 
undertakings.  The  fundamental  assumption  of  those  who  clamor 
for  a  national  policy  is  that  the  experience  of  the  past  counts  for 
little  or  nothing  ;  national  vanity  and  unreflecting  patriotism  foster 
the  behef  that  a  royal  road  lies  open  to  the  genius  of  the  particular 
people  in  question.  The  irrationality  involved  in  such  a  view,  is, 
of  course,  a  necessary  attendant  upon  popular  sentiment  unbridled 
by  intelligence  or  judgment. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  policy  really  developed  was,  in  several 
important  respects,  a  genuinely  German  one.  Who  but  the  Ger- 
mans, for  example,  have  approached  the  colonial  question  from 
the  "  learned "  standpoint,  discarding  with  decision,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  empirical,  and  on  the  other  the  "  metaphysical  "  methods 
of  their  seniors  in  the  art .?  This  learned  attitude  may  seem  amus- 
ing—  it  has  furnished  much  material  for  the  facetious,  even  in 
Germany,  and,  at  first  sight,  it  does  provoke  a  smile  to  find  the 
Dr.  pJiil.  and  the  Dr.  juris  so  generously  represented  in  the  humbler 
categories  of  the  colonial  service  ;  but  it  is  none  the  less  an  atti- 
tude marked  by  individuality  and  without  its  parallel  in  the  history 
of  incipient  colonial  activity.    Perhaps  with  the  Germans  such  an 

1  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  13,  28,  144.  Some  of  the  larger  Hamburg  and 
Bremen  firms  looked  on  colonization  with  coolness  or  distrust.    Id.,  p.  18. 

2  An  official  organ  of  the  colonial  party  declared  that  "Germany  had  nothing  to 
learn  from  England  or  any  other  colonizing  nation,  having  a  method  of  handling 
social  problems  peculiar  to  the  German  spirit."  Perry,  "  Traditions,"  etc.  Hut  cf. 
F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  28. 


MODERN  CxERMAN  COLONIZATION  553 

attitude  was  logically  to  be  expected,  though  the  historian  could 
doubtless  cite  many  striking  instances  of  a  people  scorning  its 
national  traditions  and  superior  advantages,  and  electing  rather  to 
revive  obsolete  and  exploded  fallacies  and  flounder  about  in  the 
vaguest  indecision.  To  assert  that  the  Germans  have  tried  at 
the  outset  to  profit  by  the  study  of  the  records  of  the  past,  and  by 
the  enlistment  of  the  services  of  the  best  contemporary  science,  is 
not  to  extend  them  unqualified  approval ;  but  because  they  have  at- 
tempted, with  a  fair  degree  of  consistency,  to  use  against  their  new 
environment  the  knowledge  and  experience  accumulated  by  man's 
centuries  of  struggle  with  adverse  nature,  the  history  of  their 
colonial  activity  possesses  a  certain  added  interest.  The  student  of 
the  social  sciences  feels  this  interest,  perhaps,  with  especial  force  ; 
he  is  always  looking  for  a  social  experiment  from  which  the  tire- 
some and  reiterated  errors  of  the  past  shall  have  been  eliminated, 
and  where  the  distrusted  conclusions  of  political  and  economic 
science  can  be  fairly  confronted  with  hard  fact.  In  any  case,  what- 
ever else  may  be  said  of  the  Germans,  they  cannot  be  accused  of 
holding  their  own  inexperience  as  a  matter  of  slight  moment,  to 
be  put  aside  with  a  wave  of  the  hand.^  There  seems  to  have  been 
considerable  candid  self-searching  at  the  bottom  ;  then  an  honest 
effort  to  offset  serious  disadvantages  of  many  kinds  by  calling  into 
requisition  the  most  modern  and  approved  of  methods  and  expedi- 
ents. One  cannot  fail  to  detect  the  hand  of  Bismarck  in  the  develop- 
ment of  this  rational  and  practical  side  of  the  early  colonial  policy. 
Germany  was,  of  course,  surpassingly  fitted  for  scientific  coloni- 
zation—  absolutely  and  relatively  better  equipped  than  any  other 
country  has  been.  The  reputation  of  her  historians,  explorers,  and 
professional  men  of  science,  who  have  accumulated  knowledge  and 
imparted  it  ex  cathedra,  needs  no  remark  ;  more  significant  still  as 
witness  to  the  nation's  intellectual  life  and  vigor  are  the  treatises 
of  her  army  officers,  missionaries,  and  colonial  administrators, 
written  under  the  stress  of  strenuous  lives  of  action,  and  yet  rank- 
ing among  the  very  best  contributions  to  science,  in  their  keen- 
ness of  observation  and  soundness  of  conclusion.^    Such  studies  in 

1  Meinecke,  p.  104;  cf.  [Bastian],  Einiges,  etc.,  pp.  59  ff. 

2  E.g.  those  of  Pfeil,  Boshart,  Wissmann,  Krieger,  Hagen,  Schmidt,  Klose,  Von 
Fran9ois,  Biittner,  and  many  others  mentioned  in  Giesebrecht's  compilation.  The 
high  scientific  value  of  officers'  reports  is  well  recognized  (Schmidt,  I,  282).  On 
Germany's  readiness  to  adopt  modem  scientific  methods  see  also  The  Athenceum, 
No.  3812  (November  17,  1900). 


554 


COLONIZATION 


commercial  geography,  physiography,  geology,  meteorology,  trop- 
ical hygiene,  and  ethnography  have  added  much  to  the  sum  of 
human  knowledge,  and  cannot  but  contribute  to  the  future  effi- 
ciency of  German  colonial  methods.  Unfortunately,  experiments 
in  the  field  of  the  social  sciences  cannot  proceed  by  isolation  of  fac- 
tors. Demonstration  of  cause  and  effect  in  a  complicated  social  prob- 
lem is  all  but  impossible,  and  the  captious  logician  can  always 
come  forward  with  his  "multiplicity  of  causes"  or  his  "inconsist- 
ency of  effects."  Thus  might  it  be  in  the  case  in  hand  :  one  might 
be  censured  for  exaggeration  of  the  intellectual  element  in  German 
colonial  policy,  in  view  of  the  present-day,  often  unedifying  picture 
of  the  German  colonies.  It  is  none  the  less  true  that  Germany  has 
stood  for  scientific  method  in  colonization,  and  it  is  only  a  pity  that 
she  has  stood,  at  the  same  time,  for  other  things  which  have  tended 
to  neutralize  and  obscure  her  successes  and  to  cast  ridicule  upon 
the  social  sciences  and  their  conclusions. 

The  most  unfortunate  factor  in  the  German  attitude  toward  the 
colonial  question  has  been  as  characteristic  as  the  most  enlight- 
ened element  :  if  the  Germans  are  great  scientists,  they  are  like- 
wise confirmed  militarists  and  bureaucrats.  Owing  their  national 
existence  to  rigid  discipline  and  vigorous  use  of  the  "  mailed  fist," 
they  are  disposed  to  believe  in  the  universal  effectiveness  of  inflexi- 
ble system  and  peremptory  action.  Education,  military  and  other, 
strengthens  this  conviction.  But,  though  not  without  their  place 
in  the  management  of  dependencies,  inflexibility  and  governmental 
rigor  are  about  as  ill  adapted  to  young  and  chaotic  societies  as  the 
frontier-system  would  be  to  the  Prussian  state.  The  vital  error  in 
the  German  policy  has  been  the  attempt  to  carry  over  to  the 
colonies  the  complex  military  and  administrative  system  of  the 
home-land.  Here  it  was  that  the  rational  i-egime  broke  down ; 
such  a  proceeding  was  unscientific  to  the  last  degree,  and  its  vicious 
effects  have  cast  copious  discredit  upon  the  solid  wt)rlh  of  other 
parts  of  the  German  system.^ 

^  Jannasch  (pp.  368  ff.)  comments  at  length  on  the  Geimans'  lack  of  education  for 
colonization,  and  especially  attacks  the  system  of  government  through  the  agency  of 
jurists  and  other  specialists  of  narrow  horizons.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  change 
of  attitude  toward  imperialism  and  bureauracy  of  the  "business-minister,"  Dernburg, 
since  his  accession  to  power. 


MODERN   GERMAN   COLONIZATION 


The  Modern  Chartered  Company 


555 


When  the  colonies  had  been  officially  annexed  to  the  empire, 
Bismarck,  always  a  close  student  of  effective  methods,  desired  to 
give  them  an  organization  modeled  on  that  of  the  British  crown 
colony,  directly  responsible  to  the  Chancellor ;  this  seemed  to  him 
the  most  thoroughly  tested  and  successful  system  when  one  had 
to  deal  with  colonies  such  as  those  of  the  Germans.  It  was  evi- 
dent, however,  that  such  a  system  must  entail  upon  the  imperial 
government  a  responsibility  for  the  colonies  that  it  could  not  well 
disavow,  and  under  which  there  might  well  arise  calls  for  armed 
interference  and  financial  support,  together  with  other  costly  and 
unpleasant  contingencies.  These  considerations  alienated  the  sup- 
port of  the  still  half-hostile  Reichstag,  and,  except  for  Togo 
and  Kamerun,  where  German  interests  were  more  substantial  and 
promising,  such  a  form  of  organization  was  decisively  rejected. 
This  amounted  to  a  refusal  of  the  representative  branch  of  govern- 
ment to  ratify  actions  to  which  the  executive  branch  was  com- 
mitted. The  position  was  awkward,  but  it  was  promptly  relieved 
by  the  support  of  the  colonial  societies.  The  expedient  of  the 
monopolistic  trading  company  ^  was  invoked  from  a  dishonorable 
oblivion,  and  again  set  upon  a  characteristic  career  of  incom- 
petence and  final  dissolution.  Companies  undertook  the  manage- 
ment of  all  the  possessions  except  Togo  and  Kamerun,  under 
charters  which  granted  them,  in  general,  exclusive  rights  of  rule 
under  the  general  supervision  of  the  empire,  exclusive  rights  of 
trade,  of  the  occupation  and  development  of  new  land,  and  so  on. 
Thus  the  German  state  was  initially  saved  the  expense  of  adminis- 
tration and  the  colonies  were  still  held  virtually  beneath  the  Ger- 
man flag. 

Before  entering  upon  the  history  of  the  German  companies,  it 
should  be  stated  that  these  chartered  monopolies  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  though  strikingly  similar  to  those  of  the  seventeenth, 
were  destined  to  subserve  purposes  considerably  different.  The 
same  political  and  economic  causes  which  created  the  companies 
of  the  earlier  century  have  been  effective  in  their  recent  develop- 
ment :  the  modern  companies  have  been  confined  regularly  to 
countries  of  a  rudimentary  development,  inhabited  by  peoples  of 

^  Blum,  p.  41  ;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  7,  119;  Hermann,  p.  31  ;  Meinecke, 
pp.  5-S  ;  cf.  Van  Dene  in  Iitdische  Gids,  1S88,  I,  134-142. 


556  COLONIZATION 

a  low  economic  and  political  organization.  The  privileges  granted 
under  modern  charters  have  been,  in  many  particulars,  strikingly 
similar  to  those  vouchsafed  by  the  older  documents.^  In  the  course 
of  time,  however,  general  economic  and  political  conditions  have 
been  so  modified  as  to  sap  the  independence  of  such  an  organiza- 
tion, with  the  result  that  the  modern  monopolistic  society  is  but  a 
shadow  of  its  former  self.  Belonging  in  its  prime  to  an  age  of  small, 
segregated,  and  relatively  feeble  political  unities,  it  is  quite  out  of 
its  element  amidst  present-day  movements  toward  commercial  and 
political  world-dominion.  Its  independent  political  functions  have 
been  lopped  away  and  its  commercial  powers  are  not  adequate  to 
the  tasks  and  stress  of  contemporary  life.  Its  moii()i)oly,  that 
is,  its  reputed  source  of  gain  and  power,  is  no  longer  possible.^  As 
has  been  seen,  the  East  India  Company  of  the  Dutch  (and  the 
same  may  be  said  of  that  of  the  English)  was  founded  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  mutual  protection  of  ships  and  cargoes  and  to 
prevent  ruinous  competition  between  buyers  in  the  Indies.  The 
companies  were,  to  a  great  extent,  militant  bodies,  providing  for 
themselves  by  force  of  arms,  in  distant  seas,  a  security  of  trade 
which  their  countries  of  origin  could  not  afford  They  soon  came 
to  exercise  the  tyranny  of  independent  political  powers,  and  could 
not  well  be  brought  to  account,  not  only  because  of  their  actual 
strength,  but  also  because  of  the  crudeness  of  contemporary  means 
of  communication.  Their  object  was  actual,  mercantile  gain,  for 
which  end  no  means  were  too  violent  or  underhanded.  The  case 
of  the  trading-companies  of  our  own  day,  well  represented  by  the 
German  examples,  is  somewhat  different ;  they  are  subordinate 
organizations  for  a  conscious  political  purpose  rather  than  essen- 
tially independent  organizations  for  purely  commercial  ends.  The 
actual  powers  which  they  are  able  to  wield  are  not  sufficient  to 
afford  them  more  than  a  relatively  ephemeral  independence.  Ex- 
tension of  the  market  and  its  protection,  the  development  of  com- 
mercial usages  and  norms,  the  suppression  of  war,  the  "  reach  " 
of  communication  with  its  attendant  diffusion  of  information,  an 
extended  power  of  home-control,  rendered  the  more  redoubtable 
by  the  development  of  swift  national  navies  ready  to  enforce  with 
speed  the  provisions  of  a  government  which  is,  as  it  were,  on  the 
spot  —  all  these  factors  conspire  to  render  a  company  little  more 
than  the  servitor  of  the  political  power  of  the  metropolis.  As  a 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  II,  book  ii,  chap.  v.  "^  Geffcken,  in  T/w  Fortim. 


MODERN   CIERMAiN   COLONIZATION  557 

servitor,  however,  its  functions  arc  most  significant,  in  these  days ; 
as  Leroy-BeauUeu  says,^  the  modern  companies  should  not  be 
judged  merely  from  the  standpoint  of  commerce  and  finance.  They 
offer  unrivaled  opportunities  as  a  means  of  entrance  and  occupation 
of  new  lands ;  they  afford  an  agency  which  is  simple  and  elastic, 
which  does  much  with  little,  and  which  works  in  silence  without 
having  its  doings  undesirably  advertised  in  parliamentary  discus- 
sion. Not  only  that ;  the  company  forms  a  screen  behind  which 
the  government  can  pursue  its  purposes  of  annexation  until  it  sees 
fit  to  assume  in  actuality  the  power  which  it  has  merely  delegated 
until  the  time  is  ripe.  In  the  development  of  a  new  country  such 
an  expedient  is  most  salutary  for  the  preservation  of  the  world's 
peace.  Disavowals  in  consequence  of  rash  or  over-zealous  action 
are  thereby  rendered  plausible  ;  the  company  is  the  pioneer  and 
represents  the  not  unfortunate  scapegoat  of  international  differ- 
ences, whose  existence  is  but  for  a  time  and  whose  wounds  are 
easily  healed,  however  loudly  and  bitterly  it  sees  fit  to  bleat  over 
its  lot  before  the  world. 

The  German  Companies  :   Function  and  Administration 

The  German  companies  perfectly  exemplify  this  general  type  — 
although  their  existence  has  been  arrested  considerably  short  of 
the  average  term  of  twenty-five  to  fifty  years  allotted  by  the  French 
economist.  All  but  one  of  the  German  companies,  and  that  a 
comparatively  insignificant  one,  have  surrendered  their  political 
functions  into  the  imperial  hands  and  remain  in  a  more  or  less 
private  capacity  in  their  respective  regions.^  This  history  of  the 
various  companies  in  their  dual  capacity  shows  some  variation  of 
detail,  but  presents,  on  the  whole,  a  consistent  picture  of  incom- 
petence and  failure.  They  were  constructed  after  British  and 
Dutch  models,  without,  however,  adequate  account  having  been 
taken  of  the  different  environment  in  which  it  was  their  lot  to  be 
cast.  Where  they  would  accept  them,  the  companies  were  granted 
the  essential  rights,  and  allowed  to  exercise  the  typical  functions, 
of  a  state,  under  a  slight  imperial  supervision.  These  included  the 
levying  of  taxes  and  tolls,  the  coining  of  money,  the  erection  of 
banks  of  issue,  the  maintenance  of  a  police  force,  the  administra- 
tion of  justice,  exclusive  rights  in  the  occupation  of  unoccupied 

1  II,  662-663.  -  Von  Stengel,  pp.  41-42. 


558  COLOXIZ.VriON 

land  and  in  the  closing  of  treaties  and  agreements  with  natives, 
certain  mining  rights,  railroad  ^ncessions,  and  so  on.^  In  short, 
the  rights  assured  to  the  companies  answered  to  the  necessity  to 
which  they  owed  their  existence  —  they  obtained  all  the  privileges 
necessary  to  private  societies  whose  main  raison  d'etre  was  to 
relieve  the  home-government  from  expense  on  account  of  the  pro- 
tectorates until  such  time  as  necessity  or  reconsideration  should 
bring  the  people  as  represented  by  the  Reichstag  to  a  more  tract- 
able frame  of  mind. 

The  administration  of  the  colonies  under  the  companies  was 
vested  nominally  in  a  Landcshauptviann,  who  was  assisted  by  the 
supervisors  of  the  various  districts  into  which  the  protectorates 
were  divided.^  In  reality,  however,  this  functionary  had  very  little 
freedom  of  action.  He  was  both  too  near  to  and  too  distant  from 
the  "green  baize  ":  too  near  because  his  measures  were  ever  sub- 
ject to  revocation  by  cable,  too  distant  in  that  detailed  orders  from 
Berlin  were,  for  the  most  part,  antedated  ere  their  arrival.  The 
directors  at  home  were  ever  ready  to  take  a  hand  in  the  settlement 
of  local  colonial  questions,  and  too  often  their  interference  and 
recommendation  took  the  shape  of  poorly  informed  but  confident 
meddling,  productive  of  endless  confusion  and  contradiction  ;  this 
was  flagrantly  the  case  in  New  Guinea,  the  most  distant  and  least 
known  of  the  protectorates.  Blum^  says  that  not  one  of  the  direct- 
ors or  council  of  the  New  Guinea  Company  ever  saw  the  island  ; 
that  Hansemann,  the  chief  director,  was  a  type  of  the  modern 
moneyed  aristocrat,  who  resented  advice  from  any  one  ;  that  to  his 
self-sufficiency  the  fiasco  in  New  Guinea  is  chiefly  to  be  charged. 
One  administrator  succeeded  another  in  rapid  succession,  each  new 
arrival  being  of  a  different  calling  and  having  different  interests  ; 
and  alteration  of  system  went  with  change  of  personnel.*    No  sound 

1  Von  Stengel,  p.  42  ;  Schmidt,  I,  16 ;  II,  300-301  ;  Hermann,  pp.  33-51  ;  Meinecke, 
p.  8.  The  legal  status  of  the  companies  is  concisely  treated  by  Von  Stengel;  see 
also  Der  Deutsche  Export,  pp.  50-51. 

2  Von  Stengel,  p.  68  ;  Schmidt,  II,  394  ff. ;  Fitzner,  Kolonialllandliuch,  I,  265,  etc. 
This  manual  gives  full  and  minute  details  of  the  colonies  and  their  stations  (includ- 
ing telegraph  lines,  railroads,  postal  facilities,  etc.) ;  it  also  includes  a  catalogue  of 
the  personnel  of  the  service. 

3  Pp.41  ff.,  60. 

*  Blum,  p.  43.  Mere  is  given  a  catalogue  of  changes  in  personnel  and  system. 
A  quotation  from  Schmiele  on  this  subject  is  particularly  noteworthy.  Several  stories 
illustrating  the  pitiful  weakness  of  the  judiciary  follow.  For  further  details  of  the 
Company's  management,  see  Krieger,  pp.  231  ff. ;  Schmidt,  II,  399. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  559 

governmental  system  of  any  kind  was  introduced,  no  agreements 
were  made  with  the  natives,  no  dignity  was  lent  to  the  administra- 
tion of  justice.  Occasionally  an  administrator  of  rare  personal 
force  managed  to  triumph  in  part  over  his  difficulties,  but  this  was 
the  exception.^  Boshart^  tells  a  like  story  of  the  Company  for 
Southwest  Africa.  He  says  that  the  colonial  societies,  though 
they  number  among  their  members  some  of  the  greatest  capital- 
ists of  the  empire,  get  scarcely  enough  funds  together  to  main- 
tain a  dozen  poorly  paid  and,  for  the  most  part,  useless  officials. 
The  funds  go  for  the  local  "plant"  in  Berlin,  for  clerk-hire,  and 
for  occasional  festivities  ;  no  money  is  applied  to  actual  colonial 
purposes. 

In  any  land  the  evils  of  such  a  system  of  government  are 
apparent  on  its  face  ;  they  are  the  more  disastrous  in  a  young 
and  undeveloped  colony.  In  a  new  country  there  constantly  arise 
administrative  contingencies  which  cannot  be  foreseen,  risks  which 
cannot  be  systematized  or  distributed  ;  conditions  demand  fertility 
of  resource  and  promptness  of  action,  and  success  has  often  been 
proved  to  vary  with  the  strength  of  these  qualities.  The  experi- 
ence of  all  successful  colonizers  seems  to  point  to  the  system  of 
local  direction  and  responsibility  as  the  most  practicable  in  a  field 
where,  in  any'  case,  action  must  be  largely  empiric.  If,  for  its 
welfare,  adult  trade  demands  security  and  a  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo,  and  suffers  severely  from  the  entrance  of  caprice  and 
irregularity,  certainly  the  beginnings  of  commerce  ought  to  be 
assured  against  such  disturbing  factors.    In  still  another  way  did 

1  Blum,  (pp.  121  ff.)  describes  the  truly  heroic  attempts  of  Von  Hagen  to  accom- 
plish anything  under  this  system.  He  says  there  was  a  tendency  to  refer  all,  even  the 
smallest  questions,  to  Berlin.  The  system  of  accounting  was  most  lax,  and  constant 
conflicts  arose  from  the  commercial  and  political  powers  being  lodged  in  one  hand ; 
when  the  function  of  governing  had  been  given  up  by  the  Company,  a  wholesome 
trade  set  in.  Blum  calls  the  activity  of  the  New  Guinea  Company,  "  Tappen  und 
Tasten  ohne  Sinn  und  deshalb  ohne  Gewinn  "  (p.  146).  F.  Fabri  (Fiinf  Jahre,  etc., 
p.  24)  says  the  policy  has  been  "  von  Fall  zu  Fall "  —  a  system  well  enough  in  Euro- 
pean diplomatic  entanglements,  but  utterly  out  of  place  in  a  new  country  where  the 
"  Falle  "  are  different  in  kind  and  should  not  be  allowed  to  exist.  Dr.  Ilahl,  in  the 
Bismarck  Archipelago,  managed  to  initiate  a  better  system.  The  German  adminis- 
tration in  these  parts  had  a  living  reproof  ever  before  it  in  the  admirable  system  of 
Sir  W.  MacGregor,  in  British  New  Guinea  (Blum,  p.  54). 

2  Pp.  159,  177.  Boshart  was  an  officer  sent  by  the  Company  in  1887  to  investigate 
the  political  and  commercial  possibilities  of  Southwest  Africa  and  vicinity.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  the  Southwest  Africa  Company  refused  the  Hoheitsrechte.  Complaints  of 
parsimony  are  made  by  Engler  also  (p.  112). 


56o  COLONIZATION 

the  insecurity  and  instability  of  company  administration  make  them- 
selves felt  in  the  German  colonies  :  they  complicated  the  native 
situation.  To  this  question  further  attention  will  be  subsequently 
given  ;  it  is  one  of  the  most  vital  issues,  if  not  the  most  important 
and  menacing,  in  the  history  of  the  German  colonies. 

It  would  appear,  then,  in  the  matter  of  government,  that  the 
companies  furnished  a  system  scarcely  worthy  of  the  name.  They 
benefited  commerce  to  a  very  slight  degree  only,  and  devoted 
themselves  chiefly  to  the  occupation,  such  as  it  was,  and  ruthless 
exploitation,  of  the  lands  and  their  native  products.  Starting  out 
with  great  plans  and  well-equipped  scientific  staff s,i  they  later 
found  themselves  embarrassed  for  funds  and  forced  to  reduce 
their  scale  of  operations.  Never  having  really  grappled  with  the 
essential  issues  in  the  development  of  trade  with  the  tropins,  the 
financial  strain  grew  upon  them  along  with  the  political,  until  it 
was  greater  than  they  could  bear.  Then  they  were  severally  forced 
to  request  the  imperial  government  to  take  over  the  administrative 
function  —  earlier,  perhaps,  than  had  originally  been  contemplated 
or  desired.  Inefficiency  of  administration,  therefore,  and  of  com- 
mercial methods  and  measures,  acted  and  reacted  upon  one  another, 
creating  a  vicious  and  disastrous  round,  and  almost  precluding  the 
possibility  of  advance.  The  fact  was  demonstrated  anew  that  there 
exists  an  essential  contradiction  and  incompatibility  between  the 
governing  and  the  trading  functions,  whether  or  not  these  are 
united  in  the  same  individual  or  society. ^  In  trading  one  reckons 
for  the  proximate  gain,  for  advantage  realizable  certainly  within 
the  life-time  of  the  operator  ;  the  function  of  governing,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  the  more  perfect  and  dignified,  according  as  it  discounts 
present  conditions  and  labors  for  that  distant  future  good  which, 
through  disinterested  statesmanship,  it  foresees.  A  state  may  en- 
dure immediate  losses  and  sacrifices  —  it  can  do  that  because  of 
its  longevity  and  extended  credit  —  but  the  individual  or  com- 
pany can  follow  only  afar  off  and  to  the  extent  of  its  narrower 
means  and  limited  credit.  This  contradiction  was  perhaps  less 
perceptible  in  the  seventeenth-century  prototypes  of  the  nineteenth- 
century  chartered  companies,  because,  properly  speaking,  adminis- 
tration in  the  colonies  was  in  their  time  a  mere  adjunct  to  trade- 
exploitation.    The  later  developing  ideas  of  colonial  government 

1  Kellie,  pp.  252,  319,  etc. ;  Schmidt,  I,  135  ff. ;  II,  322. 

2  Cf.  F".  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  7,  18  ff.,  120;  pp.  456  ff.,  above. 


MODERN   GERMAN   COLONIZATION  561 

which  clothe  it  with  rcsponsibihty  for  peace,  humanity,  and  civiH- 
zation,  and  make  it  thereby  the  regulator  of  trade,  were  yet  to 
come.  In  the  German  colonies  there  was  no  longer  any  opportu- 
nity to  occupy  rich  land,  dig  treasure,  or  maintain  a  spice  monop- 
oly ;  in  a  difficult  country,  under  adverse  conditions,  the  initial 
labors  preparatory  to  occupancy  must  have,  in  a  large  measure, 
preceded  the  advance  of  trade.  The  companies  could  not  open 
up  the  land  for  themselves,  and  establish  security,  order,  and  law. 
Again  it  was  demonstrated  that  a  colonial  policy  could  not  be 
built  on  trade-relations,  nor  a  stable  government  on  mercantile 
principles. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  the  colonies  of  Togo  and 
Kamerun  passed  directly  under  the  imperial  power,  and  were 
organized  after  the  general  type  of  the  British  crown  colony.^ 
The  actually  existing  German  interests  in  these  colonies  were 
substantial  enough  to  effect  this  result ;  indeed,  the  well-known 
"Kamerun"  was  popularly  all  but  synonymous  with  "colony"  in 
early  German  colonial  times. ^  The  entrance  of  the  imperial  power 
into  Southwest  Africa  was  an  unwilling  one  ;  although  originally 
a  company  had  been  formed  to  carry  forward  the  projects  of 
Liideritz,  it  promptly  declared  itself  unwilling  to  assume  the 
Hoheitsrechte,  forcing,  by  such  action,  an  occupation  at  imperial 
expense,  at  least  in  part,  and  under  imperial  officials.^  East  Africa 
next  passed  under  the  imperial  power  (1891)  ;  an  insurrection 
which  broke  out  in  1888  had  proved  too  much  for  the  East  Africa 
Company's  resources,  and,  indeed,  kept  an  able  imperial  commis- 
sioner's hands  full  for  several  years. ^  New  Guinea  presents  a  more 
checkered  history.  Owing  to  financial  embarrassment,  the  Com- 
pany, in  1889,  asked  the  Chancellor  to  take  over  the  government. 
This  was  done;  but  by  1892  it  was  found  that  double  expense  for 
officials  was  being  incurred  under  the  existing  system,  and  the 
imperial  government  withdrew.  In  1899,  however,  the  Company 
was  again  in  a  most  wretched  state  of  financial  embarrassment 
and  economic  collapse,  and  the  imperial  rule  was  again  requested 

1  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  7,  23  ff.;  Keltic,  pp.326,  330;  Geffcken,  in  The  Forimi. 

2  "  Der  Volksmund  kennt  vor  allem  nur  Kamerun,  der  gewissermassen  alle  unsere 
Schutzgebiete  reprasentiert."    Engler,  p.  157. 

3  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  23.  Hamburg  and  Bremen  firms  were  not  at  all 
sanguine  as  to  the  chartered  company  scheme.  Schmidt,  II,  265  ;  Geffcken,  in  The 
Forum. 

*  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  23,  36  ff. ;  Schmidt,  I,  i  ff . ;  Andler,  p.  273. 


562  COLONIZATION 

and  established.^  The  remaining  society,  the  small  Jaluit  Company 
of  the  Marshall  Islands,  has  naturally  better  fulhlled  its  mission 
than  any  of  the  others,  if  retention  and  control  of  its  territory  be 
considered  its  mission  ;  it  has  paid  all  regular  expenses  of  govern- 
ment and  has  enjoyed  a  fair  measure  of  reputation  and  prosperity .^ 
It  may  be  said,  then,  of  the  German  companies,  that  they  were 
really  makeshifts  pending  the  readiness  of  the  government  to  take 
control  ;  their  origin  in  the  colonial  societies  should  of  itself  indi- 
cate this.  As  makeshifts  they  have  no  doubt  discharged  important 
political  functions  and  done  their  share  towards  neutralizing  the 
dangerous  friction  caused  by  direct  contact  of  sovereign  states  on 
exterior  territory. 

Imperial  Administration 

When  the  imperial  government  succeeded  to  the  possessions  of 
the  various  companies,  colonial  policy  began  to  take  on  the  definite 
outlines  which  it  had  already  displayed  in  Togo  and  Kamerun. 
The  new  government  found  itself  on  its  own  ground  where  there 
was  fighting  to  be  done  ;  the  insurrection  in  East  Africa,  which 
had  cost  the  local  company  its  political  existence,  was  reduced  by 
a  vigorous  and  relentless  swinging  of  the  sword.  The  martial 
spirit  of  discipline  soon  seized  upon  and  pervaded  the  administra- 
tive system  ;  where  the  Spaniards  had  worshiped  the  dogma  of 
religion  and  the  French  had  set  up  the  ideal  of  "assimilation," 
the  Germans  invoked  the  panacea  of  strict  order  and  inflexible 
discipline.  It  was  natural  and  almost  inevitable  that  this  should 
be  so,  but  one  sighs  to  think  that  this  social  experiment  of  a  gifted 
people  should  have  been  crossed  by  another  of  those  inexorable 
dogmas  which  time  and  again  in  history  have  neutralized  and  set 
at  naught  interesting  social  movements  —  processes  which  were 
seemingly  sure  to  prove  or  refute  through  striking  instances  the 
practical  value  of  science  and  rational  method.  Over-government 
through  a  system  of  bureaucracy  was  about  as  bad  for  the  colonies 
as  the  interference  of  the  home  societies  had  been,  during  the  period 
of  the  chartered  companies.     If  there  is  anything  that  is  proved 

1  Miiller,  pp.  38ff. ;  Blum,  p.  v  ;  Schmidt,  II,  .joff.,  394.  Of  course  the  companies 
received  some  compensation  for  their  surrender  of  rights,  in  this  case  four  milHon 
marks  and  some  share  in  deciding  upon  measures  of  rule  under  the  empire.  Krieger, 
pp.  231  ff. 

2  Von  Stengel,  p.  200  ;  Meinecke,  p.  S  ;  Loeb,  p.  6i. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  563 

by  the  history  of  colonics,  it  is  that  they  cannot  flourish  under  an 
inelastic  and  stereotyped  system.  In  the  colonies  the  individual 
and  the  society  stand  once  more  in  closer  and  more  vital  relation 
with  their  physical  environment  ;  a  return  to  a  less  evolved  system 
of  government  is  found  necessary,  and  the  application  of  minute 
regulation  is  felt  to  be  a  detriment  and  an  anachronism.  The  rough- 
and-ready  methods  of  frontier  government  and  justice  have  their 
place  in  the  development  of  a  new  country,  and  if  external  power 
is  able  permanently  to  impose  a  much  more  highly  refined  system, 
it  is  the  misfortune  of  the  colony  involved.^  German  writers  are 
almost  unanimous  in  condemning  this  bureaucracy,  and  their  re- 
monstrances have  borne  some  fruit.  They  have  rebelled  against 
the  military  caste-system,  the  imposition  of  petty  regulations  and 
fines,  the  direction  of  affairs  from  Berlin,  the  inexperience  and  self- 
confidence  of  the  colonial  functionaries,  and  in  general  against  the 
arbitrary  conduct  of  a  governing  organization  which  did  not  know 
its  ground. 2 

As  usual,  however,  good  is  mixed  with  evil  ;  the  services  of  the 
imperial  domination  must  not  be  overlooked.  Under  the  strong 
arm,  peace  and  security  have  been  established,  and  the  slave-trade 
has  been  largely  suppressed  in  its  ancient  strongholds  by  the  power 
which  holds  the  coasts.  Expense  in  lives  and  in  money  has  not 
been  spared  in  the  exploration  of  the  Hinterland  and  in  pushing 
forward  the  permanent  outposts  of  civilization.  Scientific  investi- 
gation of  the  most  valuable  kind  has  been  made  coincidently  with 
the  advance  of  expeditions  and  of  administrative  stations.^  The 
same  conscientious  and  painstaking  effort  has  been  universally  put 
forth.  When  the  errors  incident  to  inexperience  shall  have  been 
recognized  and  eliminated  —  and  the  Germans,  hampered  by  no  false 
pride,  seem  to  be  adept  at  this  process  —  it  will  be  hard  to  find  a 
people  better  equipped  for  the  management  of  dependencies."* 

1  Bismarck's  views  on  the  value  of  the  bureaucratic  system  in  the  colonies  were 
pronounced;  he  said  in  1S76  that  no  success  was  to  be  attained  by  transplanting  the 
Prussian  government  assessors  and  bureaucratic  system  to  Africa;  that  work  at  the 
green  table  was  the  last  thing  suitable  to  that  sphere.  Poschinger,  p.  242 ;  cf.  F.  Fabri, 
Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  27,  100. 

2  For  some  details  of  German  officialism  and  its  workings,  see  Blum,  pp.  140  ff.; 
Witt,  in  BlackwoocP s,(Z\.yA\\,  7S8;  Globus,  LXXVII,  229;  Pfeil.Vorschltige,  pp.  39  ff.; 
Keltie,  p.  258,  etc. 

3  This  was  particularly  true  of  Kamerun,  where  the  unexplored  region  of  Africa  is 
nearest  the  coast.     Engler,  p.  89;  cf.  Keltie,  pp.  260  ff. 

*  See  Brunialti,  pp.  171  ff. ;   F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  29. 


564  COLONIZATION 

Under  the  imperial  rule,  the  Scluitzgchicte  "  are  substantially 
colonies  in  the  same  sense  as  the  British  crown  colonies,  form- 
ing an  integral  part  of  the  empire  as  regards  other  states,  although 
of  course  German  laws  are  not  applicable  to  them  except  by  ex- 
press enactment,  and  their  natives  are  not  German  citizens."  ^  The 
actual  power  of  administration  is  vested  in  a  governor  (or  commis- 
sioner) who  is  responsible  primarily  to  the  German  Chancellor. 
Unfortunately  he  was  at  first  responsible  to  other  officials  as  well, 
inasmuch  as  a  colonial  office  had  not  yet  been  differentiated.'-^  This 
led  to  conflicts,  and  finally  to  a  serious  over-burdening  of  the  Foreign 
Office  with  colonial  business.  The  Colonial  Department  of  the  For- 
eign Office  was  established  April  i,  1890,  and  finally,  in  very  recent 
times,  a  Colonial  Minister  has  been  appointed  ;  the  governor  is  re- 
sponsible through  this  officer  and  the  Chancellor,  to  the  emperor, 
in  whom  is  vested  the  general  function  of  rule  in  the  colonies.  The 
im|)erial  Chancellor  is  empowered  to  summon  a  colonial  council, 
consisting  of  experts  in  all  departments  of  knowledge  bearing  on 
colonies,  to  advise  with  him  in  such  questions  as  he  desires.  This 
council  passes  on  the  draft  budget.'^  In  the  colony  the  governor 
is  assisted  by  subordinates  in  the  different  provinces  or  districts, 
is  head  of  the  military  power,  of  the  judiciary,  etc.  High  centrali- 
zation, therefore,  prevails.  The  administration  of  justice  follows 
one  general  plan  in  the  protectorates  :  minor  disputes  of  natives 
are  left,  as  far  as  possible,  to  the  native  chiefs  as  arbiters ;  second- 
ary courts  try  the  remaining  minor  cases  ;  and  death  sentences  and 
appeals  are  the  province  of  the  governor,  with  or  without  council, 
as  chief  judge. '^ 

The  commercial  position  ^  of  the  colony  with  reference  to  the 
German  government  is  that  of  most  favored  country.  The  colo- 
nies rank  as  Zollausla7id^  and  their  exports  are  subject  to  the  im- 
position of  duties,  both  at  the  German  ports  and  at  the  boundaries 
of  the  other  colonies  ;  export  duties  also  are  collected,  except  in 

^  (ieffcken,  in  Tlie  Forum. 

2  Schmidt,  I,  276  ff. ;  F.  Fabii,  Flinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  123. 

8  Von  Stengel,  p.  66 ;  Loeb,  p.  49. 

*  Details  are  given  in  Von  Stengel's  work  ;  it  is  a  standard  treatise  on  legal  rela- 
tions in  the  colonies.  See  also,  for  less  detailed  treatment,  Fitzner, /<7j-j»>«  ;  Loeb, 
pp.  45  ff. ;  Schmidt,  II,  194;  Meinecke,  p.  14.  Of  late  there  has  been  a  movement 
looking  to  the  adoption  of  English  and  French  systems  of  colonial  government ;  the 
establishment  of  the  local  council  and  the  indejiendent  colonial  Ijudget  have  been 
much  discussed.  Annuls  Amcr.  Acad.  Pol.iuui  Soc.  Sci,  XIX,  No.  i  (January,  1902), 
p.  162.  ''  Von  Stengel,  pp.  97  ff. 


MODERN   GERMAN   COLONIZATION  565 

Togo  and  Kamerun.  The  tariff  on  imports  is  levied  on  a  revenue 
basis,  and  seldom  exceeds  a  low  percentage  (I0-20  per  cent) ;  many 
and  important  articles  are  placed  on  the  free  list  at  both  ends.^  Pro- 
hibitions affect  only  arms  and  ammunition,  and  spirituous  liquors. 
It  will  be  noted  also  that  some  of  the  German  territory  comes  under 
the  rulings  of  the  Berlin  conference,^  by  which  the  conventional 
basins  of  the  Congo  and  Niger  were  opened  to  free  navigation  by 
the  ships  of  all  nations.  Freedom  of  trade  was  established  and 
only  such  duties  \^ere  to  be  levied  as  would  pay  expenses  incurred 
in  the  interests  of  trade,  no  differentials  being  allowed.  These 
provisions  are,  of  course,  active  to  a  limited  degree  only  in  the 
German  possessions. 

Population 

The  settlement  of  the  new  colonies  has  not  proceeded  apace. 
It  is  generally  recognized  that,  with  the  exception  of  Southwest 
Africa,  they  are  unfitted  to  receive  any  permanent  European 
settlement ;  their  lot  is  that  of  the  trading  or  plantation  colony, 
supporting  a  shifting  population  of  European  traders  and  plan- 
ters, whose  interest  in  the  country  can  never  be  that  of  a  people 
for  its  home.  Southwest  Africa,  as  far  as  climate  is  concerned, 
might  allow  of  European  settlement ;  but,  as  has  been  seen,  the 
region  is  anything  but  inviting  to  the  settler ;  and  in  addition  to 
this,  the  action  of  the  Company  for  Southwest  Africa  has  interposed 
artificial  obstacles  of  the  most  serious  kind.  Where  it  has  not 
itself  pursued  the  selfish  policy  of  appropriation  of  the  best  lands, 
it  has  allowed  speculators  to  gain  possession  ;   the  price  of  land  ^ 

1  Details  in  Fitzner,  passim  ;  Der  Deutsche  Export,  pp.  34ff.,  41  ff. ;  Loeb,  pp.  59  ff. 
The  customs-dues  of  Togo  were  admittedly  modeled  upon  those  of  the  English  Gold 
Coast  colony.  Klose,  p.  547.  Scientific  apparatus,  the  property  of  the  missions,  etc., 
were  regularly  free. 

2  Keltie,  chap.  xiv. 

3  The  government  price  is  i  M.  per  ha.  for  the  lands  it  has  retained.  The  South- 
west Africa  Company  charges  about  the  same.  Other  companies  ask  a  prohibitive 
price,  as  they  are  waiting  for  a  rise.  Prices  are  reckoned  in  lump-sums  with  no  regard 
to  the  quality  of  the  land,  of  which,  indeed,  the  companies  are  oftentimes  as  ignorant 
as  the  settlers.  The  conditions  of  payment  are  very  hard  (10  per  cent  down,  two  years 
free,  then  10  per  cent  a  year).  Hermann,  who  gives  this  information  from  personal 
experience,  says  that,  considering  the  defective  protection  of  the  government,  the  arid 
quality  of  the  land,  etc.,  the  price  should  be  put  down  to  50  pf.  (to  cents)  per  ha.,  to 
be  paid  up  in  fifty  years.  There  are  only  two  settlers  near  Windhoek  who  deserve  the 
name,  and,  though  economical  and  industrious,  they  find  it  hard  or  impossible  to  pay. 
Hermann,  pp.  5-1 1. 


^66  COI.OXIZATION 

is,  in  view  of  existing  ctjnditions,  excx'edingly  high,  and  the  pur- 
chaser can  never  be  sure  that  his  title  is  secure  and  that  the  land 
he  has  bought  is  not  an  arid  sandhill.  Worst  of  all,  the  delays  and 
expense  incident  to  settlement  are  so  great  that  immigration  of  the 
German  peasant  is  out  of  the  question.  The  expenses  due  to  delays 
alone  (in  journeying  by  ox-wagon  to  Windhoek  and  there  waiting 
on  the  convenience  of  the  far  from  strenuous  Company  official)  is 
estimated  by  a  competent  critic  at  $ioo;  the  same  writer  asserts 
that  a  capital  of  over  $2300  is  indispensable,  ami  that,  even  with 
this,  and  neglecting  the  never  remote  possibility  of  drought,  "rinder- 
pest," and  bad  years,  the  settler  would  still  be  in  debt  $800  in  the 
hfth  )ear  of  his  cattle-raising  activity. ^  Agriculture  on  any  respect- 
able scale  is  debarred  by  physical  conditions  ;  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Windhoek,  where  prices  are  extremely  high,  it  is  only  with  great 
painstaking  that  horticulture  on  the  small  scale  can  be  made  to  pay. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the  German  emigrant  avoids  the  Ger- 
man possessions  because  of  the  virtual  extension  thither  of  the 
national  "system."  Often  this  system  is  exactly  the  incubus  which 
he  is  trying  to  throw  off  ;  why  should  he  subject  himself  anew  to 
military  conscription  and  petty  regulation  when  so  many  of  his  fel- 
low-countrymen are  leading  free  and  prosperous  lives  across  the 
Atlantic  ?  It  is  no  doubt  true  that  labor  is  deterred  from  entering 
Southwest  Africa,  the  only  German  colony  possible  of  settlement, 
because  it  is  well  known  that  the  competing  native  of  that  colony 
will  work  (after  a  fashion)  for  merely  food  and  drink  —  or  the  latter 
alone  ;  but  at  bottom,  the  attempted  artificial  direction  of  German 
emigration  is  ineffective  against  the  innate  desire  of  man  to  be  his 
own  master.'-^ 

According  to  late  official  statistics,  the  total  white  population  of 
the  German  dependencies  is  not  above  7000  ;  of  these  the  greater 

1  Hermann,  pp.  2  ff.,  13  ff.  This  author,  himself  a  settler  in  Southwest  Africa,  has 
several  times  come  into  collision  with  the  Company  and  its  powerful  manipulators  in 
Herlin  (see  Giesebrecht,  p.  121).  lie  writes  a  very  interesting  and  detailed  account 
of  the  productive  possibilities  of  Southwest  Africa.  Novelties  proposed  and  partially 
adopted  are  ostrich-raising  and  the  culture  of  the  silkworm  (Hermann,  pp.  63-64). 

2  Hermann,  pp.  1-2  ;  cf.  The  A'aiion,  LXV,  471.  Engler  (pp.  98-99)  distinguishes 
si.\  classes  of  emigrants  to  the  colonies  :  (i)  merchants  in  the  colonies  and  their  sup- 
porters at  home ;  (2)  enterprising  youths,  tired  of  home,  and  on  their  travels ;  (3)  former 
soldiers,  who  are  weary  of  garrison  life  and  impatient  of  slow  promotion,  and  who 
want  to  fight ;  (4)  young  men  through  school,  who  covet  rank  and  honors  unattainable 
at  home  ;  (5)  older  men  who  want  to  be  something  at  home  and  cannot  —  who  wish 
to  speak  or  write  ;  (6)  merchants  who  want  to  get  into  political  life. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZAIION  567 

part  are  officers,  officials,  and  traders.  In  Southwest  Africa,  the 
Ko/ojiial-Handbuch  claimed  before  the  recent  uprising  of  the  natives 
3388  German  and  foreign  settlers.^  It  should  here  be  mentioned  that 
the  Germans  have  anticipated  for  some  years,  and  with  a  mixture  of 
feelings,  the  influx  of  a  large  Boer  population  into  the  Southwest 
African  colony.  The  Boers  are  hardy  enough,  and  rich  enough  in 
cattle,  to  become  a  permanent  and  increasing  element  of  the  popu- 
lation ;  but  the  Germans  dislike  their  character  and  hav^e  regularly 
repelled  advances  looking  to  the  establishment  of  a  German  pro- 
tectorate over  certain  regions  farther  to  the  south. ^ 

Colonial  Trade 

In  the  development  of  the  colonial  trade,^  Germany  has  suc- 
ceeded little  better  than  in  the  attempt  to  direct  emigration.  The 
companies  did  practically  nothing  toward  opening  up  their  respec- 
tive regions  by  means  of  road-making,  clearing  of  river-courses,  and 
the  like.  They  did  not  attempt  to  minimize  the  risks  of  commerce 
by  the  erection  of  lighthouses,  the  making  of  charts,  and  the  dredg- 
ing of  harbors.  Communication  with  the  outside  world,  especially 
for  New  Guinea,  was  fitful,  being  rendered  possible,  for  the  most 
part,  by  Dutch  and  English  vessels.  Only  as  the  imperial  govern- 
ment came  forward  with  subsidized  lines,  was  regular  communica- 
tion with  Europe  established.  All  these  works  were  beyond  the 
strength  of  the  companies,  and,  it  may  be  said,  considering  their 
actual  political  nature  and  purpose,  beyond  their  province  ;  they 
were  to  hold  the  colonies  and  try  to  pay  expenses  some  way  till 
the  government  could  relieve  them.  There  was  really  no  incentive 
for  the  investment  of  capital  in  Southwest  Africa  and  New  Guinea, 
for  they  provided  neither  supply  stations  nor  markets  ;  ^  a  scanty 
and  inelastic  export  of  hides  and  ivory  from  Southwest  Africa,  and 
of  copra  from  New  Guinea,  was  all  that  could  be  reckoned  on.  The 
crudeness  of  the  means  of  communication  in  these  two  possessions 

1  Fitzner,  p.  141.  These  estimates  agree,  except  in  the  case  of  Southwest  Africa, 
with  those  of  the  Statesman's  Year-Book  {1901).  The  latter  gives  the  number  of 
Europeans  in  Southwest  Africa  as  1840  (1557  Germans),  which  seems  a  morereason- 
able  estimate  than  that  of  the  (perhaps  inspired)  Kolonial-Handbuch.  Hauser  says 
(p.  114)  that  there  are  not  over  3400  Germans,  functionaries  and  all,  in  the  Schutzgebiete. 

2  Biittner,  p.  105  ;  Engler,  p.  112;  Hermann,  p.  12  ;  Globus,  LXXIX,  3  (January,  17, 
1901).  3  See  Fitzner, /rtjj/>«,  for  details;  also  Der  Deutsche  Export. 

*  The  Germans  call  Southwest  Africa  their  "  Schmerzenkind."  Hauser,  p.  41  ; 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  324. 


568  COLONIZA'IION 

and  llie  distance  of  the  latter  colony  were  fatal  obstacles  to  the 
development  of  trade.  Valuable  woods  in  New  Guinea  could  not 
be  transported  to  the  coast  and  still  yield  a  profit,  and  the  cotton 
of  the  island,  though  of  splendid  quality  and  long  staple,  could  not 
realize  a  price  on  European  markets  which  would  cover  the  cost  of 
production  and  freight  charges,^  and  still  leave  a  reasonable  margin 
of  profit.  In  Togo  ^  and  Kamerun  trade-interests  had  long  existed, 
and  from  East  Africa  also  many  valuable  products  could  be  drawn  ; 
choice  woods,  palm-oil  and  kernels,  tropical  fruits,  copra,  sugar, 
ivory,  and  caoutchouc  wore  among  them,  although  the  last  two 
articles  named  were  becoming  more  and  more  scarce  under  a  sys- 
tem of  ruthless  exploitation.  Cacao,  coffee,  tea,  and  a  promising 
quality  of  tobacco  (from  New  Guinea)  were  raised  in  the  several 
tropical  colonies,  and  seemed  to  point  to  future  gains  as  recompense 
for  present  toil  and  sacrifice.  As  a  supply  region,  then,  the  colonies 
were  eminently  unsatisfactory  ;  nor  did  they  afford  a  profitable  mar- 
ket for  German  wares.  The  native  peoples  either  had  little  to  give 
in  exchange  for  German  goods,  or  their  needs  were  so  few  and  their 
improvidence  so  great  that  they  did  not  care  to  take  advantage  of 
resources  which  they  possessed.  This  was  the  case  particularly  in 
Southwest  Africa  and  New  Guinea.  The  Herero  of  the  former 
country  clung  to  their  one  form  of  wealth,  cattle,  with  religious 
fervor,  and  would  sell  only  those  beasts  that  were  old,  sick,  or  be- 
witched ;  ^  the  Papuans  of  New  Guinea  were  quite  satisfied  with 
their  lot,  and  desirous  only  of  such  minor  articles  as  iron  hatchets 
and  knives."*  Most  of  the  native  peoples  under  the  German  flag 
confined  their  demand  to  powder  and  guns,  and  to  alcoholic  spirits, 
goods  which  the  government  was  unwilling  to  supply. 

1  Blum  (p.  103)  .says  the  pltts  in  the  transport  costs  must  be  made  up  for  by  a  iiiiitm 
in  the  cost  of  production  or  a  melius  in  quality  of  product  —  for  all  of  which  practice 
and  experience  are  needed.  The  wide  fluctuations  of  the  European  markets  are  ex- 
ceedingly harmful  to  the  development  of  cotton-raising  (p.  171).    Cf.  Schmidt,  II,  409. 

2  An  exceptionally  full  treatment  of  the  economic  possibilities  of  Togo  is  given  by 
Klose,  pp.  547  ff.  ^  Biittner,  pp.  25  ff.,  86. 

*  For  ages  Papuans  have  traded  only  when  absolute  need  has  frightened  them  out  of 
their  laziness.  This  trade  was  carried  on  by  means  of  periodical,  rotating  markets  and 
festivals.  As  usual,  the  folk  of  the  smaller  islands  have  become  the  industrial  special- 
ists and  traders.  Papuan  manufactured  articles  of  export  are  largely  "  objects  of 
ethnological  interest."    Hagen,  pp.  214  ff. 

One  of  the  irritating  features  of  the  native  trade  is  the  amount  of  dickering  neces- 
sary. T>ong  discussions  are  to  the  native  a  favorite  diversion  ;  he  insists  u])on  barter- 
ing each  article  separately  and  prolongs  his  enjoyment  to  the  despair  of  the  unhappy 
German.    Schmidt,  I,  187. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  569 

East  Africa  and  Kamerun  present  certain  additional  trading 
conditions  which  entitle  them  to  separate  mention.  In  Kamerun 
the  Germans  were  long  irritated  by  the  Dualla  tribe,  a  people  of 
middlemen,  who  insisted  upon  retaining  for  themselves  the  privi- 
lege of  trading  between  widely  diverse  conjunctures  —  the  essential 
advantage  of  the  frontier-trade.  During  the  earlier  years  of  occu- 
pation, they  offered  much  open  and  covert  opposition  to  the  expan- 
sion of  German  trade  with  the  interior  ;  of  late,  however,  their 
power  has  been  weakened  by  the  extension  inland  of  the  imperial 
arms.  In  East  Africa  trade  has  remained  for  centuries  in  the 
hands  of  Arabs  and  natives  of  India,  and  attempts  of  the  East 
Africa  Company  to  lay  hands  upon  the  commercial  routes  and 
caravans  for  purposes  of  trade  and  taxation  have  been,  for  the 
most  part,  futile.^  The  tremendous  inertia  of  custom  and  the  re- 
doubtable power  of  Islam,  vested  in  the  sultan  of  Zanzibar,  have 
been  encountered,  in  active  or  passive  resistance,  at  every  turn  ; 
the  East  Africa  Company  never  got  much  beyond  the  invasion 
stage. ^ 

On  the  whole,  then,  the  trade  of  these  new  possessions  has  not 
justified  the  eager  expectations,  nor  satisfied  the  longings,  of  the 
acquisition-period.  The  possession  of  "  colonies  "  seems  to  have 
been  as  unsatisfactory  in  the  solution  of  commercial  problems  as 
of  those  of  emigration.  Nor  has  the  development  of  commerce 
with  the  colonies  been  such  as  to  afford  any  convincing  instances 
to  those  who  asserted  that  trade  would  follow  the  flag.  If  truth 
be  told,  the  tendency  of  trade  seems  to  have  been  to  follow  the 
British,  and  for  obvious  reasons.  It  was  only  by  the  use  of  English 
trade-marks,  for  example,  that  the  Germans  managed  to  get  any 
hold  at  all  in  Southwest  Africa  ;  their  goods  were  regarded  as 
"  German  trash,"  ^  and  the  demand  for  them  under  their  own 
mark  and  form  was  very  small.  Here  again  the  Germans  brought 
up  against  the  barrier  of  century-old  and  time-hallowed  custom, 
as  well  as  against  the  superior  elasticity  and  development  of 
the  British  commercial  system.  The  tariff  regulations  mentioned 
above,  however  moderate,  could  not  but  have  had  their  effect 
upon  an  incipient  trade  which  called  for  the  utmost  freedom  of 

1  The  Indians  (especially  the  Banians)  are  sly  and  bad,  but  indispensable  to  the 
Germans  for  the  present.    Schmidt,  I,  181. 

2  Cf.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  327. 

^  This  was  about  1840,  when  Germans  first  appeared  as  merchants  in  Southwest 
Africa.    Keltie,  p.  171. 


570  COLONIZATION 

development. 1  Statistics  of  Germany's  trade  with  her  colonies  ex- 
hibit, on  the  whole,  an  uninteresting  dead-level.  It  is  found  that 
while  exports  have  remained  practically  stationary,  imports,  espe- 
cially of  manufactured  wares,  have  increased  somewhat  in  volume. 
The  decline  of  caoutchouc  and  ivory  under  a  system  of  ruthless 
destruction  has  already  been  alluded  to.  In  general,  Germany's 
share  in  the  exports  and  imports  of  the  Schutzgebiete  is  insignifi- 
cant ;  it  appears,  however,  to  be  on  the  increase.^  But,  though 
the  development  of  the  German  colonial  trade  has  not  been  such 
as  to  satisfy  the  inflated  hopes  of  the  colonial  party,  the  recital 
of  its  story  need  cause  no  shame  to  the  Germans.  They  were 
working  against  overwhelming  odds.  The  companies,  however 
culpable,  cannot  with  justice  be  held  to  full  account  for  all  the 
mismanagement  and  mistakes  incident  to  their  performance  of 
temporary  and  inconsistent  functions  ;  even  if  the  directors  were 
seriously  at  fault,  the  evil  occasioned  was  rather  local  than  gen- 
eral in  its  incidence.  There  was  a  singular  moderation  and  care 
displayed  by  the  government  in  the  whole  matter ;  this,  again,  in 
all  probalMlity,  must  be  referred  to  the  influence  of  Bismarck  ;  fortu- 
nately for  the  Germans,  the  governor  of  the  mechanism  seems  to 
have  discharged  its  function  with  rare  precision. 

Internal  Improvements ;  Budget 

After  the  government  had  gathered  the  reins  of  power  into  its 
own  hands,  commercial  matters  were  set  at  once  upon  a  better 
footing.  The  companies  themselves,  especially  that  of  East  Africa,^ 
began  to  feel  themselves  more  nearly  equal  to  the  discharge  of 
their  business  functions  now  that  the  incubus  of  administration 
had  been  removed.  The  imperial  government  operated,  if  not  witli 
skilled  hand,  certainly  with  farsighted  purpose.  Scientific  expe- 
ditions were  systematically  organized  and  experiment  stations  were 

1  The  manufactured  articles  imported  into  East  Africa  are  mostly  from  England, 
America,  Switzerland,  and  India.  Arms  and  (inferior)  powder  are  about  the  only 
articles  demanded  of  the  Germans.  Schmidt,  I,  i79ff.  I'hilippson  (pp.  32,  44)  had 
predicted  (1880)  that  colonies  could  not  he  permanently  retained  by  a  country  of  such 
unfortunate  geographical  position  as  Germany  ;  he  prophesied  that  they  would  fall 
into  England's  market. 

2  The  import  trade  of  Germany  with  West  Africa  attained  its  higli-water  mark  in 
1891  (M.  5,600,000).  Since  1896  its  rise  has  been  due  to  imperial  subventions,  espe- 
cially for  Southwest  Africa.  The  statistics  here  involved  are  admittedly  poor  and 
corrupt.  Only  general  tendencies  can  be  shown.  For  details,  see  Der  Deutsche  Ex- 
port, pp.  56  ff . ;  Fitzner;  Statesman's  Year-Book,  etc.  '  Schmidt,  I,  122  ff. 


MODERN  CxERMAN   COLONIZATION  571 

founded  for  the  investigation  of  conditions  of  soil,  climate,  etc. ; 
the  acclimatization  of  various  grains,  vegetables,  and  fruits  became 
a  subject  for  study  and  experiment.  The  Hinterland  of  West  and 
Southwest  Africa  had  been  vigorously  opened  up  in  the  early  years 
of  the  imperial  government ;  East  Africa,  and  later  New  Guinea, 
now  offered  a  fresh  field  for  exploits  and  advance.  Military  and 
commercial  roads  were  built  and  carefully  patrolled.^  In  general, 
however,  trade  from  the  interior  still  passes  over  the  narrow  native 
"  paths,"  as  it  has  done  from  time  immemorial ;  ^  the  solution  of 
the  cjuestion  of  communication  still  looms  up  as  a  sine  qua  non  of 
effective  occupation  and  development.  The  imperial  coin  has  been 
made  legal  tender  in  most  of  the  colonies.  In  Southwest  Africa, 
it  is  said,  the  once  prevalent  British  coin  is  becoming  more  scarce  ; 
but  in  Togo,  where  trade-interests  have  been  better  developed, 
British  currency  is  much  preferred.^ 

In  the  matter  of  transmarine  communication,  the  government's 
hand  has  been  active  from  the  first.  Liberal  subventions  ^  were 
granted  to  African  lines,  and  by  the  early  nineties  fair  communi- 
cations had  been  established.  New  Guinea  and  the  Bismarck 
Archipelago  were  dependent  solely  upon  Dutch  and  English  lines 
until  recently ;  the  New  Guinea  Company  did  nothing  to  facilitate 
local  or  European  connections  and  the  government  could,  at  that 
time,  accomplish  little.  At  present  the  German  colonies  do  not 
suffer  to  any  great  extent  from  absence  of  external  communi- 
cation.^ Railroads  in  the  colonies  are  a  more  crying  need,  and  are 
no  more  than  in  their  beginnings.  Railroad  development  can  do 
much  for  Southwest  Africa,  where  the  chief  obstacles  to  the 
opening-up  of  the  interior  lie  in  the  time,  danger,  and  cost  of 
transport  across  the  sandy  desert  that  borders  the  coast.  Cable 
connection  is  now  made  with  all  the  African  protectorates  and 

1  They  have  generally  been  of  an  unnecessary  width  and  quality,  inasmuch  as 
length  and  penetration  have  been  sacrificed.  Natives  of  Togo  cannot  see  the  use  of 
a  road  several  meters  in  width  ;  they  solemnly  march  in  "goose-order"  along  the 
edges,  in  the  good  old  ancestral  way.    Meinecke,  p.  16. 

2  Cf.  Hauser,  p.  13.  Where  there  are  no  native  paths  (e.g.  in  parts  of  New  Guinea) 
a  passage  has  to  be  hacked  out,  step  by  step,  through  the  dense  jungle.    Krieger, 

p.  243- 

3  Loeb,  p.  53  ;  Meinecke,  p.  43  ;  Klose,  p.  127. 

*  The  first  subvention  was  legalized  April  6,  1885 ;  after  this  time  subventions 
became  more  and  more  common.    Der  Deutsche  Export,  pp.  47-4S. 

^  Fitzner,  I  and  II,  passim.  An  account  of  then  existing  connections  is  to  be 
found  in  Globus,  LXXIX,  No.  9  (March  7,  1901),  p.  146. 


572 


COLONIZATION 


limited  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  (largely  military)  are  found 
in  all  the  colonies.^ 

On  the  whole,  considering  the  obstacles  which  the  Germans 
have  had  to  meet,  and  their  inexperience  in  governing  dependen- 
cies, it  must  be  admitted  that  they  have  coped  manfully  with  an 
extremely  troublesome  situation,  sparing  neither  money,  effort,  nor 
lives  in  the  solution  of  commercial  and  other  problems,  presented 
in  their  most  forbidding  forms.  Throughout,  the  attitude  of  the 
colonizing  power  has  been  that  of  modesty  and  of  dogged  perse- 
verance, of  willingness  to  learn  and  to  correct  errors.  There  has 
been  no  extravagance  countenanced,  and  yet  the  expense  has  been 
grievously  heavy.  Many  brave  lives  have  been  lost  in  battle,  and 
many  more  sacrificed  to  the  deadly  climate,  with  its  fatal  fevers 
and  dysentery.^  In  comparison  with  such  irreparable  losses,  ex- 
penses of  administration  may  seem  slight ;  but,  as  has  been  seen, 
they  were  such  as  to  discourage  the  enthusiastic  and  reasonably 
strong  colonial  companies.  From  the  time  of  their  annexation 
until  the  late  nineties,  Togo  and  Kamerun  managed  to  pay  their 
own  way  ;  since  that  time,  however,  they  have  been  the  recipients 
of  rapidly  increasing  imj^crial  subventions.  The  small  Jaluit  Com- 
pany is  the  only  one  which  has  regularly  balanced  its  budget  with- 
out state  aid.  The  expense  incurred  by  the  empire  in  the  entire 
or  partial  administration  of  East  and  Southwest  Africa  and  New 
Guinea  has  been  heavy  from  the  first,  and  manifests  a  tendency  to 
increase  steadily.^  The  heavy  debt  item  of  the  budget  is,  of  course, 
the  expense  of  military  occupation.  The  credit  items  consist  of 
the  subventions,  and  of  various  taxes,  —  e.g.  on  natives,  on  business 
firms,  etc.,  —  customs  dues,  income  from  railroads,  and  other  minor 
income.  The  receipts  from  the  customs  form  by  far  the  largest  of 
these  items,  excepting  always  the  subventions. 

1  Fitzner,  I  and  II,  passim.    All  the  Schutzgebiete  are  in  the  Welipostverein. 

2  The  story  goes  that  there  were  always  two  governors  en  route  between  the 
English  West  African  possessions  and  the  home-land ;  one,  in  his  coffin,  being  carried 
home  for  burial,  and  the  other  hastening  to  take  his  vacant  place. 

*  According  to  Loeb  (p.  6 1),  expenses  in  behalf  of  the  colonies  rose  from  M.  9,497,000 
in  1896-1897  to  25,200,000  in  1899.  The  full  estimates,  he  says  (p.  63),  were  never 
allowed  by  the  imperial  legislature.  He  notes  (p.  70)  the  interesting  fact  that  Kamerun 
alone  has  been  required  to  repay  subventions,  on  a  basis  of  annual  installments,  to 
the  imperial  treasury.  The  budget  and  debt-contracting  powers  have  been  in  the 
hands  of  the  imperial  legislature  since  1892,  although  here  the  emperor's  hand  is  still 
very  powerful  (p.  48  ff.).  P"or  details,  see  Fitzner,  I  and  \\, passim,  and  l.oeb,  pp.  56  ff. 
In  the  former  are  to  be  found  details  of  taxation,  tax-collection,  expenses  of  various 
kinds,  and  the  like. 


MODERN  (;ERMAN  COLONIZATION  573 

To  the  Germans,  then,  as  well  as  to  other  peoples,  world-domin- 
ion has  proved  itself  to  be  an  expensive  luxury.  They  seem  to 
regard  it  as  worth  the  cost ;  indeed,  it  has  been  charged  by  certain 
recalcitrants^  that  the  popular  mind  is  unsettled  in  the  matter  of 
the  colonies  to  the  verge  of  megalomania.  The  criticism  is  made 
that  improvements  of  unquestioned  value  at  home  are  delayed  by 
reason  of  excessive  and  imprudent  grants  for  questionable  enter- 
prises in  the  colonies.  But  by  this  lavishness  the  Germans  thought 
to  raise  the  importance  of  the  empire  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

The  "  Native-Question  " 

The  native-question  in  any  colony  is  one  which,  for  the  attain- 
ment of  any  adequate  results,  must  be  attacked  at  the  same  time 
from  the  general  and  from  the  specific  points  of  view.  Its  satis- 
factory solution,  if  such  solution  is  ever  possible,  must  call  into 
requisition  the  results  of  the  most  advanced  thought  in  ,the  fields 
of  ethnology  and  the  science  of  society.  In  this  place,  however,  a 
specific  study,  with  but  casual  reference  to  general  principles,  is 
less  out  of  place,  because  of  the  homogeneous  character  of  the 
natives  of  the  German  colonies  ;  the  typical  virtues  and  defects  of 
the  German  system  stand  out,  therefore,  more  consistently,  and 
lend  themselves  to  a  briefer  and  less  involved  treatment. 

As  in  other  issues  of  colonial  policy,  so  here,  the  successes  and 
failures  of  the  Germans  are  intimately  bound  up  with  the  national 
character  and  disposition.  Theoretically,  German  administrators 
should  have  known  a  great  deal  about  native  peoples  and  their 
life ;  if  they  remained  ignorant  in  any  cases,  it  was  certainly  not 
for  lack  of  portly  volumes  on  these  subjects,  constructed  with  the 
usual  laborious  GribidlicJikeit.  An  acquaintance  with  such  sources, 
on  the  part  of  colonial  administrators,  is  far  from  exceptional ;  but 
the  most  important  contribution  of  scientific  training  to  the  han- 
dling of  the  native-question,  as  presented  to  the  Germans,  appears 
in  the  distinctly  sane  view  which  the  administrators  as  a  class  are 
enabled  to  take  before  this  troubled  issue.  Most  of  them  have 
realized  that  the  German  possessions,  in  common  with  all  other 
tropical  countries,  find  in  the  presence  of  native  races  an  essential, 
even  though  variable,  and  often  merely  potential,  factor  in  public 
wealth.    Years  have  served  to  strengthen  the  conviction  that  the 

1  Speech  of  Herr  Richter  in  the  Reichstag  (New  York  Times,  January  ,10,  1902). 


574  COLONIZATION 

Germans  are  thrown  back  upon  the  native  peoples  for  what  assist- 
ance they  are  to  get,  even  though  that  be  shght,  in  the  development 
of  colonial  resources. ^  Little  false  sentiment  is  to  be  found  and 
few  grandiloquent  expressions  of  purely  humanitarian  aims.  The 
problem  is  approached  with  'cool  head  and  with  a  method  that  is 
scientific,  even  though  over-academic  in  its  first  expressions. 

This  promising  attitude  was  compromised  first  by  the  eminently 
temporizing  policy  of  the  chartered  companies,  and,  later,  by  bu- 
reaucratic narrow-mindedness  and  military  rigor.  The  administra- 
tion of  the  companies,  with  its  shifty  and  uncertain  policy,  was  about 
the  worst  system  to  which  the  fate  of  the  native  could  have  been 
intrusted.  They  exercised  both  too  much  and  too  httle  power; 
they  imposed  upon  and  irritated  the  native,  without  being  able  to 
enforce  wholesome  discipline,  or,  indeed,  caring  to  do  so.  They 
were  in  the  field  for  very  tangible  and  immediate  ends,  and  had 
no  inclination  or  ambition  to  foresee  the  future  and  prepare  for  it. 
No  predetermined  and  settled  policy  existed  under  their  regime  ; 
they  took  little  or  no  account  of  the  character  and  customs  of  the 
native  peoples  of  their  districts.  In  New  Guinea  and  the  Pacific 
islands  the  results  of  their  inefficiency  were,  of  course,  less  notice- 
able, amounting  only  to  the  death  of  a  number  of  brave  men ;  but 
in  Southwest  and  East  Africa  the  outcome  has  been  more  momen- 
tous. The  losses  occasioned  by  the  hostility  of  Witbooi  and  of 
Maharero  may  not  have  been  directly  chargeable  to  the  arrogance 
and  stupidity  of  Company  officials  ;  ^  the  uprising  in  East  Africa, 
however,  which  finally  cost  the  local  Company  its  political  existence, 
had  its  immediate  cause  in  tactless  and  oppressive  measures,  mo- 
tived by  a  curious  combination  of  greed,  timidity,  and  parsimony. 
No  attention  was  paid  to  the  warnings  of  British  officers  who  knew 
well  the  dangerous  mood  of  the  Arabs  and  Swahili ;  these  resentful 

1  The  value  of  the  native  peoples  is  recognized  by  almost  all  the  authorities ;  the 
case  is  stated  most  strongly  by  Blum,  pp.  47,  102,  162  ;  Pfeil,  Vorschlage,  60  ff. ;  Her- 
mann, p.  82. 

2  The  earlier  uprisings  have  been,  of  course,  relatively  overshadowed  by  the  troubles 
in  Southwest  Africa  which  have  been  going  on  now  for  some  years  and  at  a  grave 
cost  of  resources  and  lives.  Military  operations  against  the  Herero  and  their  allies 
have  been  most  difficult  owing  to  the  physical  character  of  the  colony ;  and  despite 
the  adoption  of  the  arduous  "hunting  out"  style  of  campaign,  the  end  is  not  nearly 
in  sight.  The  voting  of  extra  credits  for  Southwest  Africa  has  cost  the  Kaiser  and 
his  ministers  much  trouble  from  the  opposition.  The  modest  progress  that  the  colony 
showed  is  now  set  back  for  an  indefinite  period  to  come,  and  the  whole  colonial  pro- 
gramme has  been  rendered  distasteful  to  a  large  number  of  Germans. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  575 

peoples  were  handled  with  entire  lack  of  caution  and  of  fair  con- 
sideration, and  were  not  long  in  discovering  and  profiting  by  the 
essential  weakness  of  their  oppressors.^ 

Severity  and  Cruelty  :  Maladapt ability 

The  companies  had  no  native  policy,  therefore  ;  but  with  the 
entrance  of  the  imperial  rule  there  appeared,  full-fledged,  a  most 
simple  and  definite  system.  The  invincible  Prussian  army  would 
put  these  reckless  and  insubordinate  savages  down,  once  and  for 
all.  This  was,  again,  the  military  spirit  fostered  by  German  life 
and  training ;  and  it  was  not  without  its  salutary  effect  in  the  case 
in  hand.  Much  objection  may  be  had  to  the  bureaucrat,  with  his 
petty  powers  and  small  tyranny,  who  followed  along  with  the  im- 
perial rule,  but  little  can  be  urged  against  the  German  doctrine  of 
force.  The  native  understands  force  ;  it  is  about  the  only  thing 
that  is  permanently  and  wholesomely  imposing  to  him  ;  and  any 
colonizing  people  does  well  to  flash  the  blade  from  out  the  scab- 
bard now  and  then.  The  effect  can  generally  be  produced  without 
striking  often  and  cruelly  ;  in  the  case  of  the  Germans,  however, 
it  appears  that  resort  to  actual  bloodshed  has  shown  itself  to  be 
necessary  again  and  again.  Dismissal  of  incompetent  and  insolent 
company  officials  and  of  '■'■  scJineidige  Lieutenants"  would,  doubt- 
less, have  been  in  the  nature  of  the  ounce  of  prevention,  but,  under 
the  circumstances,  these  were  an  inevitable  incubus  of  the  system. 
Much  must  be  set  down  to  the  account  of  inexperience  of  contact 
with  native  races,  and  consequent  ignorance  of  and  contempt  for 
their  customs  and  prejudices,  on  the  part  of  the  average  colonial 
functionary ;  taken  all  in  all,  however,  this  severity  was  far  better 
than  a  wavering  policy  and  indecision.^ 

Too  often,  however,  condonable  military  strictness  has  been 
called    upon   to  account   for  conspicuous  examples   of   individual 

1  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  65  ff.,  85  ff. ;  Keltie,  pp.  254  ff. ;  Johnston,  p.  256  ; 
Keane,  Africa,  II,  iSo;  Dove,  pp.  i6off.,  178;  Globus,  LXXIX,  No.  9,  p.  134.  The 
native  princes  felt  that  they  had  been  hoa.\ed  by  Peters  and  others  in  the  matter  of 
the  "  treaties  "  in  which  they  had  signed  away  land  and  power.  They  had  never  under- 
stood the  import  of  these  documents,  which  were,  indeed,  of  the  most  flimsy  sort. 
Schmidt  (I,  12-13)  gives  a  typical  example  of  Peters's  treaties. 

2  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  1 1 1  ;  Pfeil,  Vorschlage,  pp.  65  ff. ;  Studien,  etc., 
p.  256 ;  Boshart,  p.  184.  Keltie  (pp.  259-262)  compares  German  activity  in  East  Africa 
with  the  efforts  of  the  British  in  the  same  region,  to  the  great  disadvantage  of  the 
latter. 


576  COLONIZATION 

cruelty.  From  time  to  time  tales  of  indescribable  tortures  inflicted 
upon  natives  in  the  Kamerun  region  have  shocked  the  civilized 
world.  Insignificant  faults  have  been  punished  with  wanton  and 
senseless  cruelty.  Flagrant  cases  of  the  eighties  seem  to  have 
found  their  aftertypes  at  the  beginning  of  a  new  century.^  The 
Germans  seem  to  feel  that  there  is  something  abnormal  about  these 
bursts  of  murderous  rage.  They  are  not  countenanced, ^  and  the 
feeling  of  the  responsible  administrators  and  colonists  about  them 
is  one  of  anger  and  shame.  They  are  regarded  by  some  as  evidence 
of  a  distemper  for  which  the  significant  term  Tropenkollcr  has 
been  coined.^  There  really  appears  to  be  something  pathological 
about  these  cases.  No  doubt  the  German  subordinate  officer  is 
inclined  to  be  tyrannical  in  the  exercise  of  petty  power,  —  the 
German  system  is  hardly  calculated  to  instill  ideals  of  self-restraint 
in  the  treatment  of  inferiors,  —  but  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  any 
man  in  his  right  mind  could  enjoy  poking  a  ramrod  down  a  defense- 
less negro's  windpipe,  or  that  he  would  feel  it  necessary,  for  the 
sake  of  discipline,  to  whip  numbers  of  women  publicly  and  brutally, 
before  the  eyes  of  their  men.  This  is  not  the  wild  burst  of  sudden 
anger  ;  it  is  barbarous  and  insane  torture.  These  examples  are  not 
the  worst.  And  a  reasonable  physical  cause  for  it  all  is  really  not 
far  to  seek  :  the  Germans  are  naturally  maladaptable  to  an  unfa- 
miliar physical  environment,  and,  as  a  rule,  take  no  pains  to  neu- 
tralize this  weakness  by  artificial  adaptation.  All  experience  of  the 
white  race  with  equatorial  Africa  goes  to  show  that  it  is  about  as 
unlikely  a  region  in  which  to  keep  health  and  sanity  as  any  on  the 
globe  ;  the  Belgian  Congo  State,  as  well  as  the  German  protector- 
ates, has  its  tale  of  shame  to  tell.  Here  is  a  region,  then,  where 
special  care  in  matters  of  tropical  hygiene  and  dietary  are  de- 
manded of  a  European  population,  even  though  it  come  from  the 

1  New  York  Times,  December  22,  1901.  The  earlier  cases  were  those  of  Leist, 
Wehlan,  and  Peters;  in  Giesebrecht's  collection  are  found  letters  from  a  number  of 
scientists  and  administrators,  condemning  the  above  native-torturers,  together  with  a 
communication  from  Peters,  in  which  he  seeks  to  defend  his  course.  The  case  of 
Peters  has  received  special  attention  because  of  his  prominence  in  German  colonial 
history.  See  also  Schmidt,  II,  96  ff.;  Johnston,  p.  25S  ;  Hermann,  p.  84  ;  New  York 
Times,  April  15,  1894.  Giesebrecht  (p.  23)  mentions  a  study  of  his  own  on  "  Kolonial- 
greuel,"  in  jVeiie  Deutsche  Rimdschau,  1S95,  Heft  ii. 

2  The  three  culprits  mentioned  above  were  cashiered.  The  New  York  Times 
(December  15,  1901)  reports  light  punishments,  but  according  to  Sir  H.  H.  Johnston, 
(p.  25.S),  publicity  was  given  to  these  cases,  prosecution  w.ts  vigorous,  and  the  punish- 
ments proportional  to  the  offenses.    Later  years  exhibit  the  same  policy. 

8  Der  Deutsche  E.xport,  p.  91  ;   Schmidt,  II,  74-76;   Pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  p.  252. 


MODERN   C.RRMAN   COLONIZATION  577 

Mediterranean  states.  With  the  Germans,  much  more  of  caution 
IS  necessary,  for  they  are  a  people  that  has  always  acclimatized 
poorly  in  low  latitudes,  as  statistics,  even  of  Algeria,  will  show.^ 

However,  either  from  ignorance  or  from  willfulness,  the  Germans 
are  found  to  have  neglected  certain  prime  essentials  of  tropical 
hygiene.  The  more  self-evident  rules,  regarding  clothing,  marching 
in  crowded  ranks,  and  the  like,  were  perforce  observed,  but,  as  the 
reports  of  importations  into  the  German  colonies  and  the  tales  of 
eye-witnesses  unite  to  show,  the  German  absolutely  refused  to  re- 
nounce in  tropical  colonies  the  heavy  alcoholic  drinks  of  the  father- 
land. No  people  can  endure  the  continued  use -of  these  liquors 
under  the  equator ;  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  had  to  learn  to 
be  sparing  in  the  use  of  even  the  light  wines  to  which  they  had 
been  accustomed.  Doubtless  heat,  hardship,  and  coarse  food  do 
their  share  in  wrecking  the  digestive  and  nervous  systems,  but  in- 
temperance in  the  tropics  —  and  this  may  well  be  temperance  at 
home  —  must  certainly  be  taken  into  grave  account.  It  should  be 
reckoned  in  with  the  climatic  agents  which  induce  such  frequent 
melancholia  and  consequent  insanity  or  suicide  in  the  equatorial 
districts  of  Africa.^  Another  unfortunate  factor  is  present  in  the 
iron  inflexibility  of  the  social  system  in  the  colonies.  Distinctions 
of  rank,  social  position,  and  the  like  are  rigorously  maintained  ; 
nothing  short  of  imminent  annihilation  seems  likely  to  modify  the 
strictness  of  etiquette  and  caste.  There  are  no  "clubs"  in  the 
German  colonies  ;  each  military  circle  of  a  few  members  herds  by 
itself  and  gulps  down  its  steins  of  Bavarian  beer  in  lonely  and 
dignified  seclusion.  Homesickness  plays  its  familiar  role  in  in- 
ducing gloom  and  despair,  and  consequent  deterioration  of  resistive 
power.  It  is  generally  admitted  that  a  cheerful  disposition  and 
good-fellowship  do  much  to  ward  off  maladies  in  any  part  of  the 
earth,  and  especially  in  the  tropics,  where  home  influences  and  the 
society  of  women  and  of  friends  are  but  rarely  to  be  enjoyed. ^ 

These  are  some  of  the  factors  that  render  the  German  less  master 
of  himself  in  the  colonies  than  he  is  at  home,  and  predispose  him 
to  gusts  of  passion  on  slight  occasion.  They  also  accentuate  the 
irritable  and  petty  tendencies  of  a  shortsighted  bureaucracy,  and 
are,  to  a  great  extent,  responsible  for  an  ill  grace  of  manner  which 
is  sure  to  awaken  resentment  in  a  native  population,  particularly 

1  Bordier,  Col.,  pp.  55,  91,  155-157,  184-187;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I,  383. 

2  Boshart,  pp.  225  ff.  ^  Bigelow,  in  Harper's,  C,  577-590. 


578  COLONIZATION 

if  the  latter  is  already  restive  under  a  brand-new  harness  of  ill  fit- 
ting, cramping,  and  generally  trivial  restrictions.  The  contact  of 
such  a  bureaucracy  with  a  savage  or  semi-civilized  population  can 
easily  be  figured  in  imagination ;  police  regulations  calculated  for 
Berlin,  bundles  of  acts  whose  transgression  is  a  matter  of  daily 
occurrence  among  the  unwary  sojourners  in  German  towns  —  all 
these  formed  a  system  whose  application  to  the  Sudanese  and  Ban- 
tus  was  incongruous  even  to  the  local  ofificial.i  Reiterated  appeals 
on  the  part  of  opponents  of  this  system,  so  ill-suited  to  its  environ- 
ment, have  not  failed  entirely  of  effect. 

Strenge  MIT  Gerechtigkeit 

A  change  which  created,  as  it  were,  a  new  ideal  of  the  treatment 
of  the  natives  came  with  the  downfall  of  the  companies  and  the 
consequent  presence  in  the  colonies  of  well-chosen  imperial  com- 
missioners and  commanders.  The  typical  case  is  that  of  Wiss- 
mann,  in  East  Africa,  where  the  expiring  Company  had,  by  its 
oppression  and  its  indiscreet  attitude  toward  native  and  Arab  prej- 
udices, roused  a  rebellion  with  which  it  was  utterly  unable  to  cope. 
To  this  scene  of  disorder  and  uproar  Bismarck  sent  the  scientist  and 
explorer.  Dr.  von  Wissmann,  a  man  chosen  rather  for  his  knowl- 
edge and  personality  than  for  any  distinctive  military  achievements. 
He  quelled  the  insurrection  in  a  masterly  manner,  promptly  execut- 
ing the  leader.  Not  only  that ;  he  gained  the  confidence  of  the 
natives,  together  with  their  wholesome  respect,  so  that  his  succeed- 
ing administration  of  the  colony  in  peace  only  added  to  his  reputa- 
tion as  an  ''Aft-ikakcmier."  ^  His  successes  led  to  imitation  of  his 
methods  on  the  part  of  his  subordinates  and  brother-administra- 
tors ;  there  was  established  a  new  fashion,  as  it  were,  in  colonial 
management.  The  formula  of  this  system  was  simplicity  itself : 
"  sternness  with  justice."  In  dealing  with  the  rebels  in  East  Af- 
rica, Wissmann's  first  object  was  to  teach  a  "■  griindlicJie  LcJirc^' 
to  make  an  imposing  display  of  European  superiority  and  power. 
The  effect  upon  the  native  population  was  instantaneous.^    This 

1  Boshart,  pp.  182-183,  186 ;   Globus,  LXXIX,  No.  9,  p.  134. 

2  IJismarck  referred  to  Wissmann  as  "the  man  who  knew  how  to  deal  with  natives." 
Poschinger,  p.  244. 

•''  The  natives  said  of  his  rule :  "  Bisher  war  bei  euch  Deutschen  alles  Spielerei, 
jetzt  sieht  man  doch,  dass  euer  Sultan  ernst  macht  und  da  wird  es  euch  gelingen, 
wirklich  die  llerren  des  Landes  zu  werden."  Schmidt,  I,  64;  cf.  Geffcken,  in  The 
Forum, 


MODERN   (GERMAN  COLONIZATION  579 

administrator  knew  also  how  to  temper  severity  with  mercy  and 
to  use  his  prestige  to  secure  in  time  of  peace  what  he  had  gained 
in  war.  The  "  Wissmann  system  "  has  been  complained  of  by  those 
whose  humanitarian  feelings  are  wounded  by  violence  of  any  kind  in 
dealings  with  the  noble  savage  ;  but  it  is  not  without  its  sound  ele- 
ments of  common  sense  and  science.  Where  practices  abhorrent  to 
the  civilized  world  were  found  to  exist,  they  were  resolutely  erad- 
icated ;  Wissmann  dealt  blows  to  the  slave-trade  of  East  Africa 
from  which  it  will  scarcely  recover.^  In  less  essential  matters, 
however,  a  wise  moderation  was  displayed  ;  the  bureaucratic  system 
was  discouraged  and  no  attempt  was  made  to  interfere  with  cher- 
ished institutions  and  customs  of  the  indigenous  tribes.  The  Arab 
wall  and  kadi  were  retained  ;  and,  while  German  discipline  was 
enforced,  it  was  rather  along  general  lines  than  in  matters  of  de- 
tail.'-^ The  system  rested  upon  a  correct  recognition  of  conditions, 
intelligent  judgment,  and  respect  for  the  natives'  rights  and  for 
their  chiefs'  authority.  The  gifts  and  geniality  of  Wissmann  him- 
self played  a  great  part  in  his  successes  ;  he  possessed  the  qualities 
both  of  leader  and  organizer.  He  had  the  reputation  of  selecting 
realizable  aims,  and  always  realizing  them,  and  his  prestige  was 
marred  by  no  fiasco  of  any  moment ;  his  subordinates  were  held 
strictly  to  duty  and  were  at  the  same  time  assured  of  power  to  ful- 
fill the  task  assigned.  Their  loyalty  to  this  leader  is  something 
exceptional,  taking  into  account  the  extreme  hardships  of  the  serv- 
ice in  the  East  African  country.  It  speaks  well  for  the  Wissmann 
system  that  it  has  made  out  of  this  difficult  district  a  relatively 
peaceful  colony ;  later  difficulties  in  the  attempted  application  of 
civil  rule  in  East  Africa  led  to  the  re-adoption  and  consequent  vin- 
dication of  this  system.  At  the  accession  of  Hohenlohe,  Wissmann, 
who  had  been  recalled  by  Caprivi,  was  returned  as  governor- 
general  of  the  protectorate.^ 

1  Giesebrecht,  p.  22  ;  Schmidt,  I,  188  ff.,  224  ff.  An  interesting  passage  in  F.  Fabri 
(Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  55)  shows  how  a  development  of  methods  of  transportation  in 
East  Africa  will  necessarily  bring  about  the  complete  downfall  of  the  slave-trade. 

■■^  Bitter  complaint  is  made  that  the  German  functionaries  take  no  pains  to  learn 
the  native  languages,  not  even  spending  the  time  on  shipboard  on  the  long  journey 
to  New  Guinea  in  study.  The  Germans  revolt  at  the  "  pidgin  English  "  that  forms 
the  only  universally  understood  language  of  New  Guinea  and  environs.  They  combat 
it  also  in  Africa.  Blum,  pp.  165-166;  Engler,  p.  114;  Keane,  Africa,  II,  19;  Pfeil, 
Studien,  etc.,  pp.  128-130;  R.  L.  Stevenson,  In  the  South  Seas,  chap.  ii. 

3  Schmidt,  I,  232  ff.,  243-244  ;  Giesebrecht,  pp.  19  ff.  More  tact  has  been  displayed 
of  late  by  the  German  officers.    Johnston,  pp.  257-258.     It  appears  that  the  climate 


580  COLONIZATION 

A  number  of  writers  who  ha\e  criticised  the  nd ministration  of 
the  German  colonies  have  com}iiained  of  an  insufficient  display  of 
military  and  naval  power  on  the  part  of  the  home-government. 
They  have  also  asserted  that  the  opening  up  of  the  Hintcrhnui 
has  followed  no  settled  plan  and  has  worked  from  no  stable  and 
selected  base  of  ()j:)crations.^  The  number  of  imperial  troops  has 
indeed  been  small  ;  but  since  the  time  of  Wissmann,  and  especially 
in  East  Africa,  it  has  been  the  policy  of  the  government  to  utilize 
native  auxiliaries  abcnit  a  relatively  insignificant  nucleus  of  regulars. 
The  warlike  tribes  who  would,  in  any  case,  lend  themselves  unwill- 
ingly to  the  regime  of  industry,  are  glad  to  be  mustered  in  and  to 
fight  under  European  officers.  The  Sudanese  have  been  particu- 
larly useful  in  this  line,  com))letely  outclassing  the  Bantus  ;  and 
the  Solomon  Islanders  are  also  regarded  as  suitable  material  for 
the  same  ends.^  The  idea  is  that  the  warlike  tribes  shall  hold  the 
more  docile  natives  to  work,  thereby  effecting  a  division  of  labor 
of  which  all  shall  reap  the  good  results.^ 

The  Tropical  Labor  Issue 

Here  we  touch  upon  the  question  of  labor  in  tropical  colonies  ; 
it  is  rightly  recognized  as  the  vital  issue,  and  strenuous,  if  unsuc- 
cessful, efforts  have  been  put  forth  in  attempts  at  its  solution.  It 
is  a  modern  riddle  of  the  Sphin.x  at  which  the  various  nations  have 
guessed,  each  in  its  characteristic  way.  The  conclusions  of  the 
Germans,  as  a  well-informed  people,  new  to  the  subject,  singularly 
free  from  bias  and  open  to  new  truth,  possess  an  especial  and  pecul- 
iar interest  to  the  student  of  this  vexed  problem.     It  seems,  in  the 

and  hardships  finally  told  upon  Wissmann  so  as  to  impair  health  and  temper,  and  to 
a  certain  extent,  former  reputation. 

1  See  Schmidt,  I,  94;  Boshart,  p.  183;  Pfeil,  Vorschliige,  p.  43 ;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf 
Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  71  ff.;  Sievers,  Afrika,  p.  405.  Complaint  is  also  made  of  governmental 
parsimony,  which  F.  Fabri  (p.  89)  declares  to  be  false  economy  ;  "  es  geht  in  solchen 
Dingen  haufig  wie  beim  Ankauf  der  sibyllinischen  Biicher." 

2  Unfortunately  the  Sudanese  insist  upon  the  presence  of  their  families  on  any  e.x- 
tended  expeditions.  While  the  women  are  useful  in  some  ways,  they  form  an  unde- 
sirable camp-following.  It  is  noted  that  the  negro  soldiers,  although  they  were  soon 
able  to  manipulate  the  mechanism  of  the  breech-loading  rifles,  are  likely  to  shoot  high 
and  erratically  in  action.  Apparently  they  have  not  as  yet  full  confidence  in  the  new 
weapon.    See  Schmidt,  II,  374,  385;  Pfeil,  Vorschliige,  pp.  66  ff. 

'*  Pfeil,  Vorschliige,  pp.  60,  67  ;  cf.  vStudien,  etc.,  p.  239.  No  .satisfactory  system  of 
taxing  the  natives  has  been  devised.  The  Germans  have  decided,  however,  in  favor 
of  a  hut-tax  versus  a  poll-tax  ;  the  hut,  they  say,  is  something  that  cannot  evade  taxes 
by  a  timely  disappearance.  A  small  portion  only  of  the  colonial  income  is  derived 
from  this  source. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  581 

first  place,  that  the  Germans  have  been  regularly  unsuccessful  in 
creating  a  supply  of  free  labor  by  the  stimulation  of  wants  ;  the 
ground  upon  which  they  work  is  unpropitious,  and  no  support  for 
their  economists'  theories,  in  the  shape  of  actual  results,  is  yet 
forthcoming.  The  natives  are  almost  all  tropical  peoples,  whose 
needs  are  few  and  will  continue  so  to  be,  except  in  the  matter  of 
intoxicants  and  implements  of  war  which  the  sentiment  of  the 
civilized  world  refuses  to  supply. ^  The  native,  as  a  factor  in  eco- 
nomic supply  and  demand,  is,  as  has  been  seen,  a  virtual  nonentity. 
There  is  need  of  ages  of  slow  development,  or  of  some  effectual 
forcing  process,  before  the  Papuan  and  his  ilk  begin  to  respond 
to  stimuli  which  are  calculated  to  appeal  to  anything  higher  than 
momentary  desire  or  caprice.  But  the  tropics,  ex  hypotJiesi,  must 
be  developed,  and  Europeans  are,  of  themselves,  unable  to  effect 
such  development ;  if  this  be  granted,  nothing  remains  as  alterna- 
tive except  the  adoption  of  some  form  of  compulsory  labor  imposed 
upon  the  tropical  peoples.  Avowed  slavery  is,  of  course,  inhibited 
by  forces  too  strong  to  be  opposed.  Substitution  of  more  advanced 
races  is  costly  and  has  been  rendered  well-nigh  impracticable  by 
the  attitude  of  the  governments  which  sway  the  fates  of  the  peoples 
available  for  coolie  service.  The  system  of  compulsory  labor 
under  contract  remains  ;  a  system  which,  like  coolie  labor,  is  a 
partial  return,  in  the  form  of  semi-slavery,  to  the  rough-and-ready 
methods  of  the  ancient  world. 

The  Germans  did  not  reach  this  alternative,  which  seems  to 
so  many  of  their  competent  writers  a  last  and  inevitable  resort, 
without  exploring  all  the  culs-de-sac  along  in  the  way,  in  the  hope 
of  discovering  some  other  solution  less  repugnant  to  themselves 
and  others.  The  attempt  to  introduce  a  wage  system  was  early 
shown  to  be  futile  ;  what  little  labor  was  thus  secured  was  both 
low  in  efficiency  and  extremely  irregular.  Even  the  Krumen  who 
were  available  along  the  Togo  and  Kamerun  seaboard  refused  to 
enter  upon  contracts  of  over  one  year's  duration  ;  at  its  expiration 
they  insisted  upon  returning  to  their  own  tribes  with  what  they 
had  earned,  and  it  was  only  in  consequence  of  the  reckless  ex- 
penditure which  ensued  that  a  labor  force  could  again  be  recruited 
from  this  source.^  The  labor  supply  was  similarly  intermittent 
in  the  rest  of  the  African  colonies,  while  in  New  Guinea  it  was 

^  Cf.  Finsch,  Samoafahrten,  pp.  26,  62. 

2  The  labor  of  the  Krus  was  relatively  expensive,  and  its  cost  was  enhanced  by 
the    periodic    need    of    double    transportation.     See    Keane,    Man,    etc.,   pp.   53-54; 


582  COLONIZATION 

practically  impossible  to  enlist  any  workers  whatsoever  under  a 
voluntary  system.^ 

After  this  disillusionment,  recourse  was  had,  especially  in  East 
Africa  and  New  Guinea,  to  imported  labor  of  various  types.  In 
the  latter  protectorate  the  system  was  really  one  of  slave-transfer, 
whereby  the  ruling  chief  of  a  limited  area,  or  the  old  men  of  a 
village,  sold  the  vital  forces  of  captives  or  subjects  (debtors,  often- 
times) for  a  consideration  ;  that  some  form  of  compulsion  on  the 
part  of  the  Melanesian  native  authorities  was  usually  i^resent,  even 
though  it  was  not  actually  demonstrable,  is  commonly  conceded 
by  the  German  writers  themselves.  This  system  of  slavery  for  a 
term,  which  carried  with  it  the  so-called  "  Labor  Trade,"  had  been 
shamefully  abused  by  the  Queenslanders,  and  was  already  under 
universal  condemnation  ;  the  missionaries  in  the  South  Sea  were 
bitterly  opposed  to  it.  The  Germans  honestly  attempted,  there- 
fore, to  carry  out  regulations  which  would  give  the  appearance,  at 
least,  of  fairness  and  humanity.^  They  intended  also  to  keep  clear 
of  the  many  possible  misunderstandings  with  the  native  j^eoples,  and 
thus  avoid  the  inevitable  vendetta  with  its  consequent  unpopular 
punitive  expeditions,  and  other  evil  and  dangerous  consequences.^ 
An  attempt  was  made  to  give  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland  a  better  repu- 
tation among  those  islanders  whose  services  could  be  secured.* 
But  results  were  not  commensurate  with  the  effort  put  forth ;  the 
death-rate  of  the  laborers,  though  lowered,  was  still  believed  to  be 
high,  and  the  "  trade  "  in  natives  still  continued  to  be  carried  on 
in  unseaworthy  ships.     Inadequacy  of  transport  facilities  often  left 

Keichenow,  p.  44.    Hermann  (p.  86)  says  that  native  labor  has  been  relatively  over- 
paid in  Southwest  Africa. 

1  The  best  reports  of  native  labor  come  from  Togo  and  Kamerun,  but  even  here 
it  is  found  that  the  natives  regularly  choose  such  minor  occupations  as  demand  little 
physical  effort.  The  Dualla  were  always  energetic  traders,  and  continue  to  be  so, 
but  there  is  a  conspicuous  absence  of  smiths,  wheelwrights,  etc.  See  Pfeil,  Vor- 
schlage,  pp.  54  ff. ;  Schmidt,  II,  89-90,  168  ff. 

2  Pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  pp.  24  iff. ;  Finsch,  Samoafahrten,  p.  26;  Egerton,  p.  396; 
Blum,  pp.47,  78;  Schmidt,  11,410-412.  Krieger  enters  somewhat  upon  the  details 
of  the  labor  trade  (pp.  244  ff.).  The  native  never  believed  in  the  Airn'ohcvioJus. 
Blum,  p.  162. 

^  If  a  native  died  during  his  term,  the  vendetta  came  at  once  into  play,  and  the 
next  Kuro])eans  to  meet  the  relatives  of  the  deceased  were  exposed  to  unexpected 
attack  and  murder.  Money-commutation  for  such  a  death,  together  with  accrued 
wages,  were,  as  a  rule,  promptly  forwarded  to  the  relatives  or  vill.ige  authorities  of 
the  dead  man.    Krieger,  pp.  244-245. 

■*  The  native  laborers  said  of  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland:  "  No  haiL-ni  [food],  no  sun- 
day,  |)lcnly  fight,  plenty  die."    Blum,  p.  135. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  583 

the  government  burdened  with  an  unruly  crowd  of  recruits  :  those 
who  had  arrived  previously  and  whose  wages  must  be  paid  from 
the  time  of  arrival,  and  those  whose  terms  were  served  out  and 
who  were  eager  to  leave  the  neighborhood  of  the  whites  forever. 
Few  cases  of  renewed  contracts  are  to  be  found. ^  And  when  all 
these  difficulties  had  been  somehow  met  or  evaded,  the  charac- 
ter of  the  labor  supply  was,  after  all,  completely  inadequate.  The 
natives  could  be  forced  to  an  occasional  activity  in  fetching  and 
carrying,  and  could  be  induced  to  dig  the  earth  in  a  more  or  less 
desultory  fashion,  but  for  the  finer  kinds  of  labor,  in  the  raising 
of  coffee  and  cacao,  it  was  necessary  from  the  first  to  empltjy  the 
higher-class  labor  of  the  Javanese  and  Chinese.^ 

Moreover,  the  problem  of  holding  the  native  to  labor,  when 
his  presence  had  been  secured,  was  not  yet  solved. '"^  The  Mela- 
nesian  could  not  be  effectively  controlled  by  a  system  of  fines  ;  he 
had  no  idea  of  the  value  of  money,  and  whether  he  received  a 
little  more  or  a  little  less  was  a  matter  of  complete  indifference 
to  him.  In  any  case  his  earnings  went  to  the  authorities  of  his 
native  village.  And  it  was  found  that  penalties  in  the  form  of 
extra  hours  taxed  the  European  overseer  far  more  than  they 
did  the  nonchalant  native  ;  the  unsophisticated  functionaries  were 
likewise  astonished  to  find  that  the  orthodox  German  system  of 
imprisonment  was  absolutely  ineffective.  "To  lie  eight  days  long 
upon  his  back,  to  receive  his  meals  regularly,  and  every  other  day 
to  take  a  walk,  is,  for  the  Kanaka,  a  life  of  good  cheer ;  and  one 
can  easily  conceive  the  wrath  of  the  settlers  when  protracted 
and   costly   legal   proceedings   found   their   conclusion   in   such   a 

1  The  natives  reckoned  their  terms  by  "fellow-moons,"  of  which  they  counted  ten 
to  the  year;  this  difference  of  standard  led  to  frequent  misunderstandings.  Blum, 
p.  135.    Too  much  seems  to  have  been  made  of  a  few  cases  of  renewed  contracts. 

2  Blum,  p.  166.  The  government  was  also  obliged  to  furnish  a  particular  kind  of 
food  to  the  Melanesian  coolies :  yams  and  taro.  Pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  pp.  238,  242. 
Blum  (p.- 136)  thinks  the  natives  may  be  educated  through  the  agency  of  Chinese  and 
Malay  overseers  and  middlemen.  Not  long  ago  it  was  announced  (New  York  Times, 
March  30,  1902)  that  the  Tuskegee  Institute  had  been  called  upon  by  the  German 
Colonial  Economic  Society  to  send  five  graduates  to  Togo ;  these  young  negroes  were 
to  assist  three  predecessors,  sent  eighteen  months  before,  in  teaching  the  natives 
the  arts  of  agriculture. 

3  Some  German  writers  have  accused  the  authorities  of  spending  their  time  in 
deciding  how  to  hold  the  native  to  labor,  when  the  vital  question  was  how  to  secure 
the  native  at  all.  The  Germans  seem  to  have  had  a  way  of  settling  a  problem  before 
they  were  perfectly  sure  of  the  actual  terms  in  which  it  was  to  be  presented.  Pfeil, 
Vorschlage,  p.  60 ;  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  79. 


584  COLONIZATION 

chastisement."  ^  The  planters,  naturally  enough,  insisted  upon  the 
right  of  private  corporal  correction.  The  courts  were  distant  and 
uncertain,  and  the  struggle  for  commercial  existence  near  and 
sure.  Beating  exactly  met  the  natives'  ideas  of  punishment,  and, 
as  a  rule,  no  grudges  were  cherished  if  the  causes  for  such  correc- 
tion had  been  set  forth  with  requisite  clearness  and  emphasis.  But 
the  grant  of  such  privilege  would  amount  to  the  legalization  of 
one  of  the  most  characteristic  and  most  odious  marks  of  slavery. 
Humanitarian  sentiment  would  be  wounded  in  distant  Europe  ; 
and  thus  what  the  actors  on  the  spot,  with  few  exceptions, 
regarded  as  necessary,  could  not  but  be  permanently  disallowed. 
Infringements  of  this  prohibition  have  doubtless  occurred,  but 
they  have  been  relatively  few ;  the  missionaries  are  alert  to  de- 
nounce any  possible  faults  of  the  system.  It  is  no  wonder  that  the 
situation  has  remained  unaltered  for  some  years  back.^  In  this  em- 
barrassing and  hopeless  situation,  the  government  turned  to  the 
time-honored  coolie  system.  Javanese  and  Chinese  were  enlisted  in 
Batavia  and  Singapore  ;  and,  though  the  costs,  including,  of  course, 
double  transportation,  were  excessive,  the  new  arrivals  seemed  to 
promise  much  for  the  future  of  the  colony.  Political  complications 
and  national  jealousies,  however,  have  closed  the  several  sources  of 
supply.  In  the  early  nineties,  alleging  the  unhealthfulness  of  the 
New  Guinea  settlements,  both  Holland  and  England  forbade  the 
further  export  of  coolies  from  their  colonies,  after  having  rendered 
that  export  as  costly  and  as  inconvenient  as  possible.^  The  Germans 
later  cherished  some  hopes  of  deriving  a  supply  of  labor  directly 
from  China ;  but  the  well-known  hostility  of  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties to  the  coolie  system  soon  put  an  end  to  this  expectation.'* 

1  Pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  p.  254;  for  the  other  a.spect.s  of  the  question  of  punishment, 
see  pp.  252-256,  passim. 

2  According  to  Pfeil,  an  officer  of  long  experience  (see  Giesebrecht,  p.  130),  in 
view  of  the  failure  of  coolie  importation,  the  defective  system  just  described  must 
be  maintained,  with  all  its  difficulties,  for  some  time  to  come.    Studien,  etc.,  p.  244. 

'^  The  resentment  of  the  Germans  attaches  with  especial  bitterness  to  the  British ; 
tales  are  not  lacking  which,  if  true,  establish  serious  charges  of  the  breaking  of 
neutrality,  of  the  stirring  up  of  native  passions,  etc.  British  missionaries  come  in  for 
a  good  share  of  this  accusation.  As  for  the  coolie  question,  it  is  asserted  that  the 
British  were  especially  proficient  in  the  selection  of  crippled  and  diseased  natives, 
whose  subsequent  deaths  or  ailments  were  then  charged  to  the  deadly  climate  of 
New  Guinea.  Blum,  pp.  118,  168;  Schmidt,  II,  66  ff. ;  Pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  p.  240; 
Egerton,  pp.  400-402  ;   Krieger,  p.  250. 

••Blum,  p.  166.  Krieger  (pp.  236ff.)  gives  facts  concerning  the  enlistment  of 
Javanese  and  Chinese  coolies  and  their  life  in  the  colonies. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  585 

Compulsory  Labor 

Nothing  remained,  then,  if  the  colonies  were  to  be  developed  — 
and  Germany  would  scarcely  renounce  this  object  so  close  to  her 
heart  without  a  struggle  —  but  to  organize  some  system  of  forced 
labor,  and  render  it  as  palatable  as  possible  to  European  tastes.^ 
Many  of  the  best  administrators  and  writers  on  colonial  questions 
openly  support  this  system  and  justify  their  views  by  fairly  con- 
sistent lines  of  argument.  The  orthodox  position,  viz.,  to  renounce 
all  force,  is  represented  chiefly  in  the  writings  and  utterances  of 
the  older  scientists  and  missionaries,^  though  several  of  the  latter 
have  come  out  strongly  for  the  enforcement  of  regular  labor  as,  in 
any  case,  indispensable  for  the  natives'  advancement  in  civilization.^ 
The  model  before  the  eyes  of  the  advocates  of  forced  labor  was 
the  overrated  culture  system  of  the  Dutch,  as  developed  chiefly 
on  the  island  of  Java.^  They  wish,  in  effect,  to  enforce  native 
labor  through  the  agency  of  already  constituted  native  authori- 
ties, whether  those  authorities  are  chiefs  or  village  elders.^    But 

1  A  brief  account  of  attempts  to  do  away  with  the  virtual  slavery  existing  in  East 
Africa,  by  allowing  the  purchase  of  '■^Freilu-iefe,'"  is  given  in  Annuls  Anier.  Acad,  of 
Pol.  ajul  Soc.  Science,  XIX,  No.  2,  p.  164. 

2  A  collection  of  opinions  on  the  native  question  has  been  made  by  Giesebrecht ; 
this  work  has  been  done  very  completely,  and  appended  biographical  sketches  of  the 
various  contributors  enable  the  reader  to  make  correction  for  the  personal  factor  with 
some  ease.  Expressions  were  elicited  from  prominent  scientists,  colonial  officials, 
and  missionaries;  the  whole  collection  is  extremely  valuable  and  readable.  Accord- 
ing to  the  author,  the  question  is  still  sitb  jiidice ;  he  believes  that  the  more  favor- 
able views  of  the  older  scientists  are  due  to  the  fact  of  their  having  met  the  native 
before  he  had  been  irritated  and  rendered  hostile  by  contact  with  Europeans.  The 
more  modern  officers,  administrators,  and  travelers  are  unanimous  in  advocating  strict- 
ness and  sternness,  though  they  all  insist  upon  pairing  these  with  justice ;  Strenge 
viit  Gerec/itigkeit  is  the  typical  formula.  It  is  curious  how  the  opinions  differ 
according  as  the  writer  is  a  military  man,  a  missionary,  or  a  planter.  Some  of  the 
judgments  rendered  are  exceedingly  strong  pieces  of  work,  notably  those  of  Pfeil, 
Denhardt,  Holub,  Peters,  and  Hiibbeschleiden.  Though  the  author  professes  to 
have  reached  no  definite  conclusions,  it  seems  to  the  present  writer  that  the  impres- 
sions left  by  the  work,  though  perhaps  a  little  indistinct  because  of  minor  differences 
and  contradictions,  are  of  undeniable  value  to  the  colonial  administrator  and  the  stu- 
dent. Cf.  Miiller,  p.  32.  Finsch  (Samoafahrten,  pp.  64  ff.)  says  he  had  little  difficulty 
with  the  New  Guinea  natives,  for  he  followed  in  the  steps  of  the  "  moon-man,"  the 
Russian  scientist,  Miklukho-Maclay,  who  always  got  along  well  with  native  peoples. 

?  Besides  the  opinions  in  Giesebrecht's  collection,  see  especially  Pfeil,  Vorschlage, 
p.  64. 

*  Cf.  pp.  473  ff.,  above.    Pfeil  (Studien,  etc.,  pp.  248  ff.)  is  an  advocate  of  this  system. 

^  The  idea  of  holding  the  more  tractable  tribes  to  work  under  compulsion 
exercised  by  more  warlike  natives,  officered  by  Germans,  is  likewise  a  part  of  the 


586  COLONIZATION 

conditions  in  the  German  protectorates  differ  so  widely  from  those 
in  Java  that  the  outcome  of  such  a  system  must  remain  an  enigma 
until  it  is  tried  ;  the  Bantus  and  Papuans  have,  as  a  rule,  no  chiefs 
of  an  extended  and  despotic  power, ^  and  it  is  extremely  doubtful 
if  any  of  the  native  peoples  subject  to  Germany  could  be  managed 
under  the  Dutch  system.  The  islander  of  the  Dutch  possessions 
is  a  great  advance  in  character  and  civilization  over  anything  the 
German  colonies  can  produce.  The  blacks  of  the  latter  districts 
do  not  understand  what  is  demanded  of  them  ;  they  are  incorrigibly 
improvident.  The  prevailing  conviction  among  the  natives  of  New 
Guinea  was  that  the  foreigners  would  soon  depart,  —  indeed,  a 
j)reliminary  division  had  already  been  made  of  the  habitations  and 
the  personal  effects  likely  to  be  left  behind.  The  negro  believes 
that  the  white  man  will  soon  grow  weary  of  all  this  useless  activity 
and  let  things  return  to  their  former  and  natural  course.- 

No  system  of  forced  labor  has  yet  been  organized  ;  such  a  move 
would  undoubtedly  encounter  bitter  opposition  among  philanthro- 
pists at  home  and  abroad.  But  the  reasons  for  their  faith  have 
been  set  forth  so  clearly  and  convincingly  by  some  of  the  most 
capable  administrators,  that  they  cannot  fail  to  find  converts  to 
their  views  as  time  goes  on  and  conditions  grow  more  intolerable. 
Given  the  need,  real  or  imaginary,  of  developing  tropical  colonies 
under  German  rule,  and,  in  consequence  of  considerations  already 
stated,  the  inevitable  outcome  is  compulsory  labor.  A  compulsory 
labor  system,  though  abhorred  as  an  infringement  of  the  "  rights 
of  man,"  is,  it  is  claimed,  from  the  standpoint  of  society's  life  and 
weal,  perfectly  justifiable.    No  more  is  required  of  the  savage  than 

proposed  system.  Pfeil  is  a  special  advocate  of  a  rotating  labor  supply,  whereby 
certain  sections  of  a  village  population  are  drawn  upon  in  successive  periods.  Much 
difficulty  has  been  experienced  in  "  localizing  "  the  labor  supply,  and  this  had  led  to 
a  curious  proposition  involving  the  resurrection,  in  certain  respects,  of  the  charac- 
teristic provisions  of  the  Spanish  encomienda  system,  as  developed  in  America.  The 
experience  of  the  Germans  goes  to  show  that  colonizing  powers  are  rarely  able  to 
invent  anything  new  and  revolutionary  in  the  treatment  of  century-old  problems, 
even  when  the  sum  of  modern  science  and  historical  research  can  be  drawn  upon. 
Pfeil,  Vorschlage,  pp.  57,  69  ff. ;   Hermann,  p.  88. 

^  If  there  is  no  chief  to  exercise  compulsion,  force  of  some  other  nature  must  be 
called  into  requisition.  Pfeil,  Vorschlage,  p.  72.  It  is  occasionally  stated  that  this  or 
that  people  possesses  a  tribal  organization  which  is  comparable  to  that  of  the  Java- 
nese, but,  inasmuch  as  nothing  has  been  made  out  of  these  tribes,  it  is  probable  that 
the  eagerness  of  hope  has  led  to  exaggeration.  See  Blum,  p.  21  •  Pfeil,  Vorschlage, 
p.  60;    Gldhiis,  LXXIX,  No.  9,  p.  134  ;   Schmidt,  I,  160  ff. ;   Sievers,  p.  409. 

2  Pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  pp.  238  ff.;  lUum  (p.  102)  says  that  the  labor  force  of  New 
Guinea  must  come  from  elsewhere. 


MODERN   GERMAN  COLONIZATION  5S7 

has  been  and  is  demanded  of  his  civilized  su))eri(jr  ;  there  is  no 
more  reason  why  black  drones  should  be  tolerated  in  the  hive  than 
white  drones  ;  vagabondage  is,  in  any  case,  a  disease  in  the  body 
of  society.  European  philanthropists  have  no  compunctions  about 
enforcing  industry  at  home  and  coercing  each  member  of  society 
to  render  his  share  of  service  to  the  public  ;  but  as  soon  as  a  hand 
is  outstretched  to  impel  the  distant,  and  therefore  somewhat  ideal- 
ized, savage  to  vary  his  life  of  tranquillity,  the  cry  of  "Taboo  !  " 
is  heard  at  once.  But  labor,  say  these  writers,  is  the  basis  of  all 
advance  in  civilization  ;  the  experience  of  years  has  persuaded  all 
rational  missionaries  of  this.^  Only  hy  forcing  in  the  thin  edge  of 
the  wedge  can  you  open  up  the  possibilities  of  a  higher  civilization. 
Moreover,  along  with  this  alternative  of  advance,  the  native  stands 
unwittingly  before  another  and  more  serious  one,  not  less  to  be 
dreaded  by  his  friends  :  that  of  more  or  less  speedy  degradation 
and  retrogression,  if  not  extinction.  It  is  useless  to  rail  at  the 
presence  of  a  new  human  environment  which  means  for  the  native 
the  necessity  of  unwonted  activity  and  the  pain  of  change  ;  it  is 
present  in  response  to  the  action  of  nature-forces,  and  the  con- 
sequences are  inevitable.  The  most  valuable  service  is  rendered 
to  the  native  by  him  who  will  force  him,  as  a  child  is  forced,  to 
live  up  to  the  requirements  of  the  next  stage  of  growth.  This  is 
the  gist  of  the  arguments  of  the  advocates  of  forced  labor ;  ^  in 
theory,  at  least,  they  do  not  lack  a  certain  convincing  force,  and 

^  Especial  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  activity  of  the  veteran  Hahn  in 
Southwest  Africa.  After  some  years  of  disappointing  experience,  he  frankly  gave  up 
the  attempt  to  influence  the  natives  through  purely  religious  means.  He  felt  and 
acknowledged  that  an  impulse  must  first  be  given  to  the  economic  life  of  the  native 
people,  and  so  devoted  his  efforts  almost  exclusively  to  the  teaching  of  trades  and 
the  improvement  of  material  conditions.    Schmidt,  II,  280  ff. ;  Biittner,  pp.  51  ff. 

■■^  The  arguments  of  Pfeil  carry  the  most  weight,  not  only  because  of  his  high  repu- 
tation as  an  administrator,  but  because  of  the  clarity  and  vigor  of  his  statement  and 
the  exceptionally  pleasing  quality  of  his  style.  He  was  one  of  Peters's  coadjutors  in 
the  seizure  of  East  Africa,  and  has  been  active  in  the  colonial  service  ever  since. 
His  arguments  are  to  be  found  in  Vorschlage,  pp.  60  ff. ;  Studien,  etc.,  pp.  238  ff. ;  and 
in  his  letter  in  Giesebrecht's  collection  (p.  130).  Cf.  Dove,  pp.  239  ff.  1  Pfeil  says  of 
his  own  successes:  "Dies  erklare  ich  mir  nur  daraus,  weil  ich  im  Principe  streng, 
im  Einzelnen  stets  mild  war  und  allezeit  mich  bemiiht  habe,  gerecht  zu  sein.  .  .  . 
Aber  ich  habe  den  Muth  als  Princip  Ernst  und  Strenge  aufzustellen  :  6  /xt;  dapeU 
Avdpwiroi  ov  waiSeOeTai."  Vorschlage,  p.  74.  This  view  is  expressed  more  sternly  else- 
where :  "  Wir  verlangen  eine  Gegengabe  (i.e.  service)  fiir  unseren  Verzicht  auf  das 
Recht  des  Starkeren  im  Kampfe  ums  Dasein."  Studien,  etc.,  p.  246.  Boshart  is,  as 
usual,  radical  to  the  extreme,  and  sees  nothing  before  the  native  population  except 
annihilation,  which  he  is  not  adverse  to  furthering  (pp.  181  ff.).  See  also  Geffcken, 
in  T/ie  Forum  ;  Finsch,  Samoafahrten,  pp.  170-172;  Dove,  pp.  44-45. 


588  COLONIZATION 

in  practice,  as  far  as  the  German  has  exercised  a  master's  power, 
he  seems,  with  comparatively  few  exceptions,  to  have  wielded  it 
well.  The  present  labor  conditions  are  thoroughly  unsatisfactory ; 
whether  a  better  system  can  be  devised  and  carried  out,  is  for  the 
future  to  show.  The  Germans  are  well  fitted  in  many  ways  to 
deal  with  this  most  difficult  and  probably  insoluble  question. 

Missions  and  Education 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  the  natives  have  met  only  officers 
and  soldiers  in  the  colonies  ;  they  have  been  longer  acquainted 
with  the  bearers  of  the  staff  and  scrip  than  with  the  wearers  of 
the  sword.  German  missionaries  early  extended  their  activity  to 
those  parts  of  Africa  which  later  became  German  colonies.  Their 
"  converts  "  have  been  few,^  but  their  efforts  looking  to  the  ad- 
vance of  material  civilization  have  been  far  from  fruitless.  With 
the  exception  of  certain  visionaries,  whose  folly  and  ridiculous 
results  are  recorded,^  they  have  taken  an  exceptionally  sensible 
view  of  their  own  activity  and  its  prospects,  and  are  almost  uni- 
versally commended  by  the  colonial  administrators.^  They  have 
also,  though  in  far  less  degree  than  the  British  missionaries,  labored 
for  the  political  predominance  of  the  fatherland.  Some  friction 
with  the  government  has  been  caused  by  their  sectarian  squabbles 
in  the  South  Sea  possessions,  and  also  by  their  abuse  of  privileges 
and  exemption  from  customs  dues,  a  grant  which  they  utilized  in 
a  way  calculated  to  retard  the  advance  of  trade.^  On  the  whole, 
however,  they  seem  to  share  in  a  remarkable  degree  the  freedom 
from  ultra-conservatism  and  dogma  which  characterizes  the  general 
attitude  of  the  Germans  toward  the  native  tribes. 

1  Finsch  (Samoafahrten,  p.  171)  says  that  in  seven  years  215  natives  of  Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland  had  been  "converted,"  at  an  expenditure  of  350,000  marks.  From 
1842  to  1861  not  one  Herero,  in  Southwest  Africa,  was  baptized,  for  here  ability  to 
read  and  write  formed  a  condition  of  baptism.  This  wise  and  exceptional  condi- 
tion seems  characteristic  of  German  missionaries;  in  their  freedom  from  the  wor- 
ship of  numbers  of  baptisms,  confirmations,  etc.,  they  form  an  edifying  contrast  to 
their  Anglo-Saxon  brethren.  See  Meinecke,  p.  37  ;  Boshart,  p.  173;  Krieger,  p.  248; 
Schmidt,  II,  289;  IJlum,  pp.  63  ff.  2  pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  pp.  247,  262  ff. 

"  Pfeil,  Studien,  etc.,  pp.  246  ff. ;  Finsch,  Samoafahrten,  p.  170;  Krieger,  pp.  247  ff.; 
F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  p.  82  ;  Schmidt,  I,  237-241  ;  II,  288-289 ;  cf.  lUittner,  p.  1 20. 
They  enjoy  an  especially  high  reputation  with  both  Germans  and  natives  in  South- 
west Africa  ;  they  can  carry  on  a  peaceful  commerce  with  both  sides,  at  all  times. 
Biittner,  p.  1 18. 

*  Schmidt,  II,  403;  Miiller,  pp.  33-35;  I'feil,  Studien,  etc.,  pp.  11-12;  Blum, 
pp.  63  ff.,  76-83  ;   Dove,  p.  26. 


MODICRN   CERMAN   COLONIZAI'ION  589 

The  education  of  the  native  has  not  proceeded  ai)ace.  Schools 
in  the  colonies  are  of  two  types,  governmental  and  missionary. 
The  latter  were,  of  course,  of  earlier  establishment.  In  the  govern- 
mental schools  in  East  Africa  attendance  has  been  made  com- 
pulsory between  the  ages  of  si.x  and  fifteen ;  two  hours  per  day 
for  about  ten  months  in  the  year.  The  Mohammedans  of  East 
Africa  at  first  opposed  the  requirements  of  school-attendance,  fear- 
ing that  their  children  would  be  instructed  in  Christian  doctrines  ; 
the  governmental  schools  are,  however,  non-sectarian,  and  of  late 
attendance  has  increased.  The  "curricula"  are  generally  rational 
ones;  the  rudiments  —  reading,  writing,^  etc. — are  taught,  and 
supplementary  education  is  generally  along  the  line  of  trades. 
Negroes  who  can  play  the  piano  and  converse  on  such  esoteric 
subjects  as  the  Shakespeare-Bacon  controversy  are  at  a  discount 
with  the  Germans  ;  they  think  they  are  considerably  ahead  of  the 
British  here,  and  boast  that  in  teaching  they  do  not  insist  upon 
German  political  history,  the  dates  of  the  Crusades,  and  the  like. 
Their  experience  is  that  a  highly  educated  negro  is  a  rascal  and 
absolutely  useless  for  all  practical  purposes,  and  they  do  not  mean 
to  turn  out  such  products.^  The  Germans,  in  their  first  contact 
with  African  peoples,  made  some  embarrassing  and  regretted  errors 
in  their  fulsome  treatment  of  native  "  kings'  "  sons,'^  but  these  mis- 
takes have  been  speedily  recognized,  and  they  seem  to  be  settling 
down  into  an  earnest  and  intelligent  attitude  toward  the  grave  com- 
plexity of  difificulties  inherent  in  the  contact  of  widely  separated 
stages  of  culture.^ 

^  German  is  the  language  of  instruction  in  one  school  only  (Victoria,  Kamerun) ; 
elsewhere  it  is  merely  a  branch  of  instruction.  Globus,  LXXIX,  No.  9,  pp.  1 40-1 41  ; 
Engler,  p.  114. 

2  The  other  colonizing  nations  accuse  the  Germans  of  insincerity  in  the  alcohol- 
prohibitions  ;  they  say  that  the  colonies  are  inundated  with  Schnaps.  This  view  is 
resented  by  the  Germans,  who  assert  that  the  increasing  import  of  alcoholic  drinks 
is  for  German  consumption,  however  much  they  deprecate  that;  they  say  that,  at  any 
rate,  conditions  are  no  worse  than  in  the  colonies  of  other  nations.  Der  Deutsche 
Export,  pp.  67  ff. ;  Schmidt,  II,  291-292.  In  the  German  colonies  it  is  often  hard  to 
refuse  the  natives  whisky  and  tobacco  when  these  are  the  only  rewards  for  which 
they  will  put  forth  real  effort  in  labor.    Schmidt,  II,  228. 

3  Schmidt,  II,  90-92 ;  Meinecke,  p.  25. 

*  For  these  questions  of  native  education  and  kindred  topics,  see  Meinecke,  p.  37  ; 
Schmidt,  II,  91-92.  The  government  schools  are  designed  in  part  to  fit  natives 
for  the  discharge  of  minor  duties  in  the  colonial  service.  Globus,  LXXIX,  No.  9,  pp. 
140-141. 


590 


COLON  I ZAl' ION 


The  Colonial  Service 


The  general  character  of  the  colonial  service  has  already  been 
indicated  ;  it  was  found  to  possess  both  the  virtues  and  the  defects 
of  a  rigid  disciplinary  system.  Relatively  little  favoritism  appears 
in  the  selection  of  either  the  superior  or  the  subordinate  imperial 
officials.  At  first  there  were,  of  course,  no  facilities  ior  securing 
a  special  education  for  the  prospective  colonial  servant ;  the  earlier 
officials  of  the  government  had  been,  as  a  rule,  subjected  to  a 
rather  strict  and  technical  military  training,  but  it  is  hard  to  say 
whether  this  was  an  advantage  or  a  disadvantage  in  the  colonies. 
If  the  service  was  performed  in  a  spirit  more  cosmoj)olitan  and 
enlightened  than  such  training  would  lead  one  to  e.xpect,  it  was 
doubtless  due  to  the  incidental  and  unprofessional  education  which 
all  Germans  received.  As  time  went  on,  the  universities  attempted 
to  meet  a  newly  felt  need  by  improvising  courses  of  instruction  bear- 
ing on  the  colonial  career.  The  Oriental  Seminar  in  Berlin  under- 
took training  in  languages  ;  scientific  investigation  was  directed 
and  regulated,  and  lectures  were  arranged  on  tropical  hygiene  and 
kindred  subjects.  This  training  was  likely  to  be  over-academic  in 
character ;  practical  ends  were  subordinated  to  the  establishment 
of  "  principles,"  and  to  elaborate  schematization.  In  the  forma- 
tion of  the  colonial  personnel  too  much  importance  was  at  first 
attached  to  superficial  "experts";  too  little  weight  was  given  to 
personal  qualities  indispensable  in  administrators.  The  essential 
qualifications  of  youth  and  health  were  too  often  overlooked.  In 
the  course  of  time,  however,  these  errors  were  detected  and  recti- 
fied ;  they  were  the  results,  for  the  most  part,  of  misconceptions 
inseparable  from  incipient  activity  in  an  entirely  new  and  strange 
field.  1 

It  was  not  until  the  year  1 899  that  a  special  colonial  school  was 
called  into  existence.  It  was  founded  at  Witzenhausen,  near  Gottin- 
gen,  by  a  corporation  with  limited  liability,  under  the  protection  of 
the  Prince  zu  Wied.  The  semi-private  nature  of  the  enterprise,  it 
was  hoped,  would  make  for  such  unrestricted  opportunity  and  un- 
hampered development  as  would  be  impossible  under  a  rigorous 

1  Schmidt,  I,  278  ff. ;  II,  74  ff. ;  Andler,  pp.  281-282  ;  Pfeil,  Vorschliige,  pp.  32  ff. ; 
T/ie  Nation,  LXXII,  No.  1S60,  p.  158;  l^.  S.  Con.  Reports,  No.  1285  (March  10,  1902), 
p.  2.  F.  Fabri  (P'iinf  Jahre,  etc.),  writingin  1889,  .says  that  up  to  that  time  otificers  had 
been  selected  at  random  ;  there  was  no  thought  of  special  training.  Dove  (p.  174)  -says 
conditions  of  rank  and  title  have  too  often  outweiglied  those  of  personal  qualification. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  591 

governmental  direction.  This  hope  has  been,  at  least  partially, 
realized  in  the  brief  period  of  the  institution's  existence.  The 
school  was  modeled  after  what  was  considered  the  best  and  wisest 
in  the  English,  Dutch,  and  F'rench  types  ;  and  its  avowed  object 
is  to  train  up  experts  in  plantation-agriculture,  commerce,  mining, 
etc.  The  institution  is  open,  however,  to  evangelical  missionaries 
and  to  government  officials  who  wish  to  qualify  in  a  more  special 
manner  for  the  colonial  service.  It  has  been  found  that  the  demand 
for  experts,  such  as  the  school  proposes  to  turn  out  in  years  to 
come,  has  been  far  in  excess  of  the  supply.  Requests  for  trained 
overseers  and  managers  have  poured  in,  not  alone  from  the  German 
protectorates  but  from  Brazil  and  Central  America,  where,  as  is 
well  known,  considerable  settlements  of  Germans  are  to  be  found. 
Up  to  October,  1900,  a  year  and  a  half  after  the  founding  of  the 
school,  of  sixty-four  young  men  who  had  matriculated,  sixteen  were 
already  active  in  foreign  parts.  The  greatest  importance  is  attached 
to  the  character  of  the  finished  product,  and  several  dismissals  of 
unsatisfactory  novices  are  already  recorded,  for  the  institution,  to 
judge  by  its  motto,  professes  to  work 

Mit  Gott  fiir  Deutschlands  Ehr' 
Daheim  und  iiberm  Meer ! 

It  forms,  therefore,  one  more  of  those  expedients  which  are  calcu- 
lated to  keep  alive  a  sense  of  German  nationality  and  love  of  the 
fatherland,  among  emigrants  in  foreign  parts. ^ 

Other  Colonial  Possessions 

To  complete  the  picture  of  German  colonization,  it  remains  to 
speak  of  the  smaller  possessions  of  the  East.  Among  these,  Samoa 
alone  approaches  the  type  of  settlement-colony ;  Germans  have 
long  had  substantial  interests  in  these  islands  and  have  contributed 
largely  to  their  European  population.  Great  complaint  has  been 
made  in  Germany  because  the  archipelago  was  not  annexed  in 
1877;  instead  of  that,  a  tripartite  agreement,  insuring  neutrality 
of  the  islands,  was  concluded  with  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  (1889),  succeeding  the  several  treaties  of  friendship  and 
trade  of  the  late  seventies.  It  is  well  known  how  the  strifes  of 
rival  kings  all  but  drew  these  interested  parties  into  hostilities, 

1  For  a  somewhat  detailed  description  of  the  school,  see  Globus,  LXXTX,  No.  9, 
pp. 144-146. 


592  COLONIZATION 

and  how  the  archipelago  was  finally  peaceably  divided.^  The  pos- 
sessions of  Germany  in  the  South  Sea  were  augmented  in  1899  by 
the  purchase  from  Spain  of  the  Caroline,  Palao  (Pelew),  and  Ladrone 
(Marianne)  islands,  for  which  16,750,000  marks  were  paid.^  None 
of  these  islands  promise  much  for  the  future  as  colonies  or  markets  ; 
their  value  lies  in  their  position.^  They  are  coral  formations  with 
a  small  population  and  few  valuable  products.  Their  lot  and  pur- 
pose fall  in  with  those  of  Kiautschou.  This  port,  "  leased  "  in  1898 
for  ninety-nine  years,  was  seized  (1897)  to  meet  the  need  of  a  foot- 
hold in  China  after  the  Chinese-Japanese  war;  the  murder  of  two 
German  missionaries  formed  the  pretext  for  seizure.*  Here,  again, 
we  have  a  possession  which  can  scarcely  become  a  colony  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  word.  The  district  of  Shantung  is  one  of  the 
most  populous  of  the  Chinese  provinces,  but  no  success  in  the 
settlement,  even  of  merchants,  has  been  attained.  For  very  slight 
material  prospects  an  enormous  price  has  been  paid.^ 

These  late  acquisitions  have  been  held  for  too  short  a  period  for 
any  sweeping  approval  or  condemnation  to  be  passed.  In  the  islands 
conditions  are  not  materially  altered  since  the  German  occupation ; 
in  Kiautschou,  however,  considerable  activity  has  been  displayed. 
The  testimony  as  to  results  is  conflicting  ;  it  seems,  however,  that 
the  military  system  has  been  introduced  in  all  its  strictness,  and 
that  the  "red  devils"  are  already  cordially  hated  by  the  natives. 
Among  the  Germans  themselves  there  is  considerable  diversity  of 
opinion  about  Kiautschou  ;  this  disagreement  is  due,  it  appears, 
to  the  different  points  of  view,  economic  and  political,  occupied  by 
those  passing  judgment.  As  sources  of  direct  commercial  gain, 
and  as  localities  for  settlement,  it  is  evident  that  the  late  acquisi- 
tions are  a  failure.  There  may  be  some  development  of  the  coal- 
fields back  of  Kiautschou,  which  may  thus  form  an  admirable  naval 

1  F.  Fabri,  Fiinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  146  ff. ;  Schmidt,  II,  413  ff. ;  Illiistrierte  Zeitfra^s^en  : 
Samoa,  Leipzig,  1900;  Statesman's  Year-Book,  1901  ;  Hauser,  pp.  87  ff . ;  Thilippson, 
pp.  61  ff. 

2  Germany  and  Spain  disputed  the  possession  of  the  Carolines  in  18S5,  but  the 
Pope,  selected  as  arbiter,  decided  for  S])ain.    Blum,  p.  88.  ^  Engler,  p.  i6j. 

*  "  The  event  gives  rise  to  the  solilocpiy  attributed  by  a  comic  paper  to  the  German 
Emperor,  'If  my  missionaries  only  hold  out,  I  shall  soon  own  the  earth.'"  Kigelow, 
Harper's,  C,  577-590. 

^  The  subventions  have  been  regularly  very  large.  Trade  is  mostly  in  cheap 
Japanese  wares,  imported  by  Chinese  middlemen.  Local  companies  are  always  in 
need  of  government  aid;  to  a  bankrupt  electric  company,  for  example,  there  was 
recently  projjosed  a  government  credit  of  350,000  marks.  New  York  Tiincs,  January 
10  and  29,  1902  ;   Ilauser,  pp.  102  ff. 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  593 

station ;  and  it  is  possible  that  some  minor  outlet  may  be  formed 
for  Chinese  foreign  trade.  But  Hong-Kong  and  Shanghai  will  con- 
tinue, for  very  conclusive  reasons  of  all-around  superiority,  to  pro- 
vide the  main  channels  for  the  movement  of  products.^  There  is 
another,  however,  and  more  grandiose  way  of  looking  at  these 
matters,  and  for  those  who  possess  this  second-sight,  the  outlook 
is  nothing  if  not  brilliant  and  promising.  For  the  fatherland  now 
possesses  a  "naturally  rounded-out  area  in  the  Pacific" — a  series 
of  bases  of  operations  on  the  long  sea-way.  Having  the  way-stations, 
it  will  be  less  difficult,  it  is  thought,  to  secure  the  terminals.^  Such 
political  advantages,  together  with  the  opportunity  of  infusing  the 
genuine  '■'■  deutscJie  Sitte"  into  uncontaminated  aboriginal  minds,^ 
far  outweigh  the  unproductiveness  and  costliness  of  the  new  pos- 
sessions, as  of  the  old. 

Colonial  Prospects 

But  what  are  to  be  the  termini,  the  ultima  ratio  of  all  this  sacri- 
fice and  endeavor  1  The  occupation  of  Kiautschou  is  significant  of 
German  ideas  in  this  direction.  Germans  have  seen  clearly  enough 
how  national  juvenility  deprived  them  of  a  full  share  in  the  earth- 
division  of  the  eighties ;  they  are  tired  of  tropical  "  leavings  " 
and  desire  to  feed  upon  the  real  loaf.  They  have  realized  that  no 
further  division  of  unoccupied  land  is  possible  ;  but  they  have  seen 
the  probability  of  a  ne\V  kind  of  division  in  the  Far  East.  China 
is  a  country  of  endurable  climate  and  might  afford  opportunity  for 

1  Native  proprietors  were  displaced  under  the  payment  of  valuations  fixed  by  the 
German  authorities  (Bigelow).  Kiautschou  is  a  "free  port "  and  is  governed  under  the 
Department  of  the  Marine.  Meinecke,  pp.  96  ff. ;  Globus,  LXXIX,  No.  9,  pp.  141- 
143.  Richthofen  (Shantung,  etc.)  gives  much  detail  concerning  the  province;  his 
view  seems  to  be  more  sanguine  than  that  of  Hesse- Wartegg  (Shantung,  etc.).  The 
latter  (p.  29)  says,  "  Ich  habe  nunmehr  Deutsch-China  in  fast  alien  seinen  Teilen 
durchzogen  und  weiss  aus  eigener  Anschauung,  dass  dort  nichts  fiir  Europa  zu  holen 
ist."  Richthofen  (id.,  p.  242)  regards  Kiautschou  as  a  valuable  port  of  entrance  into 
northern  China. 

2  Blum  (p.  62)  congratulates  his  countrymen  that  New  Guinea  is  on  the  road  from 
Australia  through  the  Pacific  to  Asia,  and  adds,  "  mcichte  die  Zukunft  diese  neue  Strasse 
des  Weltverkehrs  weiter  ausbauen,  und  iiber  die  nunmehr  deutschen  Karolinen  gen 
Japan,  iiber  Samoa  nach  dem  deutschen  Siidamerika  fiihren  —  aber  unter  deutscher 
Flagge  ! "  Hesse-Wartegg  (Samoa,  etc.)  makes  a  great  effort  to  arouse  enthusiasm 
over  the  Pacific  colonies.  His  position  is  bitterly  hostile  to  Great  Britain.  Cf.  Hauser, 
pp.  69  ff. 

3  The  "  culture  mission"  of  the  Germans  is,  of  course,  one  of  the  most  portentous 
watchwords  of  the  colonial  pai;ty  ;  the  floutings  and  the  damaging  facts  of  the  opposi- 
tion diminish  its  effectiveness  but  shghtly.    Cf.  T.  Fabri,  p.  12. 


594  COIX^NIZAJION 

trade,  if  not  for  settlement.  The  bitterness  of  national  loss  by  emi- 
gration to  the  Americas  is  in  nowise  ameliorated  of  late,  and,  in 
view  of  a  possible  share  in  land  where  Germans  rt^/^/c/ go  and  settle, 
it  has  seemed  best  to  secure  a  "front  seat"  in  Kiautschou.  It  is 
hoped  that  future  gains  will  compensate  for  the  costly  holding  of 
this  point  of  vantage.^  Germany  is  weary  of  the  tropical  colony  ; 
golden  dreams  of  new  spice  monopolies  and  metal  treasures  have 
been  rudely  broken.  The  signs  of  the  times  are  anxiously  scanned 
for  indications  of  weakness  in  the  tenure  of  present  holders  of  tem- 
perate lands  :  if  the  bonds  of  the  British  Empire  should  loosen, 
Germany  would  expect  to  emerge  from  the  ensuing  scramble  far 
from  portionless  ;  the  status  of  Brazil  and  other  South  American 
countries,  with  a  large  and  unassimilated  German  population,'-^  are 
narrowly  watched  ;  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  only  as  strong  as  the 
power  that  stands  its  sponsor.  A  peculiar  interest  attaches  to 
German  imdertakings  and  hopes  in  the  old  culture -land  of  Meso- 
potamia ;  there  may  be  undefined  designs  on  Transylvania  and 
Turkey,  but  something  has  already  been  done  in  the  Euphrates 
valley.  Certain  railroad  concessions  are  in  German  hands  and 
trade-interests  are  carefully  fostered  ;  there  are  not  lacking  those 
who  insinuate  that  the  Kaiser's  pilgrimage  to  Palestine  several 
years  ago  had  other  than  religious  and  artistic  motives.  Here,  cer- 
tainly, is  a  wholesome  climate,  and  a  soil  which  should  respond  to 
modern  methods,  taking  into  account  its  former  exceeding  fertility 
under  crude  and  shortsighted  management.*^ 

The  time  is  full  of  possibilities,  and  the  German  people  are  en- 
dowed with  steadfastness  and  tireless  energy.  Who  can  say  what 
the  future  will  bring  forth  ?  The  Germans  have  a  high  reputation 
as  settlers,  and,  in  the  opinion  of  most  rivals,  need  only  the  chance, 
to  become  great  colonizers.  To  the  weaker  nations  they  stand  as 
a  sort  of  international  safeguard  against  the  predominance  of  Great 

1  The  Nation,  LXXI,  46;  New  York  Times,  March  16,  1902. 

2  It  i.s  observed,  however,  that  the  German  population  of  Brazil  looks  with  little 
favor  on  these  projects ;  they  do  not  wish  to  "  replace  themselves  under  the  sway  of 
the  police  and  drillmasters  of  Prussia."    Spectator,  I^XXXI,  481,  October  8,  1898. 

3  Spectator,  LXXXI,  481,  October  8,  1898;  Geffcken,  The  Forum,  XIII,  200;  F. 
Fabri,  P'iinf  Jahre,  etc.,  pp.  135-139;  Advanced  Sheets,  U.  S.  Con.  Reports,  Nos.  1273 
and  131 5  (1902);  New  York  Times,  March  16,  1902  ;  Hau.ser,  pp.  1 15  ff.,  127  ff.;  Leroy- 
Beaulieu,  I,  332.  Engler  (p.  164)  exhorts  his  fellow-countrymen  (in  1889):  "... 
schauen  wir  uns  jetzt  schon  recht  sorgsam  nach  den  Kolonien  alien  um  und  widmen 
wir  ihnen  ein  besonderes  Studium,  damit  wir  bei  Gel^genheit  audi  wissen,  wo  zuzu- 
greifen  isl  und  wir  nicht  vorher  noch  lange  tasten  und  sondiren  miissen." 


MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIZATION  595 

Britain.  The  Dutch  desire  their  presence  in  the  East,  the  Italians 
cUng  to  alHance  with  them  and  beheve  in  their  future,  and  even  the 
Frencli  view  their  activity  with  complacency  and  a  certain  scien- 
tific approval.^  Russia  must  perforce  bear  witness  to  the  effective- 
ness of  their  presence  as  settlers;^  a  high  respect  for  the  German 
components  of  their  population  is  freely  acknowledged  by  the  sev- 
eral important  states  of  the  New  World.  Even  the  British,  forget- 
ting the  grievances  of  the  eighties,  say  flattering  things  of  them.'^ 
Whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  their  colonies,*  the  Germans  are  des- 
tined to  accomplish  their  full  share  in  the  settlement  of  new  coun- 
tries and  in  the  formation  of  the  effective  races  of  the  future. 

1 "  Duitschland  als  Kolonisierende  en  Koloniale  Mogendheid,"  in  Tijdschrift  voor 
NederlandscIi-hiJie,  No.  13,  2,  pp.  218-220;  Brunialti,  p.  168  ff. ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  I, 
333.  Some  French  writers  congratulate  themselves  on  the  increasing  attention  given 
by  the  Germans  to  a  study  of  French  colonial  methods  and  policy.  Hauser,  p.  viii. 
It  is  a  striking  commentary  on  this  view  when  a  prominent  and  popular  German  writer 
on  colonies  is  found  urging  his  fellow-countrymen  to  renounce  the  British  model  and 
imitate  the  French.  He  says  that  neither  the  French  nor  the  Germans  have  succeeded 
in  their  efforts  to  adapt  British  methods.  "  Die  britischen  Einrichtungen  haben  bei 
der  Verpflanzung  stets  eine  vollstandige,  oft  ihr  innerstes  Wesen  zerstiirende  Umwand- 
lung  erfahren."  This  is  the  case  above  all  with  the  British  system  of  self-government 
in  the  colonies.    Zimmermann,  IV,  Vorwort. 

2  See  the  novels  of  Russian  writers,  especially  of  Tolstoi  and  Turgenev  ;  Tikhomi- 
rov,  I,  85  ff. 

3  Keltie  (p.  333)  says  that  Germany  has  scarcely  gotten  beyond  her  Sturtn  and 
ZJrrtWi,'- period  in  colonization;  that  there  is  no  reason  for  discouragement.  Johnston 
(p.  258)  looks  upon  the  unmixed  Teutons  as  good  colonizers  ;  the  German  in  particular 
"  is  on  first  contact  with  subject  races  apt  to  be  harsh  and  even  brutal,  but  ...  he  is 
no  fool  and  wins  the  respect  of  the  negro  or  Asiatic,  who  admire  brute  force,  while 
his  own  good  nature  in  time  induces  a  softening  of  manners  when  the  native  has  ceased 
to  rebel  and  begun  to  cringe.  There  is  this  that  is  hopeful  and  wholesome  about  the 
Germans.  They  are  quick  to  realize  their  own  defects  and  equally  quick  to  amend 
them.  As  in  commerce,  so  in  government,  they  observe,  learn,  and  master  the  best 
principles.  The  politician  would  be  very  shortsighted  who  underrated  the  greatness 
of  the  German  character,  or  reckoned  on  the  evanescence  of  German  dominion  in 
strange  lands."  It  is  a  little  hard  to  subscribe  to  all  of  this.  A  curious  mood  of  self- 
depreciation  in  comparison  with  other  nations  seems  of  late  to  have  taken  possession 
of  many  British  writers  and  travelers.  But  it  is  undeniable  that,  with  all  their  faults 
and  lack  of  experience,  the  Germans  can  well  stand  comparison  with  all  colonizing 
peoples  except  the  very  most  successful. 

*  A  strong  and  bitter  opposition  to  colonial  expansion  has  regularly  been  encoun- 
tered in  the  Reichstag,  —  especially  from  the  Socialists.  Bebel  and  Richter  have  said 
many  damaging  things  about  the  colonies,  and  the  recent  disclosure  of  corruption  in 
the  Colonial  Office,  taken  together  with  the  disasters  in  Southwest  Africa,  has  added 
strength  to  the  opposition.  This  does  not,  however,  seem  to  prevent  the  realization 
of  the  imperial  programme  in  most  of  its  details.  The  Kaiser  is  determined  and 
resourceful,  qualities  never  more  clearly  shown  than  by  his  recent  elevation  of  a 
business  man,  reputed  to  be  a  Hebrew,  Director  of  the  Colonial  office,  and  later 
Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies. 


APPENDIX 

MONEY-EQUIVALENTS 

The  difficulty  of  fixing  upon  coin-  and  price-equivalents  is  alluded  to  in 
note  I,  p.  94.  The  following  valuations  are  taken  mainly  from  Dye's  Coin  Ency- 
clopaedia,^ and  agree  fairly  well  with  the  isolated  equivalents  given  here  and 
there  by  the  regular  authorities  quoted.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  attain 
corrections  for  contemporary  purchasing-power  or  the  like,  as  most  of  the 
sums  quoted  are  estimates  in  modern  money.  Cf.  Note  at  end  of  Chapter  IV. 
Where  dollars  are  quoted  in  the  text,  the  estimate  is  generally  that  of  the 
authority  used.  The  more  unusual  valuations  have  been  noticed  in  the  foot- 
notes.   Figures  are,  of  course,  only  roughly  approximate. 


Conto  (of  reis) 

= 

$ 

1000.00 

Lira 

= 

#0.20 

Cruzado 

= 

0.40 

Maravedi 

= 

0.0025 

Ducat 

= 

2.25 

Mark  (M.) 

= 

0.25 

Duit 

= 

0.0025 

Milreis 

= 

1. 00 

Duro  (see  Peso) 

Peseta 

= 

0.20 

Florin  (see  Guilder) 

Peso 

= 

1. 00 

Guilder 

= 

0.40 

Piaster  (see 

Peso) 

Gulden  (see  Guilder) 

Real 

= 

0.05 

Krone 

= 

0.27 

Stiver 

= 

0.02 

1  Dye,  J.  S.,  Coin  Encyclopaedia,  Philadelphia,  1883;  Cf.  F.  W.  Clarke,  Weights, 
Measures,  and  Money  of  All  Nations,  New  York,  1875.  Lea  (Inquis.,  I,  560-566)  gives 
a  detailed  account  of  Spanish  coinage. 


597 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Note.  In  this  book,  based  upon  such  lines  ^  and  covering  a  field  so  wide,  it  has 
not  been  thought  necessary  in  general,  nor  indeed  has  it  been  possible,  to  go  behind 
a  fairly  limited  number  of  secondary  authorities,  when  these  had  once  been  selected 
with  an  eye  to  their  essential  correctness;  in  fact,  the  book  is  based  almost  entirely 
upon  treatises  rather  than  sources.  The  aspects  of  colonial  history  essential  for 
the  present  purpose  have  been  developed  satisfactorily  by  writers  (Colmeiro,  for 
example)  whose  lesser  statements  may  have  been  shown  to  be  inaccurate  by  later  and 
technically  better  equipped  scholars.  There  has  been,  then,  no  attempt  made  to 
cover  a  comprehensive  bibliography  ;  the  great  aim  was  to  get  at  what  was  wanted  as 
speedily  and  economically  as  possible.  Hence  the  number  of  titles  of  works  consulted 
bears  in  general  an  inverse  relation  to  the  accessibility  of  information ;  and  so  the 
bibliography  of  the  several  sections  will  be  seen  to  be  uneven  as  respects  quantity. 
For  example,  it  was  found  necessary  to  read  almost  everything  that  one  could  lay 
hand  to  in  writing  of  the  Portuguese  and  Danish  colonies ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
although  the  Hooykaas-Hartmann  Repertoriiim  was  at  hand,  and  although  the  Dutch 
publishing  houses  put  forth  thick  volumes  merely  of  titles  of  works  on  the  Dutch 
colonies,  it  was  thought  sutiticient  to  rely  upon  Blok,  De  Reus,  Van  Rees,  Day,  Pier- 
son,  and  a  few  others  for  the  essentials  of  the  subject. 

Certain  books  are  referred  to  over  several  sections  of  the  text,  but  these  have 
been  set  down  under  that  section  of  the  bibliography  to  which  they  seem  chiefly  to 
belong.  The  titles  of  the  authorities  most  frequently  used  by  the  present  writer  are 
preceded  by  an  asterisk.  Abbreviations  of  titles  used  in  the  text  are  self-explanatory, 
except  in  a  few  cases  to  be  indicated  in  the  following  bibliography. 


GENERAL  WORKS 

American  Economic  Association.     Essays  in  Colonial  Finance.    Third  Series, 

I,  3.    August,  1900. 
D'Avenel,  G.    Histoire  economique  de  la  Propriete,  des  Salaires,  des  Denrees 

et  de  tous  les  Prix  en  general  depuis  Tan  1200  jusqu'en  I'an  1800.    4  vols. 

Paris,  1894,  1894,  1898,  1898. 
Bordier,  A.     Gdographie  Medicale.    Paris,  1884. 

La  Colonisation  Scientifique  et  les  Colonies  Frangaises.    Paris,  1884. 

Bourne,  E.  G.    A  Trained  Colonial  Civil  Service.    Notili  American  Review 

(1899),  CLXIX,  528. 
Cheyney,  E.  P.     European    Background    of    American    History,    1300- 1600. 

New  York,  1904. 
Clarke,  F.  W.    Weights,  Measures,  and   Money  of  All  Nations.     New  York, 

1875. 

1  See  the  Introduction. 
599 


6oo  COLONIZATION 

Darwin,  C.  The  Descent  of  Man  and  Selection  in  Relation  to  Sex.  2d  edition. 
New  York,  1S98. 

The  Origin  of  Species  by  Means  of  Natural  Selection  or  the  Preservation 

of  Flavored  Races  in  the  Struggle  for  Life.  P>om  sixth  and  last  English 
edition.    2  vols.    New  York,  1898. 

The  Variation  of  Animals  and  Plants  under  Domestication.    2  vols.    New 

York,  1899. 

Day,  C.    A  History  of  Commerce.     New  York  and  London,  1907. 

Dye,  J.  S.     Coin  Encyclopicdia.     Philadelphia,  1883. 

Egerton,  H.  E.     A  Short  History  of  British  Colonial  Policy.     London,  1897. 

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Galton,  F.  Hereditary  Genius :  An  Inquiry  into  its  Laws  and  Consequences. 
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Griffin,  A.  P.  C.  List  of  Books  (with  references  to  periodicals)  relating  to  the 
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Gumplowicz,  L.     Der  Ras.senkampf.     Innsbruck,  1883. 

Ireland,  A.     Tropical  Colonization.    New  York  and  London,  1899. 

Johnston,  H.  H.  A  History  of  the  Colonization  of  Africa  by  Alien  Races. 
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Keane,  A.  H.  Africa.  In  Stanford's  Compendium  of  Geography  and  Travel. 
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Man  Past  and  Present.    Cambridge,  1900. 

Keller,  A.  G.     A  Sociological  View  of  the  "  Native  Question."     Yale  Re7>iew 

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Keltic,  J.  S.    Africa.    The  History  of  Nation.s,  Vol.  XIX.    Edited  by  A.  G. 

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The  Partition  of  Africa.    2d  edition.    London,  1895. 

(References  to  Keltic  are  to  the  second  of  the  above,  excepting  when  the 
present  author  refers  to  his  supplementary  chapter  in  the  first.) 

Lancs.san,  J.  M.  A.  de.     Principes  de  Colonisation.    Paris,  1897. 

Lavisse  et  Rambaud.  Histoire  Gdndrale  du  Quatritnie  Siccle  k  Nos  Jours.  12 
vols.    Paris,  1893-1900. 

Le  Bon,  G.    Lois  P.sychologiques  de  1' Evolution  des  Peuples.    Paris,  1894. 

*Leroy-Beaulieu,  P.  De  la  Colonisation  chez  les  Peuples  Modernes.  5th  edition. 
2  vols.    Paris,  1902. 

Letourneau,  Ch.  L'Evolution  du  Commerce  dans  Ics  diverses  Races  Humaines. 
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Lewis,  G.  C.     An  Essay  on  the  Government  of  Dependencies.     London,  1891. 

Lindsay,  W.  S.  History  of  Merchant  Shipping  and  Ancient  Commerce. 
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Lippert,  J.     Kulturgeschichte.    2  vols.    Stuttgart,  1886. 

Lowell,  A.  L.  Colonial  Civil  Service.  The  Selection  and  Training  of  Colo- 
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Payne,  E.  J.  Age  of  Discovery.  In  Cambridge  Modern  History,  I,  Chap.  I. 
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Halstead,  M.    The  .Story  of  Cuba.    Chicago,  1896. 

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6o6  COLONIZATION 

Rccopilacion  de  Leyes  de  los  Reinos  de  las  Indias.     Madrid,  1S41. 
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(This  translation  is  regularly  used  in   the  te.xt  excepting  where  the  author 

desired   to  revise  the   rendering   into    English.     In  such  ca.ses   the   note, 

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*Day,  C.  The  Policy  and  Administration  of  the  Dutch  in  Java.  New  York 
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De  Opiumi)olitiek  der  Regeeringen  de  Vrijheid  der  Drukpers  in  Nederlandsch- 
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Stevenson,  R.  L.     In  the  South  Seas.    New  York,  1901. 
Tijdschrift  voor  Nederlandsch-htdic.    Duitschland  als  Kolonisierende  en  Kolo- 

niale  Mogendheid.    No.  13,  2. 
Tikhomirov,  L.     Russia  Political  and  Social.    2  vols.    London,  1S88. 
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On  Kiautschou.    January  10  and  29,  and  March  16,  1902. 

Tuskegee  Graduates  called  to  Togo.     March  30,  1902. 

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Witt,  R.  C.    An  Experiment  in  Colonization.    Blackwood's,  CLXIII,  788. 
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INDEX 


Abba  Garima,  522 

Absenteeism,  11,  13,  14,  340,  456 

Abyssinia,  89,  522,  528 

Acapulco,  like  Seville,  348.     See  Nao 

Acclimatization,  4,  6,  77,   105,  137,  141, 

333.  340,  346,  459-  495'  546,  547.  572, 
576,577;  sanatoria,  546.  ^ee  Environ- 
menial  conditions ;  "  Amative  question  "  ; 
Prodiutioit,  tropical;   Race-contact,  etc. 

Adaptability,  4, 35.  ^eejezus,  J'/ianicians, 
Spanis/i,  etc. 

Adelantado,  302 

Aden,  95,  100 

Adowa,  522 

Adriatic  Sea,  31 

Adventure.  See  Discoveries,  Portuguese, 
Spanish 

yEgean  Sea,  31,  63 

Africa,  circumnavigation,  see  Cape-route, 
Da  Gaina,  jVec/io,  etc. ;  colonies  in,  see 
Colonies;  partition,  545;  voyages  down 
west  coast,  87 

Agriculture  in  colonies,  4, 8.  See  Produc- 
tion, tropical,  and  sub  Spanish  America, 
etc. 

Aguinaldo,  364 

Albuquerque,  97,  116,  117,  285;  adminis- 
tration, 100;  "colonies "of,  105;  person- 
ality, 10 1 ;  policy,  104,  fixes  Portuguese 
policy,  105 

Alcabala,  194,  284,  314,  341 

Alcaldes,  274,  283 

Alcaldes  ynayores,  356 

Alcoholic  drinks,  7,  271,  577.  See  Accli- 
matization, Pace-contact,  etc. 

Aldeias,  153,  290 

Alexander  the  Great,  34,  65,  104 

Alexandria,  95,  383 

Algeciras  Conference,  365 

Algeria,    French    in,    52;    Germans    in, 

577 

Aljubarrota,  83 

Allegiance,  43.  See  Metropolis,  relation  of 
colo)iy  to 

Almaden  mines,  208 

Almagro,  303,  316 

Almeida,  96,  117;  his  policy  vs.  Albu- 
querque's, 97 

Alva,  Duke  of,  371,  378,  3S0 

Amalfi,  61 

Amboina.    See  Moluccas 

"Amboina  Massacre,"  419 


Americaasthe"East,"6o.   See  Columbus, 

Spices,  Trade-areas,  etc. 
Amsterdam,  376,  388,  412,  447 
Anda  y  Salazar,  359 
Anglo-Boer  conflict,  446 
Anglo-Saxons,  163,  531 
Angola,  127;  missions,  128;  public  works, 

128 
Angra  Pequena,  542 
Annate,  298 

Annobom  (Annobon),  365 
Anson,  349 
Antilles,  265,  281.    See  Spanish  America, 

Espanola,  etc. 
Antwerp,  375,  381,  385 
Anwerbemodus,  582 
a-KOLKla.,  41,  42 
Arabian  Sea,  31 
Arabs,  2,  91,  96,  439,  574 
Aragon,  169 
Araucanians,  260 
Arbitristas,  190 
Archangel,  383 
Argentina,  i,  219,  316,  324,  328,  539.    See 

Buenos  Ay  res,  Plata,  etc. 
Aristocracy,  in  colonies,  17.  See  sub  Brazil, 

Spanish  America,  etc. 
Armada,  Invincible,  193,   243,   252,   254, 

256,  y-3^  324,  382 

Asientooii-jiT,,  249,  223 

Asientos,  249,  281 

Asiinilistas,  363 

Assab,  519 

"Assimilation,"  22,  56,  76,  562 

Assyria,  30 

Astrolabe,  93 

Asuncion,  291 

Athens,  49,  63 

Atjeh,  120,  416,  496;  Atjeh  war,  489,  493 

Audiencia,  306;  a  check  on  the  viceroy, 

308  (see  sub  Spanish  America);  in  the 

Philippines,  356 
Augusti,  364 
Augustin  I,  327 
Australia,  8,  12,  30,  539 
Auto-da-fe.    See  Imjuisition 
Aviles,  230 
Azores,  87 
Aztecs,  260.    See  Indians 

"  Back-freight,"  62 
Bahia,  135 


613 


6i4 


COLON! /.ATION 


Baili,  65 

Banda  Islands,  416,  420,  422,  439.    See 

Mohtcicis 
Banishment.    See  Deportation 
Banka,  491 

Bantam,  3S7,  402,  416,  430 
Bantus,  444,  5S0,  586 
Barmii^ar,  356;  Cabeza  lic,  356 
Baratieri,  525 

Barbados,  25,  223,  335,  341 
Barbary  coast,  63 
Barca,  45 
Barcelona,  171 
Barter-trade,  223 
Bastaards,  444 
Batavia,  416,  433,  435,  584 
Batavian  Republic,  463.    See  A'etherlands 
Batig  slot,  473,  481 
Bayona,  230 
Beaterio,  292 
Bebel,  595 

Berlin  Conference,  545,  565 
Bilbao,  230 
Billiton,  491 
Bismarck,  535,  538,  539,  543,  545,  553,  555, 

563.  570,  57 1'  578 

Bismarck  Archipelago,  544,  545 

Black  Sea,  31,  46 

Blanco,  362 

Blok,  381 

Blum,  55S 

Blumentritt,  347 

Boards  of  trade,  66.  See  Consoli  dei  Jiier- 
caiiti,  Cdsa  da  htdia,  Ccisa  de  Coiitra- 
tacion 

Boers,  444;  degeneracy,  446;  in  German 
Southwest  Africa,  567;  piety,  446 

Bogota,  309,  310 

Boletus,  348 

Borneo,  416,  494 

Boshart,  559 

Both,  Pieter,  417 

Bourbons,  306 

Bourne,  233,  267,  et  al 

Brabant,  375,  380 

Braganzas,  161 

Brandenburg,  499 

Brazil,  centralization  in,  136;  colonial 
service,  158;  discovery,  131 ;  emigration 
to,  132,  141,  150,  152;  foreign  aggres- 
sions, 146;  Ciermans  in,  594;  gold  and 
diamonds,  139,  149,  165;  independence, 
factors  leading  to,  158;  industry  and 
trade,  136;  Inquisition,  y.7'.;  mission.s, 
153;  natiyepolicy,  142, 143, see  /iidians; 
North  vs.  South,  132,  152,  159,  321; 
population,  134,  140,  142,  158;  Portu- 
guese achievements  in,  162;  revenues, 
151,165;  slave-raids, 143  (see  I'tiiilistds); 
slavery,  142,  157;  social  conditions, 
140;  taxation  of  mines,  151  ;  transfer- 


ence of  Portuguese  king  to,  161 ;  vs. 
Africa  and  India,  163.  See  Captaincies, 
/iidiiiiis,  Jesuits 

Bremen,  535 

Britain,  28,  45 

British,  see  F.uglish 

British  Empire,  39,  60 

Brugge  (Bruges),  375 

Brunialti,  519,  523,  527,  529 

Buccaneers,  247,  253,  282,  498 

Buenos  Ayres,  217,  222,  235,  240,  246, 
291,  310,  315,  323,  343,  522,  530;  con- 
trasts with  northern  colonies,  319.  See 
Ari^eittiiia 

Bull  of  Alexander  VI,  89,  175 

Bureaucracy,  in  a  colony,  161,554,562,  563. 
See  sub  India,  Spa)iisli  America,  etc. 

Bushmen,  550 

Byzantium,  61 

Cahallero,  195,  198,  2IO,  211,  220 

Cabildos,  310,  312 

Cabot,  John,  74 

Cabral,  92,  131 

Cacao,  25,  236 

Cacique,  262 

Cadiz  (Gades),  32,  171,  227,  231,  241,  250, 

330 
Cairo,  95 
Calicut,  89,  95 
Callao,  360 
Caml)odia,  24,  347 
Campeche,  245 
Canada,  338 

Canary  Islands,  236,  365 
Cannanore,  92 
Cannibalism,  260 
Cape  Mom,  240,  319,  412 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  41 2  ;  British  capture 

of,  445 
Cape   route,  79,   86,  87 ;    discovered  by 

Pha-nicians  (?),  32;  by  Portuguese,  70; 

Diaz  and   Da  Gama,  88;   "theoretical 

discoverer"  of,  88 ;  effects  of  discovery, 

109,  376.    See  Monopoly,  Venice,  etc. 
Cape  settlements,  442;  population,  443. 

See  Boers,  Dutch  East  India  Company, 

sub  Companies 
Cape  Verde  Islands,  87,  383 
Capital,  accumulation  of,  71,   3S3,  385; 

concentration  in   companies,  q.T.,  456 

(see    Corporate    enterprise) ;   in  king's 

hands,  see  King 
Captaincies,  87,  132 
Carabinieri,  526 
Caracas,  213,  222,  225,  236,  246,  251,  308, 

315.324  ' 
Caril)s,  260 

Caroline  Islands,  365,  592 
Cartagena,  230 
Carthage,  30,  34,  36 


INDEX 


615 


Casa  da  India,  66,  124,  228,  393 

Casa  de  CoiUratacion,  66,  228,  231 

Casa  de  Gitine,  228 

Cassala,  522,  523 

Castas,   218,   220,  282;    classification   by 

color,  220 
Caste-system,  17 
Castel-Fuerte,  267 
Castile,  169 
Castro,  J.  de,  1 17 
Castro,  V.  de,  277,  307 
Catchword,  political,  536 
Catholic  sovereigns,  169,  226,  254,  258. 

See  Isabella 
Cattle-raising,  in  a  colony,  8.    See  Spanish 

America,  Cape  settlements,  etc. 
Cavendish,  386 
Cavite,  insurrection  of,  360 
Cayenne.    See  Guiana 
Ceara,  454 
Cedilla  personal,  357 
Celebes,  423,  494 
Central  America,  218 
Centralization,  political.    See  Integration, 

Brazil,  India  {Portuguese),  iVetherlands- 

htdia,  etc. 
Cervera,  340 
Ceylon,  98,  429,  435,  439 
Chalkis,  44 

Chance,  influence  of,  90,  108,  109 
Chancellor,  German,  564.    See  Bismarck 
Channel  Rovers,  248 
Chapetones,  216,  312 
Charles  III  (of  Spain),  191,  237,  241,  268, 

279.  323'  330 

Charles  V  (Carlos  I  of  Spain),  182,  209, 
212,  226,  229,  232,  242,  246,  275,  276, 
284,  342,  368,  377 

Cheribon,  430 

Chersonese,  50 

Chile,  178,  217,  235,  240,  309,  310,  315, 
326,  338 

China,  5,  416,  487,  593 

Chinese,  acclimatization,  25,  77;  adapta- 
bility, 25;  character,  25;  economic  role, 
24;  educators  of  lower  races,  489;  emi- 
gration, 24;  in  Cuba,  334;  in  Farther 
India,  24;  in  German  colonies,  583, 
584;  in  Japan,  24;  in  Netherlands- 
India,  416,  433,  436,  437,  439,  459,  488; 
in  the  Philippines,  24,  355;  like  Jews, 
488;  over-population,  23;  republican 
communities  {kong-si'),  25;  trade,  24; 
treatment  of,  25 

Chio3<|  72 

Christianity,  39,  73 ;  fetichistic,  128.  See 
sub  Colonies,  India,  Spanish  America, 
church,  conr'ersion,  missions,  etc. 

Church.     See  sub  Colonies 

Cicero,  47 

City-economy,  48,  61,  68,  75,  460 


Civilization.    See  Culture 

Classes,  in  colonies,  14.    See  sub  Colonies 

C lergy .    See  sub  Colonies,  Dutch ,  Spanish , 

Portuguese,  etc. 
Cleruchy,  49,  53 
Climate,  4 
Cochin,  91 
Coen,  404,  416,  419,  420,  422,  423,  433, 

434,  437 

Colbert,  461,  498 

Colmeiro,  266,  328 

Colombia,  217,  229,  309,  327 

Coloni,  53 

Colonia,  2,  49,  75,  288,  305 ;  administration, 
58;  communications,  54;  expedient  in 
conquest,  51;  nature,  52;  public  works, 
54;  trade,  52.  See  Culture  d-issemina- 
tiou,  Rome,  Romanization,  etc 

Colon  iaje,  302 

"Colonial  fever,"  520 

"Colonial  pact,"  332 

Colonial  policy.  See  stib  Gertnany,  Spain, 
etc.,  and  Colonies 

Colonial  revenue,  service,  etc.  See  sub 
Colonies 

Colonial  systems.  See  sub  Portugal, 
Spain,  etc.,  and  Colonies 

Colonialraad,  503 

Colonies  (Colony),  agricultural,  9;  clas- 
sification, 3;  classification  by  Roscher 
and  Leroy-Beaulieu,  9  ;  clerical  control, 
297,  349,  364;  conquest  colony,  9,  257; 
crown  colony,  16,  555;  definition,  2,  31, 
546;  destiny  (political),  15;  exploitation 
colony, 9, 12,322  (see  Plantation  colotiy); 
expedients  in  conquest,  see  Colonia ; 
farm  colony,  q.v.;  (colony)  "for  a  pur- 
pose," 530;  garrison  (military)  colony, 
52,  53;  governmental  control,  75  (see 
Co/nmunication) ;  industrial  organiza- 
tion, 8;  mining  colonies,  12;  "mixed 
colonies,"  9;  "natural  colony,"  i,  42, 
530;  neglect  of,  16,  19,  134,  137  ;  origin 
in  trade,  8,  27,  75  (see  Trading-stations) ; 
penal,  see  sub  Colonization;  plantation 
colony,  q.v. ;  polar,  5  (see  Greenland, 
Iceland);  policy  suited  to,  559  (see 
Frontier-society) ;  political  contrasts  in, 
15;  population-contrasts,  7,  8;  products 
complementary  to  those  of  metropolis, 
q.'t'.,  13,  28,  44,  49;  settlement  colony, 
see  Farm  colony;  slavery  in,  13;  society, 
types  of,  14  (see  Frontier-society);  tem- 
perate colony,  see  Farm  colony;  trading 
colony,  9  (see  Trading-stations);  tropical 
colony,  see  Plantation  colony ;  types,  see 
classification,  above  ;  vital  conditions,  4. 
See  Acclimatizatioti,  Fnvironmental 
conditions.  Companies,  etc.,  and  below 
Chinese,  conquest,  22 ;  emigration, 
23;  government  policy,  23 


6i6 


COLOXI/.VnON 


Danish.  See  Danish  West  Indies, 
Greenland,  Iceland 

Dutch,  see  Companies,  A'et/terlands- 
India,  etc.;  influence,  45S 

German,  acquisition  late,  531 ;  admin- 
istration, 558,  559,  562;  agitation  for, 
535;  budget,  564,  570,  572;  bureau- 
cracy, 554,  559,  562,  577;  chancellor, 
564  (see  Bismarck) ;  character,  546; 
colonial  prospects,  593;  colonial  serv- 
ice, 590;  commercial  position,  564; 
communications,  549,  567,  571;  com- 
panies, q.z: ;  coolie  system,  5S  i ;  cruelty 
to  natives,  545,  575,  576;  early  enter- 
prises, 532;  education,  5S9;  emigration 
to,  566;  governor,  564;  in  East  Africa, 
544,546,550,569;  insurrection,  561;  in 
Southwest  Africa,  547,  548,  559,  567; 
insurrection,  574;  in  West  Africa,  543, 
546;  internal  improvements,  570  (see 
Companies,  Kamerun,  Toi^o,  Kiautschoii, 
/Ve-a  Guinea,  Qic);  mining,  549;  minor 
possessions,  591 ;  missionaries,  546;  mo- 
tives for  acquisition,  536,  537  (see  Ger- 
mans,  emigratio7i);  native  policy,  578, 
583;  natives,  549;  cruelty  to,  545,  575, 
576 ;  education  of,  589 ;  taxation  of, 
580;  navigation-conditions,  567;  over- 
regulation,  578;  policy,  551 ;  population, 
565;  production,  568;  "scientific"  atti- 
tude toward,  553  (see  Germans);  sub- 
ventions, 570,  572;  tariff-regulations, 
569;  trade,  567,  569;  vs.  Italian  colo- 
nies, 551;  "Wissmann  system,"  579 

Greek,  airoiKla.,  </.-!■. ;  character,  47 ;  ex- 
tent, 44;  motives  of  emigration  to,  40; 
native  policy, 47;  relation  to  metropolis, 
42;  trade,  44  (see  7'r(/(////^-j/(?//('//.r).  See 
Emii^ration,  Ifellenization,  Metropolis 

Italian  (mediaeval),  see  Fondaco; 
character,  63;  communications,  66; 
culture  dissemination,  70;  decline,  68; 
extent,  62;  influence,  70;  monopoly 
policy,  66,  67 ;  motives  for  settlement, 
61;  relation  with  metropolis,  65;  trade- 
wars,  67,  69;  Turks,  68.  See  Cape-route, 
Communes,  Crusades,  Italians,  Maona, 
Monopoly,  Spices,  Venice 

Italian  (modern),  5 1  7;  administration, 
524;  African  acquisitions,  522;  Abys- 
sinia, <i.v.\  Eritrea,  q. ■;'.•,  Somaliland, 
523;  budget,  529;  creditable  success, 
527;  motives  of  acquisition,  518,  519, 
520;  "natural  colonies,"  530;  physical 
conditions  of,  523;  policy,  524;  slave- 
trade,  526;  vs.  German,  551.  See  Colo- 
nization,  Emii^ration,  Italy,  etc. 

Phoenician,  26;  character,  27;  com- 
munications, 28,  30,  32,  33;  culture 
dissemination,  38;  decline,  34;  emi- 
gration   to,    26,    27,   40;    extent,    30; 


factors  favoring  colonization,  27,  28; 
influence  on  Africa,  39;  mining,  27,  28; 
monopoly  policy,  34 ;  motives  of  acqui- 
sition, 27 ;  relations  with  metropolis, 
33;  slave-trade,  29;  trade,  26,  28.  See 
Carthage,  Colonization,  Phcenicians, 
Monopoly,  Trading-stations,  etc. 

Portuguese,  see  Albmjuerque,  Angola, 
Brazil,  Companies,  Henry  the  Xavigator, 
Mozam/'ique,  etc.;  also  Portugal,  Portu- 
guese; African  stations,  east  coast,  98; 
communications,  112,  116;  in  Africa, 
126;  influence  on  Africa,  130;  mere 
"comptoirs"  (except  Brazil),  105;  type 
of  Iljerian  colonization,  82 
Roman.  See  Colonia 
Spanish,  see  Buenos  Ayres,  Chile, 
Companies,  Cuba,  Philippines,  Puerto 
Pico,  Spanish  America,  etc. ;  also  Spain, 
Spanish;  Africa,  365;  contrasted  with 
English  and  Portuguese,  328,  139;  type 
of  Iberian  colonization,  82 

Colonization,  artificial  development,  517, 
551;  company  policy,  see  sub  Com- 
panies; complicated  by  the  Discov- 
eries, 78;  conditions  preceding  Discov- 
eries, 74  (see  Acclimatization,  Isolation 
of  social  factors,  Pace-contact,  etc.); 
fundamental  ideas,  i  (see  Conquest, 
Emigration,  31);  influence  upon  me- 
tropolis, see  sub  Metropolis;  "interior 
colonization,"  2;  inversion  of  metropolis- 
colony  relationship,  161 ;  inversion  of 
process,  517;  military,  see  sub  Colonies, 
garrison-colony;  motives  for,  see  sub 
Colonies,  Chinese,  etc.,  Conqtiest,  Emi- 
gration; "national"  policy  of,  552; 
penal,  23,  132,  140,  211,  340,  514,  519, 
538 ;  polar,  5,  496  (see  Greenland,  Ice- 
land); "preparation"  for,  83,  517,  531, 
535  (^^^  Integration,  sub  Spain,  etc., 
economic  strength,  Unification,  religious, 
and  sub  Colonies,  Chinese,  etc.);  primi- 
tive (African,  Malay,  Peruvian),  21; 
"scientific,"  553;  simpler  forms,  21; 
tropical,  497  (see  Plantation  colony); 
tropical,  by  Scandinavians,  496,  507 

Columbus,  74,  88,  173,  211,  214,  256,  258, 
259,  285,  307,  341;  relation  to  Henry 
the  Navigator,  173 

Commerce,  "active"  and  "passive,"  71 

"  Commercial  myths,"  40,  385 

Communes,  64 

Communication,  means  of,  75,  556;  as 
bonds  of  empire,  30,  t,^,  43,  54,  75,  109, 
112,  116,  347  (see  sub  Colonies,  Chinese, 
etc.) 

Communism,  291,  293 

Compagni,  Dansh  Guineisk-l  'estindiske, 
49S  ;   Dansk-ostindiske,  496 

Compahia  de  Filipinas,  Real,  349 


INDEX 


617 


Cotnpahla  Giiipuzcoana,  236,  249 
Companies,  chartered,  accumulate  capi- 
tal, q.v.,  456 ;  aspects  of  (economic 
failures,  political  successes),  456,  555; 
character,  556 ;  colonization  policy,  433, 
435'  443i  44^'  455'  comparison  of  17th 
and  19th  century  types,  555  ;  conditions 
of  development,  11,  14,  15,  555;  cor- 
porate enteiprises,  383 ;  early  form 
(Maona),  71,  72;  ethics  of  corporate 
management,  457 ;  harmful  to  trade, 
237;  makeshifts,  562;  policy  vs.  state- 
policy,  457,  560;  resurrection,  see  Com- 
panies, German;  "screens,"  557;  A. 
Smith  on,  458 ;  sovereignty,  see  Co7ti- 
panies,  Dutch,  etc. 

Danish  East  India  Company,  496 
Danish  West  India  Company,  499, 
500;  bought  out  by  king,  501,  505 

Dutch  Companies  before  1602,  376, 
388  ;  competition  between,  389 

Dutch  East  India  Company, 391, 556; 
abuses,  463  ;  agency  against  Spain,  393, 
.  394,403,405,418;  analogy  of  its  foun- 
dation to  that  of  the  Republic,  397  ; 
bankruptcy  and  fall,  409,  439  ;  benefits 
conferred  on  state,  441  ;  Boers  as  prod- 
uct of,  445 ;  capital  of,  401  ;  chambers, 
392;  their  interrelation,  396;  charter, 
391;  charter  extension,  403,  407,  408, 
414;  chief  director,  39S;  colonization 
policy,  433,  434,  435,  442,  443  (see 
Cape  settlements);  Chinese,  i].v.\  com- 
bination with  English,  405,  419;  com- 
munications, 417 ;  competition  crushed, 
409,418;  concealment,  441;  conquests, 
430;  constituent  companies,  389;  "con- 
tingents," 425,465;  contraband  traffic, 
42 1 ,440, 444 ;  corruption  of  service,  426 ; 
decennial  report  ( 1 61 2),  403 ;  second  de- 
cennial report,  405;  Directors,  392,  41 1, 
420,  429;  their  appointment,  397;  be- 
come state  officials,  395,  403;  their 
blindness,  439 ;  their  brazenness,  404, 
405;  control  (illusoi-y)  of,  399,  403,  405; 
their  dishonesty,  402,  405;  duplicity, 
407,  439;  "ostrich-policy,"  439;  suspi- 
cion of,  405;  dividends,  401,  404,  408; 
education  of  natives,  429;  exclusion  of 
women,  436;  exclusion  policy,  386,  394, 
401;  exploitation,  411,  423;  finances, 
409,  439,  440,  442;  "forced  deliveries," 
425;  foreign  aggressions,  43S;  founda- 
tion, 389;  government  an  "appendix" 
of  trade,  458 ;  grants  of  monopoly,  392 ; 
hostility  to,  402;  in  India,  416;  income, 
440;  internal  organization,  397;  land- 
grants  in  South  Africa,  443;  mal- 
adaptability,  -^91;  missions,  428,  431; 
monopoly  policy,  418,  422;  native  de- 
population,   421  ;     native    oppression. 


420;  native  services,  430;  navy,  440; 
objections  to  West  India  Company, 
414;  organization,  392;  participation, 
392,  400;  policy  toward  private  trade, 
422;  price  policy,  420,  424,  443,  461 ; 
production,  limitation  of,  421,  424; 
quotations  of  shares,  401,  405,  408; 
regulation  of  voyages,  etc.,  427 ;  relation 
to  native  authorities,  430;  relation  to 
state,  392,  394,  407;  reputation,  401, 
415;  reversion  to  company  policy,  468 ; 
shareholders,  400,  401,  405;  slavery, 
441,  443;  A.  Smith  on, 458;  speculation, 
see  quotations,  diTndends;  taxation  in 
South  Africa,  443  (see  cofitingettts,  etc.); 
The  Seventeen,  398;  war  organization, 
394,  403,  405,  418.  See/ava,  Moluccas, 
etc. 

Dutch  Trading  Company,  477 ;  mo- 
nopoly denied,  472;  policy  of  secrecy, 
482 

Dutch  West  India  C  ompany,  396, 405 ; 
administration,  etc.,  in  New  Nether- 
lands, 447,  448,  451;  agency  against 
Spain,  410,  412,  417,  453;  bankruptcy 
and  decline,  413;  charter,  411;  charter- 
extension,  414,415;  colonization  policy, 
448,  450,  454;  contraband  traffic,  448; 
Directors,  449,  452;  dividends,  413; 
foundation,  409  (see  Usselincx');  fur- 
trade,  447;  governor,  449;  grievances 
of  colonists,  451;  in  Brazil,  413,  414, 
453;  in  New  Netherlands,  447;  in 
Surinam,  453;  land-grants,  450;  mo- 
nopoly policy,  446,  453;  operations 
against  Spain,  414;  quotations  of  shares, 
415;  Kaad,  449;  relation  to  state,  449; 
reputation,  415;  share  of  East  India 
Company  in,  41 2 ;  war-agency  vs.  Spain, 
410,412,417,453;  vs.  East  India  Com- 
pany, 442.  See  Brazil,  Nezv  Nether- 
lands, etc. 

English  East  India  Company,  497, 

536 

French   East   India  Company,  418, 

448 

German  Companies,  499,  545,  574; 
administration,  557;  decline,  557;  func- 
tion, 557,  567;  in  East  Africa,  569,  578; 
in  Marshall  Islands  (Jaluit),  562,  572;  in 
NewGuinea,  558, 561,  571;  in  South  Sea, 
541;  in  Southwest  Africa,  559,  565;  in- 
efficiency, 560  ;  land-speculation,  565 ; 
native  poHcy,  560;  powers,  558.  See 
Colonies,  German 

Greenland  Company,  513;  price 
policy,  514 

Portuguese  Companies,  115;  in 
Brazil,  157,  158 

Spanish  Companies,  235;  abolished, 
237 


6i8 


COLONIZATION 


Companies,  privileged,  see  Coiupaitics, 
chartered 

Compass,  93 

"  Compulsory  Labor,"  1 1 ,  5S5,  see  Slavery, 
substitutes  for 

Concentration,  political,  see  Integratio7t 

Congo,  565 

Congo  State,  576 

Conjuncture,  13,  27 

Conquest,  i,  22,  51,  56,  62,  97,  522;  colo- 
nies as  expedients  in,  51;  of  Gaul,  56 

Comjuista,  302,  532 

Coiiquista  de  almas,  286 

Consejo  de  Itidias,  232 

Cotisoli,  65 

Consoli  dei  mercauti,  66 

Consolidation  (preceding  colonization), 
see  ''J'rc/<aratto>i"/or  colonisation,  sub 
Colonization 

Constantinople,  63,  68,  3S3 

Contadini,  521,  524 

Contingents,  see  sub  Companies,  Java, 
A  'et/i  er  lands- In  dia 

Contraband  traffic,  see  siib  Colonies, 
Companies,  jMonopoly  policy,  Trade- 
7-estriction 

Contract-labor,  see  Slavery,  substitutes  for 

Conuco,  292 

Convenio,  337 

Conversion,  86.    See  sub  Colonies 

Coolie  system,  see  sub  Colonies,  Slavery, 
substitutes  for 

Copenhagen,  510 

Corcyra,  43 

Corinth,  42,  43,  44 

Coromandel  coast,  439,  496 

Corporate  enterprise,  see  Capital,  Com- 
panies, etc. 

Cortes,  177,  222,  260,  262,  265,  268,  343 

Cortes,  The,  304 

Coruna,  230 

Corvo,  130 

Coulanges,  F.  de,  55 

Council  of  the  Indies,  see  sub  Spain 

Counter-selection,  5,  24,  82 

Covilhao,  88 

Coxinga,  416 

Creoles,  exclusion  from  political  power, 
see  sub  Spanish  America,  Cuba,  Philip- 
pines 

Crete,  44 

Criollos,  217 

Crispi,  523 

Cromwell,  253 

Croton,  45 

"Crusade  in  the  East,"  96 

Crusader-states,  66;  relations  to  Italian 
communes,  64 

Crusades,  60,  63,  65,  70,  73,  79,  S3,  175, 
285;  Moorish  wars  as,  83;  relations  of 
Italians  to,  62 


Crusading  spirit,  So,  86,  91,  96,  99,  106, 
loS,  16S,  174,  2  58 

Cuba,  178,  217,  223,  239,  309,  329,  341, 
35'"^'  3(^2,^  482;  after  iSoo,  331 ;  budget, 
338;  Chinese,  (/. 7'. ;  classes,  331;  coolie 
system,  335;  corruption,  336;  Creoles 
excluded  from  power,  336 ;  deportation 
of  malcontents,  337  ;  exploitation,  336, 
338;  geographical  advantages,  330; 
insurgents,  336,  337,  338;  labor  supply, 
2)33  ■'  population,  331;  its  constituents, 
334;  relations  with  the  United  States, 
339;  Spanish  policy,  335;  tariffs,  335; 
taxation,  337;  trade, 333;  trade  of  Spain 
with,  330;  trade-restrictions,  t,t,3 

Culture  dissemination,  mainly  via  trade, 
29.  30,  38,  46,  57,  70,  73,  76,  459.  See 
I/ellenization,  Komanization;  also  sub 
Colonies,  education,  missions,  etc. 

"Culture  Mission,"  38,  57,  72,  76,  495, 

593 

Culture  system,  432,  473,  493,  585;  char- 
acter, 475;  colonization  under,  477; 
corruption,  477;  decline,  484;  modi-, 
fication,  490;  native  policy,  477,  480; 
not  universal,  475;  plan,  474;  reputa- 
tion, 481;  uncontrolled,  4S3.  See  sid> 
A'et  her  lands- India 

Cultures,  forced,  see  stib  Colonies,  Com- 
panies, Dutch ;  in  Philippines,  350 

Cultuur  stelsel,  473 

Cumx',  45 

Cumana,  315 

Curasao,  250 

Currency  depreciation,  see  Spain,  causes 
of  decline;  in  Cuba,  336 

Cyprus,  copper  of,  28 

Cyrenaica,  45 

C'ythera,  31 

Daendels,  463 

Damaraland,  548 

Danes,  418,440,  496,  508;  in  Netherlands- 
India,  438 

Danish  West  Indies,  497;  decline,  506; 
diseases,  505;  education,  504;  emi- 
gration, 499;  English,  French,  and 
Germans  in,  500;  governor,  504;  in- 
deninitication  for  slaves,  503;  not 
needed,  497;  Portuguese  in,  500; 
slavery,  negro,  498;  slave-trade,  499, 
501;  Spaniards  and  Swedes  in,  500; 
taken  by  English,  506;  trade-condi- 
tions, 505 

Dansborg,  496 

Dares-Salaam,  548 

D'Avenel,  94 

Day,  Clive,  464,  473,  483 

Dekker,  E.  D.,  479,  484 

Delagoa  Pay  award,  129 

Delaware,  506 


INDEX 


619 


Delaware  river,  449 

Delft,  390,  397 

Demarcation  line,  90,  123,  133,  159,  175, 
342.    See   'J'orddsillas 

Democracy  in  colonies,  i8 

Denmark,  25,  374,  521 

Dependency,  i 

Deportation,  see  Colonization,  penal;  of 
malcontents,  see  sub  Cuba.,  Philippines 

Derivation  of  ideas,  74 

Dernburg,  595 

"  Dcnlsc/te  Sitte,'"  593 

Diniz,  84 

Dionysios  I,  45 

Discoveries,  complicate  colonization,  78, 
170;  comparison  of  Spanish  and  Portu- 
guese, 172;  effect  of,  82 ;  Italians  in, 
73 ;  period  of,  73,  74.  See  Cape-route, 
Columbus,  '■'■Thalassic"  trade,  etc. 

Discovery  of  America,  effects  of,  174, 
376 

Disease,  see  Race-contact 

Diu,  battle  of,  97 

Divide  ut  itnperes,  312 

Doafoes,  see  Captaincies 

Docirina,  298 

Doge,  63,  65 

Dom  Pedro,  161 

Domestication,  see  Selection,  artificial 

Dominica,  233 

Dominicans,  in  Spanish  America,  298 

Do)iatarios,  133 

Drake,  248,  386 

Draper,  359 

Druidism,  58 

Dualla,  569,  582 

Dutch,  see  A^etherlanders 

Dutch  East  Indies,  see  Netherlands- 
India 

East  and  West,  see  Trade-areas,  com- 
plementary 

East  India  Companies,  see  sub  Com- 
panies 

East  Indians,  see  sub  Colonies,  Dutch, 
Port2igiiese 

Economic  need  vs.  religion,  138,  258 

Ecuador,  218,  349 

Edict  of  Nantes,  revocation  of,  443,  449, 

452,  499 
Education,  see  sub  Colonies,   Greek,  etc. 
Egede,  513,  515 
Egmont,  Count,  378 
Egypt,  27,  63,  95,  520;  Turkish  conquest 

of,  69 
El  Dorado,  302 
Elector  of  Brandenburg,  545 
Emigration,   i,  7,   52;  direction  of,   534, 

5';6;  motives  for,  13,   18,  61,  75,  534, 

566;  quality  of,  17 
Kncomendar,  264 


Encotnienda,  264;  a  product  of  environ- 
ment, 586.  See  sub  Colonies,  Spanish, 
Slavery,  substitutes  for 

England,  382,  518 

Engler,  550 

English,  84,  124,  248,  253,  296,  320,  323, 
452,  482,  498,  526,  591,  595;  adapt- 
ability, 19;  capture  Havana,  330; 
colonial  policy,  19  ;  develop  states  out 
of  colonies,  19;  excluded  from  East 
Indies,  426;  imitation  of  methods  of, 
595;  in  Netherlands-India,  419,  438, 
439;  in  North  America,  7 

Enkhuizen,  390,  397 

Enlightenment,  312,  361  ;  a  foe  to  seclu- 
sion system,  289.  See'  sub  Colonies, 
Dutch,  Spanish 

Enterprise,  private,  see  Companies 

Entrada,  286 

Environmental  conditions,  3,  10,  26,  28, 
37,  39,  46,  65,  77,  105,  159,  171,  215, 
223,  245,  262,  269,  296,  299,  312,  321, 
331.  346,  350,  353,  372,  374,  413,  428, 
436,  443'  445'  44S,  459.  495'  505.  5^3- 
532.. 534.  546,  548,  555,  559,  563,  570, 587 

Equality,  in  colonies,  18 

Erasmus,  370 

Eretria,  44 

Eritrea,  523,529;  budget,  527  ;  civil  gov- 
ernment, 526;  education,  527;  emigra- 
tion to,  524;  native  policy,  526;  public 
works,  527;  settlement  assisted,  528; 
trade,  525 

Eskimo,  513,  515 

Espaiiola,  17S,  214,  253,  262,  266,  309, 
315,  506;  depopulation  of,  266 

Etruscans,  37 

Euboea,  31,  50 

Evolution,  297.    See  Selection 

Excesses,  in  colonies,  7.  See  Acclimati- 
zation 

Exclusion  policy,  16,  33,  243.  See  sub  Col- 
onies, Pha-nician,  etc..  Monopoly  Policy 

Expansion,  see  Colonization 

Experimentation,  social,  see  Isolation  of 
social  factors 

Exploitation  of  the  tropics,  11,  12.  See 
Colonies,  Dutch,  etc. 

Ezekiel,  29 

Fabri,  F.,  536,  550,  551 

Factories,  see  Tradi)ig-stations 

Fair,  119;  at  Puerto  Bello,  234.  See  Fleet 

system 
Family, in  colonies,7, 14.  SeeMiscege^iation 
Farm  colony,  4,  9,  41,  48,  77,  297,  317,  319, 
321,  324,  332,  340,  411;  degeneracy  in, 
445;  its  independence  (economic,  12; 
and  political,  17,  18),  41,  49,  159,  160, 
296,320,322, 510;  not  desired  by  Spain, 
177;  unit  of  population,  14 


620 


COLONlZA'llON 


Farnese,  3S1 

Farther  India,  416 

Fecundity,  in  colonies,  6 

Fernando  I'o,  365 

Fetichism,  378,  462.    See  Loyalty 

Feudal  system,  73 

Fiefs,  313 

Fifths,  the  royal,  see  sub  Brazil^  Spanish 
America,  rcz'enue,  taxation,  etc. 

Filibusters,  247 

Filipmas,  341 

Filipino  names,  346 

Filipinos,  352.    See  sub  Philippines 

Finsch,  550 

"  Fire  water,"  271 

Fiscal  system,  see  sub  Colonies,  revenue 

Flanders,  84,  366,  370,  371,  375,  380 

Fleet  system,  139,  23S,  240,  255,  348; 
a  cruder  form  of  trade,  234 ;  fleets 
and  fairs,  232 ;  fleets  and  galleons, 
232 

Florida,  178,  315,  327 

Flotas,  233 

FonJaco,  27,  63 

Fonseca,  307 

"  Forced  deliveries,"  see  sub  Colonies, 
Dutch 

Forced  labor,  a  service  to  the  native, 
587.    See  sub  Colonies 

Foreigners,  attitude  toward,  see  Exclu- 
sion policy 

Foreman,  364 

Formosa,  24,  359,  416,  429 

France,  382,  518 

Franciscans,  in  Spanish  America,  298 

Frederick  William,  532 

"  Free  labor,"  486.  See  Slavery,  sub- 
stitutes/or 

"  Free  sea,"  394,  419 

Freedom  of  trade,  see  sub  Colonies, 
Trade-restriction 

Freeman,  75 

French,  251,  323,  454,  463,  498,  501,  524, 
525,  549,  591  ;  attempt  reduction  of 
Surinam,  455;  at  the  Cape,  443;  in 
Brazil,  146;  in  Florida,  244;  in  Nether- 
lands-India, 426,  438 

French  Revolution,  323 

Friars,  see  Clergy 

Friesland,  381 

Frontier-society,  49,  559,  563.  See  Colonies 

Frontier-trade,  27,  29,  114,  443,  574.  See 
Middlemen 

Fugger,  208,  212,  242 

Gachupines,  216.    See  Chapetones 

Galconcs,  233 

Galla,  550 

Galleons,  see  Fleet  system 

Galvez,  268,  279,  323 

Gambia,  29 


Gasca,  P.  de  la.  277,  304 

Gaul,  Romans  in,  55 

Gelderland,  381 

Genoa,  61,  67 

Genoese,  97,  520 

Gente  de  razoti,  289 

Geography,  commercial,  see  Environ- 
mental conditions.  Trade,  etc. 

Germans,  97,  452,  499,  531,  576,  595; 
anti-e.\pansionists,  538;  bureaucracy, 
554,  562,  563,  577;  character  and  dis- 
position of,  573;  colonial  acquisitions, 
522,  543;  colonial  minister,  564;  colo- 
nial policy,  general  character  of,  551; 
colonial  prospects,  593;  colonial  school, 
590;  colonial  societies,  436,  539,  555, 
562 ;  colonization,  early  unfitness  for, 
532;  emigration,  2ig,  534;  emigration, 
character  of,  550;  emigration,  motives 
for,  53S;  emigration  to  United  States, 
536;  maladaptability,  575,  576;  mission- 
aries, 592;  Oriental  seminar,  590;  rela- 
tions to  England  and  France,  544,  545; 
"scientific"  colonizers,  553;  socialists, 
595;  trade-interests,  541 

Gesellschaft  filr    deutsche    Kolonisation, 

^  544 

Goa,  captured,  100 
Goa  Dourado,  117 
Gobcrnador,  292 
Gobernadorcillo,  356 
Godthaab,  513 
Gold,    see    Metals ;     also    sub     Colonies, 

exploitation,  Mining,  Monopoly,  etc. 
"  Gold  and  Silver  Islands,"  86,  490 
Go7'crnador,  99 
Government  and  trade,  inconsistency  of, 

458,  492,   559,  560.    See  sub  Colonies, 

Dutch,  Spanish,  etc. 
Gracchi,  53 

Gran  Reunion  Americana,  323 
Granada,  reduction  of,  80,  16S,  175 
Cirand  Khan,  258 
Great  man  in  history,  85,  87 
Greeks,  35,  37;  adaptability,  47,  48;  in 

Egypt,  46 ;  sense  of  nationaHty,  48 
"Green  baize,"  558,  562 
Greenland,   496,    521;    colonization    and 

life-conditions,    512,    514;     Danes   in, 

512;    monopoly,   514;    Norse  in,   512; 

recolonization,  513;  revenue,  514 
Grenada  (West  Indies),  253 
Groningen,  381 
Griindliche  f.chre,  578 
Guadalajara,  310 
Guadeloupe,  338 
Guarani,  153,  291,  294 
Guardia  civil,  338,  363 
Guatemala,  217,  240,  310 
Guaxaca,  268 
Guayaquil,  360 


INDEX 


62.1 


Guiana,  222,  252,  454 
Guinea  coast,  532 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  411 

Haakon,  509 

Haiti,  282 

Half-breeds,  see  Miscegenation 

Hamburg,  375,  535 

Hanse,  see  Haiiseatic  League 

Hanseatic  League,  80,  367,  375,  384,  511 

Hansemann,  543,  558 

Hapsburgs,  183.    See  Spain,  A'etherlands 

Harbors,  507 

Havana,  223,  233,  245,  253,  338,  504; 
taken  by  English,  329 

Havelaar,  Max,  479,  484 

Hawkins,  300 

Hebrews,  see  yetvs 

Hegemony,  30,  35,  37 

Hellenization,  48 

Henegouwen,  371 

Henry  the  Navigator,  74,  85,  172 

Herero,  550,  568 

Hidalgo,  see  Caballero 

Hcheitsrechie,  559,  561 

Honand,37 1,376,381,382,388,390,41 1,413 

Holy  Land,  63 

"  Home,"  18 

Homeric  Age,  26,  39 

Homesickness,  269,  547.  See  Acclima- 
tization 

Hong-Kong,  364,  593 

Hoofd,  4 89 

Hoorn    (district    of    Netherlands),    397, 

398-  447 

Hoorn,  Count,  378 

Hottentots,  442,  444,  549 

Houtman,  387 

Hudson,  Hendrik,  447 

Hudson  river,  449 

Huguenots,  see  Edict  of  Nantes 

Humanitarianism,  as  a  cloak-motive,  38. 
See  Conquest,  ^'■Culture  Mission,"  J^ace- 
contact,  Slavery,  substitutes  for,  etc. 

Humboldt,  208,  217,  266,  267,  280,  312, 

333.  339.  532 

Hume,  303 

Hysteria,  political,  520,  536.  See  Mega- 
lomania 

Iberians,  46;  character,  80;  colonization 

by,8o; kings, 82.  ^ee Portuguese, Spanish 
Iceland,  496,  508;  communications,  510; 

government,  511;  life-conditions,  508; 

population,  510;  revenue,  512;  society, 

colonial  character  of,  509 
Inca,  207,  267,  268,  286,  291 
Indented  servants,  17 
India,  219  ;  British  in,  52,  57 

Portuguese  India  (=  Empire  in  the 

East),  7;  administration,  corrupt,  115; 


Albuquerque  initiates  and  fixes  Por- 
tuguese policy,   105 ;    army  and  navy, 

107,  109;  Church,  118,  121;  colonial 
service,  102;  coolie  system,  125;  cor- 
ruption, 115;  cruelties,  see  Race-con- 
tact; "Crusade  in  the  East,"  96; 
defense  of  monopoly,  94,  108;  de- 
moralizcltion,  no;  emigration  to,  104, 
115;  exploitation,  115;  extent,  106,  107  ; 
favoring  conditions,  90;  infringement 
and  collapse  of  monopoly,  123;  Inqui- 
sition, q.v.;  islands,  126;  mendicancy, 
118;  metropolis  demoralized,  113;  mis- 
sions, 122;  monopoly,  94;  monopoly 
policy,  no;  native  policy,  103,  119; 
navigation,  conditions  of,  87,   88,   92, 

108,  109;  profits  of  trade,  113,  114;  re- 
lations with  natives,  119;  sale  of  offices, 
117;  social  conditions,  117.  See  Albu- 
querque, Almeida,  Goa,  Moluccas,  etc. 

Indians,  American,  temperament  of,  263; 
in  Brazil,  142  ;  enslavement,  143,  144 ;  in 
New  Netherlands,  451.  See  sub  Brazil, 
Spanish  Atnerica,  clergy,  education, 
missions,  Jesuits,  Race-contact,  etc. 

In  Spanish  America,  adult  children, 
294  (see  missions);  conversion,  258, 
264,  285,  291 ;  degradation,  280;  depop- 
ulation and  its  causes,  263,  265,  266, 
269,  271;  in  earlier  period,  272;  edu- 
cation, 265,  287,  290 ;  elevation  of 
natives,  methods  of  clergy,  288;  en- 
slavement, 258,  259  (see  Slavery,  sub- 
stitutes for);  exclusion  policy,  289,  293; 
indulgence  of,  286;  infanticide,  272  ;  in 
northern  and  southern  Spanish  Amer- 
ica, 260,  319;  laws,  benevolent  and 
scrupulous,  274,  275;  the  "New  Laws" 
of  1542,  275;  minors,  279,  284,  294; 
numbers,  217,  218,  317;  permanent  ele- 
ment in  population,  216;  personal  serv- 
ices, 279;  protective  legislation,  212, 
272;  protective  legislation  ineffective, 
257,  276  (cf.  356) ;  protective  legislation 
uninforced,  274  (see  Z^rj  Casas);  "Pro- 
tector of  the  Indians,"  274;  seclusion, 
289,  293;  slavery,  261;  slavery  abol- 
ished, reabolished,  275,  276;  social 
position,  261  (see  Castas,  Classes,  etc.); 
subjugation,  260  ;  suicide,  272;  super- 
stitions, 179,  262;  tribute,  262;  village 
life,  2S3  (see  Pueblo) ;  wage-system,  263, 
276.    See  Clergy,  etc.,  as  above 

Indigo,  425,  475 

Indios,  217,  258 

Indios  reducidos,  286 

Industrial  organization,  in  colonies,  3,  4, 
8,  10,  76 

Industry  and  trade,  contempt  for,  211,  313 

Ingratitude,  307,  342.  See  '■'■  Spanish 
gratitude  " 


622 


COLONlZAllUN 


Inquisition,  m  Brazil,  148,  163;  India,  121, 
122;  Netlierlands,  386;  Philippines, 
354;  Portugal,  82;  Spain,  82,  212; 
Spanish  America,  244,  287,  300.  See 
S/'ii/fi,  causes  for  decline 

Inspiration,  173 

Institutions,  colonial,  contrasts  in,  19; 
natural,  in  setting  of  time,  see  Monop- 
oly, etc. 

Integration,  political,  19,  30,  31,  34,  36, 
62,  75,  80,  84,  96,  16S,  172,  181,  200, 
304.  367.  36S,  379,  389,  397,  509,  517, 

535-  550 
Intemperance,  577 

Intermediary  function.    See    Middlemen 
Irala,  316 
Isabella,    285,    299,     304.     See    Catholic 

Sovereigns 
Islam.    See  Mohammedans 
Isolation.     See     sub    Spanish     America, 

Philippines,  etc.,  cotntnunications 
Isolation  of  social  factors,  21,  25,  38,  50, 

74.  459 

Italians  (media;val),  adaptability,  com- 
mercial and  financial  devices,  71;  imi- 
tated, 71;  in  Discoveries  period,  73; 
relations  to  Crusaders,  62 ;  taxed  by 
Turks,  69;  trade-restriction,  66,  71. 
See  Colonies,  Fondaco,  etc. 
(Modern),  see  Italy 

Italy,  328,  517,  528,  595;  anti-expansion- 
ists, 523;  debt,  529;  disqualifications 
for  colonization,  517,  518;  emigration, 
219;  its  character,  521 ;  ignorance  in, 

523 
Iturbide,  327 
Iversen,  498 

Jacatra,  433 

Jamaica,  215,  250,  335 

Japan,  347 

Java,  219,  343.3''^7.  473-  477.  482;  British 
dominance,  466  ;  dependency  of  British 
India,  464  ;  population,  4S2 

Javanese,  423,  431,  477,  485,  583,  584 

Jerusalem,  63 

Jesuits,  155,  292,  293;  in  Brazil,  138,  144; 
expulsion  from  IJrazil,  i  53;  reasons  for, 
155;  in  India,  119;  expulsion  from, 
119;  in  Spanish  America,  299;  am- 
bition, 294  ;  expulsion  from  Spain  and 
Spanish  America,  294;  in  Philippines, 
353;  insight,  292;  Reductions  in  Para- 
guay, 291 ;  services,  1  56 

Jews,  35,  81,  82,  454,  488;  in  India,  121; 
in  Brazil,  132 

Jingoism,  537 

John  [,  84 

Johnston,  II.  II.,  576,  505 

jolo,  344,  493 

Juda;a,  57 


Junta,  325 

Junta  Patriotica,  364 

Juros,  192,  193 

Justice,  see  administration 

A'ddi,  579 

Kaffirs,  444 

Kaiser  W'ilhelmsland,  544,  5S2 

Kalmar-union,  511 

Kamerun,  543,  546,  54S,  555,  569,  576 

"  Kamerun,"  synonymous  with  "  colony," 
561 

Kanaka,  583 

A'atipunan,  362 

Keane,  A.  H.,  550 

Kiautschou,  592 

Kieft,  451 

Kilima  Njaro,  546 

King  as  capitalist,  87,  457;  merchant-in- 
chief,  94 ;  powder  of,  see  Integration, 
political.    See  Capital,  Companies 

"  King  and  Church,"  378 

KXijpovxici,  49 

A'olonialmenschen,  539,  541,  552 

A'ong-si,  2,  491 

Krumen,  581 

Labat,  Abbe,  505 

Labor  force,  in  colonies,  see  sith  Colonies, 

"  iWative  question,^''  etc. 
"  Labor  trade,"  582 
Ladrone  Islands,  362,  365,  592 
Land-grants,  see  sub  Colonies,  Companies 
/.andeshauptmann,  558 
Laredo,  230 

Las  Casas,  265,  275,  281 
Latifundia,  17 
Latin,  58 

Latin  nations,  7,  518 
I>a  Torre,  360 
Lea,  H.  C,  82,  257 
Legazpi,  343,  350 
Le  Maire,  402,  404,  409 
Lomos,  (iil  de,  313 
Lepanto,  254 
Leroy-Beaulieu,   11,   105,    215,  239,   244, 

279,  299,  321,  330,  332,  337,  339,  341, 

343'  36^'.  557 
Lesbos,  44 

Levant,  61  ;   Italians  in,  61 
Lima,  213,  235,  299,  310,  318 
Liniers,  320 
Linschoten,  385,  386 
Lisljon,  61,  229,  367,  384 
Lithuania,  534 
Livre,  504 
Llamas,  267 

Loanda,  S.  Paulo  de,  127 
Loreto,  291 

Louisiana,  178,  315,  330 
Low  Countries,  see  Netherlands 


INDEX 


623 


Loyalty    to    king    and   faith,    see    Inte- 
i^ralioH,  political,   Uiiifuation,  religions 
Liibeck,  375 
Liideritz,  542 
Luther,  371 

Luxuries,  see  Production,  tropical 
Luzon,  343 

Macao,  125,  416 

Macassars,  423,  496 

Macedonian  settlements  in  the  East,  50 

Madeira  Islands,  87 

Madura,  477 

Magellan,  1 23, 1 76, 3 1 6, 34 1 ;  voyage  of,  88 

Magna  Grascia,  45,  47 

Maharero,  574 

Mahrattas,  125 

"  Mailed  fist,"  554 

Mainmorte,  see  Mortmain 

Malabar  coast,  98 

Malacca,  ipo,  359,  416,  433;   Straits  of, 

418,  439 
Malaga,  230 

^l3.\?iyif:, see  sitb  Colonies,  Dntc/i,  Portuguese 
Mamelukes,  95,  98 
Manchuria,  23 
Manhattan  Island,  447 
Manila,  253  ;  captured  by  English,  359 
Manor,  \-j,  73 

Manuel,  "  the  Fortunate,"  94 
Manufacture    in    colonies,    12.     See    sub 

Colonies,  Industrial  organization 
Maona  {A/a/iona),  72 
Maracaibo,  315 
Maranhao,  147 
Maria-Theresa  dollar,  519 
Marin  Sanuto,  69 
Marmora,  sea  of,  46 
Marriage,  in  colonies,  14 
Marrons,  456 
Marshall  Islands,  545,  562 
Martinique,  223,  335,  338 
Massachusetts,  450 
Massilia  (Marseilles),  37,  45 
Massowah,  520,  522,  528 
Mastic,  72 
Mataram,  423 
^[ate,  292 
Matelief,  416 
Mauritius,  23S,  435 
Maurits  of  Nassau,  382,  387,  391,  398 
"  Max  Havelaar,"  484 
Jllayorazgos,  224 
Mecca,  95 
Mechoacan,  268 
Mediterranean,  28,  t^J,-,  69,  96,  459;  trade 

of,  44.    See  Trade 
"  Megalomania,"  520,  529,  537,  573 
Megara,  44 
Melkarth,  34 
Mendoza,  276,  308 


Menelek,  523 

Mercantile  system,  71,  246,  426;  in  Spain, 
202 

Mesopotamia,  594 

Mesta,  Consejo  de  la,  171,  190 

Mestizo,  217,  218,  220,  317 

Mestizo  privilegiado,  346 

Mestizo  de  sangley,  346,  355 

Metals,  28,  259,  262,491,  510;  from  Amer- 
ica, 203;  yield  of,  in  Brazil,  166;  in 
German  colonies,  549.  See  Mining, 
Alonopoly,  etc. 

Met  ropolis,  influence  of  colonization  upon, 
48,  113,  200,  46c;  relations  of  colony 
to,  33,42,  65,  66,  75,  161,  164;  inverse 
relation  to  colony,  161.  See  City- 
economy,  Porttigal,  Spain,  etc. 

Mexico,  215,  217,  218,  219,  220,  223,  260, 
266,  268,  274,  276,  279,  281,  300,  303, 
308,  310,  327,  346,  349,  357 

Middleburg,  412 

Middlemen,  Chinese,  437 ;  Dutch,  373, 
374,  3S5;  Greeks,  44;  Italians  (medi- 
aeval), 61,70,  79;  PhcEnicians,  27.  See 
Frontier-trade 

Mikado,  362 

Miletos,  44,  46 

Mi  Hones,  193 

Minas  Geraes,  151.     See  Sao  Paulo 

Mindanao,  344 

Ming  dynasty,  24 

Mining,  in  colonies,  8,  12,  13,  504  (see 
sub  Brazil,  Spanish  A tn erica,  jVet/ier- 
Ia7ids-India,  etc.)  ;  royalties,  .see  sub 
Colonies,  re7<enue,  taxation 

Ministry  (Spanish)  of  the  Indies,  306 

Miranda,  323 

Miscegenation,  in  colonies,  7,  18;  before 
the  Discoveries,  23,  25,  32,  35,  48.  54, 
77;  desertion  of  native  wives,  25,  436, 
515;  in  Brazil,  134,  172;  in  Cuba,  334;  in 
Greenland,  515;  in  Netherlands-India, 
434.  4361 444,  504;  i"  Philippines,  346 ;  in 
Portuguese  India,  </.?'.,  104;  in  Spanish 
America,  214,216,218,263,  295,296,317 

Misiones,  286 

Misioneros,  2S9 

"  Mission,"  national,  537.  See  Culture 
disseminatio>i 

Missions,  in  colonies,  i  ^.  See  sub  Colonies, 
Dutcli,  Portuguese,  eic,  /esuits 

Mita,  279 

Mitre,  B.,  325 

Mogul  Empire,  91 

Mohammedans,  64,  86,  88,  96,  99,  103, 
107,  121,  129,  169,258,  264,  344,  374, 
429,  459,  550,  569,  589.  See  Moorish 
JFars,  Moriscos,  AForos 

Moluccas  (Spice  Islands),  107,  123,  176, 
34^,  .347,  402,  409,  416,  419,  420,  422, 
429,  439,  494 


624 


COLONIZATION 


Monarchy,  strengthening  of.  See  Inte- 
gration, political 

Money  equivalents,  597 

Money  values,  94,  597 

Mongolia,  23 

Alonjas,  292 

Monks,  see  Clergy 

Monopoly,  14,  476,  561;  abuse  of,  457; 
Danish,  500;  Dutch,  collapse  of,  461; 
idea  of,  sanctioned  by  the  Pope,  176, 
243  (see  Bull  of  Alexander  I' I,  De- 
marcation Line);  necessary  expedient, 
392  (see  Capital,  Companies) ;  I'hceni- 
cian,  34;  Portuguese,  iii,  327;  its  in- 
fringement and  collapse,  123,  124; 
its  papal  sanction,  annulled  by  Refor- 
mation, 385,  387;  its  profits,  94,  113, 
238;  of  Seville,  227,  228,238,  304;  Span- 
ish, 212,  227;  infringement  andcollapse, 
247,  327 ;  of  Venice,  79,  86,  327.  See 
Colonies,  Companies,  Spices,  Venice,  etc. 

Monopoly  policy,  16;  before  Discoveries, 
T,^,  34,  41,  61,  66,  69;  Danish,  500,  511, 
513,  556;  Dutch,  392,  419,  423,  448,  457, 
461 ;  Portuguese, 79,89, 1 10,1  24,139,385; 
Spanish,  236,  278.  See  Colonies,  Com- 
panies, '■^Secret  commerce,"  Spices,  etc. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  327,  531,  594 

Montevideo,  320 

Montezuma,  207,  303 

Moorish  Wars,  80,  83,  264 ;  as  crusades,  83 

Moors,  see  Mohammedans 

Morale  universale,  526 

Mores,  76,  287,  469,  481 

Morgan,  253 

Moriscos,  Si,  82,  171;  expulsion  of,  186 

Morocco,  365 

Moros,  344,  351,  494 

Mortmain,  299,  353 

Moses,  Bernard,  219 

Moucheron,  386 

Mozambique,  127,  129 

Mulatos,  217 

Mulattoes,  317.    See  Miscegenation 

"  Multatuli,"  484 

Miinicipitnn,  53 

Miinster,  Treaty  of,  249 

Murex  hrandarts,  28 

Mykale,  40 

Nachtigal,  544 

N'ansen,  515 

A'ao,  348,  360 

Napoleonic  wars,  influence  of,  125,  160, 
192,  320,  324,  359,  463,  466,  493 

Nassau,  Count,  414,  453.  See  Brazil, 
Portuguese  in 

Native  labor,  see  Indians,  "■  iVative  ques- 
tion," A'ative  policy.  Tropical  production 

Native  policy,  before  Discoveries,  76.  See 
sub  Colonies,  Miscegenation,  Hace-contact 


"Native  question,"  10,  486;  in  Brazil, 
137,  142;  in  Danish  West  Indies,  510; 
in  German  colonies,  573,  580 ;  in 
Netherlands-India,  470,  486,  487;  in 
Philippines,  350.  See  Environmental 
cofiditions,  Hace-contact,  Slavery,  Trop- 
ical production 

Natives,  as  producers  and  consumers,  see 
'■'■  Xative  question,"  Race-contact,  etc.; 
causes  of  decline,  269 ;  need  of  their 
labor,  see  Forced  labor.  Tropical  pro- 
duction; treatment  of,  see  sub  Colonies 

"Natural"  colonies,  1,42,  522;  of  Italy,  530 

Navigation,  in  a  mediterranean,  28.  See 
sub  Colonies,  Communications 

Navigation  Acts,  461 

Naxos,  45 

Neapolis  (Naples),  45 

Necho,  expedition  sent  by,  32 

A'ederlandsche  Handelsmaatschappij,  472 

Negroes,  145,  218,  220,  317,  522,  526.  See 
'■'■Xative  question," Slave-trade,  Tropical 
production,  etc. 

iVegros,  217 

Netherlanders,  87,  124,  249,  482,  525,  571, 
591,  595;  adaptability,  378  (cf.  459); 
as  colonizers,  453 ;  ignorance  of  colo- 
nial affairs,  482;  in  Brazil,  146^  expul- 
sion from,  147;  in  Java,  7  (see  yi/rw); 
restrained  from  voyage  to  East,  384. 
See  Companies,  iVet/ierlands,  etc. 

Netherlands,  367,  373,  382,  518;  abolition 
of  Catholicism,  381;  accumulation  of 
capital,  385;  Bourbons,  369;  Burgun- 
dian  rule,  367;  Calvinism,  371;  Charles 
V,  368;  Church,  371;  clergy,  375,  378; 
communications,  374;  Council  of  the 
Asiatic  Possessions,  463;  Council  of 
the  Colonies,  415;  Crusades,  their 
effect,  372;  decline  of  the  South,  376; 
economic  strength,  372;  forced  to  de- 
velop shipping,  367;  Hapsburgs,  369; 
indifference  to  Church,  370;  influence 
of  colonial  career,  460;  "King  and 
Church,"  378 ;  merchant  fleet  seized 
by  Philip  II,  386 ;  movements  toward 
independence,  379;  navigation  con- 
ditions, 376,  384;  "North-Quarter," 
398;  North  vs.  South,  375,  380;  Pacifi- 
catie,q.v.;  peace  with  Spain  (1609)  ^^^ 
itseffects,  389, 41 1;  Philip  11,382;  popu- 
lation, 374;  "pragmatic  sanction,"  369; 
"preparation"  for  colonization,  367, 
370,  372;  Protestantism,  371;  resist- 
ance to  Spanish  policy.  377;  revolt,  at- 
titude of  France  and  England  toward, 
382 ;  struggle  for  religious  freedom,  370 ; 
taxation,  379;  trade,  competed  for  by 
Spain  and  Portugal,  373,  384;  Unie, 
q.v.;  unification,  367;  voyage  to  India, 
386.    See  Holland,  Zeeland,  etc. 


INDEX 


625 


"Netherlands"  as  limited  in  this  book,  382 

Netherlands-India,  administration,  463, 
468,  478;  army,  427;  budget,  481;  cen- 
sorship, 482;  centralization,  465;  Chi- 
nese, q.v.\  colonial  constitution,  483; 
colonial  service,  471,  479;  commission 
of  1816,  470;  commissions,  463;  Com- 
panies, q.v.\  company-policy,  reaction 
vs.,  and  reversion  to,  463,  471;  con- 
tingents, 465,  467,  478,  494 ;  contraband 
traffic,  427,  496 ;  conversion,  489 ;  coolie 
system,  a  virtual  slavery,  476,  487;  cul- 
ture-percentages, 478;  culture  system, 
q.v.\  demoralization,  479;  Dutch  Trad- 
ing Company,  c].v.\  emigration  to,  434, 
473;  emigration  of  women,  436;  ex- 
clusion-policy, 472,  492;  exploitation, 
464,  466,  473,  475,  476;  forced  cultures 
and  services,  472,  491 ;  freedom  of  cul- 
tivation and  trade,  467;  "free  labor," 
see  Slavery,  substitutes  for  \  governor- 
general,  441  ;  government  cultures  and 
monopoly,  see  Culture  system  ;  govern- 
ment vs.  trade,  463 ;  land-tax,  468,  470, 
471,  474,  475,  478,  491;  merchant- 
marine,  427;  mining,  491 ;  miscegena- 
tion, q.  V. ;  missions,  489 ;  native  a  minor, 
492;  native  policy,  465,  467,  469,  477, 
480,  484,  492;  native  policy  vs.  Span- 
ish and  Portuguese,  481;  "Outer  Pos- 
sessions," 494,  495;  passports,  485; 
personal  services,  430;  press-regula- 
tion, 483;  public  works,  490;  reaction 
vs.  company-policy,  463;  recent  con- 
ditions, 489;  reform,  483;  regents,  465, 
467,  469,  471,  479,  485;  reorganization, 
463,  466;  residents,  469,  47 1;  restora- 
tion, 470;  revenue,  467,  474,  478,  490; 
revenue  system  in  Java,  467;  reversion 
to  company-policy,  474;  revolts,  482; 
slavery,  431;  slavery  for  debt,  48  7 ;  slave- 
trade,  q.v.,  421,  485;  Spanish  in,  493; 
subventions,  481;  trade-restrictions, 
434,  467,  476;  wages,  427.  See  Coen, 
Companies,  Culture  disse?nination,  Cul- 
ture system,  Daendels,  Java,  Race-con- 
tact, Raffles 

New  Amsterdam,  population,  452 

New  England,  450 

Newfoundland,  412 

New  Granada,  240,  315 

New  Guinea,  107, 545, 548, 549, 567, 57 1, 584 

New  Jersey,  506 

New  Spain,  233,  245,  308,  315 

"New  states,"  17,  311;  mainly  British,  19 

New  Sweden,  452 

Niger,  565 

Nile,  95 ;  proposed  diversion  of,  99 ; 
"  Western  Nile,"  89 

North  Star,  32 

Northeast  Passage,  386 


Northwest  Passage,  447 

Norway  and  Norwegians,  374, 496, 509, 5 1 2 

iVostalgia,  269,  547 

Nova  Zembla,  386 

Novelists,  Russian  and  Polish,  533,  595 

Odyssey,  40 

Officialism,     see     sub    Colonies,     bicreau- 

cracy 
Offlciutn  Gazariae,  66 
Oficios  viles  y  baxos,  195 
oiKKTT-^i,  42,  48 
"Old  Spaniards,"  313 
Oldenbarnevelt,  383,  388,  390 
Opium,  425,  430 
Orange,  Prince  of,  377,380;  assassination, 

383 
Orden  publico,  338 
Order  of  Christ,  86 
Orellana,  302 
Orinoco,  246,  248 
Ormuz,  95,  100,  131 
Ottomans,  see  Turks 
Ovando,  264,  285 
Overijssel,  381 

Pacificatie  of  Ghent,  381 

Palao  (Pelew)  islands,  592 

Palestine,  594 

Panama,  218,  235,  245,  248,  310;  isthmus, 

233.  246 
Pandelingschap,  487 
Pantjen,  491 
Papuans,  550,  586 
Paraguay,    159,   539;   Jesuit    Reductions 

in,  291 
Parana,  291 

Parentela  spiritualis,  286 
Parma,  duke  of,  381 
Patagonia,  309 
Patino,  253 
Patroon,  448 

Paulistas,  143,  152,  160,  293 
"Pax  Romana,"  57 
Peace  of  Breda,  419,  438;  of  St.  Germain, 

532 

ireipaTai,  89 

Peninsular,  see  Spanish,  Portuguese 

Pepper,  see  Spices 

Pemambuco  (Recife),  147,  454 

Peru,  12,  140,  213,  215,  218,  223,  240,  260, 
266,  267,  300,  303,  308,  314,  315,  323, 
326,  346,  349 

Peschel,  266 

Peso,  207 

Peters,  Karl,  544,  575,  576 

Pezagno,  74 

Pfeil,  544,  585.  587 

Philip  II,  124,  184,  200,  212,  233,  377,  385, 
418;  his  unpopularity  in  the  Nether- 
lands, 369 


626 


COLONIZATION 


Philippines,  107,  235,  257,  315,  325,  341, 
418;  administration,  356;  American 
rule,  353;  anti-clericalism,  361;  Chinese 
products  in,  347;  class-discrimination 
(political),  360, 363 (see  Ovc/cj);  Church 
predominance,  350,  352;  clergy,  364; 
clergy,  native,  354;  communications, 
35S ;  conquest,  343 ;  constituents  of 
population,  345,  346;  "conversion"  of 
natives,  352 ;  corruption,  356,  35S ; 
deportation  of  malcontents,  362 ;  emi- 
gration of  Spaniards  to,  345,  346;  tv/- 
<-(W//tv/(/(/.r,  350 ;  exclusion  policy,  349; 
forced  cultures,  350;  foreign  aggression, 
358;  grievances  of  Filipinos,  360,  363; 
ignorance  (Spanish)  of,  357  ;  industrial 
organization,  347  ;  Inquisition,  </.r'. ; 
isolation,  349,  351,  357  ;  laws,  350;  limi- 
tation of  terms  of  office,  356 ;  mal- 
adaptability  of  Spanish  policy,  358 ; 
missions,  351 ;  Moros,  q.v.\  "official 
sacerdotal  tyranny,"  362;  popular  dis- 
content, 358;  public  works,  357  ;  revolt, 
361;  slavery,  351;  taxation,  357;  trade- 
restriction,  347 

Philippson,  551 

Phoca;a,  72 

Phoenicia,  26 

Phoenicians,  171,  366;  adaptability,  27; 
character,  27,  28,  34,  38,  459;  commer- 
cial spirit,  33,  35;  influence,  38;  trade, 
character  of,  26,  28 

"  Phfcnicians  of  the  East,"  459,  488 

"  Pidgin  English,"  579 

Piracy,  41,  89,  93,  125,  229,  252,  491,  498. 
See  Strand-law 

Pisa  and  Pisans,  61,  67,  520 

Pizarro,  Francisco,  177,  207,  222,  303 

Pizarro,  Gonzalo,  277,  304 

Plantation  colony,  4,  9,  25,  269,  271,  281, 
311,  322,  42S,  434,  455'. 456,  495'  523; 
its  dependence  (economic,  12;  and  po- 
litical, 15),  43;   unit  of  population,  7 

Plata  region,  522.  See  also  Argenlitia, 
Buenos  Ayres 

Plato,  48 

Podesta,  65 

Poilos,  286 

Poland,  534 

Polavieja,  362 

Poli,  the,  74 

II6X«,  48 

Politii]iie  de  luxe,  529 

Polygamy,  2S7 

Polynesia,  541 

Pombal,  135.    See  Brazil,  /ndia,  Jesuits 

Pondichery,  539 

II6i'Tos  EK|ei»'os,  46 

Pontus,  see  Black  Sea 

Pope,  power  of,  89.  See  Demarcaliou 
Line 


Population,  in  colonies,  5,  6,  16,  17;  in 
new  country,  5;  prudential  checks, 
23;  quantitative  vs.  qualitative  injuries 
to,  1S8.     See  sub  Colonies 

Portugal,  83,456,  518;  alliance  with  Eng- 
land, 83  ;  colonial  policy,  see  Albuquer- 
que; colonization,  conditioning  factors, 
80;  demoralization,  113,  114;  military 
spirit,  80;  "preparation"  for  coloniza- 
tion, 80,  81,  83;  relations  with  eman- 
cipated colony,  as  compared  with 
Spain's,  241;  reputation,  loi ;  sea- 
power  overrated,  109  (see  Spain);  slav- 
ery in,  87 ;  union  with  Spain,  and  its 
effects,  146,  453,  123.  See  Colonies, 
India,  Monopoly,  etc. 

Portuguese,  69,  366,  442,  443;  achieve- 
ments in  Brazil,  162;  colonization  vs. 
Spanish,  139;  degeneration,  109;  dis- 
coveries, contrasted  with  Spanish,  172; 
e.xploits,  military  and  naval,  108;  mal- 
adaptability,  115;  slave-traders,  87,  1 27, 
137,  144.  See  Asientos,  sub  Colonies, 
slave-trade 

Potato,  222 

Potosi,  208,  304 

Pound  (Flemish),  408 

Prasos  da  coroa,  129.    See  Captaincies 

"  Preparation "  for  colonization.  See 
Integration,  Unification,  religious,  and 
sub  Portugal,  Spain,  etc.,  economic 
strengtii,  merchant-marine,  etc. 

Presidios,  288 

Prester  John,  88 

Prices  and  price-policy,  461 ;  fluctuations, 
94,  114,  204,  238.  See  Companies, 
Monopoly,  Spice-trade,  etc. 

Principe,  382 

Production,  tropical,  see  'IVopical  pro- 
duction 

Profits,  small,  on  large  sales,  and  vice 
versa,  237.  See  sub  Companies,  Mo- 
nopoly.  Price-policy,  etc. 

Property-tenure  in  colonies,  14 

Proi)rietary  system,  see  Captaincies,  Pa- 
troons,  Prasos  da  coroa 

"  Prosperity-policy,"  477 

"  Protector  of  the  Indians,"  274.  See 
sub  Span  is  li  America 

Protectorate,  16,  37 

Protestantism  (in  Netherlands),  370,  380, 

381 
Provencals,  79 
Province,  i 

Pro-'inciic,  2,  52 

Pueblo,  356 ;  de  Indtos,  2S8 

Puerto  Bello,  233,  240,  245,  253 

l'uertoRico,2 17, 329, 340,498, 501, 507, 533 

Pulque,  284 

Punica  fides,  34 

Purple  dye,  28 


INDEX  627 


Queenslanders,  582 

Quicksilver,  2S1 

Quicksilver  process,  208,  221,  314 

Quiloa,  127 

Quinine,  222 

Quito,  213,  267,  310 

Raad  vnn  Indie,  417 

Race-conflict,  see  Kace-contact 

Race-contact,  in  colonies,  5,  10,  587  ;  be- 
fore Discoveries  (about  the  Mediter- 
ranean), 29,  34,  37,  47,  55,  59,  76;  con- 
trolled by  priesthood,  364;  factors  in, 
e.g.  alcohol,  change  of  environment, 
disease,  nostalgia,  269,  270 ;  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  "  lower  "  race,  40  ; 
in  Brazil,  138,  142  ;  in  Danish  West 
Indies,  499;  in  Eritrea,  526;  in  Ger- 
man colonies,  568,  579 ;  in  Green- 
land, 514;  in  Netherlands-India,  428, 
457'  459.  465,  469-  480,  481,  494;  in 
Philippines,  353,  364;  in  Portuguese 
India,  91,  104,  257;  in  Spanish  Amer- 
ica, 257,  263,  271,  2S0,  295,  297,  319. 
See  stib  Colonies,  Culture  disseniitmtion, 
Indians,  Miscegenation,  Native  policy, 
'■'■Amative  gitestion,"  Tropenkoller,  Trop- 
ical production 

Race-mixture,  see  Miscegetiation 

Raffles,  466,  479 

Ratzel,  550 

Raubbau,  1 1 

Recife,  see  Pernambuco 

Recopilacioti,  273,  306 

Red  Sea,  95 

Rediiccion,  284 

Reduction,  see  sid>  Spanish  America, 
missions 

Reformation,  243,  370,  380.  See  Protes- 
tantism 

Regidencia,  116,  307 

Regidores,  283 

Reichenow,  550 

Reichstag,  540,  555,  558,  595 

Religion  in  colonies,  15,  73,  75  (see 
sub  Colonies,  conversion,  missions) ; 
as  a  cloak-motive,  15,  38,  277,  286 
(see  Slave?-}',  substitutes  for,  Piracy, 
sub  Colonies,  exploitation,  etc.);  as  a  mo- 
tive for  emigration,  q.v.,  75  ;  as  a  polit- 
ical bond,  T,2,  48;  vs.  economic  need, 
258 

Rents,  in  colonies,  18 

Repartityiiento,  264,  277 

Repartir,  264 

Residencia,  in  Philippines,  356;  in  Span- 
ish America,  307,  357 

Revolution,     American,     323 ;     French, 

4,19 
Rhine,  374 
Rhodes,  44 


Riches,  desire  for,  213,  259;  vs.  humani- 
tarian feeling,  281;  vs.  religion,  258. 
See  Companies,  Monopoly,  Race-contact, 
Spice-trade,  etc. 

Richter,  595 

"  Rights  of  man,"  586 

Rigsdaler,  498 

Rink,  515,  516 

Rivera,  de,  363 

Rizal,  362 

Rogers,  95 

Romanization,  55 

Romans,  37,  520;  adaptability  and  toler- 
ance, see  Romafiization 

Rome,  37,  59 

Roscher,  8,  9,  257,  297 

Rotterdam,  390,  397 

Royalty,  see  King 

Ruga,  64 

Russia,  323,  375,  521,  595 

Saco,  281  • 

St.  Bartholomew,  506 

St.  Croix,  498 

St.  John,  498,  501 

St.  Kitts,  251 

St.  Lucia,  253 

St.  Thomas,  498,  500,  507,  533 

St.  Vincent,  253 

Salamanca,  227 

Salcedo,  343 

Samoa,  591 

San  Gabriel  Arcangel,  288 

San  Mun  Bay,  529 

San  Sebastian,  230 

Santo  Domingo,  223.    See  Espanola 

Sao  Paulo,  132,  152,  159,  321 

Saracens,  62 

Sardinia,  32 

Savannas  (of  Sudan),  8 

Scandinavians,  colonies  of,  496 ;  polar 
colonies  of,  508 

Scheidnagel,  358 

Schelde,  374 

Schmidt,  539,  550 

Schnaps,  589 

Schutzgebiete,  564,  570 

"  Sea-caravans,"  see  Fleet  system 

Secrecy,  356.  See  stib  Colonies,  admin- 
istration 

"Secret  Commerce,"  67,  iio,  441.  See 
Monopoly 

Selection,  artificial,  29;  natural,  5,  269. 
See  Counter-selection 

Self-government,  16 

Senegal,  29 

Sergipe,  454 

Serj'icio,  193 

Seville,  see  Monopoly 

Seymour,  26 

Shanghai,  593 


628 


COLONIZATION 


Shantung,  592 

Ships  and  sliipping,  see  sub  Colonies, 
Hiivigalioii,  communication 

Siam,  24,  347,  416 

Sicily,  32,  37,  44,  49 

Sidon,  30,  35,  63 

Silver  Fleet  (Spanish),  209,  239,  252,  413 

Singapore,  5S4 ;  Straits  of,  416.  See 
Malacca 

Situados,  3 1  5 

Slave-labor,  476 

Slavery,  for  debt,  1 1  ;  in  New  England, 
13;  substitutes  for,  11,  335,  486,  4S7, 
581.  See  "Compulsory  labor,'^  Coolie 
system.  Culture  system,  sub  Colonies, 
etc. 

Slave-trade,  10,  13,  30,  70,  127,  130,  147, 
157,  248,  332,  333,  421,  455,  485,  501. 
526,  563,  579.  See  Asientos,  sub  Col- 
onies, Companies 

Smith,  Adam,  226,  458 

Smuggling,  see  sub  Colotties,  Cotnpanies, 
contraband  traffic 

Societies,  colonial,  types  of,  3,  14 

"  Sociology,"  etymology  of,  48 

Sofala,  87,  127 

Solomon  Islanders,  545,  550,  580 

Somaliland,  31  ;  Italian,  523 

Souza,  136 

Spain,  28,  32,  54,  456,  518;  bankruptcy, 
194;  Church,  power  of,  197  ;  church- 
holidays,  199;  colonization,  condition- 
ing factors,  80;  conservatism  and 
consistency,  206;  contempt  for  in- 
dustry and  trade,  195;  Council  of  the 
Indies,  232,  298,  305 ;  decadence  and 
its  causes,  183,  185,  187,  189,  192,  195, 
197,  200,  240;  decline  of  population, 
188;  of  sea-power,  254  (see  Armada); 
economic  strength,  80,  81,  170,  181; 
foreigners,  treatment  of,  187  ;  govern- 
mental regulation,  i8g;  Indian  legisla- 
tion, see  Indians  ;  its  benevolence,  257, 
295;  inflow  of  bullion,  203;  influence  of 
colonial  career,  200  ;  Inquisition,  (j.v. ; 
isolation  policy,  346  (see  Monopoly) ; 
Jews,  ij.v.;  kings  of,  310,  356;  law- 
codes,  212  ;  mercantile  system  in,  202; 
military  spirit,  80;  Ministry  of  the 
Indies,  306;  Moriscos,  r/.?'. ;  reform 
attempted,  191 ;  relation  to  former  col- 
onies, vs.  that  of  Portugal,  241;  repu- 
tation, 243,  252;  sea-power  overrated, 
243;  taxation,  192  ;  trade,  liberal  policy 
toward,  241;  restriction  of,  206,  226, 
237,  318;  union  with  Portugal,  453.  See 
Casa  de  Contratacion,  sub  Colonies, 
Moorish  wars,  Spanish,  etc. 

Spanish,  69,  498,  525;  as  soldiers,  178; 
avoid  temperate  regions,  316;  char- 
acter,   313;  conquests,    177;   coloniza- 


tion and  discoveries,  contrasted  with 
Portuguese,  139,  172  ;  maladaptability, 
201,311,358.  '6t^  Iberians 
Spanish  America,  administration,  283, 
302;  its  secrecy,  305;  agriculture,  222; 
its  regulation,  224;  aristocracy,  arti- 
ficial, 313  ;  audieficia,  q.v.\  bureaucracy, 
312,  313;  cattle-raising,  224;  censor- 
ship, 300;  census,  269;  Church,  its 
dominance,  301;  its  establishments,  298; 
its  subjection  to  crown,  298;  its  toler- 
ance, 300;  classes,  discrimination  of, 
282,  312,  325,  336;  interrelation  of,  216, 
220;  mutual  antipathy  of,  313  (see  Cas- 
tas, Creoles,  Mestizo);  clergy,  259,  283, 
307;  its  numbers,  198;  its  organization, 
297;  its  policy  and  influence,  299;  its 
tact,  288;  its  tolerance,  300;  colonial 
policy  in,  anachronistic,  consistent, 
maladaptable,  426,  323,  311  ;  communi- 
cations, 245,  251,  278,  305,  318;  neglect 
of,  246;  conquests,  177  ;  Co7iquistadores, 
303;  contempt  for  labor,  313;  contra- 
band traffic,  236,  248,  282,  319  (see 
Asientos);  contrasts  between  northern 
and  southern  districts,  319;  counter- 
balancing of  officers,  308,  310;  Creoles, 
212,  217,  220,  325,  336;  Creoles  excluded 
from  political  power,  312;  dependence, 
220;    education,  301  ;    emigration    to, 

210,  213,  229,  319,  328,  340  ;  emigration 
assisted,    214;    emigration    restricted, 

211,  229,  233;  emigration  of  women 
discouraged,  213,  214;  encomiendas, 
264,  276,  586;  abolished,  279;  limited, 
273;  regulated,  278;  entails,  313;  exclu- 
sion policy,  206,  242,  305,  322 ;  ex- 
ploitation, 211,  225,  271,  273;  exporta- 
tion to,  227;  fairs,  232;  fiefs,  313; 
fleet  system,  q.i'.;  foreign  aggressions, 
251 ;  grievances  of  colonists,  325  ;  har- 
bors, 245 ;  inaccessibility,  245  ;  inde- 
pendence, movements  toward,  322 ; 
Indians,  q.v. ;  industrial  organization, 
221;  Inquisition,  q.v.;  isolation,  322; 
fruits  of,  320;  isolation  penetrated  by 
contraband  traffic,  323;  Jesuits,  q.'c'.; 
king  of  Spain,  relation  to,  298,  304; 
land-tax,  299;  limitation  of  term  of 
office,  273,  307;  manufactures,  224  ; 
tnestizo,  q.v.;  mines,  208,  221,  222,  261, 
262,  265,  266,  269,  281  (see  Mininif); 
miscegenation,  q.7'.  (see  Race-contact) ; 
missions,  261,  283,  287,  288,  290,  292  ; 
their  basis  industrial,  288;  their  char- 
acter, 288;  their  discij^line,  287;  their 
exclusion  of  luiropeans,  283;  their  in- 
dustry and  trade,  288  (see  Reductions); 
monopoly,  244;  its  infringement,  247; 
monopoly  policy,  278;  native  policy, 
257,    295    (see    Indians);    attacked   by 


INDEX 


629 


Las  Casas,  275  ;  vs.  Dutch  policy,  481 ; 
vs.  English  policy,  .  296  ;  population, 
245;  its  coherence,  215;  its  constit- 
uents, 215  (see  Ci'iisses);  its  distribution, 
223 ;  population,  dominance  of  native 
strain,  216;  population,  women,  213; 
professions,  225;  reductions,  292,  351  ; 
of  Jesuits  in  Paraguay,  291 ;  regulation, 
governmental,  212,  229,  310;  resideii- 
cia,  q.v.\  restrictions,  disintegration  of, 
240;  revenue,  207,  208,  314;  Revolu- 
tion, 325;  sale  of  offices,  310,  314  ;  self- 
government  not  learned,  311;  slave- 
raids,  260;  slavery,  261,  275  (see 
Indians);  slavery  of  negroes,  265,  2S0 
{se&i\'egroes)\  its  connection  with  sugar- 
production,  2S2  ;  societies,  type  of,  31 1 ; 
vs.  English,  276;  "old  societies  in  a 
new  country,"  314;  Spanish  influence, 
328;  taxation,  269,  271,  314;  taxation, 
the  royal  fifths,  209;  trade-restriction, 
226,  235  ;  its  disintegration,  240 ;  its 
results,  237  ;  viceroys  and  governors, 
306 ;  their  reports,  267  ;  their  terms 
abridged,  273,  307  ;  their  salaries,  308. 
See  Buenos  Ayres,  Mexico,  Alonopoly, 
Xew  Spain,  Perti 

Spanish-American  race,  295 

Spanish-American  War,  340 

"  Spanish  Fury,"  378 

"  Spanish  gratitude,"  342 

Speculation,  14,  460.  See  Companies, 
Monopoly,  etc. 

Sphere  of  Influence,  16 

Spices  and  spice-trade,  12,  18,  94,  99, 
III,  113,  176,  259,  342,  388,  402,  414, 
420,  421,  424,  485,  561.    See  Monopoly 

Spitzbergen.  386 

Stadhouder,  see  Maurits 

Staple  (port),  229,  440.  See  Lisbon, 
Seville 

States-General,  see  Companies,  Dutc/i, 
A^et  her  lands- India 

Stephens,  H.  M.,  83 

Strand-law,  93,  1 71,  375 

Sfreftge  mil  Gerechtigkeit,  578,  585 

Strength,  economic,  see  Colonization, 
^^preparation''''  for,  and  stcb  Spain, 
iVetkerlands,  etc. 

Stuyvesant,  451 

Subsidio,  194 

Sudan,  525 

Sudanese,  550,  580 

Suez,  isthmus,  69,  95  ;  project  to  pierce, 
69 

Sugar  and  sugar-production,  281,  335, 
340,  425,  475,  482,  490.  See  sub  Span- 
ish America,  slavery 

Sultan  (of  Turkey),  494.    See  Mamelukes 

Sulu,  see /old 

Sumatra,  494.    See  Atjeh 


Sumner,  W.  G.,  3,  62,  70 
Sunda,  Straits  of,  418 
Superunda,  267 
Surinam,  454 

Suspicion,   116,   244,   356.    See    sub    Col- 
onies, administration,  limitation  0/ term 
Swahili,  574 
Svvakopmund,  548 
Sweden,  251,  328,  375,  411,  506 
Sybaris,  45 
Syracuse,  42,  45 
Syria,  65 

Tarentum,  45 

Tartessus  (Tarshish),  46 

Tatars,  69 

Taxation,  see  siib  Colonies,  Companies 

Ternate,  see  Moluccas 

Teutonic  Knights,  533 

"  Thalassic  "  trade,  see  Trade 

"  The  Nineteen,"  412 

"The  Seventeen,"  417 

Thessalonica,  63 

Thormohlen,  500 

Thorstenberg,  497 

Thrace,  31,  50 

Thucydides,  41 

Tibet,  23 

Tidore,  416 

Tiende  penning,  380 

Tierra  Firme,  233,  242,  245 

Tier r as  de  ningun  provecho,  316 

Timor,  418,  439 

Tlaxcala,  268,  278 

Tobago,  253 

Togo,  543.  546,  555.  583 

Tonkm,  23,  525 

Tordesillas,  treaty  of,  90,  123,  159.  See 
Pope 

Towns,  in  colonies,  18 

Trade,  8 ;  civilizing  influences  of,  see 
Culture  dissemination;  profits  of  India 
trade,  113,  114;  "trade  and  the  flag," 
75'  569;  "trade  and  the  English,"  569; 
vs.  government,  see  Government  vs. 
Trade;  vs.  war,  see  War  vs.  Trade;  vs. 
religion,  "jt,;  "thalassic"  (or  mediter- 
ranean) and  oceanic,  69,  79,  88,  89,  93, 
165, 173  ;  trade  wars,  35,  45  (see  Venice). 
See  sub  Colonies,  Companies,  Monopoly, 
Spice-trade,  etc. 

Trade-areas,  complementary,  10,  60,  70, 

76,  79.  339 
Trade-routes,  before  Discoveries,  27,  28, 
31,  39,  44,  60,  69;  Portuguese,  95,  100. 
See  Cape-route,  sub  Colonies,  communica- 
tions, etc. 
Trading-Company,  see  Companies 
Trading-stations,   28,  32,  42,  61,  64,  75, 
105,  388,  416,  433,  443,  447.  498,  514. 
519,  537,  541,  544,  592.    See  Fondaco 


6;;o 


COLONIZATION 


Transvaal,  446 

Transylvania,  594 

Trapiclte,  2S2 

"Tributaries,"  ratio  to  persons,  267 

Tribute,  i^,  43 

Tripoli,  63,  522,  529 

Tropenkoller,  576 

Tropical  diseases  and  hygiene,  see  Accli- 
matization 

Tropical  labor,  10,  486,  580.  See  '■'^ Native 
question  " 

Tropical  production,  10,  2S1,  295;  limi- 
tation, specialization,  10,  12,510;  waste- 
fulness, II.  See  sub  Colonies,  "A'ative 
question,''''  etc. 

Tropics,  development  of,  495  (see  Accli- 
matization, Culture  system,  sub  Colonies, 
Eiivij-onmental  conditions,  ^^jVati^'e 
question^'  Plantation  cohniy.  Tropical 
production.  Race-contact,  etc.);  more 
attractive  than  temperate  regions,  see 
Trade-areas,  coinplementary 

Tsetse  fly,  547,  548 

Tunis,  63,  522;   Romans  in,  57 

Tupac  Amaru,  268 

Turkey,  594 

Turks,  Ottomans,  68,  loi,  104,  254.  See 
Matnelukes 

Tuskegee  Institute,  583 

Tyre,  30,  35,  63 

Ucciali,  treaty  of,  522 

Unie  of  Utrecht,  381,  388,  390 

Unification,  under  pressure,  36,  45  (see 

Integration) ;  religious,  80,  96,  168,  200, 

370 
Union  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  123,  343 
United  Netherlands,  396;  Republic  of, 3S3 
United  States  of  America,  2,  48,  296,  327, 

335'  364,  531.  538.  539.  551'  591 
United  States  of  Me.xico,  327 
Uruguay  (Randa  Oriental),  320 
Usselincx,  Willem,  410,  414 
Utica,  32,  T,}, 
Uti  possidetis,  389 
Utrecht,  371,  381;  peace  of,  249;  union 

of,  see  Unie 

Valckenier,  437 

Valladolid,  227 

Valuations,  94 

Van  Aerssen,  455 

Vandals,  i 

Van  den  Bosch,  474,  484,  494 

Van  der  Capellen,  472 

Van  Imhoff,  435 

Van  Overstraten,  439 

Van  Rees,  453 

Velasco,  266 


Vendetta,  582 

Venezuela,  178,  218,  309,  532 

Venice,  61,  67,  79,  80,  95,  366,  373,  520; 

reputation,  79 
"Venice  of  the  North,"  376 
Vera  Cruz,  213,  220,  226,  234,  236,  245 
/  'ereenigde  A'ederlanden,  389 
Vernon,  253 
I  'ice-comites,  65 
Vic  us,  64 
Vilayets,  2 
Villegagnon,  146 
Virginia,  450 
Virginius  episode,  340 
Visitadt>r-general,  -279 
Vivaldi,  74 

Wages,  in  colonies,  18.  See  sub  Colonies, 
native  policy,  Indians,  '^A'atiz'e  ques- 
tion,"  etc. 

Walfisch  Bay,  548 

IVali,  579 

Wappaus,  312 

War  and  trade,  inconsistency  of,  406, 
412.    See  Government  and  Trade 

W^ar  as  a  consolidating  factor,  see  Inte- 
gration, political,  LJnificatio)i,  religious 

War  of  the  Seven  Reductions,  294,  320 

Weber,  von,  536 

Welser,  212,  242,  532 

IVeltpostverein,  572 

West  and  East,  see  Trade-areas,  etc. 

\Vest  India  Company,  see  Companies 

West  Indies,  Danish,  see  Colonies,  Danish 

W^ilhelm  II,  545,  594,  595 

Windhoek,  566 

Wissmann,  von,  547,  578 

"  Wissmann  System,"  579 

Witbooi,  574 

Witzenhausen,  590 

Women,  in  colonies,  7,  14,  122,  213,  214, 
433,  436.  See  sill)  Colo7iies,  emigration 
to,  exclusion,  etc. 

Worcester,  358 

World-market,  89,  495.    See  Trade 

Xavier,  122 
Ximenes,  275 

Yucatan,  213 
Yucatecs,  in  Cuba,  334 

Zamora,  227 

Zamorin,  82,  416 

Zanzibar,  127,  569 

Zaragoza,  convention  of,  123 

Zealand,  371.  373,  381,  388,  390,  397,454 

Ztvwwrt-system,  118 

Zollausland,  564 


MAPS 

Note.  The  following  set  of  specially  prepared  maps  is  designed 
to  cover  all  portions  of  the  text.  No  references  to  the  maps  occur 
in  the  footnotes,  but  it  is  supposed  that  the  teacher,  upon  whom 
the  vital  importance  of  the  constant  use  of  charts  must  have  been 
impressed  by  experience,  will  desire  to  make  consistent  use  of  these 
aids  to  study.  The  arrangement  of  the  maps  follows  roughly  the 
main  divisions  of  the  text ;  however,  to  secure  compactness,  the 
conditions  of  different  historical  epochs  are  sometimes  indicated 
upon  the  same  sheet. 


63  T 


LIST   OF   MAPS 

I.  Mediterranean  Colonization 

II.  Colonies  in  the  Far. East 

III.  Spain,  Portugal,  and  The  Netherlands 

IV,  Colonial  Possessions,  Sixteenth  to  Nineteenth  Century 
V.  Mexico  and  the  Antilles 

VI.  African  Colonies,   1908 


632 


.^a^_____ 


X    I)     I     -I     ^         ^     ^    -?^'"^     ^ 


r.onpitude       East     130 


\  ■' 


:-.o.p,. 


COLONIAL  POSSESSIONS 

SIXTEENTH  TO  NINETEENTH  CENTURY 

Early  Spanish  Territories      I 1         Early  Portuguese  Territories 

Spanish  Trade  Routes Portuguese  Trade  Routes 

Arab  Routes Winds  of  the  Northern  Summer •— » 

0  500 1000 2000 

.•;    o  Scale  of  Miles  of  Central  Section 


ngitude  20     East    from     40    Greenwich        60 


fO 


100 


120 


Lambert's  Azimuthal  Projection 


MED 


30      ^  Longitude 
'I'ort  Elizabeth 


(/^■^^' 


■■-._i>^-^ 


Date 

5  Due 

UC  SOUTHE 

Mi^zcr- 

AA   C 

''N  i^'-^  W 

MH  2 

3  15-- 

.IAN  2  2 

9r:^ 

FEB  1  i 

1968 

-EEfi_6_ 

1968  3 

FEB  '^i 

\m     J 

MAR 

1  8  1976  " 

0£C 

EC  1  3  198; 

1 

1     Iflftn 

i   f483 

>  U,yAA/V 


Library  Bureau  Cat.  No.   1137 


1^-AX 


3  1210  00436  3675 


